1997 Ganeri Libre

8/10/2019 1997 Ganeri Libre

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STERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTENPHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE

DENKSCHRIFTEN, 281. BAND

Dharmakirti s Thought and Its Impact

on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy

Proceedings of theThird International Dharmakirt i Conference

Hiroshima, November 4-6 1997

Edited by

Shoryu Katsura

V E R L A G D E R STERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN

W IEN 1999


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ON

ON


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DHARMAKIRTTS SEMANTICS FOR THE PARTICLE EVA*

by

Jonardon Ganeri, Nottingham

Dharm akirti advances the theory that the meaning of the particle eva is vyavaccheda 'exclu-sion'. Dep ending on the position of eva in the sentence, the exclusion is of one of three kinds:anyayogavyavaccheda 'exclusion from connection with som ething else', ayogavyavaccheda 'ex-clusion from non-connection', and atyant yogavyavaccheda 'exclusion from perm anent non-connection'. Dharmakirti follows Dinn ga in using this particle as a means to introduce quanti-

fication into the clauses of the trairupya formula defining a goo d inferential sign. Kajiyam a[1966: 57; 1973] records how later Buddhist logicians applied the theory of vyavaccheda to theanalysis of negative statemen ts, to the explanation of apoJta, and to the form of statements ab outcausal relations. M y aim in this paper is to formulate D harm akirti's account of the truth-condi-tions of sentences containing eva.

1. Dharm akirti s account of the mean ing of eva as vy v cched exclusion1.1. Statement of the theory

Dharmakirti states his theory in a number of places. At P V IV 38, he remarks:

dvividho hi vyavacchedo viyog parayogayoh/vyavacched d...//There are two kinds of exclusion {vyavaccheda), [exclusion] from non-connection iyiyoga) and

[exclusion] rom connection to something else {aparayoga) '

It is at PV IV 190-192 that he offers the fullest descrip tion:

ayogam yogam aparair atyant yogam eva ca /

vyavacchinatti dharmasya nip to vyatirecakah//190//visesanavisesy bhy m kriyay ca sahoditah/vivaks to prayoge pitasy rtho yam pratiyate //\9\//vyavacchedaplwlam v kyarn yatas caitro dhanurdharah /p rtho dhanurdharo nilam sarojam iti v yath //192//

The restrictive particle eva excludes the non-connection, the connection with something else, orthe permanent non-connection of the predicate-property, when attached to the predicate term, thesubject term or the verb [respectively]. Even when not actually used, eva s role is understood fromthe speaker's intention, for [any] sentence has exclusion as its result. Examples [of the three cases]are: 'Caitra is an archer', 'P rtha is an archer', and 'A lotus is blue'.

I am grateful to Shoryu Katsura, Tom Tillemans and Brendan Gillon, for comments on an earlier version ofthis paper.


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102 J. Ganeri

The contribution of eva to the meaning of a sentence lies in the restriction1 it places on therelation between subject and predicate. More specifically, it is a consequence of Dharm aklrti'sany poha theory of meaning that the meaning of any sentence is an exclusion. So the effect ofthe insertion of eva is to make explicit which of several sorts of exclusion is exemplified by thesentence. The specific contribution of eva depends on its position in the sentence, whether itattaches to the subject, verb/copula, or (non-verbal) predicate. Dharmaklrti's examples of thethree cases expand as follows:

la. P rtha eva dlianurdharah P rtha alone is an archer. anyayogavyavacchedab. Caitro dhanurdhara eva Caitra is an archer indeed. ayogavyavacchedac. nflam sarojam bhavaty eva A lotus is surely blue. atyant yogavyavaccheda

The meaning he assigns to each of these sentences is:

2a. Being-an-archer is excluded from connection with anyone other than P rtha.b. Being-an-archer is excluded from non-connection with Caitra.c. Being-blue is excluded from permanent non-connection with a lotus.

A number of authors have drawn attention to the fact that, given these semantic assignments,the particle eva is being treated as a quantifier.2 We may note, however, that eva does not behavelike the standard (Aristotelian) determiners, 'all', 'some', 'no ' and 'not all'. For, first, eva can beinserted into sentences with singular subjects: P rtlw eva dlianurdharah is well-formed, but we

cannot say all P

rtha is an archer or no P

rtha is an archer. In this respect, the role of evaresembles the cross-categorical behaviour of expressions like 'only' and 'even' in English. Sec-ond, as we shall see in more detail below, the contribution eva makes to the truth-conditions issensitive to the sentential context in which it is inserted. Indeed, from the standpoint of moderntheory about generalized quantifiers (e.g. Barwise and Cooper [1981], Westerstahl [1988]), thecontext neutrality of the Aristotelian quantifiers, their failure to distinguish between focus andscope, places them in a rather special category. Attempts to translate sentences involving evadirectly into sentences involving the standard quantifiers of a first-order language tend to be

insensitive to such questions.Dharmaklrti's theory employs two important philosophical distinctions, both taken from the

Indian logical and grammatical literature. First, he appeals to the distinction between ayoga-vyavaccheda and anyayoga-vyavaccheda, a distinction itself based on a widely accepted distinc-tion between two types of negationnamely, prasajyapratisedha 'verbally bound' andparyud sa'nominally bound'. Second, he takes eva to be what the grammarians call a manifester dyotaka)of the sentence meaning, rather than as a 'designator' (y caka), something which makes anindependent semantic contribution to the sentence meaning. Attention to these two distinctions

1 As Katsura [1986: 8-9] notes, the grammarians were the first to link the meaning of eva w ith the notion of'restriction' (avadh ratia). See P nini-s tra 8.1.62, and Vy di's meta-rule: yata evak ras tato anyatr vadh raiiamwhen the restrictive particle eva occurs with reference to one linguistic item, the other is subject to restriction.

Later analyses concern, in effect, the proper expansion of the notion of restriction. Notice too that (2b) below is notto be read as asserting that Caitra is restricted to being an archer (and to having no other properties) but as saying thatbeing an archer is restricted to Caitra (and to no other person). See Manorathanandin's comment on PV IV 193.

2 For references, see Gillon and Hayes [1982: 194, n. 1] and below 5.


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Dharmakirti's Semantics for the Particle eva 103

will lead us to a reconstruction of Dharm akirti's theory. I am not here go ing to be concerned withthe distinction between exclusion of mere non-connection {ayogavyavaccheda) and of perma-nent non-connection {atyant yogavyavaccheda), which I do not think concerns the logical formof eva sentences.3

1.2. eva as designator v caka) or man ifester dyotaka)Dharmakirti is explicit about the role of eva: its role is to disambiguate the sentence by

specifying the nature of the connec tion between subject and predicate . In this, he follows thegrammarians, who treat most particles as dyotakas, 'illuminators' or 'manifestos' of meaning,and not as words which have an independen t meaning of their own. Thus Bhartrhari:

nip t dyotak h kecit prthagarth bhidh yinah Igam iva ke pi syuh sambh y rthasya v cak h II (VPII192)Some nip tas (particles) manifest a meaning, some are expressive of a separate meaning, some,

like augments ( gam h), express a meaning together with other elements. (Iyer's translation)

Mano rathanandin, com men ting on P V IV 190, asserts explicitly that Dharm akirti sides withthe gramm arians:

nanu nip to na svayam v cakah, kin tu dyotakah / tad asya katham ay am arthaprabhedah ityaha dyotakatv d eva nip to visesanena sahodito [ Jyogasya vyavacchedakah, visesyena sahok nyayogasya, krivay ca sahokto tyant yogeti visesan dipadav cya ev yogavyavacched dis tasahoktanip tadyotya ity arthah /Now, a particle is not itself a designator {v caka), but is a manifestor (dyotaka). How [then] can

it have this [three-fold] division of meaning? A particle, precisely on account of being a manifestor,excludes [non-]connection when attached to the predicate term, connection with another whenattached to the subject term, and permanent non-connection when attached to the verb. Therefore,what is designated by the predicate-term etc., namely exclusion of non-connection and so on, isjust what is made manifest by the particle attached to it. This is the meaning.

W hat is at issue here is as follows. According to those wh o say that eva is a manifestor, thebare sentence without eva (viz. S is P ) is ambiguous, and the effect of the insertion of eva is toreveal or make manifest which m eaning is the intended one. The particle eva functions in a way

3 The contrast between atyant yoga 'permanent non-connection' and ayoga '(mere) non-connection' seems tome to be that of non-connection at any time (t) ~ (Fx at t) vs. tenseless non-connection ~- Fx. The state of affairsdescribed as atyant yogavyavaccheda is one in which the subject and predicate are connected at some time or other,though not necessarily the present time. In other words, the subject and predicate can be connected, where 'can'

expresses a temporal and not a metaphysical modality. The state of affairs described as ayogavyavaccheda is one inwhich the subject and predicate are connected, in some tenseless sense. The distinction is therefore an instantiationof a well-known feature of the copula: that it has both a tenseless and a tensed reading. The tenseless reading isillustrated by such sentences as birds fly, and by extension, the tiger is an animal. In such cases, we take theextension of the subject and predicate to be the class of all their instances. Whether or not their extensions areconnected is then a matter independent of time. If we were to take their extensions to be the class of their instancesat a specific time, we must allow that they might be connected at some times but not others. I therefore disagree withthe view that the distinction between ayogavyavaccheda and atyant yogavyavaccheda is one of logical form (cf.Gillon and Love [1980], Gillon and Hayes [1982], Kajiyama [1973]). One may also note that in the first passagequoted from Pram nav rttika, Dharmakirti distinguishes only ayoga- and anyayoga- as the types of vyavaccheda.


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104 J. Ganeri

something analogous to parenthesis or the comma, which are also devices of disambiguation.According to those who say that ev is a designator, a bare sentence without ev has a certainassertoric content, and the effect of the insertion of ev is to add something additional to thecontent. This additional content is what eva designates. Dharmaklrti belongs to the formercamp. He regards the content of a simple sentence as being just exclusion. However, there arethree different possibilities for what a sentence excludes (ayoga, atyant yoga and anyayoga).The effect of inserting ev into a sentence is to make manifest which class of states of affair thesentence is intended to exclude.

The claim that ev is a designator is based on the thought that the sentence P rtha alone isan archer does not merely assert that nobody other than P rtha is an archer: it asserts too thatP rtha is an archer. The clauses expressing exclusion are then to be read as giving the contribu-

tion of ev to the total sentence meaning. Let us call this the 'cumulative' account of the role ofeva. On this account, a sentence S is P has a base meaning, that S is P. Inserting ev into thesentence adds an extra sense to the base meanings: S ev P means that S is P and nothing otherthan S is P. This interpretation of the role of ev is given explicitly by the Naiy yikas, who arguethat certain particles, ev included, are indeed designating expressions, which make an indepen-dent contribution to the truth-conditions of sentences in which they are embedded. The Ny yaposition is conveniently summarised in the Ny yakosa (sv. eva ):4

v stut s tu ny yog vy v cched eva-k r rthah / vy v cched s c tyant bh vah anyonc /prthivy m ev g ndh h ity dau prthivy m g ndh h prthivy ny smin gandh bh va s bodhah/ sankhahp ndura ev ity dau sankha-t d tniyav np ndurahp ndur nyasmin sany bh vas c iti bodhah /p rtha ev dh nurdh r h ity dau p rtha-t d tyinav n dh nurp rth nyasmin dh nurdh r tv vy v cched s ca pr tiy te iti/In actual fact, the meaning of ev is [always] exclusion from connection with another. An exclu-

sion is a constant absence or a mutual absence. In a case like 'in earth alone is there smell', themeaning is that there is smell in earth and absence of smell in what is other-than-earth. In a caselike 'a conch-shell is white indeed', the meaning is that that which is identical to a conch-shell is

white and that there is mutual absence from a conch-shell in what is other-than-white. In a caselike 'P rtha alone is an archer , it is understood that that which is identical to P rtha is an archer andthat there is exclusion from being an archer in what is other-than-P rtha.

1 3 The distinction between ayoga vyavaccheda and anyayoga vyavacchedaDharmakirti formulates his theory with a pair of terms which have had a wider currency, and

have acquired a conventional significance, within the philosophical tradition. This is their use toexpress the distinction between proof (svapaksas dhana) and refutation (parapaksadwand). The

terms are used to express the distinction between demonstrating the truth of one's own positionand refuting that of one 's opponents. For example, Hemacandra entitled a pair of works on theJaina system Ayogavyavaccheda dv trimsik nd Anyayogavyavaccheda-dv trimsik . Dhruvacomments that the former [is] a defence of the Jaina system, and the latter an attack on othersystems... . yog vy v cched lit. exclusion of non-possession, i.e. demonstration that truth

4 The Nyaya view is also discussed by P. Chakravarti [1933: 175-177].


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does not fail to belong to the Jaina system, that it certainly belongs to it: the constructive orpositive part of Hemacandra's work. Anyayogavyavaccheda lit. exclusion of the position thattruth might belong to other rival systems, i.e. the destructive or negative part of the undertaking[1933: 8 (notes)]. Dhruva offers another example where the pair of terms are used with this sensein S yana's commentary on Aitareya Br hmana, and he asserts that the terms are of commonoccurrence in these senses (p. 8).

Clearly, a great deal of further examples would be needed properly to establish the truth ofthis claim. However, the same conclusion as to the import of the terms can be reached on purelylogical grounds. There is a clear connection between the terms and a very well-attested distinc-tion between two kinds of negation, prasajyapratisedha snA paryud sa. For ayoga is a prasajya-pratisedha negation, while anyayoga is diparyudasa negation (cf. Kajiyama [1973], especially

the discussion therein of Bh

vaviveka). Ayogavyavaccheda and anyayogavyavaccheda excluderespectively the following two states of affair (Gillon and Hayes [1982: 199-200]):

dhanno dharmin na yunakti the predicate-property does not connect with the subject.dharmo a dharmin yunakti the predicate-property connects with non-subjects.

The negative particle a- (or nan) occurs here respectively in its two recognised roles, asverbally bound {prasajyapratisedha) and as nominally bound paryud sa). This distinction isexpressed in the well-known verse exclusion paryud sa ) is to be understood where the nega-tive [is connected] with the next word; prohibition pratisedha) is to be understood where thenegative [is connected] with the verb(al) ending (cited in Staal [1988: 116]). Staal argues that,when verbally bound the negative particle is the sentential negation ~F(x) (i.e. it is not the casethat x is F), and, when nominally bound, it is a negative subject-term-forming operator, F(~x)(i.e. it is the case that a thing-other-than-x is F).5 If that is right, then ayogavyavaccheda is theexclusion of its not being the case that x is connected with F, while anyayogavyavaccheda is theexclusion of its being the case that things other than x are connected with F. The first of these isequivalent to the positive assertion that x is connected with F, while the second makes no positiveassertion about x's connection with F, but rejects a connection between things other than x and F.Thus, there is a strong link between the two sorts of negation and the two kinds of exclusion; it isless clear which of the two distinctions is logically prior.6

These considerations suggest that ayogavyavaccheda has a broadly affirmative force, linkedwith the assertion that the subject and predicate are connected, without making any claim aboutthe relation between the predicate and things other than the subject. Anyayogavyavaccheda, onthe other hand is linked with the denial that the predicate is connected with things other than the

5 It is logically possible for the negative particle to have a third role, as a negative predicate-term-formingoperator (~F)(x) (x is non-F). Staal observes that the Mfm msakas distinguish this as a second sort of paryud sanegation. The Naiyayikas also recognise the existence of this sort of negation, and indeed use it in their analysis ofeva. When eva follows the predicate, the state of affairs excluded is that:

a dharmo dharmin yunakti the predicate's negation connects with the subject.Anyayogavyavaccheda here refers to the exclusion of S's being connected with what is other than P. See 3.2.

6 Kajiyama [1973: 62] interestingly suggests that Bh vaviveka believes that eva should be used to explain thedistinction between the two kinds of negation.


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106 J. Ganeri

subject. It makes no explicit assertoric claim about the relation between subject and predicate. Iwill now apply the considerations of this section to Dharmakirti's account of the semantics ofeva.

2. The role of eva restricting the subject term: anyayogavyavaccheda2.1. Dharmakirti s account

Dharmakirti's example of a sentence in which eva restricts the subject term (visesya)1 is:

la. P rtha eva dhanurdharahb. P rtha alone is an archer.

Dharmaklrti asserts that the content of this sentence is the exclusion vyavaccheda) of con-nection yoga) between the predicate-property dharma) and what is other than {anya) the sub-

ject {dharmin). According to this analysis, sentence lb is to be paraphrased by nothing otherthan P rtha is an archer. The particle eva here behaves as the generalized quantifier nothingother tha n. .. i s . . . A point familiar from the recent literature on the term 'only' or 'alone' is thatsuch a quantifier will in general be subject to contextual restrictions on its scope. If one states ata dinner party that only Susan smokes, one asserts, not that no thing other than Susan smokes,nor even that no person other than Susan smokes, but rather that no person at the party other thanSusan smokes. The contextual restriction on the quantifier to some salient class of objects hasindeed been noted in connection with Dharmakirti's example la . Kajiyama remarks that the

speaker's intention is not that P rtha is one of the archers, but that he is the only excellent archer(among the five brothers of the P ndava), the word 'archer' metaphorically expressing 'the bestarcher' (p. 163). The sentence thus asserts that no [brother of the P ndava] other than P rtha isan [excellent] archer. It is not to be read as asserting that P rtha is the unique archer in the entireworld.

It is clear that in the anyayogavyavaccheda analysis, the contextual restriction enters via thedetermination of the extension of the phrase S-anya\ What counts as being 'other-than-S'depends on the linguistic context. For example, the term 'other-than-blue' (anila) has as its

extension colours (or coloured things) other than blue, but not anything at all which is not blue.The point is that the term-forming paryud sa negation a generates a contrary but not a contra-dictory term. Consider Jinendrabuddhi's example as discussed by Staal [1988: 116-7]: a kartarias it occurs in P nini s tra 3.3.19, akartari ca k rake samjn y m. Staal reports Jinendrabuddhi'sargument thus: if this negation is interpreted as paryud sa the meaning would be '(the suffix isapplied) to case relationships different from the nominative' . . . [but this] interpretation shouldbe rejected, for the nominative is a case relationship and the word k rake 'case relationship'would hence be superfluous, which conflicts with a well-known economy criterion. Thus, if thenegation in a kartari is paryud sa , it would have as its extension case relationships other than

71 agree with Gillon and Hayes [1982: 97] that the terms visesya and visesaiw refer here to syntactic catego-ries, while dharma and dharmin refer to semantic types. In la the visesya is the name P rtha, while the dharminis the person P rtha. Here the dJmrmin is the referent of the visesya. However, the pairs need not correspond in thisway: it is possible for the dharmin to be that which is designated by the visesana. For example, Dharmaklrti definesa s dhya as the dharma qualified by the dJmrmin. See, for example, Tillemans [1992:455].


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the nom inative, and not merely anything other than the nominative.We can represent Dharmakirti's analysis of the content of sentences having eva restricting

the subject-term in a convenient Venn diagram (adapted from Lycan [1991: 135]).Here G is the contextually indicated

Figure 1: S eva P [S]-anya-yoga-[?]-vyavaccheda reference class, S is the subject class,Q ^ ^ ^ ^ - - ^ p is the predicate class, and M is the class

P n (G \ S). According to DharmaMrti,the content of S eva P is [S-anya]-yoga-[P]-vyavaccheda: exclusion of Pfrom connection with what is other thanS. The extension of S-anya is the classG \ S, and P is excluded from connec-

G = the contextually determined reference class for S and S- t l o n W l t h G ^ S J u s t m c a s e P ^ (G \ S) =anyar S + = S n P, the class of S which are also P. S - = S \ P, M is empty. Th us M = 0 . In the l imit-the class of S which are not P. M = (G \ S) n P, the class of S- , ^ . .u . , ,any a which are P. mg case when G is the universal domain,

this is equivalent to asserting that P c S .The major point of controversy surrounding this analysis is whether the sentence S eva P

asserts more than that no G other than S is P. In particular does it in addition carry either anexistential import that some S are P (S+ occupied), or a universal implication that all S are P ( S -empty)? For example, does partita eva dlmnurdharah assert merely that no brother of the P ndavaother than P rtha is an archer, or does it also assert that P rtha is indeed an archer? Clearly, thatis the implication of the statement, but what is implied need not be identical with what is explic-itly stated. Manorathanandin interestingly remarks that Dharmakirti's view is that the statementS eva P is made when it is well-known prasiddha) that S is P, but there is a doubt about

whether things other than S are P as well.8 This suggests that the fact that S is P is a presupposi-tion for asserting S eva P. I am using the term 'presupposition' here in its technical sense. Astatement presupposes a state of affairs iff the statement only has a truth-value if the state ofaffairs obtains. Given that the presupposition is a precondition for the statement to assert any-thing, it is generally held that that statement does not literally assert that the presuppositionobtains. However, that the presupposition obtains will usually be conversationally implicated bythe statement. In this way, one might deny that S is P is literally stated by S eva P, although itis presupposed and implicated. This is rather like the sentence No non-members will be admit-ted, which, although it does not state that members will be admitted, clearly implicates that thisis so.

If we are to assess the correctness of Dharmakirti's analysis, we must therefore ask two

8 PVV 402: p rthe dlwnurdJtaratoam prasiddlmm eva /kin tu t drs m anyasy pi kirn astiti sandehe nyayogavyavacchedaplwlam visesanam. Tillemans [1992:453 (n. 61)] sates that the usual intention in uttering the sentencecaitro dhanurdhamh is simply to assert that Caitra is not a non-archer: there can be other archers too. Thus: Caitrais an archer. On the other hand a speaker will utter p rtho dlmnurdharah in order to convey that P rtha is the onlyexcellent archer among the brothers of the P ndava. Then we would have to translate: It is P rtha [alone] who is thearcher.


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108 J. Ganeri

questions: (i) Does S eva P entail that there is some S which is P; and (ii) does S eva P entailthat all S are P? There is no general agreement on this issue: indeed, it is the primary focus of thedisagreement between Kajiyama [1973] and Gillon and Hayes [1982]. Kajiyama argues that Seva P does indeed entail that all S are P. He states that when eva is stated with the qualificand,it negates the connection of the qualifier and that which is other than the qualificand, i.e. we havea universal proposition in which the class of qualificand and of qualifier are equal in extension(p. 163). In other words, S eva P asserts that nothing other than S is P and that all S are P. Thati s/ 'S e w P i s tr ue if fM = 0 & S - = 0 .

Gillon and Hayes take issue with Kajiyama's claim, arguing that Kajiyama is misled by thefact that la has as its subject a proper name. Since S has just one member, we can deduce fromthe fact that S+ is occupied that S - is empty. That deduction is invalid when the subject is a

general term. In particular, they point out that the statement manuso [eva] dhanurdharah is truenot only in the special case where the class of human beings is equal in extension with the classof archers; it is also true in case the class of human beings is greater in extension than the class ofarchers (p. 201). Eva is more akin to 'only' than to 'just' or 'exactly'. Note, further, that Gillonand Hayes do not give S eva P an existential implication in their final statement that S eva Passerts that P c S .

2.2. The Ny ya accountI believe that both Kajiyama and Gillon and Hayes have been influenced by the Ny ya ac-

count of the semantics of such sentences, for in that account, there are indeed implications of thesort they describe. Consider a sentence analysed in the Ny yakosa:

2a. prthivy m eva gandhahb. In earth alone (there is) smell.

The Ny ya paraphrase of 2a is that smell is in earth and in nothing other than earth.9 Thesecond conjunct is the contribution of eva, while the first is the positive assertoric content of thebare sentence. The positive assertoric content of this sentence seems to be existential (cf. 3.2):

smell occurs in at least some samples of earth. So S+ is occupied and S - is unspecified. TheNy ya analysis agrees with that of Gillon and Hayes in such cases. If, however, one held that thepositive assertoric content is universal (in which case S - would be empty), the Ny ya analysis

would agree with Kajiyama's.Figure 2: The meaning of S eva P ^T *u ^

& fc We may summarise the views on of-fer in Figure 2:

The issue which divides Dhannakfrti

and the Naiy yikas is the positive existen-tial force of sentences containing eva: doesthe sentence state that some/all S are P or

( 0 stands for empty, + for occupied and U for not specified) presuppose it? It is mo st interesting to note

Dharmakirti

Ny ya

Kajiyama

Gillon-Hayes

M

0

0

0

0

S+

0

+

?

?

s

u

u

0

u

9 It is interesting to compare this analysis with a remark by Locke Essay III, VII Particles ) on the Englishparticle but I saw BUT two Planets: Here it shews, that the Mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with anegation of all other.


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that exactly the same issue is the major source of dispute about the semantics of the Englishquantifier 'only'. Horn [1989: 248] notes that the essential issue is: is only a negative in mean-ing and positive only by presupposition or implicature, or does it abbreviate a conjunction only

= 'a a n d nothing {other/more} than a ') ? Horn observes that this same issue was even dis-cussed by the medievals Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood.

3. The role of ev attached to the predicate term3.1. Dharmakirti s account

Dharmakirti's example of a sentence in which eva is attached to the predicate term visesana)is:

3a. Caitro dhanurdhara evab. Caitra is an archer indeed.

He asserts that the content of this sentence is the exclusion vyavaccheda) of non-connectionayoga) between the predicate-property dharma) and the subject (dharmin). According to this

analysis, sentence 3b is paraphrased by it is not the case that Caitra is not an archer. Since thenegative in ayoga is a sentential prasajyapratisedha) rather than a term (paryud sa) negation,there is no contextual indication of a reference class here. Again, we can depict the analysis in aVenn diagram:

According to Dharmakirti, the content

Figure 3: S P eva [S]-ayoga-[P]-vyavaccheda o f t h e s e n t e n c e S P eva i s [ ^ ^ - [ P ] -vyavaccheda, P 's exclusion from non-con-nection with S. This certainly implies atleast that S+ is occupied (some S is P). Doesit imply further that S - is empty (i.e. thatall S are P)? Once again, the example has aproper name as its subject term, and al-though in that special case we can deduce

S + = S n P, the class of S which are also P. S - = S \ P, the that S - is empty if S+ is occupied, this de-class of S which are not P. d u c o n ^ ^ yaM w h e n ^ u b j e c t t e r mis general.

Both Kajiyama and Gillon and Hayes offer arguments that S P eva entails that all S are P,i.e. that S-is empty. Kajiyama says of ayogavyavaccheda:

it negates the non-connection of the qualifier and the qualificand. That is to say, it affirms theconnection between the two, and indicates that the qualifier is an attribute of the qualificand. Thus,we obtain a universal proposition in which the class of the qualifier is greater in extension than theclass of the qualificand. The proposition does not mean that there is no archer other than Caitra,but that Caitra is one of the members of the class of archer (p. 163).

There is indeed an emphasis here on the affirmative quality of ayogavyavaccheda, which wehave stressed above, but there is also a non sequitur why should affirming a connection betweenqualifier and qualificand imply a universal proposition rather than an existential one? It is consis-tent with the facts to assume that Dharmakirti's analysis leaves the occupancy of S - unspecified.

Gillon and Hayes have a different argument that S - is empty. They say that the state of


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110 J. Ganeri

affairs excluded here is that expressed by retaining their labelling):

S 1.2 na dharmo dharmini] vartateE1.2 [The property-possessor] does not have the property.

This, they claim, can be expressed formally as 3x) Sx -i Px), some S-possessor is a non-P-possessor. The possibility excluded in ayogavyavaccheda, according to Gillon and Hayes, isprecisely that S- is occupied.

This seems wrong on two accounts. First the statement S 1.2 is not well paraphrased as 3x)Sx -n Px). We have seen that the negation in S 1.2 is a sentential negation not a term-negation.So a better paraphrase would be either (3x)( Sx & Px) or else (V)( Sx > Px)the quantityof dharminr is not specified. The second reading is indeed logically equivalent to that of

Gillon and Hayes, but the construction is at best ambiguous between the two. If the first readingis taken, the possibility excluded is that S+ is empty. Second, the Gillon-and-Hayes reading givesthe sentence S P eva no existential implication, for it will not in general follow that S+ isoccupied from the fact that S- is empty (proper name subject terms being a special case, as wehave seen). Yet we have already seen that ayogavyavaccheda should be construed as having agenerally positive sense.

I believe that Dharmaklrti's own example has proved misleading. When the subject term isa proper name, the occupancy of S+ entails the vacancy of S-. So his example P riho dhanurdhara

eva does not discriminate between the two analyses. Let us consider another example fromDharmakirti: sabdah anityah sound is impermanent. This is the thesis in a standard proof (seePV IV 37-38 ; Tillemans [1992: 454]). An opponent objects that this statement implies thatimpermanence occurs only in sound, and hence cannot occur in the inferential example (sapaksa).To this, Dharmakirti replies that the opponent mistakes the type of vyavaccheda implicitly in-volved: he takes it to be anyayogavyavaccheda while in fact it is ayogavyavaccheda. What isexcluded is the non-connection of impermanence with sound, and not the connection of imper-manence with things other than sound.

But now we have another possible motivation for the Gillon & Hayes reading of S P evaFor sabdah anityah eva surely states that impermanence is connected with all sounds, and notjust some sounds. Again, however, we must note that the subject term here is again singular notgeneral. In this sentence, as in many other similar cases, we have a mass noun, denoting theentirety of a certain sort of stuff. For example, the sentence gold is a metal is grammaticallysingular: I am speaking of the entire mass of gold stuff and only derivatively of each bit of gold.So, just as in the previous case, the reason why sound is impermanent [indeed] entails that allsounds are impermanent is that the subject term is singular. It is not because eva as attached to

the predicate is a universal quantifier.Dharmaklrti's view, then, is that what S P eva literally states is just that S and P are con-

nected. As Manorathanandin observes, a statement in this form is made when there is a doubt asto whether S is P.10 It removes the doubt by denying that they are not connected, which is

P W 402: caitre dlwnurdlwratvasandeh d visesanen yogama tram vyavacchidyate.


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equivalent to asserting that they are connected. This 'connection' between S and P entails that allS are P only when 'S ' is singular.

Thus far we have three hypotheses concerning the correct analysis of S P eva :

Figure 4: The meaning of S P eva

Dharmaklrti

Kajiyama

Gillon-Hayes

S-

u0

0

s

+

+

u

3.2. The Ny ya accountWhere are the Nyya situated? In fact, the Nyya analysis of such constructions is quite

different. The contribution to content of eva in S P eva is said to be an anyayogavyavaccheda,not ayogavyavaccheda. Specifically, it is [P]-anyayoga-[S]-vyavaccheda, S's exclusion fromconnection with what is other than P (note the reversal of S and P here, as compared with theanalysis of S eva P ). Now, the phrase P-anya again introduces a contextually determinedreference class. So the Venn diagram for the Nyya analysis will be:

Figure 5: S P eva as [P]-anyayoga-[S]-vyavaccheda

G = the contextually determined reference class for P andP-anya P+ = P n S , the class of P which are also S. P - =

P \ S, the class of P which are not S. M = (G \ P) n S , theclass of P-anya which are S.

Once again, the contribution m ade by eva is that M = 0 . What does the Nyya consider tobe positive assertoric content of S P eva ? Consider another example analysed in the Ny ya-kosa:

4a. sankah p ndura eva

b. a conch is white indeed.According to the Nyya analysis, what 4a states is that which is identical to a conch is white

and that mutual absence of conch is in that which is other than white. The first conjunct, whichdescribes the positive assertoric content of the bare sentence, appears to state that PA S is empty(all S are P), while the second conjunct, which is the contribution made by eva, states that M isempty.


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112 J. Ganeri

The curious feature of this analysis is that the insertion of ev adds nothing to the assertoriccontent, since M c S . Indeed, if is the class of coloured objects, and if there are no colourlessconches, S = M and the two clauses are equivalent. This suggests that the actual assertoriccontent of the sentence might be weaker than 'all S are P \ Suppose we are discussing whetherfruits of different sorts are sweet or bitter, and I say:

4c. mr p l m m dhur m evd. a mango is sweet indeed.

This does not imply that all mangoes are sweet: there can be tasteless ones. The implicationis that any mango which has a taste is sweet. This is an example where M is empty but not S. Theassertoric content is rather that P+ is occupied: there are sweet mangoes. In general, it seemsplausible to conjecture that the assertoric content of a bare sentence S is P, with a subject termin the singular and non-verbal predicate in apposition, is existential rather than universal. Com-pare this with the analysis of indefinite or bare plural subjects in English. A widespread view isthat the content of An S is P is existential, even if there are cases where what is conveyedpragmatically is universal (e.g. a cat meows ). Likewise, it is sometimes maintained that Menare mortal literally states just that some men are mortal, even if there is an implicature that allmen are mortal.

4 A comparison of th accounts

Let us restrict our attention to the limiting case where G is the universal domain. Thesituation in this limiting case is as in Figure 6 (S AP stands for S n P 0 ):

Can we decide in favour of one ofthese accounts over the others? One con-sideration concerns the attribution to evof a univocal semantic role indepen-dently of its position as restricting sub-ject or predicate. Both the Nyya and

the Gillon-Hayes accounts give eva aunivocal role: namely, that the term towhich it is attached has a wider exten-sion than the other term (and, at least for

the Nyya, that there are objects in the intersection). On Dharmakirti's account, sentences con-taining ev have one of two quite distinct logical forms, one based on ny yog vy v cched andthe other on ayogavyavaccheda

Clearly, the particle eva ought not be treated as an ambiguous expression. This, however,would only be an argument against Dharmakirti if he regarded ev as a designator, for then wewould have to say that it was ambiguous. However, Dharmakirti's view is that the function of evais to make manifest which of two distinct possible logical forms a sentence has. From thisperspective, it is not a criticism to say that ev does not have a univocal semantic role in the twocases, since it does not have an independent semantic role at all. Any device whose function is todisambiguate between two readings must mark the two readings differently.

Figure

Dharmakirti

Nyya

Kajiyama

Gillon-Hayes

6: The meaning

S e v a PP c S

P c S S A P

S = PP c S

of eva

SPevaS A P

S C P & S A P

S c P & S A PS c P


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Dha rmak irti s Semantics for the Particle eva 113

Another consideration h s to do with the interdef inability of the two sorts of sentence involv-ing eva. If the Nyya, or the Gillon-Hayes, semantics is correct, the two uses are virtually inter-changeable, for both semantics validate the following syntactic rules:

5a. SevP h PS evab. SPeva (- PevaS

Gillon and Hayes appeal to these transitions as part of their objection to Kajiyama (p. 202).The argument they give for the validity of the transitions is, however, fallacious. They argue that5a must be valid, as it involves a mere reversal of the word-order of S eva and "P," and inSanskrit word-order does not supervene on the underlying logical form. Likewise for 5b. Thefallacy in this argument is the claim that the transition involved in 5a is just a change in wordorder. This is not correct, since we are using word-order in our notation, to indicate which term

is the subject yisesya) and which is the predicate (visesana), and again to indicate whether eva isattaching to the subject or the predicate. Thus, in "P S eva "P" is now the subject, "S" thepredicate, and eva is predicative not subjective. The point is clearer if we introduce a notationwhich does not depend on word-order. Suppose we parse each sentence into an ordered triple. Then the transition in 5a is from to . This is not a mere transposition of word-order at all, but a com bination of twosubstantive changes. The rules in 5 assert a non-trivial thesis, that the transposition of subjectand predicate is the inverse of the transposition of the subjective and predicative uses of eva.

Suppose that gaur eva s sn dim n and s sn dim n gaur eva differ only in word-order.Then in our notion, both would be written in the same form, either "S eva P " or "S P eva as inboth cases either gaur is the subject and 's sn dim n' the predicate, or vice versa. So thetransition involved here would be the trivial one:

6a. S eva P f~ S eva Pb. S P eva \- S P eva

If, however, we construe the second of these sentences to have 's sn dim n9 as its subject

and 'gauK as its predicate, then indeed it would be written as "P S eva but would not arise froma mere word-order reversal. Gillon and Hayes' argument relies on an equivocation between thesetwo readings. Indeed, if they were right that the transitions involve a mere word-order switch,they could have no consequences at all for the semantics of eva, as the transition would not bebetween two sentences with different logical forms

Although their argument for the syntactic implications in is faulty, those implications maynevertheless be valid Indeed, finding a set of syntactically permissible transitions may well bethe right way to decide on the correct semantics for eva. One transition we have already consid-

ered concerns the deletion of eva from the sentence containing it:

7a. Sevc P h SPb. S P eva \~ S P

In fact, both parties will claim these transitions to be valid For DharmakM, it is the movefrom an unambiguous sentence to an ambiguous sentence, one which has as one of its meaningsthe meaning of the first sentence. For the Nyya, the transition is valid because the sentence onthe right expresses the existential implication of the sentence on the left. Indeed, the same ques-


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114 J. Ganeri

tion arises in the analysis of 'only'. Lycan remarks that for convenience, I have fallen in with thecommon view that Only S is P noncancellably implies S is P, but that claim is highly question-able [1991: 135 n. 12]. Perhaps the implication holds in some cases but not in others; theproblem is to give a criterion, and to build that criterion into the semantics.

An interesting pair of transitions which are validated by DharmakErti's semantics but not theNyya semantics is this one:

8a. S eva P h not S-anya P eva)b. S P eva h not {S-anya eva P

This pair reflects the logical relationship between eva and the prasajyapratisedha- andparyudasa- negations. It also corresponds to the mterdefinability of the existential and universalquantifiers. For S eva P states that all P are S, which is equivalent to the proposition that it isnot the case that some non-S is P.

Modern discussions of generalised quantification introduce the important notion of monoto-nicity. Barwise and Cooper [1981: 184] give the following tests for monotonicity. Suppose x c P2, and QS is a quantifier (e.g. some men . Then QS is monotone increasing if: QS x > QS P2,and QS is monotone decreasing if: QS P2 -> QS Vx. If it is neither, QS is nonmonotone. Forexample, some men is monotone increasing, as shown by the validity of the inference from 'somemen are running' to 'some men are moving', while no men is monotone decreasing. Horn [1989:248] observes that if only is negative in meaning and positive only by presupposition, then it willbe monotone decreasing, while if it has a conjunctive m eaning, then it will be nonmonotone.Clearly, an inference like Socrates alone is running \- Socrates alone is moving is invalid; soonly is not monotone increasing. The question is whether the inference Socrates alone is mov-ing \- Socrates alone is running is valid. The inference is invalid on the conjunctive account,since it does not follow that Socrates is running from his moving. However, it is valid on thepurely negative account, since if no-one other than Socrates is moving, then no-one other thanSocrates is running.

Returning to the particle eva, Dharmakirti's position is that eva is a monotone decreasingquantifier. The Naiyyikas treat it as being nonmonotone. The salient inference is:

9. SevaP2 h Seva F{

Given that there is no widespread agreement among linguists about what natural languageintuitions say about the monotonicity of 'only', it is hardly surprising that there is no generalconcensus about the Sanskrit particle eva. It is, however, remarkable how clearly the issue wasformulated by Dharmakirti and other Indian logicians. Only with further study of examples innatural Sanskrit transitions following the pattern of 5, 8 or 9, will we be in a position to decidewhich semantics best fits the actual use of eva. For it is ultimately the actual use of an expressionthat is the tribunal in which its semantics are to be judged.


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Dharma kirti s Semantics for the Particle eva 115

Abbreviations and Literature

Barwise, J., and R Cooper.1981. Generalized quantifiers and natural language. Linguistics aitd Philosophy 4: 159-219.

Bochenski, I. M.1970. A history of formal logic. New York.

Cakravarti, P.1933. The linguistic speculations of the Hindus. University of Calcutta.

Dhruva, A. B., ed.1933. SyadvadamanjariofMallisena with the Anyayogavyavaccheda-dv trimsik ofHemacandra. Bombay

Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 83.Gillon, B. S., and M. L. Love.

1980. Indian logic revisited: Nyyapravesa reviewed Journal of Indian Philosophy 8: 349-384.Gillon, B. S., and R P. Hayes.

1982. The role of the particle eva in (logical) quantification in Sanskrit. WZKS 26: 195-203.Hayes, Richard P.

1988. Dignaga on the interpretation of signs. Studies of Classical India 9. Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer Aca-demic Pub.

Horn, L. R. A.1989. Natural history of negation. The University of Chicago Press.

Iyer, K. A. S.1977. TJte V kyapadiya of Bhartrhari k iida II English translation with exegetical notes. Delhi: Motila

Banarsidass.Kajiyama, Yuichi.

1966. n introduction to Buddhist philosophy: n annotated translation of the Tarkabhs of Mokskaragupta.Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters (Kyoto University) 10.

1973. Three kinds of affirmation and two kinds of negation in Buddhist philosophy. WZKS 17: 161-175.Katsura, Shoryu.

1986. On the origin and development of the concept of vy pti in Indian logic. Tetsugaku (Hiroshima) 38:1-16.

Lycan, W G.1991. Even and even if. Linguistics and Philosophy 14: 115-150.

PVIV Pramanavarttika (Dharmakirti), chapter 4 (Pararthanumana): Ram Chandra Pandeya, ed. ThePranmnavarttikam of c rya Dimrmakirti with the commentaries Svopajnavrtti of the author andPram nav rttikavrtti of Mano rathanandin. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.

P W Pram nav rttikavrtti (M anorathanandin): See PV IV.Steal, F.

1988. Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought: A comparative study. In Universal 109-128. First published in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (1962).

Tillemans, Tom J. F.1992. Pramanavarttika IV (3). Asiatische Studien Etudes Asiatiques 46: 437-467.

VP V kyapadiya (Bhartrhari).Westersthl, D.

1988. Quantifiers. In Tlte handbook of philosophical logic vol. 4: Topics in the philosophy of language ed.

D. Gabbay and F. Guenther. Reidel.WZ KS Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde S dasiens.

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