Division 48 Security - Reconstruction - Peace

Context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring Supplements the

Guidelines on designing and using a results-based monitoring system (RBM system)

Published by

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH Registered offices Bonn und Eschborn Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 40 53113 Bonn Germany T: +49 228 44 60-0 F: +49 228 44 60-17 66 Dag-Hammarskjöld-Weg 1-5 65760 Eschborn Germany T: +49 61 96 79-0 F: +49 61 96 79-11 15 E: info@giz.de

I: www.giz.de

Responsible: Anne-Katrin Niemeier, Klaus H. Schreiner (Division 48, Security, Reconstruction and Peace )

Author: Katrin Bücklein

Eschborn, June 2013

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Contents

Preface ............................................................................................................................................................. 4

Introduction: what is context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring? .......................................... 5

Step 1: Devise/examine/adjust the results model .......................................................................................... 8

Step 2: Clarify the requirements to be met by the RBM system ..................................................................... 12

Step 3: Make results measurable .................................................................................................................... 15

Step 4: Finalise and operationalise the RBM system .................................................................................... 20

Step 5: Collect and analyse data .................................................................................................................... 23

Step 6: Use RBM results ................................................................................................................................ 25

Annex 1: Guidelines for the Do No Harm analysis ....................................................................................... 28

Annex 2: Guidelines for the stakeholder analysis ........................................................................................... 31

Annex 3: Overview of the objectives and use of relevant conflict analysis instruments ................................ 33

Literature ....................................................................................................................................................... 34

Further reading ............................................................................................................................................. 35

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Preface

This publication – ‘Context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring’ – relates directly to and supplements the

‘Guidelines on designing and using a results-based monitoring system (RBM system)’, produced by the Monitoring and

Evaluation Unit. It is based on the wide-ranging advisory services delivered by Division 48 (Security, Reconstruction and

Peace) in recent years to support projects and programmes operating in the context of conflicts, violence and fragility.

This supplement to the guidelines does not set out to present a new system. It aims to give practitioners involved in

establishing a monitoring system within their project or programme practical and pragmatic assistance and tips on how to

gear their monitoring systems even better to the challenges posed by the prevailing project context. This is why we will

illustrate the “6 process steps”, following the same pattern as the guidelines. We strongly recommend the use of this

supplement in conjunction with the guidelines, since it relates very closely to the concepts and terms used there.

Like the guidelines, this supplement applies to projects and programmes commissioned by the German Federal Ministry

for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Under the BMZ’s new strategy paper ‘Development for Peace and

Security’ it is mandatory to establish context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring systems in countries with increased or

acute potential for escalation (crisis early warning levels yellow or red).

The information laid out here refers to the new FS markers (peace and security marker), the use of which became

mandatory under the BMZ’s new strategy ‘Development for Peace and Security’ in April 2013. The logic underlying

markers FS 1 and FS 2 (i.e. a contribution to peace and security is either an important secondary objective or the objective

of the project or programme) aligns closely with the logic of the KR markers hitherto in use. The steps and activities

proposed here can thus be realised without difficulties in projects and programmes that still use the former marker

system.

The new FS 0 marker, which states that no contribution to peace and security is made at the objectives level, differs from

the former KR 0 marker, as the latter does not imply that the project or programme must be implemented in a context-

and conflict-sensitive manner. The binding obligation to ensure the context- and conflict-sensitive design of projects and

programmes derives from the minimum implementation standards introduced in the new BMZ strategy. These standards

prescribe context and conflict sensitivity for all projects or programmes in countries with increased or acute potential for

escalation. Thus, all projects and programmes in countries classed as ‘yellow’ or ‘red’ must be made context- and conflict-

sensitive, irrespective of their sectoral markers. This makes it obligatory to put in place a context- and conflict-sensitive

results-based monitoring system.

This supplement is thus designed not only for those working in projects and programmes in the peace and security sector,

but also for those working in all projects and programmes that operate in the context of conflict, violence and fragility.

Although it has been written with BMZ commissions in mind, this publication contains ideas and suggestions that are

relevant for all work in the context of conflict, violence and fragility, regardless of the commissioning body.

We look forward to receiving feedback and suggestions on how to improve this working aid; they will be taken into

account in the next revised version.

Anne-Katrin Niemeier,

Klaus H. Schreiner

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Introduction: What is context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring?

Context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring (RBM) pays

particular attention to the context wherein a project or programme is

implemented: the interaction between the project or programme and the

conflict context is closely monitored, i.e. both the impact of the

programme/project on the context and, conversely, the impact of the

context on the programme/project itself (see Fig.1).

Context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring is intended to

help reduce the conflict-aggravating impacts of a programme, while

strengthening its peacebuilding impacts. Within the scope of context- and

conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring, it is important to analyse

unintended negative impacts, in order to prevent the programme aggravating

conflicts, failing to achieve its objective, or even jeopardising staff

members. The context- and conflict-sensitive approach to results-based

monitoring is becoming increasingly relevant, since more and more

international cooperation projects and programmes are being

implemented in crisis, conflict or post-conflict countries.

The purpose of this supplement

This supplement aims primarily to look at designing and using a results-based monitoring system from a context- and

conflict-sensitive perspective. In ongoing projects and programmes one can use it to check whether or not all aspects of

the results-based monitoring system are context- and conflict-sensitive, and if not, which adjustments are needed. The

approach presented here builds on the BMZ strategy

‘Development for Peace and Security’ (BMZ Strategy

Paper 04/2013), which replaces the 2005 Sector Strategy

for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and

Peace-Building in German Development Cooperation1.

Through the introduction of the new strategy, the

previous KR markers were also replaced by new FS markers.

For each of the six process steps laid out in the ‘Guidelines on designing and using a results-based monitoring system

(RBM system)’2, we explain here how one can make a results model context- and conflict-sensitive. The supplement

concentrates on the requirements placed on programme steering by a context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring system,

as well as the opportunities created. It also presents various tools and practical examples. Context- and conflict-sensitive

monitoring is understood here to be an integral part of results-based monitoring. The explanations distinguish between

the different national sector markers (FS markers)3, because certain specific criteria apply in all countries with an increased

or acute potential for escalation, depending on the marker accorded. In any case, they always provide for the results-

based, context- and conflict-sensitive implementation of the intervention in question. The potential for escalation in

BMZ’s partner countries is determined once a year by BMZ’s crisis early warning scheme, and the implementing

organisations are informed.4

1 BMZ, 2005. The paper Preventing Conflict and Building Peace – A Manual of Issues and Entry Points (OECD/DAC, 2005) also gives a good overview of the different facets of crisis prevention and peacebuilding. 2 GIZ, 2012a; see also Fig. 3. 3 GIZ 2013 The Policy Marker System: DAC Markers, BMZ, Markers– Guidelines, OE 0430. 4 As soon as they are published, updates of the BMZ crisis early warning system will be made available on the GIZ intranet under ‘Wissen und Prozesse’ (Knowledge and Processes).

Figure 1:

Interaction between the context and the intervention

(Africa Peace Forum et al., 2004)

Context- and conflict-sensitive RBM embraces the direct and indirect,

positive and unintended negative interactions of an intervention with

the peace and conflict dynamics in the given context.

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Figure 2: Crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peacebuilding in line with the FS marker of a project

FS markers – the new system

All interventions commissioned by BMZ are accorded an FS marker, which indicates to what extent they help achieve an

objective in the field of peace and security. Unlike the former KR markers, the FS markers also cover the aspects of

fragility and violence. The new FS markers replace the KR markers, and became mandatory for all new interventions and

follow-on phases in all countries in which Germany is engaged in development cooperation as of 1 August 2013.5

FS 2 marker

Peace and security are the objective (expected long-term result, programme and/or module level)

of the project, i.e. they are key to its implementation. This can be checked by asking the following

question: ‘Would the project have been carried out even without this development objective?’

FS 1 marker

Peace and security are a key secondary objective (sub-aspect of the programme or module objective, output), but not one of the main reasons for

carrying out the project.

FS 0 marker

Peace and security are not the focus of the project.

Irrespective of the sectoral marker, the new BMZ strategy requires that development-policy engagement in countries with

an increased or acute potential for escalation, both at the level of the BMZ portfolio and at the level of all projects, be

designed in line with the Do No Harm principle6. Since August 2013, however, this is no longer ensured by means of the

marker system (KR 0), but through compliance with minimum standards for all fragile states and countries affected by

conflict and violence, agreed between the BMZ and the implementing organisations. In addition to a context analysis for

peace and security at programme level, and risk monitoring, these minimum standards provide for context- and conflict-

sensitive results-based monitoring.7

The FS 1 and FS 2 markers are thus equivalent to the KR 1 and KR 2 markers used hitherto. BMZs eligibility criteria with

respect to these markers are in line with those requested for the former markers. The requirements attached to the marker

FS 0 are comparable to those applied to the former marker KR — (KR dash). In countries with increased or acute

potential for escalation, however, the minimum standards apply, which are comparable to the requirements attached to

the former KR 0 marker.

5 For interventions commissioned prior to this date the KR markers continue to apply with the pertinent conditions, cf. GTZ, BMZ, KfW 2007a. 6 This principle stipulates that unintentional consequences of humanitarian aid and development cooperation be viewed critically and undesired aggravation of conflict situations is identified, avoided and mitigated. This presupposes the assessment of the substantial and operational aspects of project design: conflict relevance, conflict risks and actual results. 7 GTZ, BMZ & FRCS, 2004.

FS 0

Project not geared to peace

and security

FS 1

Peace and security are an

important secondary

objective

FS 2

Peace and security are the

objective of the project

In countries with and increased or acute potential for escalation (classified ‘yellow’ or ‘red’) the context analysis, risk management and context-sensitive results-based monitoring are

mandatory.

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With respect to ‘context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring [for a new intervention], as is the case for other

cross-cutting issues, the following applies irrespective of the marker: the more an issue is taken into account at the

planning phase, the less arduous the subsequent planning and realisation of monitoring steps and activities become.

Essentially, this means that the more information (e.g. on lines of conflict, stakeholder roles) is gathered during the

context analysis, the more this can be used for results-based monitoring’8.

PROCESS STEPS FOR DESIGNING AND USING AN RBM SYSTEM IN THE COMMISSIONING PROCEDURE

The RBM system is designed at the start of the implementation phase as part of operational planning.

Figure 3: Context- and conflict-sensitive complement to results-based monitoring in line with the six process steps

8 GTZ 2006, page 17.

Integrating/producing context/ conflict analyses Bear in mind HOW the project is to be implement

Decide on participants on the basis of stakeholder analysis/ conflict/ context analysis Analyse interaction between stakeholders

Formulate results hypotheses and indicators in the context of conflict, fragility and violence, assumptions on context-specific factors/risks, synergies, fields for observation

Stipulate responsibilities and intervals, documentation Context- and conflict-relevant information/ conduct methodical triangulation

Collect data: incorporate the analyses Monitoring as an intervention Analysis of context- and conflict-relevant results

Use context monitoring for (re-) steering and strategic alignment Adjust the results model

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Step 1: Devise/examine/adjust the results model9

What is to be achieved at this stage of designing the RBM system?

• The results model is drawn up with partners.

• The system’s boundary is defined; along with the risks, strategies and alternative strategy options are discussed with

partners.

• Objectives are agreed upon and suitable GIZ instruments identified.

• Instruments and key activities are discussed.

How can one ensure context- and conflict-sensitive design?

� Results, objective and objectives indicators

The assumed change process, which is incorporated in the production of the results model, embraces context and conflict

sensitivity, peace and security. To this end,

- a context and conflict analysis must be available;

- sector-specific or national peacebuilding needs (PBN) must have been identified;

- relevant risks that might affect achievement of the objective must have been analysed (see ‘Background Information’,

Step 3).

In many cases the results model is drawn up jointly with partners. In a conflict situation the selection of partners and

communication with these partners is particularly important, because this in itself brings with it potential conflict (see also

Step 2).

Objectives and objectives indictors, which form the basis for the context- and conflict-sensitive RBM system, are

identified and formulated on the basis of the context and conflict analyses:

- Where the FS 2 marker is awarded, the principal objective of the project is geared to peacebuilding needs.

- Where the FS 1 marker is awarded, integral parts of the project objective and the results indicators relate to making a

contribution to sectoral peacebuilding needs.

- Where projects are accorded FS 2 or FS 1 markers, the results model reflects the intended contribution of the project

to meeting national or sectoral peacebuilding needs10.

- FS 0 marker in countries with increased or acute potential for escalation: the results model must be conflict-sensitive

in design, i.e. it must incorporate relevant context-specific and conflict factors.

� When designing the results model one should look not only at WHAT is to be achieved, i.e. intended results; more

importantly one should focus on HOW these results are to be achieved. This means reviewing the way a project is

implemented, i.e. the change strategy and the processes relevant for implementation11. Every project implemented in a

conflict context must also look at the question of unintended negative impacts when designing the results model (Do No

Harm, DNH).

9 N.B.: Steps 1 to 5 cover the design and implementation of results-based monitoring, while Step 6 relates to using the system. The blue box at the start of each section summarises what is to be achieved in general for the RBM system at this stage, without referring specifically to the conflict context. 10 In line with Step 2 of the PCA, comparison of peacebuilding needs and results of the relevance assessment. 11 Cf. GTZ, 2006.

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� The integration of context- and conflict-specific issues in the results model and later in results monitoring is generally

the responsibility of the manager. The officer responsible for the commission should clarify the terms used and the

underlying concepts within the team (including ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, etc.) since the way these are understood can vary

significantly from one culture to another. Depending on the status quo ante and the available context and conflict analyses

it might be necessary to perform a subsequent Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA12) in ongoing project and

programmes; this should take place in the planning phase of new projects and programmes.

� System boundary

In a conflict context it is important to determine the system boundary. This must be discussed at regular intervals within

the framework of context- and conflict-sensitive RBM using the following questions, and procedures adapted if necessary:

- Where does the sphere of responsibility of the project or programme, which should also be reflected in the RBM

system, end? Which results are realistic in a context of fragility and conflict, within the given time limits?

- To what extent can we actually assume a context- and conflict-relevant result (FS 1, FS 2 project or programme)? At

what point could there be unintended negative impacts? How can these negative impacts be avoided?

- Which fields for observation must be paid particular attention to, on the basis of the context and conflict analysis?

What risks exist?

- Which environmental factors outside the system boundary (e.g. outside a given sector) must be monitored?

- Which alternative strategy options exist for the project or programme in the given context, should a conflict escalate?

� Instruments and activities within the change process

The production of a context- and conflict-sensitive results model never refers only to results but must also be reflected in

the choice of activities and instruments. For instance, the plan of operations too must be context- and conflict-sensitive in

design.

���� Tool: Context- and conflict analyses as the basis for producing the results model13

Context- and conflict analyses form the basis for a context- and conflict-sensitive intervention and for the results-based

monitoring thereof. For the formulation of the results model, these analyses provide information on

- lines of conflict and their structural causes

- power relations and the interaction of different stakeholders

- uniting and dividing factors (termed ‘connectors’ and ‘dividers’ in the Do No Harm terminology) as well as any forces that might obstruct or encourage change.

Frequently, conflict analyses already exist, for instance

- the brief political and economic analysis (possibly with follow-on analysis)

- a country strategy for the partner country

- context analyses of other projects or context analyses at portfolio level on the basis of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA, including peacebuilding needs)

- additional analyses compiled by other actors such as the International Crisis Group, DFID or Berghof (at country or regional level).

Should these analyses not yet be available, or not in a sufficient form, helpful guidelines and support14 lay out the

various instruments used in context and conflict analyses, including conflict profiles, conflict-sensitive stakeholder

12 GTZ, BMZ & KfW, 2007. 13 See also GTZ, 2005b.

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analyses, analyses of root causes, analyses of peace and conflict factors, Do No Harm check lists, and trend and scenario

methods.

Exemplary key questions for a context and conflict analysis, and a description of common ground between a vocational

training programme and a conflict situation are offered by the text Konfliktsensibles Monitoring in Vorhaben der Beruflichen

Bildung (GTZ, 2006, p. 13) (Conflict-sensitive monitoring in vocational training projects – German only). The text also

illustrates the practical implementation of conflict-sensitive monitoring in five steps, and could be useful for other sectors,

too.

14 Cf. GTZ, 2001; GTZ, BMZ & KfW, 2007; GTZ, 2007

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15 Cf. also GTZ, 2007, page 45; GTZ, BMZ & KfW, 2007, pages 27 & 131; Arbeitshilfe zur K-Kennung [Tool for the K marker – German only], GTZ, 2005a

Overview Step 1: Devising the results model depending on the FS marker15:

FS 0 in countries with increased or acute potential for escalation

FS 1 FS 2

Context- and conflict analysis

Basis: existing context and conflict analyses, brief political and economical analysis

Context- and conflict analysis using an abridged Do No Harm check with four key questions: What are we doing? Where is the intervention to take place? With whom will we be working? And How should we proceed?

Country-specific and sector-specific context and conflict analysis as the basis for devising a results model, objective and indicators, and for RBM

Which findings of the context and conflict analysis are available or are still needed to define the risks to the achievement of the project objective (What role is played for instance by the target groups, mediators, lead executing agencies, or a certain region in the course of the conflict?)?

Country-related and sector- or project-related context and conflict analysis as the precondition for establishing a results model, objective, indicators, and for the RBM system, possibly along with studies on specific aspects in the context of conflict, fragility and violence.

Which findings of the context and conflict analysis are available or are still needed to define the risks to the achievement of the project objective (What role is played for instance by the target groups, mediators, lead executing agencies, or a certain region in the course of the conflict?)?

Formulation of objectives and objectives indicators

General positioning of the project or programme with respect to peacebuilding needs (PBN)

In monitoring and operational planning, context- and conflict-sensitive results, activities and instruments should be linked to indicators. Monitoring should focus on potentially conflict-aggravating context-specific factors.

Intended, context- and conflict-relevant results in a sector are stipulated at module objective level and in the offers indicators or possibly only in the results and results indicators (in the results matrix at output level).

Is the link to the course of the conflict firmly established at module objective level and in the indicators?

Intended, context- and conflict-relevant results are stipulated at module objectives level. Indicators make it possible to measure these (results indicators in RBM format/RBM system also illustrates positive and unintended negative impacts).

Do objectives and indicators establish a link to the course of the conflict?

Formulation of results

Unintended negative impacts are monitored and assessed at regular intervals; conscious account is taken of dividers and connectors.

Which undesired results are expected? How can they be prevented?

Positive context- and conflict-related results are an integral part of the results model and RBM.

Contributions to sectoral PBN are formulated and are regularly reviewed.

Unintended negative impacts are analysed (e.g. using a DNH check).

Risk factors are monitored.

Which context- and conflict-related results are intended in the sector? How can they be achieved? Which unintended results are expected? How can they be prevented?

The results model and RBM refer in general to results in the context of conflict, fragility and violence.

Contributions to national PBN are formulated and are reviewed at regular intervals.

For unintended negative impacts, hypotheses are produced and analysed at regular intervals (DNH).

Risk factors are monitored.

Which results and contributions to national PBN are intended? How can they be achieved? What unintended results are expected? How can they be prevented?

System boundary General question of responsibility of the project or programme within a conflict context (DNH)

Check the boundaries of context- and conflict-relevant results as well as the responsibility for negative impacts. Define specific fields for observation and risks, draw up alternative strategy options.

Methods and activities

Context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring and operational planning

Formulate context- and conflict-relevant results indicators in monitoring and operational planning.

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Step 2: Clarify the requirements to be met by the RBM system

What is to be achieved at this stage of designing the RBM system?

• Participants in strategic and steering decisions and the necessary processes and information are identified.

• Interests in and expectations of monitoring are clear.

• The RBM system is established jointly with partners; resources are determined.

How can one ensure context- and conflict-sensitive design?

Since the RBM system is aligned with the steering requirements of the project or Programme, the central question is

what information the RBM system must deliver so that the project or programme can be effectively steered in the

conflict context. For this, the following decisions must be taken:

� Participants in strategic and steering decisions

For the context- and conflict-sensitive design of RBM systems it should firstly be decided which stakeholders are to

be involved in strategic and steering decisions and in RBM:

- Participants must be selected on the basis of the context and conflict analysis (in particular the stakeholder

analysis).

- Interaction between stakeholders should be analysed.

- A risk analysis16 will help weigh up what impacts cooperation with different stakeholders could have.

- In particular, changes within the cooperation system must be monitored consistently with the help of RBM.

It is important to have a common understanding of the conflict context and to agree on how to proceed within the

team and with partners. The discussion of possible participants in strategic and steering decisions should initially take

place only within the team, or with very close implementation partners. It must be taken into account that national

colleagues in particular have a relevant understanding of the prevailing context, and this expertise should be used

when selecting participants, and devising and using RBM systems.

� Interests, expectations and information needs

At this stage one must consider what information on the conflict context is to be generated with the help of RBM.

For FS 2 and FS 1 programmes or projects, the RBM system will have to produce information on the module

objective and indicators, while in FS 0 programmes or projects in countries with increased or acute potential of

escalation the system should provide information on important context-specific factors. Additional relevant

questions are:

- Which special interests in and expectation of the RBM system exist on the part of the team and of the various

partners as a result of the conflict context?

- Which unintended negative impacts could RBM per se cause in the given context?

� The formulation of the indicators and the above questions will allow identifying the requirements to be met with

respect to the selection and use of methods (methodical triangulation) and the intervals at which data should be

collected (see Step 4).

� Synergies and alignment of RBM with the partner system

Special sensitivity is called for when involving the partner side in monitoring or when using their monitoring system

in the context of conflict, fragility and violence:

� The programme must analyse the role played by partners in the given conflict context, and determine which

partner(s) ought to be involved in monitoring.

16 What is meant here is the risk to the achievement of the objective. See Background Information in Section 3.

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� The quality of the monitoring systems of partners often varies widely: in some cases the systems are mature and

compatible with the RBM system of a GIZ project or programme, while in other constellations monitoring is at best

rudimentary. The project/programme could focus on sending positive signals and demonstrating to partners the

benefits offered by an RBM system, in particular a context- and conflict-sensitive RBM system. The

project/programme must look in advance at the question of the extent to which the monitoring system can

reasonably be adjusted or synergies achieved with the monitoring systems of partners in the given conflict context.

Once this decision has been made, it might also be necessary to determine to what extent the monitoring system of a

partner can provide information on the objectives, results and indicators in the context of conflict, fragility and

violence. In advance, any existing partner-side monitoring system should thus be assessed for its conflict relevance

and conflict sensitivity in particular.

� One must check at regular intervals whether the results model is still relevant and whether the RBM system is

delivering the information one needs on the conflict context (contribution to PBN and DNH). Depending on the

role of partners in the conflict context, the degree of maturity of the partner-side monitoring system, and their

understanding of context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring, one might find it useful to conduct this review jointly

with the partners.

���� Tool: Key questions to clarify the requirements to be met by the RBM system in the conflict context

- What will the impact be of involving certain partners in strategic and steering decisions on others who are not

involved?

- Is there potential here for aggravating the conflict or is there peacebuilding potential, or is there a security problem?

- What implicit messages are communicated by cooperating with certain partners; what impact will this have on the

credibility of the programme/project?

- What information (e.g. on type of conflict, causes, history, intensity of conflict, parties to the conflict, conflict

region) is needed by which partners for the purposes of steering in the conflict context? Who can provide which

information? Which information is needed on the contribution to be made by the programme/project to the PBN?

- Is the (political-level) partner (lead agency) part of the conflict or is it seen as being party to the conflict? What

effect does this have on cooperation?

- Can this partner be involved in steering or RBM?

- Which special interests in and expectations of RBM arise as a result of the conflict context?

- What do partners expect in return if they contribute to the programme/project and its monitoring?

- How can the programme/project monitor, with the help of the RBM system, whether it is supporting forces that

are working against the state?

- Can the RBM system deliver results for the political dialogue in the context of conflict, fragility and violence?

- How can the RBM system indicate that certain factors are causing the conflict to escalate?

- Could the results-based monitoring system and context- and conflict-sensitive information be used by certain

partners to distort the presentation of results?

- To what extent can the programme/project provide individual partners with context- and conflict-relevant

information generated with the help of the RBM system (this must be assessed very carefully)?

- Which partners should be involved so as to integrate sufficient understanding of the context and a variety of

perspectives (e.g. different parties to the conflict, ethnic groups, both men and women, different generations)?

- Must the change in the target group’s perception of the programme/project be monitored?

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� Resources

Results-based monitoring in the conflict context often requires additional resources, since a combination of various

quantitative and qualitative methods is called for together with the requisite expertise. This must be taken into

account when planning resources.

Overview Step 2: Clarify the requirements to be met by the RBM system

FS 0 in countries with increased or acute potential for escalation

FS 1 FS 2

Joint strategic and steering decisions

Selection of participants in strategic and steering decisions on the basis of the stakeholder analysis and the Do No Harm check.

Which stakeholders/potential partners might contribute to unintended negative impacts?

Selection of participants in strategic and steering decisions on the basis of a context and conflict analysis/stakeholder analysis.

Which other partners could help meet the sectoral PBN and to what extent might cooperation potentially entail unintended negative impacts?

Selection of participants in strategic and steering decisions on the basis of a context and conflict analysis/stakeholder analysis.

Which potential partners could help meet national PBN/ achieve the main objective, and to what extent might cooperation potentially entail unintended negative impacts?

Joint RBM Who can be involved in the RBM system? Is the RBM system of partners context- and conflict-sensitive in design?

How can different partners obtain context- and conflict-relevant information from their RBM systems, and what interest do these partners have in the RBM system of the programme/project?

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Step 3: Make results measurable

What is to be achieved at this stage of designing the RBM system?

• Assumptions regarding context-specific factors and risks are analysed and formulated, along with results

hypotheses.

• Results and objectives indicators are formulated.

• Specific results are taken into account.

How can one ensure context- and conflict-sensitive design?

� Assumptions regarding context-specific factors and risks

On the basis of the context and conflict analysis (Step 1), assumptions are drawn up regarding context-specific

factors and risks that might affect the progress of the project17. The review of the assumptions regarding context-

specific factors and risks must be firmly anchored in the results-based monitoring system and the fields that are to be

given special attention (fields for observation) defined. In terms of the risks, the team must look at the factors that

would appear likely to jeopardise the success of implementation, and at how it can recognise whether these factors

are worsening, constant or improving. On the basis of this analysis, additional indicators might be formulated which

can then be tracked18.

� The relevant fields for observation must be verified at least once a year. In conflict contexts with increased or

acute potential for escalation, this can be stepped up as required and might even involve a weekly check so that the

team can respond flexibly and ensure that the objective is achieved while guaranteeing the safety and security of staff.

� Although the future development of a project cannot be anticipated in full, a thorough understanding of the

context makes it easier to identify potential positive and negative interaction between the project and the context.

Background Information: Analysis of risks to the achievement of the objective (including staff safety and security19)20:

Risks relate to factors that have a negative impact on achieving the objective of a project or programme. The OECD

makes a distinction between 1) general context- or situation-specific risks, 2) risks related to the implementation of

the project or programme, 3) internal, institutional risks and 4) risks relating to staff safety and security21. The

following are important to note:

- Risk management (PCA Step 3) is an integral part of the duty of care and thus a managerial responsibility.

- Risk management and context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring are closely related.

- Aspects of staff safety and security and context- and conflict-sensitive design are closely related.

In some countries, programme managers can fall back on institutionalised risk management. The programme

routinely provides conflict-relevant findings from the RBM system to the Risk Management Office and other

programmes. The latter will in return provide it with relevant information.

In countries without institutionalised risk management:

- It is important to use or create risk monitoring capacities within the team.

17 Context-specific factors are factors that affect the success of a project. Risks are circumstances that cannot be influenced or cannot readily be influenced, and could jeopardise the achievement of results and objectives. 18 Cf. also GTZ, 2007, page 45. 19 See also Sicherheitsleitfaden für die Büroleitung (Security Guidelines for Office Directors – German only) and Policy Personelle Sicherheit (Policy on Staff Safety and Security – German only) published by the crisis desk. 20 GTZ, BMZ & KfW, 2007. 21 GIZ, 2012b.

16

- Ongoing open-ended monitoring and discussion on changes within the context must be established (pre-

structuring; discussion based on key questions; within the scope of regular meetings or team meetings).

- Additional risk indictors can be formulated, verified and discussed (e.g. once every three months).

- Monitoring and operational planning, and possibly the results model, must immediately and flexibly be adapted

should the analysis indicate that a there is a risk in terms of achieving the objective, or in terms of staff safety and

security, or that there is some other urgent need to take action.

- Reports must include a special focus on risks.

� Results hypotheses

Results hypotheses can be identified on the basis of the context and conflict analysis and the assumptions relating to

context-specific factors and risks22:

- In FS 2 and FS 1 programmes/projects, results hypotheses are formulated for positive, peacebuilding results; they

are an integral part of the RBM system.

- In FS 1 programmes/projects, assumptions regarding specific context- and conflict-sensitive areas of a programme

or project are also developed and pertinent fields for observation formulated.

- FS 0 programmes/projects in countries with increased or acute potential for escalation examine their results

hypotheses for conflict sensitivity with the help of a Do No Harm check, and if necessary identify additional special

fields for observation.

� A results hypothesis for an FS 2 programme or project in the good governance sector, for instance, might read, ‘If

we support stable and reliable social institutions, which are working for democratisation, equality, justice and the fair

distribution of resources, we can make a contribution to security and peace.’

� A results hypothesis for an FS 1 programme or project in the field of sustainable economic promotion might

read, ‘We support institutions and actors at various levels (micro, meso and macro levels) in order to create jobs and

reduce youth unemployment. Since young men who fail to find work often perpetuate a violent approach to dealing

with conflicts, we are thus also making a contribution to reducing violent conflicts.’

The results hypothesis for a transitional development assistance programme or project accorded the marker FS 1

might read, ‘Joint events of different actors within a sector bring together the parties to the conflict. A constructive

discussion on sectoral issues has a positive impact on the relations between actors, and helps overcome the

demonization of the “other” side.’

� In an FS 0 programme or project in countries with increased or acute potential for escalation, the context-specific

factors relevant for the programme and the impacts of the programme on the context would be analysed on the basis

of the context and conflict analysis and/or a Do No Harm check. This might indicate, for instance, that the way

resources are allocated to different population groups ought to be an additional field of observation. Does a Muslim

minority, for instance, receive more direct financial support than the Christian population? Are resources distributed

on the basis of criteria that are not transparent?

� All projects and programmes must look at potential unintended negative impacts and to this end produce

hypotheses relating to their own results. The question to be asked here is, ‘What would happen in the worst case

scenario, if …?’.

For instance: What would happen if the dialogue among different actors in one sector did not develop in a positive

way? Would fronts form between the parties to the conflict engendering a negative spiral? Would this confirm the

parties to the conflict in their prejudices, and would the project then actually reinforce the trend to demonise the

‘other’ side?

22 The document Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility – Improving Learning for Results (OECD/DAC 2012, Annex B) offers a number of general results hypotheses (theories of change) in peace work.

17

The following diagram shows how assumptions relating to context-specific factors and risks are incorporated in

context- and conflict-sensitive results design.

� Results indicators and objectives indicators

In FS 1 and FS 2 programmes or projects, objectives indicators and results indicators relate in full or in part to

aspects of conflict, fragility and violence. In FS 0 programmes or projects in countries with increased or acute

potential for escalation, the Do No Harm principle is applied when formulating indicators.

� The objectives and results indicators of a context- and conflict-sensitive RBM system help to measure whether

actual, positive, peacebuilding results are achieved (FS 1, FS 2) and negative impacts avoided as far as possible.

� In a conflict context, qualitative indicators are often helpful, but these must be SMART23. Check whether or not

indicators can be taken from national programmes, for instance on national or sectoral PBN.

� Indicators should specify the stakeholders and institutions that are to adopt changes in conduct or structure with

respect to aspects of conflict, fragility and violence24.

� Partners and possibly target groups must be involved in formulating indicators.

� If necessary, additional indicators are formulated relating to risks. The analysis of risks should not, however, be

limited to collecting data on certain indicators.

� Context- and conflict-sensitive results indicators are systematically anchored in the RBM system. Monitoring

unintended negative impacts might lead to an adjustment of the results model as well as the monitoring and

operational planning, etc.

23 SMART = Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound. 24 GTZ, BMZ & KfW, 2007.

Identification of (de-)escalating factors

(context/conflict analysis)

Comparison of peace and conflict

factors with the planned activities

Analysis and assessment of the

impacts of factors on the planned

implementation

Identification of potential

unintended results

Deduction of potential risks

for the achievement of

the objective

Figure 4: Assumptions relating to context-specific factors and risks within the scope of context- and conflict-sensitive results design

18

���� Tool: Examples of context- and conflict-sensitive indicators

Examples of FS 1 indicators

- As a result of the project, employment among young people from high-risk groups has risen from X% to Y% (on

the assumption that promoting employment among certain groups of young people prevents them joining terrorist

groups).

- The number of local initiatives for cross-border economic cooperation has risen over the period Z from X% to

Y% (on the assumption that economic cooperation defuses possible conflicts).

- 75% of entrepreneurs or managing directors surveyed see an improvement in the business and investment climate

(on the assumption that an improved climate for investment defuses conflicts).

- State and non-state actors at regional level regulate three cases of environmental conflicts using peaceful conflict

resolution methods, and formalised agreements on the use of natural resources.

Examples of FS 2 indicators

- Traditional conflict mediation instances on land law matters are strengthened in x villages.

- The number of violent conflicts over land use and the need to regulate them drop by 30% in region xy.

- In x intervention municipalities, the perceived safety and security of citizens increases.

- X of the Y organisations advised by the programme (state/non-state) have included innovative approaches to

conflict transformation in their concepts (differentiated by target group) that take into account structural factors

(culture, exclusion).

- A minimum of 45 % of the complaints of abuse of police power received every year by the Office of Professional

Responsibility (ORP) of the National Civil Police (PNC) are investigated in line with existing standards.

The document How to guide to conflict sensitivity?25 provides a good overview of indicators for context- and conflict-

sensitive monitoring that relate to intervention, the context, the interaction between the intervention and the context

and to unintended results.

Example: Conflict-sensitive resource and asset management, Philippines (KR 2)

Making results measurable, analysing assumptions and risks

The programme ‘Conflict-sensitive resource and asset management’ (COSERAM), which is being implemented in

Mindanao, has a check list as part of its context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring system. It uses a number of

questions to gather information on conflict sensitivity and risk management as well as on two other cross-cutting

issues. The check list is filled in routinely every three months by all programme staff and evaluated by a local staff

member.

At periodic monitoring meetings, the results of the check list are discussed along with unintended negative impacts

of the programme, assumptions relating to context-specific factors, and existing or potential risks to programme

implementation and staff. The results of the analysis are incorporated in the orientation of activities and results, and

in the formulation of new activities, and play a part in the six-monthly reflection on objectives and results indicators.

The check list is thus an important source of information for steering the programme and selecting fields for

observation.

25 Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p. 13.

19

Overview Step 3: Make results measurable, by marker

FS 0 in countries with an

increased or acute potential

for escalation

FS 1 FS 2

Assumptions relating

to context-specific

factors, risks

Security analysis depending on the degree of escalation of the conflict and the

risk/security situation in the country (FS 1, FS 2: possibly also indicators), context- and

conflict-sensitive analysis of the project setting and monitoring of the environment in the

case of FS 1/FS 2 programmes/projects

Identify relevant fields for observation depending on the marker, and identify specific risk

factors in the case of FS 2 programmes/projects

Formulate context- and conflict-relevant risks for achieving the objective and to staff.

Describe risk management and steps taken to minimise risks.

Results hypotheses Examine results hypotheses

for context and conflict

sensitivity.

Formulate results hypotheses on positive, peacebuilding

results; These are an integral part of the RBM system.

Conduct an abbreviated DNH

check (4 leading questions);

identify dividers and

connectors and take these into

account.

Conduct a comprehensive DNH check.

Analyse relevant context-specific and conflict factors

and actors as well as social and geographical areas in

which peacebuilding results are expected.

All projects and programmes: conduct a regular Do No Harm check to identify

unintended negative impacts.

Objectives and results

indicators

Apply DNH principle when

formulating indicators.

A minimum of one

objective indicator must

relate to conflict,

fragility and violence

(sector-specific PBN)

or the issue should be

generally integrated into

indicators.

Objectives and results

indicators relate to conflict,

fragility and violence;

incorporate national PBN.

20

Step 4: Finalise and operationalise the RBM system

What is to be achieved at this stage of designing the RBM system?

• The RBM system is finalised.

• Responsibilities are laid down in the monitoring system, as well as the time schedule and data collection methods.

How can one ensure context- and conflict-sensitive design?

� Finalising the RBM system

The objectives, results, instruments and activities from the overall monitoring and operational planning that have

been laid down in Steps 1 to 3, should now be specified within the framework of a detailed RBM form (in line with

regular procedure). Indicators and results hypotheses, assumptions and risks, in particular those relating to the

conflict context, are incorporated. As required, additional fields for observation can also be incorporated, e.g.

synergies, lessons learned. Plans should also provide for the ongoing documentation of deviations and steering or

adjustment needs in the conflict context (allow sufficient time and resources).

� Within the project or programme, agreements must be reached on how potential unintended negative impacts can

be monitored, and which instruments will be needed.

� By integrating elements of context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring in routine monitoring, context monitoring

can be at least partially ‘automated’. This makes the topic more accessible. Better use is made of the potential to

contribute to peace and security.

� Responsibilities for monitoring activities

� Data collection: It must be stipulated who is to be responsible, and which partners are to be contacted.

� Data evaluation and interpretation: The results should always be discussed by the whole team and related to the

context and conflict analysis. If possible in the given context, this should be done jointly with partners.

� Communication: In the conflict context, responsible and sensitive communication of information from the RBM

system is indispensable so that appropriate steering decisions can be taken swiftly.

� All those responsible for monitoring must have capacities in context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring and DNH

or must be trained accordingly, so that they are aware of relevant context-specific factors and dynamics. The partners

involved must also be sensitised or trained.

� Over and above this, the team must have a common understanding of the concepts of ‘conflict’, ‘fragility’ and

‘violence’.

� Time schedule for RBM/ data collection

� The timing of data collection and analysis is particularly important in the context of conflicts. Are any important

events (e.g. elections) scheduled for the data collection period, which could aggravate the conflict being examined?

When is the data needed for steering purposes? Could monitoring activities and results be used or abused by parties

to the conflict?

� The intervals at which data is gathered are also significant. To ensure the ongoing monitoring of the context and

important changes, the intervals might have to be adjusted in line with circumstances on the ground. Data on results

indicators should be collected every six months or every year, while an annual interval is sufficient for objectives

indicators. Depending on the dynamics of political and social developments though, these intervals might have to be

adjusted flexibly.

� Potential negative impacts must generally be monitored more frequently than the positive, peacebuilding results to

be achieved in the long term.

21

� From the outset the time schedule for a context- and conflict-sensitive RBM system must specifically provide for

learning loops and for results to be used for steering the programme (see also Step 6).

� Data collection methods

� Methodical triangulation: In conflictual settings, perceptions, interpretations and interests often diverge. This

makes it essential to raise the reliability of data by using a variety of different sources, perspectives and methods.

Supplementing quantitative methods with qualitative methods allow to record subjective statements and opinions,

although qualitative methods often require more resources.

� Deductive procedures involving the testing of results hypotheses should be supplemented by inductive

procedures26, i.e. a process of observation and surveying using check lists or participatory results-based monitoring

methods to identify conflict-relevant impacts, especially unintended impacts, in the context of the project or

programme.

� If necessary, instruments such as check lists, guidelines for discussion in focus groups, documentation aids on

context- and conflict-sensitive results and case studies might have to be developed in line with existing requirements.

���� Tool: Key questions that might be useful when selecting methods for a context- and conflict-sensitive RBM system

- Which culture-specific methods exist that could be used to collect data (e.g. discussions in focus groups)? How can traditional knowledge be incorporated into surveys? To what extent can existing monitoring systems or data of partners be used?

- How participatory must the procedure be in terms of the scope and the group of individuals involved so that the information obtained, for instance, is subsequently accepted?

- Does the method selected genuinely take into account the conflict context?

- Does the data collection take into account contributions to national/sectoral PBN?

- What information is sensitive or barely obtainable, and might require a special data collection method?

- Can the method be combined with a Do No Harm check?

- How easily and how flexibly can the method selected or the information thus obtained be used for steering

purposes?

- How swiftly must the data be evaluated and interpreted so that decisions can be made?

- Can data be collected by an actor perceived as neutral (e.g. university institute)?

���� Examples of instruments used to collect data

• Guideline for Conflict-sensitive Implementation and Monitoring produced by the FATA Development Programme (FDP),

GIZ Pakistan: These guidelines contain lists of questions for conducting interviews and focus group discussions

with the target groups of the programme and aim to identify how the programme is perceived from the outside.

• The Listening Project is geared to open conversations with various groups to explore ways of improving

international support.

• A food security and rehabilitation project of GIZ Nepal uses participatory, qualitative data collection methods in its

Participatory and Conflict Sensitive Impact Monitoring, including monitoring workshops, field visits, group discussions

using different visualisation or scaling methods, and complements this information with the informal observations

of the project team.

Example: FATA Development Programme, Pakistan (KR 1)

26 GTZ, BMZ & KfW, 2007, page 144.

22

Finalise and operationalise the RBM system

The FATA Development Programme (FDP) in Pakistan handed over responsibility for coordinating the context-

and conflict-sensitive RBM to a Monitoring Focal Point in the project. Local project staff were trained in the Do No

Harm principle and in context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring.

The programme laid down monitoring responsibilities as well as the timing of data collection on the indicators and

the instruments to be used. In addition the team has at its disposal guidelines offering ideas and lists of questions for

every step within the project cycle and for context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring. The programme

is currently producing a context- and conflict-sensitive adaptation of the results model, monitoring plan and plan of

operations, and where appropriate, is devising supplementary data collection methods, especially in order to forge a

link to sectoral PBN.

23

Step 5: Collect and analyse data

What is to be achieved at this stage of using the RBM system?

• Baseline data are available and target values are identified.

• Data is collected at regular intervals.

• Progress is assessed on the basis of data analysis.

How can one ensure context- and conflict-sensitive design?

� Baseline data/target values/milestones

In conflict situations it is important to produce high quality baseline studies so that changes in the conflict context

over time can be proven. Baseline studies should take into account the context and conflict analyses (see Step 1).

� The project or programme must analyse and discuss when, how and with which partner baseline data can best be

gathered.

� Data collection

In FS 1 and FS 2 programmes or projects data is gathered on the indicators already formulated. In FS 0 programmes

or projects in countries with increased or acute potential for escalation Do No Harm matters must be taken into

account within the scope of regular data collection.

� Information should – as explained above – be gathered from different sources using a variety of methods. As well

as documents, statistics, etc., sources include, partners, indirect beneficiaries, intermediaries, target groups, other

donors, or implementers of the programme or project. If different actors are surveyed, their relations to one another

should be included in the analysis.

� In general, monitoring per se is an intervention, and it leaves its mark on those surveyed. RBM in the context of a

conflict can then change or even aggravate conflicts. The individuals responsible for gathering data (external or

internal) should be sensitised to this.

���� Tool: Key questions on data collection

• Which perspectives of different parties to the conflict must be taken into account in data collection? Which ‘soft’

factors (e.g. perception, attitudes) must be investigated?

• How can disadvantaged groups (women, youth, persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities) be involved?

• How can we avoid the individuals surveyed sustaining harm or being subjected to reprisals?

• What terms or sensitive issues should not be used/ mentioned in interviews or surveys?

• Would those surveyed like their data to be anonymised?

• To which degree can/must understanding and transparency be ensured? Are those surveyed clear about the

objective and procedure of the survey? Do they know how and why they were selected?

• What challenges are involved in using data in the context of conflicts? Are there special interests in making

precisely these data available, or could the data be distort by the data collection or evaluation method chosen?

� The individuals surveyed should be informed of the (anonymised) results. Participation and openness sometimes

come up against limits in the context of conflicts, when it comes to political sensitivities, power structures or the

protection of respondents. We should also take into account that surveys can raise expectations. Proactive

expectation management and feedback explaining how the information obtained will be used should also be planned.

24

� Data analysis and assessment

In FS 1/FS 2 programmes and projects it should be analysed whether the positive, peacebuilding results are being

achieved and which steering needs can be identified as a result. These programmes and projects should also analyse

whether unplanned positive peacebuilding results can be identified.

� All projects/programmes must ascertain what information is available about negative impacts and the causes

thereof.

� The data analysis and assessment should, if possible, be conducted jointly with partners. This creates new

perspectives, raises awareness and helps assess the interaction between the intervention and the context in which it

operates.

� Results of the RBM must be incorporated in further planning so that the project/programme can respond to

changes in the context and take steps to mitigate any unintended negative impacts (see Step 6).

� Staff should be trained in DNH and context- and conflict-sensitive RBM and provide the manager with

recommendations for project steering. At least one national and one international staff member should be involved

in interpreting data.

Example: Regional Social and Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees and Gaza Population (KR

2)27

Data collection and analysis

The project Regional Social and Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees and Gaza Population, a KR 2 project, has a

complex context and conflict-sensitive RBM with a detailed results model and indicators. With a view to data

collection and analysis, the project also uses a specially designed system for participatory RBM (called Reflecting on

Changes), which systematically identifies unintended positive and negative impacts, as well as risk- and security-

relevant aspects in terms of DNH. The Reflecting on Changes method is used especially at partner organisation level,

also with a view to capacity development, and is based on regular and participatory surveys using focus groups at

different levels. The method also allows for identifying unintended negative and positive results of the individual

projects.

The project supplements this method with systematic monitoring of risks and negative impacts, which are recorded

using check lists in the individual areas (Gaza, West Bank and Jordan). Security-relevant developments are

documented every week, and a detailed DNH analysis is performed on a monthly basis that covers both the regional

level and the refugee camp level and project levels. Data are distributed and discussed within the team, thus fostering

appropriate attitudes and raising the awareness of staff.

27 GIZ, 2011a.

25

Step 6: Use RBM results

What is to be achieved at this stage of using the RBM system?

• Decisions concerning steering are made with partners (strategic decisions: adjusting the results mode or target values, managerial and budget decisions).

• Evidence of results is obtained and reports produced on progress.

• Lessons learned and results are communicated.

How can one ensure context- and conflict-sensitive design?

� Steering

Since swift and flexible steering is particularly important in fragile states, conflict-affected countries and post-conflict

settings, managers must obtain a regular and comprehensive insight into any changes in the context.

� Routine ‘reflection meetings’ are held to discuss unintended negative impacts and the causes thereof, and to

explore alternative options for action. Depending on the urgency of the situation these meetings can be held twice a

year, but if the situation worsens, this can be stepped up so that meetings are held at quarterly or even monthly

intervals. At the same time, positive results and developments inside and outside the sphere of responsibility are also

regularly monitored. This space for reflection must be allowed for and applied as routine. Reflection helps us learn

from the results of RBM, helps us be sensitive to critical changes, and gives us the opportunity to investigate the

results of our own work and scrutinise these critically.

� It is the responsibility of the manager to actively foster context- and conflict-relevant RBM, to conduct

controversial discussions and to use the results of context- and conflicts-sensitive RBM in steering, as well as

communicating these results.

� It must be discussed which of the partners are to be informed of results and to what extent passing on

information can have an impact on existing conflicts. The next projects and programmes must be designed and

realised with the partners involved in steering and strategic decisions (see Step 2).

� If necessary, the results model must be changed in a context- and conflict-sensitive way or target values for

indicators reduced as a result of the interpretation of data, and this communicated to the commissioning parties.

� It should be discussed and decided to what extent the system boundary should be changed or whether the

cooperation system is still appropriate. The context and conflict analysis and the data collection methods are updated

for the next data collection period.

� Accountability/evidence of results/reporting obligations

Reporting to BMZ also includes the FS markers. For FS1 and FS 0 programmes or projects in countries with

increased or acute potential for escalation additional space must be created for this in the description of the current

situation, also in terms of unintended results and conflict-related risks. A special report might be necessary where

radical changes are observed in the context28.

� Advisory approaches or decentralised evaluations such as a PPR can help bring the programme into line with

changes in the conflict situation. The staff assigned for the evaluation should have the requisite expertise in contexts

of conflict.

� Knowledge management/learning

28 GTZ, 2007, page 23.

26

In order to learn from context- and conflict-sensitive RBM a climate of trust must be established within the team

and with partners. It has proved effective to initiate occasional ‘reflection meetings’ within GIZ, also at a supra-

project or -programme level, in order to pool knowledge about the conflict context and conflict actors, and to enable

teams to learn from one another (e.g. within the scope of workshops during the GIZ assembly to take stock of the

past year or at field staff meetings).

Example: CERCAPAZ, Colombia (KR 2)

A culture of learning and reflection29

CERCAPAZ, a peacebuilding programme which fosters cooperation between the state and civil society in Colombia, has set itself the goal of establishing a culture of learning and reflection within the team and outside the programme. The programme’s monitoring and evaluation system is part of this culture. The approach fosters individual and collective learning, and provides for an ongoing reflection on the steering of the programme in the conflict context.

The special feature is that there is a focus on regular, institutionalised learning and reflection meetings on the progress of the programme. The team identified several ‘moments’ in the course of the year at which reports are written or meetings organised, whereby a clear distinction is made between meetings with external partners and internal team-only meetings. Reflection loops from these meetings are incorporated in the steering of the programme. Over and above this, various formats have been devised which facilitate the process of reflection, as well as the documentation of the processes involved in monitoring, and foster a common understanding of the development of the intervention. Not only does every programme staff member have a role and responsibility within the monitoring system, but a ‘culture of learning and reflection team’ has been established which helps the programme manager coordinate the programme.

Example: Support for the Prime Minister’s Office in realising the reconstruction plan for northern Uganda (KR 1)

Reflection on the steering of the programme

The programme to support the Prime Minister’s Office in realising the reconstruction plan for northern Uganda devised a monitoring questionnaire, which was designed to encourage all staff members to reflect at six-monthly intervals on their own processes and strategies. Context and conflict sensitivity is an integral part of the system. Information on conflicts is solicited implicitly at all levels, and the team attempts to develop possible approaches. The results of this process and the ‘peer-to-peer consulting’ are directly incorporated in the steering of the programme and influence the advisory approaches adopted by the staff of the intervention.

29 GIZ, 2011b.

27

Overview Steps 5/6: Collect and analyse data and use RBM results

FS 0 in countries with

increased or acute potential

for escalation

FS 1 FS 2

Data collection

and evaluation

DNH aspects are taken into

account in data collection.

DNH questions are answered.

Data is gathered, evaluated and

interpreted on context- and

conflict-relevant indicators in one

sector, and the link to sector-

specific PBN explored.

Were the intended peacebuilding

results achieved; were any others

achieved?

Data is gathered, evaluated and

interpreted on context- and

conflict-relevant indicators, and the

link to national PBN explored.

Were the intended peacebuilding

results achieved; were any others

achieved?

Monitoring per se is an intervention – data collection and evaluation must therefore also be context- and

conflict-sensitive.

What information emerges on negative impacts?

What steering needs does this engender?

Steering Review the context- and

conflict-sensitive design of

the results hypotheses on the

basis of data gathered;

formulate the consequences

for steering.

Initiate reflection meetings on results hypotheses (positive results and

unintended negative impacts), causes of changes and options for

adaptation.

Use the results for programme steering, involve partners.

If necessary, adjust the results model or change the target values, system

boundaries and cooperation system; update the context and conflict

analysis and data collection methods.

Reporting,

evaluation

Create space for unintended results and risks in the

report.

Create understanding for the conflict context and

its requirements.

Report on additional positive results.

Possibly produce a special report should grave changes take place.

Learn from evaluations for the context- and conflict-sensitive design of the programme.

28

Annex 1: Guidelines for the Do No Harm analysis

Key questions for the Do No Harm analysis

Positive impacts on the conflict

� Has the organisation implementing the activities/delivering advisory services actively endeavoured to identify things/aspects/approaches that transcend boundaries and bring together people from different sides?

� Has it designed its activities/advisory services such that they are related to these connectors? � Are the activities implemented/ the advisory services delivered such that people are given an opportunity to

speak and act without any reference to war and/or violence? � Do the activities/advisory services respect, strengthen and support local authorities, if these assume

responsibility for civil governance? � Do the activities/advisory services reward those individuals, groups and communities who organise

initiatives across group lines and/or take peacebuilding action?

Negative impacts on the conflict

� Are activities implemented/advisory services delivered such that one or several sub-groups benefit significantly more than others? (also recruitment, material assistance)

� Are activities implemented/advisory services delivered such that they legitimate individuals involved in war/violence or attitudes and conduct that foster war/violence?

� Does the organisation implementing these activities/delivering these advisory services refuse to cooperate with other organisations, local government agencies or local NGOs, to exchange information or to plan common events?

� Do the staff of the organisation implementing these activities/delivering these advisory services express discouragement or powerlessness vis-à-vis their superiors, central office or sponsor? Are they often cited as a reason why something is ‘not possible’?

� Are staff tense and afraid? Do they express hatred or mistrust vis-à-vis the local population (or sections of the local population)? Do they involve their local colleagues or partners frequently in discussions of violence, war experiences, terrible experiences – thus reinforcing the impression that these are the important things?

Points to observe in the interaction between development projects or programmes and conflict contexts

Resource transfers

• Distribution impacts: The resources and services of the development project/programme benefit predominantly

one party to the conflict or reinforce the differences between groups.

• Market impacts: The presence of international organisations drives up local market prices, salaries and profit

margins. Local service providers are unable to compete with the heavily subsidised services of the international

organisations.

• Substitution impacts: The tasks taken on by international organisations substitute or displace local sources. The

international resources for the social sector free up local resources, which can be used, for instance, to wage war.

• Misuse impacts: Theft, corruption and mismanagement result in a loss of project/programme resources, which

often fall into the hands of one party to the conflict, which, for instance, is operating road blocks. This party is

thus strengthened in economic terms.

• Legitimation impacts: The advisory services delivered by an international organisation, or cooperation with this

organisation generally enhances the reputation of a local institution. This brings with it the danger of

legitimating actors in the conflict.

29

Implicit ethnic messages

• Cultural factors: If the behaviour of foreign experts is perceived as disrespectful towards local culture, this also sets

a bad example for the relationship between the parties to the conflict.

• Standard of living: Due to their high standard of living, foreign experts are often perceived as being linked to the

local elite, and close to them and their interests.

• Use of resources: If staff members of aid organisations use scarce resources, including petrol, official vehicles or

communication equipment for private purposes, such as leisure activities, this strengthens the perception that

generally those in control of scarce resources get away with using them for their own pleasure.

• Lack of respect and competition among external actors: This conduct communicates to the local population that

cooperation and mutual respect enjoy little importance among external actors too.

• Powerlessness: When project staff are not willing to assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions, this

sends the message that individuals are virtually powerless in the face of wider structures.

• Tension and mistrust on the part of project staff is transferred to their partners. Conflict becomes omnipresent in

everyday life.

• Different valuation of human life: The failure to include local staff in the security plans of the organisation

communicates the message that the lives of local staff are worth less.

• Demonisation and victimisation in public: In the internet era interested members of the local public tend to be well

informed about the statements made by the organisation at international level. Allocations of blame,

victimisation of certain groups or political accusations are perceived sensitively as taking sides in the conflict.

• Weapons and power: When organisations employ armed security staff for their own protection, they often indirectly

support one party to the conflict financially, and communicate the message that weapons are a legitimate way of

dealing with conflict.

Source: GTZ Training -CD: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peace-Building. Course concept

and training modules for decision-makers and experts in German development cooperation. (based on Mary B. Anderson, 1999)

Key questions for Do No Harm analyses

The following questions constitute the Indications of Negative Impacts

[A ‘yes’ answer indicates a negative impact]:

• Are aid goods stolen, especially by those connected directly to a warring side?

• What are the market impacts of aid in the given area?

Specifically:

o Are prices of goods connected to the war economy rising? o Are incentives for engaging in the war economy rising? o Are prices of goods connected to the peacetime economy falling? o Are incentives for engaging in peacetime economic activities falling?

• Is aid provided in ways that benefit one (some) sub-group(s) over others? Does the aid agency employ people more from one group than others? Do material goods go more to one group than others?

• Is aid providing a sufficiently significant amount of material to meet civilian needs so that: o More local goods are freed up to be used in warfare/by armies? o Local leaders take little or no responsibility for civilian welfare? [What are the manifestations

of this?]

• Is aid being given in ways that ‘legitimize’ war-related individuals (giving them more power, prestige or access to international attention or wealth)? Is aid being given in ways that legitimize the actions of war (for e.g. reinforcing patterns of population movements that warriors are causing; linking to divisions in the society thus reinforcing them)? Is aid being given in ways that legitimize war-supporting attitudes

30

(for e.g. rewarding those who are most violent; being given separately to all groups in assumption that they cannot work together)?

• Does the aid agency rely on arms to protect its goods and/or workers?

• Does the aid agency refuse to cooperate or share information and planning functions with other aid agencies, local government or local NGOs? Does it openly criticize the ways that others provide aid and encourage local people to avoid working with other agencies?

• Do field staff separate themselves from the local people with whom they are working and do they frequently use aid goods, or the power they derive from them, for their personal benefit or pleasure?

• Does the aid agency apportion its institutional benefits (salaries or per diem scales; equipment such as cars, phones, offices; expectations of time commitments to the job; rewards for work done; vacation, R & R, evacuation plans) in ways that favour one identifiable group of workers more than others?

• Do the aid staffs express discouragement and powerlessness in relation to their superiors, home offices or donors? Do they express disrespect for these people but often cite them as the reason why something is ‘impossible’?

• Are aid staffs frightened and tense? Do they express hatred, mistrust, or suspicion for local people (any of the local people)? Do they frequently engage their local staff counterparts in conversation about violence, war experiences, the terrible things they have experienced (thus reinforcing the sense that these are the things that matter)? Does the agency promote or in other ways exceptionally reward staff members who have served in more violent places/situations?

• Does the aid agency's publicity and/or fundraising approach demonise one side of the war? Does it treat one group as always ‘victimised’ by the other?

In addition to deciding if an aid agency's programme deserves a ‘yes’ answer to the above questions, people involved in these implementation

pilot projects must also assess the degree to which any of these actions, attitudes or situations actually matters in the given context.

The question to ask in this regard is: Does it directly relate to events that are effected by or caused by aid?

Note: If the answers to these questions are consistently ‘no’ and, furthermore, rather than doing the things described in the questions, the

agency and its staff are actively pursuing alternative approaches, it is important also to assess the significance of this in relation to the

conflict. Is the alternative approach recognized and commented upon by community leaders or large numbers of local people with

appreciation? Are incidences of violence between groups or of lawlessness among warriors dropping? Can any of this be attributed to a

change in climate to which the aid agency's approaches have contributed?

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Annex 2: Guidelines for the stakeholder analysis

The stakeholder analysis is an instrument that can be used to identify individuals, groups and organisations relevant

for the project context, as well as analysing existing relations and interaction between these.

Description

The production of a stakeholder analysis, also known as a stakeholder map, is a way of visualising the stakeholders,

their interaction, and conflicts. Allies or influential parties should be involved in the analysis. The analysis serves to

identify links, power relations and potential partnerships in cooperation. Your own organisation (GIZ, etc.), your

project/programme and its relations to the various stakeholders should also be part of the analysis. Before you start,

the context must be determined and delimited. Which conflict setting should be examined at what point in time? The

analysis can be conducted again at a later time point to make changes readily visible. The stakeholder analysis is also

useful to compare the perspectives of different actors or parties involved. (To do so, get each stakeholder to produce

a stakeholder map and discuss needs and fears as you compare these.)

The stakeholder analysis attempts to answer the following key questions:

� What relations exist between all stakeholders and how can these be presented? (alliances, contact broken off, etc.)

� Where do you and your organisation stand in relation to the stakeholders? How do these relations impact on activities?

� Which of the stakeholders mentioned is a conflict agent and which a peace agent?

How to proceed

• Identify important stakeholders within the conflict setting (including you and your project). Take a pin board and round/oval cards of different sizes and give each stakeholder a card. The size of the card chosen should reflect the degree of influence or power of the stakeholder. The distance between the cards represents the closeness/distance between the stakeholders. Partners in an alliance, for instance, should be placed close together. Do not take too detailed an approach; an initial rough draft showing the main stakeholders and relations is adequate. Use the entire surface of the pin board so that you have enough space for the next step.

• Draw in the relations between actors (conflict, cooperation, etc.) using the lines in the key overleaf (we recommend 3-4 different types of lines).

• If necessary, add boxes/square cards which explain the thematic dimensions of the conflict.

• Discuss the finished image or different versions of the conflict with the parties involved, as well as the different roles of stakeholders and the entry point of your own organisation.

Time: Allow at least 90 minutes for this exercise.

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3. Stakeholder map – the example of Afghanistan

Examples

1. Possible symbols 2. Template for a stakeholder map

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Annex 3: Overview of the objectives and use of relevant conflict analysis instruments

Tool Objective Use

1

Stakeholder analysis

Visualises relations between stakeholders to

gain a better understanding of power

constellations and tense relations.

Suitable for use at a very early stage in a process

so as to analyse the context and certain

situations and constellations.

Makes sense to repeat from time to time in

order either to supplement perspectives or

identify changes.

2

Conflict onion (conflict

layer model)

Analyses positions, interests and needs of

stakeholders so as to identify potential

common ground that could bring the parties

(to the conflict) together.

Should be used in the process as soon as

knowledge is available or assumptions can be

made with respect to stakeholders and attitudes.

3

Conflict tree

Stimulates the discussion of causes and

impacts of conflicts with a view to developing

a common understanding of the core

problem.

If the core problem to be addressed by the

programme needs to be defined, or when there

is disagreement as to the core problem.

4

Scenario analysis

Supports flexible strategic planning, design

and realisation of an intervention. This results

in various options for action which enhance

flexibility of action in the case of critical

incidents.

At the beginning of a development project or in

an ongoing process as a result of certain

incidents.

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Literature

Africa Peace Forum et al. (2004). Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. A resource pack. http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/publications/conflict-sensitive-approaches-development-humanitarian-assistance-and-peacebuilding-res

BMZ (2005).Sector strategy for crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace-building in German development cooperation. Strategy for peace-building. Bonn: BMZ. http://www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/themen_und_schwerpunkte/frieden/krisenpraevention.pdf

BMZ (2011a). Krisenfrühwarnung auf Grundlage der Einschätzungen des GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies (unpublished). Bonn: BMZ (German only).

BMZ (2012). Wirkungen unter der Konflikt-Lupe. Ein Leitfaden zur krisenbezogenen Wirkungsbeobachtung (German only).

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012). How to guide to conflict sensitivity. Conflict Sensitivity Consortium.

GIZ (2011a). Monitoring System of the Regional Social & Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees and Gaza Population (S&C Fund). Palestinian Territories: GIZ.

GIZ (2011b). Monitoring und Evaluierung im Programm CERCAPAZ (German only).

GIZ (2012a). 6 Prozessschritte zum Aufbau und zur Nutzung eines WoM-Systems im Auftragsverfahren (Phase 3: Durchführung). Eschborn: GIZ (German only).

GIZ (2012b). Stocktaking of the interface between conflict sensitive project management and security risk management in the GIZ. Eschborn: GIZ.

GIZ (2013). The Policy Marker System: DAC Markers, BMZ Markers – Guidelines, OE 0430, May 2013.

GTZ (2001). Konfliktanalyse für die Projektplanung und -steuerung. Eine praktische Handreichung. GTZ: Eschborn (German only). http://www.giz.de/Themen/en/SID-0C665BD0-774BA638/dokumente/de-konfliktanalyse.pdf

GTZ (2005a). Arbeitshilfe zur K-Kennung bei der Angebotserstellung. Eschborn: GTZ (German only).

GTZ (2005b). Leitfaden zur Durchführung einer Konfliktanalyse. GTZ: Eschborn (German only).

GTZ (2006). Konfliktsensibles Monitoring in Vorhaben der beruflichen Bildung. Eine Orientierungshilfe. Eschborn: GTZ/FAKT (German only). http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/07-0022.pdf

GTZ, BMZ & KfW (2007a): PCA Mindeststandards für K0, K1 und K2- Vorhaben. Anwendung von PCA bei K0 Vorhaben. Mindeststandards für Vorhaben der TZ und EZ (German only).

GTZ (2007b). Empfehlungen für das Auftragsmanagement zur konfliktsensiblen Gestaltung und Steuerung von TZ-Vorhaben (German only). http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/de-crisis-empfehlungen-auftragsmanagement-2007.pdf

GTZ, BMZ & FRCS (2004). Practitioner’s Guide: Do No Harm. Eschborn: GTZ. www.http://methodfinder.de/

GTZ, BMZ & KfW (2007). Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA). Ein methodischer Rahmen zur konflikt- und friedensbezogenen Ausrichtung von EZ-Vorhaben. Eschborn: GTZ (German only). http://www.giz.de/Themen/de/dokumente/de-crisis-pca-2008.pdf

OECD/DAC (2005). Preventing Conflict and Building Peace – A Manual of Issues and Entry Points. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/35785584.pdf

OECD/DAC (2012). Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility – Improving Learning for Results. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/evaluating-donor-engagement-in-situations-of-conflict-and-fragility_9789264106802-en

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Further reading

Davies, Rick and Jess Dart (2005). The ‘Most Significant Change’ (MSC) Technique - Evaluating in conflict situations. http://www.mande.co.uk/docs/MSCGuide.pdf

DFID (2010) Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations, Briefing Paper I: Monitoring and Evaluation. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67695/building-peaceful-states-I.pdf

KOFF Newsletter Swisspeace (2013/ Nr. 117). Wirksame Friedensförderung & Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (German only). http://koff.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/koff/Publications/NL/NL_117_d.pdf

KOFF, FriEnt (2013). http://www.frient.de/nc/publikationen-service/dokumente/library/help-or-hindrance-results-orientation-in-conflict-affected-situations.html

United States Institute of Peace (2011). Improving Peacebuilding Evaluation. http://www.usip.org/publications/improving-peacebuilding-evaluation

Search for Common Ground (2010), Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs, http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/ilt_manualpage.html

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Postfach 5180 65760 Eschborn Germany Email: info@giz.de Internet: www.giz.de