Feyerabend, Paul - Erkenntnislehre by Viktor Kraft, 1963

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The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Erkenntnislehre by Viktor KraftReview by: P. K. FeyerabendThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, No. 52 (Feb., 1963), pp. 319-323Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

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REVIEWS

Erkenntnislehre.By Viktor Kraft.

Springer-Verlag,Vienna, I96o. Pp. v + 375.

IN his latest book ProfessorKraftattempts to give a systematicpresentationof the theory of knowledge in its presentstateof development' (iii). One

of the main reasons or this enterprise ies in the fact that the new develop-ments in philosophywhich startedwith the Vienna Circle 'have not been

taken into accountby the German books on the theory of knowledge'

(iii). Americanbooks, on the other hand 'use great precisionin derivingtheoremsfrom presuppositionswhich postulatewhat would seem to be in

need of investigation. ... In thisway the problemsareput aside,theyarenot

dealtwith. But it is the taskof epistemologyto proceedto the foundations

and to clarifythem' (iv).ProfessorKraft startsaccordinglywith an investigation of the natureof

knowledge and of the manner in which the essential characteristicsof

knowledge can be determined. Thisinvestigation s a masterpieceof clarity

andincisive

argumentandit should be read

by anyoneintendingto take

upa

problem of epistemology or of the philosophy of science. The main thesis

of this chapter s that' the idea of knowledge can be arrivedat only on the

basis of stipulationsand its validity is a matter of agreement (with these

stipulations) (28). The theory of knowledge is therefore'very different

from the factualsciences; it does not deal with somethingexistingin realitybut putsforth aimsand normsfor our intellectualactivity' (32). It suggestsan idealwhich we use to criticiseor to praisetheories, statements,points of

view which are announced together with the claim that they represent

knowledge (23). It 'is supposedto be the basisfor a criticism of actualtheorizingandnot an activitywhich merely describes uchtheorizing (24).

This is radically different from both the traditionalviews (of which

Platonism, phenomenology, transcendental dealism, and inductive meta-

physicsarediscussed) ndfromwhat is implicitin manyphilosophicalnvesti-

gations of today. In its early days logical positivismwas bold enough to

oppose even the sciencesand to demandthat they be changed radicallyand

freed from their metaphysical ngredients. This was an unreasonabledeal,no doubt, but being an ideal t provided a motor for changeandfor critical

examinationof the existing theories. It also led to the constructionof newtheories (the elementary quantum theory is an example). And it is quiteclearthat modem science tselfcould not have come into being without such

a motor. At its beginning it was very different ndeed,both as regards ts

content and as regardsthe methods used for its augmentation,from the

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REVIEWS

existingbodyof doctrine-Aristotelianhysics. Thosewho built it com-

paredthe existing things with an ideal and found them wanting. It is for

this reasonthat they were capableof changingthe whole outlook of theirage, the attitude towards religion included. Such radical optimism is

hardlyfound today. Especiallywithin philosophy properthe realisationof

the limitations of the early doctrines of the Vienna Circle as well as the

generalcommotion createdby the progressof the scienceshave led to a most

submissive attitude towards the actual form of the sciences and later even

towardsthe opinions inherent n the naturallanguages. Such an attitude s

todayalsoexhibited owardssubjectswhich arestillin their nfantilestage.Theyarenot criticised n the basisof a perhapsomewhat trict dealand

thereby ivena chance o improve, heyareratheraid o possess ' logicoftheirown' accordingowhichtheymustbejudged;whichmeans, fcourse,thatthey are notjudgedat all. An analysisike the one carriedout byProfessorKraft n the firstchapter f this book shouldconvinceeveryonethatsucha procedures neitherpossible, ordesirable.It is notpossible s

any investigationnto the actualform of some enterprise roceedsbyselection(clearly oteverymoveof a scientist anandshouldberecordednddescribedy thephilosophyf science) nd, hereby, yimplicit eferenceoanideal(9). Andit is not desirable s we shouldbe clearaboutourpre-ferences ather han ntroduce hem n anunderhandashion.

It is unfortunatehatProfessorKraftdoesnot follow up this excellent

descriptionf the naturef epistemology yanequally leardevelopmentfthenormsadopted, f thereasonsor theadoption f thesenorms,as well as

by a detailedargument howinghow his positionon various ssues sinfluenced y thesenorms. Thiswould have beena revolutionarynder-

taking ndeed,the first construction f a purelynormativeepistemology.As it is therearemany ssuesn thebook which are discussedn thetradi-

tional ashion. However hosecaseswhere hereferenceo norms s madeexplicithowverywellthepowerof thenew modeofthinking. Anexample(and heonlyexample shallbe ableto discussn thepresent eview) s the

wayinwhichProfessor raft reats heproblem finduction,heproblem ftheexistence f materialobjects, ndtheproblemof the existence f otherminds.

ProfessorKraftargues eryconvincinglyhattheproblemof inductionis stillwithout a solution. He discusseswith excellent easonshe inade-

quacies f theprobabilisticheories, otablyof the theories f Reichenbach

and Carnap themainobjections gainst he latterareinapplicability,oproblems f physics,of the formalsystemsused(233f.) aswell as the factthat n a world with infinitelymany ndividualsany general tatement as

probabilityeroon the basisof finiteevidence232);instance-confirmationfor which a finitevalue is obtained s rejectedwith the remark hat thesciencescannotdo without laws which are needed for the purposeof

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explanation.)The conclusionof the discussions that the step beyond

experimentalesults anbe madeonlywith thehelpof hypothesesor which

littleor no initialjustifications given. A pointof view that is usedforprovidingknowledgeaboutreality s a systemof suchhypotheses243).And' what sregardeds nductionsnothingbuttheprocess f introducinghypotheses n thebasisof (theknown)facts..... Inductionstherefore ota new andspecificmethodofjustification.Theredoesnot existanyvalidmethodofjustificationesidesdeduction'(253).

In the Anglo-Americaniterature his doctrinehas becomeassociatedwith thenameof ProfessorKarlPopper f theLondonSchoolof Economics.Itis therefore otunimportanto pointout thatKrafthasdeveloped is own

ideasindependently,nd earlier[in his GrundformenerWissenschaftlichenMethodenhichwaspublishedntheyear1925 tenyearsbefore hepublica-tionof the German ditionof theLogicofScientificiscovery)n Vol. 203 ofthe SitzungsberichteerOesterreichischenkademieerWissenschaften;his

essaydealsboth with the natural ciencesand the socialsciences;it stilldeservescarefulstudyby anyoneinterested n the philosophyof these

subjects. Popperhimself eferso Kraftasone of hispredecessors.]Thereare alsodifferencesetweenKraft'spointof view and thatof Popper. An

examples his attitude owards heproblemof observation.According o

Poppertest-statements('basic-statements) are aboutobservable elationsbetweenmacroscopic bjects. They aremotivatedby experience, ut not

justifiedy it. Theirinterpretations 'materialistic'. Accordingo Kraft,however,the 'hypothesisof a world of objectswhich exists outside he

realityof ourexperiencesanonlybe testedon thebasisof experience;..the reasons thatallother actsalreadynvolvethehypothesiso be tested'

(294).Now theimportanthing s that or Kraft est-statementsrenot about

singleperceptions,r

sensations-this s the positionwhich has been soeffectively riticisedby Popper-but about'perceptions,nsofar stheyaremembers f acontextregulated ylaws (293),oraboutbundlesofperceptions.

It is worthwhileo look a littlemore nto the theorybehind his inter-

pretation f the test statements.Two domains reassumed,he domainof

reallyexistingobjects, ndthedomainof perceptions.Perceptionsrenot

sensations;without theknowledgeadded o thesense-data e wouldnot

possess nyperceptionf materialobjects (285). Nor areperceptionsartsof realobjects:' what s given n experiencesnottheobject .. itself. ..

Thisobject s essentiallynperceivable(291). Whatwe meet n theworldof experiencesresigns or the objects Anzeichen).But-and now comestheimportanttep-thesesignsarenolongerdentifiedwitheither ensations,or withsingle erceptions.Whatrepresentsmaterialobject and, orthatmatter,whatrepresentsomebody lse'smind) n thedomainof experienceis a bundleof perceptionslawfully connected and it is to this bundle that

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observationsentencesrefer. The chargeof psychologismis therebysuccess-

fullyavoided.

Howevert mightnow beobjectedhat hephysical bjects ostulatednadditiono theirrepresentativesn theplaneof observation recompletelysuperfluous.Thetheoryhasgreat imilarity ithKant's ointofview. Thedomainof experience orrespondso Kant'sdomainof phenomena r tohis 'nature' whichis just phenomena onnectedby laws. And the real

objects eemto be verysimilar o the Dingansichof Kant: theyarenotaccessibleo directobservation,hey are postulatedn additionto the

perceptionsnd heyseem o bealtogetherseless. Thisobjection verlooksthe very importantdifference etweenKraft'stheoryand the theoryof

Kantwhichmay be summarisedn the followingtwo important oints:first,Kraftestablishes connection etween hepostulatedealobjects nd

experiencewhichallowshim to controlproperties f the formerby refer-

enceto thelatter;theseconddifferenceies n the factthatmethodological,normative onsiderationsregivenfor theacceptancef thehypothesis f

real thingsand of other minds. This must now be explainedn some

detail.Asin thecaseof theproblem f inductionKraftpointsoutthatalmostall

procedures

f the sciences ndof commonsense(observationndmeasure-

ment ncluded)nvolvehypothesesuchas thehypothesisf theexistence fmaterialhingsand the hypothesis f the existenceof otherminds. He

makes t veryclear hat hese wo ideasarehypotheses,hattheyareunjusti-fiedconjecturesorwhichno foundationanbegiven. This sdone,partly,

by a detailed xaminationndrefutationf traditionalndmore modern'

arguments ttempting o provethem in one way or another. He also

argues ery convincinglyhat heonlyalternativeo the use of thesehypo-theses s solipsism. n thishe is much more straightforwardhan many

philosophersavebeenwho wanted o havetheircakeandeat

it,i.e. who

watedto drop'metaphysical'deassuchas the ideaof the realityof the

externalworld,andwhohoped hat hiscouldbe donewithoutendingupin absurdity.I thinkProfessorKrafthasexhibitedheirmethods erywell.

We thereforeeem o be leftwitharather ncomfortablehoice-solipsism,or a body of doctrine or opinion)which usesunjustifiedonjecturess

essentialarts. Is therea wayoutof thisdilemma?

There s,andthe solutionspurelymethodological,r normative. It is

alsovery simpleand containswo demands nly. First, hat our ideasbe

testable.Thisdemandnvitesus to connectouthypotheses iththedomainof experience. Second,hatour deasbecapable f givinganexplanationf

knownphenomena.Thisdemand pecifieshe connectionwithexperiencein detailandalsoputsrestrictionspontheideas o be used: the ideasmust

not beadhoc,heymustberichern content hanwhat heywant to explain,that stheymustestablishonnectionsn thedomain fexperience hichare

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eithermorestrict,or morecomplex, hanthe connections lready nown.

It alsoresultsn theirtranscendingxperience-for f the entitiespostulated

forexplanationompletely oincidewith laws n the domainof experience,thentheyareadhocwithrespecto theseawsand hereforeolongercapableof giving a satisfactoryxplanation.The hypothesis f the existenceofmaterial bjectss therefore ot only an essentialpart of our thinking, nthe sciencesndwithincommon ense, partwithoutwhichmuch pparentlyvaluableknowledgewould simplycollapse-this,too, is shown in greatdetailbyProfessor raft-it is alsocapablef support.Thesupports notbyproof, orby 'induction' it is by methodological rgumentationhat s byreferenceo someof thenormswhich constitute urepistemology. This

establishes decideddifference etweenKraft'sheoryof two worlds,andKant's.

I have dweltat lengthon thisparticulartemin order o showhow anormative pistemologyan takecareof traditionalproblemsorwhichno

satisfactoryolution s asyetavailable. I shall hereforeave o omit a moredetaileddiscussion f the remainingpartsof the book which dealwith

language,ogic, the ideaof truth,physicalaws,reality,microphysics,ndthe theoryof probability. And in any case it would have been quiteimpossibleo giveahalf-way atisfactoryccount f a bookwhich s so rich

in content ndat thesame imewrittennsucha tersestyle. Letme mentiononlyone furtherpoint. Manycontemporaryhilosophersresoconvincedof therevolutionaryharacterf theirenterprisehattheybelieve heycan

safelyneglecteverythinghathappened efore, ay, 900ooorperhaps 889,the birth-dateof Wittgenstein).Wittgensteinhimself has broughta

completelyunhistoricalatmospherento philosophy. Although dealingwithproblemswhichhaveafirm oundationnthehistoryof philosophy ehaspresentedheseproblemsn a fashion hatsuggestedhattheyhadjustbeenbornandwere

completelynrelatedo whatever lsehadbeen

thoughtbefore(exceptperhapshe TractatusndRussell'sPrincipia).Kraft'sbookshowsthe advantage ained rom an acquaintanceith the philosophicaltradition. It is to be recommendedo anyserious tudent f epistemologyand of thatrecentbastard-childf epistemology,hephilosophy f science.

P. K. FEYERABEND

Toward eunionnPhilosophy.By MortonWhite.

University ress,London:Cumberledge, arvard,956.Pp.xv + 308.

THmtitleof ProfessorWhite'sstudygivesexpressiono hisconcernaboutthe growthof ' compartmentalisationof philosophynto special ubjects,and indicatesan attemptat re-establishingommunication etweenthevariouscompartments.The principal im of his enquirys to showthat

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Feyerabend, Paul - Erkenntnislehre by Viktor Kraft, 1963

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