Gottschalk AnaximanderApeiron 1965

Anaximander's "Apeiron"Author(s): H. B. GottschalkSource: Phronesis, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1965), pp. 37-53Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181755 .

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Anaximander's Apeiron' H. B. GOTTSCHALK

Fifteen years ago W. Kraus began an article on the Apeiron by saying that "It is now generally agreed that Anaximander's Infinite is not material in any real sense".2 Since then a consider-

able number of studies have been published and several divergent views of the Apeiron have been maintained.3 The problem arises from the apparent inconsistencies in the evidence of Aristotle and Theo- phrastus. Their statements fall into three groups:

1. At Metaph. 1069b22 and Phys. 207a21ff and b35ff4 Aristotle appears to identify the Apeiron with his own completely potential prime matter. It is obvious that Anaximander cannot have thought of it in this way, but does Aristotle really claim that he did, as Cherniss asserts?5 In the Metaphysics passage his object is to illustrate his doctrine that all things come into being out of what is potentially, but not actually. As an example of this he refers to those physical systems in which the world is made to arise from a substance without any specific character of its own, i.e., those of Anaximander and Demo- critus, to whose first principles no sensible qualities could be assigned, and of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, who are treated, for the purpose of this argument, as if their first principles were respectively the acop&poq and the primeval mixture; looked at in this way they become 1 This article is a revised version of a paper read to the Northern Association for Ancient Philosophy in March, 1963. I am grateful to the members of the Association for their helpful discussion. This does not mean that they neces- sarily agree with the views put forward here. 2 W. Kraus, "Das Wesen des Unendlichen bei A.", Rh.Mus. 93 (1950), 364ff. 8 The most important recent discussions are by G. Vlastos, "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies", C.Ph. 42 (1947), 168ff; F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae p. 159ff; U. H6lscher, Hermes 81 (1953), 257ff; 385ff; J. B. McDiar- mid, "Theophrastus on Pre-Socratic Causes", Harvard Studies 61 (1953), 96ff; G. S. Kirk, CQ 49 (1955), 21ff; C. H. Kahn, A. and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, N.Y. 1960; P. Seligman, The Apeiron of A., London, 1962; and the relevant chapters in Kirk and Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, and W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1. 'Cf. VS 59A61, 12A14. 6 H. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy, p. 366.

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monists having an indeterminate substance as their first principle. If these substances are completely indeterminate, it follows that they are nothing in actuality but everything potentially, and so indistinguishable from Aristotle's prime matter.6 But Aristotle does not pretend that this accurately represents his predecessors' thought. On the contrary, the very tentative language in which he states his conclusion shows quite clearly that he was drawing his own inference from their writings.7

The Physics passage comes at the end of Aristotle's discussion of infinity. Since every complete thing is determined and therefore limited, Aristotle concludes that the infinite is essentially incomplete and can only become something complete by being limited; in itself it is only potentially anything, i.e., it behaves as matter rather than form. Moreover, he goes on, all earlier thinkers appear to treat the infinite as matter, therefore it is nonsense to speak of it as that which embraces all things rather than that which is embraced.8 The last clause almost certainly alludes to Anaximander's doctrine,9 but Aristotle does not attribute his own doctrine of matter to him. What he says is that Anaximander should have arrived at this concept, if he had thought out the implications of his own statements about the first principle.

2. More important are two passages in which Anaximander is grouped with the Pluralists. One of these is Phys. 1877a20 (= VS A 16), where the early philosophers are divided into two groups, those who take as their first principle a specific substance of which other substances are modifications, and those who derive the other substances from the papXy by a process of 'separating-out' (?XxpEveaOxL), implying that these

substances pre-existed in the apyn in some way. The second group is made to include Anaximander, Empedocles and Anaxagoras; but Anaximander's principle is referred to as 'r gv, while it is said of the others that they regard the one and the many as truly existing, and

6 Seligman (p. 24ff, 28ff) also compares Metaph. 983b6ff, but here Aristotle only says that the earliest philosophers posited causes 'of a material kind' (&v U%vj e2et, cf. Ross ad loc.); all the thinkers to whom he refers, from Thales to Anaxagoras, derived the world from one or more fully qualified substances, and Anaximander is not even mentioned. 7 &(yre TG q 0 7jq &v elev IA.vot, 1069b24; also the PfX-nov yap of b21. 8 poMVOEV0ML 8 7r&VTC4 XOa 0t &XXOL &q U\ XP [VOL

') &1rCEP(P. 8M XaI &TOWOV T6

tepLtXoV nOLvLm ik L 7 neptsX61ievov, 208a2-24. The word u'n is used in the same wide sense as at Metaph. 983b7. 9 Cf. Phys. 203 b 1Off = Anaximander A 15; below, p. 39.

38



their original state is called a 'mixture'.10 This distinction is important; it suggests that Anaximander regarded the Apeiron as a unity, even though he held that the world came from it by a process involving 'separation'.1' This is confirmed by GC 314allff, where we find the same division into monists and pluralists. But this time the criterion is whether they believed in one elemental substance or many, and Anaximander is not included among the pluralists.12

The second of these passages is Metaph. 1069b22, to which I have already referred in a different connection. Here Aristotle speaks of 'ECuneaoxX6ouq 76 [LypX xct 'AvsLxto?v8pou, and does not distinguish Anaximander from the Pluralists proper. This however does not invalidate the distinction drawn at Phys. 187 a20. The Physics passage is part of a summary of earlier views which, within its limits, is clearly meant to be historically accurate, while the sentence from the Meta- physics is a mere aside, such as a modern writer would put into a footnote, and is carelessly written.13 Moreover, to make his point Aristotle had to emphasise the unity, not the plurality, of the &pcAt to which he refers; they had to be actually one, in order to be potentially many. He is not making a pluralist of Anaximander, but monists of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

3. There is only one other passage relevant to the present discussion in which Aristotle mentions Anaximander by name. At Phys. 203b lOff he says that "those thinkers who do not posit a further cause, such as Mind or Love, besides the Infinite" speak of it as 'surrounding' and 'guiding' all things, and regard it as divine; "for it is immortal and deathless, as Anaximander says". Strictly speaking only the last pair of epithets is ascribed to Anaximander. But Hippolytus14 tells us that he spoke of the Apeiron as 'surrounding' the universe, and this makes it likely that he also used the word xufpcpv&v of the Infinite. The

10 o' 8 .CO5 iO k ^6o V k kv ovvaTL6^Tmq 3xxp&eoct, 6a7rcp 'Avoc[Lxv8p6q pC7)L,

xxol 8aoL 8' Ev xlct 7ro& ya9XaLV, cr7rep 'Etvre8oxXq xxot 'MAvx y6pot cx T-roU pAyFto yoc,P XMl o0ToL &XXpklOUaL -r&XXo, 187a20-23. ii Cf. Simpl. 24, 25 = VS A 9; Zeller Ph.Gr.6 I 203 n. 1, Holscher p. 261ff. 12 Cf. Holscher i.c. 18 The word [Ty[a seems to be used with special reference to Empedocles, as in similar contexts elsewhere (cf. Bonitz Index Arist. 467b15; it is attached to Anaximander loosely, as Zeller puts it, by a 'slight zeugma'. (E. Zeller, Ph.Gr.5 I, 204 n. 1; cf. Holscher p. 262). 14 Ref. 1.6.1 = VS A 11, from Theophrastus.

39



preceding sentence,'5 however, cannot have come from him, although it is generally included in the testimonia for his philosophy.'6 Very similar reasoning is used by Melissus (B 2, 3), and the structure of the argument in Aristotle with its intricate series of dilemmas is more suggestive of Elea than Miletus. Probably it is Aristotle's own re- statement of an Eleatic argument.'7

These are all the explicit references to the Apeiron in Aristotle. But there are several places where he speaks of thinkers who posit an infinite simple bodily substance different from the elements, because if one element were infinite, it would long ago have destroyed the rest. One is at Phys. 204b 22ff, and in his commentary (p. 479.33) Simplicius tells us that Anaximander is meant; earlier in the same commentary he attributes to Anaximander the reason Aristotle gives here for making the infinite substance different from the elements.18 At GC 329 a8ff the same view is criticised again in very similar terms, and Kirk is almost certainly right in saying that Aristotle is thinking of Anaximander here."' Finally, on nine occasions, Aristotle mentions a theory which makes the ?&pyX something midway between air and water or between fire and air.20 Whether this refers to Anaximander or not has been much debated; even in antiquity the commentators were divided, Alexander and the majority accepting the ascription to Anaximander while Nicolaus of Damascus and Porphyry denied it.21 The arguments on both sides are pretty evenly balanced, but probably Aristotle had 15 203b4ff. 16 VS A 15, Kahn p. 42, Seligman p. 57f. But see Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy p. 57 n. 2. 17 Aristotle has reversed Melissus' argument; he infers the eternity of the infinite from its infinity, whereas Melissus infers its infinity from the fact that it had no beginning in time. This is certainly how Anaximander would have argued, if he reasoned in this way at all. Jaeger (Theology o the Early Greek Philosophers p. 27f) suggests that Melissus borrowed his argument from Anaximander; but this is very unlikely. 18 Simpl. Phys. 24.21ff = VS A 9 , Arist. Phys. 204b26ff. There is also a resemblance between 204b33ff and the sentence quoted as Anaximander's own by Thphr. Phys. Op. fr. 2 = VS B 1. 19 CQ 49.25ff. 20 Between air and water:Phys. 203a18, 205 a27, Cael. 303b 12, Metaph. 989a14; between fire and air, Phys. 187a14, GC 328b35, Metaph. 988a30; both possi- bilities are mentioned at GC 332 a 21. The reference at Phys. 189 b 3 to a substance intermediate between water and fire may be a slip. Cf. Ross on Phys. 187 a 14; 0. Gigon, Der Ursprung der gr. Philosophie p. 68ff; Kirk CQ 49.24ff; Kirk and Raven p. lOff; Kahn p. 44ff. 21 Cf. Simpl. Phys. 149.9ff, 151.20ff, and Zeller I (ed. 5), 209.

40



Anaximander in mind when he wrote at least some of these passages. All the same, his vagueness and his refusal to name Anaximander as the author show that he was doubtful about accepting this as a true representation of his doctrine.

Theophrastus mentions Anaximander's doctrine twice. In the fragment of the cpuatxxv A6ioa dealing with the Milesians, Anaximander is described as a monist who regarded the first principle as an infinite substance different from the elements, which is eternal and ageless and surrounds all the worlds; he is criticised for not saying what kind of thing it is, and for only naming the material cause.22 All this adds nothing to what Aristotle has told us.

Another passage is more difficult. This apparently came from the chapter on Anaxagoras and has been taken to prove that Theophrastus equated the Apeiron with the primeval mixture of Anaxagoras.

XCL sarocke (p-aLv 6o 0Oe6ppa'YoC 7poC7XtaL(q t4 'AvacLvLmMpy Asys,V '0 'Avcx~oy6pcav ' eNvo yip cpat v o LxpLaL'o ciepu Ir v Avcaypc ?XL Oc yAp 9TLV eV T- MetpC? T05Ob MeCpOU 'r'

aUYYeVn ?p?pEaOaL 7Cpoq ,X?qX, xxl 6't p?iv rV TF 7rO C pua y V,

yEVeaC^xL xPuV, OICL g yn, yiV' 6pLotwq 3 xal2 tuv &khv dvxa-rov, (4 Ot) YLVO~LCVcoV &X ? pX6VT& 7p6-?pOV. 68 XLV7Sb Xal ysVeae&( xatrov C'7?ara tov voVv 6 Avcxiy6po, iUcp' o6 aLtXptv6F.pLv

rOUq re xoaCou; xad T-qv -ov WCOV (PUlJLV &y\Vv)a0v. XOaL ouo [Lvy

qprCm, X?Pv6v@cov ao'?LSV &v O 'Avoxy6paq T'c& .LC?V Utx?acq XpXa4

07UCLpOU; 1tOLeLV, F(qV e 'r7 XtLVYaeCo4 XOC LJ yevia4sc aT(dcw [LaLv TOV

VOVV- eL t1?n T 1L0LV Th)V tr6 V T(v u7rOX&OL FJ.CXV ?eVML cUpt)av &OpLtaOV

xoa X(T' ?I806 xxa'L Xocr o?y0, ta9g aVO sag &pxaa v ?yetv

T- VTe TOU GU?CpOU (PUMV XMCO TOV V05V - &CF'? YOCEV?1XL TXo' acq0urmXX

atroLyeoX? 7oyourkraEw; noWv 'AvL,oct&vapu."23

Only the last seven lines (17-23) contain Theophrastus' own words. But it has generally been assumed that the remainder, from line 11 where Theophrastus is first named, to the beginning of the actual quotation, is a paraphrase of something Simplicius found in Theo- phrastus, and is meant to justify his assimilating Anaxagoras' theory

22 Thphr. Phys.Op. fr. 2 = Simpl. Phys. 24.13ff = VS 12A9; Hippol. Ref. 1.6.1 = VS A 11; Aet. 1.3.3 = VS A 14. The different versions of Theophrastus' report, with the Aristotelian parallels, are printed in parallel columns in Kirk, CQ 49.22. 28 Simpl. Phys. 27.11-23 = Thphr. Phys. Op. fr. 4 = VS 59A41. The same quotation is repeated by Simpl. 154.17-23 (= VS 12A9a); in this version Simpl. inserts 7r&v'rco before cpocLvcrxL in the last line. This word is taken into the text by Diels in the Doxographi and in VS 12A9a, but not in VS 59A41.

41



to Anaximander's.24 Controversy has centred on the word CXsZvon in line 12. By the normal rules it ought to refer to Anaximander, but parallels have been adduced to show that it could refer to Anaxagoras,25 and the point is unlikely to be settled in this way.26 What no one seems to have done so far is to consider the purpose of these sentences. The second one (lines 15-17), about the function of Mind in Anaxagoras' system, has clearly been put in to enable the reader to understand the allusions to Mind in the quotation from Theophrastus. This leaves the first sentence; and we have to ask whether it too forms part of Sim- plicius' summary of Anaxagoras' views, or whether it gives Theo- phrastus' reason for assimilating them to Anaximander's. Now in the earlier part of the same paragraph27 Simplicius describes Anaxagoras' doctrines that all substances have always existed, that there is a portion of everything in everything, and that things appear to be the substance of which they contain most. At line 15ff he tells us that Mind was the agency which brought about the formation of the world. The intervening sentence tells how the original mixture of all things was broken up and like substances came together. This sentence is a necessary link in the exposition; without it the sentence about Mind is left hanging in the air. It must therefore refer to Anaxagoras. This also explains why Anaxagoras is not named right at the beginning of the next sentence, as he should have been if there were a change of subject. Presumably Simplicius used the strong demonstrative in line 12 because he was returning to Anaxagoras after referring to Theophrastus. The yxp in the same line is difficult; it might be anticipatory, but I suspect that it refers back to the sentence "6T& (leg. 6,Tv) nXeZa'a 9vL,

-a5mrx 'vaXXo6r'co &v 9xoca6v a-TL XOctL v" (= Anaxag. fr. 12) which immediately precedes the first mention of Theophrastus.

These sentences, then, continue the outline of Anaxagoras' teaching begun on the previous page. They may be partly based on Theo- phrastus, but they have no more to do with the actual quotation than any others on the same page of Simplicius' text, and they certainly do not give the reason for the interpretation of Anaxagoras which the

24 Cf. Diels in the apparatus criticus to Simpl. I.c., Kirk CQ 49.27n, and the literature quoted in the next note but one. 25 E.g., Arist. de an. 404a27, also in a comparison. 26 For recent discussions see McDiarmid pp. 100, 142 n. 64, who makes it refer to Anaximander, and Kahn p. 41f, who refers it to Anaxagoras. 27 P. 26.31-27.11 = VS 59A41.

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quotation contains.28 The ambiguity arose because Simplicius intro- duced his quotation before he was ready for it, and then interrupted it without erasing what he had already written. Once this is grasped its meaning becomes plain. There are two ways of looking at Anaxagoras' system: if we stress the fact that all substances have existed from all time and were already present in the primeval mixture, we must say that he posits an infinity of material oipxxL and one moving cause. But if we regard his primeval mixture as a unity, his material principle turns out to be a single infinite substance, and in this respect his teaching is the same as Anaximander's. This is exactly what Aristotle had said,29 and it is also what Simplicius understood Theophrastus to mean, if we may judge by the words with which he introduces the fragment of Theophrastus when he quotes it a second time.30

The evidence of Aristotle and Theophrastus, then, can be summarised as follows:

1. Anaximander's 4py) was a principle 'of the material kind' and he did not assume the existence of a further 'moving principle' such as the Mind of Anaxagoras.

2. It was called 6 &7reLpov, in the singular. 3. It is 'divine', eternal, indestructible, and 'governs' the world. 4. It is corporeal but not identical with any of the elements or any

other known substance. 5. The universe was derived from it by a process involving 'separation',

and in this respect it resembled the primeval mixtures of Empedo- cles and Anaxagoras.

6. Theophrastus classified Anaximander as a monist.

Most historians have followed Theophrastus and assumed that Anaximander started with a single undifferentiated substance. But this view has been attacked by Heidel and more recently by Cherniss and McDiarmid, who believe that the Apeiron was a mixture like that

28 Diels (Doxogr. p. 479) was wrong to print them in widely-spaced type, as if they had come directly from Theophrastus' book. 29 See above, p. 37. 0 xoct 86(ppmaTo 8i T6v 'AvaEmy6poxv et6 '6v 'AvmcELavopov auvsoJv xal oVSto5

XXoqLpiVeL TX' D6 'Avaoy6pou Xey6[evo, C sVVxcOoL VAXv ocM-r6v 9uaLv ?kyCLV 9. u7roxcLtevov, Simpl. Phys. 154.14ff = VS 12A9a, cf. Holscher p. 263, n. 5.

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of Anaxagoras.31 They argue that Aristotle tried to read his own doctrine of qualitative change into the Pre-socratics, and therefore treated their &pXoL as single substances which could be starting-points for differentiation according to his own rule; this tendency so domi- nated his interpretation that he even tried to make the pluralist theories conform to his pattern, But in spite of his bias he had to admit that Anaximander was closer to the Pluralists than to the Monists in some respects; from this they conclude that Anaximander was really a Pluralist, and his 'monism' an invention of Aristotle's. Theophrastus, according to this view, was too much under his master's influence to contradict him, but he is refuted by his own paraphrase of Anaxi- mander's doctrine; in the sentence "' Jv 8& N y?veatq zarL t0oz oaL, xaL

'rv qOopa v ek i toc5' yNvaOa" (= VS 12B1) the plurals J)v... rockoc "imply that the material principle of existing things is not a single entity but a multitude of some kind."32 The last argument is obviously inconclusive.33 But quite apart from that, Cherniss' interpretation as a whole misrepresents Aristotle. Aristotle was perfectly aware of the distinction between monistic and pluralistic systems, and admitted the existence of both. Why, then, should he insist on making a monist of Anaximander, if he was really a pluralist? And where does he attribute his own doctrine of &iX)oL%'a& to Anaximander? What he says is that the elements evolved from the Apeiron by a process of 'separation' and not as a result of 'alteration', but that Anaximander, unlike Empedocles and Anaxagoras, did not believe 'v xcri to?a& icn.34 This is a very precise statement, which can only mean that Anaximander's doctrine was essentially monistic, in spite of some resemblances to those of the later pluralists; we have no reason at all for rejecting it.

On the other side there are some positive indications that the Apeiron was conceived as a single entity.

8B A. W. Heidel, "Qualitative Change in Pre-Socratic Philosophy", Arch. Gesch. Philos. 19 (1906), 344ff; id. "On Anaximander", C.Ph. 7 (1912), 230ff; Cherniss pp. 366f, 375f; McDiarmid lOOf. Contra Holscher p. 267f. 32 Cherniss p. 377. 88 Though accepted by Vlastos (C.Ph. 42.170) it has been dismissed by Kirk (C.Q. 49.35) as "too improbable to merit discussion". Cf. McDiarmid p. 141 n. 57. 84 Phys. 187a20ff. Cheriss' paraphrase of this passage (p. 375), "Aristotle associates Anaximander with Anaxagoras and Empedocles, opposes this group to the 'monists', and says that Anaximander as well as the other two posits a mixture from which he derives other objects by a process of separation", distorts the meaning of the text.

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1. It was endowed with the characteristics of divinity: it was said to be immortal and to govern the world. These statements are impossible to reconcile with the concept of a mechanical mixture all of whose constituents have their separate identities from all time: oix &yOCOv 7o?0uxoLpovc7].

2. Whatever the exact terms he used, Anaximander certainly believed that things come into being and are destroyed. What could he have meant by this, if all substances always existed in the Apeiron? 'Recomposition', Heidel thinks.35 But the notion that "there is no coming into being or destruction, only the combination and dissolution of substances which exist for ever" is propounded as a novelty by Empedocles (fr. 8) and Anaxagoras (fr. 17).

3. The natural tendency of the Greeks was to explain the world by the smallest possible number of causes. The pluralist systems were devised as an answer to Parmenides and seem always to have been regarded as second-best; the only one of them to have any lasting influence was Atomism, which succeeded better than the rest in maintaining the essential unity of the world. But there is no reason why any thinker earlier than Parmenides should have adopted such a theory, and no evidence that any philosopher between Anaxi- mander and Parmenides was aware of this possibility.36

There remains the difficulty of reconciling the belief in a single first- principle with the view that other substances are 'separated-out' of it. As Aristotle states it, this implies that the things which are separated- out pre-exist in the Apeiron before their separation.37 One solution which has been put forward is that the Apeiron was a perfect fusion in which the opposites were "so thoroughly mixed that none of them appear as single, individual things".38 But it seems odd to speak of a fusion with a separate identity existing before its constituents, and the fundamental problem remains. If the source is genuinely one, in what sense can the opposites pre-exist in it? 3 If they do pre-exist in the

35 Arch. Gesch. Philos. 19 (1906), 343. 38 Cf. Zeller I (ed. 5), 207f; Vlastos p. 171ff; Holscher p. 261f, 268; Kirk and Raven p. 431. a ot 8' &x roi &v6q &voiva4 -Ta& kvmvn6rjTac &xxptvcaOmt, Phys. 187a20. 38 Vlastos p. 171, Cornford Princ. Sap. p. 178; criticised by Seligman p. 46ff. 39 Vlastos (p. 171f and n. 147) tries to differentiate between the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and the "unreformed doctrine of krasis" found in some Hippocratic treatises, which he identifies with Anaximander's doctrine. As an example of the latter he quotes Hippocr. VM 14 (not 16) TrXV5X tiv

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source, where is its unity, and is it legitimate to speak of their emergence as 'coming into being'? In fact the concepts of pre-existence in and emergence from a mixture or fusion, and of coming into being, are incompatible. Putting the same thing historically, a philosopher who believed that coming into being is possible and indeed natural would not have conceived the (much more sophisticated) alternative, which would have seemed pointless to him.

Now Aristotle's discussion of the pluralist thesis at Phys. 187a24ff deals only with Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and evidently these thinkers were in the forefront of his mind when he wrote about the opposites being 'separated-out' of their source. The word vou'act in particular seems to have come from Anaxagoras.40 But there is some doubt also whether Anaximander used the term 'separate-out' (CxxptVeAOxL) or 'separate-off' (abtoxpLveaOcL), and what exactly was separated from the Apeiron.41 Simplicius repeats Aristotle's account,42 but in the only extant description of Anaximander's cosmogony, based on Theophrastus, we find that something "capable of producing the hot and the cold" was separated off from the Infinite and out of this a sphere of flame grew round the air surrounding the earth like bark round a tree." From this simile it would appear that Anaximander

[LetLeyCvm xczl eX pn O CXX iOLGLV OOT?(rOCVep& i'LV 05're XU74EL T&V &VOpco7OV, 6'rov

i 'r OU&rcav &d7oxpLO xmX mu'-6 &9' kwvrou ykvrmt, 'r6re xac qaxvep6v &a-t xoc XuTreL

'r6v &v6pw7rov. But this is no different from Anaxag. fr. 4 rplv 8U &7oxptOivoct 'roi-roc n&v-rov 6?O6 &6v'r.v ou' Xpot 1V8nXOq iV OU8te( & r*xXWuE y&p 4 au'L0LLgLq 7TCVrcoV

Xp%m,sv, and so Vlastos' distinction breaks down. 40 See the index to VS p. 161a43ff; cf. Holscher p. 261f. Vlastos (p. 171 and n. 139) claims that "the same word occurs frequently in the pre-Socratics... with the very sense required in the present context"; but it does not occur in this sense in writers earlier than Parmenides. 41 Cf. Holscher l.c., Kirk and Raven p. 129ff, Kahn p. 40ff. 42 Verbatim at Phys. 150.22 (on 187a20); on p. 24.24 (== VS A9) he grafts a reminiscence of Aristotle on to Theophrastus' account to produce, "o&roq 86 OUX &OUOLO 4LOU ro) ( (OU ''V yfVeaLV Mtel, &)XX &.TOXpLVOjkVGV 'C&)V 6VONTE

43 Ps-Plut. Strom. 2 = VS 12A10, cpraal 8i 'r6 (? rt) &x 'ro5 at8ou y6VL[OV OCpFLoi3 -re xocd 4uXpo5 xoT-r& '?v y&JcaLv 'roVe 'ro x6a[Lou &.'roxpL"VOxL XE 'MLVa iX 'Or&rOU

9?)OY56 a9OCtPOav 7repLtpurXVML T& 7repl 'V y?v &fpL 64 Tlw V&gpy cP?ot6v. Earlier in the same chapter it is said that the 'innumerable worlds' were separated off (&7roxexp[aOmL) from the Infinite, but this seems to be due to the compiler (against Holscher p. 265). The language of this sentence is certainly his own (e.g. xczO6Xou, cf. Diels Doxogr. p. 156n) and Simplicius and Hippolytus have ytveaOat in the corresponding place of their reports. Presumably Theophrastus used the vague expression y(vcaOmL 'rob o4pmvo6q in his chapter on the Apeiron,

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imagined the formation of the world as an organic process like the growth of a plant or embryo, and the Apeiron as something capable of producing seed; both exxp(veoaOo and &toxpELvaou were regularly used of the bodily secretions, and could have had this sense in Anaximander's book.44 The whole matter is very obscure, but at least we can say that these expressions donot necessarilyimply thatwhateverwas 'separated- off' from the Apeiron must have existed in it beforehand. If we take the simile at its face value this becomes very unlikely.

Aristotle and Theophrastus may have misunderstood Anaximander's use of &rroxpLveaOat, but they were certainly right to treat the Apeiron as a single entity. But neither tells us what it was. To account for this gap in their information, Kirk has supposed that they obtained their knowledge of Anaximander's teaching from a collection of excerpts from his book and did not have a copy of the original.45 There certainly is a good deal of evidence to support this view. But if Anaximander's book was lost beyond recovery by the middle of the fourth century, it must have gone out of circulation considerably earlier; and it is not easy to imagine anybody in the fifth century writing a summary of an obsolete book of natural philosophy which was probably quite short already.46 On the other hand, the verbatim quotation preserved by Theophrastus shows that he had access to some original document, and Theophrastus censured Anaximander for not specifying the nature of the Apeiron.47 Probably therefore Aristotle and Theophrastus had read his book, and if they could not give a precise account of the nature of his first-principle, this was because Anaximander himself did not do so.

Nor is it difficult to see the reason for this. However he conceived the 'opposites', Anaximander must have shared the common belief of his time that they are in permanent conflict with one another, and that the continuance of the universe depends on there being a certain balance or 'equality' between them. To say this is not to read Aristotelian notions into Anaximander.48 True, the opposites played an important

and the more accurate duroxplveaOcL when he came to explain how the universe was derived from it. "4 Cf. H. C. Baldry, CQ 26 (1932), 29f, Guthrie p. 90f. 'r CQ 49.37f; Kirk and Raven pp. 101, 105. 46 If the putative compiler was a pupil of Anaximander (cf. Kirk and Raven p. 101) he would hardly have neglected the Apeiron. 47 Ap. Aet. 1.3.3. = VS 12 A 14. 48 As Cherniss (pp. 28, 376) and McDiarmid (p. 99) claim. Contra Vlastos p. 168f and n. 121, and passim.

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part in Aristotle's system, but he did not invent them. Similar ideas were held by Alcmaeon and Heracleitus and were commonplace by the time the 'Ancient Medicine' was written; they are clearly implied already by Anaximander's fr. 1. This meant that anything infinite, or even anything large enough to surround all things and to be their source, must be completely impartial.49 It was not enough that it should be different from any of the obvious 8uv&[uLSq such as the hot or the cold, light or darkness. It could not have any sensible qualities at all, any more than the atoms of Democritus. It could only be described as the source of all things, everlasting and indescribably vast; these were its only properties. Like the atoms, it was a metaphysical construction, devised to account for the origin of the world. Anaxi- mander's originality lay in his ability to conceive such a thing without clothing it in mythical attributes.50 Yet there was a limit to what he could do. Democritus could abstract qualities from the substances in which they inhere, and was thus enabled to relate the world of sense to his first principles. This degree of abstraction was beyond the power of Anaximander, hence he was unable to describe the relationship of sensible things to their source in a coherent way; as Guthrie puts it (p. 87), "In applying the ancient formula 'everything came into being out of one thing', Anaximander virtually cheated." The result was a dangerous gap in his system, but one that Anaximander apparently did not notice. Presumably he just said that "in the beginning was the Apeiron, existing from all time, etc", and then went on, rather like Hesiod, to give a cosmogony of a kind that had already become in large part traditional.51

It may seem bold to attribute abstract reasoning of this kind to

49 This is the reasoning attributed to Anaximander by Arist. Phys. 204b24ff, Simpl. Phys. 479.34, 24.21ff (= VS 12A16, A9). According to McDiarmid i.c. this 'reconstruction' is completely unhistorical, being based on the metaphor 8L86vact y&dp aiOT& 8txiqv xxl tLaLV &)XYXuOLq ~q6 &&8xEa later quoted by Theophrastus (Phys.Op. fr. 2 _ VS B1). It is difficult to see why Aristotle's account should be any the worse for that. Its only unhistorical feature is that he speaks of elements rather than opposites, but this should not upset anyone. Aristotle does not ascribe the doctrine of four elements to Anaximander. 50 Cf. Deichgraber Hermes 75 (1940), 15; Gigon p. 61. 51 If the greater part of Anaximander's book was taken up with detailed cosmology, it would explain why Aristotle and Theophrastus knew so much more about this than the Apeiron. Chaos is described later in the Theogony (736ff), but only because, unlike the Apeiron, it apparently became identified with a part of the universe after its creation (cf. Theog. 700, 814). Cf. F. Solmsen "Chaos and Apeiron", Stud. It. Fil. 24.1950.242ff.

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Anaximander, but fortunately we have a parallel which is attested beyond any doubt. According to Aristotle he argued that the earth is suspended at the centre of the universe without being supported by anything else, because there was no reason why it should move in one direction rather than another.52 In his recent book Kahn has rightly stressed the rationalistic character of Anaximander's thought, which marks him off from the other Milesian thinkers. Perhaps it is significant that these two doctrines, the Apeiron and the free suspension of the earth, were rejected by his successors, while his more empirical cosmology became very influential.

If this is how Anaximander conceived the Apeiron, it becomes possible to see why Aristotle treated it as he did. Not only was there a gap in Anaximander's theory, but his first principle could not be meaningfully described in Aristotelian terms. As an actually existing corporeal substance it must, for Aristotle, be identical with one of the four elements or a compromise between them - whether we call this a mixture or an 'in-between' substance makes no difference.53 In reality it was neither. No doubt this is why Aristotle made no attempt to give a complete account of it. But sometimes he mentioned Anaxi- mander's theory in order to illustrate some point he wanted to make. On these occasions he always emphasised one aspect of it at the expense of the rest, and to that extent distorted it. However, his apparently contradictory statements can be reconciled if they refer to an entity such as I have described. The Apeiron gave rise to everything but was not identical with any conceivable sensible substance; therefore from Aristotles' point of view it must be everything potentially and so appears simply as matter. At some stage in the evolution of the world something was separated off from or out of the Apeiron; to this extent it behaved like the primeval mixture of Anaxagoras. It was a single substance actually existing and distinct from any of the elements; this would make sense if it were an intermediate between the elements, and Aristotle was probably thinking of Anaximander when he mentioned this as a possible basis for a monistic system. His procedure may seem unsatisfactory to-day. But Aristotle was not writing as a historian and did not have footnotes in which to deal with incidental problems. Theophrastus, who was aiming at historical accuracy, told us all there was to tell when he described the Apeiron as ypu'V TLVOX

52 Arist. Cael. 295 b 1Off = VS 12 A 26. 53 Cf. GC 1.10 and H. H. Joachim, J.Ph. 29 (1904), 72ff.

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&6pwLaov." Significantly he apparently did not refer to it as an 'intermediate substance', made no attempt to identify it with prime matter, and defined more precisely in what respect it resembled Anaxagoras' mixture.

Modem scholars who have tried to say more about the nature of the Apeiron have inevitably fallen into the same error as Aristotle. To say that it was a mixture or complete fusion of the opposites is no different from the kind of statement Aristotle made about it. The same is true of the idea that it was not really a material substance at all. It was not identical with any known or conceivable material substance. But the notion of immaterial being was almost certainly unthinkable in the sixth century B.C. Moreover, the Apeiron was the source of all physical things, and this implies that it was itself a body of some kind. No Greek ever accepted that the material world could arise from something non-material, though they were prepared to believe that the original substance might be very different from what came out of it. All these attempts to define the Apeiron more or less distort the truth, and the reason is the same in every case. Like Aristotle, the writers who make them are trying to describe the Apeiron in terms which make sense to themselves and their audience.

We cannot describe the Apeiron as such. What it meant to Anaxi- mander can only be gauged by considering its function in his system. This function was a dual one. It was that from which all things have sprung and to which they will ultimately return; and it 'embraced and governed' all things. The former role it took over from the first principles of the mythological cosmogonies. These entities only acted as the first parents of the universe. Once it had developed, they had no more part in it. But the Apeiron has also usurped the function which the mythographers gave to the later gods who seized power after the creation of the world was complete. This unification was an important feature of the philosophical as against the mythological world-picture, and makes it quite impossible to reduce Anaximander's teaching to a re-statement of the old myths, for all that they had some common features.55 It implies a continuing relationship between the world and its source much more intimate than anything envisaged by Hesiod or writers like him. For the same reason I should hesitate to join Selig- man56 in describing Anaximander's thought as dualistic. Seligman is

54Phys. Op. fr. 2 = FV 12A9. 55 There were other differences also; see above, p. 48 n. 51 and Holscher p. 411. 56 Pp. 54ff, 113; Deichgrdber (Hermes 75.17) is more cautious.

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thinking primarily of the contrast between the changing physical world and the permanence of the Apeiron, and within these limits he is perfectly right. But the expression makes us think of 'matter' and 'spirit', and a modem reader might forget how closely the world was linked with the Boundless in Anaximander's system. An idea of what was in his mind can perhaps be gained by comparing the 'rational fire' of the Stoics, in spite of the obvious differences. In one respect at least the Stoic doctrine is closer to his than any other. In both systems the originating substance did not give birth to the world directly but produced first a moist seminal mass, from which everything else later developed.57

From the foregoing it will be clear that Anaximander used the word &7retpOV in its obvious sense of 'spatialy infinite'. This is how Aristotle and Theophrastus understood it, and the meaning is well attested for all periods of Greek literature; Anaximenes described the air as &=erpos and according to Xenophanes the earth extends downwards ?&E7tLpOv.5 Nevertheless many scholars believe that for Anaximander &,tepov meant primarily 'without internal boundaries or distinctions' and hence 'qualitatively indeterminate'59 There is, however, not a scrap of evidence that the word could have this meaning. Not only are there no early parallels, as Kirk says.60 Aristotle and Porphyry, who were interested in the concept and collected the meanings of the word, do not mention any such usage.61 According to these authorities the word could have three senses: infinite in extent or number; inescapable (of fetters, etc.); and as an epithet of perfectly circular or spherical objects, such as rings without a bezel, uninterrupted. The second meaning is irrelevant to our purpose, the third is obviously derived from the first.62 Thus it is illegitimate for Cornford to infer from this

67Diog. Laert. 7.135f = Stoic.Vet.Fr. 2.580 VS 12A10. 68 Anaximenes VS 13 A5, from Theophrastus; Xenophanes fr. 28. For the later Pre-Socratics see the index to VS; cf. Kraus p. 366ff, Kahn p. 231ff. 9 Tannery, Pour l'histoire de la science helldne, p. 94ff; Cornford, e.g., Princ. Sap. p. 178; Guthrie p. 85ff. For other early supporters of this view, see Zeller I (ed. 5), 199 n. 3. 60 Kirk and Raven p. 109. A. Rey (La jeunesse de la science grecque, p. 59) after Rivaud (Probleme du devenir pp. 89 and 193) claims &(7reEpoov arpr6v from Pindar as an instance of this use. He does not specify where it occurs, but presumably he means 01. 11.18 uTy6teLvOv mTpm&6v V' &.netpctov xM)'V. 61 Arist. Phys. I 4-8; Porph. Quaest. Hom. in Iliad. p. 189ff Schrader = Schol. B. in Iliad. 14.200, Schol. E in Od. 1.98. *' Cf. Arist. Phys. 207alff.

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that &=LpOV could mean 'without intemal boundaries' and therefore 'indistinct'. Even if it could be translated 'without internal boundaries or distinctions', this would simply denote a single, homogeneous substance as opposed to a mechanical mixture or emulsion; it would tell us nothing about the character or lack of character of the substance to which it was applied, or about the relation of that substance to others. There were no internal boundaries in Thales' water or Anaxi- menes' air.

Such expedients can only be justified if there is no possible alternative. But the arguments used to show that Anaximander cannot have intended the word to have its ordinary spatial meaning are not at all convincing. 1. Tannery (p. 95f) argues that the 'eternal motion' of the Apeiron was identical with the rotation of the heavens, and a rotating infinite mass is impossible; and also that, since the earth rests at the centre of the universe, the extension of the Apeiron must be limited. The second of these arguments rests on a confusion between the extension of the universe and of the primary substance, though they are by no means the same. As for the first argument, this explanation of the 'eternal motion' was already refuted by Zeller and scarcely anyone accepts it to-day." 2. It is said that Anaximander did not have the Euclidean concept of space and so could not have conceived of an infinite extension. Though probably true, this is irrelevant. It is possible without having read Euclid to imagine something going on and on without any limit. This must have been what Xenophanes meant by saying that the earth extends downwards k &zt?pov; presumably he thought it impossible that there should by anything underneath.64 The same reasoning could have been used by Anaximander; the Apeiron surrounds all things, therefore there cannot be anything outside it to limit it, and so it must be infinite.65 Cornford's alternative suggestion, that Anaximander"may have thought of his Unlimited as an immense sphere" (p. 176f), is much less likely. In all the passages where t7Lpoq or ObreLp6W refer to 63 Zeller I (ed. 5), 199 n. 3, 221 n. 2; cf. Burnet p. 61. R. Mondolfo, L'Infinito nel pensiero dell' antichita classica p. 320ff, tries to show that Anaximander would not have looked on rotation as incompatible with the notion of infinitely extended substance. 64 Was this intended as an attack on the existence of Tartarus? 65 Cf. Arist. Phys. 203bll, 20ff; Cornford (Princ. Sap. p. 175 n. 1) thinks that this argument may go back to Anaximander. A similar argument is attributed to Xenophanes at (Arist.) XMG 978 b 1.

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circular or spherical objects, they are used as adjectives; their meaning is still something like 'uninterrupted', and the notion of circularity is contained in the nouns to which they are attached.66 There is no reason to believe that this notion can attach to the word &7tLpoq by itself, particularly when it is used as a noun. 3. Many interpreters feel that Anaximander ought to have given his first principle a name which would convey something of its character; in Kirk's words, "We might expect any such single description to refer first to the kind of substance, not to its commonly assumed vastness of extent."67 Now if Anaximander had wanted to indicate that his apxn was an 'indefinite substance' there are words in Greek which would have conveyed this unambiguously;68 he would hardly have chosen a word whose ordinary meaning is quite different and which, as far as we can tell, no Greek ever understood in that way. But 'indefinite substance' is not a suitable appellation for the parent and ruler of the universe, and the word 'indefinite' is meaningless unless we consciously abstract qualities from things, something that Anaxi- mander probably could not do. The term &xuLpOv had the advantage of predicating something positive of the oCppn without committing Anaximander to any view of its nature. He chose it precisely because it did not refer to the kind of substance but only to its vastness of extent.

Leeds University.

66 Emped. fr. 28; Arist. Phys. 207 a 2; and the passages quoted by Porphyry l.c. 67 Kirk and Raven p. 109. 68 E.g. &6pLaToq, Thphr. ap. Simpl. Phys. 154.20 = VS 12 A9a; Mx8LxpL'roq, Anon. in Alcman fr. 5 p. 24.23 Page.

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Gottschalk AnaximanderApeiron 1965

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