HILF Study

5/20/2018 HILF Study

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High-Impact, Low-Frequency Event Risk tothe North American Bulk Power System

Gerry Cauley, President and CEO, NERC

Mark Lauby, Director, Reliability Assessments andPerformance Analysis, NERC

Industry Briefing | June 2, 2010


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About NERC

Develop & enforce reliability standards

Analyze system outages and near-misses& recommend improved practices

Assess current and future reliability

International regulatory authority for electricreliability in North America


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North Americas Critical Infrastructure

North Americas bulk power system is one of our mostcritical infrastructures; it underpins our government,economy and society in many important ways

Comprised of over 200,000 miles of transmission lines,

thousands of generating plants, and millions of digitalcontrols

Electric sector has a long history of successfullymanaging day-to-day reliability risk


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Managing Risk


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High-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) Risks

Black Swan events

Occur very infrequently, or, in somecases, have never occurred

Little real-world operationalexperience with addressing theserisks

Generally have the potential to

impact many assets at once Catastrophic impacts on the bulk

power system and society-at-large


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Examples of Ongoing Public/Private Effortsto Address HILF Risks

Year Effort

2009 NERC Pandemic Influenza Working Group coordinates withgovernment authorities to provide guidance to the electric sectoron the 2009 A/H1N1 Pandemic

July 1 First requirements of NERCs Critical InfrastructureProtection Standards become mandatory and enforceable acrossthe U.S.

2008 U.S. EMP Commission issues summary report onElectromagnetic Pulse risk to civilian infrastructure

National Academy of Sciences releases report on Geo-magneticDisturbances


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NERC/DOE Joint HILF Effort

Partnered in July 2009

Formed Steering Committee

Conducted Workshop inNovember 2009

110 Subject Matter Experts,including DOD, DHS, FERC,

Congressional staff, intelligencecommunity, EMP Commission,all sectors of the electric industry


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Todays Report

Summary of November workshop

Creates a common understandingof three HILF risks

Segmented analysis of threat,vulnerability, and consequence

Lays the groundwork for the

development of an action plan

19 Proposals for Action suggested byworkshop participants


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Three Principal HILF Risks

Coordinated Cyber, Physical, and BlendedAttacks

Pandemics

Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMD),Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), and IntentionalElectromagnetic Interference (IEMI)


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Common Framework Approach to HILF Risk

Sound Risk Management Must Take Holistic, Sector-Wide Approach

Impossible to fully protect the grid from all threats. Cannot gold plate the system.

Must focus on balance of resilience, restoration, and protection.

Key Interdependencies Must Be Identified and Understood

Electric sector highly dependent on telecommunications and fuel supply and deliveryinfrastructure.

HILF Risk Must be Placed In Context

HILF Risks are part of a larger risk landscape facing the sector. Many competingpriorities strain available resources: smart grid implementation, climate change

HILF Risk Differs from Traditional RisksRequires risk managers to take a different approach to handling these risks.

Public/Private Partnership Critical to Progress

More effective public private partnership must include better information sharing,coordinated R&D, and clearer risk indicators.


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Coordinated Attack Risk

Concerted, well-planned attack against multiplekey nodes

Potential for cyber attacker to manipulate keysystems and provide misleading information tosystem operators

Adaptive attack could actively attempt to thwart

responders efforts to restore power


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Coordinated Attack RiskKey Proposals for Action

More effective information sharing betweengovernment and industry on specific threats andvulnerabilities

Consider traditional system planning andoperating practices with respect to coordinatedattack threats

Research and development to create forensictools for industrial control systems (i.e. SCADA)


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Pandemic Risk

People Event

Potential loss of significantportion of workforce neededto reliably operate the powersystem

2009 A/H1N1 outbreak a

mild event and did not exhibitthe characteristics of mostconcern to the electric sector

Hospitals are overrun during the1918 Pandemic


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Pandemic RiskKey Proposals for Action

Electric sector entities should review pandemicplans to incorporate lessons learned from 2009

A/H1N1 event

Pandemic severity scale should be created tobetter track societal impacts

Better leading indicators should be developed

and communicated to businesses during apandemic outbreak


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Geomagnetic Disturbance Risk

Earthly effects of solar weather

Geomagnetically-induced currents can causewidespread tripping of high-voltagetransmission lines

Potential for lastingdamage to high-voltage

transformers


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Geomagnetic Disturbance RiskKey Proposals for Action

Existing measurement index for strength ofgeomagnetic disturbances (K-index) should beimproved

Spare equipment database for high-voltagetransformers should be considered

Evaluate and recommend cost-effective and

efficient mitigations


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Electromagnetic Pulse and IntentionalElectromagnetic Interference Risk

High-Altitude detonation of a nuclear weaponwould simultaneously interrupt and potentiallydamage many system components

Intentional Electromagnetic Interference, ifcoordinated, could result in local disruptions tomultiple key nodes

l l d l


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Electromagnetic Pulse and IntentionalElectromagnetic Interference RiskKey Proposals for Action

Identify and prioritize top ten mitigations thatare both cost effective and sufficient to protectthe system

Spare equipment database for high-voltagetransformers should be considered

Long-term R&D roadmap


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Question & Answer

Contact:

Janet SenaDirector, Government [email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

HILF Study

Documents

Transcript of HILF Study