Iwrm ankündigung

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Energy provision for agricultural irrigation Christian Kimmich IWRM, 29-06-11 A case study from Andhra Pradesh, India, and the MENA region

Transcript of Iwrm ankündigung

Energy provision for

agricultural irrigation

Christian Kimmich

IWRM, 29-06-11

A case study from Andhra Pradesh,

India, and the MENA region

Chapter 2:

The political economy of the

electricity-irrigation conundrum

Christian Kimmich

An analytic historical perspective on

policy persistence in Andhra Pradesh

2IWRM 29-06-11

Review: problem statement

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• Electricity policies of persisting subsidization

• Fast diffusion of tube well irrigation

• Groundwater over-exploitation

• Increase in energy utilization

• Inefficient use of water and energy

• Power shortages

• High costs for utilities and the state

Review: state expenditures on subsidies

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*: Revised estimates and Budget estimates

Source: Composed on the basis of data from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Andhra

Pradesh , Statistical Abstract 2008, and Advance Estimates

Subsidies (mio INR)

Subsidies (% of total expend.)

GSDP (current prices; mio INR)

Subsidies (% of GSDP)

2001-02 20947 8,47% 1571500 1,33%

2002-03 10562 3,87% 1681430 0,63%

2003-04 15100 4,80% 1908800 0,79%

2004-05 13640 4,11% 2247130 0,61%

2005-06 16962 4,86% 2559410 0,66%

2006-07* 18420 4,45% 3010350 0,61%

2007-08* 24080 4,33% 3648130 0,66%

2008-09* 46150 6,57% 4158320 1,11%

2009-10* 60400 4752670 1,27%

Table: Electricity subsidies in relation to state expenditures and GDP

Review: “market” approaches

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P

Q

D SS

Δ

P

Δ

Q

• “The analysis shows that unit pricing of

electricity influences groundwater use efficiency

and productivity positively. It also shows that

the levels of pricing (..) are socio-

economically viable.” (Kumar 2005)

-> Nevertheless, subsidization policies remain persistent

• “the proposed discriminatory pricing regime will

reduce subsidies substantially (..), but remains too

high to be resolved without political action” (Dossani

and Ranganathan 2004)

Problem statement: the political economy

• Welfare economics:

Assumption of a “benevolent government”

However:

• Differences in understanding the functioning of

social structures and agencies

• Norms and values inherent in understanding

• Differences in normative conclusions

• Scientific and public discourse

• Interest groups and power

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Research questions

• Why do inefficiencies in energy and water utilization prevail?– Which role does tube well irrigation play?

– Which role does electricity use for irrigation play?

• Why did this development path historically unfold?– Why and how did the policy of subsidization emerge?

– Why is the policy of subsidization persistent?

– Which factors contribute to this persistence?

• How can efficiencies be improved?– Which incentives do the stakeholders have?

– Which impediments do the stakeholders face?

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Outline

• The political economy narrative

• Stakeholder analysis: Who is involved?

• A theory of public choice

• Empirical evidence and preliminary results

• Utilities governance and institutional choice

• The „regulation‟ model

• The „vote bank‟ model

• Results and conclusions

• Outlook

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The political economy narrative

• „Vote bank‟ politics:

A promise of subsidized electricity

provision for agriculture mobilizes a

large share of the agricultural electorate

• Party competition leads to a competitive

search for votes

• Respective policies are designed to win

elections

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Public / Electorate / Citizens

Consumers (Agriculture,

Industries, etc.)

Government / Departments

Parliament

Regulator

Utilities

Figure: Principal-Agent and stakeholder relations

1. The political system

(left side)

2. Governance and

regulation of

infrastructure

(right side)

Stakeholder analysis

A theory of public choice

• „median voter‟ model (Downs 1957)

Hypothesis: “Political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly

as a means of gaining votes” (Downs 1957)

• Assumptions: one issue space (e.g. re-distribution, subsidies),

two parties A and B

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Figure 1: Single-peaked preferences Figure 2: Bi-modal preferences

• Implications: convergence and stability vs. divergence and imposition

• Extensions: multi-party-systems, proportional representation, coalitions

Emerging party competition

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Party 1967 1972 1978 1983 1985 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Congress (INC) 165 219 175 60 50 182 26 91 185

45.4 52.3 39.3 33.6 37.5 47.2 33.6 40.6 38,6

Swatantra 29 2 - - - - - -

9.8 2.0 - - - - - -

Janata Party - - 60 - - - - -

- - 28.8 - - - - -

TDP - - - 198 202 73 219 179 47

- - - 46.3 46.2 36.6 44.1 43.8 37,6

TRS - - - - - - - - 26

- - - - - - - - 6,7

BJP - - - 3 8 5 3 12

- - - 2.8 1.6 1.8 3.9 3.7

Left Parties 20 8 14 9 22 13 34 2

15.4 9.2 5.2 4.8 5.0 5.2 6.5 3.3

Others 3 1 30 2 3 6 3 4

0.7 2.4 17.5 2.6 0.9 3.1 3.2 3.8

Independents 68 57 15 22 9 14 12 5

26.5 32.2 9.2 9.9 8.8 6.1 8.7 4.8

Seats

% votes

Table: Election results for the Andhra Pradesh State Assembly

Investments vs. subsidies in Indian agriculture

• Subsidization of

irrigation, credit,

fertilizers, and power

• “Since 1982, power

subsidy has taken the

largest share. In 1999 it

accounted for 64% of

total input subsidies in

Indian agriculture” (Fan et al. 2008: 165-6)

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Input subsidies and public investments in agriculture

Source: Fan et al., IFPRI, 2007

The electorate: a policy majority?

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1971 % 1981 % 1991 %

Cultivators 5794701 32%1 7407938 33% 7891167 28%

Agricultural laborers 6828685 38%1 8325017 37% 11625159 41%

Total working population 18005999 41%2 22629101 42% 28445482 43%

Rural population 35100000 81%2 41062000 77% 48621000 73%

Total population 43503000 100% 53550000 100% 66508000 100%

Registered agricultural connections (pump-sets)

185733 3%3 422418 6% 1134519 14%

1: percentage of total working population; 2: percentage of total population; 3: percentage of cultivators

Table: Population, agricultural electorate, and pump-set owners

• laborers are working on the farms with pump-set owners

• many cultivators are dependent on water markets from tube well owners

• politicians cater to large landowners/‟patriarchs‟ as key swing voters with

an entire community (Lal 2003)

The electorate: a policy majority?

• Farmers should receive electricity for free.

• Do you think that agriculture pays a fair price for electricity?

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Yes No Don‘t know

357 65 378

45% 8% 47%

Yes No Don‘t know

442 248 110

55% 31% 14%

Survey: Stratified random sample (N=800) from Hyderabad, AP

Preliminary results• Single-peaked preferences:

absence of cleavages, stable policy

• Party competition and

anti-incumbency (floating) voters

Unanswered questions:

• Why did party competition emerge in the first place

during the 70s?

• Why did this type of subsidization policy emerge?

– Why no election gifts, direct payments or investment subsidies?

– Why no race to the bottom in party competition?

• Why does an urban majority support the policy?

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Questions?

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Public / Electorate / Citizens

Consumers (Agriculture,

Industries, etc.)

Government / Departments

Parliament

Regulator

Utilities

Figure: Principal-Agent and stakeholder relations

1. The political system

(left side)

2. Governance and

regulation of

infrastructure

(right side)

Stakeholder analysis

Electricity governance in AP, till 1998

• State monopoly, governed

by a State Electricity Board

(SEB), which vertically

integrates generation,

transmission, and

distribution

• Tariff setting through

aggregate revenue

requirement and rate-of-

return regulation

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Source: Victor and Heller (2007: 4)

Theories of utilities governance & regulation

• If the electric utility is a monopoly, prices/tariffs cannot emerge out of

competition (Mill 1848, Commons 1932)

• Tariff policy can be realized through efficiency considerations,

• but can also become subjected to monopoly rents and partial interests

• Information asymmetry of regulation,

• also an opportunity for taxation and subsidization (Crew and Kleindorfer 2002)

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Theories of public and institutional choice

• Models of party competition: median voter, issue spaces (Hotelling 1929, Downs 1957, Mueller 1976, etc.)

• Electoral and business cycles (Persson and Tabellini 2000)

– Credible and enforceable commitment

– Observable and verifiable results

– Repeated games, information, and rational expectations

Analytical frameworks:

• Actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf 1997)

• Institutional Analysis and Development (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 2005)

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A „regulation‟ model

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• SEB: High transaction costs

(personnel & enforcement) of

metering

SGE

SEB

A

A

SGE: State Government Executive

SEB: State Electricity Board (Utility)

A: Agriculture

P

Q

D

S

p

q

S‘

q‘

p‘

• A: Dynamic incentives:

increase of production

Regulation: cross subsidization

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Source: India Infrastructure Report 2008

Figure: Comparison of tariffs for agriculture and industry in Paise (INR)

-> Within „soft‟ budget constraints

A 'vote bank' model

• Pa/Pb: vote maximization,

promises constrained by

credibility

• V: impartial and partial

interests, rational

expectations

• SGE: policies constrained by

promises and future vote

maximization

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O(Pb)

SGE(Pa) V

V

SGE(Pa)

SGE(Pb)

SGE(Pa)

SGE(Pb)

Alternatives? (election gifts, direct payments,

investment subsidies)

Results and conclusion

• Transaction costs: saving on metering

• Budget constraints: cross subsidization

• Easy political exploitation of tariffs because of utility characteristics

• Repeated interaction:

feasible and credible promise, rational expectations of voters

• Increased production: food security to reduce inflation

• Urban electorate: food prices, networks, discourse

-> The subsidization policy is likely to persist

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Outlook

Which problems of electricity

utilization for irrigation are

farmers facing?

How can efficiency of energy

use for irrigation be

improved?

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Chapter 2:

The political economy of the

electricity-irrigation conundrum

Christian Kimmich

An analytic historical perspective on

policy persistence in Andhra Pradesh

27IWRM 29-06-11