Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke Gülker Dezember … · Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke...

discussion paper

FS I 98 - 207

Institutional and Financial Frameworkfor Job Rotation in Nine European Countries

Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke Gülker

Dezember 1998ISSN Nr. 1011-9523

e-mail: [email protected]@medea.wz-berlin.degü[email protected]

Research Study of the Education and Employment FoundationStiftung Bildung und Beschäftigung, Auf der Steig 6, Postfach 1506,D-78005 Villingen

commissioned by

SPI Service Gesellschaft, Gräfestraße 3, D-10967 BerlinTel: +49-30-690892-0, Fax: +49-30-69089232, e-mail:[email protected],

and the

Senate Administration for Labour, Vocational Training and Women’s Affairs,BerlinSenatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Bildung und FrauenStorkower Str. 134, D-10407 Berlin,Tel: +49-30-4214-0, Fax: +49-30-4214 2050,e-mail: [email protected]

cofinanced by the TRANSLAM-Project from the European Commission,Directorate General XII, Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels,Tel: +32-2-295 0568, Fax. +32-2-296 3024

ZITIERWEISE / CITATION

Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke Gülker

Institutional and Financial Framework for Job Rotation in NineEuropean Countries

Discussion Paper FS I 98 -207Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 1998

Forschung sschwer punkt: R esearch Area:Arbeitsmarkt und Labour Market andBeschäftigung Employment

Abteilung: R esearch Unit:Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Labour Market Policy andBeschäftigung Employment

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforsc hungReichpietschufer 50

D-10785 Berline-mail: [email protected]

Internet: http://www.wz-berlin.de

Abstract

Job rotation as an important element of labour market policy has only a rathershort tradition in most Member States of the European Union, except in thescandinavian countries. The transnational partnership "job rotation" wasfounded at the end of 1995 and financing for job rotation projects came mainlyfrom the Community Initiative ADAPT, but also from the European StructuralFunds. Job rotation here is defined as the combination of further training for theemployed and substitution by a previously unemployed person. In the non-scandinavian countries manifold local initiatives were started, which operateunder very heterogeneous institutional and financial national frameworks. Forthese reasons a solely quantitative comparison of results of the individualprojects may be misleading. We attempt to analyse and compare in this studythe legal, political and financial preconditions on the national and local level aswell as the relevant incentives for the firm of job rotation projects.

The research strategy of the study initially identifies the major key areas forjob rotation projects, which can be deduced from the theory of transitionallabour markets. Based on hypotheses about the necessary framework forsuccess of job rotation we then confront these hypotheses with bothquantitative and qualitative indicators in a third step. For example, the legalframework is compared on the basis of indicators on the existence of a right tofurther training for the employed and unemployed, legal obligations or a levy onfirms for further training of their employees, dismissal protection legislation incase an employees takes a longer leave as well as the potential use of alreadyexisting regulation of active labour market policies for job rotation project. Wecompare Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, UnitedKingdom and Germany.

The major results are:

1. far-reaching legal or collectively agreed regulations regarding further trainingfor the employed and practice-oriented training for the unemployed and forsections of the non-working population are a necessary precondition for awider spread of job rotation;

2. incentives for the substitution persons should be clearly positive and throughan adequate reimbursement for substitution work, a sufficient increase incomparison to unemployment benefits needs to be assured;

3. costs incurred through job rotation projects should be ‘fairly’ distributedthrough a suitable co-funding structure in order to keep the so-called‘deadweight’ effects as low as possible,

4. incentives for employees to undergo further training must be guaranteedthrough the existence of appropriate regulations and leave of absence forthe purpose of improving one’s skills must be flanked by secure dismissalprotection legislation;

5. functional regional policy networks are necessary in order to implement theprojects on the interface between labour market policy and structural policy;

6. job rotation in (not only) Germany could gain a new impetus through thewider spread of further training funds based on collective agreementsincluding elements of job rotation and complemented through additionalfunding by labour market policy or tax reductions to participating firms.Under such a framework job rotation could make a stronger contribution tothe reduction of unemployment by at the same time reaching higherproductivity.

Zusammenfassung

Jobrotation als wichtiges Element der Arbeitsmarktpolitik hat in den meistenMitgliedsländern der Europäischen Union, mit Ausnahme der skandinavischenLänder, eine kurze Tradition. Erst Ende 1995 wurde die transnationale Partner-schaft "Jobrotation" auf europäischer Ebene angeregt und Projektfinanzierunghauptsächlich durch die Gemeinschaftsinitiative ADAPT, aber auch aus deneuropäischen Strukturfonds ermöglicht. Jobrotation bezeichnet dabei dieVerbindung von Weiterbildung für Beschäftigte und Stellvertretung durch zuvorArbeitslose. In den nichtskandinavischen Ländern der EU wurden daraufhineine Vielzahl an lokalen Initiativen gestartet, die unter sehr heterogenen institu-tionellen und finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen ihre Arbeit aufnahmen. Da ausdiesen Gründen ein rein quantitativer Vergleich der Ergebnisse der Einzelpro-jekte nur schwer möglich ist, versucht diese Studie die jeweiligen Startbedin-gungen, die rechtlichen, politischen, finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen aufnationaler und lokaler Ebene sowie die betrieblich relevanten Voraussetzungenfür Jobrotationsprojekte zu untersuchen.

Das Untersuchungsdesign der Studie identifiziert zunächst die wichtigstenmöglichen Problemfelder für Jobrotationsprojekte, abgeleitet aus der Theorieder Übergangsarbeitsmärkte, und versucht daraus hypothetische Erfolgsbedin-gungen abzuleiten, die dann in einem dritten Schritt mit jeweils mehrerenquantitativen und qualitativen Erfolgsindikatoren zusammengeführt werden.Das Feld der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen wird beispielsweise inhaltlichverglichen anhand von Indikatoren zur Existenz eines Rechts aufWeiterbildung für Beschäftigte und Arbeitslose, gesetzliche Verpflichtungenoder Abgaben für Unternehmen zur Weiterbildung ihrer Beschäftigten,Kündigungsschutz bei längerer Freistellung sowie die Anwendbarkeit vonexistierenden Regelungen aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik für die Durchführung vonJobrotation. Die untersuchten Länder sind Dänemark, Finnland, Frankreich,Italien, Österreich, Portugal, Schweden, Vereinigtes Königreich undDeutschland.

Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse:

1. Weitreichende rechtliche oder tarifliche Regelungen bezüglichWeiterbildung für Beschäftigte und praxisnahe Aus- oder Weiterbildung fürArbeitslose und Teile der inaktiven Bevölkerung sind eineGrundvoraussetzung für eine breite Anwendungsbasis von Jobrotation;

2. Anreize für Beschäftigte, an Weiterbildung teilzunehmen, müssen durch dieExistenz von entsprechenden Regelungen gewährleistet sein. Die Weiter-bildungsfreistellungen sollten durch Arbeitsplatzsicherheit flankiert werden

3. Kosten, die durch Jobrotationsprojekte anfallen, sollten durch eine entspre-chende Kofinanzierungsstruktur möglichst auch entsprechend den entste-henden Vorteilen verteilt sein, um Mitnahmeeffekte möglichst gering zuhalten;

4. leistungsgerechte Entlohnung der Tätigkeit als Stellvertreter/in ist ein wichti-ger Motivationsfaktor, d.h. ein ausreichender Abstand zwischen dem Niveauder Lohnersatzleistung und dem Entgelt für die Stellvertretung ist erforder-lich;

5. funktionsfähige regionale Netzwerke der arbeitsmarktpolitischen und wirt-schaftlichen Akteure sind notwendig für eine günstige Implementations-struktur;

6. Jobrotationsprojekte in Deutschland könnten durch eine Verbreitung vontarifvertraglich geregelten Weiterbildungsfonds mit Jobrotationselementenund arbeitsmarktpolitischer oder steuerlich begünstigter Ergänzungsförde-rung, eine neue Dynamik erhalten. So könnte Jobrotation einen stärkerenBeitrag leisten zur Verringerung der Arbeitslosigkeit bei gleichzeitig erreich-baren Produktivitätsgewinnen.

Contents1. Introduction 1

2. Aim of the study 3

3. Institutional and financial framework for job rotation 7

3.1. Legal framework 7

3.2. Financial framework 8

3.3. Regional networks 9

3.4. Companies' structural and economic conditions 10

3.5. Motivational conditions 11

3.6. Project development 12

4. Discussions of the conditions for job rotation in nineEuropean countries 15

4.1. Denmark 15

4.1.1. Institutional framework 15

4.1.2. Incentive structure and evaluation 18

4.2. Finland 19



4.3. Sweden 21



4.4. France 22



4.5. United Kingdom 24



4.6. Italy 26



4.7. Portugal 28



4.8. Austria 30



4.9. Germany 31



5. Conclusion and outlook 36

6. Bibliography 40

Appendix 44

1

1. Introduction

Job rotation is a special form of combining further training for companyemployees and unemployed persons whereby the vacated workplaces are filledby unemployed substitutes during the further training period. Job rotation wasfirst introduced in the 80’s in Denmark and was then over the following yearsfurther developed and implemented on a nation-wide scale.1 At the end of 1995the transnational partnership ”Job rotation – A new method in Europe” wasestablished with the aim of testing this system in all Member States of the EU.The partnership initially comprised of 30 partner organisations in 14 countries.

Job rotation can be seen as an innovative combination of structural andemployment policies corresponding to the strategy of the transitional labourmarkets.2 As a structural policy measure on the one hand, the qualificationdeficits of a company’s staff are improved, while on the other hand, thanks totraining and temporary jobs for the unemployed, qualifications and placementchances are increased. These two aspects are reflected in the financial andinstitutional 3 framework conditions for job rotation.

Job rotation projects are frequently co-financed by national and EUfunding. On the European level , funding is primarily drawn from the communityinitiative Adapt , but also from Objective 1 to Objective 4 of the EuropeanStructural Funds4. Adapt was established in 1994 following the results ofstudies which showed that the European employment systems had lowerperformance levels than Japan and the USA (European Commission 1993 and1997).

In Europe the majority of new jobs are created in small to medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs). Since these firms, in comparison to large companies, offerlesser opportunities for further training, they are among those most threatenedby global industrial changes. Employees of SMEs are one of the most importanttarget groups for the community initiative Adapt. Adapt’s intent is to help

1 Similar substitution model projects were also successfully implemented in Norway and

Sweden in the early 90’s (cf.. Festoe 1998, Lindberg 1995).2 cf. Schmid (1993).3 The term ”institution” used in this study is based on the comprehension of institutions as

”manifestation forms or symbol nets for regular activities or customs which are used publiclyand have been socio-historically set for a ‘relevant duration’” (Waschkuhn 1985: 376).

4 The main aim of the European Structural Funds is to create economic and social cohesionwithin the European Union through six objectives. Objective 3 comprises of the battle againstunemployment, the integration of young persons and those excluded from paid labour andthe creation of equal opportunities between men and women. Objective 4 deals with helpingthe employed to adapt to changes in industries and production structures.

2

businesses and their employees to tackle the demands and effects of industrialchanges and thus to safeguard and increase employment standards. The aimsof this initiative are to accelerate the economy’s acclimatisation to the structuralchanges (1), to increase competition in trade and industry (2), to avoidunemployment by improving qualifications (3) and to hasten the creation of newjobs (4). These aims are to be predominantly fulfilled by the development ofhuman resources. The initiative will continue until the end of the year 2000 andhas a total budget of ECU 2.940 Million (DM 5.820 Million)5. Job rotation hasbeen selected by Adapt as a model project and is receiving special support. (cf.EUROPS and European Commission: Internet6).

On the national level on other hand, there are several different fundingmodels for job rotation projects and these models depend on the individualnational institutional framework conditions. Since, apart from the differing levelsof funding, the European framework conditions for the implementation of the jobrotation projects are qualitatively similar, we are deducing that the differingnational results are due to the individual national institutional and financialconditions.

5 The distribution of the Adapt budget for the individual countries and the proportion of national

co-funding can be seen in Table 1: 2.5.6 http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg05/esf/en/public/sr_adapt/sr_hor.htm

http://www.europs.be/de/progci.htm.

3

2. Aim of the study

The successful implementation of job rotation as an innovative combination ofstructural and employment policies is, due to its complexity, particularlydependent on the individual national institutional framework conditions. Theaim of this study is to identify the conditions for successful job rotation, toidentify the most important indicators which distinguish these institutional andfinancial framework conditions and then, using these indicators, to describeand assess the framework conditions for job rotation in the individual countries.

The research design for this study is based on hypotheses which weredeveloped from the analysis of the various project planning phases for typicallyideal job rotation projects. For this an inductive method was selected. Thismethod was derived from the ten phases of a typical job rotation project – asagreed upon in the transnational module for job rotation project management7.In a general overview, these project phases – with the concrete experiencesand problems of the parties involved – were set in correlation and analysed..8 Aquestionnaire was sent to certain co-ordination agencies (mainly Adaptprojects) in the countries being surveyed in September 1998 to gain additionalinformation.9

The experiences gained from the Danish example of successful, nation-wide implementation of job rotation projects set the analytical starting point forthe study (European Commission 1997b). Each of the ten different projectphases of job rotation bear particular problems, but also have a number ofessential prerequisites in common which play a vital role in the success orfailure of a project.

On analysing the various phases of a typical job rotation project, sixdifferent key areas were identified which were of particular importance for the

7 The progress of a typical job rotation project can be defined in 10 phases: Preparation;

Contracts; Application phase; Information; Detailed planning; Recruitment phase; Carryingout the job rotation project; Implementation of new skills; Evaluation; Perspectives for newprojects (cf. AOF Faglige Skole, Silkeborg, DK, Hans Bechgaard).

8 Conferences on the job rotation theme, discussions with experts and literature evaluationabout initial job rotation experiences (Moraal 1998, Uhrig 1998, Fietz 1998, SPI 1997-1998)proved especially helpful here.

9 Bettina Uhrig (SPI) was of invaluable help in carrying out this questionnaire-based survey.Special thanks for co-operating go to SPI (Berlin), Arcidonna (Palermo, Italy), Direccao Geraldos Assuntos Consulares e Comunidades Portuguesas (Lisbon, Portugal), EU–JobrotationSecretariat (Aalborg, Denmark), Glasgow Development Agency (Edinburgh, Scotland), MiltonKeynes College (Buckinghamshire, England), Länsarbetsnämnden (Örebro, Sweden), ÖSBUnternehmensberatung GmbH (Vienna, Austria), University of Helsinki - Lahti Research andTraining Centre (Lahti, Finland).

4

development of the projects. On the basis of these key areas, a second stagethen developed hypothetical requirements for the success of job rotationprojects. In the third stage, these prerequisites for success were developedand, using the data on the institutional framework conditions in nine countries,the established indicators for success of job rotation could be examined.10 Thefinal stage at the end of the study deals with the evaluation of the results andthe formation of conclusions. Figure 1 shows an overview of the various studyphases to identify the prerequisites for the successful implementation of jobrotation.

A evaluation design was then established on the basis of these fourworking stages (see Figure 2 ) showing six different key areas of the study. Thekey areas (Column A) are assigned to the success prerequisites (Column B)which are then assigned to the corresponding indicators (Column C). Table 1(Appendix) shows a more detailed list of the indicators and their significance inthe different countries. Chapter 3 deals with the elements and features of theindividual key areas and the necessary conditions for success, along with theirindicators, are described in more detail.

The institutional and financial framework conditions in the individualcountries for job rotation are analysed and compared in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 isa summarised assessment of the analysis on hand and outlines, on a moreabstract level, the favourable conditions for job rotation as well as presentingtheir pragmatic equivalents. This chapter also gives an evaluation of the futurechances of integrative employment and structural policies, such as job rotation,in Germany.

10 The nine countries are: Denmark, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Austria, France,

Germany, Italy and Portugal.

5

Analysis of the courses of different Jobrotation-projectsand identification of the key areasA

Formulation of hypothetical favourable prerequisitesB

Identification of indicators for the favourable prerequisitesC

Evaluation and formulation of resultsD

Figure 1: Sequential procedure method to identify the indicators for therequirements the success of job rotation. The grouping from A toC corresponds to the columns A to C in Figure 2.

(C)Indicators

(B)Conditio

nsforsuccess

(A)Keyareas

IV.

!!!

Problem

awarenessinSMEsregardingqualific

ation

deficits

Flexible,innovativemanagementform

sWillin

gnessofemployers

andemployeesto

co-

operate

injobrotation-projects

Corporate

stru

cturaland

economicconditio

ns

4.1

Firm

sactivity

infurth

ereducation

4.2

Generaleconomicsituation

4.3

Unemploymentrate

V.

!!!!

Inform

ationforsubstitu

tesandemployees

Substitu

tescoaching

Employmentprotection

Acceptable

wagesforthesubstitu

tes

Motivationalconditio

ns

5.1

Legalstatusofsubstitu

tion

5.2

Wagelevelforthe

5.3

Promotionoffurth

ereducationforindividuals

5.4

Wagereplacementratesofbenefits

5.5

Durationanddynamicsofbenefits

5.6

Supportfortheideaoflife

-longlearning

5.7

Subjectivejobsecurity

substitu

tes

II.

!!

co-ordinatedfundingsources,clearguidelinesand

opportu

nitie

sfundsforinnovationsandqualific

ation

2.1

Financialresponsibility

forLMP

2.2

Responsibility

forimplementationofLMP

2.3

ExpendituresforactiveLMP

2.4

Main

focusofactiveLMP

2.5

SizeofthenationalAdapt-b

udget

2.6

Financingoffurth

ertra

iningforemployees

Financialfra

mework

I.

Legalfra

mework

!!!!

rightto

takeeducationalleaveandrig

htto

work

orto

get

educationfortheemployedandunemployed

responsibility

oftheemployerto

qualify

staff

protectionagainstdismissal

suitable

labourpromotionlaw

1.1

Regulationsforfurth

ertra

iningforemployees

1.2

Stre

ngth

ofemploymentprotection

1.3

Regulationsforfixedterm

contra

cts

1.4

Regulationsforwork

andtra

iningoftheunemployed

III.

!!

intensiveco-operationbetweentheactors

ofthe

regionalemploymentsystem

co-operative,trip

artite

decision-m

akingstru

cturesand

traditio

ns

3.1

Organisationalstru

cture

ofpublic

employmentservice

3.2

Organisatio

nalstru

cture

ofsystem

offurth

ereducatio

n3.3

Actors

intheJobrotatio

n-network

Regionalnetwork

!!!

Widecapacitie

sandprofessionalisation,financialand

personellprovisionsofco-ordinators

andtra

ininginstitu

tes

Detailedinform

ationabouttheregionalqualific

ationneeds

Politic

alandscientific

support

6.1

Statusofregionalco-ordinators

6.2

System

fordeterm

inationofregionalqualific

ationneeds

6.3

Existenceofsupportiv

ecommitees

6.4

Number/s

izeofJobrotation-projects

Projectdevelopment

VI.

Fig.2:Jobro

tatio

n-key

area

s,co

nditio

nsforsu

ccessandtheir

indica

tors

7

3. Institutional and financial framework for job rotation

3.1. Legal framework

The legal framework conditions are very important preconditions for thedevelopment of job rotation projects. They stem directly from the individuallegal systems and are therefore dependent on legal traditions and current laws.In our context, regulations governing vocational training for the employed andunemployed, dismissal protection laws and the national legislation regardingemployment promotion are of particular relevance. Due to their sanctionpotential, legal regulations have a complementary effect on other incentivestructures and may play a decisive role for the parties involved in job rotationprojects.

A legally anchored right to further training is a favourable frameworkcondition. If possible, a large number of workers should have access to thisright and it should encompass a longer period thus allowing it to be used for jobrotation training courses. Such rights however must also be flanked by effectivedismissal protection laws so that a worker’s job is not threatened when he/sheis partaking in further training courses. Dismissal protection laws in this caseare primarily to help win workers for further training. They work as an insuranceagainst the loss of a job during the absence caused by the training.11 On theother hand, secure dismissal protection laws promote higher company loyaltywhich is an important factor making companies willing to invest in theirpersonnel. In cases of high fluctuation and high unemployment, companiesmay attempt to harness skilled workers from the external market and fire theirnon-qualified staff. If a company has made an initial investment in furthertraining it will try to profit as long as possible from its staff’s increasedproductivity in order to gain the highest returns possible from the humanresources investment. This again lessens the probability of a company makinglay-offs. (cf.. Mincer 1989, Becker 1964).

Secure dismissal protection can however also lessen staff motivation toacquire additional skills. If a job is safe, regardless of the workers’qualifications and productivity, then they are not bound to continue to upgradetheir skills in order to keep their jobs.

11 We thank our TSER co-operation partner Rachel Silvera for this comment. She notes that in

France, work releases are often used to check the dispensability of staff members.

8

The motivation for workers to participate in further training and to bear partof the costs depends on the types of training on offer. The higher the level ofgeneral skills being offered by the courses, the stronger are their own interests.When a course offers a higher level of specific skills the workers are lessmotivated to make a personal investment in this area.12

Along with these incentive structures, conditions for job rotation could bevery much improved if companies were legally bound to give their staffcontinual training.

Favourable for the unemployed would be legislation granting workers alegal right to further training which would allow all unemployed persons theopportunity to participate in job rotation projects. This infers the compatibility oflegal regulations for employment promotion with job rotation. A clear-cutcreation of legislation for job rotation in the national legal systems would be ofgreat advantage. As an assistance, regulations for practice-oriented training forunemployed could also be used.

In the key area ”legal framework conditions”, a large selection of indicatorscould be identified which can be used for a systematic empirical description ofthe requirements for successful job rotation. The selected indicators are:regulations concerning further training for workers, the strength of theemployment laws, the precepts for fixed-term contracts and the lawsconcerning active labour market policy (s. Ill.1 and Table. 1: 1.1 to 1.4).

3.2. Financial framework

Along with the legal framework conditions, the financial framework conditionsare probably the most important factors for the success of job rotation. Fundingfor the project management, for the training courses and for the evaluationmust be guaranteed as well as the salaries for the trainees and substitutes.This report shows vast differences in international comparisons (Table 1: 5.2and EU Job Rotation – The Secretariat 1998), which, through thecorresponding differences in the incentive structures, we assume, greatlyinfluence the individual participating parties. The financial framework conditionsare closely connected to the motivational conditions (s. 3.5), but are on anotherlevel within our research system. Therefore we differentiate within our analysisscheme between financial framework conditions and motivational conditionswhich also have financial aspects.

12 General skills are beneficial for many other employers and raise the worker’s wage level;

specific skills, on the other hand, are beneficial only to the company carrying out the training(Becker 1964).

9

We believe that the structure of the national labour administration oremployment service, as the main source for funding of active labour marketpolicy, plays an important role for job rotation as an instrument for integratedstructural and labour market policy (cf. Moraal 1998: 14). Job rotation is acombination of employment and structural policies. The labour market policyaspect is met by training and job placement for unemployed persons while thecomponents of the structural aspect are the state-assisted training of workersand the establishment of regional networks. In many countries these threepolicy areas can be assigned to up to three different government ministrieswhose separate political objectives and budgets may vary widely. The analysisof indicators for the financial liability for labour market policy, administrativeresponsibility for policy, for the responsibility for company further training andfor funding job rotation projects shows the relation between the administrativeand financial organisational structure and the framework conditions for jobrotation (Ill..1 and Table 1: 2.1, 2.2, 2.6 in appendix and EU Job Rotation – TheSecretariat 1998). Additionally one must investigate as to whether the budgetallocated to active labour market policy and its focuses, which varies widely inthe all the countries, influences the conditions for the success of job rotation.

Based on the indicators for the financial framework conditions, primarily theconditions for the promotion of job rotation projects as an instrument for activelabour market policy are described. Since a large percentage of funding comesfrom the Adapt initiative, we expect that a relation will be seen from the amountof the national Adapt budget (Tab.1: 2.5) and the number and size of the jobrotation projects in the nine countries being investigated in this study (Tab.1:6.4). Furthermore, indicators have been selected which give information on thedifferent possibilities of funding further training and on the already existing jobrotation model projects. This will assist us in showing the most importantfeatures of the funding systems for enterprises, workers and the unemployed.

3.3. Regional networks

The participation of many different parties in job rotation projects calls for animmense amount of co-ordination. Specialist literature maintains that theresulting costs can be reduced by establishing and institutionalising regionalnetworks (Schmid 1996a: 217ff.). Beyond the actual co-ordination output, co-operative network structures provide employment and structural policysolutions, job rotation being one of them.

In drawing up the conditions for success in this area we are assuming thatalready existing regional networks and co-operative institutions can be utilisedin developing and carrying out job rotation projects. This is only possible in aco-operative environment with mutual trust and with all parties workingtogether. If these prerequisites are not fulfilled, or only in a very rudimentary

10

fashion, then the co-ordinating agency has substantially more work in planningand implementing job rotation projects. The proficiency of a co-operativenetwork is, however, dependent on the autonomy of the individual participants(cf. Benson 1975). This is why the sovereignty of the regional labour offices ofthe employment service, which are important network participants, plays such asignificant role. If their decision-making authority is severely limited then therewill be a smaller repertory of solutions. In order to describe the structure ofregional networks, the indicators showing the organisational structures of thelabour offices and the further training system, along with their network partners,have therefore been taken into account (Tab.: 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3).

3.4. Companies' structural and economic conditions

The community initiative Adapt, and therefore most of the job rotation modelprojects are targeted primarily towards SMEs. These enterprises very oftensuffer from the lack of a skilled workforce without being properly aware of thisproblem, not to mention having a strategy to overcome these skill deficiencies.One of the main objectives of job rotation is to make these companies aware ofthis problem and to develop suitable training programmes with the SMEs andother involved parties. However, the degree of the obstacles to implementingjob rotation projects does not only depend on management and the personneldepartments but also on the company’s current economic situation.

Economically viable companies are usually more prepared to invest timeand capital in their human resources as opposed to businesses which are ineconomic difficulties. Furthermore the so-called desired ”adherence” effect, i.e.when the substitute is kept on by the company as a permanent worker,increases in accordance with higher actual or expected turnover. On the otherhand, the probability of a substitute being kept on is lessened when a companymust in any case decrease its workforce for economic reasons.

Corporate further training activities, the general economic climate and theaverage rate of unemployment in the individual countries are the indicators forthe structural and economic conditions for job rotation (Tab. 1: 4.1 to 4.3). Theuse of these indicators should assist the comparable empirical study of therequirements necessary in this key area for the success of projects.

A society which has integrated structural changes and technologicalprogress in the employment system has a stronger awareness of present andfuture challenges in comparison to a system which still adheres to the oldproduction structures and technology. In this context the indicators for thegeneral economic climate and further training activities in enterprises also giveindirect information. These indicators are of course only rough guidelines, asthe pace of structural changes can vary widely in the different sectors,

11

branches and regions of an economy, with a large discrepancy among theSMEs.

The structural changes and dynamics of the employment system can workin two ways for job rotation: on the one hand, the obligation to adapt to newproduction and consumer situations increase further training activities, while onthe other hand, competitive pressure and the necessary acclimatisation canlead to a very difficult economic situation whereby many enterprises mayneglect personnel development.

This also applies to SMEs and staff training. This indicator can also workboth ways for job rotation. On the one hand high activity in the training fieldimplies that a company is generally open for further training opportunities, whileit can also imply that these needs are already adequately covered by thecompany itself. This second probability however is rather unlikely. Theimplementation of job rotation projects with companies which, in any case, areactive in the training area may also increase the danger of a so-called‘deadweight’ effect. This can occur when companies abuse the wide range ofassistance and subventions for job rotation to undertake training schemeswhich they could have afforded to carry out without external assistance.

The indicator for the general economic climate (Tab.1: 4.2) can also beinterpreted in two directions: A healthy climate can be advantageous for jobrotation as good turnover forecasts will make investments in new technologyand human resources seem profitable13, on the other hand, full productioncapacity may lead to lack of extra resources to plan and carry out job rotationprojects. Decisive factors here are how ‘lean’ the company’s individualproduction structures are and the average number of overtime hours.

3.5. Motivational conditions

Job rotation can only be a success if the participants partake on a voluntarybasis. Both the employees and their substitutes must show a high degree ofmotivation and willingness to learn. Only a motivated substitute can besmoothly integrated in the workplace while only a motivated employee will reapthe benefits of a further training course which will in turn increase thecompany’s productivity and flexibility. We expect that the participants’ personalmotives for taking part in further training are mainly due to financial incentivesor the hope of immaterial gains. This is why the incentives are closelyinterwoven with the financial framework conditions for job rotation.

13 The close connection between economic growth and employment has been confirmed in a

comprehensive OECD study (1996b).

12

The wages for the substitutes and the amount, duration and developmentof unemployment benefits have been chosen as indicators. We expect that themotivation of unemployed persons to participate in job rotation projectsincreases in line with the difference between the wage for substitutes andunemployment benefits. We also expect their motivation to increase if theduration of unemployment payments is relatively short (cf. OECD 1997b: 51ff.).

One of the non-commercial advantages to participation in job rotationprojects is social status. This can be indirectly associated with the substitute’sauthorised status in the company. If the substitutes are only active as ‘unskilledpart-time help’ they are not likely to be accepted as equal colleagues by otherstaff. Regulations which allow for the employment of substitutes with fixed-termcontracts in companies could help raise their working status and thus increasemotivation for potential substitutes.

State promotion of further training can very much increase workers’incentives to participate in job rotation projects. An idea worth considering inthis context would be a certification standard by which further training would beawarded with a government-recognised certificate. This would mean that thenew skills acquired could be utilised in other jobs and not solely for theenterprise participating in job rotation.

An indication of the likelihood of finding enough workers and unemployedto participate in job rotation schemes is their willingness for life-long learning(Tab.1: 5.6). Such unemployed persons would be more inclined to take on anew work area within a project rather then those who are not willing to learnnew skills and are only prepared to take on the same type of work which theyhad before unemployment. Willingness for life-long learning is an even moreimportant influence for workers to take part in further training.

An interesting, though ambivalent, indicator is the worker’s subjectivefeeling of job security in the various employment systems (Tab.1: 5.7, cf. alsoChapter 3.5 on pages 8-9). Low job security would probably increase theworker’s efforts to improve his/her skills in order to secure his/her job or toimprove chances of finding more steadfast employment. On the other hand, thefear of job loss could also impede a worker’s motivation to learn new skills ashe/she may be afraid that a (temporary) absence could heighten chances ofbeing laid off.

3.6. Project development

The high degree of complexity in job rotation projects is due to the multipleelements whose complicated interaction results in much time and troublehaving to be invested in setting up a project. The interests of many different

13

parties must be taken into account and many separate projects must be co-ordinated and synchronised. This calls for a professional project managementbody which initiates and co-ordinates all the necessary stages. This task istaken over by the regional co-ordination agencies for the job rotation modelprojects.

In order to master this task professionally and effectively the co-ordinationagencies must have adequate planning capacities, staff and funding. Theproject management must be able to work with the other parties involved todevelop and implement good and practical project ideas. Success indicatorshere are the task areas and other functions of the co-ordination agencies(Tab.1: 6.1).

Another important prerequisite for job rotation projects is the developmentof suitable training modules for the staff of companies partaking in the projects.These are often developed in close co-operation with the enterprisesthemselves and with business associations and trade unions. This calls fordetailed and concrete information on the current or future qualificationrequirements for the individual companies. Analyses of the regional trainingrequirements – the results of which could be useful for job rotation projects –were however not carried out in all the European countries involved. Existentregional surveys on training requirements are therefore very importantindicators within the key area ”Project development” (Tab.1: 6.2).

The political and academic environment also plays an important role in therealisation of job rotation projects. There is indeed a strong political willingnesson a European level to initiate and implement model projects which forms to anequal degree the political framework for job rotation in all EU Member States.However the heterogeneous methods of putting EU initiatives into practice canlead to varying results. Furthermore the differing administrative andorganisational structures ( centralism, federalism) can also influence theindividual national and regional framework conditions for job rotation.

This also applies to the community initiative Adapt, which according to itsdefinition is put into practice on the initiative of the Member States (EuropeanCommission: Internet). This involves implementing schemes at grass root level.Additionally the framework conditions for job rotation projects are alsoinfluenced and decided upon by the actors on the national and regional levels.This is not only true for concrete legislation but also in relation to administrativeregulations, work instructions and informal decision-making processes.

General and specific support from individual and collective parties onnational, regional and local levels for job rotation projects would be anadvantageous political framework condition. This support could be both in theform of political decision making as well as on an administrative level. There isa wide scope of possibilities to support or hinder job rotation. This range

14

encompasses from tight or flexible administrative regulations right through toadapting regional or national laws to the requirements of employment andstructural policy-related schemes such as job rotation.

The academic environment can also have either positive or negativerepercussions for job rotation projects. Here one must mention interactionbetween science and the political actors, identified by experts or researchsurveys on job rotation projects – this interaction may well influence policybehaviour. Scientific background information and structural analyses can behelpful and encouraging when developing concepts and carrying out projects.Committees with members from political, research and practice-orientatedbackgrounds can be of particular advantage as they can use their wide scopeof influence to counter barriers in the planning and implementation of projects.

Unfortunately it is difficult to gather empirical data in this area. Longinterviews would be necessary with the parties involved in the national jobrotation projects and these would then have to be analysed and evaluated froma network-theoretical standpoint. This undertaking is beyond the scope of thisstudy so a systematic description of the political and academic support had tobe omitted. Instead, the regional supporting committees with representativesfrom business associations, politics, research bodies and from the projects whoidentified and discussed job rotation problems at regular intervals were takenas an indicator (Tab.1: 6.3).

15

4. Discussions of the conditions for job rotation in nineEuropean countries

The conditions leading to the success of job rotation projects are structured inthe third part of this study. The fourth part deals with the analysis for conditionsfor projects in the individual national contexts. We shall commence withDenmark where job rotation has been implemented on a nation-wide scale andhas been developed as an important element for employment and structuralpolicy. Denmark will thus serve as a contrast foil with which the institutional andfinancial regulations in the other countries can be compared and evaluated.

4.1. Denmark

The implementation of job rotation in Denmark can be regarded as successful.The number of participants taking part in job rotation makes this evident.Soerensen (1998: 49) reports over 17,800 participants for 1994, over 29,000for 1995 and over 36,500 for 1996 (cf. Tab.2). The numbers however accordingto the European Commission (1997b: 14) are somewhat less, with officialfigures for 1995 at 24,340.14 While it is expected that participant numbers willhave decreased for 1997, a strong increase in numbers is planned for 1998and 1999.15 A comparison between the number of participants in Denmark andin the other countries (Tab. 1: 6.3) clearly shows that job rotation has beenmuch further developed here, along only with Sweden. What are the reasonsfor this success?

4.1.1. Institutional framework

Active labour market policy is held in high regard in Denmark and the intensitywith which it’s propagated lies just behind that of Sweden in the list of countriesunder survey (Tab.1: 2.3). Qualification and training enjoys an immensely highpriority within employment schemes (Tab.1: 2.4). The state plays an excellentrole in further education by providing training centres and centres for adulteducation.

14 The discrepancy between these figures is based on the different definitions for ”job rotation”.

The border between a normal substitution for an absent employee e.g. in Germany formaternity leave, and a substitution within the job rotation framework is not always clearlydefined.

15 Relevant estimations for Denmark were delivered by Stig Skovbo, AOF Silkeborg.

16

The Danish law on work release is an important legal framework conditionallowing the large-scale implementation of job rotation projects. From 1993 to1994 the number of participants rose by almost a third from approx. 6,700 toapprox. 19,000. According to DTI (European Commission 1997b: 7), thisincrease is due mainly to changes in the employment laws which came intoforce at the beginning of 1994 encouraging work leave. These law reformsconcerned three areas: firstly, the a much wider section of the workforce weregiven a right to study leave, secondly pay during leave was increased to 100%of unemployment benefits and thirdly a direct substitution for the worker oneducational leave was no longer compulsory (Nätti 1997, Höcker/Reissert1995). It is interesting to note here that, according to the statistics on hand, thisvoluntary basis did not lead to a decrease of unemployed substitutes but on thecontrary, figures increased from approx. 1,000 to approx. 5,000 (Tab.2).

This could be due to two factors. In broadening the rights to educationalleave with corresponding better payment benefits, a distinct incentive wasestablished leading to an increase in the number of employees availing ofstudy leave from approx. 12,000 to approx. 80,000 between 1993 and 1996.16

Secondly, job rotation has been intensively implemented nation-wide since1994. To help achieve this, intensive public awareness campaigns were carriedout to make the new opportunities for leave-taking better known.

The fact that there is a lesser number of substitutes in comparison toemployed workers participating in job rotation projects in Denmark is anindicator that on average several workers are replaced by a single substituteand that therefore the average replacement period by the substitute is of longerduration than the worker’s study leave.17

Tab.2: Job rotation and further training: Number of participants and totalnumber of employees on leave in Denmark.

1993 1994 1995Employed JR Participants 3.680 12.200 21.015Unemployed JR Participants 1.042 5.600 7.988Total JR Participants 4.722 17.800 29.003Total of leave for training 2.400 47.000 80.000Ratio of employed JRparticipants to total of leavefor trainin g 3:2 1:4 1:4

Sources: Nätti and AOF Silkeborg, own calculations.

Joint statutory and union regulations allow workers to avail of regular leave forfurther training for up to 1 year duration (unemployed persons: 2 years) (s.

16 However during the same period the utilisation of family leave and sabbaticals decreased

perceptibly. Thus the total figures for persons on leave through these three programmes fellfrom 140,000 in 1994 to 132,000 in 1995.

17 This observation has also been confirmed for job rotation projects in other Europeancountries Uhrig (1998: 37). The Berlin model projects, where a single substitute replaces anemployee on training are to be seen more as an exception.

17

Tab.1, 1.1). Corresponding employment legislation (UTB/ATB Laws) enablesunemployed persons to participate in further training which includes a practicalwork period. This ”employment offer” is available as an individual activationplan to people who have been unemployed for (according to which risk groupthey belong) between six months and two years. The combination of both ofthese sets of regulations played an important role in the implementation of jobrotation projects, especially during the initial period (Soerensen 1998: 43).

Settlements for leave of absence for employees in Denmark have beenaccompanied by corresponding funding arrangements. Both funding forcompanies partaking in further training (Tab.1: 2.6), and funding for theindividual participants can be described as comparably generous. Educationalleave is specially designed for the introduction of job rotation (EuropeanCommission, BIR Denmark 1997: 38). Payment is in line with 100% of themaximum amount of unemployment assistance (Tab.1: 5.3 and 5.5). Loss ofincome during a longer period of study leave is relatively low for members ofthe lower and middle wage brackets as compensatory payments are 90% of thelast gross wages.18 This circumstance could explain an interesting phenomenonin the participant statistics: Even though empirical studies (Audier/Giraud 1996,Schömann/Becker 1994, Tuijnman/Schömann 1996) show, that companies arein general more interested in training their better educated employees19 andthat this group is more interested in further training, (Eurobarometer 44.0), theproportion of lesser skilled workers is higher (European Commission 1997b:15f). The companies could be compelled to subsidise income loss for theirhighly qualified employees while on educational leave which would only add tothe high production losses incurred during the absence of such a well-integrated highly productive colleague.

A further explanation for the above-average participation of lesser-skilledparticipation in job rotation projects would be the difficulty in finding suitablyqualified substitutes in Denmark. This shortage would then mean that fewerprojects could be tailored to highly-skilled participants.

The structure of the trade unions offers a further explanation for high rateof participation of lower-skilled workers. Since union membership is designatedaccording to occupational groups and not according to sectors, a strong lobbyfor the non-skilled and low-skilled workers can sway a lot of influence for theirparticular demands. Furthermore the trade unions’ responsibility for theunemployment insurance funds means that their members still remain closelyassociated with the unions even after job loss.

18 In general, unemployment benefit rates in Denmark are 90% of the last gross salary

(Schmid/Reissert 1994: 239). However, the level for net unemployment benefits for 1994 wasset much lower by the OECD (1996). The relatively low maximum benefit which reduces anaverage earner’s unemployment benefits to well below 90% of the last gross wage could helpexplain the difference.

19 This can be very clearly observed in France (European Commission, BIR France 1996).

18

4.1.2. Incentive structure and evaluation

Job rotation’s success in Denmark is remarkable in regard to its extent and theresults for labour market policy. The longer replacement duration of substitutesin enterprises had possibly a positive influence on the number kept on aspermanent employees. 60-80% of the substitutes were kept on in many regionsof Denmark (European Commission 1997b: 1) which is a great success factorfor an labour market policy measure. Both the offers for further training alongwith their financial framework conditions act as strong incentives forcompanies and individuals to avail of these opportunities. This is obvious dueto the high number of enterprises training their workforces (Tab.1: 4.1), as wellas the Danish people’s extremely positive attitude to life-long learning (Tab.1:5.6).

The number of substitutes in 1995 was only approx. 4% of the total numberof unemployed in Denmark (AOF 1998 and OECD 1997e). Job rotationhowever becomes more significant when the substitute figures are compared tothe difference in the total unemployment statistics between 1994 and 1995: In1995 the total unemployment figures dropped by approx. 25,000 compared tothe previous year. 16% (approx. 4.000 persons) of this reduction can be seenas a direct result of job rotation20, when using the premise that on average 70%of the substitutes are taken over and when disregarding other fluctuationfactors.

The percentage of unemployed who are participating, within the frameworkof ”employment offers”21 in job rotation projects is between 5 and 10%.22 Thesefigures show that the general effects of job rotation on the long-termunemployment rate 23 in Denmark are relatively low: when 70% of thesubstitutions are taken on permanently after the replacement period, thepercentage of long-term unemployed obtaining regular jobs is between 2 and5% of the total number of long-term unemployed persons, whereby thispercentage is not checked for substitution effects. On the assumption that anew job could be created anyway for half the substitution posts, which would befilled by an unemployed person under different circumstances, the percentageof new jobs for long-term unemployed created through job rotation would bereduced to between 1 and 2.5%.

20 This very simple model calculations based on the premises of very advantageous

circumstances and ignores some important factors.21 After a period of between 6 months to 2 years an unemployed person must be offered a job

or training – here job rotation is very suitable. The length of the unemployment period beforethis must be offered depends on his/her placement chances. This scheme is to protect targetgroups who are difficult to place from long phases of unemployment.

22 Cf. Soerensen (1998: 49) and European Commission (1997b: 14).23 Here all unemployed persons with a job offer (see Footnote 22) are classified as being long-

term unemployed.

19

The relation between the number of participants in job rotation to the totalnumber of short and long-term unemployed shows that job rotation can indeedhave a significant effect on reducing unemployment. However, at least in theform implemented in Denmark, it is less suitable as an instrument to counterlong-term unemployment.

On examining Danish dismissal protection laws (Tab.1: 1.2), which arehowever flanked by high and long on-going benefits, one can observe thatstrong further training activities on the part of enterprises, a high willingness toparticipate on the part of workers and unemployed and weak dismissalprotection laws are not necessary contradictory. Despite the weak dismissalprotection laws, the subjective job security consciousness in Denmark is higherthan in all other countries being surveyed. This can be accounted for by thestrongly growing economy and the decreasing unemployment rates.

4.2. Finland


The legal framework conditions which can be related to Adapt Job Rotationwere adopted in Finland in 1995. The foundation for these is the leave ofabsence legislation which furnishes far-reaching legal conditions similar toDenmark. After a certain continuous working period, workers have a right to upto a year’s leave of absence (Nätti 1997). In contrast to Denmark however, thisperiod can be freely utilised and the employer is compelled to replace him/herwith an unemployed substitute for this period (Tab.1: 1.1). Distinct regulationsfor vocational training for the unemployed are anchored in the employmentpromotion laws. Furthermore, the opportunity of utilising job rotation projectshas been explicitly adopted by the legislation (Tab.1: 1.4).

Although the percentage of Finland’s budget for active labour market policyis a high proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP), the intensity ofexpenditure is very weak due to the high unemployment rate. The mainemphasis of the labour market policy in on training schemes (Tab.1: 2.3, 2.4).

Further training in enterprises is, as in Denmark, co-funded by the state.This responsibility does not lie completely with the enterprises – a factor whichmakes job rotation projects easier to implement. Furthermore the socialpartners, whose structures and networks could be used for job rotation projects,also have funds for further training (Tab.1: 2.6).

The tripartite and yet decentralised structure of the labour administration isof advantage to job rotation’s labour market policy and social policy functions.Trade union representation on all important committees is also a warrant for the

20

even-handed implementation of job rotation (Tab.1: 2.6). The desired”adherence” effect of the substitutes is relatively strong thanks to Finland’sparticularly good economy which lends itself to expansion potential (Tab.1:4.4).


The incentives for employees are relatively weak. Payments would have toincreased in order to be able to utilise the opportunities for leave of absence inFinland for job rotation. The low financial compensation (Tab.1: 5.3) has provedto be the main deterrent to avail of leave of absence. 73% of the workers whotook leave were female which indicates that the opportunity is often availed offor maternity leave. The average length of absence was 8.5 months (Nätti1997).

The projects established through the Adapt Job Rotation initiative alsoseemed to offer little incentive for the substitutes . They were normally nottaken on the staff roll but continued to have unemployed status (either duringjob experience or in the form of further training). Additionally their remunerationis low in comparison to a worker’s wage (Tab.1: 5.1, 5.2).

The low incentives could however be counterbalanced by the highunemployment rate, the medium wages level and the above-averagewillingness of the unemployed for life-long learning (Tab.1: 5.4, 5.5, 5.6).

For enterprises , participation in job rotation projects, is in contrast,worthwhile as, according to our calculation model, they do not have to bear anypart of the active costs.

Despite the inadequately developed incentive structures, the indicatorsavailable justify the classification of Finland’s institutional structures as beingsuitable for employment and structural policies such as job rotation. The legalframework conditions on the level of reimbursement payments however, mustbe adapted. The fact that legal regulations specifically suitable to job rotationalready exist is a positive factor. The promising start of the ”Act on Jobalternation” (Työvuorottelutoimikunnan väliraportti) project can be evaluated asa sign of positive conditions for job rotation. Further surveys on the possibilitiesof combining ”Job alternation leave” with job rotation must be carried outhowever before reaching a final conclusion.

21

4.3. Sweden

Experience with substitution models has been gathered in Sweden since 1987which led to the introduction of ‘further training substitution’(Utbildningsvikariat) in 1991. This has since been developed into a nation-widepolicy instrument and led to placements of approx. 42,000 substitutes in 1994/5(Olsson 1997).


Far-reaching laws dealing with leave of absence for further training exist inSweden as in the other Scandinavian countries. Additionally since 1996 theSwedish employment promotion legislation has laws dealing particularly withsubstitutions (Tab.1: 1.1 and 1.4).

The percentage of 2,25% of the GDP for active labour market policy ishigh, exceeded only by Denmark. The intensity of this policy is clearly at thetop of the countries surveyed (Tab.1: 2.3).

Leave of absence is especially encouraged by the Swedish labouradministration when it can deter lay-offs. About DM 12,600 (ECU 6,350) isavailable per worker (Tab.1: 2.6) but only if the employer guarantees that nolay-offs shall occur for the duration of the project (Olsson 1997). This offer forfurther training is combined with the labour office offer to fill the free workplaces with unemployed substitutes. Despite this rather contradictoryarrangement24 , according to Lindbeck (1995), 7,600 unemployed substitutescould be integrated in courses in autumn 1994.

In contrast to Denmark, the most use for the substitute method has beenfound in the public administration sector. It is mainly the regionaladministrations (regional parliaments) and municipalities which successfullyutilise this scheme in the health and care sector. The restructuring of theregional parliaments brought an added inducement to apply the further trainingsubstitution method (Lindbeck 1995).

The decentralised organisational structure of the Swedish labouradministration is probably advantageous to the implementation of thesubstitution models. Its tripartite structure is beneficial in achieving social policytargets and in finding agreement with the social partners (Tab. 1: 3.1).

As is the case in Finland, the relationship between the ‘Swedish version’ ofthe substitution model with Adapt Job Rotation is not fully clear. A combination

24 If funding is only paid for training for workers whose jobs are in danger the company will not

have any great interest in filling these surplus workplaces with unemployed persons.

22

of both instruments could of course be taken into consideration. On the otherhand the Swedish ‘Further training offer’ focuses more strongly on directlyendangered jobs as is usually the case in Adapt projects. Which of thesepossibilities is relevant could not, unfortunately be clarified.

According to information from LAA Örebro, 1,414 persons (workers plussubstitutes) partook in job rotation projects. This is an immense difference incomparison to the other countries and is probably due to the participation oflarger firms in the projects.


The incentives for unemployed to participate in job rotation seem especiallystrong in Sweden. According to the model calculation, 96% of normal wagesare paid and the substitutes receive a fixed-term contract with the enterprises.Furthermore the 35% difference to the unemployment benefits is completelysufficient and is the third highest in the countries surveyed, behind the UnitedKingdom and Austria (Tab.1: 5.1 to 5.3).

The willingness towards life-long learning is somewhat less prevalentamong Swedish employees as is among their Danish and Finnish colleagues.In Sweden 79% of the workers accept the principle of the necessity for life-longlearning while in Finland the figure is 81% and in Denmark 93% (Tab.1: 5.6).The worker’s subjective feeling of job security is also less than in Denmark andFinland even though Swedish employment protection laws are stronger thanthose of the other two countries (Tab.1: 1.2). As a lower level on this indicatorcan also signalise higher willingness for further training, this would be apositive influence for job rotation, at least when the courses consisted of acertain ratio of general skills (s. Chapter 3, 3.1 and 3.5, P. 8,9 and 13).

The enterprise funding share for job rotation projects is, according to themodel calculation, the highest of all the surveyed countries. This could pose aproblem for implementing projects.

The framework conditions for job rotation can be described as positive.This assessment is supported by the current participant figures.

4.4. France

The job rotation model projects in France are the most recent in the Europeanpartner countries. Although projects were being planned in 1996, actualimplementation with Adapt approval only began in 1998. Apart from the Adapt

23

initiative, no other job alteration methods have been developed in Francecomparable to those in Denmark and Finland.

The study of the framework conditions for the concrete application cantherefore only refer to the very few reports available on project experience andis to be regarded as provisional.


The French further training system for employees is well-developed. It is basedon an obligatory levy from the enterprises. These must invest 1.5% of theirgross wage bill in training and further training whereby the lion’s share isinvested in in-company training (Tab.1: 2.6). This system offers an explanationfor the high involvement of French enterprises in further training. Thisinvolvement is however not uniform in all enterprises: smaller companies offerfar less training than firms with over 250 employees (Tab.1: 4.1). It has alsobeen observed that it is mainly the higher-skilled workers who get theopportunity to participate in further training courses (Audier/Giraud 1996). Bothof these observations point to unequal opportunities as a result of this allotmentstructure and is contradictory to social policy objectives. Job rotation could, inthis situation, help lessen these inequalities: further training in SMEs could beencouraged with a special focus on helping lower-skilled workers.

The chances of developing job rotation projects in France depend oncertain unknown factors. If it were possible to utilise funds invested inenterprise training then the funding for employees in job rotation projects wouldbe secured. Additionally a considerable amount of the EU’s Adapt budget hasbeen reserved for France (Tab. 1: 2.5). Since active labour market policy has agreat significance in France (Tab. 1: 2.3, 2.4) and many programmes for theunemployed exist, there should not be any great hurdles for job rotationprojects to be expected in the area of the financial and legal frameworkconditions.

However the fragmentation of the labour administration could lead toproblems for job rotation. Questions regarding areas of responsibility, sectorand branch-related peculiarities and the split unions make the assessment ofjob rotation’s chances uncertain (Tab.1: 2.2, 3.1). There is not sufficient dataavailable for an exact prognosis on the development of the frameworkconditions. This is because the Adapt projects are still in an early stage.

A number of indicators among the motivational factors indicate positiveconditions for job rotation. Workers and unemployed have a positive attitudetowards life-long learning, the unemployment rate is well above the Europeanaverage and wages for substitutes, at least according to our calculation model,are considerably more than unemployment benefits (Tab.1: 5.2, 5.6, 4.4). The

24

about average French dismissal protection laws (Tab.1: 1.2 and 5.7) couldpose a problem for the incentives for workers to undergo further training toacquire special skills. This, combined with the clear sense of job insecurityprevalent in France (Tab.1: 1.2 and 5.7), could result in workers rejecting alonger leave of absence for training for fear of losing their jobs in their absencedue to economic reasons.


A combination of all recognisable framework conditions for the implementationof job rotation schemes signalises a positive incentive structure forenterprises . According to the model calculation, no extra costs for participationin projects would be incurred which would not already be covered by thenormal contributions to the further training funds.

One shall have to see as to what extent the weak dismissal protection lawswill be a positive or negative incentive factor for employees (cf. Chapter 3, 3.1and 3.6). An evaluation of the incentive structure for the unemployed iscurrently not possible because the most important indicators for the legal statusand wages of substitutes in enterprises are still unclear.

An overall assessment of the financial and institutional conditions for jobrotation in France has therefore somewhat conflicting results. All estimationshave a high uncertainty factor due to the high level of fragmentation in theFrench employment system. The chances for job rotation are lesser incomparison to the north-European countries as the most important constituentof a positive legal and financial structure, namely the existence of regulationsfor long-term leave of absence for further training, is less prevalent than inDenmark or Finland. Nevertheless it is possible that the existing rules forindividual study leave and the pledges for further training are sufficient for adynamic development of job rotation projects.

4.5. United Kingdom


Against its background of a liberal legal tradition, The United Kingdom does nothave any general binding laws regarding leave of absence for workers. Up tonow, the government has focused on incentives for companies and individualsto help raise the level of further training activities. Further agreements maythen be negotiated individually or with the union partners. Correspondingly, thelabour laws are less adjusted and have no restrictions for fixed-term and a lowlevel of dismissal protection (Tab.1: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3). On the other hand, the laws

25

for employment promotion contain elements of the combination of training andwork experience which could be utilised for job rotation (Tab.1: 1.4).

Funding for active labour market policy is low in the United Kingdom. Bothas a percentage of the GDP and the strength of spending are five to six timesbelow that of the better equipped countries (Tab.1: 2.3). Accordingly thepriorities for active labour market policy lie within the labour administration’sclassical core tasks: the lion’s share of funding is made available for theplacement of the unemployed (Tab.1: 2.4)25. The United Kingdom, however,receives a large sum from the Adapt budget – the total amount being thehighest of all the countries in this survey (Tab.1: 2.5).

The fact that the organisational structure of the employment service andlabour market policy is geared towards enterprise needs and the creation ofprivately-run TECs (Training and Enterprise Councils) to the disadvantage oftripartite administrative structures is in sharp contrast to the situation alreadydescribed in Denmark, Finland and Sweden as well as in France. TECs areorganisations which receive contracts via public tender from the authorities toperform public tasks. After a certain period the TECs must reapply for thesecontracts. The objective is to make these public services as economicallyviable as possible. The question here is to what an extent this principle mayhinder demanding and, in the planning and implementation of projects,complicated, long-lasting forms of labour market policy such as job rotation. IfTEC activities are to be evaluated on a narrow benefit – cost analysis wherebythe ”quick success” counts, then it would be difficult to organise job rotationprojects with them. In the light of this institutional structure, it seems importantthat the influential British employers should be convinced of the benefits of jobrotation projects so that the Industrial Training Boards, the TECs andEmployers Associations would be willing to co-operate on projects. Only so canone imagine a nation-wide implementation of job rotation in the UnitedKingdom.

The structural and economic conditions for enterprises seemadvantageous for this. British enterprises are extremely active in furthertraining in comparison to the other countries. In companies with over 250employees the United Kingdom tops the scale ahead of France with a rate of48% while for SMEs it follows Denmark in second place (Tab.1: 4.1).Furthermore, the economic situation, which gives pointers to the likelihood ofenterprises making growth investments, looks relatively healthy even thougheconomic growth in 1998 and 1999 is significantly weaker than in 1997 (Tab.1:4.4). The indicators among the incentive factors can also be seen as positive.The substitutes are employed by companies with wages well exceedingunemployment benefits, dole payments are extremely low and the British are

25 Both qualitative and quantitative changes can be expected from the objectives set by the

United Kingdom’s new government. The budget for active labour market policy is to beincreased and the training of workers is to be designated as one of the most important aims.

26

second to the Danes in their positive attitude to life-long learning (Tab.1: 5.1 to5.6).


The incentives for employees to participate in further training schemes such asjob rotation are strengthened by the compulsion for continually improving one’sown skills – this is due to low job security caused by weak employmentprotection laws.

The incentives for enterprises are no doubt dependant on whetherparticipation in job rotation projects decreases or raises the costs for givingtheir employees further training.

The incentives for the unemployed to participate in job rotation projectsare strong. According to our model calculations, substitutes’ wages are on parwith those of regular employees and much higher than average unemploymentpayments.

The estimation of the chances for a nation-wide implementation of jobrotation projects in Britain is also somewhat contradictory. The main uncertaintyfactor is the TECs’ reaction and suitability. Their suitability for active co-operation in a job rotation network is difficult to gauge. Their co-operation,however, is of vital importance because of the central role they play inimplementing active labour market policy in the United Kingdom.

4.6. Italy


A legislative reform encompassing leave of absence for employees and grantsfor further training is being planned in Italy where previously no generalregulations existed for training for workers. Regulations already exist for fixed-term employment of staff as well as rights for the unemployed to participate intraining courses and practical training (Tab.1: 1.1 to 1.4) – these can be utilisedwithin the job rotation framework.

Italy takes third last place in front of the United Kingdom and Austria in itsspending for active labour market policy measured as a percentage of theGDP. This ranking is improved when the strength of spending is observed: hereItaly takes fourth place together with Portugal. The main focus of the activelabour market policy is, due to the high rate of youth unemployment, onassistance and schemes for the youth and for jobless young persons. These

27

measures offer a variety of vocational training programmes. Most of the fundingcomes from the government with EU subsidies also as an important source,especially for the more underdeveloped regions (Tab.1: 2.1 to 2.6). Theimportance of the European contributions for Adapt job rotation projects isobvious from our model calculation: as in Finland and the United Kingdom, thecalculation model is based on the high funding share from EU resources (EU-Job rotation – the secretariat 1998).26

The organisation structure of the labour administration could have adetrimental effect on the development of nation-wide job rotation projects inItaly. It is a centrally organised, yet horizontally fragmented structure with astrong regulated focus on job placement.27 There is a large number of boardsand management committees with tripartite structures.

Several steps have been taken recently to decentralise the labouradministration with the aim of giving more policy responsibility to the individualregions (Tab.1: 3.1).

In 1993 further training activities in Italian enterprises were, on average,less than in Portugal and the lowest of all surveyed countries (Tab.1: 4.1). Thisis a clear indicator for Italy’s huge structural problems in this area. Despite thissituation, Italy’s economic barometer (Tab.1: 4.4) is similar to that of the othercountries so that one may speak of good conditions for job rotation-inducedfurther training and a positive prognosis of companies undertaking expansioninvestments.

Willingness for life-long learning is high among the unemployed. Theyhave a mid-range position when compared with the other countries and thesame can be said of Italian employees. These figures are in stark contrast tothe other sections of the population with 66% having a positive attitude – thustaking the third last place ahead of Austria and Germany (Tab.1: 5.6).


The framework conditions as far as the motivational factors are concerned maybe described as relatively poor. The substitutes do not have a contract withthe employer and their wage level is, according to the model calculation (Tab.1: 5.2) only 40% of that of the regular employees and a mere 6% more than

26 The study of the financing models, however, has shown that the assessment of the cost

sharing is to be viewed with scepticism. In southern Italy a co-funding from the EU to thegiven extent (EU-Job Rotation – the secretariat 1998) is quite improbable and would be incontradiction to the principle of ”Supplementation” (European Commission 1996a: 23).

27 In Italy enterprises are legally bound to give the employment administration notice ofvacancies. Only registered unemployed persons may be taken on. Changes are occurringhowever in this area and legislation has been introduced, opening the market for temporaryemployment agencies.

28

average unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits are, however, so lowin Italy (Tab.1: 5.4) that an incentive to participation in job rotation projects maybe expected –alone due to the dire straits of the unemployed.

Positive incentives for employees and employers remain low as long asthere are no regulations for leave of absence for further training.

In view of the institutional changes being planned or already initiated inItaly, one may be curious as to the future developments in active labour marketpolicy. The status quo is probably only to a certain limit suitable for a nation-wide implementation of job rotation. This appraisal is confirmed by the lack ofeffective study leave regulations, the low compensatory wage level which is adecisive factor for substitutions in northern Europe, the rigid rules governingfixed-term contracts and job placement.

4.7. Portugal


The right of the individual to vocational training is anchored in the Portugueseconstitution. Due to the high rate of youth unemployment, the main focus of theemployment and training regulations is geared towards this target group. Thisfocal point is mirrored in the funding for the various fields of active labourmarket policy (Tab.1: 1.1, 1.4). It comes as a surprise that the Adapt budget forPortugal is relatively modest when compared to that of the other countries. Itsvolume is, on par with Sweden’s, the lowest – however with a 72% co-fundingshare from the EU (Tab.1: 2.5)28.

The state-run institute for training and employment (IEFP) plays a centralrole in the Portuguese vocational training and further training system. It runsactive labour market policy programmes and its ”Protocol Centres” form asignificant part of the further training infrastructure (Tab.1: 2.2, 2.6, 3.1, 3.2).The IEFP is administered in a tripartite form and plays a central role in currentand future job rotation projects.

Further training activities in Portuguese enterprises are underdeveloped(Tab.1: 4.1). In the SME sector, Portugal lies in second last place in front ofItaly while taking last place in the area of larger enterprises. Despite these lowresults, the willingness towards life-long learning is surprisingly high, especiallyamong the unemployed. The rate in Portugal is 84%, surpassed only by theBritish and Danish unemployed.

28 See footnote 26.

29

Subjective job security in Portugal is low despite the healthy economicclimate and the relatively low unemployment rate (Tab.1: 4.3, 4.4, 5.7). Thiscould increase workers’ incentives to participate in further training in order toimprove their chances on the internal and external labour markets (cf.Sengenberger 1987).


The incentive for the unemployed to participate in job rotation projects inPortugal does not seem very high. Substitutes do not receive contractualemployment and the 16% difference between the compensatory wages andunemployment benefits is in the mid-range of the survey countries. Theunemployment rate of 6.6% in Portugal is relatively low so one must expect ashortage of motivated substitutes.

When participating in job rotation further training schemes workers do notlose their status as employees and can profit from increased productivity andcorresponding salary increases. This proves that their incentives are positive,at least when the training encompasses a wider selection of general skills.

According to our model calculation, the incentive for Portugueseenterprises for participating in job rotation projects is high (EU-Job Rotation –The Secretariat 1998). The employer must only bear the costs of a possibleloss in productivity caused by the use of a replacement worker. This losshowever is merely short term and is compensated through the productivity gainfrom employees’ improved skills, implying that participation will bring a clearprofit.

A detailed evaluation of the chances for a future nation-wideimplementation of job rotation involves a certain degree of uncertainty due tothe data available. The chances for job rotation in Portugal can be gauged ascautiously optimistic due to a) the strong position of the government in theinstitutional structure of the further training system, b) the reliance of thePortuguese economy on a rapid modernisation in order to increasecompetitiveness and c) the general positive attitude towards life-long learning.

The most recent legislation draft for the explicit promotion of job rotationschemes undoubtedly mirrors a great political enthusiasm. As to whether thesenew regulations will actually promote a nation-wide implementation remains tobe seen.

30

4.8. Austria


A new law for leave of absence for educational purposes has been passed inAustria. At a first glance these new regulations offer an extensive legalfoundation for job rotation: workers have a right to a 6-12 month sabbaticalafter a constant three year term of employment and this is financed throughunemployment insurance (Tab. 1: 1.1). However the singularities of this law aresuch that it cannot be utilised for job rotation projects: 29: A minimum of 6months leave is too much for most company managers and the financial lossesfor the employees are so large (a standard monthly rate of ECU 400 is paid forleave duration) that most of them cannot afford to undertake further trainingunder these conditions.

Austria has a centralised integrated employment service which isresponsible for passive and active labour market policy programmes andservices (Tab.1: 2.2, 3.1). This situation raises the question as to whether theresponsibility labour market policy lying in a single organisation and theresulting minimised interweaving of budget administration could have a positiveeffect on the development of integrated co-operative forms of labour marketpolicy such as job rotation. The labour administration is controlled on all levelsby committees made up of various parties which are also responsible fordrawing up labour market policy objectives. These co-operative structures arealso mirrored in the Austrian further training system (Tab.1: 3.2).

The assumption that the integrated structure of the employment servicewould lead to an increased activation of labour market policy cannot beconfirmed through the Austrian archetype. Funding for active labour marketpolicy is only 0.38% of the GDP which corresponds to a spending intensity of0.06. This is extremely low in comparison to the other countries, with theexception of the United Kingdom (Tab.1: 2.3). As in the United Kingdom,Austrian labour market policy focuses primarily on job placement for theunemployed. This is followed however by training for the unemployed and notby special programmes targeted towards youth unemployment (Tab.1: 2.4).This difference is certainly due to the differing problem areas in both countries:thanks to the dual apprentice system, Austria has, in comparison to most of theother countries, no problems with youth unemployment.

The passivity of the Austrian employment service in regard to its structureof objectives is possibly due to the extremely low unemployment rate incomparison to the other countries . It was 4.5% in May 1998, together withDenmark (4.7%) the best results of all countries surveyed (Tab.1: 4.4). 29 We would like to thank the expert for job rotation from ÖSB who gave us valuable

information on the practicalities of the new legislation during one of our conferences.

31

Another unusual result is the attitude of the Austrians to life-long learning.Both workers and the unemployed have little interest (Tab.1: 5.6) – this couldbe due to the thorough original training offered by the dual system.


The incentive for unemployed to participate in job rotation projects assubstitutes is quite high in Austria. The substitutes receive a fixed-term contractfrom the company and their wages are significantly higher than the averageunemployment benefits (Tab.1: 5.1, 5.2).

The incentive for employees to begin a course in further training with thehelp of the newly introduced regulations is to be seen as still too low. Althoughthe possibility of being able to take a longer leave of absence may be judgedas positive, the payment of 400 ECU is as a rule too much of a wage loss andcannot be seen as a positive motivational factor for employees.

The costs for job rotation projects are divided among the various actors inline with a co-operative social partner-structure of the Austrian employmentsystem. Austria does not receive a strong European funding subsidy as doItaly, Finland or the United Kingdom. The enterprises bear 13% of the costs, arate surpassed only in Sweden and the United Kingdom. This burden couldpossibly have negative results for support from enterprises for job rotation.Furthermore, the new and, from the point of view of time, inflexible newregulations lower still further the motivation for enterprises to take part in jobrotation.

While an attempt has been made in Austria to create institutional andfinancial framework conditions for equal job opportunities for all, the newregulations must be thoroughly improved in order to facilitate a nation-wideimplementation of job rotation. This primarily applies to the flexibility of leaveduration and the financial incentives for the released workers. The co-operativestructures of the employment system, on the other hand, signalise a positiveprognosis for job rotation projects, so that one may venture an overall positiveforecast.

4.9. Germany

The first job rotation projects were begun in 1996 in Germany. The projectorganiser, SPI in Berlin, was contracted to test the possibilities for a nation-wide implementation of job rotation as well as implementing the actual projectson a pilot basis.

32


The traditionally strong division in German labour market policy betweengeneral initial training and further training in enterprises is one of the mostimportant institutional framework conditions for the implementation of jobrotation projects. In contrast to other European countries, the objectives ofgovernment training policy are strongly separated from the interests of theenterprises (Tab. 1: 2.6). The employment promotion law reform has, due to itscontent matter and as a result of political strategy, lessened this divisionsomewhat. But the labour market policy structure is, up to now, not well gearedto applying job rotation as an instrument providing an interface between labourmarket policy and structural policy. The consequences of this institutionalstructure can be seen in the implementation of further training for employeesand the utilisation of substitutes.

There is no uniform national law for educational leave in Germany. Tenfederal states30 have laws giving employees the right to ten days study leaveevery two years (Tab. 1: 1.1). These laws stem from the German traditiontowards adult education and are designed to allow workers general access toalso a very general form of further education. Educational leave is normally notavailed of for concrete further training and in many small companies theemployees are often not allowed to take this leave. All in all, a total of only 2%of all employees avail of this right (cf. Moraal 1998).

Further training activities in enterprises are well behind the other bigEuropean countries (Tab.1: 4.1). The structural features, especially of theSMEs result in an inadequate strategic utilisation of further training to helpincrease competitiveness.

Quite a large sum is allocated by the government for the further training forworkers and unemployed (Tab.1: 2.3; 2.4). In 1995 approx. 17,1 billion DM ,almost 50% of the total funds for active labour market policy, was spent onvocational training schemes (a high sum in international comparison) (cf.Schmid 1998). However employees must fulfil strict conditions in order to availof these schemes – they may only participate in further training courses when”there is a threat of unemployment or when training is necessary due to a lackof a recognised qualification” (§77 Abs. 1 SGBIII). ”Employees may not besupported when the results of the training are in the interests of the companywhere they are employed”. This means that in structural policy terms, a future-orientated training is not only not planned but is explicitly excluded frompromotion. As a result of these laws as well as the dual vocational trainingsystem, one can interpret the willingness of workers and unemployed towards

30 In the new Laender, laws governing educational leave have been passed only in Brandenburg

and Sachsen-Anhalt. The old Laender with study laws are Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen,Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinat and Schleswig-Holstein.

33

life-long learning as being very low – 64% of the former and 55% of the latterhave a positive attitude – low in comparison to the other countries (Tab.1: 5.6).

For the implementation of job rotation these legal framework conditionsmean that with EU support these national regulations are more or less passedby. Adapt or Objective 1 to 4 funding is usually used for this purpose. Thenational ADAPT budget of 1,068 Mill. DM is high and 47,6% of this comes fromEU funding (Tab.1: 2.5). This co-funding sum is calculated taking into accountthat Germany comprises of both Target 1 regions and non-Target 1 regions.The Target 1 regions (these include all the new Laender)are supported with a65% share from EU funds while other areas receive 42%.

The legal regulations and the funding of the substitutes describe thesecond effect of the strong division of responsibility for general skills trainingand company-specific training – this division is traditional in Germany. Thesubstitutions are usually organised through programmes run by the FederalEmployment Service and they are given a period of practical work experiencein an enterprise for the duration of the substitution. (Tab. 1: 1.4). Thecombination of the German contribution payments with the centralisation ofdecision-making responsibility at the Federal Employment Service results in theproblem of making adequate active labour market policy funds available whichare in an anticyclical relationship to the current business cycle. However, thesedecision-making structures are being partially decentralised through the SBGIII amendment which allots ‘experiment budgets’ to the local employmentservices (Tab.1: 3.1).

In principle, §89 SGBIII (Practical training) has greatly improved the legalfoundation for the utilisation of substitutes in enterprises in comparison to theAFG (Employment Promotion Law) regulations. A period of company training inprogrammes run by the Federal Labour Office was however possible under theAFG laws if ”the course is completed with an examination of the type laid downin §46 of the Vocational Education Law or in §§42 or 45 of the Trades andCrafts Rules or if not less than one quarter of the curriculum encompassestheory” (§41 Abs. 2a AFG). Experience has shown however that this regulationis not concrete enough to include the possibility of substitutions so thediscretionary powers of the local labour offices and the necessary amount ofco-ordination were high. §89 formulates periods of practical training ”whichserve to promote further training in a workplace which is temporarily vacateddue to the usual employee’s leave of absence for further education...” (§89Abs. 1 SGB III).

However despite this clear improvement of the legal framework conditions,there still remain serious difficulties for the implementation of job rotation. Forexample unemployed persons normally have a right to avail of a labour office-run course only once every two years. Exceptions are so called ”assessmentcourses” with a duration of up to two months. But since the integration chances

34

for substitutes increase in accordance with the length of the substitution period(cf. Olsson 1997), the unemployed must fundamentally show interest in coursesof longer duration.

Additionally, the funding of the substitution through the FederalEmployment Service brings the problem that the maintenance payments arenot higher than unemployment benefits (Tab. 1: 5.1, 5.2). As well as the lowshort-term financial incentive for the unemployed to participate in substitution,31

this can also have negative implications for their acceptance within thecompany’s social system.

Finally, the implementation of job rotation schemes calls for an enormousdegree of co-operation between the parties from politics and the economy. The,up to now, strict separation of German labour market policy from structural andeconomical policies means that one cannot expect such net-work structures tohave been widely established or institutionalised on local levels. Thus forexample, negotiations between the social partners about the frameworkconditions for further training has very little tradition in comparison to otherEuropean countries.


The institutional framework conditions listed here, show the incentive structuresfor the participating main parties – the unemployed, the employees and theenterprises.

It can be seen that the incentive for the unemployed to participate in jobrotation schemes is low. On the one hand, their substitution wages are little orno improvement on unemployment benefit and their status remains the same.On the other hand, there is also a chance that they could lose their right toparticipate on another, possibly longer and more successful, labour office-runscheme for two years if they participate in a job rotation course. These negativeincentives can only be balanced out if the unemployed have a realistic chanceof finding a permanent job through the substitution. The take-over figures andthus the direct labour market policy success of job rotation have not yet beensystematically analysed. There are indications that the take-over quota is on amedium range. This is probably due to the necessary concentration on smalland medium-sized enterprises.

Basicly there are more positive incentives for employees to participate injob rotation projects. Usually they do not have to pay a share of the costs forcourses of the further training which means that their investment involves thetime needed for the course and helping to incorporate the substitute in his/her

31 An enterprise subsidy of up to DM 310,- monthly is possible under the unemployment

insurance regulations.

35

workplace. Considering the increasing necessity for life-long learning, one mayspeak here of a positive cost-benefit ratio.

However the institutional framework conditions described above mean that,despite the generally positive incentive structures, the employees are not freeto decide to participate in such schemes. So long as there are no generalregulations concerning training leave, the company management usuallyselects the staff members who are to participate. This results frequently in anincrease of segmentation within the company (cf. Sengenberger 1987).

In general, the incentive structure for enterprises is positive. In theGerman system to date, the enterprises also only have to bear a share of theactive further training costs – this is limited to continuing the employees’ wagepayments. On the assumption that suitable substitutes are selected (this choiceof course being the highest risk factor for the enterprise), the potential increasein the company’s competitiveness outweighs the costs incurred.

From an labour market policy viewpoint, there are, in regard to theenterprises, so-called ‘deadweight’ effects to be discussed. All reports on thestate of the German SMEs emphasise the fact that there is a low awareness ofthe necessity for strategic further training planning. This means that thoseparties responsible for implementing projects must make a special effort toinclude enterprises in the schemes which need assistance in protecting theirworkplaces through upgrading of qualifications. If this does not succeed, thereis, in the light of the German institutional framework, a danger that the trainingcourses which have been planned anyway, will be subsidised for the moreactive companies which will then produce detrimental effects for the otherenterprises.

Finally, these outlined incentive structures can only be accepted in the lightof the current implementation methods. It has become clear that animplementation of job rotation especially within the present national legalconditions would be very difficult without EU support. On the national levelthere is, up to now, no public budget or suitable instrument available to updatefurther training for employees in the preventative sense as promoted by theADAPT initiative.

A summary therefore in a final assessment calls on those responsible toimprove the incentive structures for the unemployed, to provide the means foremployees to participate without European subsidies and possibly thatenterprises take more responsibility for further training also in financial termswhich could help the prevention of ‘deadweight’ effects.

Certain aspects of such a development of the framework conditions for along-term, nation-wide implementation of job rotation schemes in Germany willbe briefly discussed at the end of the following summary.

36

5. Conclusion and outlook

The aim of this study was to theoretically develop the conditions necessary fora nation-wide implementation of job rotation schemes in nine Member States ofthe European Union and to investigate them empirically in an internationalcomparison.

Six separate key areas could be identified which are particularly relevantfor the expected success of job rotation schemes. These could be differentiatedin ”external” conditions, i.e. those that cannot be immediately altered throughlabour market policy and instruments and in ”internal” conditions. From ourviewpoint, the external factors include the economic health of the individualsectors and the level of competitiveness of the participating companies. On theother hand there are factors which, for a long-lasting success of job rotationschemes in a national context, must be influenced by political strategies: thelegal and the financial framework conditions and the prerequisites toimplementation. Indicators were specified which showed advantageous ordisadvantageous development potential for job rotation in the individualcountries. In this context, the most important indicators can be summarised as:the legal regulations for the further training of the employed and theunemployed, the strength of the dismissal protection laws, the financial andpolitical responsibility for training, the relation between unemployment benefitsand substitution payments and the co-operative structure of the regionalimplementation networks.

Empirically based opinions about the actual effects of the individualframework conditions on the success of job rotation schemes are, all in all, stillvery difficult to make at this present stage of project developments in thevarious European countries. The Danish example however, shows that one ofthe main factors for setting up a nation-wide implementation is a combination ofjust a few framework conditions:

x Far-reaching legal or collectively agreed regulations regarding furthertraining for the employed and practice-oriented (further) training for theunemployed and for sections of the non-working population are necessary.

x The incentives for employees to undergo further training must beguaranteed through the existence of appropriate regulations. Leave ofabsence for the purpose of improving one’s skills must be flanked by securedismissal protection legislation.

x The costs incurred through job rotation projects should be ‘fairly’ distributedthrough a suitable co-funding structure in order to keep the so-called‘deadweight’ effects as low as possible.

37

x The incentives for the substitution persons should be clearly positive.Through an adequate reimbursement for substitution work, an sufficientincrease in comparison to unemployment benefits should be assured.

x Efficient regional networks are necessary in order to implement the projectson the interface between labour market policy and structural policy.

A stable legal basis for the further training of workers has been created inDenmark through the creation of new regulations for leave of absence. Parallelto this, due to the right of an unemployed person to a job offer after a six monthperiod of unemployment, the legal as well as the financial prerequisites for theimplementation of job rotation have been created. In the context of the above-mentioned necessary framework conditions, both of these new regulationswithin the past few years appear to be the key to the successful Danish nation-wide implementation of job rotation projects.

When taking both of these factors as fundamental prerequisites, one canalso say that along with Denmark, Finland and Sweden have also fulfilled theseconditions. Similar legal regulations are presently being drafted in Italy while inAustria, although the new regulations need to be improved along with a usefulco-operative structure in the labour administration, the development potentialcan be deemed as positive. In France, Portugal and the United Kingdom, thereis presently no legal basis tailored to job rotation. France however could createa new innovative and, possibly in the long-term, a more successful structure forjob rotation implementation by utilising the system of the further training funds.Portugal has also already institutionalised initial stages towards co-operativelabour market policy through the training societies, which can well provide afoundation for new innovative legislation. Implementation in the UnitedKingdom will prove more difficult. The combination of the traditionally low rateof government activity in training both the employed and the unemployed withthe weak dismissal protection laws is certainly detrimental to the creation ofpositive framework conditions offering all parties involved incentives forenterprises to partake in job rotation. However in this case, the promising newpolitical developments must be observed – these could well lead to a positiveturn in integrative labour market and structural policies.

When estimating the development potential of the German model in thelight of the other nine countries compared in this study, a very positiveprognosis can be ventured. Active labour market policy in Germany focusestraditionally on training for the unemployed and, thanks to the changes made inthe legislation governing labour market policy (SGB III), one of the barriers inthis area has been overcome: when participating in schemes run by theemployment service, unemployed persons may now undergo longer practicaltraining in enterprises. This deserves special mention as this is an examplehow quickly the law-makers reacted to make necessary changes the need ofwhich was recognised through the practical implementation of job rotation. Thisreflects the willingness to create more suitable framework conditions.

38

On the other hand it has also become clear that more far-reaching changesare necessary in order to achieve a labour market policy of long-termsuccessful job rotation implementation: the area of training for the employed isstill not covered by the German employment promotion laws which means thatthe implementation of job rotation schemes is still extremely dependent onEuropean co-funding.

The current form of implementation in Germany offers the unemployed toofew, and the enterprises possible too many, positive incentives to participate injob rotation schemes. An important way to tackle this problem would be throughrestructuring the funding models.

For the long-term perspective, a form of funding needs to be found which iscounterpart to the current systematic logic in the Scandinavian countries andwhich will simultaneously utilise their experience in order to draft ones ownlong-term, workable financing concept. Corresponding to the practice inDenmark and Finland for example, the substitutes need to be offered a betterfinancial incentive to participate in job rotation projects. This can be managedby concluding a fixed-term contract with the enterprise for the duration of thesubstitution period. When it is assumed that, due to lack of experience, thesubstitute cannot match 100% of the productivity of the worker beingsubstituted but rather around 80%, then the wages could be agreed on as 80%of the agreed union rate.

The employees undergoing further training would receive unemploymentbenefit for this period which in the German unemployment insurance systemwould amount to approx. 68-78% of their previous wages for a training periodof up to six months (cf. Tab.1: 5.4). Since it can be assumed that theemployees will have increased productivity after the training and will thus alsobenefit from a wage increase, then they have also incentives to participatedespite the short-term decrease in wages. This would to a certain extent be anextra burden on the unemployment insurance system as the workersundergoing training probably have a right to higher unemployment benefitsthan the substitutes. But through this change-over in financial responsibilities,there would be such a fundamental change in the incentive structures that inthe long-term, a net benefit for the economy may be expected.32

It is clear that this restructuring of the funding has been suggested from amid-term to long-term perspective. However for the short-term and for atransitory period until fundamental changes to the financing structures havebeen made, more leeway for funding the substitutes could be found throughinvolving the social security offices to a greater extent. The social security

32 In order to exactly determine this net benefit, deadweight, ousting and substitution effects

must of course be checked and the cost-benefit ratio for all participating parties must be moreprecisely estimated as was possible within the framework of this study. Here only the trendsfrom the analysis of the international comparison could be considered. For exactor figuressee the publication by Günther Schmid which is currently being prepared.

39

offices play an important role in any case in seeking and funding substitutes,although their degree of involvement varies from region to region. Theirinvolvement is advantageous because the local social security offices mayoften freely avail of certain amounts of the budgets (this applies to the localemployment service since the SGB III is in force) and also because manyexperts of the regional economic structure are employed there.

In any case, a co-ordination of all parties responsible for the unemployed(as well as the labour and social security offices, also smaller initiatives) to helpcreate a type of ”pool of unemployed persons” is an interesting variant in orderto lower the current high transactions costs of finding suitable substitutes.

It has been pointed out that to date no regular financial conditions, whichare independent of European funding, have been set up in Germany for thefurther training of employees. In the sense of a fair co-funding form, it could beargued that the enterprises, which have a direct interest in further training dueto the increased productivity of their employees who undergo training, shouldalso pay a share of the active training costs. Thus, a proportional funding frompublic finances, whereby active labour market policy must be extended toinclude more preventive schemes, and funding from private enterprises couldbe a solution.

The developments in Denmark have shown that the participation ofenterprises in job rotation depends much on the economic climate. In thecurrent healthy economy, production is running at maximum capacity whichmeans that little freedom remains to partake in further training schemes. On theother hand, especially the small and medium-sized enterprises – the mostimportant target group – have, in periods of low turnover, insufficient financialresources to share the active costs of further training. The nation-wideintroduction of further training funds, as is practised in France for example,would be a solution to this dilemma and would help create a fair financingstructure. In Germany also there are already in certain sectors further trainingfunds and their effects have been generally deemed as positive by theenterprises. Moreover, if enterprises were to participate in a fund system, theirwillingness for further training would be increased33.

Apart from disseminating an idea ”whose time has come”34 and the activeengagement of all parties involved, the successful implementation of jobrotation calls for the creation of suitable framework conditions for employeesand positive incentives for the unemployed. This is however only to beachieved by those responsible within the political system and the enterpriseassociations and is no doubt dependent on prevailing political majorities andthe balance of power. 33 This result has been described by Moraal and Schmidt (1998) for the social fund in the

scaffolding sector.34 In context with Job Rotation a quote from Victor Hugo is often cited: ”Nothing is as powerful

as an idea whose time has come”.

40

6. BibliographyAOF (1998): Faglige Skole, Stig Skovbo, Silkeborg (DK). Discourse material for

the conference ”Job rotation–Experiences with a model ”, National workinggroup.

Audier, Florence and Olivier Giraud (1996): ”General Education, Initial andFurther Training and the Prevention of Social Exclusion in France”,contribution to ”Training and Human Capital Investment”– TRANSLAM –Network workshop, Paris, 6.9.1998.

Benson, J. Kenneth (1975): ”The Interorganizational Network as a PoliticalEconomy”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 6/75, S.229-249.

Becker, Gary S. (1964): ”Human Capital. A theoretical and empirical Analysiswith special Reference to Education.” New York: NBER.

EU-Jobrotation – The Secretariat (1998): ”Window of opportunity – Jobrotationpossibilities in Europe”. Silkeborg (DK): EU-Jobrotation – The Secretariat.

European Commission (1993): ”Growth, Competition, Employment. PresentChallenges and Ways towards the 21st Century”. Luxembourg: EuropeanCommunities Publications.

European Commission (1995-1998): MISEP Basis information reports UnitedKingdom (1997), Sweden (1997), Denmark (1997), France (1995), Portugal(1997), Italy (1997), Austria (1998), Germany (1997). Berlin: I.A.S.

European Commission (continual): ”inforMISEP schemes”. Berlin: I.A.S.

European Commission (1996): ”Employment in Europe”. Luxembourg:European Communities Publications.

European Commission (1996a): ”The Structural Funds in 1995. SeventhAnnual Report” Luxembourg: European Communities Publications.

European Commission (1997a): ”Employment in Europe”. Luxembourg:European Communities Publications.

European Commission (1997b): ”Job Rotation Schemes in Denmark. FinalReport”, DTI Industrial Analysis (DK), Manuscript.

European Commission in the internet:http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg05/esf/en/public/sr_adapt/sr_hor.htm.

European Industrial Relations Review, Issues 289 (February 1998), 290 (March1998), 291 (April 1998).

EUROPS - (European Office for Programme Support) in the internet:http://www.europs.be/de/progci.htm.

Eurostat (1996): ”Statistics in Focus. Population and Social Conditions,1996/7”.

41

Festoe, S. (1998): ”Elemente der norwegischen Arbeitsmarktpolitik”. In:Grünewald, Uwe, Dick Moraal (Ed.): ”Modelle zur Finanzierung derberuflichen Weiterbildung Beschäftigter und Arbeitsloser”. Bielefeld:Bertelsmann.

Fietz, Harald (1998): ”Job rotation as a model of enterprise-orientedqualification”. In: Schwedler, Hanns-Uve (Ed.): ”New institutionalarrangements in the labour market”. Berlin: European Academy of theUrban Environment, EAUE.

Höcker, Herrad (1994): ”The Organisation of Labour Market Policy Delivery inthe European Union”. In: inforMISEP Policies No. 48 / Winter 1994.

Höcker, Herrad, Bernd Reissert (1995): ”Beschäftigungsbrücken durchStellvertreterregelungen in Dänemark und Schweden”. Berlin: BBJ Verlag.

Lauterbach, Uwe (continual): ”Internationales Handbuch der Berufsbildung”.Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Lindbeck, Leif (1995): ”Ausbildungsvikariat – das Programm derStellvertreterregelungen in Schweden”. In: Höcker, Herrad / BerndReissert: ”Beschäftigungsbrücken durch Stellvertreterregelungen inDänemark und Schweden”. Berlin: BBJ Verlag.

Moraal, Dick (1998): ”Freistellung für Bildungszwecke als Rahmenbedingungeiner integrierten Arbeitsmarkt- und Qualifizierungspolitik”. In: Grünewald,Uwe, Dick Moraal (Ed..): ”Modelle zur Finanzierung der beruflichenWeiterbildung Beschäftigter und Arbeitsloser”. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann.

Moraal, Dick, Schmidt, G (1998): Die Sozialkasse im Gerüstbaugewerbe; Eintarifvertraglich geregeltes Finanzierungsmodell der Aus- undWeiterbildung. In: Grünewald, Uwe, Dick Moraal (Hrsg.): ”Modelle zurFinanzierung der beruflichen Weiterbildung Beschäftigter undArbeitsloser”...

Nätti, Jouko (1997, being published): ”Sabbatical leave schemes in Finland”.

OECD (1994a): ”The OECD Job Study. Evidence and Explanations, Part 1”.Paris: OECD.

OECD (1994b): ”The OECD Job Study. Evidence and Explanations, Part 2”.Paris: OECD.

OECD (1996a): ”Employment Outlook”. Paris: OECD.

OECD (1996b): ”The OECD Jobs Strategy: Technology, Productivity and JobCreation. Vol. 2: Analytical Report”. Paris: OECD.

OECD (1997a): ”Employment Outlook”. Paris: OECD.

OECD (1997b): ”Implementing the OECD Jobs Strategy. Lessons from MemberCountries’ Experience”. Paris: OECD.

OECD (1997c): ”Implementing the OECD Jobs Strategy. Member Countries’Experience”. Paris: OECD.

OECD (1997d): ”Making Work Pay. Taxation, Benefits, Employment andUnemployment”. Paris: OECD.

OECD (1997e): ”Labour Force Statistics 1976-1996”. OECD: Paris.

42

OECD (1998a): ”OECD Economic Outlook. June 1998”, Paris: OECD.

OECD (1998b): ”OECD Employment Outlook. June 1998”. Paris: OECD.

Olsson, Birgitta (1997, being published) ”Long Paid Leave: A Component ofActive Market Policies in Scandinavia”.

Schäfers, Bernhard und Wolfgang Zapf (Ed..) (1998): ”Handwörterbuch zurGesellschaft Deutschlands”. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Schmid, Günther (1993): ”Übergänge in die Vollbeschäftigung. Formen undFinanzierung einer zukunftsgerechten Arbeitsmarktpolitik”. WZBDiscussion Paper FS I 93 – 208. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fürSozialforschung.

Schmid, Günther (1996a): ”Process Evaluation: Policy Formation andImplementation”. In: Günther Schmid, Jacqueline O’Reilly, KlausSchömann: ”International Handbook of Labour Market Policy andEvaluation”. Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar.

Schmid, Günther (1996b): ”New Public Management of Further Training”. In:Günther Schmid, Jacqueline O’Reilly, Klaus Schömann: ”InternationalHandbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation”. Cheltenham (UK):Edward Elgar.

Schmid, Günther, Bernd Reissert (1996): ”Unemployment Compensation andLabour Market Transitions”. In: Günther Schmid, Jacqueline O’Reilly, KlausSchömann: ”International Handbook of Labour Market Policy andEvaluation”. Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar.

Schmid, Günther (1998): Art. ”Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung”. In: Schäfers,Bernhard und Wolfgang Zapf (Ed.): ”Handwörterbuch zur GesellschaftDeutschlands”. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Schömann, Klaus, Rolf Becker (1995): ”Participation in Further Education overthe Live-course: A Longitudinal Study of Three Birth Cohorts in the FederalRepublic of Germany.” In: European Sociological Review, 11 (2), S. 1-22,187-208.

Schömann, Klaus (1995): ”Active Labour Market Policy in the European Union”.WZB Discussion Paper FS I 95-201. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlinfür Sozialforschung.

Sengenberger (1987): ”Struktur und Funktionsweise von Arbeitsmärkten. DieBundesrepublik Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich”. Frankfurt/M.:Campus.

Soerensen, J. H. (1998): ”Reflexionen und offene Fragen – angeregt durch diedänischen Erfahrungen mit der Finanzierung der Weiterbildung fürBeschäftigte und Arbeitslose”. In: Grünewald, Uwe, Dick Moraal (Hrsg.):”Modelle zur Finanzierung der beruflichen Weiterbildung Beschäftigter undArbeitsloser”. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann.

SPI Jobrotation (Ed.) (1996-1998): Interim and Status reports on the Berlin JobRotation Projects.

Tuijnman, Albert C., Klaus Schömann (1996): ”Life-long Learning and SkillFormation”. In: Günther Schmid, Jacqueline O’Reilly, Klaus Schömann:

43

”International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation”.Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar.

Uhrig, Bettina (1998): ”Jobrotation – ein neues Instrument für dieQualifizierungs- und Beschäftigungspolitik in Deutschland?”. In:Grünewald, Uwe, Dick Moraal (Ed.): ”Modelle zur Finanzierung derberuflichen Weiterbildung Beschäftigter und Arbeitsloser”. Bielefeld:Bertelsmann.

Waschkuhn, Arno (1985): Art. ”Institution(en)”. In: Dieter Nohlen (Ed.): ”PipersWörterbuch zur Politik. Politikwissenschaft” Vol. 1. Munich/Zurich: Piper.

44

App

endi

xT

ab. 1

: Ind

icat

ors

of th

e in

stitu

tiona

l and

fina

ncia

l fra

mew

ork

for

Job

rota

tion

in n

ine

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies.

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

I. Le

gal f

ram

ewor

k1.

1. R

egul

atio

ns fo

rfu

rthe

r tr

aini

ng (

FT

)fo

r em

ploy

ees

No

com

puls

ion

for

ente

rpris

es fo

r F

T,

but i

ncen

tives

suc

has

the

”Inv

esto

rs in

Peo

ple”

sta

ndar

d.A

cces

s to

trai

ning

and

paid

edu

catio

nle

ave

is n

egot

iate

dbe

twee

n th

e em

-pl

oyer

and

em

-pl

oyee

.

Acc

ess

to F

T is

guar

ante

ed b

y th

erig

ht o

f all

empl

oy-

ees

to le

ave

of a

b-se

nce.

Sin

ce 1

978

all e

m-

ploy

ees

can

avai

lof

25

wor

king

day

sfo

r le

ave.

No

gove

rnm

ent

fund

ing

for

the

wor

k re

leas

e(O

EC

D 1

997:

97)

Em

ploy

ees,

une

m-

ploy

ed a

nd s

elf-

empl

oyed

(Em

ploy

men

t for

am

in. o

f 3 y

rs. w

ithin

the

past

5 y

rs.)

have

a r

ight

eve

ry 5

year

s to

a y

ear-

long

(un

empl

oyed

:2

year

s) le

ave

for

FT

(w

ith th

eem

ploy

ers

cons

ent)

.F

T d

urin

g w

ork

time

for

low

-ski

lled

wor

kers

, add

ition

alco

llect

ive

agre

e-m

ents

.E

mpl

oym

ent o

f un-

empl

oyed

sub

sti-

tute

s d

urin

ged

ucat

iona

l lea

veis

vol

unta

ry(s

ince

199

4).35

Em

ploy

ees

have

arig

ht to

indi

vidu

alst

udy

leav

e (C

IF)

Low

util

isat

ion,

no

stat

e fu

ndin

g fo

rth

e w

ork

rele

ase

(OE

CD

199

7: 9

7).

Ent

erpr

ises

mus

tin

vest

fixe

d su

m in

FT

(s.

2.6

.)

Con

stitu

tiona

l rig

htto

voc

atio

nal t

rain

-in

g. L

egal

reg

ula-

tions

exi

st fo

r go

v-er

nmen

t fun

ding

for

FT

for

empl

oyee

s.R

egul

atio

ns fo

r un

-pa

id F

T le

ave

are

agre

ed u

pon

with

the

unio

ns.

No

gene

ral F

Tre

gula

tions

.E

duca

tiona

l lea

vepo

ssib

le.

Acc

ordi

ng to

the

”Agr

eem

ent o

nE

mpl

oym

ent”

, leg

alre

gula

tions

are

be-

ing

plan

ned

for

wor

k re

leas

e,gr

ants

for

FT

and

ale

vy fo

r tr

aini

ng

Leav

e of

abs

ence

(”jo

b al

tern

atio

nle

ave”

, JA

L) (

90-

359

days

) w

ith e

m-

ploy

er’s

con

sent

afte

r pe

riods

of

cont

inua

l em

ploy

-m

ent (

as o

f 1ye

ar).

Em

ploy

men

t of u

n-em

ploy

ed s

ubst

i-tu

tes

com

puls

ory.

Leav

e of

abs

ence

may

be

used

for

any

purp

ose.

Add

ition

alco

llect

ive

agre

e-m

ents

pos

sibl

e

Em

ploy

ees

(Firm

s>

200

staf

f): a

fter

3ye

ars

empl

oym

ent

brea

k fo

r F

T(”

unpa

id le

ave,

un-

paid

stu

dy le

ave”

)fo

r 6-

12 m

onth

s.P

aym

ent f

rom

un-

empl

oym

ent i

nsur

-an

ce: 5

565A

S(a

ppro

x. 4

00E

CU

). H

ighe

rpa

ymen

ts fo

rsp

ecia

l tra

inin

gpo

ssib

le.

No

com

puls

ory

re-

plac

emen

t for

job

rele

ase

for

FT

; oth

-er

wis

e (p

aren

tal

leav

e, s

abba

tical

):re

plac

emen

t.

In 1

0 of

the

16La

ende

r ed

uca-

tiona

l lea

ve r

egul

a-tio

ns fo

r em

ploy

ees

(5 d

ays

annu

ally

)F

eder

al la

ws

for

mas

ter

craf

tsm

antr

aini

ng in

the

trad

ese

ctor

.F

T la

ws

cove

r pr

i-va

te F

T a

nd fu

nd-

ing.

Add

ition

al c

olle

c-tiv

e ag

reem

ents

(pos

sibl

e).

1.2.

Str

engt

h of

dism

issa

l pro

tect

ion

legi

slat

ion

(End

of

the

80s)

36

(2,0

)w

eak

(11,

0)st

rong

(4,0

)w

eak

(6,0

)m

ediu

m(1

6,0)

stro

ng(1

4,0)

stro

ng(9

,5)

med

ium

(13,

0)st

rong

(9,5

)m

ediu

m

35

cf. N

ätti

(199

7).

36S

ourc

e: O

EC

D (

1994

b).

45

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

1.3.

Reg

ulat

ions

for

fixed

term

cont

ract

s37

No

rest

rictio

nsS

ever

al r

estr

ictio

nsan

d re

gula

tions

, no

max

imum

dur

atio

n,re

new

able

twic

e.

Onl

y re

stric

tion:

rene

wab

le o

nly

un-

der

cert

ain

cond

i-tio

ns.

Sev

eral

res

tric

tions

and

regu

latio

ns,

unde

r no

rmal

circ

umst

ance

s no

tre

new

able

,ot

herw

ise

not m

ore

than

twic

e.M

axim

um d

ura-

tion1

8 m

onth

s.

Sev

eral

res

tric

tions

and

regu

latio

ns,

max

imum

dur

atio

nm

onth

s, r

enew

able

twic

e.

Sev

eral

res

tric

tions

and

regu

latio

ns,

unde

r no

rmal

cond

ition

s no

tre

new

able

,m

axim

um d

urat

ion

6 m

onth

s.

*

Few

res

tric

tions

,un

der

norm

al c

ir-cu

mst

ance

s no

t re-

new

able

.

Cer

tain

res

tric

tions

and

regu

latio

ns, r

e-ne

wab

le, m

axim

umdu

ratio

n 18

mon

ths

1.4.

Reg

ulat

ions

for

wor

k an

d tr

aini

ng o

fth

e un

empl

oyed

Tra

inin

g fo

r W

ork

prog

ram

me:

Com

-bi

natio

n of

FT

and

wor

k ex

perie

nce

for

the

unem

ploy

ed;

Impl

emen

tatio

n:T

EC

s

Off

er o

f tra

inin

gth

roug

h th

e la

bour

adm

inis

trat

ion,

prac

tical

trai

ning

and

cour

ses

at th

ew

orkp

lace

, Sub

sti-

tutio

n fo

rem

ploy

ees

in F

Tle

gally

reg

ulat

ed(U

tbild

ning

svik

aria

t19

96)

Com

bina

tion

offu

rthe

r tr

aini

ngla

ws

for

the

unem

ploy

ed a

ndle

ave

of a

bsen

cefo

r em

ploy

ees

poss

ible

38; r

egul

a-tio

ns fo

r em

ploy

ees

and

the

unem

ploy

ed h

ave

been

bro

ught

into

line.

Fre

e A

MU

cour

ses.

Rig

ht to

sup

port

for

voca

tiona

l tra

inin

gsc

hem

es,

assi

stan

ce fo

r jo

bco

mm

ence

men

t,in

tegr

atio

n co

urse

s

Voc

atio

nal t

rain

ing

for

youn

g pe

ople

and

prob

lem

grou

ps, p

ract

ical

trai

ning

esp

ecia

llyfo

r yo

ung

pers

ons.

Rig

ht to

par

ticip

ate

in v

ocat

iona

l tra

in-

ing

cour

ses,

pra

cti-

cal t

rain

ing.

Labo

ur m

arke

ttr

aini

ng w

ith a

rig

htto

fina

ncia

lsu

ppor

t, vo

catio

nal

trai

ning

(es

p.yo

uth)

. Law

thro

ugh

job

rota

tion

:S

ubst

itutio

n of

rele

ased

empl

oyee

s by

unem

ploy

ed p

er-

sons

39

Voc

atio

nal t

rain

ing,

trai

ning

, FT

, tra

in-

ing,

Job

star

tas

sist

ance

,po

ssib

ility

to p

ar-

ticip

ate

in F

T a

ndjo

b cr

eatio

nsc

hem

es, f

ull-t

ime

cour

ses

last

ing

upto

1 y

ear,

in jo

bro

tatio

n a

ndsc

hem

es w

ith a

part

icul

arly

hig

hpr

actic

al p

ortio

n.S

peci

al ta

rget

grou

ps: L

ong-

term

unem

ploy

ed, o

lder

and

youn

g un

em-

ploy

ed p

erso

ns.

The

une

mpl

oyed

also

rec

eive

paym

ents

dur

ing

trai

ning

.

37

Sou

rce:

EIR

R (

No.

284

, 199

7), E

urop

ean

Com

mis

sion

(19

96).

38T

he c

ombi

natio

n of

fur

ther

trai

ning

for

em

ploy

ees

and

the

empl

oym

ent o

f un

empl

oyed

per

sons

in th

e fo

rm o

f jo

b ro

tatio

n ha

s be

en m

ade

easi

er th

roug

h th

elo

ng-t

erm

leav

es o

f ab

senc

es (

VU

S)

and

the

regu

latio

ns f

or f

urth

er tr

aini

ng a

nd a

ctiv

atio

n fo

r th

e un

empl

oyed

(U

TB

/AT

B).

39A

dditi

onal

sta

te s

ubsi

dies

for

inne

r-co

mpa

ny tr

aini

ng is

pos

sibl

e si

nce

the

begi

nnin

g of

199

8 w

hen

the

furt

her

trai

ning

is c

ombi

ned

with

the

empl

oym

ent o

f a

long

-ter

m u

nem

ploy

ed p

erso

n (c

f. in

forM

ISE

P N

o. 6

2, S

umm

er 1

998,

P. 2

7).

46

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

II. F

inan

cial

fram

ewor

k2.

1. F

inan

cial

res

pon-

sibi

lity

for

labo

urm

arke

t pol

icy

Min

istr

y fo

r ed

uca-

tion

and

Em

ploy

-m

ent (

DfE

E)

Min

istr

y fo

r La

bour

Min

istr

y fo

r La

bour

Min

istr

y fo

r La

bour

and

Sol

idar

ityM

inis

try

for

Edu

ca-

tion

and

Labo

urM

inis

try

for

Labo

uran

d S

ocia

l Ins

ur-

ance

Min

istr

y fo

r La

bour

Fed

eral

Min

istr

y fo

rLa

bour

and

Soc

ial

Aff

airs

Fed

eral

Min

istr

y fo

rLa

bour

and

Soc

ial

Aff

airs

(B

MA

)2.

2. R

espo

nsib

ility

for

labo

ur m

arke

t pol

icy

impl

emen

tatio

n

Act

ive

and

pass

ive

mea

sure

s:La

bour

adm

inis

tra-

tion.

Act

ive

mea

sure

sin

co-

oper

atio

n w

ithth

e pr

ivat

ely

or-

gani

sed

TE

Cs

(Tra

inin

g an

d E

n-te

rpris

e C

ounc

ils).

Act

ive

mea

sure

s:La

bour

adm

inis

tra-

tion

(AM

V)

Pas

sive

mea

sure

s:U

nem

ploy

men

t in-

sura

nce

fund

s(S

ocia

l par

tner

s)an

d th

e la

bour

ad-

min

istr

atio

n (b

asic

secu

rity)

(K

AS

)

Act

ive

mea

sure

s:La

bour

adm

inis

tra-

tion

(AM

S/A

F)

Pas

sive

mea

sure

s:P

aym

ent o

f une

m-

ploy

men

t ben

efits

from

man

y un

em-

ploy

men

t ins

ur-

ance

s (”

A F

unds

”)

Act

ive

mea

sure

s:A

NP

E (

labo

ur m

ar-

ket s

ervi

ces,

labo

urm

arke

t tra

inin

g,F

T)

and

Min

istr

yfo

r la

bour

(sp

ecia

ltr

aini

ng c

ours

esdu

e to

the

stru

ctur

al c

hang

eset

c.P

assi

vem

easu

res:

UN

ED

IC

Act

ive

mea

sure

s:In

stitu

te fo

r E

m-

ploy

men

t and

Tra

inin

g (I

EF

P),

Pas

sive

mea

sure

s: In

stitu

tefo

r S

ocia

lIn

sura

nce

(IG

FS

S)

Act

ive

mea

sure

s:R

egio

nal a

nd lo

cal

labo

ur d

irect

orie

sP

assi

vem

easu

res:

INP

S o

r la

bour

di-

rect

orie

s

Act

ive

mea

sure

s:la

bour

Adm

inis

tra-

tion

Pas

sive

mea

sure

s:re

spon

sibl

e: M

inis

-tr

y fo

r H

ealth

and

Soc

ial W

elfa

re,

paym

ents

thro

ugh

the

unem

ploy

men

tin

sura

nce.

Act

ive

and

pass

ive

mea

sure

s:La

bour

Adm

ini-

stra

tion

(AM

S).

Act

ive

and

pass

ive

mea

sure

s:”F

eder

al la

bour

Off

ice”

(B

A),

regi

onal

labo

urof

fices

, reg

iona

lpu

blic

aut

horit

ies.

2.3.

Exp

endi

ture

s40

for

activ

e la

bour

mar

ket p

olic

y (1

995

or 1

996)

a)in

% o

f GD

Pb)

inte

nsity

41

a)0.

46b)

0,06

a)2,

25b)

0,39

a)2,

26b)

0,23

a)1,

3b)

0,10

a)1,

04b)

0,11

a)0,

9b)

0,11

a)1,

73b)

0,09

a)0.

38b)

0,06

a)1.

43b)

0,14

2.4.

Mai

n fo

cus

of a

c-tiv

e la

bour

mar

ket

polic

y42

1. P

lace

men

t2.

You

ng u

nem

-pl

oyed

1. W

age

subs

idie

s2.

You

ng u

nem

-pl

oyed

1. T

rain

ing

2. W

age

subs

idie

s1.

Tra

inin

g2.

You

ng u

nem

-pl

oyed

1.Y

oung

une

m-

ploy

ed2.

Tra

inin

g

1.Y

oung

une

m-

ploy

ed1.

Tra

inin

g2.

You

ng u

nem

-pl

oyed

1. P

lace

men

t2.

Tra

inin

g1.

Tra

inin

g2.

Wag

e su

bsid

ies

2.5.

a)N

atio

nal A

dapt

budg

et43

b)E

U s

hare

in %

c)pe

r em

ploy

ee(1

996)

44

a) 1

.421

Mill

. DM

b) 4

4.2

%c)

49,

40 D

M

a) 4

9 M

ill. D

Mb)

52%

c) 1

1,40

DM

DM

a) 1

40 M

ill.

b) 4

5 %

c) 4

9,20

DM

a) 1

.270

Mill

.b)

43.

4%c)

49,

60 D

M

a) 5

9 M

ill.

b) 7

2.0

%c)

13

DM

a) 8

21 M

ill.

b) 5

3 %

c) 3

5,90

DM

a) 1

02 M

ill.

b) 4

5.9

%c)

40,

80 D

M

a) 6

0 M

ill.

b) 4

5 %

c) 1

6,50

DM

a) 1

068

Mill

.b)

47.

6 %

c) 2

7,80

DM

40

Sou

rces

: OE

CD

Eco

nom

ic S

urve

ys: I

rela

nd (

1997

: 96)

, Eur

opea

n C

omm

issi

on (

1995

-199

8): M

ISE

P B

asis

info

rmat

ion

repo

rt A

ustr

ia 1

998.

41S

pend

ing

inte

nsity

: Spe

ndin

g as

a p

erce

ntag

e ra

te o

f th

e G

DP

div

ided

by

the

num

ber

of u

nem

ploy

ed.

42S

ourc

e: O

EC

D (

1996

a).

43T

he to

tal n

atio

nal b

udge

t for

Ada

pt p

roje

cts

cons

ists

of

a E

urop

ean

shar

e (3

1-75

%)

and

a na

tiona

l sha

re. C

onve

rsio

n: 1

EC

U =

1,9

8 D

M. S

ourc

e: E

UR

OP

S in

the

inte

rnet

.44

The

em

ploy

men

t rat

e of

199

6 w

as th

e ba

sis

for

the

calc

ulat

ion

of A

dapt

sup

port

per

em

ploy

ee (

Sou

rce:

OE

CD

199

8b).

47

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

2.6.

Fin

anci

ng o

f FT

for

empl

oyee

sE

nter

pris

es

pay

for

the

FT

, lev

ies

toth

e In

dust

rial

Tra

inin

g B

oard

s.S

peci

al lo

ans

for

furt

her

trai

ning

are

avai

labl

e to

sm

all

ente

rpris

es (

up to

50 e

mpl

oyee

s).

Sta

te s

ubsi

dies

for

inne

r-co

mpa

nytr

aini

ng a

nd F

Tpo

ssib

le (

60S

EK

/h,

920h

/em

ploy

ee in

2 ye

ars)

. No

subs

idie

s fo

rle

aves

of a

bsen

ce.

Loca

l aut

horit

ies

finan

ce g

ener

al F

T

FT

for

empl

oyee

sis

mai

nly

fund

ed b

yth

e go

vern

men

t(A

MU

), th

e co

sts

for

the

ente

rpris

esde

pend

s on

the

com

pany

spe

cific

a-tio

n of

the

cour

ses.

Ent

erpr

ises

(>1

0em

ploy

ees)

mus

tin

vest

(1,

5%)

ofth

eir

gros

s w

age

sum

in tr

aini

ng:

0,2%

indi

vidu

al F

T,

0,4%

initi

al tr

ain-

ing,

0,9

%en

terp

rise

FT

Ent

erpr

ises

(<1

0em

ploy

ees)

: 0.1

5%in

a g

loba

l tra

inin

gfu

nd, n

o s

ubsi

dies

for

leav

es o

f ab-

senc

e

Sta

te fi

nanc

edIE

FP

furt

her

trai

ning

act

iviti

es:

30%

of f

undi

ng is

dire

ctly

allo

cate

d to

thei

r ow

n ”p

roto

col

cent

res”

, 70%

tose

mi-s

tate

cen

tres

or o

ther

co-

oper

ativ

es.

Voc

atio

nal a

ndfu

rthe

r tr

aini

ng is

fund

ed b

y th

e go

v-er

nmen

t (na

tiona

lan

d re

gion

al).

EU

fund

s pl

ay a

sign

ifica

nt r

ole,

espe

cial

ly in

und

er-

deve

lope

d re

gion

s.S

hare

d fu

ndin

g of

cour

ses

by la

rger

com

pani

es a

nd th

ego

vern

men

t.

Sta

te s

ubsi

dies

for

voca

tiona

l tra

inin

gan

d tr

aini

ng in

the

ente

rpris

es.

Soc

ial p

artn

ers’

FT

fund

s fo

r em

ploy

-ee

s. L

eave

s of

ab-

senc

e fin

ance

dth

roug

h un

empl

oy-

men

t ins

uran

ce.

Ent

erpr

ises

and

trad

e un

ions

Res

pons

ibili

ty li

esw

ith th

een

terp

rises

; fun

dsso

lutio

ns a

vaila

ble

in c

erta

in s

ecto

rs(b

uild

ing

and

cons

truc

tion)

III. R

egio

nal n

etw

orks

3.1.

Org

anis

atio

nal

stru

ctur

e of

the

labo

urad

min

istr

atio

n45

Dec

entr

alis

ed o

r-ga

nisa

tion:

”Man

agem

ent b

yob

ject

ives

”, lo

cal

”Em

ploy

men

tS

ervi

ce C

entr

es”

(ES

C)

Hig

h de

gree

of i

n-de

pend

ence

. Tri-

part

ite a

dmin

istr

a-tiv

e st

ruct

ures

have

bee

ndi

sman

tled

infa

vour

of m

ore

in-

fluen

ce fr

om r

e-gi

onal

em

ploy

ers.

Dec

entr

alis

ed o

r-ga

nisa

tion:

Labo

ur a

dmin

istr

a-tio

n (A

MS

and

AM

V)

is r

espo

nsi-

ble

for

the

co-o

rdi-

natio

n an

d an

alys

isof

labo

ur m

arke

tpo

licy.

Als

o re

-sp

onsi

ble

for

ES

Ffu

nds.

Com

mun

alpi

lot p

roje

cts

tost

reng

then

the

re-

gion

alis

atio

n of

mea

sure

s.T

ripar

tite

repr

esen

-ta

tion

on a

ll le

vels

.”O

ne e

ntry

sys

tem

”

Dec

entr

alis

ed o

r-ga

nisa

tion:

14 r

egio

nal

bran

ches

whi

chco

-ope

rate

with

the

adm

inis

trat

ive

boar

ds o

f the

re-

gion

al la

bour

of-

fices

, with

the

so-

cial

par

tner

s an

dw

ith th

e lo

cal

auth

oriti

es.

Cen

tral

ised

, fra

g-m

ente

d or

gani

sa-

tion.

Sta

te c

ontr

ol is

high

but

ther

e ar

etr

ipar

tite

boar

ds o

nal

l lev

els.

Res

pons

ibili

ty fo

rF

T is

div

ided

mor

est

rong

ly a

mon

g th

ere

gion

s.50

0 di

ffer

ent c

on-

trac

ts e

xist

betw

een

the

labo

urm

arke

t par

ties

(hig

h gr

ade

offr

agm

enta

tion)

‘Gui

chet

uni

que’

(One

-sto

p-of

fice)

Cen

tral

ised

, int

e-gr

ated

orga

nisa

tion.

The

soc

ial p

artn

ers

are

invo

lved

in th

ead

min

istr

atio

n of

IEF

P a

nd IG

FF

S.

(Stil

l:) c

entr

alis

ed,

frag

men

ted

orga

ni-

satio

n.La

rge

num

ber

ofdi

ffer

ent

auth

oriti

es,

adm

inis

trat

ions

and

corp

orat

ist

bodi

es a

re in

volv

edin

labo

ur m

arke

tpo

licy.

Str

ongl

yre

gula

ted

job

plac

emen

t. T

ri-pa

rtite

arra

ngem

ents

on

all l

evel

s of

labo

urm

arke

t pol

icy.

Reg

iona

l lev

el is

impo

rtan

t for

in-

dust

rial r

estr

uctu

r-in

g. E

xten

sive

re-

gion

alis

atio

n of

labo

ur m

arke

tpo

licy

is b

eing

plan

ned

.46

Dec

entr

alis

ed o

r-ga

nisa

tion:

trip

artit

e co

nsul

ta-

tions

on

all l

evel

s,ta

rget

ed p

olic

y im

-pl

emen

tatio

n;th

e la

bour

reg

ions

and

loca

l lab

our

offic

es a

re r

espo

n-si

ble

for

impl

e-m

enta

tion.

Cen

tral

ised

, int

e-gr

ated

orga

nisa

tion:

All

leve

ls h

ave

aco

mm

ittee

with

equa

l trip

artit

e re

p-re

sent

atio

n w

ithco

ntro

lling

and

de-

cisi

on-m

akin

gau

thor

ity. O

n th

efe

dera

l sta

te a

ndre

gion

al le

vels

:F

orm

ulat

ion

of e

m-

ploy

men

t pol

icy

obje

ctiv

es in

the

indi

vidu

al r

egio

ns.

Cen

tral

ised

, int

e-gr

ated

orga

nisa

tion:

Adm

inis

trat

ion

thro

ugh

a tr

ipar

tite

com

mitt

ee o

n na

-tio

nal,

regi

onal

and

loca

l lev

els.

Fin

an-

cial

inde

pend

ence

incr

ease

d th

roug

hth

e in

trod

uctio

n of

an ”

expe

rimen

tal

budg

et”

whi

ch th

elo

cal l

abou

r of

fices

can

free

ly u

tilis

ew

ithin

the

fram

e-w

ork

of th

e no

rmal

lega

l con

ditio

ns.

45

Sou

rces

: Höc

ker

(199

4), E

urop

ean

Com

mis

sion

(19

95-1

998)

: MIS

EP

Bas

is in

form

atio

n re

port

s.46

cf. E

urop

ean

Com

mis

sion

: inf

orM

ISE

P M

easu

res

No.

62,

Sum

mer

199

8.

48

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

3.2.

Org

anis

atio

nal

stru

ctur

e of

the

furt

her

trai

ning

syst

em

Reg

iona

l gov

ern-

men

t rep

rese

nta-

tives

co-

oper

ate

with

the

regi

onal

auth

oriti

es a

nd th

eT

EC

.In

dust

rial T

rain

ing

Boa

rds

run

trai

ning

inst

itutio

ns fo

r th

eem

ploy

ed w

hich

are

finan

ced

by th

een

terp

rises

.S

ME

s re

ceiv

e su

p-po

rt fr

om th

e T

EC

sin

que

stio

ns r

e-ga

rdin

g fu

rthe

rtr

aini

ng.

FT

for

adul

ts o

f-fe

red

by th

e m

u-ni

cipa

litie

s(v

ocat

iona

l tra

inin

g,sc

hool

and

uni

ver-

sity

edu

catio

n)S

ubsi

dise

d in

ner-

com

pany

FT

(s.

2.6.

)

Reg

iona

l lab

our

mar

ket b

oard

s(c

ompr

isin

g re

-gi

onal

labo

ur o

f-fic

es, s

ocia

l par

t-ne

rs a

nd lo

cal

auth

oriti

es)

resp

on-

sibl

e fo

r pl

anni

ngac

tive

labo

ur m

ar-

ket p

olic

y.O

ffer

of s

peci

al o

c-cu

patio

nal s

ecto

ran

d br

anch

orie

n-ta

ted

”Lab

our

mar

-ke

t tra

inin

gsc

hem

es”

(AM

U),

who

se u

tilis

atio

n in

the

ente

rpris

es is

orga

nise

d by

co-

oper

ativ

eco

mm

ittee

s (w

orks

com

mitt

ees,

trad

eun

ions

, em

ploy

ers’

repr

esen

tativ

es).

VU

C (

gene

ral a

dult

educ

atio

n) a

lso

for

the

unem

ploy

ed.

Fur

ther

trai

ning

fund

s (c

f. T

ab.1

:3.

6.)

exis

t in

all

bran

ches

, trip

artit

ere

pres

enta

tion

onth

e up

per

leve

lon

ly, e

nter

pris

esre

spon

sibl

e fo

r F

Tof

em

ploy

ees,

spe

-ci

al tr

aini

ng o

ffer

for

SM

E e

mpl

oy-

ees.

AF

PA

: Reg

iona

lre

spon

sibi

lity

for

cont

ribut

ing

to fu

r-th

er tr

aini

ng fo

rem

ploy

ees

incr

eas-

ing.

Res

pons

ibili

ty fo

rF

T li

es w

ith th

eM

inis

try

for

labo

uran

d S

ocia

l Aff

airs

whi

ch c

ontr

ols

the

IEF

P tr

aini

ng c

en-

tres

.O

ffer

: Voc

atio

nal

trai

ning

for

em-

ploy

ees

and

for

the

unem

ploy

ed a

ndm

anag

er tr

aini

ngfü

r S

ME

s.T

arge

t gro

ups:

low

er s

kille

d w

ork-

ers,

SM

E e

mpl

oy-

ees,

the

disa

bled

,th

e lo

ng-t

erm

un-

empl

oyed

, eth

nic

min

oriti

es, w

orke

rsaf

fect

ed b

y st

ruc-

tura

l cha

nges

.

Voc

atio

nal t

rain

ing,

furt

her

trai

ning

for

the

empl

oyed

, for

scho

ol-le

aver

and

for

the

unem

ploy

edis

the

resp

onsi

bilit

yof

the

Min

istr

y of

labo

ur a

nd o

f the

regi

ons

whi

ch r

unvo

catio

nal t

rain

ing

cent

res.

FT

for

empl

oyee

sis

run

in-h

ouse

by

larg

er c

ompa

nies

.F

T a

lso

for

shor

t-tim

e w

orke

rs(W

age

Com

pens

atio

nF

und)

.Q

ualit

y ce

rtifi

catio

nfo

r fu

rthe

r tr

aini

ngin

stitu

tions

The

labo

ur a

dmin

i-st

ratio

n is

resp

onsi

ble

for

finan

cing

furt

her

trai

ning

for

the

unem

ploy

edw

here

by p

lann

ing

and

impl

emen

tatio

n is

done

on

regi

onal

and

loca

l lev

els.

Bot

h so

cial

part

ners

run

thei

row

n fu

rthe

r tr

aini

ngin

stitu

tions

. Tar

iffco

ntra

cts

and

rew

ards

for

ente

rpris

esst

imul

ate

furt

her

trai

ning

act

iviti

es.

”Sec

ond

Cha

nce”

prog

ram

me.

The

voc

atio

nal

trai

ning

and

furt

her

trai

ning

sys

tem

isle

ft m

ainl

y to

the

trad

e ch

ambe

rsw

hich

set

the

ex-

amin

atio

n re

quire

-m

ents

and

aw

ard

cert

ifica

tion.

Str

ong

focu

s on

trai

ning

as m

aste

rcr

afts

man

in c

rafts

and

indu

stry

.In

divi

dual

sec

tors

(che

mic

als,

bank

ing

and

insu

ranc

e) h

ave

thei

r ow

n fu

rthe

rtr

aini

ng s

yste

ms.

Col

lect

ive

agre

e-m

ents

: var

ious

regu

latio

ns(r

atio

nalis

atio

npr

otec

tion

agre

e-m

ents

, qua

lific

atio

nof

tarif

f con

trac

ts)

(of l

ittle

sig

nifi-

canc

e)3.

3. A

ctor

s in

the

JRne

twor

kT

EC

(S

cotla

nd:

LEC

), C

ham

bers

,re

gion

al a

nd m

u-ni

cipa

l boa

rds

,pr

ivat

e an

d st

ate-

run

scho

ols

*

Labo

ur m

arke

tbo

ards

, sta

te a

ndse

mi-s

tate

edu

ca-

tiona

l ins

titut

es,

ofte

n w

ith c

orpo

ra-

tist a

dmin

istr

atio

n

AF

PA

(ad

ult e

du-

catio

n), A

NP

E(la

bour

adm

inis

tra-

tion)

, tra

de u

nion

s,fu

rthe

r tr

aini

ng in

-st

itute

s, r

egio

nal

auth

oriti

es

Labo

ur a

dmin

istr

a-tio

n, fu

rthe

rtr

aini

ng in

stitu

tions

,co

nsul

tanc

ies

Reg

iona

l lab

our

adm

inis

trat

ions

,so

cial

par

tner

s*

Labo

ur a

dmin

istr

a-tio

n, s

ocia

lpa

rtne

rs, t

rain

ing

bodi

es

Labo

ur o

ffic

es,

stee

ring

com

mit-

tees

, em

ploy

ers’

asso

ciat

ions

,en

terp

rises

,re

sear

ch in

stitu

tes,

trai

ning

bod

ies,

co-

ordi

natio

n ag

enci

es

49

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

IV. C

orpo

rate

str

uctu

ral a

nd e

cono

mic

con

ditio

ns4.

1. F

urth

er tr

aini

ngac

tiviti

es o

f the

ent

er-

pris

es (

1993

)47

a)S

ME

(10

-249

em

-pl

oyee

s)b)

Com

pani

es(>

250

empl

oyee

s)

a)28

b)48

*a)

35b)

32a)

22b)

47a)

7b)

22a)

5b)

23*

*a)

16b)

26

4.2.

Gen

eral

econ

omic

situ

atio

n(P

erce

ntua

l cha

nge

ofth

e G

DP

inco

mpa

rison

to th

epr

evio

us y

ear

(199

7,19

98, 1

999)

48

3,3/

1,7/

1,8

1,8/

2,6/

2,4

3,4/

3,0/

2,8

2,4/

2,9/

2,8

3,5/

3,8/

3,2

2,4/

2,9/

2,8

5,9/

4,2/

3,0

2,1/

2,7/

2,9

2,2/

2,7/

2,9

4.3.

Une

mpl

oym

ent

rate

49

a)19

95 /

1996

/19

97b)

1998

(M

onth

)

a)8.

7 / 8

.2 /

7.0

b)6.

4 (M

arch

)a)

8.8

/ 9.6

/ 9.

9b)

8.9

(May

)a)

7.2

/ 6.8

/ 5.

5b)

4.7

(Apr

il)a)

11.7

/12.

4/12

.4b)

11.9

(M

ay)

a)7.

3 / 7

.3 /

6.8

b)6.

4 (M

ay)

a)11

.9/1

2.0/

12.1

b)12

.0(J

anua

ry)

a)16

.2/1

5.3/

13.1

b)12

.7 (

May

)

a)3.

9 / 4

.3 /

4.4

b)4.

5 (M

ay)

a)8.

2 / 8

.9 /

10.0

b)9.

8 (M

ay)

V. M

otiv

atio

nal c

ondi

tions

5.1.

Leg

al s

tatu

s of

the

subs

titut

ion

Tem

pora

rily

em-

ploy

ed b

y th

e co

m-

pany

Tem

pora

rily

em-

ploy

ed b

y th

e co

m-

pany

Tem

pora

rily

em-

ploy

ed b

y th

e co

m-

pany

Not

yet

cla

rifie

dN

ot e

mpl

oyed

by

the

com

pany

Not

em

ploy

ed b

yth

e co

mpa

nyN

ot e

mpl

oyed

by

the

com

pany

Em

ploy

ed w

ith a

fixed

term

con

trac

t(N

ot)

tem

pora

rily

empl

oyed

by

the

com

pany

50

47

Pro

port

ion

of th

e em

ploy

ees

who

par

ticip

ated

in f

urth

er tr

aini

ng in

199

3 as

a p

erce

ntag

e of

the

tota

l sta

ff. S

ourc

e: E

uros

tat (

1996

), th

e pe

rcen

tage

s sh

ow th

ear

ithm

etic

ave

rage

of

the

perc

entu

al n

umbe

r of

fur

ther

trai

ning

par

ticip

ants

in th

e ca

tego

ries

10-4

9 em

ploy

ees,

50-

99 e

mpl

oyee

s an

d 10

0-24

9 em

ploy

ees

(a),

as w

ell a

s 25

0-49

9 em

ploy

ees,

500

-999

em

ploy

ees

and

1000

+ e

mpl

oyee

s (b

).48

Sou

rce:

OE

CD

Eco

nom

ic O

utlo

ok (

1998

), F

igur

es f

or 1

998

and

1999

are

OE

CD

est

imat

es.

49S

tand

ardi

sed,

sea

son-

rela

ted

unem

ploy

men

t rat

e in

per

cent

acc

ordi

ng to

OE

CD

est

imat

es; d

efin

ition

cor

resp

onds

to th

e IL

O c

onve

ntio

n. S

ourc

e: O

EC

D N

ews

Rel

ease

in th

e In

tern

et (

ww

w.o

ecd.

org)

.50

Pos

sibl

e st

atus

: Tra

inin

g sc

hem

e (§

48 S

GB

III)

, wor

k pr

actic

al f

urth

er tr

aini

ng s

chem

e (§

89 S

GB

III)

, pra

ctic

al tr

aini

ng in

job

crea

tion

sche

me,

SA

M, f

ree

mea

sure

s.

50

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

5.2.

Wag

e le

vel f

orth

e su

bstit

ute

51

a)as

a %

of t

he e

m-

ploy

ees’

wag

esb)

Diff

eren

ce b

e-tw

een

subs

titu-

tions

’ wag

es a

ndco

mpe

nsat

ory

paym

ent

bene

fits

a)10

0%b)

70%

a)96

%b)

35%

a)10

0%b)

10%

a)75

%b)

34%

a)72

%b)

16%

a)40

%b)

6%a)

42%

b)15

%a)

76%

b)64

%a)

45%

52

b)0%

53

5.3.

Pro

mot

ion

of fu

r-th

er e

duca

tion

for

in-

divi

dual

s

Lear

ning

acc

ount

s,tr

aini

ng c

hequ

esfo

r yo

uth.

Tax

redu

ctio

ns, g

ood

borr

owin

g ra

tes.

Gov

ernm

ent-

fi-na

nced

prom

otio

nal

prog

ram

me

for

em-

ploy

ees

on e

duca

-tio

nal l

eave

, but

no

stat

e or

fund

s-ba

sed

paym

ents

.

FT

in fr

ee A

MU

cour

ses

gene

rally

lead

to r

ecog

nise

dce

rtifi

catio

n.F

inan

cial

sup

port

com

para

ble

toun

empl

oym

ent

bene

fits

for

empl

oyee

s on

furt

her

trai

ning

leav

e.

Sup

port

for

yout

htr

aini

ng (

créd

it fo

r-m

atio

n), n

o ge

nera

lst

ate

or fu

nds-

base

d pa

ymen

ts

Edu

catio

nal l

eave

with

sta

te-f

inan

ced

supp

ort p

ossi

ble.

Eve

ning

cou

rses

for

empl

oyee

s.S

peci

al ta

rget

grou

ps: b

adly

-qu

alifi

ed S

ME

empl

oyee

s.

Cer

tific

atio

n al

sofo

r sh

ort f

urth

ertr

aini

ng c

ours

es.

Com

pens

atio

n fo

rfu

rthe

r tr

aini

ng p

e-rio

ds th

roug

h ne

ww

orki

ng ti

me

mod

-el

s, g

rant

s fo

r em

-pl

oyee

s in

FT

,”h

onor

ary

loan

s”fo

r em

ploy

ees

who

com

bine

par

t-tim

eem

ploy

men

t with

FT

.

Gov

ernm

ent s

up-

port

for

indi

vidu

als.

Fin

anci

al s

uppo

rt:

60%

of u

nem

-pl

oym

ent

bene

fits

, max

. FIM

4500

(D

M 1

495)

per

mon

th fo

rem

ploy

ees

onre

leas

e, in

voca

tiona

l FT

:+F

IM 1

000

tax

free

.

Gov

ernm

ent-

run

furt

her

trai

ning

of-

fers

usu

ally

free

of

char

ge.

Fin

anci

al s

uppo

rtfo

r th

eun

empl

oyed

,as

sist

ance

for

em-

ploy

ees,

fina

ncia

lsu

ppor

t par

tially

from

the

ente

rpris

es

Indi

vidu

al s

uppo

rtfo

r F

T (

stud

ygr

ants

etc

.).

Sub

sidi

es fo

rtr

aini

ng in

stitu

tions

51

The

cal

cula

tion

is b

ased

on

the

natio

nal m

odel

cal

cula

tions

EU

job

rota

tion

(199

8).

52In

Ger

man

y an

ent

erpr

ise

subv

entio

n of

up

to D

M 3

10 m

onth

ly f

or th

e su

bstit

utio

n is

pos

sibl

e.53

As

an u

nem

ploy

ed p

erso

n in

fur

ther

trai

ning

: mai

nten

ance

cor

resp

ondi

ng to

une

mpl

oym

ent b

enef

it or

une

mpl

oym

ent a

ssis

tanc

e. A

s a

part

icip

ant i

n a

job

crea

tion

sche

me

(pr

actic

al tr

aini

ng):

cor

resp

onds

to jo

b cr

eatio

n sc

hem

es r

ates

.

51

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

5.4.

Wag

ere

plac

emen

t rat

es o

fbe

nefit

s af

ter

tax

(OE

CD

199

7)54

55 :

a)S

ingl

e pe

rson

b)C

oupl

e, 2

child

ren,

incl

.ho

usin

g be

nefit

s,in

itial

c)C

oupl

e, 2

child

ren,

incl

.ho

usin

g be

nefit

s,af

ter

the

60th

mon

th o

f une

m-

ploy

men

t

a)23

b)77

c)77

a)75

b)89

c)99

a)70

b)83

c)83

a)67

b)80

c)65

*a)

36b)

47

c)11

a)63

b)88

c)98

*a)

68b)

78

c)71

5.5.

Dur

atio

n an

d dy

-na

mic

s of

ben

efit

paym

ents

6 m

onth

sm

axim

um d

urat

ion,

then

un-

empl

oym

ent a

ssis

-ta

nce

roug

hly

corr

espo

ndin

g to

soci

al w

elfa

rebe

nefit

s

300

– 45

0 da

ys,

exte

nsio

n po

ssib

lew

hen

cond

ition

sfu

lfille

d (A

vaila

bilit

yan

d w

illin

gnes

s to

wor

k)

Up

to 5

yea

rs.

(une

mpl

oyed

ove

r60

: 30

mon

ths,

un-

der

25: 6

mon

ths,

then

job

offe

r.M

axim

um li

mit:

2630

DK

r (1

997)

per

wee

k (3

49E

CU

, 688

DM

)

max

. 27

mon

ths

unem

ploy

men

tbe

nefit

s th

engr

adua

l red

uctio

nov

er 3

3 m

onth

sfo

llow

ed b

y so

cial

wel

fare

ben

efits

and

othe

r as

sis-

tanc

e

Dep

ends

on

the

age

at w

hich

the

unem

ploy

edpe

rson

com

men

ced

last

job.

Exa

mpl

es: 3

0ye

ars:

15

mon

ths,

40 y

ears

: 21

mon

ths.

6 m

onth

sm

axim

um d

urat

ion,

then

soc

ial w

elfa

rebe

nefit

s af

ter

asse

ssm

ent

2 ye

ars

unem

ploy

-m

ent b

enef

its, t

hen

basi

c ra

te o

f une

m-

ploy

men

tas

sist

ance

(no

tw

age-

rela

ted)

20-3

0 or

52

wee

ksun

empl

oym

ent

bene

fits,

then

un-

empl

oym

ent a

ssis

-ta

nce

for

unlim

ited

perio

d

6 to

32

mon

ths

de-

pend

ing

on a

gean

d co

ntrib

utio

nsle

vied

, the

n un

em-

ploy

men

tas

sist

ance

for

unlim

ited

perio

d

5.6.

Sup

port

for

the

idea

of l

ife-lo

ng le

arn-

ing

56

a)W

orki

ng p

opul

a-tio

n (1

5-64

)b)

Em

ploy

ees

c)U

nem

ploy

ed

a)82

b)85

c)84

a)76

b)79

c)72

a)91

b)93

c)92

a)80

b)83

c)80

a)67

b)71

c)84

a)66

b)72

c)76

a)74

b)81

c)71

a)47

b)49

c)38

a)58

b)64

c)55

5.7.

Sub

ject

ive

job

secu

rity

(Spr

ing

1996

)57

3327

5621

2530

3137

28

54

Sou

rce:

OE

CD

(19

97d )

. Dat

a w

as g

athe

red

for

the

year

s 19

94/1

995.

55T

he a

vera

ge n

et c

ompe

nsat

ory

paym

ents

are

for

a 4

0 ye

ar-o

ld a

vera

ge p

rodu

ctio

n w

orke

r (A

PW

, sin

gle

or w

ith f

amily

), w

ho h

as b

een

cont

inua

lly e

mpl

oyed

sinc

e ag

e 18

, one

mon

th a

fter

the

com

men

cem

ent o

f un

empl

oym

ent.

56E

urob

arom

eter

44.

0 (A

utum

n 19

96).

Per

cent

age

of w

orke

rs a

nd u

nem

ploy

ed w

hich

hav

e a

posi

tive

attit

ude

to th

e pr

inci

ple

of li

fe-lo

ng le

arni

ng. A

ll a

ge g

roup

sar

e re

pres

ente

d.57

Per

cent

age

of e

mpl

oyee

s w

ho c

ompl

etel

y ag

ree

with

the

stat

emen

t ”M

y jo

b is

sec

ure”

. Sou

rce:

OE

CD

(19

97a:

133

) ba

sed

on E

urob

arom

eter

44.

3.

52

Indi

cato

rU

nite

dK

ingd

omS

wed

enD

enm

ark

Fra

nce

Por

tuga

lIta

lyF

inla

ndA

ustr

iaG

erm

any

VI.

Pro

ject

dev

elop

men

t6.

1. S

tatu

s of

the

re-

gion

al c

o-or

dina

tion

agen

cy

WE

A: p

rivat

e, n

on-

prof

it-m

akin

gtr

aini

ng o

rgan

isa-

tions

(W

orke

r–F

T)

GD

A: c

o-op

erat

ion

with

Sco

ttish

Ent

erpr

ise

(Sco

ttish

TE

Cs)

,pr

ivat

e co

mpa

nies

unde

r co

ntra

ct b

yth

e pu

blic

auth

oriti

esW

arrin

gton

Bor

-ou

gh C

ounc

il a

ndS

outh

Ayr

shire

Cou

ncil

: mun

icip

albo

dies

.M

ilton

Key

nes

Col

lege

: Sch

ool

for

FT

AB

F: p

rivat

e, n

on-

prof

it-m

akin

gtr

aini

ng o

rgan

isa-

tion

(Wor

ker–

FT

)C

ount

y La

bour

Boa

rd o

f Öre

bro

:is

the

regi

onal

la-

bour

adm

inis

trat

ion

as s

teer

ing

com

-m

ittee

for

AA

MP

(als

o ad

min

iste

rsE

SF

fund

s)

AO

F: p

rivat

e, n

on-

prof

it-m

akin

gtr

aini

ng o

rgan

isa-

tion

(Wor

ker–

FT

)jo

b ro

tatio

n is

im-

plem

ente

d by

8 r

e-gi

onal

AO

Fbr

anch

es.

E2I

: co

nsul

ting

for

the

priv

ate

and

publ

ic s

ecto

rs.

AN

FA

: Tra

inin

gfu

nds,

est

ablis

hed

by th

e so

cial

par

t-ne

rs (

Wor

ker–

FT

)

SO

PR

OF

OR

: pri-

vate

ent

erpr

ise

cons

ultin

g(p

erso

nnel

deve

lopm

ent,

FT

).P

roje

cts

with

ass

o-ci

atio

ns a

nd tr

ade

unio

ns.

DG

AC

CP

: nat

iona

lst

ate-

run

orga

nisa

-tio

n fo

r th

e im

ple-

men

tatio

n of

rei

nte-

grat

ion

and

furt

her

trai

ning

pol

icie

s.

Arc

idon

na: i

nde-

pend

ent n

on-p

rofit

-m

akin

g so

ciet

y fo

rth

e pr

omot

ion

ofeq

ualit

y on

the

la-

bour

mar

ket.

Fun

ding

sou

rces

:M

inis

try

for

Labo

ur,

regi

onal

and

loca

lau

thor

ities

and

publ

ic fu

ndin

g.

Laht

i Res

earc

han

d T

rain

ing

Cen

tre.

Sta

te-r

un c

olle

gefo

r un

iver

sity

edu

-ca

tion,

FT

and

la-

bour

mar

ket t

rain

-in

g

ÖS

B: p

rivat

e, li

m-

ited

com

pany

, con

-su

ltanc

y.

SP

I: no

n-pr

ofit-

mak

ing

foun

datio

n,im

plem

enta

tion

ofla

bour

mar

ket p

ol-

icy,

con

sulta

ncy

BF

Z: t

rain

ing

in-

stitu

te in

co-

oper

a-tio

n w

ith th

e la

bour

adm

inis

trat

ion,

non-

prof

it-m

akin

g.

6.2.

Sys

tem

for

dete

r-m

inat

ion

of r

egio

nal

qual

ifica

tion

need

s

Gov

ernm

ent:

an-

nual

ques

tionn

aire

s to

ente

rpris

es, T

EC

san

d fu

rthe

r tr

aini

ngin

stitu

tions

: re-

gion

al a

naly

ses,

annu

al n

atio

nal

gene

ral a

naly

sis

Est

ablis

hmen

t of a

very

flex

ible

trai

n-in

g an

d fu

rthe

rtr

aini

ng s

yste

mw

hich

can

qui

ckly

reac

t to

chan

ges.

Qua

rter

ly s

ecto

ran

d oc

cupa

tion-

rela

ted

stud

ies

onre

gion

al le

vels

by

asso

ciat

ions

,la

bour

mar

ket

serv

ice,

ann

ual n

a-tio

nal r

epor

t

Ent

erpr

ises

:re

port

s on

pers

onne

l dev

el-

opm

ent p

lans

but

are

neith

er c

ompu

l-so

ry n

or m

onito

red.

Gov

ernm

ent s

ur-

veys

in in

divi

dual

sect

ors,

reg

iona

lob

serv

atio

n bo

dies

Dat

a co

llect

ion

(ent

erpr

ises

, re-

gion

s, s

ecto

rs)

for

the

pros

pect

ive

na-

tiona

l req

uire

men

tspl

anni

ng b

y an

em

-pl

oym

ent a

ndtr

aini

ng w

atch

-dog

Pre

limin

ary

inve

sti-

gatio

ns b

y in

dus-

tria

l and

trad

eas

soci

atio

ns o

n th

esy

stem

isat

ion

ofre

quire

men

ts p

lan-

ning

Pro

spec

tive

re-

quire

men

ts p

lan-

ning

by

the

Min

istr

yfo

r La

bour

Sur

veys

by

the

boar

d of

Eco

nom

i-ca

l and

Soc

ial A

f-fa

irs, f

eder

al M

in-

istr

y fo

r La

bour

and

Soc

ial A

ffai

rs,

AM

S (

regi

onal

lev-

els)

Est

imat

ions

by

the

Fed

eral

Min

istr

ies

on a

nat

iona

l lev

el,

surv

eys

and

repo

rts

by th

ela

bour

off

ices

and

the

IAB

, reg

iona

lm

odel

pro

ject

s.S

pora

dic

larg

ere

gion

al a

ndna

tiona

l stu

dies

6.3.

Sup

port

ive

com

-m

ittee

sye

s*

no*

*no

nono

yes

6.4.

Siz

e of

the

JRpr

ojec

ts (

Num

ber

ofpr

ojec

ts /

empl

oyee

sin

JR

/su

bstit

utio

ns)

58

3 / 1

35 /

3439

/ 11

30 /

285

80 /

3000

/ 12

00*

8 / 2

99 /

193

4 / 6

0 / 8

01

/ 450

/ 32

32 /

900

/ 223

8 / 7

6 / 8

6(o

nly

SP

I)

58

Sou

rce:

Que

stio

nnai

re f

or th

e su

rvey

. Sta

nd: S

epte

mbe

r 19

98. O

nly

the

figur

es f

or S

PI a

re a

vaila

ble

for

Ger

man

y. S

ix f

urth

er p

roje

cts

in th

e U

K a

re s

till i

n th

epl

anni

ng s

tage

s.

BÜCHERDES FORSCHUNGSSCHWERPUNKTSARBEITSMARKT UND BESCHÄFTIGUNG(nur im Buchhandel erhältlich)

Bettina BangelGeographie der Altersgrenzen.Frühverrentung im regionalen Strukturwan-del1993, Berlin, edition sigma, 251 Seiten

Friedrich Buttler, Wolfgang Franz, RonaldSchettkat, and David SoskiceInstitutional Frameworks and Labor MarketPerformance. Comparative Views on the U.S.and German Economies1995, London/New York, Routledge,352 Seiten

European Academy of the Urban EnvironmentNew institutional arrangements in the labourmarket. Transitional labour markets as a newfull employment concept1998, Berlin, EA.UE series „The UrbanEnvironment in Europe“, 135 Seiten

Gernot Grabher (Ed.)The Embedded FirmOn the Socioeconomics of Industrial Net-works1993, London/New York, Routledge, 306 Seiten

Gernot GrabherLob der Verschwendung1994, Berlin, edition sigma, 144 Seiten

Gernot Grabher / David Stark (Eds.)Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism.Legacies, Linkages and Localities1997, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 360Seiten

Hubert Heinelt / Gerhard Bosch / Bernd Reissert(Hrsg.)Arbeitsmarktpolitik nach der Vereinigung1994, Berlin, edition sigma, 249 Seiten

Hitchens, D.M.W.N. / Wagner, K. / Birnie, J.E.East German Productivity and the Transitionto the Market Economy1993, Aldershot, Avebury, 126 Seiten

Hansjörg Herr / Andreas Westphal (Hrsg.)Transformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa.Makroökonomische Konzepte und Fallstu-dien1993, Frankfurt/New York, Campus, 370 Seiten

Traute MeyerUngleich besser? Die ökonomische Unab-hängigkeit von Frauen im Zeichen der Expan-sion sozialer Dienstleistungen1997, Berlin, edition sigma, 216 Seiten

Mirjana Morokvasic / Hedwig Rudolph (Hrsg.)Wanderungsraum Europa. Menschen undGrenzen in Bewegung1994, Berlin, edition sigma, 286 Seiten

Frieder Naschold / David Soskice / Bob Hancké /Ulrich Jürgens (Hg.)Ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit und Insti-tutionelle InnovationWZB-Jahrbuch 19971997, Berlin, edition sigma, 366 Seiten

Jacqueline O'ReillyBanking on Flexibility1994, Aldershot, Avebury, 297 Seiten

Jacqueline O’Reilly / Colette Fagan (Eds.)Part-Time Prospects. An International Com-parison1998, London/New York, Routledge, 304 Seiten

Sigrid QuackDynamik der Teilzeitarbeit.Implikationen für die soziale Sicherung vonFrauen1993, Berlin, edition sigma, 289 Seiten

Hedwig Rudolph / Mirjana Morokvasic (Eds.)Bridging States and Markets.International Migration in the Early 1990s1993, Berlin, edition sigma, 330 Seiten

Hedwig Rudolph (Hg.)unter Mitarbeit von Dagmar SimonGeplanter Wandel, ungeplante Wirkungen.Handlungslogiken und -ressourcen imProzeß der TransformationWZB-Jahrbuch 19951995, Berlin, edition sigma, 348 Seiten

Ronald Schettkat (Ed.)The Flow Analysis of Labour Markets1996, London/New York, Routledge, 294 Seiten

Günther Schmid (Ed.)Labor Market Institutions in Europe.A Socioeconomic Evaluation of Performance1994, New York/London, M.E. Sharpe, 291Seiten

Günther SchmidÄr full sysselsättning fortfarande mö jlig?Övergångsarbetsmarknader som en nystrategi för arbetsmarknadspolitiken.(Übersetzung: Birger Viklund)1995, Södertäje, PM Bäckström Förlag, 53Seiten

Günther Schmid / Jacqueline O'Reilly /Klaus Schömann (Eds.)International Handbook of Labour MarketPolicy and Evaluation1996, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 954Seiten

Klaus SchömannThe Dynamics of Labor Earnings over theLife Course. A Comparative and LongitudinalAnalysis of Germany and Poland1994, Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung:Studien und Berichte, Bd. 60, Berlin, editionsigma,190 Seiten

Klaus Schömann / Ralf Rogowski /Tomas KruppeLabour Market Efficiency in the EuropeanUnion. Employment Protection and Fixed-Term Contracts1998, London/New York, Routledge, 214 Seiten

zukunft im zentrum, Service-Gesellschaft fürBeschäftigungs- und Qualifizierungsberatung /Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialfor-schung (Hrsg.)Arbeitslandschaft Europa. Bericht zumZweiten Europäischen ArbeitsmarktkongressThe European Labor Landscape. Report on theSecond European Labor Market CongressBerlin 1994Vertrieb: zukunft im zentrum gGmbH,Rungestraße 19, D-10179 Berlin, Schutzgebühr:20,-- DM, 328 Seiten

DISCUSSION PAPERS 1995

Abteilung:Organisation und Beschäftigung

FS I 95 - 101Sigrid Quack, Jacqueline O'Reilly,Swen HildebrandtNew Patterns of Recruitment and Training inGerman, UK and French Banks. Anexamination of the tensions between sectoraland national systems

FS I 95 - 102Sigrid Quack, Swen HildebrandtHausbank or Fournisseur? Bank Services forSmall and Medium Sized Enterprises inGermany and France

FS I 95 - 103Sigrid Quack, Swen HildebrandtDas Geheimnis der Banken - Zum Einfluß vonOrganisationsstrukturen und Personalpoli-tiken deutscher und französischer Kredit-institute im mittelständischen Unterneh-mensgeschäft

Abteilung:Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Beschäftigung

FS I 95 - 201Klaus SchömannActive Labour Market Policy in the EuropeanUnion

FS I 95 - 202Sylvia MatheusDienstleistungsarbeit als Auffangnetz? EineAnalyse der Eintritte und Wechsel in Dienst-leistungsarbeit mit Daten des Sozioöko-nomischen Panels

FS I 95 - 203Colette Fagan, Janneke Plantenga, Jill RuberyDoes Part-Time Work Promote Sex Equality?A Comparative Analysis of the Netherlandsand the UK

FS I 95 - 204Klaus SemlingerArbeitsmarktpolitik für Existenzgründer.Plädoyer für eine arbeitsmarktpolitische Un-terstützung des Existenzgründungsgesche-hens

FS I 95 - 205Hugh Mosley, Thomas Kruppe and StephanSpeckesserFlexible Adjustment through Shor t-timeWork: A Comparison of France, Germany,Italy, and Spain

FS I 95 - 206Birgitta RabeImplementation wirtschaftsnaher Arbeits-marktpolitik - Lohnkostenzuschüsse nach§ 249h Arbeitsförderungsgesetz in Berlin undSachsen

FS I 95 - 207Klaus Schömann, Ralf Rogowski, ThomasKruppeFixed Term Contracts and Labour MarketEfficiency in the European Union

FS I 95 - 208Claudia Spee und Günther SchmidBeschäftigungsdynamik in Ballungsregionen.Entwicklung und Struktur der Beschäftigungdes Berliner Arbeitsmarktes in Ballungs-raumvergleich 1977-94

FS I 95 - 209Nigel MeagerArbeitsmarktpolitik für Existenzgründer. In-ternationale Erfahrungen der Existenzgrün-dungsförderung von Arbeitslosen

Abteilung:Wirtschaftswandel und Beschäftigung

FS I 95 - 301Wendy Carlin, Peter RichthofenFinance, Economic Development and theTransition: The East German Case

FS I 95 - 302Andrew GlynSocial Democracy and Full Employment

FS I 95 - 303Andrew GlynUnemployment and Inequality

FS I 95 - 304Ronald SchettkatAsymmetric Labor Market Flows over theBusiness Cycle

FS I 95 - 305Wendy Carlin and Colin MayerStructure and Ownership of East GermanEnterprises

FS I 95 - 306Andres GlynDoes Profitability Really Matter?

FS I 95 - 307Andrea Boltho, Wendy Carlin,Pasquale ScaramozzinoWill East Germany Become a New Mezzo-giorno?

FS I 95 - 308Sigurt VitolsAre German Banks Different?

FS I 95 - 309Sigurt VitolsGerman Banks and the Modernization of theSmall Firm Sector: Long-Term Finance inComparative Perspective

FS I 95 - 310Sigurt VitolsCorporate Governance Versus EconomicGovernance: Banks and Industrial Re-structuring in the U.S. and Germany

FS I 95 - 311Sigurt VitolsFinancial Systems and Industrial Policy inGermany and Great Britain: The Limits ofConvergence

FS I 95 - 312Sigurt VitolsInflation Versus Central Bank Independence?Banking Regulation and Financial Stability inthe U.S. and Germany

FS I 95 - 313Thomas R. CusackPartisan Politics and Public Finance:Changes in Public Spending in the Industria-lized Democracies, 1955-1989

FS I 95 - 314Steven CasperHow Public Law Influences DecentralizedSupplier Network Organization in Germany:The Cases of BMW and Audi

FS I 95 - 315Thomas R. CusackPolitics and Macroeconomic Performance inthe OECD Countries



FS I 96 - 101Swen HildebrandtBerufsausbildung in Frankreich zwischenStaat, Region und Unternehmen:Neuere Entwicklungen in der RegionProvence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur

FS I 96 - 102Dorothee BohleGovernance im Spätsozialismus. DieHerausbildung hybrider Koordinationsformenund informeller Vernetzungen in Polen undUngarn in den achtziger Jahren

FS I 96 - 103Felicitas Hillmann / Hedwig RudolphJenseits des brain drain - Zur Mobilitätwestlicher Fach- und Führungskräfte nachPolen

FS I 96 - 104Gernot GrabherNeue Bundesländer?Zur Rolle des historischen Erbes in derReorganisation von Betrieben und Regionenin Brandenburg

FS I 96 - 105Philippe BernouxDas Unternehmen - ein neues soziologischesForschungsobjekt in Frankreich?

FS I 96 - 106Frauke MieraZuwanderer und Zuwanderinnen aus Polen inBerlin in den 90er Jahren.Thesen über Auswirkungen der Migrations-politiken auf ihre Arbeitsmarktsituation undNetzwerke


FS I 96 - 201Willem J. Dercksen / Jaap de KoningThe New Public Employment Service in theNetherlands (1991-1994)

FS I 96 - 202Peter Auer with Thomas KruppeMonitoring of Labour Market Policy in theEU-Member States

FS I 96 - 203Jacqueline O'ReillyTheoretical Considerations in Cross-NationalEmployment Research

FS I 96 - 204Günther SchmidReform der Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Vom für-sorgenden Wohlfahrtsstaat zum kooperativenSozialstaat

FS I 96 - 205Peter Auer / Stefan Speckesserunter Mitarbeit von Lothar LinkeLabour Markets and Organisational ChangeFuture Working Structures for an AgeingWorkforce

FS I 96 - 205aPeter Auer / Stefan Speckesserunter Mitarbeit von Lother LinkeArbeitsmarkt- und Organisationswandel: Zu-künftige Arbeitsstrukturen und ältere Arbeit-nehmer

FS I 96 - 206Günther Schmidunter Mitarbeit von Maja HelmerBeschäftigungswunder Niederlande?Ein Vergleich der Beschäftigungssysteme inden Niederlanden und in Deutschland

FS I 96 207Philip O’Connell and Fran McGinnityWhat Works, Who Works? The Impact ofActive Labour Market Programmes on theEmployment Prospects of Young People inIreland


FS I 96 - 301Bob HanckéIndustrial Reorganisation in France.Changing relationships between large andsmall firms

FS I 96 - 302Bob HanckéThe Political Economy of OrganizationalChange. Industrial Restructuring andIndustrial Relations in France: Le CasRenault

FS I 96 - 303Bob Hancké / David SoskiceCoordination and Restructuring in LargeFrench Firms. The Evolution of FrenchIndustry in the 1980s.

FS I 96 - 304Elisabetta GualminiPolicy Innovation in the Italian LabourMarket: The influence of institutions

FS I 96 - 305Richard HymanInstitutional Transfer: Industrial Relations inEastern Germany

FS I 96 - 306Steven CasperGerman Industrial Associations and theDiffusion of Innovative Economic Organiz-ation: The Case of JIT Contracting

FS I 96 - 307Mark LehrerThe German Model of Industrial Strategy inTurbulence: Corporate Governance andManagerial Hierarchies in Lufthansa

FS I 96 - 308Isabela MaresFirms and the Welfare State: The Emergenceof New Forms of Unemployment

FS I 96 - 309Bob HanckéLabour Unions, Business Co-ordination andEconomic Adjustment in Western Europe,1980-90

FS I 96 - 310David Soskice / Bob HanckéVon der Konstruktion von Industrienormenzur Organisation der Berufsausbildung. Einevergleichende Analyse am Beispiel vonGroßbritannien, Deutschland, Japan undFrankreich

FS I 96 - 311Bob Hancké / Sylvie CieplyBridging the Finance Gap for Small Firms.The role of information flows across largefirm-based production networks in supplyingfinance to small firms: the case of France

FS I 96 - 312John PhillimoreRestructuring Australian Industrial Relations:The Limits of a Supply Side Approach

FS I 96 - 313Bob Hancké / Steven CasperISO 9000 in the French and German CarIndustry. How international quality standardssupport varieties of capitalism

FS I 96 - 314Isabela MaresIs Unemployment Insurable? Employers andthe Institutionalization of the Risk of Un-employment

FS I 96 - 315Torben IversenThe Political Economy of Inflation:Bargaining structure or central bankindependence?

FS I 96 - 316Mark K. CassellThe Treuhandanstalt, Privatization and theRole of the Courts

FS I 96 - 317Pepper D. CulpepperProblems on the Road to "High-Skill": Asectoral lesson from the transfer of the dualsystem of vocational training to easternGermany

FS I 96 - 318Sylvain BroyerThe Social Market Economy: Birth of anEconomic Style

FS I 96 - 319David SoskiceGerman Technology Policy, Innovation, andNational Institutional Frameworks

FS I 96 - 320Karl-Orfeo FioretosHow and Why Ins titutional Advantages arePreserved in a Global Economy: A Compari-son of British and Swedish Multilateral Pre-ferences

FS I 96 - 321Sigurt VitolsGerman Industrial Policy: An Overview

FS I 96 - 322Steven CasperThe Development of Decentralized SupplierNetworks in East Germany: A Challenge tothe German Model of Industrial Organization

FS I 96 - 323Richard DeegGerman Banks and Industrial Finance in the1990s



FS I 97 - 101Felicitas Hillmann / Hedwig RudolphRedistributing the Cake? EthnicisationProcesses in the Berlin Food Sector

FS I 97 -102Dorothee BohleZwischen lokaler Anarchie und globalenNetzen: Transformationsprozesse im polni-schen Straßengüterverkehr

FS I 97 - 103Felicitas HillmannThis is a migrant’s world: Städtischeethnische Arbeitsmärkte am Beispiel NewYork City

FS I 97 - 104Sigrid QuackKarrieren im Glaspalast. Weibliche Führungs-kräfte in europäischen Banken

FS I 97 - 105Enzo MingioneThe Current Crisis of Intensive WorkRegimes and the Question of Social Exclu-sion in Industrialized Countries


FS I 97 - 201Dirk FingerDienstleistungsschecks in Europa - einModell für Deutschland? Beschäftigungs-effekte und Kosten für die Volkswirtschaft:fünf Szenarien

FS I 97 - 201aDirk FingerService cheques in Europe - a model forGermany? Employment effects and macro-economic costs: five scenarios

FS I 97 - 202Günther Schmidin collaboration with Maja HelmerThe Dutch Employment Miracle? Acomparison of employment systems in theNetherlands and Germany

FS I 97 - 203Günther Schmid, Peter Auer, Hugh Mosley,Klaus Schömann (Eds.)Progress in Evaluation Research:Documentation of Two Transfer-Workshopson the „International Handbook of LabourMarket Policy and Evaluation“

FS I 97 - 204Günther Schmid, Klaus Schömann undHolger SchützEvaluierung der Arbeitmarktpolitik. Ein analy-tischer Bezugsrahmen am Beispiel des Ar-beitsmarktpolitischen Rahmenprogramms inBerlin

FS I 97 - 205Silke BothfeldTeilzeitarbeit für alle? Eine Untersuchungvon Teilzeitpräferenzen in Deutschland undGroßbritannien unter beschäftigungspoliti-schen Gesichtspunkten

FS I 97 - 206Ralf Rogowski und Günther SchmidReflexive Deregulierung. Ein Ansatz zurDynamisierung des Arbeitsmarkts

FS I 97 - 206aRalf Rogowski and Günther SchmidReflexive Deregulation. International experi-ences and proposals for labour marketreform

FS I 97 - 207Jacqueline O’Reilly, Claudia SpeeRegulating work and welfare of the future:Towards a new social contract or a newgender contract?

FS I 97 - 208Hugh Mosley and Stefan SpeckesserMarket Share and Market Segment of PublicEmployment Services


FS I 97 - 301Mark Lehrer, Owen DarbishireThe Performance of Economic Institutions ina Dynamic Environment: Air Transport andTelecommunications in Germany and Britain

FS I 97 - 302Stewart WoodWeakening Codetermination?Works Council Reform in West Germany inthe 1980s

FS I 97 - 303Thomas R. CusackOn the Road to Weimar? The PoliticalEconomy of Popular Satisfaction withGovernment and Regime Performance inGermany

FS I 97 - 304Bob HanckéModernisation Without Flexible Specialis-ation. How large firm restructuring andgovernment regional policies became thestep-parents of autarchic regional productionsystems in France

FS I 97 - 305Mark TiltonRegulatory Reform and Market Opening inJapan

FS I 97 - 306Thomas R. CusackPartisan Politics and Fiscal Policy

FS I 97 - 307Peter A. Hall /Robert J. Franzese, Jr.Mixed Signals:Central Bank Independence,Coordinated Wage Bargaining,and European Monetary Union

FS I 97 - 308David Soskice and Torben IversenCentral Bank - Trade Union Interactions andthe Equilibrium Rate of Employment



FS I 98 - 101Hildegard TheobaldFrauen in leitenden Positionen in der Privat-wirtschaft. Eine Untersuchung des schwedi-schen und deutschen Geschlechtervertrages

FS I 98 - 102Isabel GeorgesHeterogeneity versus homogeneity?Transformation of wage relations of theFrench and the German public telephoneoperators: the case of directory inquiryservices

FS I 98 - 103Dieter Plehwe (Hg.)Transformation der Logistik

FS I 98 - 104Sigrid QuackReorganisation im Bankensektor.Neue Chancen für Frauen im Management?

FS I 98 - 105Janne Tienari, Sigrid Quackand Hildegard TheobaldOrganizational Reforms and Gender: Femin-ization of Middle Management in Finnish andGerman Banking


FS I 98 - 201Dietmar DatheWechselwirkungen zwischen Arbeitszeitpoli-tik und Arbeitsangebotsverhalten. Eine Un-tersuchung zur Bedeutung von Arbeits-präferenzen für eine Politik der Arbeitsum-verteilung

FS I 98 - 202Ton WilthagenFlexicurity: A New Paradigm for LabourMarket Policy Reform

FS I 98 - 203Klaus Schömann, Thomas Kruppe undHeidi OschmianskyBeschäftigungsdynamik und Arbeitslosigkeitin der Europäischen Union

FS I 98 - 204Jacqueline O’Reilly, Ralf Rogowski (Hg./Eds.)Dokumentation des Round-Table Gesprächs„Die neue Labour-Regierung in Groß-britannien: Zwischenbilanz der erstenhundert Tage“„The New Labour Government in GreatBritain: Assessment of the first 100 days“

FS I 98 - 205Holger Schütz, Stefan Speckesser, GüntherSchmidBenchmarking Labour Market Performanceand Labour Market Policies: TheoreticalFoundations and Applications

FS I 98 - 206Günther SchmidTransitional Labour Markets:A New European Employment Strategy

FS I 98 - 207Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke GülkerInstitutional and Financial Framework for JobRotation in Nine European Countries


FS I 98 - 301Karin WagnerThe German Apprenticeship System afterUnification

FS I 98 - 302Donatella GattiThe Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment inVarying Micro-Institutional Settings

FS I 98 - 303Steven CasperThe Legal Framework for CorporateGovernance: Explaining the Development ofContract Law in Germany and the UnitedStates

FS I 98 - 304Torben Iversen and Thomas R. CusackThe Causes of Welfare State Expansion:Deindustrialization or Globalization?

FS I 98 - 305Bob HanckéIndustrial Restructuring and IndustrialRelations in the European Car Industry.Instruments and Strategies for Employment

Absender/From:

Versandstelle - WZB

Reichpietschufer 50

D-10785 Berlin

B E S T E L L S C H E I N

O R D E R F O R M

Bitte schicken Sie mir aus IhrerPublikationsliste folgende Diskussions-Papiere zu.

Please send me the following discussion papers from your Publication List:

Paper No. Author__________________________________________________________________________

Bitte schicken Sie bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers

unbedingt eine 1 DM-Briefmarke pro paper und einen

an Sie adressierten Aufkleber mit. Danke.

For each paper you order please send a "Coupon- Réponse International " (international money order)

plus a self-addressed adhesive label. Thank You.

Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke Gülker Dezember … · Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke...

Documents

Transcript of Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke Gülker Dezember … · Klaus Schömann, Ralf Mytzek, Silke...