Mascareño, A. - The Function of Ethics from the Perspective of the Individual

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Soziale Systeme 17 (2011), Heft 1, S. 186-210 © Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

Aldo Mascareño

The Function of Ethics from the Perspective of the Individual*

Zusammenfassung: Als Theorie der Moral wird die Ethik zu einer Reflexion darüber, wie der moralische Code auf unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Zusammenhänge an-gewendet wird. Dieser Aufsatz versteht ergänzend die Funktion der Ethik als einelose Kopplung zwischen individueller Motivation und sozialer Selektivität, i. e. zwi-schen einer individuell skizzierten gesellschaftlichen Projektion und der sachlichenErfahrung in der Gesellschaft. Als eine lose Kopplung besteht die Funktion der Ethikdarin, vor eventuellen Entkopplungen individueller Motivation und sozialer Selekti- vität zu warnen, so dass eine institutionell nicht akzeptierte individuelle Wünschbar-keit zumindest in der Ethik Akzeptanz findet. Der Aufsatz illustriert dies anhand vierunterschiedlicher Inklusion / Exklusions-Konstellationen.

In a structurally differentiated and semantically pluralistic modern society,ethics mediates between moral requirements and social circumstances; it con-nects the factual constraints and enablements with moral norms in order toevaluate courses of action and avoid an over-moralization of social selectivity.Ethics might be in this sense called a reflexive theory of morality. In doing so,ethics assumes a monitoring position regarding how the moral code – as acirculatory and fluid mode of communication – is applied to systemic commu-nication. Ethics becomes thus a theory of morality, a social device suited forthe reflection and problematization of morality in a highly complex modernsociety (Luhmann 2008, 282 ff.).The aim of this paper is to explore whether reflexive ethics may assume anotherfunction in contemporary society, namely a cognitive and normative role inthe relationship between individuals and functional differentiation. My gene-

ral thesis is that individuals are coupled with society through a personal modusvivendi that links individual motivation to diverse options of social selectivity.This personal modus vivendi is a combination of normative and cognitive ex-pectations – while the former are composed of a prioritization of concerns, thelatter are structured by alternative options of accomplishing expectations. In

* This art icle was possible thanks to financial support by the Chilean Council for Scienceand Technology (Grants 1110437 and 1110428). All translations of the following citationsoriginally in German by A. M. The author should like to thank Daniel Chernilo and theanonymous reviewers of Soziale Systeme for their helpful comments. This article was possi-ble thanks to financial support by the Chilean Council for Science and Technology (Grants1110437 and 1110428).



The Function of Ethics from the Perspective of the Individual 187

referring to options of social selectivity, a personal modus vivendi has to deal with structural constraints and enablements individuals meet alongside theirrelationship with systemic operations. As long as in certain situations –such

as inefficient institutional outcomes, exposure to dangers and increased exclu-sions – individuals confront severe restrictions or even find no social optionsto realize their modus vivendi, ethics becomes a factor of motivation to eitherreestablish or reinforce the relationship with social selectivity. In this vein, thefunction of reflexive ethics is not to prevent an over-moralization of societybut to prevent the decoupling of individual motivation and social selectivity.Inequality, inequity, discrimination, coercion, poverty are sources of differ-ent levels of exclusion in contemporary society. Systemically seen, these ex-clusions reveal an uneven interpenetration of functional differentiation withstructures and semantics of stratified and center / periphery-forms of social

organization in different regions of the world society. From the perspectiveof the individuals however, those exclusions directly affect the instantiationof projects, desires and expectations of concrete individuals, regardless whatkind of aspirations they have and the region they live in the world. In other words, exclusions universally affect the instantiation of the personal modus vivendi, and consequently a sense of distrust towards institutions and personsfractures the individual motivation to take part in social communication. Mymain argument is that ethics contributes to the reconstruction of this fracturedmotivation by offering justifications –such as individual freedom, consensus,

solidarity, equity, recognition, among others – to fight against exclusions. Eth-ics helps in reestablishing the circularity between individual motivation andsocial selectivity, reinforces thus the communication in social systems, andprevents the reproduction of non-legitimate differences within them.In order to provide the central steps of this argument, I begin at the level of thepsychic system with a reconstruction of the emergence of motivation and ex-pectation in relation to the outer, social world (I). By elaborating on Margaret Archer’s theory of the internal conversation, I argue in a rather complementa-ry way that psychic reflexivity is a pre-condition of the individual motivationtowards social selectivity and consequently of the modus vivendi (II). Having

this framework in mind, I reconstruct the function of ethics in terms of a loosecoupling between individual motivation and social selectivity (III) and relatethis function with the combination of motivation and selectivity in the theoryof symbolic media (IV). Proceeding with this theoretical framework, I shallillustrate the function of ethics with regard to four constellations of inclusion:inclusion / self-exclusion, compensated inclusion, inclusion by risk / exclusionby danger, and sub-inclusion (V). Finally, I present some concluding remarks(VI).



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I. Reflexivity in psychic systems and the emergence of motivation

Reflexive processes are those that apply their own operations to themselves

(Luhmann 1984). Psychic operations are a special case of system operations.Their fundamental elements are cogitations, and the continuous fluctuationof these elements between self-reference and hetero-reference constitutes itsoperative mode. This can be called reflexivity or autopoiesis of consciousness.Edmund Husserl (1982, 33) selected the concept of intentionality to representthis continuous fluctuation between self- and hetero-reference: »Consciousprocesses are also called intentional ; but then the word intentionality signifiesnothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to beconscious of something; as a cogito , to bear within itself its cogitatum«. AfterLuhmann, this intentionality of consciousness constitutes the operational

unity of the psychic system; it is universal not in a transcendental but ratherin an operative way: »consciousness is always consciousness of phenomenathat are linked to a continuous processing of self-reference (consciousness)and hetero-reference (phenomena), and intentionality is precisely the form which makes this difference operable as unity« (Luhmann 2005a, 31). Withthat, consciousness can avoid to be described as an aggregation of its multipleoutcomes: perception, thought, will, sensibility – i. e. it is not the sum of theproducts of its own intentional operability, but rather a self-producing activ-ity. Consciousness becomes reflexive: the difference between self- and hetero-

reference can be reproduced through intentionality as the fundamental opera-tion of the psychic system.The ›consciousness of phenomena‹ (the operation of intentionality) entailsan observational mode by which the individuality of the psychic system cancorrelate its internal references with the social environment, namely with theconstraints and enablements of function systems and the multiple options con-tained in the constellations of meaning of symbolic media. By means of thereality of the operation it can be sure that this correlation is not an illusion butthe real context of its individuality: »The intentional operation is a permanentoscillation between hetero- and self-reference, and prevents thus that con-

sciousness ever disappears in the world or arrives at a standstill« (Luhmann1997a, 35). It is certainly true that, on the one hand, the operative oscillationbetween self- and hetero-reference affects every outcome of consciousness, buton the other, this oscillation neither anticipates what kind of distinction theobserver will apply nor how she shall deal with the paradoxes of her observation – for example, the individual herself may feel attracted to something,perceive that it is not recommendable, look for other alternatives, think thatalternatives are not satisfactory enough, decide to postpone everything, andhope for better days ahead; or she may hold the expectation and insist against

all odds. The bifurcation of self / hetero-reference generates this oscillation, butindividuals deal with it when they reflexively confront the social world.




Self- and hetero-reference enact the irritability of individual consciousnesseither through its own cogitations about cogitations or through cogitationsregarding external events. In the first case, recursive identities of the self

about herself are produced, i. e. a condensation shaped by the reiteration of theself-observation: the reiteration is regarded as the same for the self, althoughit does not need to be ontologically the same. Identities are thus produced,not discovered (see Luhmann 2005b, 15 f.). In the second case, such identitiesare operatively and, therefore, reflexively monitored regarding their adjust-ment to the conditions of the outer social world. The reflexivity of individualconsciousness is thus also socially scrutinized (see Giddens 1986; Sandywell2003). The individual can assess whether these self-produced identities arealso identifiable in the outer social world, whether they can expect to be con-firmed by specified or generalized others or not.

By means of this reflexive operation of constructing recursive identities (self-reference) and by drawing internal correlations with the social world (hete-ro-reference), individuals are able to identify their own motivations. Motiva-tions emerge as a type of self-produced identity with a social substrate anda guiding function: they are temporarily stabilized condensations that per-form the operation of individual consciousness in terms of expectations (seeParsons 2007).1 A new bifurcation thus arises depending on how individualconsciousness experiences the concretization of expectations: The fulfillmentof expectations shall be deemed to be a normal case, and deviations shall be

experienced as abnormality: »The difference normal / abnormal may be broadlyand unspecifically applied, and includes distinctions such as correct / incorrector secure / insecure in a rudimentary form. One side of this dichotomy, thenormal, correct, secure one, gives the opportunity to continue with the auto-poiesis alongside the representation. The other side has an alarming function.It suggests now that it is time to come to terms with the deviation and eitherto renormalize the expectation or to change it« (Luhmann 2005c, 74).That being the case, the internal normality correlates with socially stabilizednormative expectations: the world confirms the individual expectations aboutthe world (e. g., to get a job after years of professional training, to receive medi-

cal attention in case of illness, to get a legally sanctioned compensation whenrights of one’s own have been infringed by others). Abnormality is however aproblematic case, because incorrectness, insecurity, and deviation ask for pre-established social requirements to cope with uncertainty (e. g., institutionalsupport when discrimination leads to exclusion, another opportunity to get a job when the first application fails, equal education opportunities despite pov-erty conditions). Under abnormal conditions, individuals may reject the lack offulfillment and constantly insist on the concretization of the expectation, orthey may also simply renounce to it. In the first case, a sufficiently stabilized

1 With reference to personality Valsiner (1998, 386) speaks here of independent dependence.



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institutional framework is required – an institutional framework which candeal with the disappointments and assist the individuals in compensating forthe losses they experience (rule of law, fundamental rights, public policies, as-

sistant networks). In the second case, the institutional framework must offera suitably structured social situation where abnormality can be individuallyexperienced as socially normal because the possibilities of fulfillment of ex-pectations are rapidly and easily available when it comes to disappointments(market alternatives, educational opportunities, scientific options, technicalchoices) (see Luhmann 2005d). As long as this institutional framework successfully deals with the psychic ex-perience of normality / abnormality, the individual motivation may be success-fully connected with social selectivity, which means, the ontological distancebetween psychic and social operation can be bridged through expectation.

The emergence of individual motivation is thus a matter of circular alignmentof both psychic operation and options of social selectivity: the more the so-cial world can deal with expectations (whether normative or cognitive), thestronger the correspondence between internally produced identities and theirfactual correlates in the outer social world. Through motivation individualsmay manage normal situations without doing a great deal to get things done:someone is willing to sell something, another one willing to buy; someone islooking for a job, another one is looking for a trained professional; someone isclaiming for justice, another one is willing to revise the case. Something simi-

lar applies to abnormal situations. In those cases, motivation moves the individual to normalize abnormality by taking alternative options into account: ifanother one gets the job, another post, elsewhere, could be still open; if injus-tice happens, the right to compensation is protected by law. Individuals thusreflexively process normality and abnormality alternatively as normative andcognitive expectations: »Expectations are experienced and treated as cognitive when they are adapted to reality in the case of disappointment. For normativeexpectations the opposite holds: that one does not reject them if someone actsagainst them« (Luhmann 1985, 33). As stated, adaptation to reality in the caseof cognitive expectations requires easy-access options from the institutional

framework (another place to work, to study, another investment option); andin the case of normative expectations the individual insistence requires resta-bilizing social structures (tribunals, welfare institutions, assistance networks).Functionally differentiated societies have developed both kinds of institutionaloutcomes to cope with normative and cognitive expectations and in doing so,they can stabilize the individual motivation. Another question is how individuals internally manage the abnormality of expectations.The conscious experience of abnormality of expectations can take place witheither socially stabilized normative or cognitive expectations. Everything de-

pends on the constraints and enablements of social systems; too many con-straints and a small number of enablements for the fulfillment of expecta-




tions, either normative or cognitive, reinforce the individual experience ofabnormality, especially because of the cumulative nature of constraints: dis-crimination based on appearance, aging, provenience, reputation, ethnicity or

gender leads to a precarious job-offer and consequently to prolonged periodsof poverty particularly in regions with inefficient support networks or with a weak institutional development. From a structural perspective, an abundanceof constraints and a reduction of enablements produce a decoupling of individual expectations and options for social selectivity: there is not enough so-cial space (options, alternatives, contingency) for the fulfillment of individualexpectations. Accordingly, from a semantic perspective, and especially whenthe normality of the other one seems to be more stable than one’s own nor-mality, a social valuation of the problem is produced by ethical semantics suchas fairness, equity, justice, non-discrimination or in other cases individual in-

terest, survival, convenience, accommodation. In such cases, individual motivation comes into question as reflexive mechanism in deciding either to insistor to change the prioritization of individual plans, and the ethics is the firstsocial device where this individual motivation finds resonance.Such a function of ethics must rely on a connection of psychic and social re-flexivity. The question now is how individual reflexivity constructs this orien-tation to society, and how the function of ethics emerges from this. By elabo-rating on Margaret Archer’s concept of reflexivity, I explore the former, and,at the same time, pave the way for the latter, namely, for a complementary

understanding of ethics as a reflexive evaluation of decouplings between individual motivation and social selectivity.

II. Personal modus vivendi

Archer’s theory aims to explain the emergence of the social world as a con-tinuous interplay (analytical dualism) between agency and structure. Sinceindividuals are born in a given context, their agential powers confront a pre-existing social structure which they cannot create but certainly maintain and

eventually transform in the present. Structures are thus time-precedent in re-lation to action; there is a temporal gap between both structure and agencythat fosters autonomy on both sides of the form: autonomous causal powers ofstructures upon agents and of actors in transforming structures. This is calledthe double morphogenesis of structure and agency (Archer 1995). Society re-sults from this interplay. I am neither interested here in assessing such a theo-retical framework (see Mascareño 2008) nor in her assessment of the possibil-ity of a systemic reflexivity (see Archer 2007, 30 ff.). Yet, I shall pay attention to Archer’s concept of modus vivendi in order to expand the systemic conceptual

basis for a reflexive ethics from the individual perspective.



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In contradistinction to the concept of modus vivendi in political philosophy,2 modus vivendi here refers to a constellation of concerns individuals constructalongside their experience with / in society. It is precisely this experience which

leads them to prioritize concerns (interests, needs, aspirations, future imagesof the self in society, in a word: expectations) given the structural constraintsand enablements they meet in different social situations (Archer 2007, 62 ff.;2000, 222 ff.). As interests, needs, aspirations cannot be concretized simulta-neously, and as the correlation between constraints and enablements changesmaterially, socially and temporarily from system to system, a modus vivendibecomes a matter of prioritization. The question ›How do I go about it?‹ has tobe answered continuously in order to decide courses of action for the instan-tiation of concerns in a suitable modus vivendi.Choosing courses of action in a given social situation (or projects in Archer’s

terminology) entails individual reflexivity to decide what kind of motivationmay be correspondingly instantiated. This presupposes both, the social desir-ability of the institutional framework (the role expectation in Parsonian terms)and individual desirability of the recursively self-produced personal identity(or motivation as seen in Section 1). In Archer’s words: »Through such a modusvivendi a subject’s personal identity is aligned with her social identity. Arriv-ing at this alignment is a dialectical process, generally requiring adjustmentand accommodation between the personal and the social. It is rarely optimal,it is frequently revisable, but it is always reflexive in nature« (Archer 2007, 88).

In analyzing such a reflexive nature of the modus vivendi, Archer deploysher argument in three steps. The first step is to place reflexivity at the op-erative level of the psychic system — the domain of mental privacy in her words (Archer 2003). She distinguishes between first-order and second-ordermental activities. While the former are composed of beliefs, desires, ideas andthoughts (observations of consciousness), the second order of mental activity is par excellence reflexivity itself (operation of consciousness, as stated in Section1). Beliefs, desires, ideas and thoughts may be seen as either social expecta-tions (public domain) or as internal observations of the self. In contradistinc-tion, reflexivity originates in the private domain and cannot become public: »it

is a matter of pure contingency whether it is given public articulation or anydeterminate behavioral manifestation« (Archer 2003, 25). If reflexive meansprocesses which apply their own operations to themselves, through reflexiv-

2 Broadly speaking, the concept of modus vivendi in political philosophy refers to the consti-tution of a public order in which individuals may establish political compromises with eachother without renouncing their substantial values. The political realm becomes thus neutral(Larmore 1992, 70 ff.); it suppresses-preserves (aufhebt ) what individuals may feel or bel ieveis the ultimate nature of the good or the supreme moral value of moral conduct (McCabe2010, 124 ff.). This does not mean detachment toward these values, but it means that thepublic order depends on political discussions (see also Cherry 2009; Rawls 1996; MacIntyre2008). I do not follow this analysis here. However, if the concept of contingency characteri-zes the modern social world, then a public idea of modus vivendi is more than an attractivealternative for a post-metaphysical politics (see Thornhill 2007).




ity individuals are aware of their first-order mental activities, can revise themand decide whether they are worth being transformed into communicationsat any given moment. Reflexivity becomes thus an operation of alter that con-

nects the first selection of information (first order mental activities in Archer’s view) and the second selection of a reflexively selected utterance to engage incommunicative events that instantiate the modus vivendi. Archer’s second step is to explain the outcomes of reflexivity for the psychicsystem. Since reflexivity entails deliberation between meaningful and contin-gent alternatives of information (different beliefs, desires, ideas and thoughts),the main outcome of reflexivity is the prioritization of individual concerns – anindividual motivational scale suited for action in the social world. Simultane-ously, this gives the individual a continuous sense of self through the func-tion of memory (Archer 2003, 45). Metaphorically, Archer defines this reflexive

deliberation as an internal conversation.3 In contradistinction to the concept ofintrospection as a mere observation of internal states of mind, the concept ofinternal conversation aims to differentiate operation (reflexivity) from infor-mation by simultaneously relating them inside the domain of mental privacy. As a third and last step in the explanation of psychic reflexivity and its orien-tation to society, Archer aims to specify internal conversation by analyzingPierce’s operational difference between ›I‹ and ›Me‹. While the ›Me‹ is madeup of internal stabilizations (expectations) acquired in interpretative efforts ofthe past – a repertory of well-known possibilities or ›habits‹ in Pierce’s words

(1958) –, the ›I‹ is capable of selection (Archer 2003, 73ff.). Selections of the ›I‹involve both the self-monitoring of the ›Me‹ and the innovative responses ofthe ›I‹ to the contingent social environment of the psychic system (the future›you‹) – in other words, the I-selections include the responses of the self to itsengagement in communicative events, alternatively as alter or as ego. Reflexiv-ity is therefore not only a systematic relationship between ›I‹ and ›Me‹, but italso makes possible an active coupling with the contingent outer world andproduces a mediated act of balance between both psychic and social autono-my. The mediatory function is assumed and performed by the modus vivendi.

3 The roots of the concept of internal conversation can be traced back to American prag-matism, mainly to William James (1987), Charles Pierce (1958) and George Herbert Mead(1932). Even though Mead is best known for his work on internal conversation, Archerarguably rejects the over-socialization of the self implied in Mead’s concept of ›generalizedother‹ – an image of society in the psychic system that cancels its autonomy and restricts itsoperational reflexivity to a secondary role (Archer 2003, 83ff.). James’ rather rudimentarycontribution to a theory of psychic reflexivity is, after Archer, threefold: »Firstly, the notionof thought as internal speech; a movement from inchoate premonitions to articulate utte-rances. Secondly, the insight that to accomplish this internal speech we have to listen toourselves as we phrase our thoughts. Thirdly, the appreciation that the articulation of what

we mean entai ls self-monitoring, in which some words are welcomed as appropriate andothers rejected as inapposite expressions« (Archer 2003, 63-64). In opposition to Mead, theproblem here seems to be the absence of social irritability of consciousness; the absence ofcoupling or interpenetration in systemic terms. Archer then constructs her view on internalconversation in Piercian terms (see below).



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The internal conversation entails time in order to continuously achieve inter-nal condensations of expectations. The self is in itself ›subject‹ (the ›I‹) and›object‹ (the ›Me‹) of a sequential turn-taking whose main outcome is a future

individual project (the ›you‹). This project leads to prioritizing concerns in theform of a personal modus vivendi »with which we think we can live« (Archer2003, 102). This is not only a cognitive matter, but also an emotional one; theyare ›best guesses‹ about the desirable; a condensation of fundamental individ-ual motivations produced in relation to society. These concerns may be moreor less successful, more or less altered, more or less temporarily deferred ac-cording to the constraints (exclusions, asymmetries and disappointments) andenablements (inclusions, possibilities, accomplishments) individuals confrontin society. A personal modus vivendi is not a fixed model of action; it can-not be, because it is a prioritization of individual concerns and motivations

that has to be able to reorganize priorities and projected courses of action when exclusions, asymmetries and disappointments jeopardize the desirableinclusions, possibilities and accomplishments. A modus vivendi is thereforecomposed by both normative and cognitive expectations; the former aim toconcretize the future image of the ›You‹ while the latter look reflexively foralternatives of doing this in a sequential turn-taking that includes the selec-tions and social irritability of the ›I‹ as well as the reconstruction of the pastorganized by the ›Me‹. A modus vivendi is, so to speak, a medium for individuality in society; it is a

changing prioritization of concerns and motivations , in which ›prioritization‹ is theindividual side of the story and ›changing‹ means adaptation through projectsto social constraints and enablements. The question is now, what is the role ofethics in this context, and how it relates with the modus vivendi.

III. The function of reflexive ethics

As argued above, ethics is the reflexive side of morality, i. e. it assumes thefunction of being a theory of how the moral code esteem / disesteem is applied

to different contexts of systemic communication, preventing thus an over-moralization of society (see Luhmann 1990a; 1996a; 2008). In this regard, theprimary reference of ethics is the social system. Because an over-moralizationof society could produce an artificial distortion in the systemic codes – namelythat payments are good and non-payments bad, that being in the governmentis good and being in the opposition is bad, that transcendence is good andimmanence bad, and so on – the function of ethics relies on how social sys-tems can reflexively deal with such a state of affairs.Certainly, this could be a function of a reflexive ethics when its main reference

in a differentiated society is the social system. Yet, self-descriptively, ethics re-fers continuously to the evaluation of individual actions. Consequently, when




the reference is the individual, another path for the analysis of the function ofethics must be followed. With a primary reference to individuals (and not tosocial systems), I shall deploy my argument regarding the function of ethics in

four steps.First, considering the autonomy of the psychic system (Section 1) and the con-ditions of construction of the modus vivendi (Section 2), there is no equivalencebetween individual expectations and social expectations. If internal reflexivityis an operational modus of the psychic system, then internal expectations arenot primarily subordinated to the social, but to individual reflexivity itself – tothe autopoiesis of consciousness in Luhmannian terms. Certainly, individualsmay reflect upon their possibilities in confronting socio-structural constraintsand enablements regarding the concretization of their modus vivendi, but indoing so, they express the desirability of their concerns in the world. Desirabil-

ity is another word for motivation. It entails the expectation that the structur-ally stabilized social situations (systems) can transform internal motivationsinto social acceptance, either in normative terms (namely, that a given institu-tional framework deals with the disappointments and compensates the even-tual losses) or in cognitive terms (namely, that this institutional frameworkalso offers rapidly and easily available options when it comes to disappoint-ments). Desirability is in this sense the individual expression of an externallyenvisaged society (a meaningful projection of society by the psychic system) where the modus vivendi might be effectively deployed and instantiated.

Second, despite the desirability of a projected society consisting of an insti-tutional framework that deals with disappointments and offers alternativeoptions, this depiction is not the society. In dealing with disappointments, anormatively-driven institutional framework takes generally more time thanexpected in transforming desirability into acceptance; the temporality of pro-cedures is not the temporality of the individual expectation: many becomepoorer waiting for social welfare, many have died waiting for justice to come.One can trust in procedures, but this must be renewed every time a clause ofthe procedure is accomplished; the concluding social acceptance of one’s owndesirability is not secured in each step, but step by step (Luhmann 2000, 71 f.).

Therefore, it is always possible that another applicant obtains the post, thatthe other party wins the case, that the compensations do not match the losses,or that in spite of the existence of compensating mechanisms, they cannotabsorb the increasing demands of the public. On the other hand, the exist-ence of rapidly and easily available options in cognitively-driven institutionalframeworks is not a matter of fact from the perspective of the individual. Op-tions must not only exist; they must be accessible to individuals, and socialsemantics always plays a crucial role in defining differences of accessibility tothose options through distinctions based on appearance, aging, provenience,

reputation, ethnicity or gender (see Benhabib 2002). They fill up the constel-lations of inclusion / exclusion with a lot of crosscutting symbolic presupposi-



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tions that reduce everyone’s access to options in different ranges. Under thesecircumstances, switching rapidly and easily from one alternative to another inorder to cope with cognitive disappointments is rather an improbable under-

taking because discrimination tends towards a cancellation of contingency,i. e. an elimination of alternative possibilities.Third, the aforementioned situations reveal an oscillating trajectory betweenthe individual depiction of society and the factual disappointments and ful-fillments of expectations. My hypothesis here is that in such cases, reflexiveethics accomplishes the function of preventing the decoupling of individualmotivation and social selectivity in a dual manner: by producing legitimatemodes of criticizing society and by changing the prioritization of individualconcerns inside the modus vivendi. With these two strategies, reflexive ethicsaims to manage the oscillation between the internal projections of society and

the factual experience in society, so that disappointments, either normativeor cognitive, may be channeled through some social source when the insti-tutional framework fails in providing effective procedures, satisfactory com-pensations or rapidly and easily available options to fulfill one’s expectations.In other words, when individual desirability finds no immediate institutionalacceptance, it finds a kind of acceptance in ethics. Ethics then is a source ofmotivation to express disagreement, to demand urgent decisions, to protestpublicly or privately, but also to reflexively modify the prioritization of individual concerns when constraints override the alternative enablements. Ethics

and modus vivendi are thus loosely coupled , namely they refer to each otherbut preserve their own autonomy (see Weick 1976; 1989; Orton / Weick 1990).Critical decouplings between individual motivation and social selectivity arethereby prevented, and the transformation of individual desirability into so-cial acceptance may be regained precisely by strengthening the acceptance ofthe ethical unacceptability of the situation of exclusion.Fourth, because of the reflexive nature of the ethical evaluations, courses ofaction or personal projects change in time. Their holders may have the ex-perience of success and then undertake another plan, or may postpone, alteror even change their own concerns while reflecting on their expectations by

means of ethical evaluations such as ›accommodation‹, ›convenience‹, ›inter-personal reciprocity‹, ›decency‹, ›fairness‹ (Archer 2003, 235 ff.). Individualsmay also be incapable of transforming reflexivity into projects having there-fore no other choice but to act passively towards the social constraints andenablements they meet (298 ff.). These alternative possibilities make clear thatthe question of moral norms and their ethical assessment is a matter of con-tinuous interplay between individual and society. While moral norms emergein society through evolutionary stabilization, they are confronted in everydaylife with ethical evaluations of the desirable made by different individuals try-

ing to adapt their own expectations to the circumstances within which theybecome involved. Subsequently, this affects the production and continuity of




social norms. Ethical reflexivity means, in this regard, structural coupling ofboth psychic and social systems through the performance of a personal modus vivendi.

Reflexive ethics entails, therefore, more than the Luhmannian informationalfunction: ›speaker of morality and translator of social requirements towardsmorality‹ (Luhmann 2008). Its complementary function, from the perspectiveof the individual, seems to be a reflexive evaluation of the conditions of adjustment of the personal modus vivendi to the external circumstances, so that,in spite of exclusions, asymmetries and disappointments, the motivation forsocial selectivity remains coupled with the individual motivation enclosed inthe personal modus vivendi.

IV. Individual motivation and social selectivity

Combined with selection, motivation is a key word in Luhmann’s theory ofsymbolically generalized communication media (Luhmann 1997, 316 ff.). Byconditioning the selection through successfully achieved communicationthe symbolic media become a factor of motivation. In this framework, selec-tion and motivation are deemed to be social constructions rather than psy-chic states. Symbolic media such as truth, values, love, money, power, operateas constellations of coordinated selectivity that provide a repertory of com-

mon understandings, complementary expectations and differentiated topicsof communication (Luhmann 1998). Tightly coupled with the structures andsemantics of function systems, the symbolic media are dense fields of mean-ing whose self-regulation does not really need to take into account the psychicactivity of individuals, their motivation or the conditions of selectivity of theirown personal modus vivendi. Communication is enough when it comes tothe functioning of symbolic media. These constellations of meaning are filledup with evolutionary presuppositions about a wide (but also limited) range ofpossibilities to classify social selections onto different fields by ascribing themto specific positions and functions (at the level of interactions, organizations,

and function systems, or even to the environment). They are structural limi-tations of the possible (Luhmann 2005e). This is the reason why consensuallegitimacy, individual utility functions or psychic internalization do not con-tribute in a crucial way to the explanation of social autopoiesis. In contradis-tinction, in Luhmannian terms: »The motives for acceptance must be ratherincluded in the selectivity itself« (2005e, 220).If a reflexive ethics has also to do with the reflexively adaptive evaluation ofthe personal modus vivendi to external circumstances, then the ethical ques-tion must be how internal motivations enclosed in the modus vivendi cope

with the evolutionarily developed presuppositions contained in the constella-tions of meaning of symbolic media. There is no doubt that the construction



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of a personal modus vivendi keeps an eye on society —in terms of independ-ent dependence (Valsiner 1998). It is impossible to conceive a modus vivendidevoid from stabilized social possibilities. Whoever wants to develop a modus

vivendi aiming to a transformation of social conditions must confront, in thefirst place, highly stabilized structural couplings between economy, politicsand law that prevent radical changes. Nonetheless, if the thesis of the reflexiveautonomy of the psychic system is accurate, and if this includes the reflexiveconstruction of a personal modus vivendi, then there are no reasons to as-sume a direct continuity between individual motivations and the social selec-tivity of symbolic media. In other words, highly stabilized social expectationsdo not positively define individual motivations; from the perspective of theindividual, they are rather an open field to connect individual motivation andsocial selectivity in order to instantiate the modus vivendi.

Since symbolic media can be understood as a structural limitation of the pos-sible, and as they open up possibilities of successful communication in dif-ferent fields of meaning, there is a wide range of available options in socialselectivity to which individual motivation can be coupled. In doing this, eachindividual motivation may contribute to the morphogenesis of social selectiv-ity – namely to modify conditions of selection – as well as to its morphosta-sis – that is, to reproduce already existing conditions. In turn, the successfullyrealized communicative options available by the symbolic media allow theindividual to fulfill her modus vivendi, or slightly change her prioritization

of concerns if social selectivity in the symbolic media offers more constraintsthan enablements in a given situation. From this perspective, individualsnot only experience social facts and meanings, but they also reflexively de-fine their actions from their own experiences. In Archer’s words: »On the onehand, the direct effect of the outer world upon the inner consists in experience ,much of which impinges involuntarily upon the subject. On the other hand,the indirect effect of the inner world upon the outer consists in mental de-liberation, whose resultant actions impinge upon the world voluntaristically«(Archer 2003, 78 – my italics). ›Voluntaristically‹ is a delicate word. It resemblesnot only an over-individualization of society, but also of the individual herself.

On the other side, individual experiences and actions are also attributed po-sitions in the theory of the symbolically generalized communication media.They are unavoidable attributions regarding the orientation of the communi-cation process to specific structural positions, and also an important one forindividuals since reflexivity furthers variation in the prioritization of concernsby making ethical considerations of the desirable vis-à-vis these positions.In this sense, the ethically assessed expectations of the desirable (whethernormative or cognitive) can be coupled with the successfully realized com-municative options of symbolic media. Given that the personal modus viven-

di may be reflexively postponed, altered or even changed by individuals inconfronting social constraints and enablements, they move through a wide




range of social selectivity. This means that analogous modi vivendi may beperformed through different paths of successfully realized communication. Itfollows from this that: a) personal modi vivendi are not pure imagination or

voluntarism; they can (or cannot) be concretely carried out in society, and b)since they are reflexively constructed, they may be altered (according to theconstraints and enablements they deal with) without losing the prioritizationof concerns, or even slightly changing it on the basis of ethical evaluations ofthe desirable.From the perspective of a reflexive ethics, a decoupling between individualand society takes place when the individual motivation cannot correlate withoptions for selectivity provided in systems and symbolic media, namely aslong as in extreme situations the coupling between the personal modus viven-di and the successfully realized communication possibilities dissolves. This

problem arises when in spite of reflexive efforts there is no chance at all toinstantiate the individual perspective of the desirable: when political arbitrari-ness is not processed by legally stabilized institutional frameworks, when ex-treme poverty is not compensated by inclusion policies, when a general eco-nomic crisis leaves no other option than to start all over again, or in a broadersense, when the distinction between constraints and enablements, betweeninclusion and exclusion possibilities, implodes in itself and individual motiva-tion decouples from social selectivity. Yet, the question rises if in the modern world society individuals experience

this problem. This can be illustrated by means of the distinction inclusion / ex-clusion.

V. Inclusion, exclusion and decouplings

Inclusion is the opportunity of social consideration of persons in functionallydifferentiated systems; exclusion refers to its negative side: »What is meanthere is that social systems presuppose persons and assign them places within which they can act with complementary expectations; it can be romantically

said: individuals feel at home« (Luhmann 1997b, 621). Inclusion implies par-ticipation of persons in the operations and outputs of systemically differenti-ated systems. Because systems and outputs are diverse, the scope of participa-tions consists of a wide range of possibilities. In this regard, I would like tosuggest that these possibilities could be brought together in four dimensions:a) inclusion / self-exclusion; b) compensated inclusion; c) inclusion by risk / ex-clusion by danger; and d) and sub-inclusion.The distinction inclusion / self-exclusion is crucial in order to focus on the in-stantiation of the modus vivendi. The definition of the desirable implies the

identification of the non-desirable, or at least a conscious indifference towardsnon-actualized options. The non-desirable is whatever does not match with



200 Aldo Mascareño

the prioritization of the personal modus vivendi: to go to the church beingagnostic, to take part in the government being in the opposition, to buy a carif one is engaged against global warming. Self-exclusion knows that there are

other possibilities, but the instantiated ones are deemed to be the most appro-priate in order to carry out the prioritization of individual concerns. Self-exclu-sion is therefore always inclusion. The individual pattern of inclusion is variedenough to select an option from a set of equivalent alternatives without affect-ing the prioritization of concerns in the modus vivendi: if someone else getsthe job, another equal or better post may be eligible; if share prices fall, anothersection of the portfolio may compensate the eventual and transitory losses; ifthe neighborhood becomes unsafe for children, another zone or region, evenabroad, becomes a real option to live. The lifestyle condensed in the modus vivendi is secured by the wide range of options of the individual (or famil-

ial) pattern of inclusion, so that excluded alternatives are certainly recognizedbut not considered as eligible in order to instantiate the own modus vi vendi:public health is not an option when private health care is a better, though ex-pensive, solution; the immigrants’ quarter is not a real option to live, despitelow-priced and bigger properties; market consumption is not only a matter ofutility, but also a symbolic identification and self-positioning inside the socialstratification map: it is not only a computer, it is Mac-lifestyle; it is not only acar, it is the universal symbol of Mercedes; it is not only vacations, but exo-tic places in faraway places — though never Miami nor Mallorca. In terms of

class analysis, the distinction inclusion / self-exclusion refers mainly to globalupper and upper middle classes in which the autonomous pattern of inclusionallows self-exclusion from significant alternatives because these are already well-covered inside the modus vivendi. As long as structural constraints insome of the selected inclusion possibilities come into being, other alternativeenablements can be activated. Eventual decouplings between modus vivendiand social selectivity are in this case short-term events and do not severelyaffect the prioritization of individual concerns, because individuals can movetowards other options of social selectivity in cognitively-driven social systemsor they can re-establish their expectations in normatively-driven systems.

We can speak here of an either-or model of inclusion , that means: this and thatoption are equally useful for the instantiation of the modus vivendi. Especiallyethics semantics such as individual freedom, free will, freedom of choice, andtheir semantic counterpart in attitudes such as tolerance, play a salient role inthis case, since the former confer the selection a symbol of generalized legiti-macy and the latter transform the indifference (exclusion) towards the non-selected options into tolerance (inclusion).4

4 Classical liberal arguments are here the most suitable semantic discourses. Along with pro-perty, freedom is a fundamental, rather natural right in liberal philosophy. This emphasison freedom is counterbalanced by tolerance as in J. Locke (2003), and, with a different con-ceptual structure, also by self-preservation in T. Hobbes (2003) and sympathy in A. Smith




Compensated inclusion functions on the basis of the either-or-model as well.However, in this case the perspective of the desirable must be adjusted to ad-ditional institutional conditions coming from systemic outputs of political,

economic, and legal nature. Social security institutions, regulating agencies,public organizations of protection of rights (consumers’ rights, human rights,ombudsmen), state interventions, civil society networks, and international or-ganizations count as compensatory mechanisms aiming to protect the con-tingency of options for social selectivity. In these cases, the prioritization ofindividual concerns can be preserved through an adjustment to the availableopportunities. Nevertheless, these available opportunities are reduced to pub-lic outcomes or to the marginal contribution of civil society networks.Compared with the first case (inclusion / self-exclusion), compensated inclu-sion entails a restriction of choices. In a weak sense, it means already an over-

limitation of the structural limitation of the possible provided by the symbolicmedia. Not the whole symbolic range is available for the individual, but themore homogeneous and restricted institutional range of options especially of-fered by the public institutional framework and the private ›subprime‹ con-sumption market. The modus vivendi still remains, even though the form thatits instantiation adopts is not the most desirable: there are options availablefor others that I would have also selected if I could – a private, better schoolfor the children, a house with a white picket fence in the suburbs instead of acouncil flat in the margins, a stronger credit in an investment bank instead of

a development project of the Ministry for Cooperation.Certainly, a risk of decoupling between personal modus vivendi and socialselectivity takes place here, however the compensatory mechanisms foster itsrecoupling in a middle-term horizon with the above mentioned restrictions.In any case, it remains still doubtful whether this recoupling can restabilizethe modus vivendi or not, because the either-or-alternatives become indexed with the institutional outputs. This produces a closed circularity of expecta-tions between personal modus vivendi and institutional outputs. Since theseoutputs are crucial for the instantiation of the modus vivendi, individuals mayeither adapt to them cognitively by changing the prioritization of concerns,

or, normatively, not learn from the fact that they are relatively, but continu-ously disappointed by the offered alternatives. Thus, they can either demandan improvement of public policies (coverage, efficiency, efficacy) or look fornon-institutional, informal options (see Mascareño 2012). The compensatingmechanisms aim, in turn, to multiply the formal either-or-options in order tocounterbalance the exclusion’s constraints, and they periodically and publicly

(2004). The same configuration can be found in Rawls (1999): the first principle of justicerefers to freedom of selection; the second one, to the empathy toward the most disadvan-taged. However, the synthesis of the two principles brings Rawls nearer to the consequencesof compensated inclusion (see below).



202 Aldo Mascareño

announce revolutionary plans and programs that make the individuals farmore dependent on these political expectations.The problems confronted in this case are the classical paradoxes of the Ameri-

can and Central European welfare states. In Luhmann’s words: »The welfarestate produces instability to the extent that it is faced with a necessity of re-action that it self creates but cannot foresee, i. e. to the extent that it invokesthe competence to compensate for incompetence and to the extent that itsmeasures are absorbed by this fact« (Luhmann 1990b, 68). This case becomesa standard situation in different regions of the world society in which thedemocratically conceived and formally designed compensatory institutionscan no longer cope with the increasing demands for inclusion (see Deffner2007; Grzymala-Busse 2008; Ledeneva 2009; Dewey 2011). No wonder thenthat in particular regions of the world society democracy turns into populism,

dictatorship or totalitarianism (see Germani 1978). Regarding the individuals,the compensation with new policies for the problems produced by previouspolicies leads to compulsory adaptations of the modus vivendi and, thus, to ageneralized instability in its internal configuration: political promises increasethe individual expectations for better options, and political reality brings theexpectations all the way back down to the bottom. In turn, the modus vivendihandles with real options, hoping in the meantime the promises become real.In those cases a sense of frustration and inequity emerges, and ethics seman-tics such as fairness, equality, equal opportunities, solidarity, assume a central

place in the discussions about the compensating role of public institutions.The social availability of these ethics aspirations compensate the individualfrustration by appealing to a future representation of an improved inclusion,on the one hand, and motivate in the present to hold the expectation that thisis still possible, on the other. In a word, they prevent a decoupling of individual motivation and social selectivity.5 As advanced, this is closely related to the difference of risk and danger. Inclu-sion by risk has its counterpart in the exclusion by danger . The distinction be-tween risk and danger depends on how the occurrence of future damages isattributed: if they are ascribed to one’s own decisions (namely, to a selection

from contingent options), then the future damages are deemed to be risks ofthe decision maker; if they are attributed to the decisions of others (namely,to an external, undetermined source of selection), then the future damages

5 In terms of ethics stances, among others, the combination of public and private autonomy ina deliberative democracy (Habermas 2006) deals with the question of inequity and justice,as well as the Rawlsian general conception of equal distribution and opportunities (Rawls1999), and the proposition of a subsidiary state after the negative interchange of liberties(Höffe 1995). In this vein, the claims for solidarity (Brunkhorst 2005), recognition (Honneth1995), responsibility (Jonas 1979), and cosmopolitanism (Fine 2007; Chernilo 2010) play alsoa role in public demands. Generally, Kantian and Neo-Kantian models can be understoodas responding directly to constellations of compensated inclusion and exclusions by danger(see below).




can be recognized as dangers (see Luhmann 2003). The one who decides isincluded through the risk of the decision, i. e. through the multiple possibili-ties of decision from which just one is selected; the one that observes this,

is exposed to the danger of other’s decisions – that means, to consequencesupon whose origin she has no influence. Consequently, the decision makermoves in an environment of selection, in an either-or model of inclusion in which she can connect the individual perspective of the desirable with differ-ent options for social selectivity. In contradistinction, the observer, as soon asshe is excluded from decision making, has only two options, whether to ac-cept the consequences of the other’s decision or not. Luhmann (2003, 112 ff.)distinguishes here between decision maker and affected persons. Becausethere are decisions on all sides, decision makers and affected persons cannotbe brought into a clear differentiation of social groups or institutional roles –

as if the government consisted from the decision makers and the oppositionfrom the affected persons. On the other hand, being affected by the decisionsof others is not always a problematic matter. As long as the selected decisiondoes not interfere with the prioritization of individual concerns, and as longas the one who is eventually an affected person might move rapidly and easilyto other available options offered by a cognitively-driven institutional framework or find compensations that effectively deal with the disappointments ina normatively-driven institutional framework, the either-or model of inclusionmay remain intact for those affected by the decision. If that is not possible, then

the affected one falls into a whether-or-not model of inclusion , which cancels thecontingency of options for selection and produces a decoupling between individual motivation and social selectivity (decisions, in this case). A whether-or-not model of inclusion is a type of take it or leave it pattern ofinclusion. It does not deny all possibilities of selection for a given problem, butit just presents one alternative as eligible: a specific type of subsidized prop-erty, a marginal subsistence job, a monopolistic inefficient health service, alow-quality public education. There is actually no alternative, or more pre-cisely, the alternative is ›whether or not to accept the only inclusion possibil-ity‹. From the perspective of the individual, the contingency of social life is

thus cancelled, for at least two equivalent options (the minimal expression ofthe either-or model) are required to make a real choice. If contingency is can-celled, the instantiation of the personal modus vivendi becomes instable andthe individual motivation towards social selectivity weakens. If the functionof reflexive ethics relies on preventing the decoupling of individual motivationand social selectivity, then here is where ethics becomes crucial. By meansof the critique of society and the modification of individual concerns, individuals are willing to transform the whether-or-not model of inclusion into aneither-or model. They look for a restabilization of available options, for a new

production of contingency which deals with the cancellation of contingency ofthe whether-or-not model and avoids the decoupling of individual motivation



204 Aldo Mascareño

and social selectivity by alerting society that precisely this is happening. Thiscan be called an ethics of contingency. Concretely, that means:

a) either to protest against the incompetence of compensatory institutions

(inefficient social policies, stagnating bureaucracy, inequity, patrimonialprivileges) and against the unilateral exposure to damages and dangersof others’ decisions that affect one’s own modus vivendi (non-participa-tive public and private plans, traffic of influences, corruption), or

b) to reflexively modify the prioritization of individual concerns in orderto adjust them to the prevailing constellation of constraints and enable-ments without losing the orientation of the modus vivendi.

In the first case, the protest deals with an »expression of dissatisfaction, witha representation of injury and discrimination, and often with wild desires«

(Luhmann 2003, 136). Protests aim »to pay attention to different kinds of reali-ties by registering contradictions« (Luhmann 1996b, 195), and in doing so, theyforce the acceptance of the ethical unacceptability of the exclusion situation byappealing to values and principles such as fairness, equity, equality, justice,non-discrimination, solidarity, integration, namely through socially stabilizedethical expectations that constitute, thus, a first step towards a recoupling ofindividual motivation and social selectivity (see note 4). On the other hand,particular cultural values and communitarian ethical commitments becomealso crucial here.6 They support demands coming from different groups andranging from gay to animal rights, from indigenous compensations to gremialprivileges, from neighborhood improvements to commitments against global warming and financial crises. All of these demands feel at home in ethicalconsiderations. Ethics provides a visible and including stage either to play therole of the socially conscious outsider or to stress public attention when exclu-sions are critical. Regarding political inclusion, Luhmann argues as follows:»The protesters refer to ethical principles, and if one has chosen an ethicalpoint of view, it is a secondary question whether one is in the majority or inthe minority« (1996b, 206). The recoupling takes place, at least, in the formof an ethically motivated protest; at best, by activating structural variations

through ethically integrated social movements. Another question is whetherthe structural variations are systemically selected and restabilized, and quiteanother theme how far the systemic restabilizations drift apart from the initialdemands: social movements fight for democracy and fundamental rights and what they get is a military transition to nowhere, as in Egypt; students protestfor a high-quality education and what they receive are diffuse promises of

6 A wide spectrum of ethics theories can be included here. With different views: the seman-tics of authenticity in communitarian thinking (see Taylor 2003), the significance of the life

world in phenomenological approaches (Blumenberg 2006; Ricoeur 2000), the inevitabilityof traditions in anthropological conceptions (Marquard 2003; Lübbe 2004), the increasingcircles of loyalties in pragmatic proposals (Rorty 1995), and even the immanent value ofdiversity in postcolonial and postmodern propositions (Gilroy 1994).




future reforms, as in Chile; people protest against the irrational exuberanceof financial markets and the answer is another crisis, as in USA and Europa.In other words, there is always a distance between individuals and society,

between individual motivation and structural constraints. However, as stated, when individual desirability finds no immediate institutional acceptance, itfinds it in ethics.For individuals ethics means the possibility of maintaining the expectationof concretization of the personal modus vivendi; and for society it means thatcontingency must be increased, that an extremely high reduction of complexi-ty to whether-or-not alternatives becomes uncomfortable, undesirable or evenunacceptable in certain social situations. Ethics reminds society that it wouldnot exist without individual motivation, and that a generalized decoupling ofindividual motivation and social selectivity would be not a risk, but a danger

for social selectivity and autopoiesis.In the second case, the adjustment of personal concerns entails a plan orproject which mediates between individual motivation and social selectivity,between modus vivendi and systems (see Archer 2007). Projects are personalexpectations that, in the form of courses of action, confront socially stabilizedstructural constraints and enablements and concretize those concerns. Whena project fails, the modus vivendi may remain intact as long as another projectcan undertake the role of transforming motivation into socially accepted selec-tivity. This presupposes an either-or model of inclusion, namely a set of rapidly

and easily available options to either reorient or recreate the project and real-ize personal concerns. On the contrary, when the available options have beenreduced to whether-or-not alternatives, individuals may fall into situations ofsub-inclusion to restore the either-or options (see below), or they can tempo-rarily change the prioritization of concerns in the modus vivendi and simulta-neously enact an alternative concern while they wait for a better constellationto realize the original plan: to migrate instead of waiting for job opportunitiesin the local area, to continue working instead of studying, to postpone the ideaof having another child as long as the economic conditions do not get any bet-ter, or to tolerate an oppressive political situation instead of protesting against it

because the danger of incoming damages is greater than the risk of the decisionto engage in hostile actions. In doing this, ethics semantics such as conveni-ence, adaptation, and accommodation are deemed to be the supporting justifi-cation. They express the failure in being successful with the originally intendedproject (exclusion), but also the expectation that by momentarily changing theprioritization of concerns, something is still to be done (inclusion).7 These eth-

7 Technical ly, this can be viewed as a shift from value-oriented to end-oriented actions (Weber2004), as a rationally selected utility function (Coleman 1994), as a negotiation of the self

with herself between the future present and the present future (see Luhmann 1997b), or asdisplacements inside the integrated and non-integrated dimensions of the different regimesof justi fication (see Boltanski / Thévenot 2006).



206 Aldo Mascareño

ics stances contribute to make personal renunciations and misleading decisionssocially acceptable and, in turn, they hold the renounced project as a latentstructure of the modus vivendi, which can be actualized in a better situation.

In this respect, those ethics semantics are both: a form of front-line discursiveinclusion regarding the risk of a structural decoupling of individual motivationand social selectivity, and a way to increase the contingency of social possibili-ties without losing meaningful options.Finally, the problem of sub-inclusion is the most extreme limitation of the ei-ther-or-model. Persons in this situation »are lacking the necessary conditionsto exercise their constitutional fundamental rights [but] they are not free fromthe duties and responsibilities to which the state order submits them« (Neves2007, 262). The main concern then becomes mere subsistence: refugees, mi-grants in war zones, the politically persecuted, extreme poverty. This can be

recognized not only with regard to hard cases such as Iraq, Haiti, Bangladesh,but also in particular cases in Latin America, Africa or even Eastern Europe(see Domingues 2008; Gyekye 1997; Georgiev 2008). Persons under condi-tions of sub-inclusion are confronted to an acute decoupling between individ-ual motivation and social selectivity. In these cases, the concept of fracturedreflexivity in which individual passiveness prevails and a factual drift replacesthe modus vivendi, could be applicable (Archer 2003, 298ff.).8 However, a de-cision must be taken: either the factual drift continues or individuals give it atry in order to reestablish the either-or-model.

Since a modus vivendi is composed of normative and cognitive expectations,the most probable path to follow is the search for possibilities to instantiate thepersonal modus vivendi. Because sub-inclusion denies fundamental rights andleads to oppressive situations at the same time, individuals may appeal to all ofthe ethics stances applicable to the other constellations of inclusion / exclusion.This is also the reason why extreme poverty, marginalization, genocide, xeno-phobia, institutional violence and coercion are not the crucial reference of justone or a few ethics assessments, but of all of them. The diverse ethics stancesreveal the unacceptability of the exclusion situation from different angles (ab-sence of individual freedom, destruction of community bonds, annihilation of

virtues, obscene structural inequalities, inhumane conditions) and foster dif-ferent inclusion strategies (individual efforts, cultural tolerance, increasing cir-cles of loyalties, institutionally controlled change or revolution, democratiza-tion and instantiation of human rights) to reconstruct the coupling betweenindividual motivation and social selectivity. In doing so, ethics offers a multi- variate framework where sub-included individuals may find either semantic oreven structural support for their expectations, as well as some justifications for

8 Even the concept of empirical motivation in Habermas’ theory of symbolic media (1988)does not help too much here. With regard to the personal modus vivendi, empirical motiva-tion could be better understood as an instantiation of either power-oriented or economicalmotives.




the transgression of legal norms and for social action, even beyond the limitsof formally institutionalized mechanisms – for example, by joining informalnetworks or by achieving formal inclusion through bribes, favors, violence, and

intimidation, i. e. by adopting the situation of sub-inclusion as one’s own per-sonal modus vivendi (see Araujo 2009; Mascareño 2010).Sub-inclusion is an outcome of the institutional framework to build con-vertibility barriers against exclusion (Stichweh 2005), that is, to constrain anexponential growth of exclusions coming from a particular exclusion andalternatively produce the options the modus vivendi needs for its instantia-tion. Actually, functional differentiation regularly does it this way: it limitsthe snowball effect of exclusions with normative and cognitive mechanismsof inclusion. Indeed, systems have no built-in normative motivation to denythe access to benefits and goods to any specific individual, human group or

community (Mascareño / Chernilo 2009). Rather the opposite: they need theindividual motivation in order to preserve the selectivity of their autopoiesis.For this reason functional differentiation has succeeded as the prevailing dif-ferentiation form of modern society. It has shown a high flexibility to adoptlocal and regional variations, and to transform the whether-or-not model ofinclusion into either-or alternatives. But problems still remain at the level ofthe compensatory institutional framework, of affected persons in constella-tions of risk and danger, and in situations of sub-inclusion. Precisely therelie the roots of critical decouplings between individual motivation and social

selectivity in several regions of world society, which, in turn, makes highlyuncertain and difficult at least the continuity of systemic communication. Themore this gap widens, the less likely systems are to sustain their autopoieticoperation and individuals to instantiate their modus vivendi.

VI. Contingency

Sociologically – as seen – the problem lies in the over-limitation of the struc-tural limitation of the possible as long as in given situations particular alterna-

tives are presented as either necessary or impossible. This can be conceptual-ized as cancellation of contingency and must be distinguished from reduction ofcomplexity which is carried out in different forms by function systems (Luh-mann 1971). Cancellation of contingency suggests the transformation of spe-cific existing alternatives into a necessity and the denial of others invokingtheir impossibility. For example: it is necessary to accept the incompetence ofcompensatory institutions because no other alternative is offered; it is neces-sary to accept the danger of other’s decisions because the political system elidesprotests’ demands; it is impossible to avoid discrimination due to insuperable

cultural differences; it is impossible to overcome sub-inclusion due to economicmacro-balances. Cancellation of contingency means thus unfeasibility of in-



208 Aldo Mascareño

dividuals’ decisions. ›A decision is due but cannot be rendered‹, to paraphraseKoselleck’s (1973; 2006) concept of crisis – now at an individual level.This might be one of the main concerns of ethics as a reflexive theory: to open

a gate towards the increase of contingency when individual options are reducedto a whether-or-not model of inclusion. In providing a set of values and prin-ciples for action, ethics becomes a factor of inclusion when a decoupling of in-dividual motivation and social selectivity takes place because the institutionalframework fails in producing and maintaining an either-or model of inclusion. Against the exclusion by dangers, inefficient institutional outcomes and sub-inclusion, individuals might be initially included in the ethics. That means, theymay maintain their modus vivendi as soon as they find a way to reconnect mo-tivation and social selectivity. The ethics is the first step in that process.

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Prof. Aldo Mascareño, Ph.D.Escuela de Gobierno, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez Av. Diagonal Las Torres 2640, Peñalolén

Santiago de [email protected]

Mascareño, A. - The Function of Ethics from the Perspective of the Individual

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