Nie Wieder

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Nie Wieder: Group-Based Emotions for In-Group Wrongdoing Affect Attitudes toward Unrelated Minorities Jonas H. Rees Bielefeld University Jesse A. Allpress University of Sussex Rupert Brown University of Sussex This article focuses on the effects of group-based emotions for in-group wrongdoing on attitudes towards seemingly unrelated groups. Two forms of shame are distinguished from one another and from guilt and linked to positive and negative attitudes towards an unrelated minority. In Study 1 (N = 203), Germans’ feelings of moral shame—arising from the belief that the in-group’s Nazi past violates an important moral value—are associated with increased support for Turks living in Germany. Image shame—arising from a threatened social image—is associated with increased social distance. In Study 2 (N = 301), Britons’ emotions regarding atroci- ties committed by in-group members during the war in Iraq have similar links with attitudes towards Pakistani immigrants. We extend the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that the effects are mediated by a sense of moral obligation and observed more strongly when the unrelated group is perceived as similar to the harmed group. Guilt was unrelated to any outcome variable across both studies. Theoretical and practical implications about the nature of group-based emotions and their potential for affecting wider intergroup relations are discussed. KEY WORDS: group-based emotions, shame, guilt, social distance, moral obligation It is a frequently expressed view that collective remembrance of large-scale atrocities, such as the Holocaust perpetrated by Germans or war crimes committed by one group against another, will prevent future transgressions from happening. For example, in a speech to the German parliament on 27 January 2010, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, this idea was encapsulated in what Shimon Peres, then President of Israel, called the “decisive lesson [from the Holocaust]: ‘Never again’.” Similarly, Horst Köhler, then Federal President of Germany, in a speech marking the 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II in 2005, said: “We bear the responsibility to keep the memory of all this suffering and its causes alive and we have to ensure that it never happens again.” In this article, we seek to examine the effects of reminders of in-group wrong- doing on wider contemporary intergroup relations. We investigate the effects of such reminders in two quite different contexts: the Holocaust in Germany and the abuse of Iraqi civilians by British forces in Iraq. Political Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2013 doi: 10.1111/pops.12003 387 0162-895X © 2013 International Society of Political Psychology Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia

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Nie Wieder: Group-Based Emotions for In-Group WrongdoingAffect Attitudes toward Unrelated Minorities

Jonas H. ReesBielefeld University

Jesse A. AllpressUniversity of Sussex

Rupert BrownUniversity of Sussex

This article focuses on the effects of group-based emotions for in-group wrongdoing on attitudes towardsseemingly unrelated groups. Two forms of shame are distinguished from one another and from guilt and linkedto positive and negative attitudes towards an unrelated minority. In Study 1 (N = 203), Germans’ feelings ofmoral shame—arising from the belief that the in-group’s Nazi past violates an important moral value—areassociated with increased support for Turks living in Germany. Image shame—arising from a threatened socialimage—is associated with increased social distance. In Study 2 (N = 301), Britons’ emotions regarding atroci-ties committed by in-group members during the war in Iraq have similar links with attitudes towards Pakistaniimmigrants. We extend the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that the effects are mediated by a sense of moralobligation and observed more strongly when the unrelated group is perceived as similar to the harmed group.Guilt was unrelated to any outcome variable across both studies. Theoretical and practical implications aboutthe nature of group-based emotions and their potential for affecting wider intergroup relations are discussed.

KEY WORDS: group-based emotions, shame, guilt, social distance, moral obligation

It is a frequently expressed view that collective remembrance of large-scale atrocities, such asthe Holocaust perpetrated by Germans or war crimes committed by one group against another, willprevent future transgressions from happening. For example, in a speech to the German parliamenton 27 January 2010, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, this idea was encapsulated inwhat Shimon Peres, then President of Israel, called the “decisive lesson [from the Holocaust]:‘Never again’.” Similarly, Horst Köhler, then Federal President of Germany, in a speech markingthe 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II in 2005, said: “We bear the responsibility tokeep the memory of all this suffering and its causes alive and we have to ensure that it neverhappens again.” In this article, we seek to examine the effects of reminders of in-group wrong-doing on wider contemporary intergroup relations. We investigate the effects of such reminders intwo quite different contexts: the Holocaust in Germany and the abuse of Iraqi civilians by Britishforces in Iraq.

Political Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2013doi: 10.1111/pops.12003

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0162-895X © 2013 International Society of Political PsychologyPublished by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ,

and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia

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We propose that collective remembrance of in-group wrongdoing—past or present—may playan important role in determining how perpetrator group members relate to out-groups, even whenthese out-groups are unrelated to the original wrongdoing. If remembrance of the in-group’s wrong-doing does indeed influence how group members confront unrelated out-groups, then this representsan important and hitherto neglected factor influencing contemporary intergroup relations. Althoughwe are proposing that remembrance of in-group transgressions plays an important role in preventingfuture wrongdoing, it is possible that not all individuals respond equally to reminders of in-groupmisdeeds. It might be that, rather than reducing the tendency to offend in the future, some groupmembers will react negatively to such reminders, adopting a defensive and antagonistic stance. Whatdrives an individual to react in a certain manner? We propose that the type of emotional reaction aperson experiences in response to such reminders may play a crucial role in determining how anindividual responds to the in-group’s misdeeds. We investigate this assertion in the present article.

Implicit in that famous phrase, never again (or “Nie wieder” in German), is the assumption thatpeople’s feelings and thoughts about harmful injustice done to one group will be linked to theirattitudes towards other unrelated groups. This should be true especially for individuals directly orindirectly associated with that injustice who, because of their group identifications, may continue tofeel a sense of guilt or shame for their in-group’s misdeeds (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, &Manstead, 1998). However, research on such collective or group-based emotions has so far focusedexclusively on the link between collective guilt and shame and restitutional responses, such aswillingness to apologize or make reparations to the harmed out-group (Branscombe & Doosje,2004a; Brown, 2009; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006).

To grasp the broader consequences of the remembrance of crimes perpetrated by the in-group,we need to understand not only the complexity of group-based emotions but also their associationswith people’s attitudes towards out-groups other than those originally victimized. By doing so, thepresent article is the first we know of to empirically study a phenomenon that has long been assumedbut is far from trivial: the link between group-based emotions concerning harm done to oneout-group and attitudes towards another, unrelated minority. We first propose an analytical distinc-tion between two different forms of group-based shame and guilt and provide evidence for it. Wethen show how these emotions are differentially related to attitudes towards a minority out-group notoriginally associated with the transgression.

Interpersonal and Group-Based Guilt and Shame

Guilt and shame have often been conceptualized as separate emotions with different phenom-enologies and different effects (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Teroni& Deonna, 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2006). An early contribution was by Lewis (1971) who suggestedthat, while both emotions were self-focused and arose from some perceived moral violation, theydiffered in the degree to which the self is implicated. She argued that guilt results from a focus on themisdeed and how that act affected the other, and shame results from a feeling that the self as a wholeis morally flawed. Lewis therefore argued that guilt should provoke attempts to make restitutions insome way, while shame will result in hiding, avoidance, or even self-defensive aggression.

Others have made similar arguments about the sense of global worthlessness provoked by shameand a more action-oriented sense of responsibility implied by guilt (e.g., Branscombe, Slugoski, &Kappen, 2004; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Relatedly, some authors have suggested that guilt is moreother-focused than shame. Baumeister and his colleagues, for instance, propose that guilt serves tostrengthen and maintain social relationships by motivating perpetrators to make restitutions to thosethey have wronged (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Another distinction has consisted inunderlining the more private nature of guilt relative to shame’s more public character (Ausubel,1955; Fontaine et al., 2006; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). It has

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also been suggested that guilt stems from norm violations while shame derives more strongly froma failure to live up to certain central values (Higgins, 1987; Lynd, 1956; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). Insum, shame is often characterized as self-defensive and having negative reactions towards the victim,while guilt is usually conceptualized as an emotion with more prosocial outcomes.

In some studies of interpersonal relations, shame has, indeed, been linked to self-blame andavoidance responses (Miller & Tangney, 1994; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Smith et al., 2002;Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996) and guilt to prosocial tendencies (Niedenthal, Tangney, &Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow,1992). However, reparation is not always associated more with guilt than with shame (Rosemanet al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996). Indeed, de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) foundthat shame episodes motivated relationship-enhancing interpersonal behavior in situations relevant tothe initial shame episode. There is also evidence that guilt is sometimes linked to maladaptiveoutcomes (de Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; Fedewa, Burns, & Gomez, 2005;Luby et al., 2009; Meehan et al., 1996). So, not only can shame have adaptive, relationship-enhancing effects at the interpersonal level, but also guilt can have negative effects.

Research on group-based emotions reveals similar ambiguities. Some research has found thatpeople’s feelings of guilt about misdeeds committed by their in-group are, indeed, associated withwishes to make reparations to the harmed out-group (e.g., Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010;Allpress & Brown, 2012; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic,2008; Doosje et al., 1998; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; McGarty et al.,2005; Swim & Miller, 1999). However, Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel (2007) found that feelings of guiltabout the invasion of Iraq did not predict American and British students’ support for any reparativeactions once shame and anger were controlled for (see also, Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 2006; Harth,Kessler, & Leach, 2008). Also, Allpress and colleagues (2010) observed that, in the context ofAustralia’s apology to Aboriginal Australians, shame was a stronger positive correlate of collectivepolitical action than guilt.

Research on the effects of group-based shame has provided mixed evidence. Lickel, Schmader,Curtis, Scarnier, and Ames (2005) and Schmader and Lickel (2006) showed that shame for others’misdeeds was associated with a desire to distance oneself from both the situation and those respon-sible for the wrongdoings (see also, Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Iyer et al., 2007). However,other studies have observed positive associations between group-based shame and reparation atti-tudes and other prosocial responses (Allpress et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2008; Brown & Cehajic,2008; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012). These findings pose something of a puzzle for thetraditional view that guilt and shame should have opposite consequences for social relations.

Moral and image shame. Elsewhere, we have argued that these inconsistencies may be resolvedby distinguishing between two different varieties of shame (Allpress & Brown, 2012). There, and inthe present article, we follow the theoretical work of Teroni and Deonna (2008) and Deonna,Rodogno, and Teroni (2011), who provide a novel way of distinguishing between shame and guilt tohelp solve the inconsistencies in the shame literature. Deonna and colleagues’ distinction sees shameas intimately connected to the violation of self-relevant values and guilt as connected to the violationof normative prohibitions. The significant advantage of this distinction is that it explains theoccurrence of shame in seemingly diverse and disparate situations. As shame is connected withvalues, feelings of shame may arise in any circumstance in which an individual feels that thebehavior or situation in question seriously undermines an important value. This conceptualization ofshame implies that it can arise in relation to many different values, and it is therefore unlikely thatshame will always lead to the same type of response. Rather, the motivational effects of shame willbe determined by the value to which the feeling of shame is connected in that particular situation (fora similar argument that, depending on context, different outcomes may be connected to one singleemotion, see Reifen Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011).

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What might determine the direction of shame’s motivational effects? Shame is an aversiveexperience, regardless of its origins. Given its aversive nature, people will be motivated to think andact in ways that best reduce their levels of shame. In line with this view, the effects of any particularform of shame can be seen as representing a “coping strategy,” by which people seek to reduce thenegative shame experience. Although an individual may have a number of different coping strategiesavailable to them, they are likely to choose the strategy that they believe is most likely to reduce theirshame. What determines which strategy is likely to be most effective? The answer to this questiondepends on the value to which shame is connected. As shame arises when a self-relevant value hasbeen seriously violated, an individual is most likely to reduce the feelings of shame by adoptingattitudes and behaviors that reduce the threat to this value and allow one or one’s own or the group’sactions to be seen as living up to or consistent with this value. Which attitudes and behaviors achievethese goals is likely to differ for different values, and therefore, types of shame. It is for this reasonthat we predict that different forms of shame will have different attitudinal and behavioral effects—individuals will strive to reduce these feelings in different ways because different forms of shame arerelated to different values.

In previous work (Allpress & Brown, 2012), we have proposed that it is important to differen-tiate between two particular forms of shame: image shame and moral shame. We make this distinc-tion because we believe that the values of image and morality are especially important in the contextof intergroup relations. Feelings of shame that arise from the sense that the in-group’s social imagehas been seriously tarnished—which we call image shame—should have different effects fromshame that arises from the belief that the in-group’s actions violate an important moral value—whichwe call moral shame. For image shame, because one’s concern is solely with the image andreputation of the group—and not the well-being of the victim group—the easiest way to restore one’svalued social image, and to reduce the shame that arises from the judgement of others, is likely toinvolve avoidance and withdrawal from the critical gaze of others, in a hope that the issue will blowover. Such a strategy can be successful considering the short attention span of the world’s media andits average consumer. An individual in this situation might also, if they believe such a strategy willreduce or avoid further external blame of the group, adopt a defensive strategy of actively coveringup the group’s misdeeds.

It is also possible that an individual experiencing image shame might view a strategy of(disingenuous) support for apology and superficial acts of restitution as a useful way to bolster thein-group’s reputation amongst third parties. This strategy is less likely to occur, however, becauseacts of apology and compensation usually commit the in-group to further and prolonged acts ofrestitution. As the concern in image shame lies with the restoration of the in-group’s image and notwith the well-being of the victim group, an individual experiencing this form of shame is unlikely tosupport opening themselves and their group up to further reparative commitments. The initialpreference, therefore, is likely to reflect an image-maintenance strategy characterized by avoidanceand cover-up. We would expect that it is only once this initial preference is shown to be ineffectivethat alternative strategies will be adopted.

It is not as easy, however, to avoid and forget transgressions giving rise to moral shame, becauseit is the immoral acts themselves—rather than the criticisms of others—that have high self-importance. The coping strategy that is adopted in relation to moral shame will therefore reflect theparticular importance of one’s moral values. In this case, avoidance of the issue is unlikely to restoreone’s personal value of morality and is therefore likely to be a less fruitful strategy for reducingmoral shame. In order for moral shame to be reduced, an individual must once again be able to seethemselves1 (or their group) as acting in a manner that is consistent with their moral values. For this

1 Note that the self in moral shame is different from the self in Lewis’ (1971) popular conception of shame. Here, the self isimportant because of the importance of values for how we see ourselves. In Deonna and colleagues’ conception of shame,

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reason, an individual is most likely to adopt attitudes and behaviors that address the initial wrong-doing and restore the well-being of the victim group. Such a strategy is likely to include a (genuine)support for apology and compensations and openness to discussing and addressing the originaltransgression.

The theoretical account of Deonna and colleagues also provides insight into the motivationaleffects of guilt. Their approach suggests that because of guilt’s connection with normative prohibi-tions, the reparation that is envisaged in guilt is likely to be limited to the compensation for the harmdone, rather than further reaching soul-searching and self-questioning that moral shame invites.Because guilt arises from societal prohibitions, rather than internalized moral convictions, theprosocial effects of guilt are likely to be limited. This latter point is of importance for the distinctionbetween moral shame and guilt. It is likely, given their respective causal factors, that the effects ofguilt will be much weaker than those of moral shame. This is because the threat to one’s valuedself-conception as moral is likely to prove to be a more potent motivator of reparative behavior thanconcern with normative sanctions.

Evidence in support of these ideas was provided by Allpress and Brown (2012; see also Allpresset al., 2010, Study 2). In three studies, Allpress and Brown (2012) demonstrated that the two forms ofshame could be empirically distinguished and were differently correlated with orientations towards theout-group: image shame had clear associations with negative orientations towards the harmedout-group whereas moral shame had associations with positive out-group orientations. In line withpredictions, guilt was found to have less consistent associations with either kind of orientation, beingweakly associated with support for apology and compensation in only one of the three studies.

The theoretical rationale of Gausel and Leach (2011) and findings of Gausel and colleagues(2012) are also generally supportive of the ideas we present here, although these authors advance adifferent conceptualization of shame.2 Focusing on contemporary Norwegians’ feelings about themistreatment of the Tater minority, Gausel and colleagues were able to separate shame from feelingsof inferiority and social rejection. The latter emotion was positively correlated with tendencies toavoid or cover up the Tater historical issue and negatively related to prosocial orientations towardsthe Tater. In contrast, shame revealed an exactly opposite pattern: a negative correlation withavoidance and cover-up and a positive association with prosociality. Guilt proved largely unrelatedto either outcome measure in these studies.

Building upon the theoretical work of Teroni and Deonna (2008) and Deonna and colleagues(2011) as well as our own empirical substantiation of this distinction (Allpress & Brown, 2012), weseek to investigate how image shame, moral shame, and guilt influence individuals’ responses tounrelated minorities within their societies. In order to investigate these influences and to ensure thegeneralizability of our findings, we conducted two studies in two different countries: Germany andthe United Kingdom. Study 1 was conducted in Germany and investigated how contemporaryGermans’ feelings of shame and guilt in relation to the Holocaust are linked to their attitudes towardscontemporary Turkish immigrants in Germany. In Study 2, we investigated the relations of Britons’emotional responses to the abuse of Iraqi civilians by British soldiers during the most recent invasionof Iraq with their attitudes towards contemporary Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom.

the aspect of the self that is the focus of shame is related specifically to the value in question. Lewis, on the other hand, seesthe self-focus of shame as global and all-encompassing and for this reason predicts that shame will be overwhelming andwill lead to withdrawal. It is the specific nature of the self-focus in moral shame, we believe, that allows an individual to facetheir (group’s) immorality in a positive and adaptive way.

2 Gausel and colleagues propose that shame can only arise in response to the perception that one’s behavior represents aspecific moral failure. They argue that shame cannot occur for other reasons and that shame reported for any nonmoralreason is not in fact a feeling of shame but some other emotion. They focus, in particular, on responses to social criticismand claim that any feelings of shame that arise for this reason are not feelings of shame but feelings of rejection. We addressthis issue elsewhere (Allpress & Brown, 2012), showing that not only is image shame distinct from feelings of rejection, butthat it is image shame, and not rejection, that is connected to negative responses to in-group wrongdoing.

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There is one final issue to be raised before turning to the empirical contribution of this article.In many studies of intergroup relations, positive and negative orientations towards out-groups aretreated as two sides of the same coin. Typically, researchers will measure in-group bias, out-grouphostility, and various other emotions and regard them all as equally useful and essentially equivalentindices of intergroup attitudes (Brown, 2010). Yet in the past two decades, it has become apparentthat indicators of a negative orientation towards out-groups may not be the same as indicators of aless positive orientation towards that same out-group. Brewer (1999) has argued persuasively thatout-group “hate” should not be conflated with in-group “love.” And Mummendey and Otten (1998)have shown in a sustained program of research that there is some asymmetry between positive andnegative attitudes towards the out-group (see Gardham & Brown, 2001). In view of these arguments,in the first study to be presented here, we include both positive and negative indicators of out-groupattitudes. Conveniently, this is also consistent with our predictions for the divergent effects of imageand moral shame.

The Present Research

The main aims of the present article are to (1) contribute to our understanding of group-basedemotions by further substantiating the separability of guilt, moral shame, and image shame, (2)demonstrate the hypothesized influence of group-based emotions about an incident involving oneparticular out-group (Jews in Study 1, Iraqis in Study 2) on attitudes towards another currentminority out-group (Turks in Study 1, Pakistanis in Study 2), and (3) identify conditions under whichthe aforementioned generalizing effects of group-based emotions on intergroup attitudes occur or areamplified. We conducted the following research in Germany—in the context of unthinkable crimesduring the Holocaust in the past (Study 1)—and in the United Kingdom—in the context of abuse ofIraqi prisoners during the recent invasion of Iraq (Study 2). Both Germany and the United Kingdomshow evidence of ongoing discrimination against ethnic minorities (BBC, 2004; Department forWork and Pensions, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 1995; Wagner, Christ, & Pettigrew, 2008).

Study 1

The response of many Germans born after 1945 to the atrocities committed during the Nazi eracan be considered a paradigmatic example of collective guilt3 and shame. Even though thesepost-war generations of Germans could have no personal responsibility for the Holocaust, the merefact of their German identity is often enough to evoke such self-conscious emotions (Branscombe &Doosje, 2004b; Doosje et al., 1998). Interestingly, however, there is little psychological research intoGerman group-based shame and guilt. In one exception, Peetz, Gunn, and Wilson (2010) found thatGerman participants who distanced the event further into the past experienced less guilt as adefensive reaction to being reminded of the Holocaust. Dresler-Hawke and Liu (2006) establishedpositive links between young Germans’ shame and their willingness to confront and accept respon-sibility for the Nazi past. The authors’ conclusion that young Germans are struggling to reconciletheir German identity with feelings of shame regarding the Nazi era demonstrates the importance ofthis topic in Germany to this day. Similarly, Rensmann (2004) in a review of qualitative andquantitative data on collective guilt and national identification in Germany argued that how guilt“influences collective identification in contemporary Germany touches on the very core of German

3 Note, however, that the German Kollektivschuld (collective guilt) is a highly emotionally laden term differing in meaningfrom the technical way collective or group-based guilt is used here. Whereas it has been employed to (ostensibly oreffectively) accuse all Germans of being guilty of the Holocaust—in the contexts of Historikerstreit (Knowlton & Cates,1993) and particularly the Goldhagen controversy (Rensmann, 1999)—we are referring to it to describe the experience ofemotions merely because of one’s group membership but without personal involvement (Doosje et al., 1998).

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social identity” (p. 169). In sum, Germany is an ideal environment for the study of group-basedemotions. Interestingly, however, psychological research in the German context has only recentlybegun to emerge (see Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Peetz et al., 2010; Zimmermann, Abrams, Doosje, &Manstead, 2011, Studies 4 and 5).

The Holocaust and Contemporary Debates about Turkish People in Germany

In the now culturally diverse contemporary Germany, it is not uncommon to hear references tothe Holocaust in seemingly unrelated debates, for example, about ethnic minorities and with regardto immigration. Anecdotally, references to the Holocaust appear to be used by social commentatorsin an attempt to add emotive force and support to their argument. Interestingly, this tactic seems tobe used by both supporters and opponents of immigration, such that the Holocaust is portrayed byopponents as an unfair burden and barrier to national pride that forces Germans to submit to a tideof immigration and is referenced by supporters as a reminder of how not to treat people and thedangers of xenophobic rhetoric (see Cohen, 1998; Kulish, 2010; for a comprehensive overview ofhow reference to the German past is instrumentalized and how anti-Semitism and other ideologiesare mingled in contemporary political debates, see Rensmann, 2005). The largest of these minoritygroups living in Germany today are Turks with more than a fourth of the 8.2% of non-Germanpopulation in 2009 originating from Turkey and an even greater number of “Germans with Turkishmigration background” (German Federal Statistical Office, 2009). Prejudice and discrimination,whether subtle or blatant, are still prevalent problems in Germany today, and Turkish immigrants areamong the commonly targeted minority groups (Wagner et al., 2008).

While it seems that references to the Holocaust are used by politicians and public figures tosupport and add emotional content to their arguments, what is less clear is how such allusions mightconsequently influence Germans’ attitudes and emotional reactions within contemporary contexts,particularly with regard to contemporary minority groups. We set out to test the idea that Germans’feelings of shame or guilt for the Holocaust can be linked to attitudes and feelings towards anotherout-group, Turkish immigrants living in Germany today.

The Effect of Guilt and Shame for the Holocaust on Contemporary Intergroup Relations

With the Nazi past deeply embedded in the German cultural identity and essential parts of theGerman national curriculum devoted to teaching and discussing the topic in school, Germans cannothelp but be aware of their past (Buruma, 2002; Knowlton & Cates, 1993; Peetz et al., 2010;Rensmann, 2004). Frequent reminders of the Holocaust in public discourse or reference to a specialburden Germans must never forget suggest that emotional reactions to historical wrongdoingmay—or are commonly assumed to—affect contemporary intergroup relations. We argue thatgroup-based emotions experienced in response to the Holocaust can in fact influence attitudestowards a contemporary out-group not connected to the original event. We refer to this phenomenonof emotional reactions to one specific event, in this case the Holocaust, affecting attitudes towardsseemingly unrelated out-groups as generalization. We expect the specific emotions (moral shame,image shame, and guilt) to motivate similar responses to a contemporary minority group as they doto the victim group itself: as such, individuals concerned about their in-group’s flawed morality canbe expected to react more prosocially towards another out-group, borne, in part, of a sense of moralobligation for past wrongs. Individuals concerned primarily about damage to the in-group’s image asa result of past wrongdoing, on the other hand, should be more prone to avoidance-based, antisocialreactions to an unrelated minority group, possibly in an attempt to avoid less powerful out-groupmembers who may threaten the power differential by evoking the in-group’s misdeeds or possiblyto repair their social identity by derogating others (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007).

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Theoretically, group-based guilt should provoke a limited prosocial response to the victim group, butbecause the concern with guilt is simply with repairing the specific damage done to the victim group,it will not motivate attitudes or behavior towards unrelated out-groups.

Hypotheses. (1) Group-based emotions—guilt, moral shame, and image shame—are expected tobe clearly separable empirically. (2) Moral shame with regard to the Holocaust is predicted to benegatively linked to social distance from an unrelated out-group, Turks living in Germany today.Conversely, the same emotion is predicted to be positively related to supportive attitudes towardsTurkish people. Image shame is predicted to function in an opposite fashion.

Based on Deonna and colleagues’ (2011) theoretical analysis and previous research (Allpress &Brown, 2012; Gausel et al., 2012), we did not expect guilt to be related to attitudes towards Turks.

Method

Participants

Two hundred and three German participants, ranging from 18 to 71 years of age (M = 27.5,SD = 9.8), were approached in either a university in a larger German city (Nstudent = 146) or in publicspaces in the same city (Ngeneral = 57) to take part in a study of their opinion on “Germany in pastand present.” Of the full sample, 85 participants (42%) were female and the modal highest formaldegree was the German Abitur (general qualification for university entrance) with a universitydegree aimed for or completed (90.1%). Naturally, the two subsamples differed on this latter variable(c2 (4) = 49.94, p < .01) with virtually all students having completed further education, but fewerhaving done so in the general sample (66.7% university degree attained for or completed; 7%Certificate of Secondary Education; 17.5% General Certificate of Secondary Education; 7%advanced technical college entrance qualification).

Procedure

Having agreed to take part, participants were informed about their right to withdraw from thestudy without incurring any penalties and ensured of their anonymity at all times; they then filled outthe questionnaire and returned it to the investigator.4 Upon completion of the questionnaire, theywere given the opportunity to ask any remaining questions about the study and thoroughly debriefed.No financial rewards were offered. The study conformed fully to APA/BPS ethical guidelines.

Measures

Guilt. Guilt experienced because of the Holocaust was assessed using a six-item scale partiallyadapted from Peetz and colleagues (2010; e.g., “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for thebehavior of Germans towards Jews”; a = .82).

Shame. The two facets of shame were measured by asking participants how they felt with regardto the Holocaust. As a preliminary measure, moral shame was assessed with one item (“I feelashamed for the damage done to Jewish people by Germans.”), and image shame was measured withthree items (“I feel disgraced because the behavior of Germans towards Jewish people has created abad image of Germany in the eyes of the world”; “I feel ashamed when I realize that other countries

4 In an experimental part of this study, we intended to alter participants’ perception of the Holocaust as either a closed or openchapter (vs. a control condition without manipulation) using a timeline procedure. This manipulation did not affectparticipants’ group-based emotions or any of the variables of interest here.

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might think of Germany negatively because of the Holocaust”; and “Sometimes it shames me howothers can see Germany as immoral for our involvement in the Holocaust”; a = .90).

Social Distance. An adapted scale from Wagner and colleagues (2008) was used to measuresocial distance from Turks living in Germany (six items, e.g., “I would have problems moving intoa district where many Turks live”; a = .85).

Minority support. Conversely, supporting attitudes towards Turks in Germany were assessed bythree items (“I would approve of tax increases in order to support Turks living in Germany”; “I,personally, would like to be more involved in supporting Turks living in Germany”; “People withTurkish background living in Germany should be supported more by us Germans”; a = .78).

Control measures. Age and highest formal degree were assessed as potential control measures.All items were measured using a 6-point scale ranging from “disagree strongly” to “agree

strongly” and presented in randomized order. An overview of the main scales, control variables, andtheir intercorrelations is given in Table 1.

Results

Differences by Subsample

As expected, age and highest formal degree were found to differ by subsample in preliminaryanalyses. It was thus decided to control for age and highest formal degree where appropriate. Noother differences by subsample emerged.

The research questions will now be addressed in turn: first, the factorial structure of themeasures will be assessed, and then the hypothesized effects of each emotion on attitudes towardsTurks will be demonstrated.

Factorial Structure of Measures

The following confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) and structural equation modelling (SEM)were conducted using AMOS 18.0 for Windows. Missing values of the manifest indicators weremean-substituted.5

Guilt, shame, support of, and social distance from foreigners. To assess the factorial structure ofguilt and shame as well as the validity of the assumed distinction between support of and socialdistance from Turks living in Germany, two sets of CFAs were conducted: one to assess the factorial

5 The number of missing values was well below 1% overall and not exceeding 3% per variable. No systematic pattern ofmissing values or correlation of missing values with any of the independent or dependent variables were found, and data wasthus assumed to be missing completely at random.

Table 1. Overview of Study 1 Main Scales and Their Intercorrelations

Measure M (SD) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

(1) Guilt 3.37 (0.97) .65** .50** -.09 .28** .10 -.06(2) Moral Shame 3.59 (1.80) .51** -.12 .34** .12† .02(3) Image Shame 2.84 (1.42) .18* .11 -.04 -.01(4) Social Distance 2.52 (1.04) -.74** .01 -.26**(5) Foreigner Support 3.65 (0.98) .02 .07(6) Age 27.5 (9.7) -.36**(7) Highest Formal Degree

**p � .01 *p � .05 †p � .10.

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structure of the three emotions and one to assess the structure of the two intergroup attitudes. Theassumed tripartite structure of guilt, moral shame, and image shame fitted the data well, with itemsfrom each scale loading only on their respective factors (see Table 2). Moreover, this three-factorsolution (Model 1) was superior to three alternative models: Model 1a, a two-factor model in whichboth types of shame were collapsed into a single factor, separate from guilt; Model 1b, anothertwo-factor model combining moral shame and guilt into one factor separate from image shame; andModel 1c, in which all three emotions were combined into a single “negative emotions” factor.6 Thepredicted two-factor structure of intergroup attitudes, in which positive and negative orientationswere separated, was also found to fit the data well and to be superior to a single “general intergroupattitude” factor, all Dc2s, p < .017 (See Table 2; Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Hu & Bentler, 1999;MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996).

Generalizing Effects of Group-Based Emotions

The hypothesized effects of each emotion on attitudes towards Turks were then tested byspecifying a model predicting social distance from and support for Turks living in Germany fromfeelings of guilt, moral shame, and image shame regarding the Holocaust. Predictors and outcomevariables were allowed to covary but no single item was allowed to cross-load. The suggested modelfitted the data well, even when controlling for age and highest formal degree, c2 (169) = 255.55,

6 As a rule of thumb, an AIC difference of < 2 indicates no meaningful discrepancy between models; a difference between 4and 7 indicates considerable evidence that the model with the lower AIC is better, and a difference of > 10 indicatessubstantial support for the model with the lower AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).

7 CFAs reported here were performed separately for emotions about the Holocaust (guilt, moral shame, and image shame) andattitudes towards Turks (social distance from and support of Turks). CFAs including all these latent constructs together,however, yielded the same pattern of results.

Table 2. Fit Indices of Models Tested in Confirmatory Factor Analyses in Studies 1 and 2

c2 (df) CFI RMSEA AIC

Study 1Emotions about Holocaust1) Three-factor model 61.08 (31) .976 .069 109.081a) Two-factor model 1 (moral shame combined with image shame) 115.87 (32) .932 .114 161.871b) Two-factor model 2 (moral shame combined with guilt) 72.75 (32) .967 .079 118.751c) One-factor model 322.13 (33) .766 .208 366.13Attitudes towards Turks2) Two-factor model 31.97 (26) .992 .034 69.972a) One-factor model 88.40 (27) .919 .106 124.40Study 2Emotions about Iraq war3) Three-factor model 167.17 (61) .981 .076 227.173a) Two-factor model 1 (moral shame combined with image shame) 365.01 (63) .945 .126 421.013b) Two-factor model 2 (moral shame combined with guilt) 342.05 (63) .950 .122 398.053c) One-factor model 591.44 (64) .905 .166 645.44Separate Mediator4) Five-factor model 345.81 (141) .970 .070 443.814a) Four-factor model 1 (moral obligation combined with moral shame) 472.68 (145) .952 .087 562.684b) Four-factor model 2 (moral obligation combined with image shame) 561.96 (145) .939 .098 651.964c) Four-factor model 3 (moral obligation combined with guilt) 525.11 (145) .945 .093 615.114d) Four-factor model 4 (moral obligation combined with social distance) 652.57 (145) .926 .108 742.57

Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, AIC = Akaike InformationCriterion.

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p < .001, CFI = .959, RMSEA = .050, PCLOSE > .40, and explained correlations to within anaverage error of .071 as indicated by the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Fit indiceswere thus well in line with the cut-off criteria suggested in the literature (Hu & Bentler, 1999;MacCallum et al., 1996). The model is presented in Figure 1.8

A clear generalization of moral and image shame but not of guilt on attitudes towards Turks wasobserved: moral shame significantly and positively predicted supportive attitudes (b = .29, p < .01),whereas image shame significantly and positively predicted social distance from Turks (b = .35,p < .01). In addition, a negative path from moral shame to social distance (b = -.18, p = .07) was veryclose to conventional levels of significance. A negative path from image shame to supportive attitudes(b = -.12) and both paths from guilt were not significant (ps � .10). The overall explained variancein the dependent variables was moderate (R2

Prejudice = .17 and R2Foreigner Support = .13).

Discussion

As hypothesized, group-based emotions about a historical injustice perpetrated by the in-groupwere found to be clearly separable into moral shame, image shame, and guilt. These emotions werethen found to be differentially related to attitudes towards a contemporary minority out-group.German participants’ moral shame about the Holocaust was positively associated with support forand negatively associated with social distance from Turks living in Germany today. Image shameshowed an opposite pattern of relationships. Such findings are difficult to reconcile with someprevious accounts of the distinction between guilt and shame (e.g., Branscombe et al., 2004; Brownet al., 2008; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) but are consistent with recent research that has sought todisentangle them more precisely (Allpress & Brown, 2012; Allpress et al., 2010; Deonna et al., 2011;Gausel et al., 2012). Moreover, they extend those subsequent analyses by showing that such emo-tions can influence or generalize to attitudes towards a seemingly unrelated out-group. To ourknowledge, studies of group-based emotions have exclusively focused on how guilt and shame aboutharm done to one out-group affect attitudes and behavior towards that same out-group. We demon-strate, however, that uncoupled from the emotion-eliciting event and out-group, group-based emo-tions can also be related to individuals’ attitudes towards other out-groups as well.

8 The model held even when controlling for participants’ self-reported political orientation (measured as one item coded from1 = “left” to 6 = “right”) which did not change the pattern of interrelations substantially. Political orientation was conse-quently discarded as a potential control measure.

Moral Shame

Guilt

Image Shame

Social Distance

Foreigner Support

d1

d2

-.18†

.29*

.35**

-.11

-.16

.16

.51

.50

.65 -.77

R2 = .17

R2 = .13

Figure 1. Structural equation model of generalization of guilt and shame in Study 1. Controlled for age and highest formaldegree. Indicators of latent constructs and their error terms are not displayed for the sake of clarity.*p � .01 **p � .01 †p � .07.

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One possible explanation of this process would be a generalized tendency for people to categorizein terms of group-memberships. This notion that attitudes towards one out-group are linked to attitudestowards another out-group has found its way into the literature under the label of Group-FocusedEnmity (Zick et al., 2008). Zick and colleagues (2008) argue that different types of prejudice shouldbe “interrelated because they all mirror a generalized devaluation of out-groups” (p. 364), and they goon to find negative attitudes towards various out-groups (e.g. xenophobia, islamophobia, anti-Semitism) to be substantially correlated in large representative samples of German participants (seealso Aosved, Long, & Voller, 2009).9 It might then be that Germans’ attitudes towards Jews and Turksas two different out-groups are similar, and as group-based emotions about the Holocaust areassociated with attitudes towards the former, they are equally correlated with the latter.

The application of Zick and colleagues’ ideas to the present findings imply that feelings of shameshould influence attitudes towards all out-groups equally. We do not believe this to be the case. Rather,we suggest that shame feelings will most strongly influence attitudes towards out-groups that, althoughnot directly connected with the original victim group, are perceived as similar to the harmed group.Furthermore, we propose that any positive effects of emotions about in-group wrongdoing on attitudestowards an unrelated out-group (i.e., the effects of moral shame) will be explained, at least in part, bythe perception that the in-group has a particular moral obligation, an outstanding moral debt to repayas a result of the in-group’s original transgression. Thus, we are proposing that the association betweengroup-based emotions and attitudes towards an unrelated out-group is driven (mediated) by feelings ofmoral obligation and is stronger (moderated) when the out-group is seen as similar to the originallyharmed group. We sought to investigate these ideas in Study 2.

Study 2

Study 2 was conducted in the context of a contemporary intergroup conflict, the war in Iraq, inwhich reliable press reports and witness testimony agree that members of the in-group (Britishsoldiers in this case) had consistently and systematically abused Iraqi prisoners under their charge(Amnesty International, 2007; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004). Such crimes havegiven rise to considerable public outcry in Britain (e.g., BBC, 2004) and thus provided a convenientand topical focus for our research. This research context provides a strong test of the ideas developedin Study 1, as it represents a quite different situation. Not only was the war still ongoing at the timeof the study, but the issues surrounding the abuse of Iraqi prisoners were yet to be resolved.

The aim of Study 2 was to extend the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating two importantunderlying processes, mediation through feelings of moral obligation and moderation via perceivedsimilarity. An additional and important aspect of Study 2 related to the refinement of the moral andimage shame measures. The items used in Study 1 represented an early conceptualization of theseemotions, and as such, we refined these items in Study 2. In particular, we added two items, referringto both the damage done to the victim group and to the immorality of the in-group’s actions to thescale measuring moral shame, to improve on the single item employed in Study 1. Similar adjust-ments were made to the image-shame scale to bring it more in line with our theoretical account,including direct reference to damage to the in-group’s reputation.

Hypotheses. (1) British people’s moral shame with regard to the Iraq war is predicted to benegatively linked to social distance10 from Pakistanis living in Britain. Image shame is predicted tofunction inversely. (2) The effects of moral shame will be mediated by a sense of moral obligationfor human rights violations in Iraq. (3) This mediation will be moderated by the perceived similarity

9 See also the literature on displaced aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen,Carlson, & Miller, 2000) for examples of how reactions elicited by one stimulus can generalize to another.

10 We focus here only on social distance from foreigners because the present study was part of a larger research project inwhich support for Pakistani immigrants was not measured.

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between original out-group (Iraqis) and target out-group (Pakistanis), such that the emotions will bemore strongly related to attitudes towards Pakistanis when Pakistanis are seen as similar to Iraqis.

Method

Participants and Procedure

A community sample was recruited via an online survey. The survey was run through arewards-based online shopping network, in which users receive rewards points for completingsurveys, entering competitions, and purchasing items through the system’s website. Of thoserecruited, 301 participants (36% female) who self-identified as “British” were included in the finalanalysis. The ages in the sample ranged from 19 to 81 (M = 47.9, SD = 11.4). The study conformedfully to APA/BPS ethical guidelines.

Measures

The measures used in this study were similar to those used in Study 1, although the moral-shameand image-shame scales were expanded, in line with Allpress and Brown (2012) and refined in orderto more accurately capture moral shame and image shame. The items were as follows:

• Guilt (“I feel guilty for the manner in which Iraqi people have been treated by British”; “Evenif I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of British towards Iraqis”; “I feel guiltyfor the bad living conditions of the Iraqi people”; a = .92).

• Moral shame (“Our treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what itmeans to be British”; “I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people”;“I feel ashamed for the damage done to Iraqi people by Brits”; “I feel ashamed because Britain’sactions with regard to Iraq have been immoral”; a = .95).

• Image shame (“I feel disgraced because the behavior of Brits towards Iraqi people has createda bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world”; “I feel ashamed when I realize that othercountries might think of Britain negatively because of our involvement in Iraq”;, “To think howBritain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed”; “I feel humiliated whenI think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqipeople”; “I feel ashamed because Britain has a damaged reputation”; a = .97).

• Social distance was assessed with a scale parallel to that used in Study 1 (“I would haveproblems moving into a district where many Pakistanis live”; “Too many Pakistanis live in GreatBritain”; “Pakistanis should be sent back to their home country if jobs become scarce”; a = .93).

• Moral obligation was measured with three items (“Britain has an ethical obligation to make upfor its actions in Iraq”; “I am concerned that British troops acted immorally in Iraq”; “Britain hasabsolutely no moral obligation to the Iraqi people (reversed)”; a = .77) and perceived similaritywith one item (“How similar are Pakistanis and Iraqis?”).

All items were assessed using a 7-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “stronglyagree.” An overview of the measures and their intercorrelations is given in Table 3.

Results

In preliminary analyses, the hypothesized factorial structure of the three group-based emotionswas, again, supported in CFAs (see Table 2). Alternative models fitted the data significantly worse.

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Thus, closely replicating Study 1, these findings obtained in a different intergroup context confirmthat it is possible to differentiate moral shame, image shame, and guilt.

Another set of CFAs was run to confirm that the hypothesized mediator, moral obligation, wasdistinct from the independent and dependent variables. A five-factor model including the threegroup-based emotions, social distance from Pakistanis, and moral obligation as separate factors, fitthe data significantly better than any model in which the latter had been combined into one factorwith: moral shame (model 4a), image shame (model 4b), guilt (model 4c), or social distance (model4d), all Dc2s, p < .001, all DAICs > 100. Results of these analyses thus clearly supported theseparability of the measures. Fit statistics for the models can be found at the bottom of Table 2.

Generalization of Group-Based Emotions

A model predicting social distance from Pakistanis from feelings of guilt, moral shame, andimage shame regarding British misdeeds in Iraq provided a good fit to the data (c2 (97) = 243.35,p < .01, CFI = .977, RMSEA = .071, SRMR = .024). Moral shame (b = -.52, p < .01) was signifi-cantly and negatively, whereas image shame (b = .38, p < .05) was positively, linked with socialdistance. The link of guilt (b = -.22, p = .12) with the dependent variable was again not significant.These findings replicate those of Study 1 by showing that Britons’ emotional reactions to in-groupwrongdoing in Iraq are related to attitudes towards a seemingly unrelated minority group, Pakistanisliving in Britain.

An additional model was created in which moral obligation mediated the effects of the threeemotions. This model also fitted the data well, c2 (141) = 345.81, p < .01, CFI = .970,RMSEA = .070, SRMR = .041. Bootstrapping analyses using 5,000 bootstrap resamples and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals (CIs) showed that indirect effects from moral shame (standard-ized indirect effect -.41; CI: -.77 to -.20) but not from guilt (-.11; CI: -.29 to .02) or image shame(.08; CI: -.07 to .27) were significant at the a = .05 level (see Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). Thissecond analysis can be seen in Figure 2. We also tested the mediation model without the direct pathsfrom emotions to social distance. This nested model explained the data equally well as the full model(Dc2 (3) = 5.29, p > .15). These analyses therefore show that the effects of moral shame on socialdistance are mediated by a sense of moral obligation for the in-group’s wrongdoing.

Testing the Moderated Mediation Hypothesis

As the reader will recall, we did not expect feelings of moral shame for in-group wrongdoing,and the accompanying sense of moral obligation, to influence attitudes towards all out-groupsequally. Rather, we predicted these feelings would specifically influence attitudes towards out-groupsthat are perceived as similar to the original victim group in core aspects. To test the hypothesized roleof perceived similarity, we designed a moderated mediation model according to Preacher and

Table 3. Overview of Study 2 Main Scales and Their Intercorrelations

Measure M (SD) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

(1) Guilt 3.61 (1.61) .87 .86 -.35 .70 -.17(2) Moral Shame 4.16 (1.61) .90 -.37 .77 -.18(3) Image Shame 4.03 (1.60) -.28 .68 -.15(4) Social Distance 3.84 (1.81) -.52 .27(5) Moral Obligation 4.69 (1.27) -.28(6) Similarity 3.56 (1.53)

Note. All correlations significant at p � .01.

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colleagues’ (2007) Model 3. We assumed that while group-based emotions with regard to the originalincident, especially moral shame, should always be associated with moral obligation, the latter’seffect on social distance from an unrelated out-group would depend on perceived similarity of thetwo out-groups. Following Kline and Dunn (2000) and to avoid multicollinearity and linear depen-dency of the constructs in the model, the interaction term of moral obligation and similarity neededfor this test was computed as a the manifest product of the two centered variables (see also Aiken &West, 1991). The model fitted the data well (c2 (169) = 375.01, p < .01, CFI = .970, RMSEA = .064,SRMR = .039). Both the interaction term and perceived similarity itself emerged as meaningfulpredictors of social distance from Pakistanis (b = -.11 and b = .14, respectively, both ps � .05), thusqualifying for the theorized moderated mediation. The only direct path remaining significant (i.e.,not fully mediated) in the final model was that from image shame to social distance (b = .31, p = .03)paralleling the mediation analysis reported above. Further analyses confirmed that, as expected, thelinks from moral obligation to intergroup attitudes were especially pronounced for individualsperceiving Pakistanis to be similar to the original out-group Iraqis: when the sample was split intoa high- and low-similarity group (M � 1 SD), the path from moral obligation to social distanceremained significant for the high-similarity group only (bHigh Similarity = -.43, p < .05) and was consid-erably higher than for the low similarity group (bLow Similarity = -.28, p = .06).

Discussion

Study 2 replicates and extends the findings from Study 1 and thus further supports the idea thateffects of group-based emotions in response to specific in-group wrongdoing can be linked toattitudes towards a seemingly unrelated out-group, which is the target of contemporary discrimina-tion. The emotions of guilt, moral shame, and image shame concerning the British involvement inIraq were, again, found to be clearly separable constructs and showed the predicted links to attitudestowards Pakistanis living in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, our analyses showed that the effectsof moral shame were mediated by a sense of moral obligation. These mediation effects were morepronounced if individuals judged the two groups to be more similar.

There is an additional issue raised by Study 2 that deserves further discussion, namely the highcorrelations among predictor variables, a possible indication of multicollinearity. There are threepoints to note about this issue. First, the findings of Study 2 were strikingly consistent, not only with

Moral Shame

Guilt

Image Shame Social Distance

.65**

-.10

.14

.90

.86

.87

R2 = .29

Moral Obligation

d1

-.80**

R2 = .60

d2

.36* (.44*)

-.14 (-.66**)

-.13 (-.25)

Figure 2. Mediated structural equation model of generalization of guilt and shame in Study 2. Manifest indicators and theirerror terms are not displayed for the sake of clarity. Direct (unmediated) effects in parentheses.*p � .05 **p � .01 †p = .06.

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those of Study 1, but with the studies presented by Allpress and Brown (2012), where the intercor-relations among emotion variables were lower (and consistently fell between .50 and .70). Second,the relatively large sample size of the present study offers some protection against the disruptiveeffects of multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). Third, regression analyses (not reported here) show thatthe collinearity statistics were all within normal ranges, all variance inflation factors < 5.30 andtolerances > .18. As such, the evidence suggests that multicollinearity did not unduly influence theresults of Study 2.

General Discussion and Implications

The present article supports and extends previous research on guilt and shame in a number ofways. As expected, group-based shame was found to consist of the two facets of moral shame andimage shame and to be clearly separable from guilt. Both forms of shame were then shown to bepredictive of attitudes towards a seemingly unrelated out-group—that is, they generalized in asystematic way.

Structure of Guilt and Shame and Their Correlates

In line with Allpress and Brown’s (2012) claim of a distinction between guilt, moral shame, andimage shame, data in both German and British contexts were found to be more compatible with athree-factor than with a two- or one-factor structure. Not only has this finding important theoreticalimplications in offering insights into the nature of group-based emotions, it may also prove to bepractically meaningful in that reactions motivated by genuine feelings of moral shame could, in fact,be supportive of wider intergroup relations. Behavior motivated by image shame, on the other hand,may also trigger actively antisocial responses such as wishing to maintain social distance from other,socially devalued out-groups, possibly in reaction to social identity threat (Allpress et al., 2010;Branscombe et al., 2007).

The present data, together with others (Allpress et al., 2010; Allpress & Brown, 2012), challengesome thinking in the literature on group-based emotions by suggesting that, rather than guilt beingthe important motivator of intergroup behavior, the two forms of shame investigated here areprimarily driving reactions to reminders of past and current injustices: just as group membership canmake us “guilty by association” (Doosje et al., 1998), so too can it make us feel ashamed byassociation, and the latter feelings may be more potent.

Guilt showed consistently negligible relationships with the dependent measures in both studies.Others, too, have found similarly weak or unstable associations between guilt and various outcomemeasures (Allpress & Brown, 2012; Allpress et al., 2010; Gausel et al., 2012; Harth et al., 2008; Iyeret al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). Such findings are consistent with the characterization of guilt putforward by both Teroni and Deonna (2008) and Deonna and colleagues (2011). These authorsconceptualize guilt as motivating limited reparative acts directly to the victim group, with theintention solely of reversing the harm done, but with little concern for the greater morality of thein-group or for the more general well-being of the victim group. For this reason, we would not expectguilt to influence attitudes towards any group other than the victim group. This is unlike moralshame, which motivates a degree of soul-searching that is likely to influence wider attitudes andbehaviors.

Our data suggest that image shame differs from other group-based emotions in core aspects. Notonly did it have negative effects on intergroup attitudes, Study 2 highlighted the fact that its operatingmode is different from that of moral shame. While the effects of moral shame were fully mediatedby the experience of moral obligation, image shame retained a direct positive link with socialdistance. Together with recent theorizing (Allpress & Brown, 2012; Deonna et al., 2011; Gausel &

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Leach, 2011; Teroni & Deonna, 2008), the present results suggest that this image component mightbe the reason why research into group-based emotions has misconceptualized shame in general asbeing solely linked to antisocial reactions. Further research is needed to investigate the mediating andmoderating processes involved in the effects of image shame on attitudes towards out-groups.

Implications for Wider Intergroup Relations

In this article, we investigated the novel notion that a link exists between group-based emotionsconcerning one intergroup episode and attitudes towards another unrelated out-group. These findingsshow that emotional reactions for in-group wrongdoing may have important effects on widerintergroup relations. If perpetrator group members feel moral shame for their group’s misdeeds, thenthis is likely to have positive effects on the wider treatment of minority groups. This finding providessupport for the notion that collective remembrance of large-scale historical atrocities such as theHolocaust may prevent future transgressions from happening.

However, a risk is that shaming a group for their actions (and thus inducing image shame in theperpetrator group) can have wider and more extensive negative effects than originally thought.Allpress and Brown (2012), for instance, provide evidence that image shame is associated with a hostof negative outcomes connected with the initial shame-eliciting situation and raise concerns that, forthis reason, shaming can sometimes be an unproductive strategy by which to encourage groups toaddress their misdeeds. Our present findings provide additional cause for concern by showing thatshaming may have further implications for how the perpetrator group treats other minority groupswithin the wider society.

Future Research

We believe the present article presents a fertile base for future research. By demonstrating thatthe effects of shame with regard to harm done to one group are not confined to attitudes towards thatoriginally victimized group, we hope to broaden the scope of research into group-based emotions.Although our analyses provide initial insights into the conditions under which shame may influenceattitudes towards unrelated out-groups, future work should continue to test and document themediating and moderating mechanisms, particularly in relation to image shame. We have offered thepossibility earlier that a desire to maintain or bolster the in-group’s status may account for some ofthe negative effects of image shame. Further work may find it fruitful to experimentally manipulateimportant variables, such as perceived similarity or moral obligation (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Leach,Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Our laboratories are currently conducting studies investigating thelongitudinal effects of these emotions, the role of moral obligation, and the impact of perceivedvictim status of the target out-group, thus addressing one obvious shortcoming of the presentcorrelational findings—that they only allow for somewhat limited inferences about causality.

Conclusions

The present research has implications for the role of reminders of historical or contemporaryinjustice in debates about seemingly unrelated issues. Although such reminders sometimes seem sostartlingly out of place, our research suggests that their use by members of both the left and right endsof the political spectrum may have meaningful effects on members of the general population. Giventhe generalizing effects of collective emotions, appealing to the immorality of the group’s misdeedsmay elicit moral shame and lead to an increase in positive attitudes towards members of an unrelatedout-group. Appeals to Germans’ “historical responsibility”—for example, as made by then GermanFederal President Richard von Weizsäcker in his commemoration speech in 1985, and recently by

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Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle in a speech given on July 1, 2010—fit intothis line of reasoning. Highlighting continuing external criticism of the in-group, however, maytrigger feelings of image shame, which may, in turn, lead to an increase in distancing from otherout-groups. References to the shame that is “imposed on us by others” may be an example of publicfigures using the evocation of feelings of image shame to advance (either consciously or uncon-sciously) their own political ends in a seemingly unrelated domain such as immigration policies.Moral obligation and its effects—positive and negative—are thus not confined to only one out-group.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by a German Academic Exchange Service and a German NationalAcademic Foundation scholarship awarded to the first author. The authors are grateful to GerdBohner and Rüdiger Schmidt for their permissions to collect data for Study 1 at Bielefeld Universityand the Citizens Advice Bureau Bielefeld. Parts of this article were presented at the 16th GeneralMeeting of the European Association for Social Psychology, Stockholm, Sweden. Correspondenceconcerning this article should be sent to Jonas Rees, Department of Psychology, Bielefeld University,P.O. Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

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