Organisational Interactions in Luhmann's Theory of Social Systems.pdf

7/28/2019 Organisational Interactions in Luhmann's Theory of Social Systems.pdf

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Mnchner betriebswirtschaftliche Beitrge

Munich Business Research

Organisational Interactions in Luhmanns Theory of Social

Systems

David Seidl

# 2003-9

LMU

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt Mnchen

Munich School of Management


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Organisational Interactions in Luhmanns Theory of

Social Systems

David Seidl

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt Munich

Institute of Organization

Abstract:

This paper explores the form and function of organisational interactions from the perspectiveof Luhmanns Theory of Social Systems. After a short recapitulation of Luhmanns conceptof organisation and interaction a suggestion on the conceptualisation of organisationalinteractions will be made. Organisational interactions are interactions that describe themselvesas organisational and that select their own operations with regard to their implications forthe organisational reproduction. A particular kind of organisational interaction is thedeciding interaction in which decisions for the organisation are produced. The relationbetween organisation and deciding interaction is described as one of interpenetration. Thismeans that organisations can make use of the interactional complexity for their ownreproduction. Three functions of organisational interactions will be discussed: (1) complexityreduction, (2) deparadoxification and (3) memory. It follows a discussion of possibilities fororganisations of conditioning interactions for their puroses. The paper concludes with a briefreflection on the advantages of the proposed conceptualisation of organisational interactions.


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1. Introduction

Luhmann distinguishes in his theory three types of social systems: society, organisation and

interaction. While the functioning of each of the systems (as autopoietic systems) has been

described fairly well1, the relation between the systems has received comparatively little

attention. Particularly unclear remains the relation between organisation and interaction.

Apart from a few remarks here and there (e.g. Luhmann 2000, pp. 25, 255, 373) Luhmann

himself hasnt written anything on that issue. The only serious contribution comes from

Andr Kieserling (1994; 1999: chapter 11), who isn't however very explicit on how to

conceptualise the relation in the 'technical' terms of Luhmann's theory.

Luhmann's systems theoretical perspective initially seems to oppose the idea of organisational

interactions: organisation and interaction are conceptualised as two systems that are

operatively closed with regard to each other; i.e. they cannot take part in the autopoiesis of

each other - as they for example take part in the autopoiesis of society. Thus, what can be

observed empirically - that there are interactions that make organisational decisions and in

this way contribute to the reproduction of the organisation seems (at first) theoretically

impossible. While the theory indeed excludes the possibility of interactions becoming part of

the organisation, there are other more complex - ways of conceptualising the contribution of

interactions to the organisational reproduction in terms of Luhmann's theory, which will be

explored in this paper.

In the following we will first explain Luhmann's concepts of organisation and interaction as

two autopoietic systems that reproduce themselves on the basis of different operations. We

will then explore ways of conceptualising organisational interactions using the concepts of re-

1 See for society e.g. Luhmann (1997; 1993b: part II; 1995: chapter10), for organisations e.g.Luhmann (2000; 1993b: part III; 1993c; 1992) and for interactions e.g. Luhmann (1995: 405-436;1999) or Kieserling (1999).


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entry and interpenetration. This will be followed by an exploration of functions that

interactions might serve in organisations and the ways in which organisation can condition

interactions for their purposes. We will close with a brief reflection on the advantages of the

proposed conceptualisation of organisational interactions.

2. Organisation and interaction as two types of social systems

According to Luhmann's theory organisations and interactions can be conceptualised as two

types of social systems that reproduce themselves on the basis of different types of

communication. Organisations on the basis of decision communications and interactions on

the basis of communications among people present. Both systems are perceived as operatively

closed in the sense that they can only operate in the context of their own operations (Luhmann

2000: 51-52): organisations can only reproduce themselves through (their own) decisions and

interactions only through (their own) communications among people present.

Organisations are conceptualised as autopoietic "systems that consist of decisions and that

themselves produce the decisions of which they consist through decisions of which they

consist" (Luhmann, 1992b: 166; my translation). Three concepts are central to this

understanding of organisation: the concept of decision, the concept of decision premise and

the concept of uncertainty absorption.

Decisions constitute the elements of the organisation. They are a specific kind of

communication2: they are communications that communicate their own contingency3

(Luhmann 1993e: 339). That is, they communicate the decision as such and the alternatives to

the decision. In this sense decisions are paradoxical communications: Every decision

2 For Luhmann decisions in organisations are communicative events. He thus contradicts theclassical notion of a distinction between decision making and the communication of that decision.(Luhmann, 2000: 141-145).


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communicates that there are alternatives to the decision - otherwise it wouldn't be a decision

and it simultaneously communicates that there are no alternatives since the decision has been

made otherwise it wouldn't be a decision (Luhmann, 2000: 142). Because of their

paradoxical nature decision communications at first may appear as extremely improbable

phenomena - they call for their own deconstruction (Luhmann, 2000: 142). Empirically

however one can observe that decision communications do succeed, in fact in organisations

decision communications are normality. How does the organisation prevent the constant

deconstruction of its decisions? Firstly this happens through the totalisation of decision

expectation (Luhmann 2000: 145; Kieserling 1999: 352). Any communication reproducing

the organisation is forced into the form of a decision. Thus even the deconstruction of a

decision would itself have to take the form of a decision. Secondly, organisational decisions

take place in the context of other decisions which it refers to in order stabilise itself as

decision. In other words every decision communicates also a meta-communication which

says that the decision maker had the right, authority or other good reasons for deciding the

way he did. (Luhmann 2000: 142). In general terms, decisions are stabilised through reference

to organisational structures.

With the concept of decision premise4 Luhmann captures the structural aspect of

organisations. Every decision constitutes a decision premise for later decisions as it defines

the structural conditions for it. Decision premises here serve a double function as both

creating and restricting the decision. They create the decision situation in the first place.

Without decision premises there is no occasion for decision making. At the same time,

decision premises restrict the decision situation by restricting the decision possibilities.

Decisions dont only serve as decision premises for immediately following decisions, but they

3 Contingency here in the modal sense of also possible otherwise.


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can also decide on decision premises which are binding for a multitude of later decisions.

Luhmann distinguishes between three types of such far-reaching decision premises:

programmes, communication channels and personnel (Luhmann 2000; 1993; 1992).5

With the concept of uncertainty absorption6 Luhmann captures the processual aspect of

organisations; the question of how one decision leads to further decisions and thus to a

reproduction of the organisation. That is, uncertainty absorption describes the autopoiesis of

the organisation (Luhmann: 1993c: 308). In the transition form one decision to the next one

the uncertainty involved in the original decision disappears. In other words a connecting

decision takes the result of a preceding decision as given (the decision was made!) and uses

this result as premise for itself. One could also say, the first decision in-forms the following

decision only about the result of the original decision but not about the uncertainty involved in

the decision making. To bring the two concepts together one can define: uncertainty

absorption takes place when earlier decisions are accepted as decision premises for later

decisions (Luhmann 1993: 299; 2000: 193).

The system of face-to-face interaction, in contrast to the system of organisation, does not

consist of decision communications but on communications that are based on reflexive

perception of the physical presence of its participants. Analogously to the communications of

organisations interactional communications contain a meta-communication communicating

4 The concept originally was introduced by Herbert Simon (1957: 201) and Simon et. al (1950: 57ff.).

5 In fact Luhmann (2000; 1993, 1992) suggests to use the term decision premise only with regard tosuch decided decision premises. One could also distinguish between decision premises in anarrow sense and decision premises in a wider sense.

6 The concept originally was introduced by March and Simon (1958: 165): Uncertaintyabsorption, they write, takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and theinferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated.


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that it is a communication amongst people present (Kieserling, 1999:67). 7 In other words the

communications carry the code presence/absence. With this code interactions refer to their

system/environment distinction. Whoever is considered present is treated as participant in the

communications (if not as speaker then as listener) and whoever is considered as absent is

treated as environment. (Luhmann 1997: 815). The difference of presence and absence in this

sense marks the difference of self-reference and hetero-reference for the operations of the

system (Luhmann, 1997: 815-816). Like all social systems interactions are complex systems,

which means that they are forced to make selections. Luhmann (1995: 415) distinguishes

between factual, temporal and social structures:8 interactions usually produce topics for the

communication; they place communications in a sequence and particularly also take the end

of the interaction into account; they develop rules for turn taking in the communication - in

particular when somebody speaks the others have to remain quiet. Analogously to the

organisational reproduction, where every decision creates the necessity for further decisions,

every interactional communication necessitates further interactional communications.

Reflexive perception in the interaction enforces a continuation of the communication. It is

almost impossible to evade communication in an interaction. As Luhmann writes: Even the

communication of not wanting to communicate is communication. [] In practice, one

cannot not communicate in an interaction system; one must withdraw if one wants to avoid

communication. (Luhmann, 1997: 413; original emphasis)

In interaction systems the person9 plays a very prominent role. While in organisations

decisions are largely justified by reference to earlier decision premises mostly decisions are

presented as a direct consequence of earlier decisions in interactions communications are

7 Who is considered present is determined by the interaction itself. In this sense presence is itself asocial construct of the interaction.

8 On these three dimensions of meaning generally see Luhmann (1995: 76-81).9 Defined as a bundle of social expectations (Luhmann 1995d).


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primarily attributed to persons; the reasons for particular communications are primarily

sought in the person and his particular intentions. More than in organisations in interactions

the person as such is held responsible for what is communicated. 10 Ensuing communications

take the personal aspect of earlier communications into account and very often address that

personal aspect explicitly; organisational decision communications, in contrast, tend to focus

on the result of the decision and only in exceptional cases address the particular (personal)

circumstances of the earlier decision situation.

3. Conceptualising organisational interactions

Organisation and interaction are two types of social systems reproducing theselves in very

different ways. Nevertheless the (theoretical and empirical) literature speaks of interactions

taking place within organisations. How is one to conceptualise the relation of organisation

and interaction in such cases. Within first of all could be meant in a local sense, e.g.

meetings take place in the offices, two workers at the conveyer-belt talk about the new

working hours. From a Luhmannian perspective the locality of the interaction wouldnt

matter. Organisation and interaction are two different systems that constitute environment for

each other, i.e. the systems are operatively closed against each other. The solution however

isnt that easy taking into account that such interactions might produce decisions for the

organisation; that is to say interactions seem to play a role in the organisational reproduction -

and in this sense could seem to contradict the idea of operational closure.

An alternative solution to this problem could be to conceptualise the relation between

organisation and interaction analogously to that between society and organisation or society

10 We are only speaking of social constructions, not of any causal connection between psychicsystem and communication in an ontological sense (cf. Kieserling 1997: 67).


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and interaction. Society constitutes the all encompassing system of communication in which

organisation and interaction differentiate themselves on the basis of specific communications

(Luhmann 1997). Thus organisation and interaction reproduce with every operation - decision

communication and interactional communication respectively - both themselves as it

constitutes a decision communication or interactional communication and the society as

decision communication and interactional communication are communications. Society thus

can be found both inside and outside of the organisation or interaction (Luhmann 2000: 59;

383; Luhmann 1995: 405 ff.). Analogously one might try to conceptualise organisational

interactions as social systems that take place in organisations in the sense that they reproduce

themselves by interactional decision communications; i.e. they would reproduce themselves

by a specific kind of decision communications. In this sense they would reproduce both

themselves and the organisation simultaneously. Such a conceptualisation, however, wouldnt

be compatible with the empirical observation that decision communications within

organisational interactions are relatively rare. Most communications even in formal

meetings are non-decision communications. In fact, it is particularly the non-decision

communication that is typical for (organisational) interactions; decisions constitute a kind of

foreign matter to the interaction. 11 Often no decisions are made at all in such interactions.

Furthermore, sometimes part of an interaction is organisation-related while other parts have

nothing to do with the organisation. A business meeting ends in bed; during a board meeting

some members of the board discuss the latest results of the Football World Cup; after their

coffee break together colleagues make their way back into a meeting 12. In all these cases it is

not that one interaction is terminated and a new interaction is started but it is one and the same

interaction. Thus the relation between organisation and organisational interaction has to be

conceptualised differently from one of inclusion.

11 Cf. Kieserling (1999): 355 ff.; Kieserling (1994a).


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Before we try a conceptualisation of organisational interactions in terms of Luhmanns

theory we will first give a short overview of the different empirically observable forms of

interactions in organisations. Firstly there are deciding interactions in which decisions for

the organisation are made; one might think of board meetings, strategy meetings etc. Secondly

there are decision-preparatory interactions in which the conditions for later decisions are

laid. That is to say in the interaction itself no decisions are made but later decisions are

prepared for; e.g. interactions in which relevant information for later decisions is exchanged,

the participants deliberate later decisions without making decisions. Thirdly there are semi-

detached interactions with a merely loose relation to decision making; that is interactions

which communicate about decisions without direct focus on influencing decision making.

One might think of informal interactions between members of an organisation gossiping about

organisational issues.13 Fourthly there are organisation unrelated interactions in which

topics that are unrelated to the organisation are communicated about; e.g. members of an

organisation talk during their work about their night out together. These different forms of

interaction differ in the degree to which they contribute to the organisational reproduction:

from a direct involvement in decision making to a complete detachment from the

organisation.

To start with we can exclude the fourth type of interaction from the list of possible forms of

organisational interactions. It can be treated as a normal interaction in the environment of

the organisation (cf. Kieserling 1997: 360). Their location within the physical boundaries of

the organisation and the involvement of members alone doesnt grant them a specific status

with regard to the organisational reproduction. The other three forms of interaction however

have an organisational significance.

12 See the analysis in Atkinson et al. (1978).


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If one cant conceptualise the relation between organisation and organisational interaction as

one of inclusion there remains only the possibility of treating it as a special kind of structural

coupling; i.e. the structures of two systems are adjusted to each other in a way that allows

mutual influences on their respective reproductions.14 Organisational interactions reproduce

themselves on the basis of their interactional communications but they take the organisational

operations into account. That is organisational interactions allow for a conditioning of their

own operations through the organisation in social, factual and temporal respects. In other

words interactional communications orient themselves not only according to their

interactional structures but also according to organisational structures, i.e. its environment. In

terms of systems theory this has to be conceptualised as a re-entry (Spencer Brown 1979) of

the interaction/organisation distinction (as the system/environment distinction) into the

interaction (as system). The interaction observes its own communications with regard to their

significance for the interaction and for the organisation. The interaction can of course only

observe this distinction according to its own logic; its own construction.15 This for example

means that the distinction is reconstructed with regard to the interacting persons16: as a

distinction between their organisational roles (and generally: membership) and interactional

roles.17 In other words the interactional communications take into account that the persons

involved in the interaction have other roles outside the interaction in the organisation and that

these roles have to be taken into account in the interactional communications. Or put the other

way around, the interaction treats the difference between interactional and organisational roles

13 On such forms of communication see e.g. Cf. March and Sevn (1989), Drew and Heritage(1992), Boden (1994), Fuchs (1995), Kurland and Pelled (2000).

14 Structural coupling constitutes a complementary concept to that of operative closure; it allowsconceptualising the influence of systems in the environment on the autopoiesis of a system inquestion (Baecker, 2001: 219; Luhmann 1995b).

15 The re-entered distinction isnt, of course, the original distinction it is mark and not cross asSpencer Brown (1979) would have it.

16 Since interactional communications generally are primarily oriented according to the interactingpersons.


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of its participants as its distinction with the organisation. Interactional communications in this

sense can be observed with regard to interactional roles and with regard organisational roles.

In terms of Heinz von Foerster (1981: 304-305; 1993) the interaction uses the (re-entered)

interaction/environment distinction in the form of a difference in roles as programme.

The re-entry of the organisation into the interaction doesnt however mean that organisational

structures the organisational logic are introduced into the interaction. First of all due to the

different forms of reproduction organisational structures cannot serve as interactional

structures they belong to different domains. The interaction, however, can reconstruct the

structures in interactional terms. For example the hierarchical structure of decision

communications can be translated into a stratified order of respect with regard to persons in

different positions, a differential treatment of persons with regard to their contributions to the

communication, e.g. with regard to turn-taking, granted speaking time, or with regard to

possibilities of criticism. Apart from that the re-entry doesnt mean that the interaction is

trying to translate the organisational structures into interactional structures trying a

representation of the organisation. Even the opposite could be the case the interaction could

counter the organisational structures, e.g. by an (explicit) suspension of the hierarchical order

of positions. The important point however is that the interactional structures, whether

imitating or contrasting the organisational structures, refer to the organisational structures.

Without explicit reference to the organisation the interaction couldnt be treated as

organisational.

Although the re-entry of the organisation into the interaction is accomplished through the

reference to the participating persons and thus the social dimension is ultimately central

17 On the consideration of organisational roles in the interaction see Kieserling (1999): 360 ff.


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the organisation can be reflected into the interaction in all three dimensions of meaning18. In

the social dimension as already addressed above the interaction takes the participants

personal experiences and actions as organisational members (which largely result from their

organisational roles) into account. In the factual dimension the interaction structures its

communications according to organisational themes, e.g. the interaction might communicate

about new strategies for the organisation or the official organisational self-description. Again,

this doesnt mean that the themes have to be dealt with in the same way as they are dealt with

in the organisation. The participants might treat the theme cynically, i.e. communicate about

the other side19 of the theme; that which the official version of the theme disguises (cf.

Luhmann 2000: 430 ff). What organisational themes are dealt with and how depends on the

participating persons. As with all interactions the personal relation to the topic is decisive and

contributions to a topic are attributed personally.

In the temporal dimension the interactional communications might reflect the temporal

structures of the organisation for example by scheduling the interaction as to coincide with

external organisational events. The interaction might be terminated because the participants

are needed elsewhere in the organisation, the participants in a meeting might wait for a late-

comer who is held up in another meeting, an important topic on the top of the agenda might

be moved to the end in order to allow for additional information to be provided by the

organisation, e.g. the results of a parallel meeting; or vice versa a topic might be dealt with

early in a meeting in order for its result to be available to other organisational

communications. An interaction might also be intentionally protracted in order to obstruct

certain organisational processes. Again, more than anything else the reflection of temporal

structures of the organisation into the interaction is accomplished through the focus on the

18 On the three dimensions of meaning see Luhmann (1995): 75-81.


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participating persons and their organisational roles. The structuring of the interaction is very

much oriented according to the time available to the participants; the participants can bring

the interaction to an end by referring to other organisational obligations that temporally

coincide. In contrast, the reference to extra-organisational obligations e.g. one has to pick up

ones children from the kindergarten is only in exceptional cases accepted as an orientation

for the temporal structuring of the interaction (cf. Kieserling, 1999: 360). Of course, the

organisational interaction to the extent that it takes place during working hours can

count on the exemption of its participants from any other extra-organisational obligations for

the time being; i.e. the availability of the participants is guaranteed by the organisation and

only organisational obligations can thus count as reasons for terminating ones presence.20

Even if the temporal structuring isnt oriented directly according to the temporal availability

of its participants temporal structures of the organisation are still transported into the

organisational interaction through the participating persons. An agreement has to be reached

until a certain time because it was promised by somebody, or because the personal career of

one of the participants depends on it, or because it would make it easier for the participants to

continue their ordinary work. Or an informal meeting on the corridor is terminated because

the participants have to get back to their desks in order not to get sacked for laziness.

So far we have described some features of organisational interactions, in particular the re-

entry of the organisation into the interaction. One could also say the re-entry of the

19 In Spencer Browns (1979) terms the unmarked state. In fact, cynical communication constitutes are-entry.

20 In the case of after-hour meetings the situation is somewhat different. Whether or not one canclaim other obligations depends very much on the organisational arrangements. In manycontemporary organisations, for example consultancy firms, working hours are not really pre-defined but depend on the particular tasks at issue. In other words, members are expected almostalways to be available for the organisation. This doesnt mean that they will always be available,but that reasons for their non-availability have to be formulated as organisational reasons e.g.one has to take a weekend off to keep a clear head for an important meeting on Monday.


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organisation into the interaction is the defining criterion21: to the extent that such a re-entry

takes place it is an organisational interaction. But how can this re-entry be explained? Why

would an interaction orient itself according to an organisation? An easy but somewhat

unsatisfactory answer would be that an interaction as autonomous22 system is free to select its

own structures and if it, thus, selects its structures with regard to an organisation then it does

so - it is its own selection; and if it doesnt, it doesnt. In this sense only the interaction itself

can determine whether or not it orients itself according to the organisation; in particular the

organisational roles of its participants.23 It is the interaction itself that sees itself as

organisational. It has to be understood as a self-attribution (Kieserling, 1999: 79; see also

Luhmann 1999:64) of the interaction to the organisation. In order to ascertain whether an

interaction attributes itself to the organisation one has to observe the interactional

communications whether or not the interaction/organisation distinction serves as a guiding

difference for the communications.

What is of specific interest here is how the interaction describes itself, i.e. what self-

descriptions it uses in its communications. Interactions, in contrast to organisations (Luhmann

2000: chapter 14; Seidl: 2002a; 2002b) or societies (Luhmann 1997: chapter 5), usually do not

possess very elaborate self-descriptions. Nevertheless some (at least rudimentary) self-

descriptions can always be found. An interaction might describes itself as strategy review,

crisis meeting, board meeting or as chance encounter, flirt, class reunion etc.24 The

21 A re-entry pertaining to the interactional structures and not its autopoiesis (cf. Kieserling 1999:79).

22 Autopoiesis implies autonomy (Luhmann 2000: 51)23 Or put the other way around, to disregard any extra-organisational roles of its participants.

Alternatively the interaction could for example include all other roles of its participants in thatway creating an intimate interaction (cf. Luhmann 1995: 224 ff.) - not an organisational one.

24 Often such self-descriptions are merely implicit, i.e. implied in the communication but could bemade explicit if the members were asked about them.


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self-attribution of an interaction to an organisation would normally be reflected in the self-

description, as is evident in several of the above examples.25

The interactional self-attribution to an organisation as we indicated above neednt refer to

the entire interaction.26 Interactions can in the course of their communication processes

change their focus. An interaction might start as organisational and end as intimate (cf.

Kieserling 1999: 162). Any change of self-attribution - this cant be emphasised enough is

the interactions own decision.27 This however means that interaction first has to free itself

from the organisation-related structures (from its guiding difference interaction / organisation)

before it can switch to the structures of intimacy.28 Or an organisational interaction might

suspend its organisational self-attribution for a tea- or lunch-break (during which the

participants stay together) and resume its organisation-related communications afterwards (cf.

Atkinson, Cuff and Lee, 1978).

Beyond the mere establishment that an interaction attributes itself to an organisation, we can

also try to answer why an interaction might attribute itself to an organisation. One reason is

that for many interactions the reference to the organisation is close at hand.29 Often

25 One can also find explicit dissociations from the organisations in interactional self-descriptions This is not a business meeting - where the vicinity (in physical or temporal respects) otherwisewould suggest a self-attribution to the organisation.

26 See analogously the change of self-attribution of interactions to functional systems of society(Kieserling, 1999: 80 ff). There is however a difference in that in the case of a self-attribution to a

functional system of society through specification of structures the interaction also uses thefunction-specific code as guiding difference for its communications; i.e. the interactionalcommunications (partly) take place in the functional system of society. In the case of theorganisational interaction, in contrast, the organisation remains environment for the interaction.

27 This is not to say that there might not be external factors supporting a switch.28 One of the greatest obstacles to such a switch is the co-ordination of the change of structures. The

change-over of structures has to take place simultaneously (in order to avoid a conflict betweenstructures) if a break-down of the interaction and thus the end of its reproduction is to be avoided.In order to accomplish the switch the interactional communications might have to use theirreference to the organisation; for example one might refer to the end working hours connectedwith the suggestion of having a drink together in a nearby pub.

29 In terms of Goffman (1975) the organisation offers a frame for the interaction.


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participants of an interaction know each other only as members of an organisation. They

might even just know that the other person is a member of the same organisation. As such the

orientation according to the organisational roles of the participants might be close at hand.

This provides the interaction with a point of reference for establishing its structures. Most

importantly it provides the interaction with topics of communication.30 Where participants

who hardly know each other otherwise would struggle to find topics for communication, the

orientation according to the organisational roles might provide an almost unlimited source of

possible themes.31 In this sense the self-attribution to the organisation might serve as a

facilitation of the reproduction of the interaction. In interactions among people who only

know each other as members of the same organisation this self-attribution to the organisation

might even serve as a kind safety-net to get hold on when no other topics are close at hand.32

Often interactions form as a response to organisation-related situations of double

contingency. For example, two workers having to co-ordinate their interdependent tasks might

instead of asking their superior resort to a mutual interaction as a means of co-ordination.. In

such cases the reason for the interaction seems to precede the interaction. While it ultimately

depends on the interaction (as autonomous, autopoietic system33) whether it forms at all34 and

30 Topics for interactional communication are mostly not only interactional topics but organisationalor generally societal topics. The concrete definition of the topic, however, is interaction-specific

(cf. Kieserling 1999: 181; 205).31 Organisational interactions, however, mostly would present the situation as if the topic was the

reason for the interaction even where it were the other way around, i.e. that the interaction wasfirst and had to look for a topic (cf. Kieserling 1997: 195)

32 One might start to speak about the weather but after a while this topic might be exhausted and noother topic close at hand as one doesnt know the other person. In this case the commonorganisation (i.e. the respective memberships) might serve as orientation for the continuation ofthe communication (e.g. What do you think about the new CEO?)

33 Interactions are no trivial machines in terms of Heinz von Foerster (e.g. 1984) which could bedetermined from outside.

34 This is a paradoxical formulation (i.e. the interaction determines its own existence) for the factthat interactions are emergent phenomena.


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what structures, in particular: what themes of communication, it selects.35 Nevertheless, the

organisation almost forces itself onto the interaction. The self-attribution to the organisation is

so close at hand that the interaction almost couldnt ignore it and would have to justify not

focussing on the organisation. What one could rather find is that such interactions would start

as organisational, i.e. attribute themselves to the organisation, and then later maybe change

their self-attribution to something else with the difficulties described above.

4. Deciding interactions

In the following we want to focus on one of the forms of organisational interactions

described above: the deciding interaction. The important point about such interactions is that

they produce interactional communications that can be treated by the organisation as

(organisational) decisions. That is the deciding interaction can contribute to the organisational

reproduction. A particularly pressing question in this context is how to conceptualise the

status of these communications with regard to interaction and organisation respectively. Are

these communications elements of both systems, in the same way as interactional

communications are also communications in the societal system (Luhmann 1995: chapter 10);

or are they something completely different in both systems, as for example one and the

same36 communication constitutes a legal communication (as contract) in the legal

subsystem and a payment-related communication (as transaction) in the economic subsystem

of society (Luhmann 1993a; Lieckweg, 2001). In order to answer this and other related

questions we will apply the concept of interpenetration, that Luhmann (1995: chapt. 6; 1995c)

35 If an interaction forms the participants could ignore the organisation and talk about football knowing each other as football fans.

36 To speak of one and the same communication in this context is in fact not entirely correct as itimplies an ontological meaning which cant be meant here. See in this respect Luhmann (1995):215.


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used for describing the relation between social and psychic system 37, to the relation between

organisation and deciding interaction.38

Luhmann speaks of interpenetration between (autopoietic)39 systems, if the systems

reciprocally presuppose the complex achievements of the autopoiesis of the respective other

system and treat them as part of the own system (Luhmann 1995d: 153). That is to say, when

systems reciprocally make their own complexity (and with it indeterminacy, contingency,

and the pressure to select) available for constructing [the] other system (Luhmann 1995:

213; original emphasis). Luhmanns classical example is the relationship between psychic and

social system: social systems can rely on psychic systems to be stimulated by communication

and to process parallel psychic operations that allow them to irritate the social systems in

suitable moments in order to trigger further communications reproducing the social

system.40 Vice versa the psychic system presupposes complex achievements of social

systems.41 Important in this respect is that both systems are operatively closed with regard to

each other. It is not that the systems overlap in any way psychic operations cannot become

part of social systems and vice versa. As Luhmann writes: This means that the complexity

each system makes available is an incomprehensible complexity [] that is, disorder for the

receiving system. (Luhmann 1995a: 214). In this sense social systems can presuppose the

37 A part from that he described also the relation between organism and psychic system, brain and

the nervous system (e.g. Luhmann, 1995: 214, endnote 7), but not the relation between socialsystems.38 Another concept for analysing the relation between organisation and organisational interaction is

that of medium and form by Fritz Heider (1959) instead of form he speaks of thing. For anapplication see Seidl (2001) and for applications to the relation between social and psychic systemsee Luhmann (1995c), Baecker (1992).

39 The concept of interpenetration applies only to autopoietic systems (Luhmann 1995: 218).40 One of the most important achievements that the social system presupposes the psychic system to

accomplish is perception in particular the perception of uttered sounds (Luhmann 1995a:chapter 6).

41 But it is somewhat less dependent on social systems as it can also reproduce itself for a certaintime at least without social systems (Luhmann 1995c: 39)


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contributions of the psychic system to its autopoiesis without comprehending the functioning

of the psychic system and vice versa.

Analogously the relationship between organisation and deciding interaction can be described

as one between two operatively closed systems, in which the interaction makes its own

complexity available to the organisation and vice versa. That is the organisation can rely on

its interactions to fulfil tasks necessary for the organisational reproduction, although the

organisation cannot comprehend the logic of the interactional reproduction. Luhmann for

example writes: Work processes that cannot be technisized, for example lessons at school

or preaching in church, [] force the organisation to displace its performance conditions into

interaction among people present and to entrust it to inscrutable processes. (Luhmann 2000:

373; my emphasis; my translation)42

In order to fully understand the concept of interpenetration in this context we have to have a

closer look at the decision communications that come about in the course of deciding

interactions. These communications (in some way) take place in both systems - they are

elements in the interactional communications to the extent that further interactional

communications connect to them and they are organisational communications to the extent

that they serve as decision premises for further decisions. Luhmann writes about

interpenetration in general:

To be sure, interpenetrating systems converge in individual elements that is,

they use the same ones but they give each of them a different selectivity and

connectivity, different pasts and futures. Because temporalized elements (events)

are involved, the convergence is possible only in the present. The elements signify

42 Beyond un-technisizible work processes there are of course many other occasions in which theorganisation has to rely on its interactions (see below).


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different things in the participating systems, although they are identical as events:

they select among different possibilities and lead to different consequences. Not

least, this means that the convergence to occur next is once again selection, that

the difference of the systems is reproduced in the process of interpenetration.

(Luhmann 1995: 215; original emphasis)43

If we look at decisions in organisational interactions this is exactly the case. We have one

communication that is used in both systems, but has a different meaning in each. In the

interaction it has to be understood in the context of other interactional communications in

reaction to what other interactional communications did the communication come about, what

other interactional communications can follow. In the interaction one is interested in who said

what, in response to whom, with what reactions of the others. In this sense the content of the

decision might be only of secondary importance. For the organisation the communication has

a very different meaning. It has to be understood in the context of other decisions, which

might even lie outside the interaction: earlier decisions that served as decision premises and

later decisions for which this decision serves as decision premise. For the organisation the

meaning of this communication results from its implications for connecting decisions, while

for the interaction it results from the meaning for further interactional communications to

connect to it.44 A concrete example might illustrate this idea. A university has decided to

create a new position and in a later staff meeting a particular candidate is chosen for it. For the

organisation the decision on the candidate connects directly to the earlier decision to create

the position. In order to understand the relevance of the decision for the organisation it is

43 Luhmann speaks of interpenetrating systems also as systems that are operatively coupled incontrast to a mere structural coupling (Luhmann 1995c: 41).

44 For Luhmann the elements of a system are only defined through their integration into the system,i.e. their relation to other elements (Luhmann 1995a: 20ff.). In this sense the samecommunication is for interaction and organisation a different one as it relates to other elements ofthe respective systems in different ways.


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enough to relate it to this decision as its decision premise (and of course other decision

premises, e.g. who has the authority to decide what etc.). For the continuation of the decision

process (e.g. further decisions on concrete curricula etc.) it is only relevant which candidate

has been chosen (and which ones havent). It is completely irrelevant who was for or against

the candidate (for what personal reasons), how long it took the participants to reach the

decision etc. What counts for the further decision process is the decided alternative, the

process to the decision and the uncertainty involved in it are irrelevant or absorbed (cf.

Luhmann 2000: 193). For the interaction, in contrast, it is exactly these personal aspects of

the communication that are important and in the continuation of the interactional

communication this personal aspect will be referred to (cf. Kieserling 1999: 385-386).

The autopoiesis of organisations - as we explained above can be described with the concept

of uncertainty absorption. In the transition from one decision to the next decision the original

uncertainty of the initial decision is absorbed the ensuing decision only orients itself

according to the chosen alternative. With regard to our argument above this means that the

interactional circumstances - the pros and cons, the doubts etc which represent very much

of the uncertainty involved in the decision making are left out in the ensuing decision

communication. In other words the decision does not in-form later decision about these

issues these issues to speak with Bateson (1972: 315) do not constitute differences that

make a difference for the further reproduction of the organisation. Within the interaction in

contrast these issues are the differences that make a difference. The interactional

communication of a decision does in-form ensuing interactional communications in these

respects. Thus in the interactional context such interactional decision communications

(usually) do not absorb the uncertainty involved in the decision making. Even if the decision

is not openly challenged the particular circumstances under which the decision was made will

have a great influence on further communications.


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We have to distinguish between two different foci of interactional decisions. Interactional

decisions can refer exclusively to the organisation outside the interaction; for example a

decision on a new strategy. Or they can refer to the interaction itself, i.e. concern the

structures of the interactional communication; for example decisions about the topics on the

agenda and their order, decisions to close or interrupt a meeting. In the first case the content

of the decision communication (i.e. the chosen alternative) does not have any implications for

the interaction. What is important for the interaction is that the decision has been made, but

not what decision has been made. In such interactions, as Kieserling (1999: 372) writes, the

decision is declared an output category that has to be delivered to the interactions

environment. In the second case the interaction treats its own communication processes

(partly) as decision processes. The communications are stylised as decisions and other

communications connect to them as ifthey treated them as decision premises. The interaction

however cannot but take the personal aspects of the communication into account as it is the

basis of its autopoiesis. Thus, even where the interaction presents its communications as

decision processes the communication in reality is reproduced differently. Thus, in order to

understand the interactional communications one has to understand the interactional

meanings behind the faade of decision communications.45 For example who decided what

against whom and how does he react to it. The interaction puts its own communications into a

(for the interaction) artificial form (Kieserling 1999: 373), but this artificial form is only the

surface behind which different information is latently processed.46 Apart from that

interactions can never present all their communications as decisions. A great part of the

45 See in this respect also Goffmans (1959) distinction between front and back stage.46 This doesnt mean that the interactional communication is more than the decision

communications, i.e. decision communication plus the interaction-specific communication. Ratheras we said before the reproduction of decisions follows a different logic than the interactionalcommunications. Or as Kieserling (1999: 358) puts it, between organisation and its interactionsthere exist considerable differences in information.


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communications resists being put in the form of decisions, e.g. the expression of surprise

about particular opinions etc. (cf. Kieserling 1999: 355-358; Luhmann 2000: 255).

Interactions stylise (some of) their own communications as decisions in order for the

organisation to integrate them into the organisational decision process. That is to say the

interaction observes its own operations with regard to its implications both for the

interactional process and with regard to the organisation. This also means that the interaction

can to a certain extent regulate what kind of communications become available to the

organisation and what dont; or in other words the interaction can (to some extent) influence

the organisational boundaries. In order to understand the influence of organisational

interactions on the organisation it is important to understand how the boundaries of interaction

and organisation relate to each other. Luhmann writes about the boundaries of interpenetrating

systems referring in particular to the relationship of social and psychic system, which can

however analogously be applied to our question:

Decisively, boundaries of one system can be included in the operational domain of

the other. Thus the boundaries of social systems [analogously: organisations] fall

within the consciousness of psychic systems [analogously: the communications of

interaction]. Consciousness [analogously: interactional communication]

intervenes and thereby acquires the possibility of drawing boundaries for social

systems [analogously: organisations] precisely because these boundaries arent, at

the same time, boundaries of consciousness [analogously: interactions]. The same

holds conversely: the boundaries of psychic systems [analogously: interactions]

fall within the communicative domain of social systems [analogously:

organisations]. In the course of orienting itself, communication [analogously:

decision communication] is constantly forced to use what psychic systems

[analogously: interactions] have already assimilated in their consciousness


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[analogously: interactional communications] and what they have not. This is

possible because the boundaries of psychic systems [analogously: interactions] are

not also boundaries of communicative [analogously: decisional] possibilities. (Luhmann

1995: 217; original emphasis)47

Organisational interactions can deal with the organisational boundaries in a differentiated

manner. Not everything that is communicated in the interaction has to be put in decision form

and thus made available to the organisation. On the contrary, interactions very often

intentionally withhold communications from being interpreted as organisational decisions. In

this way interactions often distinguish between official communications (that are presented as

decisions) and unofficial communications which often (explicitly) are kept from being

interpreted as decision. The organisational boundary often becomes an explicit topic of

interactional communication: what is to be made available to the organisation and what not

this communication is itself, of course, not intended to become an official communication.

The boundary is often even drawn retrospectively; initially official (decision) communications

are retrospectively withdrawn as illegitimate contribution this is usual practice in courts for

example (see Kieserling 1999: 373). Apart from interactions offering communications as

decisions to the organisation there is also the possibility of the organisation interpreting

communications as decisions although they werent originally intended so. The interaction

can only make suggestions to the organisation but cannot not determine what and how its

communications are observed.48

In any relationship of interpenetration there have to be specific signs that indicate to the

systems (potential) points of coincidence. That is to say the shared elements have to be

47 See analogously on the relationship between interaction and functional subsystems of societyKieserling (1999: 80-81)

48 Because both systems are operatively closed with regard to each other.


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marked in some way in order for the respective other system to be able to recognise them. In

the case of the relationship between psychic and social system this function of coupling is

served in the first place by language (and writing) (Luhmann 1995a: 272; Luhmann

1995c: 41). Articulated communication stands out from mere noise49 and captures the

attention of psychic systems (Luhmann 1995a: 142-143). And the other way around, if a

psychic system wants to contribute to the autopoiesis of a social system it tends to cast its

utterance in linguistic form.50 Such a marker for shared elements can also be found in the

case of the relationship between organisation and organisational interaction. The interaction

can highlight certain culmination points (Luhmann 1993e: 339) in the flow of interactional

communications in order to signal to the organisation possible points of connection. Such

markers could be an explicit declaration of a communication as decision - I thus conclude:

we have reached the decision to One can sometimes find that there exists a specific format

for such declarations, as for example the announcement of a verdict at court or the granting

of a doctorate at university. One of the most prominent markers however is the record51; if a

communication is put on record it is a strong signal for the organisation that the

communication lends itself to a treatment as organisational decision. Many organisations will

only recognise something as organisational decision if it is put on record. For the interaction

this means that it can regulate its relation to the organisation or better: the boundaries of the

organisation by distinguishing between communications on record and off record.52

What is to be put on record and what is to be kept off record often is an explicit point of

discussion in the interaction (Boden 1994: 85, Kieserling 1999: 385). Sometimes specific

points can be even retrospectively erased from the records.

49 Articulated speech disturbs a person who is not addressed more than mere noise. (Luhmann1995a: 142-143).

50 There are, of course, also non-linguistic forms of communication. (Luhmann 1995a: 151)51 On the classical treatment of this point see Weber (1979).


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5. Functions of organisational interactions

Interactions, as we argued above, can make their complexity available to the organisation and

in this way contribute to the fulfilment of organisational functions. In the following we want

to discuss three functions in particular: complexity reduction, deparadoxification and

memory.

(1) The possibility of a system of resorting to the complexity of another system as is implied

in the concept of interpenetration has implications for the systems handling of its own

complexity. At first on could say that it enables the system to increase its own given

complexity by the complexity that the other system makes available53 - in the sense that more

elements and relations between elements are involved in the processing of information.54

Based on Ashbys (1956: 202 ff.) law of requisite variety55 one could expect organisations

with for them turbulent environments to increase their complexity by enlisting the

complexity of organisational interactions. Thus, the more complexity is required the more

organisational interactions would be initiated by the organisation. One could maybe interpret

the empirical studies by Burns and Stalker (1961) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in that

respect, if by organic structure is meant the use of interactional communications for

coordinating operations. Furthermore, one can find that organisations initiate interactions

when problems arise that cannot be handled on the basis of organisational decision processes

52 The distinction on record / off record is the second order observation according to which itobserves its relation to the organisation.

53 Not: the entire complexity of the other system, as only part of the complexity becomes available.54 See the definition of complexity as defined by the number of possible elements and the possible

relations between the elements in Luhmann (1980).55 Variety can be understood as number of possible system states which is another expression for the

number of elements and possible relations between them.


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(cf. Schwartzman (1986), Schwartzman (1989), Weick (1995): 187, Kirsch (1992): 278). One

could think for example of crisis meetings and similar interactions. However, in order to

understand the mechanism by which the complexity of the organisation is increased through

interpenetration with organisational interactions we have to look at this issue from a slightly

different angle.

Based on the notion of complexity as pressure to select (Luhmann 1995a: 23-28; 1993d)

one can say that the more a system can use the complexity of another system for reducing its

own complexity the less it has to do it itself. 56 That is to say a system that can instrumentalise

the complexity of another system for making selections amongst its possibilities doesnt need

to make the selections itself; or in other words needs less structure. Luhmann in this sense

writes with regard to specific case of interpenetration between social and psychic system:

[A]n empirically proven hypothesis fits these considerations: social systems that

can enlist more complex psychic systems need less structure. They can cope with

greater instabilities and quicker structural change. They can expose themselves to

chance and thereby relieve their internal regulation. This is comprehensible if one

correctly understands complexity and interpenetration, namely, as a pressure to

select that increases with size and as the ability to condition this pressure in an

open way. (Luhmann 1995a: 217; endnote omitted)

This hypothesis can be applied analogously to the relation between organisation and

organisational interaction. The greater the complexity of organisational interactions that an

organisation can enlist the less decision premises it needs. This line of argument finds support

for example in the literature on team coordination in contrast to hierarchical coordination,

which is also inherent in much of the literature on lean management or flat hierarchies, - if we

56 On the necessity of complexity for reducing complexity see Baecker (1999)


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understand teams as succession of organisational interactions57. The more an organisation can

rely on interactions to guide organisations in their decision making the less the organisation

needs to develop its own decision premises or the less detailed they have to be; e.g. no

elaborate rules about communication procedures, no detailed decision programmes, no

detailed personnel planning. Apart from that one can often find that particularly at the apex of

an organisation in business organisations: amongst the top management team decision

processes are only to a very minor degree pre-structured in the form of formal decision

premises. Instead the organisation mostly relies on organisational interactions for guiding

the organisational decision process.58

On the basis of this second interpretation it becomes clear how the complexity of the

organisation is increased by organisational interactions. The complexity of an organisation

requires the organisation to select decision premises and in this way reduce its complexity.

With the selection of structures the variety, i.e. the number of possible relations between

elements, is reduced. Reduction of complexity, however, is necessary in order for the system

to be able to operate otherwise the system wouldnt have enough internal guidance to

make self-reproduction possible (Luhmann 1995a: 283). By relying on organisational

interactions to make the selections, the organisation can do without a pre-selection of possible

relations in the form of decision premises and in this sense allow for a greater variety. In other

words organisational interactions increase the complexity of an organisation by relieving the

organisation of having to reduce its complexity. To go back to our examples above,

organisations with organic structures possess a greater variety as the possibilities of relations

between elements is less restricted by (formal) decision premises. Instead the organisation

57 To be precise, teams may be defined as a succession of organisational interactions with identicalcomposition which are perceived and expected as a unity (cf. Kieserling 1999: 221).

58 See for example Mintzbergs (1973) empirical study on the work of top managers, who spendmost of their time in interactions.


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initially allows for a relatively greater variety of relations, which only in the concrete decision

situation are then limited through interactional processes.

(2) Organisations, more than any other types of social systems, have to deal with paradoxes.59

As explained at the beginning of the paper every single operation of an organisation

constitutes an explicit paradox. In order for a system not to get paralysed by its paradoxes

the paradoxes have to be deparadoxified. The main mechanism of deparadoxification of

ordinary decisions within the organisation is the attribution to a decision maker (Luhmann

2000: 136; 147). The paradox of decision is in that way shifted from the operative level to the

structural level. Instead of the undecidability of the decision (Von Foerster 1992: 14), the

structures entitling the decision maker to make a specific decision come to the fore; instead of

asking about the form of the alternativity of the decision (Luhmann 1993c: 289) one is led

to ask about the decision premises that justify the decision - in particular the hierarchical

orderings of positions (cf. Luhmann 2000: 138). While any such question if consequently

investigated ultimately ends up again at the paradox of decision (i.e. the decision to put

certain structures in place60), usually the organisational complexity inhibits such

investigations as Luhmann (2000: 139; my translation) writes: the paradox is concealed by

complexity. Thus, this basic form of deparadoxification in most cases is enough for

preventing a paralysis.

There are however cases where the shift of the decision complexity onto the level of

structures isnt enough as a means of a deparadoxification; where the shift doesnt prevent the

exposure of the paradox. This could be the case where the structures themselves are

59 Any self-referential system is paradoxically constituted. (Luhmann 1995a: 33)60 and beyond that the ultimate decision creating the organisation in the first place implying the

paradox of its existence before its existence.


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contradictory61, e.g. unclear decision competencies; thus instead of the operative paradox the

organisation would have to deal with a structural paradox.62 It could also be the case where no

clear decision premises exist. For example in connection with decisions on fundamental

decision premises in the context of business organisation one also speaks of policies or

strategies; or during major turbulences in the organisation. Closely related to this is the case

where decisions pertain to the very structures that serve as their decision premises. These are

primarily decisions on fundamental organisational change this could be a change of

fundamental decision premises. In these cases the attribution to decision makers and their

respective positions (as combination of the three general decision premises) cannot serve as a

means of deparadoxification. In these cases organisations often use interactions as a means of

deparadoxification. Decisions arent attributed to individual decision makers but to a

deciding interaction. This could either mean that the interaction is perceived directly as the

decision maker; one could think of a jury at court that announces its (!) verdict or corporate

boards announcing their (!) decision on a new strategy. Alternatively it could also mean that

one decision maker in an interaction is centrally held responsible for a decision but as other

participants have assented the decision ultimately is attributed to the interaction.

The attribution of decisions to interactions can serve as a means of deparadoxification to the

extent that the interactional processes for the organisation are incomprehensible. This

means that the concrete processes leading to the decision making remain in the dark for the

organisation not the interaction. In this sense the decision paradox is shifted onto the

mystery (Luhmann 2000: 135-140) of an interaction: the interaction has decided the

undecidable but from outside one cant say how (cf. Schwartzman (1987), pp. 285-286).

Usually one cant even ask as the interaction, in contrast to individual decision makers, as

61 Structural contradictions or paradoxes for Luhmann (2000: 147) have to be understood asderivatives of paradoxes on the operative level.


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they cannot be addressed as a unity (Kieserling 1999: 383-384).63 Furthermore, interactions

often actively contribute to the mystery by interactions withholding any information on the

concrete processes involved in the decision processes (cf. Kieserling 1999: 382)64. One could

again think for example of juries at court which at most disclose the number of votes for or

against a particular judgement but no concrete reasons; or at corporate boards that might

disclose reasons for a decision but keep their statements so general that they dont really say

anything about the factual decision making. Decisions in this way defy any criticism; they are

stabilised by reference to the incomprehensible complexity of the interaction. The only points

for potential criticism are the (starting) conditions of the interaction: who participated in the

interaction, what was the official agenda etc; in other words, criticism is re-directed toward

the decisions and decision premises involved in setting up the interaction. This again can be

evaded by drawing them as much as possible into the interaction i.e. participants and topics

are chosen from within the interaction - and by presenting the interaction more or less as

spontaneously formed so that the official justification for the initiation of the interaction can

be provided retrospectively from within the interaction.

Organisational interactions dont only serve as a means of deparadoxifying and thus

stabilising decisions after they have been made, but they can also serve such a function in the

decision situations themselves. In other words interactions can provide an orientation in

decision situations where such guidance cannot be provided by the organisation itself. 65 Thus,

where the organisational decision premises are ambiguous or conflicting, or where decisions

pertain exactly to the decision premises that could provide guidance, that interaction can take

over the lead; the decision process is pressed ahead by the dynamic of the interaction.

62 Which again manifests itself in concrete operations.63 The participants can, of course, be asked but every participant might tell a different story.64 Cf. Goffman (1959) on secrets of and in interactions.65 This is just another perspective on the same point as above.


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Decision making in this sense is less oriented according to organisational than interactional

structures. Retrospectively, however, decision premise for the decisions can be and probably

have to be searched for, reconstructed, re-interpreted or even invented. In other words

decisions retrospectively can be presented as if they had been guided by decision premises

decisions are post-rationalised. This line of argument to some extent runs counter to

Kieserlings (1999: 368-359) hypothesis that normally interactions guide the organisational

decision processes while in crisis situations the decision processes guide the interactions. We

would rather say that under crisis situations in particular situations which lead to a

fundamental ambiguity of the organisational structures interactions take the lead.66

(3) Organisational interactions can serve a memory function in the organisation. With

memory Luhmann (2000: 192, passim; 1997: passim)67 refers to the fact that systems

discriminate between forgetting and remembering: the memory selects what to sort out into

forgetting and what to remember.68 In contrast to traditional conceptualisations memory is not

understood as storage of information (Walsh and Ungson 1991: 61) but as a function that

relates present situations to earlier operations of the system. One could say it defines the

system-related reality of the concrete situation. In this sense the organisational memory

determines in every concrete decision situation what earlier decisions to relate. In other words

it remembers other decision situations and interprets the concrete decision situation in their

context. In order to understand why certain situations or aspects of situations are remembered

and others forgotten one has to understand the conditioning of the organisational memory.

Luhmann writes about the organisational memory:

66 Which system takes the lead under normal conditions can be left open here.67 Luhmann here draws on the neurophysilogical and general cybernetic studies of Von Foerster

(1949; 1985: 133-172; 1950; 1969)68 As Luhmann writes, the main achievement of the memory is forgetting; remembering

consequently has to be conceptualised as inhibition of forgetting (Luhmann 2000: 192).


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When it comes to organizations the memory is linked to the uncertainty

absorption which connects decisions with decisions. It forgets the generally

underlying uncertainty, unless it has become part of the decision in the form of

doubts or reservations. But it forgets also the numerous contributing decisions (the

invitation to a meeting, the unsuccessful attempts at pushing through a request); it

represses also most of what contributes to the autopoiesis of the system. By and

large [] it only retains what later decisions draw upon as decision premises.

(Luhmann 2000: 193, my translation, footnote omitted)

In this sense organisations tend to remember only results of decision processes and to forget

their concrete developments. This radical forgetting although a lot of potentially useful69

references to earlier situations get lost is necessary for the organisation in order not to clog

up its capacity for information processing (Luhmann 2000: 192). One could also say the

memory serves as an important form of complexity reduction.

Organisations cant however dispense completely with all that it forgets. Often it needs to

remember for example information that was gathered in connection with a decision or

concrete developments of a decision process or the concrete arguments for and against

particular decisions by particular members of the organisation.70 Such references might be of

particular importance in cases where the organisation experiences inconsistencies between its

decision premises or where new decision situations are difficult to make sense of. Or it might

just be that such references make specific decision situations easier to handle. In such cases

and it might indeed be in almost all decision situations the interaction can provide the

organisation with an appropriate memory. This is the case because the memory of

(organisational) interactions is conditioned in a different way. The interactional memory in

69 Useful in the sense that they could make later decisions easier.


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contrast to the organisational memory is not connected to the organisational uncertainty

absorption. Kieserling in this sense writes:

The memory of the organisation remembers only decisions and forgets everything

else. The memory of the interaction and its participants, in contrast, is conditioned

in a totally different way. They might remember the process more than the result

and the defeated more than the finally victorious candidates. (Kieserling, 1999:

385-386, my translation)

The interactional memory, thus, seems to be conditioned almost in the opposite way to that of

the organisation. What the one tends to forget the other tends to remember. Because of their

relationship of interpenetration the interaction can make its own memory available to the

organisation. This doesnt of course mean that the organisational memory is enlarged by the

interactional memory; the interactional memory doesnt become part of the organisational

memory in the same way as the interactional complexity doesnt become part of the

organisational complexity, as argued above. The organisation doesnt have direct access to the

memory of the interaction, but it can expose its decisions to the interactional memory by

having decisions take place within interactions. If a decision is discussed within

organisational interactions the participants are likely to draw on past experiences in

connection with similar decision situations, to arguments that they previously might have had

and similar things. Although these communications are inconceivable for the organisation

they have an effect on the communication that ultimately will be interpreted by the

organisation as its own decision and, thus, will have an effect on the organisational

autopoiesis. Organisations might in this sense instrumentalise interactions for remembering

what they themselves have forgotten.

70 And to remember thatit has forgotten what it has forgotten.


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This memory function of organisational interactions can also be described as a form of

complexity reduction to be precise: reduction of temporal complexity. Interactions by

making their memory available to the organisational reproduction serve a function of

complexity reduction for the organisation. Analogously to our argument above we can say

that organisations can use organisational interaction for selecting relations between the

present decision situation and earlier decision situations of the organisation. To the extent that

the organisation can rely on interactions fulfilling this task in concrete decision situations they

dont have to establish structures that pre-select the relations. Apart from the fact that

organisations due to their particular mode of reproduction (i.e. uncertainty absorption) are

always dependent on interactional memory without that they wouldnt be able to reproduce

themselves -, we can find different degrees to which the interactional memory is drawn upon.

Analogously to our argument above we can say the more an organisation can rely on

interactional memory the less elaborate its own memory structures e.g. written

documentation etc. - and vice versa.

Possibilities for conditioning organisational interactions

So far we have discussed functions that organisational interactions might serve for their

organisation. We havent however asked how interactions can be brought to serve these

functions. It probably wouldnt be enough for organisations to rely on interactions to form

spontaneously and by chance in the right moment when they are needed. Rather, although

interactions are operatively closed vis--vis organisations they nevertheless can be

conditioned.71 That is to say organisations can create certain context factors that make it

71 Cf. Luhmann (2000: 373).


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likely for interactions to reproduce themselves in ways that are of benefit to the organisation.

This conditioning can be temporal, social and factual.

Conditioning in the time dimension is particularly focused on beginning and ending of an

interaction. The organisation can decide to start an interaction and it can also decide on a

certain time limit after which the interaction is to come to an end. For example, a meeting can

be scheduled for a certain time - from three to four o'clock. The organisation could also

decide on a sequence of interactions - every Monday from three to four o'clock (cf.

Luhmann 1997: 818). However, as the organisation has no direct access to the interactional

operations, it cannot directly start or terminate them;72 only the interaction itself can produce

its own beginning and its own ending. Yet, organisations can condition participation and,

thus, indirectly 'stimulate' interactions to produce beginning and ending. That is to say, the

organisation can decide on a certain time span for which members are to come together. The

beginning of the interaction can be conditioned in so far as the organisation can arrange for

members to come into face-to-face contact on the basis of which an interaction is likely to

form.73 The ending can be conditioned through the decision to withdraw the participants after

the time has run out. The interaction can observe this prospect of their participants being

withdrawn after a certain time and in expectation of that produce its own end. When the time

has run out, the participants of the interaction say 'good bye' to each other.

In the social dimension the organisation can condition the interaction by deciding on

participants. That is to say, the organisation can influence the interactional communications

by deciding who is to participate and, thus, what perspectives become available in the

72 Unless the organisation, for example, decided to blow up the interaction with a bomb, in whichcase the interaction would not be terminated by the interaction itself, but by the elimination of its(necessary) environment of psychic systems (cf. Luhmann 1995c: 45)

73 Kirsch (1992), pp. 271 ff., in this sense, speaks of the 'creation of necessary and sufficient initialand contextual conditions' for the emergence of interactions.


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interaction (cf. Kieserling 1999: 378). Especially important in this context are the perspectives

given through the particular organisational roles of the participants. For example, if the

organisation decided that senior managers are to participate, the interaction is likely to be

different from a meeting between shop floor workers only.

Again, by deciding on the composition of the interaction the organisation can condition it, but

it does not have any direct control over it. It is ultimately left to the interaction to determine

who is treated as present and who as absent. In this sense, even people physically present

might be considered absent by the interaction. Similarly, the formal organisational roles of the

participants might not be referred to by the interactional communications.

Conditioning in the fact dimension concerns the organisation's influence on the selection of

topics. An explicit conditioning in this dimension would be a decision on the agenda of a

forthcoming interaction. The selection of topics can also be indirectly influenced through

decision on participants. For example, if many marketing managers were involved in the

interaction, the communication is likely to focus on marketing issues.74 Another way of

conditioning the selection of topics is to set in advance certain output categories for the

interaction, e.g. certain decision have to be made. An important form of conditioning concerns

the constraining of the range of possible topics. Instead of influencing the interaction in a way

that makes the selection of a specific topic more likely, the organisation can also make the

selection of certain topics more unlikely; for example by withholding information.

Although we have treated the different dimensions of conditioning separately, here, they are

to a large extent interdependent. For example, by starting an interaction for discussing recent

sales figures, the organisation might condition the interaction in all three dimensions. In the

74 One has to be careful not to confuse the social and fact dimension. Here we are speaking ofspecific topics of communication - the sales figures are talked about. When we speak about the


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object dimension t

Organisational Interactions in Luhmann's Theory of Social Systems.pdf

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