Revolten und politische Verbrechen zwischen dem 12. … of Infidencia in Spanish... · “La...

Revolten und politische Verbrechenzwischen dem 12. und 19. Jahrhundert

Herausgegeben vonAngela De Benedictis, Karl Härter

Studien zureuropäischen Rechtsgeschichte

Veröffentlichungen desMax-Planck-Institutsfür europäische RechtsgeschichteFrankfurt am Main

Band 285

Vittorio KlostermannFrankfurt am Main2013

Revolten und politische Verbrechenzwischen dem 12. und 19. Jahrhundert

Rechtliche Reaktionen undjuristisch-politische Diskurse

Revolts and Political Crimefrom the 12th to the 19th Century

Legal Responses andJuridical-Political Discourses

Herausgegeben vonAngela De Benedictis und Karl Härterunter redaktioneller Mitarbeit vonTina Hannappel und Thomas Walter

Vittorio KlostermannFrankfurt am Main2013

Titelkupfer von: Johann Wilhelm Neumair von Ramsla,Von Auffstand der Untern wider ihre Regenten und Obernsonderbarer Tractat / verfertiget Durch Johann WilhelmNeumair von Ramsla daselbst Erbgesessen, Jena:Reiffenberger 1633© Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttelhttp://diglib.hab.de/drucke/37-1-pol-1s/start.htm

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Inhalt

Preface and Acknowledgements ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... IX

Karl HärterRevolten, politische Verbrechen, rechtliche Reaktionen undjuristisch-politische Diskurse: einleitende Bemerkungen ... ... ... ... 1

1. Recht, juristisch-politische Diskurse, Wissen und Medien /Law, Juridical-Political Discourses, Knowledge and Media

Angela De Benedictis“According to Bartolo”, “according to Baldo”. Archives ofKnowledge for the Study of Revolt ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 17

Andreas RothRevolte, Aufruhr und Tumulte – strafbare Verbrechen oderlegitimer Widerstand? ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 41

Luigi LacchèLese Majesty: the Conceptualisation of a Political Crime betweenLegal History and Historiography ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 61

David von MayenburgDer Bauer als Rebell in der Tradition des Ius Commune undder frühneuzeitlichen Aufstandsliteratur ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 75

Emanuele Conte“Defensa”. Resistance against unjust Power in theMedieval Learned Law (12th–13th Centuries) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 121

Diego QuaglioniFrom Rebellion to Military Law. Balthazar Ayala’s De iure etofficiis bellicis ac disciplina militari (1582)... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 135

Inhalt V

Andreas WürglerRechtliche Reaktionen auf Revolten – Revolten als rechtlicheReaktionen? Herrschaft und Protest inden frühneuzeitlichen Medien... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 147

Malte GriesseAufstandsprävention in der Frühen Neuzeit: LänderübergreifendeWahrnehmungen von Revolten und Verrechtlichungsprozesse ... 173

2. Fallstudien / Case Studies

Andrea ZorziRévoltes et crimes politiques dans l’Italie communale et seigneuriale 213

Martin P. Schennach“Plus valuerunt verbera quam verba”? Rechtliche Reaktionenauf Revolten in den österreichischen Ländern zwischenden Bauernkriegen von 1525 und 1626 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 235

Christiane BirrRebellische Väter, versklavte Kinder: Der Aufstand der Moriskenvon Granada (1568–1570) in der juristisch-theologischenDiskussion der Schule von Salamanca ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 281

J. Friedrich BattenbergEin Aufruhr gegen die Juden zu Fulda von 1591. RechtlicheReaktionen und Folgen ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 319

Lothar SchillingDeutung und rechtliche Sanktionierung von Adelsrevoltenim Frankreich des 16. und frühen 17. Jahrhunderts ... ... ... ... ... 339

André KrischerAufruhr als Hochverrat? Drei Londoner Riots vor Gericht(1668, 1710, 1780) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 381

VI Inhalt

Thomas WalterPunishing Rebels, Ringleaders and Followers. Punitive Responsesto the Saxon Peasant Uprising of 1790 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 415

Aniceto MasferrerThe Crime of infidencia in the Cortes of Cádiz. An Approachto the Crime of Treason during the Early SpanishConstitutionalism (1808–1814) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 447

Editors and Contributors ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 475

Inhalt VII

Preface and Acknowledgements

This volume collects the papers presented at the international conferenceRevolten und politische Verbrechen zwischen dem 12. und 19. Jahrhundert:Reaktionen der Rechtssysteme und juristisch-politische Diskurse / Rivolte ecrimini politici tra XII e XIX secolo: Reazioni del sistema giuridico e discorsogiuridico-politico held at the Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsge-schichte, Frankfurt am Main, in April 2011. This endeavour started as anItalian–German co-operation between the Università di Bologna representedby Angela De Benedictis and the Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechts-geschichte Frankfurt am Main, represented by Karl Härter, based on respec-tive research projects dealing with the history of tumulti and political crime.

Our main purpose was to conceive and present new approaches to thehistory of revolts and political crimes, combining social, political and legalhistory. Therefore, we have added three more contributions of participantswhich initially were not presented at the conference but provide additionalaspects and case studies to our topic. As a result, this volume covers a widespectrum of rural, urban and aristocratic revolts, rebellions, uprisings, andupheavals in many European countries and Russia from the Middle Ages tothe early 19th century. This variety of phenomena is linked by the mainapproach to explore the interdependences between revolts and political crimein focusing on the legal responses and the juridical-political discourses(including public media) as explained in more detail in the introductory essay.Hence, this volume presents the contributions in two sections: The firstfocuses on “Law, Juridical-Political Discourses, Knowledge and Media” and– after a general introductory essay – presents more general studies oncriminal law and political crime, the crimen laesae maiestatis, treason, theconceptualisation of peasant rebels, defensa and resistance, military law andthe images of revolts and legal responses in public media as well as the trans-border perception of revolts. The second section comprises different casestudies of rural, urban and aristocratic revolts in Italy, Austria, Spain, France,England, Fulda and Saxony, analysing a broad variety of legal responses aswell as specific topics and contexts such as minority groups (Moriscos, Jews)or colonial and military occupation.

As an overall result, this collection proves that despite their diversmanifestations (concerning actors, motives, causes, results etc.), revolts wereperceived, conceptualised and treated between the poles of serious politicalcrimes such as the crimen laesae maiestatis, treason, or infidencia on the onehand, and protest or resistance on the other hand. In pre-modern Europe (and

The editors IX

beyond) revolts stimulated flexible legal responses, controversial juridical-political discourses and ambiguous media images which may be seen as cross-border characteristics that challenged and to some respect altered the legalsystems and the ius commune in particular. Thus, the angle of political crimeand legal responses provides an important insight: Revolts widely affected thepre-modern legal systems which on the discursive as well as on the practicallevel developed flexible and appropriate responses – ranging from criminali-sation, punishment and military law to mediation, prevention and Verrecht-lichung – in order to regulate political and social conflicts.

Finally, the editors would like to thank the authors who presented anddiscussed their contributions at the conference and provided them to thisvolume as well as the other participants who actively contributed to thediscussion, namely Anette Baumann, Gerhard Dilcher, Patrick Lantschner,Winfried Schulze, Friedrich Christian Schroeder, and Andreas Suter. Equally,our thanks goes to the staff of the Max-Planck-Institut für europäischeRechtsgeschichte and its directors Thomas Duve and Michael Stolleis fortheir indispensable support and help in organising the conference andpublishing this volume.

The editors

X Preface and Acknowledgements

The Crime of infidencia in the Cortes of Cádiz.An Approach to the Crime of Treason during theEarly Spanish Constitutionalism (1808–1814)1

1 Introduction: Revolt, Treason, crimen laesae maiestatis and infidencia

The Spanish expression “infidencia” has several meanings, namely, treason,disloyalty, faithlessness, or breach of trust. Emerging as a crime in the contextof the Independence War (1808–1814), it was used to criminalize those whosupported the French authorities personified in Joseph I, brother of NapoleonBonaparte and thus functioned similar to the crime of treason to punish thosewho betrayed – sometimes through revolts – the “Spanish” nation personifiedin the legitimate king (Fernando VII). In this regard, it may be said that theinfidencia was introduced in the Early nineteenth-century Spain as a responseof the state to those who had committed the serious political crime ofbetraying or revolting against the legitimate Spanish authority.

Spain, as many other European territories, has a long history of revoltswhich were often regarded and punished by the authorities as treason.2

Therefore, the following case study focuses solely on the state’s legalresponses to disloyalty and revolt in the context of the Independence War(1808–1814) and the political crime of infidencia which occurred only in the

Aniceto Masferrer 447

1 This study has been undertaken in the context of the research project entitled“La influencia de la Codificación francesa en la tradición penal española: suconcreto alcance en la Parte General de los Códigos decimonónicos” (ref.DER2012–38469), financed by the Spanish ‘Ministerio de Economía yCompetitividad’.

2 For an overview see the Pérez Zagorín, Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660,vol. I.: Society, States, and Early Modern Revolution. Agrarian and UrbanRebellions, Cambridge 1982; Jonathan C. D. Clark, Revolution and Rebel-lion. State and Society in England in the seventeeth and eighteeth centuries,Cambridge 1986; for Spain, see Justiniano García Prado, Historia delalzamiento, Guerra y Revolución de Asturias (1808–1814), Oviedo 1953;Julio Valdeón Baruque, Revueltas y revoluciones en la historia. PrimerasJornadas de Estudios Históricos, Salamanca 1990.

named period to punish those who supported the French authorities anddisappeared – almost completely – afterwards and was never integrated in theSpanish criminal code. In fact, the emergence of infidencia was closely relatedto the popular uprising of the second of May (“Dos de Mayo”) 1808, thatmarked the end of the Spanish Old Regime. During this rebellion the peopleof Madrid revolted against the occupation of the city by French troops,provoking a brutal repression by the French Imperial forces and triggeringconsequently the Independence War.3 It is well known that the repressionfollowing the counterinsurgency of the initial rebellion was harsh. On theevening of the second of May the French Marshal in command of Madrid,Joaquim Murat, created a military commission which imposed death senten-ces to all captured rebels who had been carrying weapons of any kind. In astatement issued that day Murat proclaimed: “The population of Madrid, ledastray, has given itself to revolt and murder. French blood has flowed. Itdemands vengeance. All those arrested in the uprising, arms in hand, will beshot.”4 All public meetings were prohibited and an order was issueddemanding that all weapons should be handed over to the authorities.Hundreds of prisoners were executed the following day, a scene that Goyacaptured in his famous painting The Third of May 1808.

Whereas the French occupiers hoped that this harsh suppression of theuprising would demonstrate their control of Spain, the rebellion actually gaveconsiderable impetus to resistance, and in the following weeks further revoltserupted in different parts of the country. In fact, the popular resistance lastedthroughout the whole Independence War, and the final Spanish victory wasdue – at least to some extent – to the guerrilla movement, a spontaneous and

448 The Crime of infidencia in the Cortes of Cádiz

3 For an overview, see Enrique Moral Sondobal (ed.), España y la Revolu-ción francesa, Madrid 1989; Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on ModernSpain, New Jersey 1971, chapters 6 and 7; Raymond Carr, Spain 1808–1939, Oxford, 1982, chapter III; David G. Chandler, The Campaigns ofNapoleon, New York 1995; Jesús De Juana López, La Guerra de laIndependencia (1808–1814), in: Historia contemporánea de España (1808–1939), ed. by Francisco Javier Paredes, Barcelona 1996, pp. 89–107; JoséA. Armillas Vicente (ed.), La Guerra de la Independencia. Estudios, 2 vols.,Zaragoza 2001; more specifically, see Charles J. Esdaile, The Breakdown ofAuthority in Spain, 1812–1814, in: Armillas Vicente, La Guerra, I, pp. 35–50; Antonio Moliner Prada, Pueblo y ejército en la Guerra de la Indepen-dencia, in: Armillas Vicente, La Guerra, II, pp. 917–953; MichaelGlover, The Peninsular War 1807–1814. A Concise Military History, London2003; Antonio Moliner Prada (ed.), La guerra de la independencia enEspaña, 1808–1814, Alella 2007; Jean-René Aymes, La Guerra de laIndependencia en España (1808–1814), 6th ed., Madrid 2008.

4 Jon Cowans, Modern Spain. A Documentary History, Pennsylvania 2003.

partly popular reaction against the French military occupation.5 During thewar the Cortes of Cádiz issued several laws threatening punishment to thosewho supported the French cause. In this context the crime of infidenciaemerged and was conceptualised as a political crime, thereby referring tovarious forms of infidelity against the patria (or Spanish nation) and aiming atthe prosecution and conviction of those who supported the cause of JoséBonaparte.6 After the war and the return of King Fernando VII the Spanishstate prosecuted the French supporters harshly,7 notably using the crime ofinfidencia which, as a flexible – and still more ambiguous – concept, allowed,to some extent, to criminalise and punish a variety of different behavioursregarded as politically (or socially) deviant and dissident.

Ambiguity and flexibility had been a characteristic feature of the crime oftreason throughout the Spanish criminal law tradition. Because the king wasconsidered to be the head of the kingdom which formed his “body”, nearlyevery action against the peace,8 the order or the stability of the kingdomcould be regarded as a crime of treason. This explains why it was so difficult


5 Miguel Artola, La Guerra de Guerrillas, in: Revista de Occidente 10 (1964),pp. 12–43, here pp. 16 ss.; Charles Esdaile, Heroes or villains revisited:fresh thoughts on la guerrilla, in: II Seminario Internacional sobre la Guerra dela Independencia (24–26 de octubre de 1994), Madrid 1996, pp. 191–210;Antonio Moliner Prada, La guerrilla en la Guerra de la Independencia,Madrid 2004; Charles Esdaile, España contra Napoleón. Guerrilla, bando-leros y el mito del pueblo en armas (1808–1814), Madrid 2006; Javier Nart/Rafael Abella, Guerrilleros: el pueblo en armas contra Napoleón (1808–1814), Madrid 2007; Antonio Moliner Prada, El fenómeno guerrillero, in:Moliner Prada, La guerra de la independencia en España, pp. 123–152; seealso the work of Conde De Toreno (José María Queipo de Llano y Ruiz deSaravia), Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución en España, 5 vols.,Madrid 1847, second edition Astorga 2008.

6 In this regard, see Félix José Reinoso, Examen de los delitos de infidelidad ala patria, imputados a los españoles sometidos baxo la dominación francesa,second edition, Burdeos 1818; an insightful review provides Ignacio Agui-lera Santiago, Notas sobre el libro de Reinoso “Delitos de infidelidad a lapatria”, in: Boletín de la Biblioteca Menéndez Pelayo (Número extraordinarioen homenaje a D. Miguel Artigas), vol. I, pp. 319–386.

7 Many French families were expelled from Spain; for example, Irene Castells/Antonio Moliner, Crisis del Antiguo Régimen y Revolución Liberal enEspaña (1789–1845), Barcelona 2000, particularly chapter 2, pp. 73–79(concerning the ‘afrancesados’); see also José Antonio Salas Auséns, Unaconsecuencia de los sitios de Zaragoza: la expulsión de los franceses en 1813,in: Armillas Vicente, La Guerra, I, pp. 247–274.

8 On this matter, see José Orlandis, La paz de la casa en el derecho español dela Alta Edad Media, in: Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español [AHDE] 15(1944), pp. 107–161; Rafael Gibert, La paz del camino en el derecho

to list all the cases of treason, being an endeavour “as impossible as useless”.9

This demonstrates the complexity of the historical notion of such crimes astreason, which belonged to the category of “atrocious crimes”10 which areequally characterised by an intricate historical development which wasremarkably sophisticated for political reasons. Therefore the criminal lawwas (and still is) very sensible to the political sphere and has often been usedfor political purposes.11

According to the Siete Partidas, the crime of high treason was committedby those that killed (or tried to kill) the King, by those that joined (alliedwith) the King’s enemies by action or omission, by those that raised others upagainst him – thus criminalising the instigation of revolt and rebellion –, orby those that killed any of his representatives.12 Perpetrators were threatenedthe death penalty and the confiscation of their assets. Goods belonging to thepatrimony of their wife’s and daughters’ dowry were excluded from thispunishment, from which a fourth part could be inherited; the same applied tothe patrimony of their creditors. These exceptions did not protect the sons ofconvicted, who were branded with lifelong infamy (‘infamis’), prohibitingthem to hold an office or to benefit from any inheritance.13 As far as this isconcerned, Gregorio López highlighted in his commentary of the Partidasthat the legal sanctions always affected the male line and never the femaleone, quoting the opinions of some commentators that argued that if themother had been the author of the crime, her own son should not bepunished with the appropriate punishment.14 Whereas Partidas VII, 2, 1listed fourteen forms of treason, later on Alfonso XI reduced them to nine,


medieval español, in: AHDE 27–28 (1957–58), pp. 831–852; Luis GarcíaDe Valdeavellano, Domus disrupta. La protección jurídica del domicilio enlos Derechos locales portugueses de la Alta Edad Media, in: Anales de laUniversidad de Barcelona (1943), pp. 65–72.

9 Aquilino Iglesia Ferreirós, Historia de la traición. La traición regia enLeón y Castilla, Santiago de Compostela 1971, p. 137.

10 On this matter, see Isabel Ramos Vázquez, La represión de los delitos atrocesen el Derecho Castellano de la Edad Moderna, in: Revista de EstudiosHistórico-Jurídicos 26 (2004), pp. 255–299.

11 Francisco Tomás y Valiente, El Derecho penal como instrumento degobierno, in: Estudis 22 (1996), pp. 249–262; Mario Sbriccoli, CrimenLaesae maiestatis. Il problema del reato politico alla soglie della scienziapenalistica moderna, Milano 1974.

12 Partidas VII, 2, 1.13 Partidas VII, 2, 2.14 Gregorio López, Las Siete Partidas, Glosse to P. VII, 2, 2, b ‘sean varones’.

Aggravated capital punishment must never, in any case, be applied to thenobleman that has been tried and found guilty of treason. According to the

which were promulgated and eventually contained in the Ordenamiento deAlcalá 32, 5.

Though the crime of treason in the Spanish criminal law tradition has beenextensively explored,15 not a single study covers the related crime ofinfidencia.16 Thus we first of all need to clarify the relationship betweenthe crime of treason and the crime of infidencia as well as the relationshipbetween treason and crimen laesae maiestatis. Otherwise a statement like theconnection between treason/crimen laesae maiestatis and infidencia is barelycomprehensible. Concerning the former, admittedly any behaviour or actwhich is constitutive of infidencia could be considered as treason, but not any


Partidas, they shall not give him an infamous death as punishment, by dragginghim along, forcing or sullying him, but instead, a quick beheading or death bystarvation, if they wanted to show great severity (Partidas II, 21, 24).

15 Alfonso Otero Varela, Dos estudios histórico-jurídicos, vol. I: El riepto enel Derecho castellano-leonés, Roma/Madrid 1955; Juan García Gonzalez,Traición y alevosía en la Alta Edad Media, in: AHDE 32 (1962), pp. 323–345;Francisco Tomás y Valiente, El Derecho penal de la Monarquía absoluta(siglos XVI–XVII–XVIII), Madrid 1969; José María Espinosa Isach, Latraición en Castilla durante la Baja Edad Media (extracto publicado de tesisdoctoral), Valencia 1970; Iglesia Ferreirós, Historia de la traición.

16 The Spanish criminal law historiography has not paid attention to this matter;Juan Baró Pazos, Historiografía sobre la Codificación del Derecho penal en elsiglo XIX, in: Doce Estudios de Historiografía Contemporánea, Santander1991, pp. 11–40; Clara Alvarez Alonso, Tendencias generales de lahistoriografía penal en España desde el siglo XIX, in: Hispania. Entre derechospropios y derechos nacionales. Atti dell’Incontro di Studio. Firenze/Lucca, 25–27 maggio 1989. Per la storia pensiero giuridico moderno 34/35, Milano1990, 2 vols., pp. 969–984; Enrique Gacto Fernández, Aproximación a laHistoria del derecho penal español, in: Hispania. Entre derechos propios yderechos nacionales, pp. 501–530; Alfonso Otero Varela, Historia delDerecho criminal en Compostela, in: Dereito 8/1 (1999), pp. 141–186;Aniceto Masferrer, La dimensión ejemplarizante del Derecho penal muni-cipal catalán en el marco de la tradición jurídica europea. Algunas reflexionesiushistórico-penales de carácter metodológico, in: AHDE 71 (2001), pp. 439–471; Aniceto Masferrer, Continuismo, reformismo y ruptura en la Codifi-cación penal francesa. Contribución al estudio de una controversia historio-gráfica actual de alcance europeo, in: AHDE 73 (2003), pp. 403–420;Aniceto Masferrer, El ius commune en la historiografía penal española.Una apuesta metodológica de apertura hacia lo supranacional y europeo, in:Studi in Onore di Manlio Bellomo, ed. by Orazio Condorelli, EmmaMontanos-Ferrín and Kenneth Pennington, Roma 2004, t. III, pp. 563–587; Aniceto Masferrer, La historiografía penal española del siglo XX. Unaaproximación a sus principales líneas temáticas y metodológicas, in: Rudi-mentos Legales 5 (2003), pp. 29–125.

of the legally regulated forms of treason constituted the specific crime ofinfidencia. Moreover, infidencia could also be described as a crimen laesaemaiestatis, because treason and crimen laesae maiestatis were not juridicallydistinguished in the early modern period. Though some Spanish legal sourcesof the Middle Ages made a distinction between traición (treason against theking and his relatives) and aleve (treason against others, alien to the royalfamily),17 as well as between traición regia (treason against the king) andcrimen maiestatis (treason against the emperor),18 the Siete Partidas VII, 2, 1had considerably blurred this distinction and early modern Spanish lawyersidentified treason with crimen laesae maiestatis, treating them as synony-mous.19 However, infidencia was not just an element of the concept of thecrime of treason, but a peculiar form of treason merely regulated in a specifichistorical period in the context of the Independence War and the revoltagainst the French occupation (1808–1814).


17 Celestino R. Pardo Núñez, El Aleve. Un estudio histórico sobre las fuentesnormativas, Santiago de Compostela 1984; the Siete Partidas differentiatedhigh treason from ‘aleve’ (or petty treason). They defined high treason as thedisloyalty towards the King or his manors and vassals, and termed it ‘aleve’when the violation was committed against others. Therefore, it is consideredthat ‘aleve’ is the act committed by a nobleman whose aim is to dishonor, hurt,or kill another nobleman or a public authority before challenging him: if theauthor of a crime is not a nobleman, it was not possible to consider it a ‘aleve’,unless that it was produced by breaking a truce.

18 On the crimen laesae maiestatis, see Carlo Ghisalberti, Sulla teoria deidelitti di lesa maiestà nel diritto commune, in: Archivo Giuridico FilippoSerafino 149 (1955), pp. 100–177, particularly pp. 160–165; Tomás y Vali-ente, El Derecho penal de la Monarquía absoluta, p. 239; on some specificcrimes belonging to the crimen laese maiestatis’ category, see Jacques Chif-foleau, Sur le crime de majesté médiéval, in: Genèse de l’Estat Moderne etMéditerranée. Approches historique et anthropologique des practiques et desreprésentations, Roma 1993; Iñaki Bazán Díaz, El crimen de lesa majestaddivina: brujería y superstición vasco-navarra (s. XIII-1530), in: Heresis. Revuesemestrelle d’heresiologie médiévale 29 (1988), pp. 83–108; José SarriónGualda, Encantamiento, herbolarias y hechiceras en el Fuero de Cuenca y enlos de su familia, in: Javier Alvarado Planas, Espacios y Fueros en Castilla-La Mancha (siglos XI–XV). Una perspectiva metodológica, Madrid 1995,pp. 387–404.

19 On this matter, see Iglesia Ferreirós, Historia de la traición, pp. 225 ss.,234 ss., and particularly pp. 244 s.

2 The Independence War, Historical Origin and Contextof the Crime of Infidencia

The Cortes of Cádiz, summoned in 1810, were faced with the indispensabledissociation with the Old Regime as well as with the threat of the Frenchtroops which had invaded the Peninsula.20 The military occupation alarmedKing Carlos IV and his valido Godoy, who planned to escape to Andalusiaand to organise resistance. But before they could execute their projects, theywere separated on the 17th of March 1808 due to the riot of Aranjuez inwhich the monarch was obliged to abdicate in favour of his son Fernandoand Godoy was taken as a prisoner. Napoleon used the serious internal crisisof the Spanish Crown to compel the (unnecessary) abdication of Carlos IVon the 5th of May (since he had already abdicated) followed by FernandoVII21 on the next day, both of them being kidnapped by the FrenchGovernment.22

This resulted in two political developments which finally led to revolt andconfrontation: On the one hand, since the May uprising, a popular insur-rection against the French troops started which led to the final collapse of theold institutions.23 As a result the Juntas Provinciales emerged in the pro-vinces, and even though they bore no relation to the Old Regime, they wereled by authorities whose power originated from the monarch who had beenkidnapped by the French invaders. On the other hand, on the 8th of July 1808the new Spanish Constitution (called the Constitution of Bayonne or the “firstConstitution of contemporary Spain”) was promulgated and approved byJoseph I, brother of Napoleon and the Spanish Deputies who had contributedto its drafting.24

Thus, Spain split into two opposed sides, one represented by the supportersof King Fernando VII, and the second which supported Joseph I as the newking “of Spain and the Indies“ (covered by the occupation troops) who


20 Compare especially the Fontainebleau treaty (27th October 1807) that gaveway to the peaceful transition of the French troops through Spanish territory;on this cf. also Vicente Palacio Atard, La España del siglo XIX, 1808–1898, Madrid 1978, p. 22.

21 The abdications are narrated by Conde de Toreno, Historia del levanta-miento, vol. I, p. 168.

22 For a convincing interpretation of these events cf. Miguel Artola Gallego,Los orígenes de la España contemporánea, Madrid 1975, p. 123.

23 Cf. Artola Gallego, Los orígenes de la España contemporánea, n. 22,p. 165.

24 For a more thorough discussion on problem if the term constitution applies tothe text of 1808 cf. Karl Loewenstein, Teoría de la Constitución, Barcelona1979, p. 218.

promised enlightened reforms based on the new Spanish Constitution. Re-forms and the apparently liberal, but “granted charter“ should convince theSpanish to accept the French occupation and the imposed oath of allegiance tothe new monarch. The offer was not absolutely rejected, because a consid-erable part of the Spanish population appreciated the changes brought by theFrench. As a result the new group or party of the afrancesados (or Frenchi-fied) emerged,25 based on the loyalty to Joseph I. They tried to maintain theorder and to improve the social and economic situation of those who hadchosen to support a monarchy that was capable to achieve changes throughan enlightened despotism which, however, was faced with the threat ofrevolution following the well known French example of 1789.

As mentioned above, the French occupation caused a popular reactionwhich initially resulted in the formation of Juntas Provinciales in 1808 thatarose spontaneously and more or less autonomously without the leadership ofhigher political or military authority. With them a revolt or revolutionarymovement started that led to the establishment of a Central Board in Aranjuezon the 25th of September that assumed political authority.26 This wasfollowed up, after severe military defeats that started in Ocaña (1809), bythe establishment of a Regency Council on the 30th of January, whichreturned to the traditional legal system in 1810. Thus two opposed political


25 On the afrancesados, see the work of Miguel Artola, Los afrancesados,Madrid 1953, is essential. Here we use the 1976 edition. Artola didn’t hesitatein stating that “the afrancesados – Frenchified – constitute a party, becausetheir decision to swear to Jose I is a necessary condition to reach the power anddevelop from it a specific program that unlike other parties that appear in thoseyears” (a clear reference to the ‘absolutist’ and ‘liberal’); see Miguel Artola,La burguesía revolucionaria (1808–1869), Madrid 1976, p. 19; see also JuanLópez Tabar, Los famosos traidores. Los afrancesados durante la crisis delAntiguo Régimen (1808–1833), Madrid 2001; Juan López Tabar, La miradacrítica. Los afrancesados ante la Revolución española, in: Experiencia ymemoria de la Revolución española (1808–1814), ed. by Fernando DuránLópez and Diego Caro Cancela, Cádiz 2011, pp. 99–119; another relevantsource is Andrés Muriel, Los afrancesados, o una cuestión de política, Paris1820.

26 The problems of the Central Board resulted from the fact that it never assumedthat its power came from the Juntas Provinciales. As Moliner Prada emphasi-ses: “the serious contradiction of the (Board) Central was its blend of old andnew. Its members were torn between past and future, slowly dissociating fromthe Juntas Provinciales, their true support. At no time were their performancesrevolutionary, still in its early resolutions the term ‘vasallos’ was used to referto the Spanish” Antonio Moliner Prada, La España de finales del sigloXVIII y la crisis de 1808, in: Moliner Prada, La Guerra de la Independenciaen España, pp. 41–72, p. 67.

and legal orders emerged: one represented by Joseph I and the Constitution ofBayonne, and another, led by the Council of Regency, unifying absolutists aswell as liberals in the Cortes of Cádiz that met in September 1810 to discuss areformist alternative and adequate responses to the constitution of KingJoseph by adopting some principles of 1789,27 such as the recognition ofcertain individual rights, the principle of national sovereignty and the divisionof powers.28 However, they were also faced with the problem of theafrancesados.

In the Cortes of Cádiz the issue of the afrancesados was relevant andpresent from the very beginning.29 A careful examination of the debatesdemonstrates enmity and suspicion against France, the French and theirSpanish supporters, the afrancesados,30 revealing hatred,31 complaints aboutthe French despotism,32 the rejection of French offsprings,33 the admonition


27 Luis Sánchez Agesta, Historia del constitucionalismo español, Madrid 1956,p. 59.

28 As reflected in the Decree of September 24th, 1810, in: Colección de losDecretos y Órdenes que han expedido las Cortes generales y extraordinarias,vol. I, Madrid 1820, pp. 1–3; the Decree of August 6th, 1811, Colección deDecretos, vol. I, pp. 186–193; and the Decree of June 8th, 1813, Colección deDecretos, vol. IV, p. 86.

29 On this matter, see Juan Carlos Domínguez Nafría, El trato de losafrancesados en la legislación de las Cortes de Cádiz, in: Estudios sobreHistoria de la Intolerancia, ed. by Javier Alvarado, Madrid/Sicaria 2011,pp. 573–596.

30 DSC, Congreso, 28 December 1810, p. 240: “indulto a los afrancesados”;DSC, Congreso, 29 December 1810, p. 250: “En España, por desgracia, hayalgunos que siguen el partido de los franceses”; DSC, Congreso, 29 December1810, p. 250: “formar un partido con los españoles franceses”; DSC, Con-greso, 29 December 1810, p. 252: “Temo mucha la perfidia de los franceses, laseducción de los afrancesados, el frío desaliento de los egoístas, y las instiga-ciones sordas de los que, atendiendo a sus intereses particulares, los hallan encontradicción con el nuevo orden de cosas que las Cortes han de introducir enel Estado”.

31 See, for example, the comments in: DSC, Congreso, 9 December 1810, p. 153;DSC, Congreso, 19 December 1810, p. 191; DSC, Congreso, 29 December1810, p. 257; DSC, Congreso, 29 December 1810, p. 261; DSC, Congreso, 17December 1810, p. 183; DSC, Congreso, 18 December 1810, p. 185; DSC,Congreso, 19 December 1810, p. 191; DSC, Congreso, 24 December 1810,p. 223; DSC, Congreso, 29 December 1810, p. 248, 252–255, 257, 258, 260,261; DSC, Congreso, 30 December 1810, p. 264, 267, 268, 270; DSC,Congreso, 31 December 1810, p. 272.

32 DSC, Congreso, 16 December 1810, p. 168; DSC, Congreso, 29 December1810, p. 257; DSC, Congreso, 29 December 1810, p. 247–248.

33 DSC, Congreso, 17 December 1810, p. 182–183.

not to follow the French legal model,34 rewards for anyone who may harmFrench interests,35 and the compassion towards Spaniards who were living inFrance.36 As afrancesado was considered anyone who, in an active manner,had favoured the policy of Joseph I from the beginning of the Frenchoccupation. Although recent research agrees that those who passively toler-ated the French “intruder king“ and adopted (more or less forced) to certaingovernment measures could hardly be considered as afrancesados, we canalso determine, some voluntary cooperation with the invader through theacceptance of roles and responsibilities or, on the contrary, forced collabo-ration of the officers required to swear loyalty to the new monarch in order topreserve their position.37

From the perspective of the afrancesados, they had tried to save the nationin a dire situation, which had urgently required reforms which the French hadpromised. Hence, a part of the population was inclined, at an early stage, tothe support of a monarch who, respecting the Catholic religion, had promisedfurther progress and freedoms. In this regard the political option to supportthe French army and Joseph I was also culturally and ideologically influencedby the principles of “enlightened despotism“ based on the idea that reformscould only be achieved through a minority of intellectuals co-operating withthe government or the authorities. As indicated, the French occupationcreated the somewhat contradictory alliance between the absolutist defendersof the Ancient Regime and the Bourbons, and the liberals, held together by theambition to defend Spain against the French invasion, finally paying off in1814. Both absolutists and liberals considered the afrancesados as represen-tatives of the policy of reform and supporters of the “intruder king”, and –above that – also as traitors; the former because they had turned their backsto the legitimate monarchy, and the latter because they had fought the Spanishnation.

One of the fundamental problems of King Joseph I in Spain was the need togenerate confidence and loyalty, because the troops who accompanied himcould barely attract support in those towns and cities that were initiallypeacefully occupied. In order to ensure the fidelity of those Spaniards whoserved him as office holders and employees, the new monarch postulated that


34 DSC, Congreso, 21 December 1810, p. 204.35 DSC, Congreso, 20 December 1810, p. 197.36 DSC, Congreso, 19 December 1810, p. 193.37 On the problem of ‘passive collaboration’ and the afrancesados see also Juan

López Tabar, La España josefina y el fenómeno del afrancesamiento, in:Moliner Prada, La guerra de la Independencia en España, pp. 325–354,p. 326.

they had to take an oath of loyalty on the Constitution of Bayonne.38 Thus,the new regime created a political group which was designated as juramen-tados (or jurors) and differed from the afrancesados who were activesupporters of the French but did not take an oath of loyalty. Concerningtheir motivation and purposes – reforms to save the nation and an efficientpublic administration – they converged in the defence of the new constitu-tional monarchy against the absolutists, the approval of the new authorityand the implementation of the reform programme that was completed byrespecting the Catholic religion, territorial integrity and the independence ofthe country.39 However, it was difficult to effectuate such an ambitiousprogramme not at least because at the time of his arrival the new monarchwas confronted with insurrections, revolts and resistance in the regions ofAndalusia, Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia that refused to recognize the newsovereign. Moreover, in this context of revolt and resistance the Cortes ofCádiz started to discuss possible legal responses to treat the problem of thejuramentados and the afrancesados.

3 The Liberals and the conceptualisation of the crime of infidencia

From the viewpoint of the liberals both the juramentados and the afrancesa-dos – in supporting the invaders – had committed a crime of treason to their


38 See Art. 7 of the Constitution of Bayonne, June 6, 1808, in: Prontuario de lasLeyes y Decretos del Rey Nuestro Señor José Napoleón I desde el año 1808,vol. I, Madrid 1810: “The people of Spain and the Indies take an oath to theking in this way: ‘I pledge allegiance and obedience to the king, the Constitu-tion and the laws.’” In developing this provision Joseph I determined I theRoyal Decree of October 1, 1808 (ibidem): “The employees in any industryand all those who enjoy salary or pension of our public treasury, which musttake the oath of allegiance prescribed by the Constitution shall cease toperceive this interim salary or pension if it does not exist in the secretary ofthe minister to whom it may concern, the act of this oath”. The Royal Decreeof February 15, 1809 (ibidem) threatened: “All of the magistrates of thekingdom, all employees in any branch of the Administration, who as such orindividually have not taken the oath of allegiance and obedience to our person,to the Constitution and the laws, will execute in writing in the term of the thirdday after publication in the places where they are” (Art. 1); “the main leaderswill be those that refer to the respective ministries the referred oaths, statingthat they had not done, and they also accompany the term in the above”(Art. 2); “those who do not take the oath shall be deemed to have resignedfrom their jobs or positions” (Art. 3).

39 Cf. Artola, Los afrancesados, p. 59; furthermore: Juan Carlos DomínguezNafría, La América española y Napoleón en el Estatuto de Bayona, in: RevistaInternacional de los Estudios Vascos. Cuadernos 4 (2009), pp. 315–346.

homeland. According to the deputies of the Cortes of Cádiz, the legalprovision that was immediately applicable to this political crime was estab-lished in the Siete Partidas, because it could be considered as crimen laesaemaiestatis, which comprised (as indicated above) the betrayal of the king,punishable with the death penalty and the expropriation of the betrayer andhis children, all of them despised permanently.40 However, this provisioncould not be mechanically applied, not only because the prescribed punish-ment was considered too harsh, but also – and more important – becausemany of its elements seemed too vague. In October 1810 the General andExtraordinary Cortes ordered the Royal Council to file a regulation tosubstantiate and adjudicate the crimes of infidencia, a term now used todesignate a specific kind of treason that emerged in the present context.41 TheCouncil had in mind a former regulation approved by the Junta Central forthe extraordinary and temporary court of supervision and protection on 26thof October 1808, which aimed at the prosecution and punishment ofmembers “of the French party or their protectors”. According to its provi-sions, the cases of infidencia were substantiated in accordance with the lawsof the kingdom (Sections I–VIII), actually meaning those concerning the crimeof treason.

On the other hand, the liberals gathered in Cádiz promoted one of the firststeps taken by the general and extraordinary Cortes in 1810: to enact a civiland a military pardon to demonstrate “clemency for Spanish subjects”.However, neither of these texts specifically mentioned crimes,42 and thatresulted in controversial debates in the Congress between the supporters ofgrace and pardon and those who were not willing to forgive the collaborators.


40 Refering to Partidas VII, 2, 1: “tanto quiere decir en romance como yerro detraición que faze ome contra la persona del Rey”; cf. also the remarks in thefirst chapter of this article. The deputies were, nonetheless, wrong, since theapplicacable legal provisions was not Partidas VII, 2, 1, but the Ordenamientode Alcalá 32, 5. On this matter see also Reinoso, Examen de los delitos deinfidelidad a la patria, pp. 328 ss.

41 Note that the crime of infidencia was already in force in the Spanish militarylaw since the 18th century, namely, in the Royal ordinances for the regime,discipline, subordination and service of their army from October 22th, 1768,VII, III, Art. 4.4 (the so called ‘Ordenanzas de S. M. para el régimen, disciplina,subordinación y servicio de sus Exércitos’, known also as ‘Reales Ordenanzasde Carlos III’).

42 See the Art. VII Decree of November 21st, 1810, in: Colección de Decretos,vol. I, pp. 20–24, which approved the military pardon, and the decree ofNovember 30th, 1810, in: Colección de Decretos, vol. I, pp. 28–30, whichprescribed the civil pardon.

This controversy occurred already in the first meetings held in Cádiz, whenthe city was still surrounded by French troops and tried to organise resistanceand continued during the early years of the Congress and influenced thedebate on the punishment of those Spaniards who had supported the Frenchinvaders and were accused of committing the crime of treason against thenation.

The Congress started with the reform of the justice system and on February18th, 1811, the General and Extraordinary Cortes passed a decree whichauthorised the territorial audiencias as the ideal organs of justice to adjudicatein all matters and cases which they are responsible by law, and except forcases of infidencia, excluding any privileged “fuero”. In consequence theprivileged tribunals do not intrude on knowledge of such crimes and are sentto the respective district audiencias of the cases of that nature.43 This resultedin a significant accumulation of cases of infidencia in the Court of Seville, andpromoted a request to the Congress of Deputies on August 11th to augmentthe number of the ministers of justice and even deploy natural judges.44 Anorder issued on July 14th and a decree of August 25th 1811 tried to solvethese problems by allowing the ordinary as well the military courts thepreliminary investigation of problematic cases in order that they wereadjudicated by the audiencias.45


43 Decree of February 18th, 1811, in: Colección de Decretos, vol. I, pp. 76–79,Art. 1. See also DSC, Congreso, n. 93, 28 December 1810, p. 240.

44 It was passed to the Justice Committee (‘Comisión de Justicia’) to give anopinion on the representation of the same ‘Audiencia’ (of Seville), in which “inview of the disadvantages and difficulties by the circumstances in which it [the‘Audiencia’] was found in determining the causes of ‘infidencia’ of offendersbeing referred from various parts under the sovereign decree of last February18th, it should be declared that natural ordinary judges of the prisoners shallnot inhibit the knowledge of the causes of ‘infidencia’”: DSC, August 11, 1811,p. 1618; we are using the second edition of the Diario de sesiones de las Cortesgenerales y extraordinarias, Madrid 1870.

45 Order of July 14th, 1811, in: Colección de Decretos, vol. I, p. 77: “Por la qualse manda a las Audiencias procedan con actividad en las causas de infidencia,sin necesidad de consultar las sentencias de muerte”. It ordered furthermore:“The General and extraordinary ‘Cortes’ have ruled that the Regency Councilshould advise the ‘Audiencias’ on the Peninsula to proceed in cases of‘infidencia’ in a summary way, punishing the guilty without delay, and withoutconsulting the death-penalty sentences by virtue of the powers which areincumbent by law.” Decree of August 25th, 1811, in: Colección de Decretos,vol. I, p. 205: “The General and Extraordinary ‘Cortes’, desiring to stirobstacles to the prompt administration of justice, have resolved that in casesof ‘infidencia’, whose knowledge is up to the regional (or territorial)‘Audiencias’, excluding any privileged ‘fuero’, the apprehension of offenders,

Thus, the prosecution of the afrancesados encountered a still imperfectlegal system notably with regard to its constitutional foundation and theprinciple of legality. Hence, the Ministry of Grace and Justice recommended“restraint and sensitivity” in qualifying the crimes of infidencia, especially inthose villages that were abandoned by French troops.46 However, the generaltrend was to accuse those of treason who during the occupation had notactively resisted the invading army or had shown some collusion withsoldiers, which resulted in an abundance of complaints and arrests.

As a primary measure the Justice Committee of the Congress proposed theappointment of a “special supreme commission of justice“ which in thisspecific case should carry out a visit of all the notorious criminal casespending in the civil and military courts of Cádiz and the Isle of León.47

Confronted with the excessive number of people who had been imprisoned,the Justice Committee drafted a report in which it recommended to release alldetainees unless there were suspected of infidencia or any other serious crime.In that case, trials should proceed as diligently as possible.48 Furthermore, thedrafting of a police regulation was proposed to reinforce the order of the city,notably by establishing the superintendent as a new authority. Though somedeputies expressed that this could only serve to suppress freedom and therebyserve the enemies of the nation, others like Dou and Bassols defended theregulation, arguing that “the laws speak of traitors and enemies, when theseare known in a regular state of things”, and reasoning about the need for thenew standard: “but nowadays the case is very different because friends aremixed with enemies, nationals with foreign […]. Is it not ordered by RoyalWill that all the cases of infidencia should be adjudicated exclusively by theAudiencias? Does this Regulation, supported by the Council, not prescribe thesame? I waive each of its chapters […] of what I should not ignore is whetherthe Regulation of police is not wanted, no one comes to mourn and complainabout infidencias in Congress, and that if he had grounds or suspicions, go tothe governor of Cádiz to give part of what is appropriate.” On the other


either regular judges, or military, which may know, to proceed with them,making and completing the summary at the earliest, and once verified, toreturn it without delay to the territorial ‘Audiencia’.”

46 Cf. DSC, August 31st, 1811, p. 1736: given the state of disarray in which thecourts were found, the Ministry of Grace and Justice expressed the need to“proceed with great circumspection and delicacy in qualifying the crime of‘infidencia’ to the territories who just evacuated the enemies.”

47 Dictamen de la comisión de Justicia del Congreso de los diputados; Report ofthe Justice Committee of the Congress of Deputies, DSC, Congreso, May 7th,1811, pp. 1029–1036.

48 DSC, Congreso, n. 218, May 7th, 1811, p. 1033.

hand, the deputy Villafañe questioned the regulation and the establishment ofthe superintendent stating that the existing laws already ordered that thegovernors and magistrates should treat such matters, and further indicatingthat, according to the standards set by Carlos III and Carlos IV, “no one ismore on purpose to hear cases of infidencia.”49

The parliamentary debates reflect the diversity of opinions among thedeputies of the Cortes of Cádiz which, anyhow, seemed to agree with theprinciple that the cases of infidencia should be adjudicated by the Audienciasinstead of resorting to other institutions such as military tribunals or specialcommittees.50 Nevertheless, they requested a report of the Justice Committeewhether the Ordenanzas de Carlos III, which established that all militarycases of infidencia had to be adjudicated by military tribunals, should beconsidered abolished.51 Several months later, the adoption of a new decreewas proposed, introducing an exception to the general rule whereby all casesof infidencia should be adjudicated by the Audiencias: the military jurisdictionshould treat all cases of infidencia related to espionage as it had been stated bythe former military ordinances.52

The deputies were deeply concerned with the law applicable to the cases ofinfidencia. Whereas some of them seemed to be annoyed by the lack ofprecision of infidencia, particularly considering the fact that several lawsmade explicit reference to it, others maintained that the legal concept wasplain enough and did not need any further legal clarification.53 Though themajority stressed that it was not appropriate to literally or strictly apply thelaw of treason embodied in the regulation of the Partidas (P. VII, 2, 1) – orotherwise many would be convicted – it seemed convenient to approve a by-law to define the specific cases of infidencia which should be prosecuted andpunished.54 The issue of such a by-law constantly emerged in the parliamen-tary debates.55 It is undoubtedly, that it was drafted and regulated the various


49 Interventions of the deputies of Catalonia (Dou i Bassols) and Valencia(Villafañe), in: DSC, Congreso, July 22th, 1811, pp. 1493–1496.

50 See, for example, DSC, Congreso, n. 207, 26 April 1811, p. 939; DSC,Congreso, n. 218, 7 May 1811, p. 1032.

51 DSC, Congreso, n. 219, 8 May 1811, pp. 1038–1039.52 DSC, Congreso, 6 October, 1811, p. 1998; later on this was literally adopted

by the Decree of October 6th, 1811, in: Colección de Decretos, vol. II,pp. 12 s.; see also DSC, Congreso, n. 631, 12 August 1812, p. 3529.

53 This complaint can be found, for example, in DSC, Congreso, n. 82, 17December 1810, p. 182.

54 DSC, Congreso, n. 150, 26 February 1811, p. 588; DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29June 1811, pp. 1363 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29 June 1811, pp. 1366 s.

55 DSC, Congreso, n. 111, 15 January 1811, p. 373; DSC, Congreso, n. 160, 8March 1811, p. 649; DSC, Congreso, n. 198, 17 April 1811, p. 882; DSC,

cases which constituted the crime of infidencia and the legal procedure: a copywas made available to the Cádiz’s deputies, it was read in a session, and theJustice Committee reported on it.56 Some deputies even complained about thedelay in the passage of the regulation,57 or proposed the printing of the by-law.58 However, it is not clear whether it eventually was printed, though it isobvious that it was never approved.59

In practice many who were suspicious of infidencia were imprisoned.60

Although it was clear that the Audiencias were assigned to adjudicate thesecases, they seemed uncertain and hesitant how to deal with them, and as aresult cases accumulated61 and many accused remained in prison for a longtime before being judged or released.62 Besides, some accusations of infiden-cia were motivated by personal rivalry or revenge,63 and therefore certainlydeviating from such purposes as the loyalty to the nation.


Congreso, n. 237, 26 May 1811, pp. 1128 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29 June1811, pp. 1363 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29 June 1811, pp. 1366 s.; DSC,Congreso, n. 291, 20 July 1811, p. 1473; DSC, Congreso, n. 333, 31 August1811, p. 1736.

56 Cf. DSC, Congreso, n. 291, 20 July 1811, p. 1474; DSC, Congreso, n. 290, 19July 1811, pp. 1470 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 289, 18 July 1811, p. 1465.

57 DSC, Congreso, n. 391, 28 October 1811, p. 2166.58 DSC, Congreso, n. 392, 29 October 1811, p. 2170.59 Unfortunately it was not possible to detect it in the consulted sources. Besides,

no further references to the by-law are to be found in the parliamentary debatesfrom November 1811 onwards. The matter arose again some days before thepromulgation of the Constitution of Cádiz and some deputies pointed out thatthey preferred to leave the regulation of infidencia as it stood (in the Partidas),rather than going forward with the approval of the by-law: DSC, Congreso,n. 510, 4 March 1812, pp. 2857–2864, and it seems that this positioneventually succeeded.

60 DSC, Congreso, n. 839, 1 May 1813, p. 5153.61 DSC, Congreso, n. 287, 16 July 1811, p. 1457.62 This explains the comments encouraging to proceed as diligently as possible

with those who were imprisoned: DSC, Congreso, n. 218, 7 May 1811,p. 1033; an Order of May 1811 prescribed the prompt release of prisonerswhose measure had been taken by unknown judges, unless afterwards a casehad been initiated “or they were imprisoned on suspicion of infidencia.” Orderof May 1811, I: “It is prescribed to release all prisoners of whom it is unknownthe judge that caught them, as well as those a cause had not been made, unlessthere were later formed, or are imprisoned on suspicion of infidencia, or othercrime, and suspicions against them on had not disappeared […]”; an accusedcould spend several months in prison before being judged: DSC, Congreso, n.223, 12 May 1811, p. 1062; see also DSC, Congreso, n. 239, 28 May 1811,p. 1141.

63 DSC, Congreso, n. 884, 16 June 1813, p. 5496; DSC, Congreso, n. 890, 23June 1813, p. 5545; DSC, Congreso, n. 897, 5 July 1813, pp. 5611, 5616,

Once the Constitution of Cádiz was promulgated (March 19th, 1812), thedeputies’ main concern was how to prosecute and punish the infidentes (ortraitors) in line with the new constitutional landscape or, to put it simple,according to legality.64 After five months a report was drafted and discussedin the Cortes analysing the impact of the Constitution on the regulation ofinfidencia.65 The prosecution and punishment of this crime within the newconstitutional context needed to be aligned to the principle of presumption ofinnocence, the new legal procedures and the new system of penalties to avoidthe imposition of punishments which had been constitutionally abolished(particularly, the confiscation of goods).

The most difficult question was to guarantee the presumption of innocence,an issue that the parliament had been controversially debated even before theapproval of the Constitution. Some deputies had stated that a strict applicationof the infidencia legislation would result in the conviction of many suspects asinfidentes,66 notably because suspicions of treason spread throughout thewhole country, and not only in the patriotic area of Spain. In October 1808, adecree was approved which compelled all public officers and civil servants toswear an oath if they wanted to keep their position and salaries.67 Since manydid not comply with it, another decree was issued that added the new provisionthat all officers who neglected such a duty of loyalty would be considered “as ifthey had resigned from their offices.”68 As a consequence, so it seems, somedecided to abandon their posts. Hence, another decree was enacted toencourage officers to return, otherwise they would ultimately lose their postand be disqualified from administering any other public office as well as theirgoods would be confiscated.69 The specific form of oath was legallydetermined for both, public70 as well as ecclesiastic71 officers and servants.


5617, 5619; perhaps for this reason, some accusations of infidencia wereanonimous: see, for example, DSC, Congreso, n. 154, 2 March 1811, p. 154.

64 DSC, Congreso, n. 586, 10 June 1812, pp. 3294–3301.65 DSC, Congreso, n. 616, 22 July 1812, pp. 3459–3463.66 Cf. footnote 54.67 Decree 1st October 1808 (“Para que los empleados y todos los que tengan sueldo

ó pensión del tesoro público cesen de percibirlo hasta que conste haber hechojuramento de fidelidad”), in: Prontuario de las Leyes y Decretos, vol. I, p. 55.

68 Art. III of the Decree 16th February 1809 (“Para que todos los empleadospresten el juramento de fidelidad y obediencia”), in: Prontuario de las Leyes yDecretos, vol. I, pp. 107 s.

69 Decree 1st May 1809, in: Prontuario de las Leyes y Decretos, vol. I, pp. 168–170.70 Decree 2nd May 1809 (“En el que se fixa la formula del juramento que deben

prestar los empleados públicos”), in: Prontuario de las Leyes y Decretos, vol. I,p. 178.

71 Decree 7th July 1809, in: Prontuario de las Leyes y Decretos, vol . I, pp. 193 s.

Besides that, the oath of fidelity to the Constitution of Bayonne was evenrequested from all common people living in the cities and villages which wereunder French dominion.

This legislation demonstrates that distrust and suspicion were widespreadagainst all people who were living in the occupied territory and who weresuspected of having taken the prescribed oath of fidelity to the enemies of theSpanish nation. Mistrust or resentment was even more acute against thoseholding a public office, since it was assumed that they were particularlysupporting the French occupation. However, the general climate of distrust,suspicion and resentment hardly applied to the principle of presumption ofinnocence and some liberals expressed criticism and the parliamentarydebates were characterised by a diversity of opinions.

Although it was clear that a forced oath did not fully constitute the criminalbehaviour of infidencia, it was regarded as a stain or as disgrace which neededto be eradicated through a process of “purification” (purificación),72 in whichthe motives of the suspect should be investigated and he had to prove hisinnocence (or the enforcement of the oath). This serious issue particularlyconcerned the public officers and was frequently discussed in the parliamen-tary debates in which some deputies claimed that “not all who reside amongthe French are wicked.”73 The most controversial question was how toproperly deal with the public officers in the French occupied territory whodid not abandon their posts and were working for the public administrationof Joseph I. The main (but not generally accepted) opinion in the Cortes wasto treat them as suspicious of infidencia or as infidentes; and some deputiescomplained about the exceptional benignity with which the infidentes weretreated.74 Other deputies objected that the crime of infidencia should not beconfused with a lack of patriotism or a certain level of negligence, and did notapply to the dissmissal of public officers.75 The deputy Llanera, for instance,stated that until the commission for the crime of infidencia had not proved acriminal behaviour, all citizens should be treated well because they wereprotected by the law.76

The crucial question was whether the oath of fidelity taken by officialsconstituted a crime in itself or should be subsumed under the crime ofinfidencia. The majority argued that public officers who had taken an oath


72 DSC, Congreso, n. 834, 26 April 1813, pp. 5117 s.73 DSC, Congreso, n. 216, 5 May 1811, p. 1014.74 DSC, Congreso, n. 269, 28 June 1811, pp. 1352.75 DSC, Congreso, n. 257, 16 June 1811, pp. 1270 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29

June 1811, pp. 1364 s.76 DSC, Congreso, n. 260, 19 June 1811, pp. 1284.

to keep their jobs should not be prosecuted like a deserter or defector who hadcommitted the crime of treason or infidencia.77 Although it was appropriateto dismiss them from their public office once the national army would takecontrol over the territory,78 they could not be regarded as infidentes.79 Thedeputy José Martínez, for example, stressed that it seemed highly appropriateto distinguish clearly between those who had committed infidencia, the publicofficers who had taken an oath, and the rest of the common people who hadbeen forced to take an oath.80 However, others disagreed with this opinion,affirming that many infidentes would get away without being prosecuted andpunished,81 demanding that it was necessary to plainly establish who hadcommitted infidencia, particularly in the cities and villages during the time ofJoseph’s dominion.82 The situation of the public officers proved to bedifficult, as the deputy García Herreros observed: In the beginning, the“patriotic” or national government had not given any specific order toabandon their offices and to present themselves to the national authorities;if they remained in their posts, they had to take an oath of fidelity to Joseph I,and, in the end, would be convicted and permanently dismissed from anypublic office.83 If, on the contrary, they decided to abandon their offices andto return to the services of the patriotic government, authorities and peoplewould regard them with distrust and suspicion.84

As a consequence of the Constitution of Cádiz, the judicial competences toprosecute the cases of infidencia and the tribunal in charge were modified aswell. As noted above, in 1811 an order of July 14th and a decree of August25th assigned the cases of infidencia to the Audiencias.85 However, this did nolonger concur with the administration of justice and the jurisdiction asregulated in the Constitution. For that reason the Cortes decided to reform


77 DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29 June 1811, pp. 1362.78 Resolución 28th October 1811, which ordered that those who had sworn an

oath to the ‘intruso’ government should be dismissed from their office andpermanently disqualified from holding other offices; on this resolution, seeDSC, Congreso, n. 511, 5 March 1812, pp. 2867–2871; DSC, Congreso, n.512, 6 March 1812, pp. 2875–2879.

79 DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29 June 1811, pp. 1366 s.80 DSC, Congreso, n. 648, 4 September 1812, p. 3640.81 DSC, Congreso, n. 293, 22 July 1811, p. 1493.82 DSC, Congreso, n. 333, 31 August 1811, p. 1736.83 Art. 1 Decree CXCII, September 21st 1812 (“Medidas para asegurar la

confianza de la Nación respecto a los empleados y otras personas públicas”),see also also Art. 3, Decree August 11th August 1812, and Art. 4, DecreeAugust 11th August 1812, in: Colección de decretos, vol. III, pp. 84–87.

84 DSC, Congreso, n. 270, 29 June 1811, pp. 1362.85 See footnote 45.

the judicial competences regarding the cases of infidencia and declared thatthis crime should also be judged by the ordinary tribunals in the first instance,leaving the second and third instance to the Audiencias.86 This measure,which had been requested some months ago by the Audiencia of Seville,87 wasalso supposed to prevent the frequent delays in judging these cases.88 But notevery ordinary judge took the infidencia cases seriously,89 and therefore theAudiencias were assigned to supervise and review their judgments.90 Afterthis legal reform was completed, some cases of irregularities concerning thecompetent tribunal were presented to the Cortes as an “infringement of theConstitution” (“Infracción de la Constitución”, art. 247).91

Another important reform concerned the abolition of the confiscation ofgoods, a punishment that affected not only the convicted infidente but also hisoffsprings. As indicated above, the Partidas threatened the death penalty andthe confiscation of all goods to all traitors, which could also cause animportant damage to their descendants.92 The deputies of the Cortes werefully aware that such an unfair measure would affect quite respectable (andguiltless) descendants of convicted “political criminals”.93 After the promul-gation of the Constitution of 1812, whose article 304 abolished the con-fiscation of goods,94 the Cortes enacted a decree to adjust the former


86 DSC, Congreso, n. 631, 12 August 1812, p. 3529; Orden August 9th 1812(“Para que el Juez de letras de Cádiz conozca en primera instancia del crimende infidencia”).

87 DSC, Congreso, n. 293, 22 July 1811, p. 1493; DSC, Congreso, n. 313, 11August 1811, p. 1618; DSC, Congreso, n. 668, 29 September 1812, p. 3761.

88 See, for example, DSC, Congreso, n. 150, 26 February 1811, p. 584; on theinadequacy of the Audiencias in dealing with the cases of infidencia, see DSC,Congreso, n. 257, 16 June 1811, pp. 1270–1271.

89 DSC, Congreso, n. 953, 25 August 1813, p. 6041.90 DSC, Congreso, n. 865, 27 May 1813, p. 5367.91 DSC, Congreso, n. 711, 26 November 1812, p. 4080.92 Partidas VII, 2, 1; see also footnotes 13 ss., and their main texts.93 DSC, Congreso, n. 289, 18 July 1811, p. 1465.94 On this matter, see Art. 304 of the Constitution of 1812 (“the punishment of

confiscation of goods shall not be imposed”). Compare also the subsequentSpanish Constitutions: 1837, Art. 10; 1845 Art. 10; 1856, Art. 12; 1869, Art.13; 1876, Art. 10; 1931, Art. 44,and 1978, Art. 31.1. Cf. also on the history ofthis penalty and punishment in general; Miguel Pino Abad, La pena deconfiscación de bienes en el Derecho histórico español, Córdoba 1999; JuanSainz Guerra, La evolución del Derecho penal en España, Jaén 2004,pp. 349–352; Aniceto Masferrer, Codification of Spanish Criminal Lawin the Nineteenth Century. A Comparative Legal History Approach, in:Journal of Comparative Law 4/1 (2009), pp. 96–139, particularly pp. 107 s.;Aniceto Masferrer, Liberal State and Criminal Law Reform in Spain, in:The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Mortimer Sellers and

legislation to the new constitutional regulation.95 The decree ordered to ceasethe confiscations that concerned afrancesados who were convicted as traitors,and to transmit their property to their descendants (Art. XIII). However, thedecree neglected to some extent the principle of the favourable retroactivity,and added that this regulation should not apply to those who had beenconvicted as infidentes before the promulgation of the Constitution (Art.XIV). The implementation of this legal reform was discussed several times inthe parliament, striving to tackle a variety of issues concerning the problem ofconfiscation in the criminal-law procedure.96

What did not change with the Constitution of Cádiz was the principleaccording to which the crime of infidencia could not be reprieved orpardoned. The crime of treason had always constituted an exception to thegeneral rule that all crimes could be pardoned, and the crime of infidencia stillfollowed this exception. All deputies agreed on this matter,97 and during theabsence of the monarch the Cortes enjoyed the power to pardon criminals.98

The parliamentary debates were characterised by the uncertainty of somedeputies in legal issues and others had to call to mind that pardon could onlybe granted to those who had actually been convicted for the commission of acrime; consequently, there was no need to pardon those who had just takenthe oath of fidelity to Joseph I.99 This somewhat confusing discussion revealsto which extent some deputies indiscriminatingly put the same label onafrancesados, juramentados and infidentes. Moreover, soldiers and militarypersons could not receive pardon,100 and the respective decrees of the Cortesonce again emphasised that everybody convicted for the crime of infidenciahad to be excluded from pardoning in particular.101


Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Dordrecht/New York 2010, pp. 19–40, particularlypp. 35 s.

95 Decree CLXXV, 17 June 1812, in: Colección de Decretos, vol. II (III. 1812-II. 1813), pp. 28–34.

96 DSC, Congreso, n. 562, 9 May 1812, pp. 8172 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 562, 9May 1812, p. 8174; DSC, Congreso, n. 586, 10 June 1812, pp. 3294–3301;on the confiscation of goods against the afrancesados, see DomínguezNafría, El trato de los afrancesados, pp. 585–589.

97 DSC, Congreso, n. 211, 30 April 1811, p. 974; DSC, Congreso, n. 817, 6 April1813, p. 4985; DSC, Congreso, n. 79, 21 September 1820, pp. 1149–1150.

98 DSC, Congreso, n. 211, 30 April 1811, p. 973; DSC, Congreso, n. 779, 23February 1813, p. 4746.

99 DSC, Congreso, n. 512, 6 March 1812, pp. 2875–2879, particularly p. 2878.100 DSC, Congreso, n. 510, 4 March 1812, p. 2861.101 Decree CLXV, May 25th 1812, in: Colección de los Decretos y Órdenes que

han expedido las Cortes genrales y extraordinarias desde 24 de mayo de 1812hasta 24 de febrero de 1813, Madrid, vol. III, pp. 1–3; Decree CLXVI, May25th 1812, in: Colección de Decretos, pp. 3–6.

Nevertheless, the Constitution of Cádiz and the liberals followed to someextent the French regulation under the Constitution of Bayonne that haddemanded an oath of fidelity from the common people.102 The context of civilwar and revolt, from which the Constitution of Cádiz originated, stimulatedpatriotism and even “nationalism” which was expressed in the debates of theCortes. In the discussion on the final drafting of article 7 (6 in the final text), forexample, it was determined that the love to the country should be considered aconstitutional duty that contrasted with the behaviour of individuals (such asafrancesados, juramentados or infidentes) who had embraced the party of theenemy.103 The harshness with which the deserters were treated also illus-trates104 that suspicion of infidencia could easily generate distrust, resentmentand even hatred.

4 Infidencia, Treason and crimen laesae maiestatis after 1814– Some Concluding Remarks

Although the parliamentary debates of 1813 show many references to thecrime of infidencia, the concept of this crime gradually disappeared after theend of the Independence War, the return of Fernando VII and the restorationof an absolutistic political system. Some normative references can be foundthough: On May 2nd, 1814 a pardon was granted to the deserters, again


102 Art. II Decree CXXXIX, 18 March 1812, prescribing the oath of loyalty to theConstitution of Cádiz, to be done at the Isle of León in the next holiday afterMass: Colección de Códigos y Decretos, II, p. 109; the same was establishedfor the rest of the Spanish territory: Decree CLXI, 22 May 1812, in: Colecciónde Códigos y Decretos, II, p. 209; on this issue see Domínguez Nafría, Eltrato de los afrancesados, pp. 589–594.

103 The article was finally approved. In the discussion the deputy Felipe Aner desaid: “it is clear that Spain in general it has been a great test of patriotism, butthere is no doubt that many individuals (although few) have forgotten the loveof the homeland and have embraced the party of our enemies because theyhave not known what is due to the country, or because they have forgottenabout it. It is therefore necessary to continually impress upon them the love ofcountry as their main duty, because if they have forgotten it, this will makethem to remind it, and if they don’t know it, they will be taught”; cf. DSC,Congreso, 2 September 1811, p. 1740.

104 See, for example, the ordinances from 15 October 1811 (“En que se fija laregla para conceder indulto a los desertores”) and 10 June 1812 (“Cómo debeportarse la Regencia con los desertores que se le presentan”), stating thatpardon would only be granted in ‘rare and singular’ cases, in: Colección deDecretos, vol. III, III. 1812-II. 1813, pp. 34–35.

excluding the infidentes.105 One day later, to celebrate the arrival of FernandoVII and the return of the government to Madrid, another decree was issuedthat granted a military pardon, excluding – as before – anyone convicted forthe crime of infidencia.106 In September 11th, 1814, Fernando VII issued aRoyal Ordinance disposing that the crimes of infidencia had to be judged bythe ordinary tribunals and abolished the privileged fuero which infidentes hadenjoyed before the reforms of the Cortes of Cádiz (with the so-called Tribunalde Seguridad Pública).107

Only a few references to the infidencia are to be found in the parliamentarydebates (Cortes ordinarias, not extraordinarias) of 1814, which were relatedto a problem with some infidentes in Chile,108 espionage,109 a conflict ofmilitary jurisdiction,110 dismissal from public office for being accused ofinfidencia,111 and a military case of infidencia (the so-called Audinot case).112

It may be concluded that infidencia disappeared after the historical contextchanged in which this crime concept had emerged. Moreover, also the crimeof treason declined in importance, following not infrequently the paths ofpolitical circumstances, as it had happened a century earlier during the War ofthe Spanish Succession (1700–1714) when it was used by the monarch forpolitical purposes.113 Although treason was not formally abolished andvirtually still in force between 1814 and 1820, its role and effective applica-tion diminished considerably.114 The parliamentary debates of 1820 and1821 seem to confirm this view: there are only a few references with the


105 DSC, Congreso, n. 73, 2 May 1814, p. 323–324.106 Decree LXXXVII, 3 May, 1814 (“Indulto militar con motivo d ela reunión del

Gobierno en Madrid, y por la llegada del Rey al territorio español”), in:Colección de Decretos, Madrid, 1822, vol. V, pp. 202–204.

107 Royal Order of September 11th, 1814; on this matter see Roberto L. BlancoValdés, Rey, Cortes y fuerza armada en los orígenes de la España liberal,1808–1823, Madrid 1988, pp. 298–300.

108 DSC, Congreso, n. 6, ap. II, 4 March 1814, p. 58.109 DSC, Congreso, n. 16, 12 March 1814, p. 102.110 DSC, Congreso, n. 16, 12 March 1814, p. 104.111 DSC, Congreso, n. 51, 11 April 1814, p. 238.112 DSC, Congreso, n. 16, 12 March 1814, p. 106; DSC, Congreso, n. 56, 16

April 1814, pp. 258–259.113 José María Jover Zamora, Una página de la Guerra de Sucesión: el delito de

traición visto por el Fiscal del Consejo de Castilla, in: AHDE 17 (1946)pp. 753–784; Manuel Torres Aguilar, El delito de deserción y la reformadel reclutamiento en el ejército de Felipe V, in: La Guerra de Sucesión enEspaña y América. Actas X Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar, 13–17 denoviembre de 2000, Sevilla 2001, pp. 541–555.

114 See, for example, DSC, Congreso, n. 99, 6 June 1821, pp. 2074 s.

majority of them referring to past cases,115 or regarding matters of militarylaw.116

The first Spanish penal code of 1822 did not comprise any specific crimeof infidencia and successive codes followed that path.117 They all regulatedthe crime of treason without defining or even mentioning any particularcriminal behaviour which can be described as infidencia.118 Although thecrime of treason acquired a clear political content or dimension during theearly modern period, it was considerably shaped as a political crime andconcept in the political and legal sources, and notably the criminal law fromthe beginning of the codification movement onward during the 19th and20th century.119 Based on the crucial distinction between crimes against the“external security” of the state and crimes against its “internal security” (or“against the constitution”) the concept of treason was further codified andelaborated in the penal codes of 1822, 1848, 1850, 1870, 1932, and


115 DSC, Congreso, n. 34, 7 August 1820, p. 421; DSC, Congreso, n. 79, 21September 1820, pp. 1149 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 105, 17 October 1820,p. 1714; DSC, Congreso, n. 115, 27 October 1820, pp. 1932 s.; DSC, Con-greso, n. 79, 17 May 1821, pp. 1645 s.; DSC, Congreso, n. 99, 6 June 1821,pp. 2074 s.

116 DSC, Congreso, n. 11, Apéndice, 8 March 1821, p. 338; DSC, Congreso,n. 11, Apéndice, 8 March 1821, p. 342; interestingly enough, FranciscoPérez de Anaya, Lecciones y modelos de elocuencia forense, Madrid 1848,pp. 198 ss., collected the defence of D. Antonio Díaz, a retired military officewho had been accused of the crime of de infidencia in accordence with Art. 6 ofthe criminal law of 25th April 1821.

117 Nicolás Paso y Delgado/Bernardo de Toro y Moya, Nociones delderecho penal español, así común como excepcional: para el uso de loscursantes de jurisprudencia, Granada 1848, pp. 265 ss., in dealing with thecrime of treason of the Art. 141 of the 1848 criminal code, uses the expression‘infidencia’, but the code does not contain at all this expression.

118 In the session of May 22nd, 1836 of the ‘Estamento de Procuradores’: DSC,Legislatura 1836, tomo III, pp. 445–448, some members requested a criminallaw project on conspiracy and infidencia.

119 On treason as political crime see Alicia Fiestas Loza, Los delitos políticos(1808–1936), Madrid 1976; on the codification of criminal law in Spain, seeAniceto Masferrer, Liberal State and Criminal Law Reform in Spain, in:Sellers/Tomaszewski, The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, pp. 19–40; Masferrer, Codification of Spanish Criminal Law, pp. 96–139; AnicetoMasferrer, La ciencia del Derecho penal en la Codificación decimonónica.Una aproximación panorámica a su contenido y rasgos fundamentales, in:Javier Alvarado Planas, Estudios de Historia de las ciencias criminales enEspaña, Madrid 2007, pp. 273–349; Aniceto Masferrer, Tradición yreformismo en la Codificación penal española. Hacia el ocaso de un mito.Materiales, apuntes y reflexiones para un nuevo enfoque metodológico ehistoriográfico del movimiento codificador penal europeo, Jaén 2003.

1944.120 However, the codes of 1848, 1850, and 1870 still referred to thecrimen laesae maiestatis which was not abandoned easily.121

The penal code of 1822 defined the crime of treason as a conspiracy to alterthe constitution or the monarchical government, threatening the death penal-ty.122 The same concept – conspiracy – and punishment should apply to thosewho attempted to obstruct the ordinary courts,123 the permanent deputationof the courts124 and to those that advised the king to perform any of theaforementioned acts.125 The penal code of 1848, under this heading, made adistinction between crimes against “external security” of the state and crimesagainst its “internal security”. The former comprised attempts to destroy theindependence or integrity of the state which should be punished with thedeath penalty,126 as well as the incitement of a foreign country to declare waron Spain, threatening also the death penalty in the case of completion.127 Thecrimes against the “internal security” were defined as the attempt on the life ofthe king or his immediate successor, being punishable by death128 just as thecompleted or attempted murder of the relatives of the monarch.129 Further-more, the penal code of 1848 established also “rebellion” and “sedition” aspolitical crimes against the security of the state. The crime of rebellion wasdefined as the public uprising against the government to dethrone the king orchange the political order, and should be punished with the death penalty ifperpetrators (notably the instigators or ringleaders) could be considered asofficials or authorities, or the incident had caused serious havoc.130 Inaddition, the crime of sedition comprised also public upheaval which ob-structed public authorities and government activity.131 While the former waspunishable by the death penalty, in the case of sedition the code threatenedimprisonment that could be extended to a lifelong penalty depending on thelevel of participation and the character of the perpetrator.

This brief survey of the Spanish penal codes proves that some elements ofthe concept which had constituted the crime of infidencia still subsisted in the


120 1822, Arts. 188–191, 248; 1848 and 1850, Arts. 139–144; 1870, Arts. 136–143; 1932, Arts. 123–130; 1944, Arts. 120–125.

121 1848 and 1850, Arts. 160–166; 1870, Arts. 157–164.122 Art. 188.123 Art. 189.124 Art. 190.125 Art. 191 and 248.126 Art. 139.127 Art. 140.128 Art. 160.129 Art. 165.130 Art. 167.131 Art. 174.

legal context of political crimes and treason (particularly the “crimes againstthe external security” of the state), though the crime of infidencia stricto sensudisappeared with the codification movement and was never reintroduced inthe criminal law: it was thus a legal concept of a political crime which onlyplayed an important role in the historical context of the early Spanishconstitutionalism and the respective debates of the Cortes in particular.However, in the context of revolt and upheaval within the Latin Americanterritories the “causas of infidencia” existed much longer than in Spain, andthe concept of infidencia was used to punish those who had revolted againstthe Spanish colonial authority.132

As a result, we may conclude that the specific historical situation of Spainbetween 1810 and 1814 – characterised by the French occupation, resistanceand revolt, and two antagonistic political groups (absolutists and liberals) –generated the specific political crime of infidencia discussed and shaped in theCortes of Cádiz as a contemporary legal response to a peculiar politicalconflict. For that reason the analisis of the crime of infidencia – despite itsbrief existence in the Spanish legal tradition – is worthwhile and offersinteresting insights in the historical development of political crimes in Spain.First of all, the history infidencia in Spain shows the consequences of a crimeof political character, exemplarily represented in the concept of the crimenlaesae maiestatis. If the Roman law (Corpus iuris civilis) constituted “a kindof legal supermarket, in which lawyers of different periods have found whatthey needed at the time,”133 it is important to keep in mind that the categoryof crimina laesae maiestatis was part of this legal supermarket; once devel-oped by the learned jurists (particularly by Bartolus in the 14th century) andconnected to the principle of sovereignty (Jean Bodin, 16th century) it was putat the service of the state or, more specifically, of the royal power.

Although during the Ancién Regime the royal power was not – at leasttheoretically – fully unlimited,134 in practice the monarchies could exert aconsiderable plenitude of power, notably using such legal concepts as the


132 In this regard, see, for example, Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Causas deinfidencia: estudio preliminar, Caracas 1969; Miguel Ángel García, Proce-sos por infidencia contra los próceres salvadoreños de la independencia deCentroamérica desde 1811 hasta 1818, El Salvador 1940; Mario BriceñoPerozo, Las causas de infidencia, Madrid 1961 (concerning Venezuela).

133 Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History, Cambridge 1999, p. 2.134 On this matter, see Aniceto Masferrer/Juan A. Obarrio, The State Power

and the Limits of the Principle of Sovereignty: An Historical Approach, in:Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency: Security and HumanRights in Countering Terrorism, ed. by Aniceto Masferrer, Dordrechtet al.2012, pp. 15–51.

crimen laesae maiestatis or the crime of treason. Thus, the historical changefrom the Ancién Regime to the liberal state implied substantial consequencesconcerning the use of treason or lese majesty as political crimes to achievepolitical purposes, and notably in this regard the “constitutionalization” ofthe national sovereignty, the separation of powers, the recognition of funda-mental rights and the principle of legal supremacy limited the power of theliberal or national states (including their monarchs).135

Not surprisingly, the main source of controversy in legislating and prose-cuting the crime of infidencia sprang from the fact that under the condition ofthe new political and constitutional system the state was not above the lawand treason could not be prosecuted and punished without keeping the rule oflaw.136 That was a new situation, indeed, which needed new legal responsesto deal with political dissidence, and the former concepts of political crime –crimen laesae maiestatis and treason – had to be legislated and applied withinand according to a new political and constitutional system, resulting in theconceptualisation of the crime of infidencia through the debates and legis-lation of the Cortes of Cádiz. But this process proved to be controversial andambiguous, because those who where shaping the development of modernconstitutionalism (the deputies of the Cortes of Cádiz) followed different –and even antagonistic – political attitudes or ideologies (the absolutists andliberals). As a consequence, the main controversial question was the appro-piateness to prosecute and punish political dissidents and collaborators – theafrancesados, juramentados and infidentes – using infidencia as a new legalconcept of political crime to respond to a somewhat “rebellious”,“revolutionary” or civil war-like situation. This may also explain why theactual prosecution of the crime of infidencia, following the regulation of themedieval text of the Partidas, turned out to be paradoxical and controversial.Indeed the life of the Spanish crime of infidencia was short but intensive.

Aniceto Masferrer


135 On this matter, see Aniceto Masferrer, The Fragility of Fundamental Rightsin the Origins of Modern Constitutionalism. Its Negative Impact in ProtectingHuman Rights in the “War on Terror” Era in: Counter-Terrorism, HumanRights and the Rule of Law: Crossing Legal Boundaries in Defence of theState, ed. by Aniceto Masferrer/Clive Walker, Cheltenham (forthcoming).

136 The main criticism to the crime of infidencia made by Reinoso, Examen de losdelitos de infidelidad a la patria, was precisely the violation of the constitu-tional guarantees and standards, denouncing, among other things, the judicialarbitrariness (pp. 344–357) and the violation of the separation of powers(pp. 358–386).

Editors and Contributors

Prof. Dr. Friedrich BattenbergTechnische Universität DarmstadtKarolinenplatz 5D-64289 [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Angela De BenedictisAlma Mater Studiorum – Università degli Studi di BolognaDipartimento di Storia Culture CiviltàPiazza San Giovanni in Monte 2I-40124 [email protected]

PD Dr. Christiane BirrMax-Planck-Institut für europäische RechtsgeschichteHansaallee 41D-60323 Frankfurt am [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Emanuele ConteUniversità di Roma TreDipartimento di GiurisprudenzaVia Ostiense 161I-00154 [email protected]

Dr. Malte GriesseUniversität KonstanzExzellenzcluster „Kulturelle Grundlagen von Integration“Fach D 173D-78457 [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Karl HärterMax-Planck-Institut für europäische RechtsgeschichteHansaallee 41D-60323 Frankfurt am [email protected]

Tina Hannappel M.A.Max-Planck-Institut für europäische RechtsgeschichteHansaallee 41D-60323 Frankfurt am [email protected]

Editors and Contributors 475

Jun. Prof. Dr. André KrischerWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität MünsterHistorisches SeminarDomplatz 20–22D-48143 Mü[email protected]

Prof. Dr. Luigi LacchèUniversità di MacerataDipartimento di GiurisprudenzaPiaggia della Torre 8I-62100 Macerata (MC)[email protected]

Prof. Dr. Aniceto MasferrerUniversitat de ValenciaCampus dels TarongersEdificio Departamental OccidentalE-46022 [email protected]

Prof. Dr. David von MayenburgUniversität LuzernRechtswissenschaftliche FakultätFrohburgstrasse 3CH-6002 [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Diego QuaglioniUniversità degli Studi di TrentoFacoltà di GiurisprudenzaVia Giuseppe Verdi 53I-38122 [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Andreas RothJohannes-Gutenberg-Universität MainzFachbereich Rechts- und WirtschaftswissenschaftenJakob-Welder-Weg 9D-55099 [email protected]

Prof. DDr. Martin P. Schennach MASUniversität InnsbruckInnrain 52A-6020 [email protected]

476 Editors and Contributors

Prof. Dr. Lothar SchillingUniversität AugsburgUniversitätsstraße 10D-86135 [email protected]

Thomas Walter M.A.Max-Planck-Institut für europäische RechtsgeschichteHansaallee 41D-60323 Frankfurt am [email protected]

PD Dr. Andreas WürglerUniversität BernHistorisches InstitutUnitobler Länggassstrasse 49CH-3000 Bern [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Andrea ZorziUniversità di FirenzeDipartimento di Storia, Archeologia, Geografia, Arte e Spettacolo (SAGAS)Via S. Gallo, 10I-50129 [email protected]

Editors and Contributors 477

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