Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 22. Oktober 2015 zu

Pakistan: Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi, Militäroperation

Zarb-e-Azb

Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

Unterhalten bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen (Taliban, Sipah-e-Sahaba) in der

Stadt Karachi geheime Trainingslager, beispielsweise im Stadtteil Bhains Co-

lony? Wenn ja, werden dort Minderjährige an Waffen ausgebildet?

Läuft momentan eine Operation der Regierung gegen bewaffnete Oppositi-

onsgruppen (beispielsweise unter dem Namen Zarb-e-Azb)?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecher-

che) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen.

1 Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pa-

kistan (TTP), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

Karachi als Rückzugsgebiet für bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen. In Karachi, der

Hauptstadt der Provinz Sindh, sind Kriminalität und Korruption, in die auch lokale

Politiker verwickelt sind, laut The Guardian (21. Oktober 2015) und International

Crisis Group (23. Januar 2014) extrem weit verbreitet. Die Stadt ist in den letzten

Jahren wegen ihrer Gesetzlosigkeit ein wichtiges Rückzugsgebiet und eine Geld-

quelle für bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen geworden. Laut The Guardian (21. Okto-

ber 2015) sollen es diese Gruppen sogar geschafft haben, Teile der Stadt unter ihre

Kontrolle zu bringen. Laut The News (12. Oktober 2015) planten Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan (TTP) wie auch Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) im Oktober 2015 Anschlä-

ge in Karachi, die aber vereitelt werden konnten.

SSP-Präsenz in Karachi. Laut The Wall Street Journal (30. Juli 2015) operiert die

SSP ganz offen in Karachi und ist dort sehr präsent. Beispielsweise geh ören Dut-

zende Madrasas (im pakistanischen Kontext: Religionsschulen) in Orangi, einem

Stadtteil von Karachi, zur SSP. Im Februar und März 2015 wurden in Karachi laut

International Crisis Group (2. März 2015), Express Tribune (24. Februar und 4. März

2015), Pakistan Today (15. Februar 2015) und Samaa.tv (1. Februar 2015) mehrere

gezielte Anschläge auf Mitglieder der SSP (ASWJ) ausgeführt, und mehrere von

ihnen wurden dabei getötet.

Hintergrund: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) – Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat

(ASWJ). Laut der US-amerikanischen Botschaft in Pakistan (23. Oktober 2009) und

BBC (17. August 2009) ist die Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) eine bewaffnete Op-

positionsgruppe, die 1985 in der Provinz Punjab gegründet wurde und sich gegen

die schiitische Minderheit in Pakistan richtet. Zu ihren Zielen gehört die Umwandlung

von Pakistan in einen rein sunnitischen Staat. Laut BBC (17. August 2009) und Ex-

press Tribune (13. März 2012) hat die Gruppe mehrmals ihren Namen geändert , um

Verbote durch die Regierung zu umgehen; so nannte sie sich nach 2002 Millat-e-

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Islamia. Ihr aktueller offizieller Name ist Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), allerdings

ist sie weiterhin am besten unter dem Namen SSP bekannt. Laut der US-

amerikanischen Botschaft in Pakistan (23. Oktober 2009) folgt die SSP der Deo-

bandi-Ideologie, und mehrere andere bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen sind aus ihr

entstanden. Wichtige Anführer und reguläre Kämpfer von anderen solchen Gruppen

gehörten vormals der SSP an, so beispielsweise Qari Hussain, der Vertreter des

TTP-Anführers Baitullah Mehsud, der laut BBC (30. September 2009) 2009 getötet

wurde. Laut dem American Enterprise Institute (8. September 2014) haben die An-

schläge der SSP im Jahr 2014 eine neue Qualität erreicht. Im September 2014 bei-

spielsweise wurde in Punjab ein schiitischer Offizier des pakistanischen Militärs in

einer Moschee auf einem Militärgelände getötet. Laut The Wall Street Journal (30.

Juli 2015) behauptet die SSP, in jedem Distrikt von Pakistan präsent zu sein. Sie

soll ausserdem Verbindungen zur Lashkar-e-Jhangvi haben, einer weiteren bewaff-

neten Oppositionsgruppe. Laut derselben Quelle werden wichtige Führungspersön-

lichkeiten der SSP von der Polizei beschützt. Laut Foreign Policy (8. September

2015) geniesst die SSP ausserdem die Unterstützung politischer Parteien, und ihre

Mitglieder sind selber politisch aktiv. So ist der Anführer der SSP (ASWJ), Maulana

Ahmed Ludhianvi, weiterhin Parlamentsmitglied.

TTP-Präsenz in Karachi. Laut BBC (21. März 2013) waren 2013 die in Karachi an-

sässigen Teile der TTP sowie kriminelle Gruppen in illegale Landnahme und Strei-

tigkeiten um Land verwickelt. Gleichzeitig setzten sie dort mit Unterstützung von

Teilen der Bevölkerung in ärmeren paschtunisch dominierten Stadtteilen mobile Ge-

richte ein, die in solchen Streitigkeiten Entscheidungen fällten und auch Bestrafun-

gen durchführten.

Hintergrund: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Pakistanische Taliban). Laut dem

Council on Foreign Relations (18. November 2013) ist die 2007 im Nordwesten Pa-

kistans gegründete TTP eine paschtunisch dominierte Koalition von bewaffneten

Oppositionsgruppen. Die TTP hat dem pakistanischen Staat den Heiligen Krieg

(Jihad) erklärt. Sie strebt danach, Gebiete unter ihre Kontrolle zu bringen, setzt die

Scharia in von ihr kontrollierten Gebieten um und kämpft gegen NATO -

Sicherheitskräfte in Afghanistan. TTP verübt Anschläge auf Militärpersonal und Mili-

täreinrichtungen aber auch auf Zivilisten.

TTP und SSP gehören zu den «guten», von der Regierung unter bestimmten

Bedingungen geduldeten bewaffneten Gruppen. Laut International Crisis Group

(22. Juli 2015, S. 3-4, 8-10) unterscheidet die pakistanische Regierung entgegen

öffentlicher Verlautbarungen weiterhin zwischen «schlechten» Taliban, die das pa-

kistanische Militär angreifen, und «guten» Taliban. Letztere schliessen beispielswei-

se die Gul Bahadur-Fraktion der TTP sowie ihr seit langem verbündete afghanische

Gruppen wie Mullah Omars Rahbari Shura, Gulbuddin Hekmatyars Hizb-e Islami

sowie das Haqqani-Netzwerk ein. Viele Anführer und Mitglieder der «guten» Taliban

und ihrer afghanischen Verbündeten konnten, gewarnt durch das pakistanische Mili-

tär, vor Beginn der Operation Zarb-e-Azb (siehe Abschnitt 3) im Juni 2014 aus

Nordwasiristan nach Afghanistan, in benachbarte Gebiete in der Khyber Pakhtunk-

hwa-Provinz und in FATA sowie nach Karachi fliehen. Auch die SSP gehört laut der-

selben Quelle zu den «guten» bewaffneten Gruppen, die von den Antiterroris-

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musoperationen der Regierung ausgenommen sind, solange sie keine staatlichen

und Militäreinrichtungen angreifen.

The Guardian, 21. Oktober 2015:

«[Karachi] is one of the most violent places in the world. For the 23 million people

who live there, crime has become a central part of life, as commonplace as traffic

jams and power cuts. (…) It is not just the high rate of crime that marks Karachi

out, but the entanglement of crime with the very highest echelons of politics:

the gangsters who stand for parliament, the politicians who sanction street kill-

ings. Karachi’s criminal syndicates do not limit themselves to slums. The bhat-

ta (extortion) economy, is worth billions of rupees. A few years ago, I visited a

poor district in the east of the city, and met a local youth leader who told me that

most families spent at least a third of their income on water sold from tanks; the

“water mafia” siphoned off the mains supply and charged outrageous rates to

sell it back to people. The “transport mafia” has repeatedly stymied attempts to

build a proper public transportation system. At some point, most citizens have

to do business with criminals – to buy a house, start a business, get running

water, take a bus.

In recent years, militant groups have taken advantage of the city’s lawlessness

to establish a foothold, effectively taking control of certain areas. Now, suicide

bombings and violent attacks on state targets have been added to the regular

gun battles between rival criminal gangs and the steady stream of targeted kill-

ings of political party activists. (…) The fate of Pakistan depends on Karachi, the

megalopolis that provides a quarter of the nation’s GDP, and the fate of Karachi will

be decided by the power struggles between its gangsters, terrorists, police and polit-

ical groups.» Quelle: The Guardian, Karachi vice: inside the city torn apart by kill-

ings, extortion and terrorism, 21. Oktober 2015:

www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/21/karachi-vice-inside-city-riven-by-killings-

kidnappings-and-terrorism.

International Crisis Group, 23. Januar 2014:

«Military operations in KPK as well as in FATA agencies have failed to apprehend

the TTP’s leadership and dismantle militant networks. Instead, they have relocated,

including to Karachi, which has become a sanctuary and funding source for

Pakistani militants and their Afghan allies .» Quelle: International Crisis Group,

Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23. Januar 2014, S. 31:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-policing-urban-

violence-in-pakistan.aspx.

The News, 12. Oktober 2015:

«The Karachi police, after receiving an intelligence report that Taliban and Sipah-

e-Sahaba terrorists were planning to carry out attacks in Karachi during the

month of Muharram, particularly at imambargahs in Qasba Colony, Peerabad

and Orangi Town and on mourning processions , have revised their security plan

to prevent them. (…) The report discloses that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan was

trying to carry out terrorist activities during Muharram in Qasba Colony, Peerabad

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and Orangi Town. Besides, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan too was planning at-

tacks, especially on the first of Muharram – the eve of Yaum-e-Farooq-e-Azam (RA).

The letter mentioned the names of some terrorists including Amjad, Ehstasham and

Zahid, who were probably present in the localities of Orangi Town. It was warned

that the terrorists might carry out attacks on the routes of mourning processions, par-

ticularly in Guru Mandir and its adjoining, Soldier Bazaar, and Jamshed Quarters.»

Quelle: The News, Strategy revised as new terror plans surface, 12. Oktober 2015:

www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-345074-Strategy-revised-as-new-terror-plans-

surface.

The Wall Street Journal, 30. Juli 2015:

«KARACHI, Pakistan—In this sprawling metropolis of 20 million, access to water is a

daily struggle for many. In Orangi Town, one of its roughest neighborhoods, some

residents have found a way to meet that need: by turning to the country’s biggest

Islamic extremist group. Radicals from Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat have dug wells

as part of their campaign to deliver public services and solidify support. The

water isn’t clean, but it is better than nothing, and grateful residents c ome to fill up

buckets. The Sunni extremist group is the reincarnation of a banned militant outfit

that security officials say was involved in killing thousands of people from the minori-

ty Shiite branch of Islam. ASWJ itself was banned in 2012, according to officials

at Pakistan’s Interior Ministry familiar with the action. But the ban was never

publicized much less enforced—an effort that would pose formidable challeng-

es given the group’s large network. The ASWJ, which operates openly, insists it

isn’t banned. “We have hundreds of thousands of people—what will you do with

them if you suppress us?” said Dilshad Ahmed, who heads the ASWJ in Orangi dis-

trict. “We are everywhere.”

Pakistani military officials say that they have broken with a decades -old policy of us-

ing jihadists as proxies in India or Afghanistan, and that they will eliminate them all

in turn, starting with the most dangerous for Pakistan. Last year, authorities again

vowed to crack down after a massacre of more than 130 children at an army -run

school in the northwestern city of Peshawar, an attack claimed by the Pakistani Tali-

ban. They specifically resolved to go after groups that change their name to circum-

vent bans. But ASWJ doesn’t even distance itself from its original name: its of-

ficials say they are fighting in the courts for the right to again call themselves

Sipah-e-Sahaba, the violent sectarian outfit banned in 2002. (…)

ASWJ claims a presence in every district in Pakistan. Its leaders deliver public

speeches, its followers organize rall ies and its members are candidates in elec-

tions. In Orangi, it runs dozens of madrassas, or Islamic schools.

“ASWJ wants to be the political face of the terrorists,” said Hasan Zafar Naqvi, a Shi-

ite religious scholar. “But they cannot achieve their aims th rough politics. That is why

they are so dangerous.” The group’s leaders say they don’t advocate killing Shiites,

though they publicly incite hatred against them and insist that Pakistan should de-

clare them to be non-Muslims. “Shiites are infidels,” said Ghulam Mustafa Baloch,

the head of ASWJ’s Islamabad branch. “Their beliefs are not those of any Muslim.

They are against Islam.”

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According to security officials, ASWJ feeds hate-filled recruits to an even more

radical sectarian offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which is accused in some of Pa-

kistan’s bloodiest attacks against Shiites. Those include a bombing in January at

a Shiite mosque in Shikarpur, in southern Sindh province, that killed 61 people, law -

enforcement officials say. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi operatives often use ASWJ madras-

sas as hide-outs, security officials say. ASWJ claims that it has no links to

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. “A person has one foot in Sipah-e-Sahaba, and the other in

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” said one of Karachi’s top counterterrorism officials, using the old

name for ASWJ. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s alleged leader, Malik Ishaq, was killed in a fire-

fight on Wednesday after his supporters attempted to free him from police custody.

Orangi is supposed to be the domain of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, a secular

political party that dominates Karachi, the capital of Sindh province. But while its

members often fear to tread in Orangi’s menacing alleyways, ASWJ cadres carry

themselves with a swagger. ASWJ flags and graffiti decorate the streets in some ar-

eas of Orangi. The group’s madrassas are popular with locals who complain that the

government schools don't function. The group’s leader, Ahmed Ludhianvi, has po-

lice protection. Other senior ASWJ officials, like the firebrand leader for Sindh,

Aurangzeb Farooqi, also have police escorts. Police say that these men face

death threats. Mr. Farooqi has been attacked multiple times. Mr. Baloch, the Islama-

bad head, was shot and wounded on June 26 as he left his house. No one has

claimed responsibility for those attacks, which po lice believe were either the result of

infighting or revenge by Shiites.

ASWJ contends that it pursues its sectarian objectives through peaceful means. Mr.

Ludhianvi maintains that he has restrained the group’s more violent elements. “What

more can I do?” Mr. Ludhianvi, who is based in the eastern province of Punjab, said

in an interview. He said that members of his group are being attacked and simulta-

neously facing government curbs, which he called “a serious injustice.” The military,

which last year launched a continuing operation against the Pakistani Taliban’s

base in the tribal areas, insists that all “terrorists” in the country will be target-

ed. While attacks overall have declined over the last couple of years, attacks

against Shiites have persisted.

Muhammad Amir Rana, head of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, said joining

a group like ASWJ often served as the last stage before graduating to a major -

league terrorist group such as al Qaeda or the Pakistani Taliban. The ideology of

ASWJ also echoes that of Islamic State, the virulently anti -Shiite group that has

seized territory in Syria and Iraq, and now has a foothold in Pakistan. “Indoc-

trination is the most important phase,” said Mr. Rana. “After that, they have a

choice: whether to go for the political choice on the same platform, or go for

the violent choice.”» Quelle: The Wall Street Journal, In Pakistan, Extremist Group

Expands Its Reach: Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat operates openly in country’s largest

city, 30. Juli 2015:

www.wsj.com/articles/in-pakistan-extremist-group-expands-its-reach-1438300910.

International Crisis Group, 2. März 2015:

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«[S]everal members of Sunni extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba (also known as Ahle

Sunnat Wal Jamaat) were killed in targeted attacks, including three in Karachi 1

Feb[ruary].» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch Database: Pakistan, 2.

März 2015:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx.

Express Tribune, 24. Februar 2015:

«Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) district Korangi president Maulana Shabbir

Hyderi was gunned down, while his companion was injured in a firing incident

in Korangi area of Karachi on Tuesday evening. Maulana Hyderi, 45, and his

companion Khad Din, 35, were traveling on their motorbike when unidentified assail-

ants in a car attacked them within the limits of Awami Colony police station. DSP Ali

Muhammad Khosa told The Express Tribune that Maulana Hyderi died on the spot

while his companion suffered injuries.» Quelle: Express Tribune, ASWJ district pres-

ident shot dead in Karachi, 24. Februar 2015:

http://tribune.com.pk/story/843520/aswj-district-president-shot-dead-in-karachi/.

Express Tribune, 4. März 2015:

«An Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ)’s office bearer and his driver were shot

dead near Paracha Chowk in Shershah, Karachi on Wednesday. ASWJ’s Karachi

chapter General Secretary Dr Fayyaz was travelling along with his driver Arif when

unknown armed men riding on motorcycles targeted them. Both were shot multiple

times. The injured were rushed to the Civil Hospital, Karachi where both of them

succumbed to their injuries. Earlier on February 27, a prayer leader belonging to

the ASWJ was killed and another injured in a firing incident near Safora Chow-

rangi in the city. The Karachi chapter chief, Aurangzaib Farooqui had also es-

caped an assassination attempt last month.» Quelle: Express Tribune, ASWJ’s of-

fice bearer shot dead in Karachi , 4. März 2015:

http://tribune.com.pk/story/847734/aswjs-office-bearer-shot-dead-in-karachi/.

Pakistan Today, 15. Februar 2015:

«A local leader from the banned Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) was killed in a tar-

geted attack in Rawalpindi on Sunday, while the central president of the party, Au-

rangzeb Farooqi, escaped a bid on his life in Karachi late on Saturday . (…)

ASWJ’s Central President Aurangzeb Farooqi was targeted by unidentified gunmen

near the Quaidabad Bridge area in Karachi on Saturday night. Farooqi escaped un-

hurt in the attack while three of his bodyguards sustained injuries, according to a

party spokesperson. A large number of police and Rangers personnel reached the

spot and cordoned off the area as a probe into the incident was initiated.» Quelle:

Pakistan Today, ASWJ leader killed in Pindi, another escapes attack in Karachi , 15.

Februar 2015:

www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/02/15/national/aswj -leader-killed-in-pindi-another-

escapes-attack-in-karachi/.

Samaa.tv, 1. Februar 2015:

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«Karachi: At least three activist of a religious party were gunned down in two

separate shootings here on Sunday night , police said. In the first incident a drive-

by shooting at Islampura Chowk in Orangi Town left Akhtar Hussain, 50, dead and

his son seriously injured. According to sources, Hussain was associated with Ahle

Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ). The dead and the injured were shifted to Abassi Sha-

heed Hospital. In the second shooting, two AWSJ men were picked off by a couple

of biker gunmen near Malir Halt area of the metropolis. Both of them died of the

bullet wounds then and there.» Quelle: Samaa.tv, Gunmen kill 3 Karachi ASWJ

men in hours, 1. Februar 2015:

www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2015/02/gunmen-kill-3-karachi-aswj-men-in-hours/.

US-amerikanische Botschaft in Pakistan, 23. Oktober 2009:

«The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was formed in 1985 in Jhang, Punjab by

anti-Shia clerics. This banned terrorist organization is focused on sectarian

violence and the group was originally supported by Zia-ul-Haq's government in

a move to counter Shia Iran's influence in Pakistan. The funding for SSP comes

from both external and local sources such as the trader -merchant class in Jhang.

SSP was responsible for the rise in sectarian violence in the 1980s and 1990s. SSP

advocates Deobandi ideology and has served as the basic ideological and mili-

tant birthing ground for other militant groups. The group was linked with the

1997 attack on former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, and they take credit for killing

several Shia doctors in Karachi in 2001. Recently, the SSP has resurged in Southern

Punjab and has links with other militant outfits. Qari Hussain, the most feared

deputy of Tehreek Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) recently killed leader, Baitullah

Mehsud, came out of SSP and many of the TTP's foot soldiers are from SSP

ranks. (Note. The SSP is also believed to be behind the violence against Christians

in Punjab in late August and early September 2009. End Note.) (…) CRSS's Gul ar-

gues that TTP has strong network links with radical groups such as SSP and LeJ

[Lashkar-e-Jhangvi], and many Taliban leaders have studied at madrassas in South-

ern Punjab.» Quelle: US Embassy in Pakistan, Extremism in southern Punjab and

northern Sindh, 23. Oktober 2009 (vertrauliches Dokument, veröffentlicht durch

Dawn, 2009: Southern Punjab extremism battle between haves and have -nots, 21.

Mai 2011):

www.dawn.com/news/630651/2009-southern-punjab-extremism-battle-between-

haves-and-have-nots.

BBC, 17. August 2009:

«The SSP is an Islamic extremist organisation whose goal is to convert Paki-

stan into a "pure" Sunni state. (…) The SSP, which was banned by President

Pervez Musharraf in February 2002, has continued to operate under various

names to counteract the ban. After 2002, it changed its name to Millat -e-Islamia.

(…) When this name was also placed on the banned list, the name of Ahle Sun-

nat Wal Jamaat was adopted. Although this is the official title, Sipah -e-Sahaba

is the name everybody, including the party's own cadres, use to refer to the or-

ganization.» Quelle: BBC, Pakistan 'extremist' is shot dead, 17. August 2009:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8205158.stm.

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Express Tribune, 13. März 2012:

«The ASWJ have also been working towards a lift of the ban on Sipah -e-Sahaba, the

proscribed outfit that the ASWJ claims as their own. “We were from the Sipah-e-

Sahaba, and we only changed the organization’s name when General Musharraf

banned us” said Allama Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, chief of Ahl -e-Sunnat Wal

Jamaat. Speaking to The Express Tribune via phone from Jhang, Ludhianvi said “We

changed the name of the organization out of respect for the law. Our real or-

ganization is actually Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.” “When Musharraf banned

Sipah-e-Sahaba, Azam Tariq the former chief named the organization Millat -e-

Islamia, which was banned as well, so when Maulana Azam Tariq died, Allama

Ludhianvi the next chief started Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat,” Younas Qasmi sec-

retary of Ludhianvi added.» Quelle: Express Tribune, No ban on Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal

Jamaat, 13. März 2012:

http://tribune.com.pk/story/349444/no-ban-on-ahl-e-sunnat-wal-jamaat/.

BBC, 30. September 2009

«The Taliban in Pakistan have released a video confirming that their former leader

Baitullah Mehsud is dead .» Quelle: BBC, Taliban film shows leader is dead, 30.

September 2009:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8282174.stm.

American Enterprise Institute , 8. September 2014:

«On Saturday, gunmen in Karachi murdered a prominent Shia cleric’s son and his

bodyguard. And on Sunday, in Sargodha in Punjab, suspected militants from the

sectarian Sipah-e-Sahaba (Soldiers of the Prophet’s Companions) shot dead a

brigadier in the Pakistani army. That a serving officer was killed in a Shia

mosque in a military cantonment suggests a new level of brazenness for anti -

Shia groups in Pakistan. (…)

Only in the 1980s, under the fundamentalist Sunni dictatorship of Gen. Zia ul -Haq,

did the compact between Sunni and Shia begin to fray. That’s when Pakistan was

sucked into a shadowy proxy war for influence between two rival strains of radical Is-

lam: the messianic Shia variety propagated by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, and Wah-

habism, the austere back-to-basics form of Sunni Islam championed by Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis also poured cash into madrassas propagating Deobandism, a close

cousin of their own harsh version of Islam born in nineteenth century India. »

Quelle: American Enterprise Institute, Pakistan’s Shia under attack , 8. September

2014:

www.aei.org/publication/pakistans-shia-under-attack/.

Foreign Policy, 8. September 2015:

«Groups such as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Jundullah, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Sunni

Tehrik, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), Sipah-e-Muhammad, Tehrik-e-Jafaria,

and LeJ have openly advocated sectarianism and their propensity to target religious

minorities has significantly intensified. Ironically, some of these sectarian groups —

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if not all — are believed to have close relations and enjoy considerable support from

political parties. Despite being outlawed, some of these groups have openly contest-

ed elections in alliance with other political parties. Moreover, the leader of the pro-

hibited ASWJ, Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi, who has allegedly been responsible

for the murder of thousands of Shias, has remained a member parliament.»

Quelle: Foreign Policy, 8. September 2015:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/08/the-sectarian-dilemma-in-pakistan/.

BBC, 21. März 2013:

«This mobile Taliban court does not limit its interests to this one shanty town

on the outskirts of Karachi. It has been arbitrating disputes across many sub-

urbs in the metropolis. The Taliban largely emerged in poor areas on the fring-

es of the city, run-down places with little or no infrastructure for health, educa-

tion and civic amenities. Their mobile courts have been hearing complaints for

quite some time, but in recent months they have also started administering

punishments - a sign of their growing clout. In January, they publicly adminis-

tered lashes to an alleged thief after recovering stolen goods from him. The goods

were returned to the owner who had reported the theft. (…) There is a tussle under

way between mafia groups (becoming more prolific and powerful in Karachi)

who seek to seize land and militant groups who are also grabbing land. This in-

cludes the Taliban, for all their willingness to arbitrate in these disputes. It is clear

that they want to tighten their grip in Pakistan's biggest city, its commercial centre.

And they appear to have great influence in those suburbs dominated by the

Pashtun ethnic group.» Quelle: BBC, How the Taliban gripped Karachi , 21. März

2013:

www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21343397.

Council on Foreign Relations , 18. November 2013:

« Supporters of the Afghan Taliban who sought refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas mor-

phed into a distinct entity following the Pakistani army's initial incursion into the sem-

iautonomous region in 2002. In December 2007, about thirteen disparate militant

groups coalesced under the umbrella of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also

known as the Pakistani Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan.

Pakistani authorities accused him of orchestrating the assassination of former prime

minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Short-lived ceasefires signed with Islam-

abad in 2008 and 2009 provided opportunities for the Pakistani Taliban to regroup

and make territorial gains, analysts say.

After a U.S. drone strike killed Baitullah in August 2009, his cousin and deputy Ha-

kimullah Mehsud assumed leadership of the TTP. (…) A shura council chose hard-

liner Mullah Fazlullah as Hakimullah's successor shortly after his death. Fazlullah,

who gained infamy for ordering the assassination attempt on Pakistani schoolgirl an d

activist Malala Yousafzai, rejected talks with the government. (…) The predominant-

ly Pashtun group draws membership from all of FATA's seven agencies as well

as several settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa in the northwest. The TTP

has declared jihad against the Pakistani state, seeks to control territory, en-

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

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forces sharia, and fights NATO forces in Afghanistan. (…) The Pakistani Taliban

has targeted security forces and civilians alike (…).» Quelle: Council on Foreign

Relations, Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists, 18. November 2013:

www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422.

International Crisis Group, 22. Juli 2015:

«Attempts begun in February 2014 to negotiate a peace emboldened the insurgents

and were further complicated by the military’s continued distinction between

“bad” Taliban groups that attacked the security forces and “good” Taliban,

such as the TTP’s Gul Bahadur group and longstanding Afghan proxies, includ-

ing Mullah Omar’s Rahbari Shura, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb -e Islami and the

Haqqani Network. Amid amplified public calls for state action, talks were abandoned

after the June 2014 terror attack on Karachi’s international airport. The military took

the lead, with little civilian input, conducting an operation (Zarb-e-Azb, sharp strike),

in FATA’s North Waziristan agency, where militant groups operated with impunity.

Belying claims that no distinctions would be made, Pakistani Taliban that main-

tained peace deals with the military, as well as the Afghan insurgents, were re-

portedly warned well in advance; many leaders and foot soldiers reportedly re-

located to Afghanistan, neighbouring FATA agencies, KPK’s settled districts

and even Karachi.» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Revisiting Counter-terrorism

Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls , 22. Juli 2015, S. 3-4:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-

terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.aspx.

International Crisis Group, 22. Juli 2015:

«(…) the most prominent banned jihadi groups continue to operate freely under

changed names and through so-called charity fronts. These “good banned

groups”, as a prominent opposition parliamentarian called them, do not target

the state and its security forces, and many also serve as the military’s proxies

to promote perceived national security interests. This selective approach is justi-

fied on the grounds that the clampdown is to be “sequenced”, starting with those who

have targeted or are currently target ing the state, but to be followed eventually by

those that have other goals, including against India and Afghanistan. This ignores

the links between sectarian, regional and global jihadi groups, which involve

sharing of resources, recruits, intelligence and, occasionally, targets. Jihadi

proxies can and have also turned their guns against their military patrons in the past.

(…) several homegrown Sunni extremist outfits also appear to be considered

among the “good banned groups”. These include the Sipah -e-Sahaba Pakistan

(SSP, banned in 2002, now renamed Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, ASWJ). An arrest

warrant for its leader, Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi, is ignored and its officers, madras-

as and mosques in Islamabad have been given police protection from rival extremist

factions.

According to a senior provincial government official, “the military is telling mili-

tants you guys have stepped out of line [by attacking military and other state

targets]. The message [is] you can carry on if you go back to the way it was” .»

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

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Quelle: International Crisis Group, Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Paki-

stan: Opportunities and Pitfalls , 22. Juli 2015, S. 8-10:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-

terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.aspx.

2 Trainingslager in Karachi

Deobandi Madrasa-System und Ausbildung von Minderjährigen an Waffen. Laut

International Crisis Group (29. März 2007) sind die Deobandis, deren Ideologie die

SSP gewaltsam vertritt, eine der vier religiösen Untergruppen des sunnitischen Is-

lam. Laut der US-amerikanischen Botschaft in Pakistan (23. Oktober 2009) dienen

die Madrasas (im pakistanischen Kontext: Religionsschulen) der Deobandis dazu,

Schüler zum salafistischen Islam zu «bekehren» und sie über den Heiligen Krieg

(Jihad) zu belehren. Oft stehen sie in Verbindung mit bewaffneten Oppositionsgrup-

pen, welche die Schulen laut Friday Times (12. Juli 2013) dazu benutzen, unterzu-

tauchen, zu rekrutieren und auszubilden. Laut International Crisis Group (22. Juli

2015, S.12-13) existieren in Pakistan 11 ‘000 Deobandi Madrasas, die als «sensibel»

eingestuft sind. Mindestens 20 Madrasas in bzw. bei Islamabad und Rawalpindi sol-

len laut derselben Quelle auf Verbindungen zur TTP untersucht worden sein . We-

nigstens zwei von ihnen bilden ihre Schüler im «Handhaben von Waffen für den Hei-

ligen Krieg» aus. Madrasas sollen laut derselben Quelle ihren Schülern auch helfen,

sich bewaffneten Oppositionsgruppen anzuschliessen, beispielsweise in den Som-

merferien.

Jihadistische Madrasas in Karachi. Im Rahmen dieser zeitlich begrenzten Recher-

che konnten keine Informationen zu jihadistischen Madrasas im Stadtteil Bhains

Colony gefunden werden; allerdings existieren in Karachis zentralem Distrikt laut

Friday Times (12. Juli 2013) mehr als 813 jihadistische Madrasas. Im selben Distrikt

finden gleichzeitig mehr als drei Viertel aller interreligiös motivierten Tötungen statt.

In den städtischen Gebieten der Provinz Sindh (Karachi, Hyderabad und Sukkur)

befinden sich laut derselben Quelle ungefähr 74 Prozent der 12 ‘545 Madrasas der

Provinz, von denen ausserdem 6191 zur Deobandi-Schule gehören. Dieselbe Quelle

zitiert das Heimatministerium von Sindh, laut dem mehr als 600 Madrasas in der

Provinz als gefährlich eingestuft werden.

International Crisis Group, 29. März 2007:

«In addition to the better known divisions between the Sunni majority and Shia mi-

nority, Pakistan’s Sunnis are themselves divided into four broad categories:

Deobandis, Barelvis, Alhe Hadith (Salafi), and revivalist modernist movements such

as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The first three Sunni subsects emerged as religious edu-

cational movements in the nineteenth century during British rule in India. The JI

came into being in the 1940s. Each sect and subsect has militant groups that

claim to defend – with violence – their group’s interest or particular brand of

religious truth. Each sect and subsect also has political parties that do the same

through the formal political system. The lines between a sect’s militant groups and

political parties are often both blurred and porous.» Quelle: International Crisis

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

– 26. Oktober 2015 Seite 12 von 20

Group, Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism , 29. März 2007, S.1-2, Fussnote

7:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/130-pakistan-karachis-

madrasas-and-violent-extremism.aspx.

US-amerikanische Botschaft in Pakistan , 23. Oktober 2009:

«The gap in Barelvi and Sufi welfare services is now filled by well-heeled, foreign-

financed Deobandi madrassas. Poor Barelvi families often are forced to send their

children to Deobandi madrassas to receive food, boarding, and monthly stipends.

According to defense analyst Aisha Siddiqa, the number of Deobandi madrassas in-

creased 140% between 1988 (1320) and 2000 (3152). These religious seminaries

and their accompanying evangelical wings have worked on converting commu-

nities to Salafism and neutralizing resistance to more rabid interpretations of

Islam. Secondly, madrassa students are indoctrinated about jihad at these in-

stitutions, which can lead them to joining any number of militant groups on

their own. Lastly, according to Siddiqa, the madrassas can act as transit

points where kids from government schools are shown the social mobility that

can accompany militancy and are offered a doctrinal justification for militant

action.» Quelle: US Embassy in Pakistan, Extremism in southern Punjab and north-

ern Sindh, 23. Oktober 2009 (vertrauliches Dokument, veröffentlicht durch Dawn,

2009: Southern Punjab extremism battle between haves and have-nots, 21. Mai

2011):

www.dawn.com/news/630651/2009-southern-punjab-extremism-battle-between-

haves-and-have-nots.

The Friday Times, 12. Juli 2013:

«In a recent survey carried out by the Sindh Home Ministry, there are 12,545

madrassas in the province, of which 2,161 are sectarian and dangerous. About 74

percent of these religious schools are in Urban Sindh (Karachi, Hyderabad and

Sukkur). (…) About 67 percent of the madrassas in the province are owned by peo-

ple who do not have a Sindh domicile. According to the survey, 6,191 of the

madrassas belong to the Deobandi school of thought , 2,811 are Barevli, 412 fol-

low the Ahle Hadith doctrine and 512 belonged to the Shia fiqh.

The most alarming aspect of the study is that the areas with the highest concentra-

tion of madrassas are the focal points of sectarianism. One example of that is Ka-

rachi's central district that has more than 813 madrassas. More than 74 percent

of all sectarian motivated killings in Karachi are carried out in this district.

Mufti Taimoor Afridi owns the Jamia Islamia madrassa in North Karachi, with 381

students mostly from the tribal areas. "These children would have joined the Taliban

if they weren't studying here," he said. "We are teaching and feeding them. The

money comes from local donors." Mufti Taimoor Afridi recently bought a new 4x4 Vi-

go worth Rs 3.2 million. Inside the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat's headquarters in Kara-

chi, party head Aurangzeb Farooqi says his group's madrassas do not promote sec-

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

– 26. Oktober 2015 Seite 13 von 20

tarian rivalry. "We have hundreds of madrassas with thousands of students, and we

do not teach sectarianism."

The population of madrassa students in Sindh according to the Home Ministry survey

is estimated at up to 120,000 to 150,000. "We have seen cases in the past where we

recovered children chained in a madrassa named Madrassa al Arabia al Uloom," said

Mohammad Rameez Khan, an official of the Sindh Home Ministry. "The parents en-

rolled the children but the madrassa administration chained them so they wouldn't

run-away."

(…) [T]he madrassa networks remain a major cause of concern for the Sindh gov-

ernment. "A majority of sectarian terrorists use these madrassa networks not

just to hide but to recruit, pick and even train," said senior police officer

Chaudhry Aslam, who heads the CID. "There are over 600 madrassas in Sindh

which are red flagged and termed dangerous," said a source in the Sindh Home

Ministry. But analysts say it is hard to prove how a specific religious curriculum pro-

motes hatred, violence and prejudice towards various sects within Islam and non -

Muslims, especially when the entire state and private school curriculum is de-

signed to promote, inculcate and incite the spirit of jihad and hatred among

children as young as five.

There are also concerns about the future about the thousands of students who enro ll

in these religious schools. "What will these children do after graduation?" asks

Mufti Naeem of Jamia Binoria, one of the largest seminaries in Sindh. "There has to

be vocational training and some sort of accommodation to these madrassa students

or there would be issues at all levels."» Quelle: The Friday Times, The madrassa

networks of Sindh, 12. Juli 2013:

www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20130712&page=5 .

International Crisis Group, 22. Juli 2015:

«11,000 Deobandi madrasas have been identified as “sensitive”. According to

an Islamabad police report, at least twenty in or near the capital and Rawalpindi

were being investigated for TTP links, and at least two give “jihadi weapons

training classes to students”. A KPK government report identified 145 “highly sen-

sitive” madrasas, the majority in Tank district, bordering on FATA’s South Waziristan

agency. According to a 2013 Sindh home ministry survey, the province has over

12,500 madrasas, with between 120,000 to 150,000 students. Over 2,100 madrasas

were deemed “dangerous”. Karachi’s central district, a hotbed of sectarian vio-

lence, has over 800 jihadi madrasas. Yet, the paramilitary Rangers-led counter-

terrorism operation targeting the city’s criminal gangs, political party-backed

armed groups, extortion and kidnapping rackets and TTP elements has exclud-

ed jihadi madrasas. Sindh’s government has taken some steps to clamp down

on jihadi madrasas. In February 2015, police reportedly sealed the offices of

seven in Sukkur and Badin districts. By March, the home secretary said that 72

suspected of involvement in terrorist activities were closed in Hyderabad. Yet,

the vast majority remain operational, with “big nurseries” of jihad in districts such as

Shikarpur, Sukkur and Khairpur. (…)

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

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«Though scores of alleged militants and terrorists arrested for conducting or

plotting terror attacks have been affiliated to jihadi madrasas, police rarely in-

terrogate their teachers and administrators, who commonly help students enrol

with militant outfits, for example during the summer break. To evade account-

ing for those who have been recruited for jihad, many madrasas require parents

and guardians to sign a form absolving them of responsibility if a student goes

missing. They are often added to police lists of “sensitive” seminaries, but po-

lice rarely follow up by assigning investigators, recording lectures or monitor-

ing those entering and exiting.» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Revisiting

Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls, 22. Juli 2015, S.

12-13:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-

terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.aspx.

3 Operationen der Regierung gegen bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen

Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb gegen bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Nord-

wasiristan. Laut Reuters (17. Februar 2014), The Guardian (1. März 2014) und

Agence France-Presse (9. März 2015) versuchten Anfang 2014 die pakistanische

Regierung und die bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppe Pakistanische Taliban (Tehrik-e-

Taliban Pakistan – TTP) mehrmals, einen Waffenstillstand zu schliessen und Frie-

densgespräche einzuleiten. Als diese scheiterten, begann das pakistanische Militär

am 21. Mai 2014 laut einem Situationsbericht der Pakistan Red Crescent Society

(18. August 2014), Luftschläge gegen bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen einschliess-

lich der TTP in Nordwasiristan durchzuführen, welches Teil der Stammesgebiete

unter pakistanischer Bundesverwaltung (Federally Administered Tribal Areas – FA-

TA) ist. Laut The Guardian (9. Juni 2014) und BBC (11. Juni 2014) wurde am 8. Juni

2014 der internationalen Flughafen in Karachi angegriffen. Sowohl die TTP als auch

die Islamische Bewegung Usbekistan nahmen die Verantwortung für den Angriff für

sich in Anspruch. Laut Agence France-Presse (15. Juni 2014) und IRIN (24. Juni

2015) erklärte die pakistanische Regierung e ine Woche später den Beginn der Mili-

täroperation Zarb-e-azb (Urdu für «scharfer Schlag») in Nordwasiristan. Diese Ope-

ration dauerte Mitte Oktober 2015 laut Daily Pakistan (16. Oktober 2015) weiter an.

Paramilitärische Operation gegen bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen und krimi-

nelle Gruppen in Karachi. Laut Express Tribune (5. September 2013) beschloss

die pakistanische Regierung am 4. September 2013 eine Operation in Karachi, um

die Aktivitäten krimineller Gruppen und bewaffneter Oppositionsgruppen, die dort

eine wichtige Rückzugsbasis haben (siehe Abschnitt 1), zu beenden. Die Operation

sollte von den paramilitärischen Rangers durchgeführt und formal unter der Leitung

der Regierung der Provinz Sindh stehen, von der Karachi die Hauptstadt ist. Laut

The Economist (26. September 2015) und International Crisis Group (22. Juli 2015,

S. 21-22) kontrolliert aber faktisch das Militär die Rangers-Operation. Laut De-

fence.pk (11. Juli 2015) und The Economist (26. September 2015) ergänzen sich die

paramilitärische Operation in Karachi und die militärische Operation Zarb-e-Azb in

Nordwasiristan und haben gemeinsam für eine deutliche Schwächung von TTP in

Karachi gesorgt. Allerdings blenden Berichte über den «Erfolg» der Karachi-

Operation laut der Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (5. Oktober 2015), einer

unabhängigen Nichtregierungsorganisation sowie laut The Guardian (21. Oktober

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

– 26. Oktober 2015 Seite 15 von 20

2015) die hohe Zahl von extralegalen Tötungen (extrajudicial killings) aus, die eben-

falls zur Bilanz der Operation gehören. Ausserdem ist laut International Crisis Group

(22. Juli 2015, S. 12-13) der Sektor der jihadistischen Madrasas (siehe Abschnitt 2)

von der Ranger-Operation ausgenommen. Allerdings hat die Provinzregierung von

Sindh laut derselben Quelle ihrerseits Schritte gegen solche Madrasas unternom-

men, so auch im Februar und März 2015, einschliesslich der Schliessung von 72

Madrasas in Hyderabad, die verdächtigt wurden, in terroristische Aktivitäten verwi-

ckelt zu sein. Laut International Crisis Group (22. Juli 2015, S. 21-22) erwarten Ver-

treter der Polizei und der Zivilgesellschaft in Karachi, dass die Gewalt wieder auf-

flammen wird, sobald die paramilitärische Operation beendet ist. Laut The Wall

Street Journal (30. Juli 2015) hat sich die Zahl der Angriffe auf Schiiten trotz der

Ranger-Operation nicht verringert.

Reuters, 17. Februar 2014:

«Peace talks between the Pakistani government and Taliban insurgents broke

down on Monday after insurgents said they executed 23 soldiers in revenge for ar-

my operations in the volatile tribal regions on the Afghan border. (…) Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif announced the latest round of talks last month just as speculation was

heating up that the army was preparing to launch a major ground and air offensive

against Islamist strongholds on its western frontier.» Quelle: Reuters, Peace talks

between Pakistan and Taliban collapse after killings , 17. Februar 2015:

www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/17/us-pakistan-taliban-idUSBREA1G0MP20140217.

The Guardian, 1. März 2014:

«The Pakistani Taliban has announced that the group will observe a one-month

ceasefire as part of efforts to negotiate a peace deal with the government,

throwing new life into a foundering peace process. Spokesman Shahidullah Sha-

hid said in a statement emailed to reporters on Saturday that the top leadership of

the militant group has instructed all of its units to comply with the ceasefire .»

Quelle: The Guardian, Pakistan Taliban announce one-month ceasefire to aid peace

talks, 1. März 2014:

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/01/pakistan-taliban-ceasefire-peace-talks.

Agence France-Presse, 9. März 2015:

«The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) declared a one-month ceasefire last

weekend, but that was swiftly followed by a major attack in Islamabad and a

bloody roadside bombing targeting security forces – both claimed by dissident

groups. Less than 48 hours after the TTP announced its ceasefire, a gun and sui-

cide bomb assault on an Islamabad court complex on Monday left 12 dead, the first

attack in the heavily guarded capital since 2011. It was disowned by the TTP central

command but claimed by a group calling itself Ahrar -ul-Hind, while Wednesday's

roadside bombing in the northwest that killed six paramilitary troops was claimed by

another renegade faction, Ansar-ul-Mujahideen.

Talks aimed at ending the TTP's seven-year insurgency resumed on Wednesday

despite those blows, and on Thursday the government announced it was setting up

a new committee to accelerate the process. But the attacks have raised fears that

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

– 26. Oktober 2015 Seite 16 von 20

the militant movement is splintering dangerously – though several analysts said

they suspected the "new" factions were simply the TTP operating under anoth-

er guise.» Quelle: Agence France-Presse, Shadowy militant splinter groups threaten

Pakistan peace talks, 9. März 2015:

http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/shadowy-militant-splinter-groups-threaten-

pakistan-peace-talks.

Pakistan Red Crescent Society , 18. August 2014:

«Immediately after airstrikes on the hideouts of militants in the targeted areas of

North Waziristan Agency by Pak Army on 21st May 2014 , mass exodus of the

population started from the area on 22nd May 2014 to the settled districts of KPK.»

Quelle: Pakistan Red Crescent Society, PRCS IDPs NWA Operation Situation Report

no.13 18-08-14, 18. August 2014:

http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/prcs-idps-nwa-operation-situation-report-no13-18-

08-14.

The Guardian, 9. Juni 2014:

«The Pakistani Taliban has claimed responsibility for an attack on Karachi air-

port in revenge for their late leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, who was killed in a US

drone strike in November. The initial assault at Jinnah international airport in

Pakistan's southern port city began late on Sunday and raged until dawn, when

the military said that at least 24 people – including all 10 attackers – had been

killed. Equipped with suicide vests, grenades and rocket -launchers, they had battled

security forces in one of the most brazen attacks in years in Pakistan's biggest city.

Fighting resumed early on Monday morning when gunshots could be heard inside the

airport and rangers and elite commandos were seen rushing inside. (…) Pakistani

authorities, who suggested the gunmen appeared to be Uzbeks, believe the

group intended to destroy or hijack aircraft before they were stopped by security per-

sonnel and commandos.» Quelle: The Guardian, Karachi airport: Pakistani Taliban

claim responsibility for attack, 9. Juni 2014:

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/fighting-resumes-karachi-hours-after-siege-

over.

BBC, 11. Juni 2014:

«Uzbek militants fighting with the Pakistani Taliban say they carried out Sun-

day's deadly assault on Karachi's international airport. (…) At least 39 people

were killed in the airport raid, including all 10 gunmen. DNA tests are being conduct-

ed on the gunmen, who officials in Karachi said appeared to be of Uzbek origin .

The BBC's Shahzeb Jillani in Islamabad says the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

(IMU) is a highly trained militant group, with bases in the North Waziristan tribal re-

gion. It works closely with al-Qaeda and Taliban militants and has previously carried

out large-scale co-ordinated attacks in Pakistan, including one on Peshawar airport

in 2012.» Quelle: BBC, Karachi airport: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claims at-

tack, 11. Juni 2014:

www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27790892.

Agence France-Presse, 15. Juni 2014 :

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

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«Pakistan on Monday launched fresh air strikes on the northwest tribal region

where it has deployed up to 30,000 troops in a long-awaited offensive to eliminate

Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants from their border stronghold. The action in North

Waziristan was launched a week after a brazen insurgent attack on Pakistan's

main airport in Karachi which left dozens dead and marked the end of a troubled

peace process. The offensive was announced on Sunday (…).» Quelle: Agence

France Presse, Pakistan deploys troops, jets in anti -militant offensive, 15. Juni 2014:

http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-deploys-troops-jets-anti-militant-

offensive.

IRIN, 24. Juni 2015:

«Operation Zarb-e-Azb, or Sharp and Cutting Strike, is meant to clear Taliban,

al-Qaeda, and foreign militants out of North Waziristan, part of the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Militant groups have been based there for more

than a decade, launching attacks inside Pakistan and across the border against coa-

lition forces in Afghanistan. The military says the operation it launched in June

last year is in its final phase after killing more than 2,700 militants.» Quelle: IRIN,

Displaced Pakistanis caught between the Taliban and army, 24. Juni 2015:

www.irinnews.org/report/101668/displaced-pakistanis-caught-between-the-taliban-

and-army.

Daily Pakistan, 16. Oktober 2015:

«Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Friday chaired a high-level meeting to discuss the

ongoing military operation Zarb-e-Azb and stalled peace process of Afghanistan.»

Quelle: Daily Pakistan, PM Nawaz chairs high level to discuss Zarb -e-Azb, Afghan

peace process, 16. Oktober 2015:

http://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/pakistan/pm-nawaz-chairs-high-level-to-discuss-zarb-

e-azb-afghan-peace-process/.

Express Tribune, 5. September 2013:

«“The Rangers will start a targeted operation in the next two to three days,” an-

nounced Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan following a special meeting of the

federal cabinet at the Governor’s House on Wednesday. The meeting decided to

give the paramilitary force the ‘full mandate’ to lead both investigations and the

operation against extortionists, terrorists, target killers and kidnappers in the

metropolis. (…) Speaking at the conference, Chief Minister Shah appreciated the

prime minister’s role in helping the provincial government resolve the volatile

situation in Karachi and said the decision to launch a paramilita ry operation in

the city would not affect provincial autonomy .» Quelle: Express Tribune, Karachi

law and order: Rangers to launch operation in two days, 5. September 2013:

http://tribune.com.pk/story/600064/karachi -law-and-order-rangers-to-launch-

operation-in-two-days/.

The Economist, 26. September 2015:

«Operation Zarb-e-Azb has seen key towns in the former Taliban sanctuary of

North Waziristan retaken by the state. Militants have been hunted down else-

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

– 26. Oktober 2015 Seite 18 von 20

where, particularly in Karachi, which had been a major centre of Taliban activi-

ty. All this work has helped cut mil itant violence by nearly half in the last nine

months, according to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, a think -tank in Is-

lamabad. (…) [O]versight is badly needed as the army’s power expands. Military

courts have started hearing terrorism cases. The army sits on “apex committees” that

co-ordinate security matters in each of the four provinces. Through the paramilitary

Rangers force it is largely in charge of policing in Karachi.» Quelle: The Econo-

mist, Hail to the chief: Politicians are overshadowed by a publicity-seeking general,

26. September 2015:

www.economist.com/news/asia/21667980-politicians-are-overshadowed-publicity-

seeking-general-hail-chief.

International Crisis Group, 22. Juli 2015:

«The ongoing Rangers-led Karachi operation shows how reliance on parallel forces,

with a separate chain of command, undercuts accountability and transparency, while

marginalising and undermining civilian institutions. Ostensibly supervised by the

Sindh government, the Rangers have taken control of most areas of policing ,

from having an alternative dial-in complaints centre to developing an ISI-supported

counterpart to the Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC). Sidelining police and

provincial government, operation review meetings are held at Karachi’s army

corps headquarters, often cha ired by Army Chief Sharif in the chief minister’s

absence.

Extrajudicial and custodial killings by the Rangers and police (called “encoun-

ters”) are increasingly common in Karachi. Often little is known about the al-

leged terrorists/criminals; human rights activists and even serving police claim

the Punjabi-dominated Rangers have specifically targeted some communities,

particularly recent Pashtun migrants, who are accused of membership in or

supporting the TTP. Serving and retired Sindh police worry that such killings might

generate sympathy for criminal and militant gangs among targeted communities.

Moreover, a senior serving Karachi officer said, “when you have the Rangers running

the show and … encounter killings, we [the police] think, ‘why bother doing any in-

vestigation? Why bother doing our job?’” The numbers of sectarian, gang-related

and other targeted killings may have declined, but this is more likely the result

of violent extremists, extortionists and other criminals keeping a low profile

than the disruption or dismantling of their networks. Police, activists and other

civil society stakeholders in Karachi believe that once the operation is over, the

violence will likely resume.» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Revisiting Counter-

terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls , 22. Juli 2015, S. 21-22:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-

terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.aspx.

Defence.pk, 11. Juli 2015:

«Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a year-old counter-insurgency offensive in North Wazir-

istan, has greatly helped authorities in Karachi to dismantle networks of the

terrorist movement Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), analysts and officials say.

(…) The offensive in a distant tribal agency and on-going police work in Karachi

Pakistan – Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen in Karachi , Militäroperation Zarb-e-Azb – Schnellrecherche

– 26. Oktober 2015 Seite 19 von 20

have created a synergy that helps public safety. The police and Rangers had

been conducting a clean-up operation in Karachi since 2013, knocking down crime

considerably. They benefited when the military attacked mili tant bases in North Wa-

ziristan starting last June. The army destroyed the TTP's command-and-control

system, which had a ripple effect extending all the way to Karachi , analysts and

officials said. (…) Law enforcement, particularly the Rangers, have killed many

key Taliban commanders and supporters in Karachi , Raza Khan, a community ac-

tivist in Gulshan-e-Buner, said. "We haven ’t seen the Taliban killing anyone or extort-

ing money from traders in the past four months," he said."» Qelle: Defence.pk, Zarb-

e-Azb brings peace to Karachi residents, 11. Juli 2015:

http://defence.pk/threads/zarb-e-azb-brings-peace-to-karachi-residents.385359/.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 5. Oktober 2015:

«There is no doubt that the overall law and order situation in Karachi is better

today than it was in September 2013 when the Rangers operation was launched.

It is also true, however, that the number of killings in encounters and com-

plaints of rights violations at the hands of the security apparatus have escalat-

ed over that period. Allegations of enforced disappearance, custodial killing,

torture and the operation not being even-handed demand close scrutiny. There

is substance to the complaint that an independent mechanism to evaluate the Rang-

ers actions is lacking. Civilian input and oversight of the operation appears to be

non-existent. Questions remain over the sustainability of any gains made, par-

ticularly with respect to the capacity of the police to take over once the opera-

tion concludes.» Quelle: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Gathering clouds

threaten democracy, rights: HRCP, 5. Oktober 2015:

http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/gathering-clouds-threaten-democracy-rights-hrcp/.

The Guardian, 21. Oktober 2015:

«Overstretched and underfunded, the [Karachi police] force has just 30,000 officers.

(London’s Metropolitan police employs nearly 50,000 for a population of 8.3 million.)

Since 2013, the force has been engaged in an effort to bring the city under control.

Announcing the mission, known simply as the Karachi operation, interior minister

Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan told reporters that the police and the Pakistan Rangers –

a paramilitary force under the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior –

would focus on the “four heinous crimes of target -killing, kidnapping, extortion

and terrorism”. The result has been a dramatic increase in extrajudicial killings

or “encounters” as they are euphemistically known. Since the operation began,

800 people have been killed by police. Officers, who generally claim they are act ing

in self-defence, are rarely held to account. (…)

The current anti-crime initiative seems to be working. According to official statis-

tics, at least, the city-wide murder rate is significantly reduced. (970 murders

were reported in the first half of 2015, 57% less than in the same period in 2014.) Of

course, this does not include the hundreds of people shot dead by the security

forces. Police justify these illegal killings by saying that Karachi is in a state of

war and that any deaths are an unfortunate result of armed clashes. The Human

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– 26. Oktober 2015 Seite 20 von 20

Rights Commission of Pakistan, an NGO, has brought several cases against senior

officers. (…)

Faced with the threat of death at the hands of the Taliban, many people – police

officers, journalists, politicians – quietly leave the country.» Quelle: The Guardi-

an, Karachi vice: inside the city torn apart by killings, extortion and terrorism , 21. Ok-

tober 2015:

www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/21/karachi -vice-inside-city-riven-by-killings-

kidnappings-and-terrorism.

International Crisis Group, 22. Juli 2015:

«11,000 Deobandi madrasas have been identified as “sensitive”. According to an Is-

lamabad police report, at least twenty in or near the capital and Rawalpindi were be-

ing investigated for TTP links, and at least two give “jihadi weapons training classes

to students”. A KPK government report identified 145 “highly sensitive” madrasas,

the majority in Tank district, bordering on FATA’s South Waziristan agency. Accord-

ing to a 2013 Sindh home ministry survey, the province has over 12,500 ma drasas,

with between 120,000 to 150,000 students. Over 2,100 madrasas were deemed

“dangerous”. Karachi’s central district, a hotbed of sectarian violence, has over

800 jihadi madrasas. Yet, the paramilitary Rangers-led counter-terrorism opera-

tion targeting the city’s criminal gangs, political party -backed armed groups,

extortion and kidnapping rackets and TTP elements has excluded jihadi mad-

rasas. Sindh’s government has taken some steps to clamp down on jihadi mad-

rasas. In February 2015, police reportedly sealed the offices of seven in Sukkur

and Badin districts. By March, the home secretary said that 72 suspected of in-

volvement in terrorist activities were closed in Hyderabad.» Quelle: International

Crisis Group, Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and

Pitfalls, 22. Juli 2015, S. 12-13:

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-

terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.aspx.

Wall Street Journal, 30. Juli 2015:

«ASWJ contends that it pursues its sectarian objectives through peaceful means. Mr.

Ludhianvi maintains that he has restrained the group’s more violent elements. “What

more can I do?” Mr. Ludhianvi, who is based in the eastern province of Punjab, said

in an interview. He said that members of his group are being attacked and simulta-

neously facing government curbs, which he called “a serious injustice.” The military,

which last year launched a continuing operation against the Pakistani Taliban’s

base in the tribal areas, insists that all “terrorists” in the country will be target-

ed. While attacks overall have declined over the last couple of years, attacks

against Shiites have persisted.» Quelle: Wall Street Journal, In Pakistan, Extremist

Group Expands Its Reach: Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat operates openly in country’s

largest city, 30. Juli 2015:

www.wsj.com/articles/in-pakistan-extremist-group-expands-its-reach-1438300910.