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n literature, the Baltic States are usu-ally called �small� although their total

area is not that unimportant at all. It isroughly as large as two thirds of North-ern Germany or the UK, it comprisesabout half of Japan or California and itis about one and a half times larger thanthe area of the BeNeLux states (Belgium,the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Re-garding transport and commerce, theBaltic States are perfectly situated betweenEastern and Western Europe. They areagriculturally self-sufficient. Shale in Es-tonia and waterpower in Lithuania andespecially Latvia create optimal conditionsfor power generation and the industrialdevelopment of these states. After WorldWar II, oil fields even were found in

The Military situationin the Baltic States11111

By Mr. Edgars Andersons

Lithuania and Latvia. The forests in theBaltic States, especially in Latvia, can beregarded as one of their great natural riches.Moreover, the Baltic States are not as poorin mineral resources as commonly assumed.An important factor in the Baltic Stateswas the development of industry based onlocal materials, but that later turned into aspecialization in electrical engineering, pre-cision instruments, chemistry and similarbranches. This industry, especially in Latvia,could more easily compete with the greatpowers on the world market. The long coastof the Baltic Sea with its great ports, espe-cially Riga, Ventspils (Windau), Liepâja(Liebau), Tallinn (Reval) and Klaipeda(Memel), is of considerable economicimportance for the Baltic States. Although

the Baltic Sea gives access to the AtlanticOcean, one should pay attention to thefact that it belongs to the so-called bor-der seas, which creates certain militarydifficulties. The Baltic States are also anatural focal point for international traf-fic routes in the air, on railroads androads. The land�s surface is mostly verysuitable for the building of transportinfrastrucure.2

However, the military situation of theBaltic States must be regarded as highlydangerous. They are in the northern sec-tion of a long and narrow line of smallerstates that are an obstacle for access fromRussian territory to the Atlantic Ocean,the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.One should always be aware of the fact

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that the Russian empire, known today asthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR), makes up one sixth of the earth�stotal surface area. The situation of theBaltic States was aggravated by the factthat access to the Baltic Sea was easiest pre-cisely in their territory. This fact poses aserious threat to the independence of theBaltic peoples as long as the Russian em-pire exists and the non-Russian peoples thatare under Russian influence (about one halfof the general population) do not gain sov-ereignty. To the rear of the Baltic people �in the West � is the open sea. TheScandinavian peoples on the other side,remembering their sad experiences in thepast, have always tried to stay away fromthe problems of the European continentand especially of the Baltics and to remainin relative isolation on the ScandinavianPeninsula. However, the Baltic and Finno-Ugrian people have been able to stay onthe coasts of the Baltic Sea for more than4.000 years although they have lost wideareas in Northern and Central Russia.3

The German Empire bordered the Bal-tic States in the Southwest. Just like in

the Middle Ages, it has been a serious threatto the independence of the Baltic Statesin modern times. But centuries-old expe-rience has taught the Germans that theBaltic �horn� � situated far in the North-east and under German rule � has alwaysbeen extremely difficult to defend and,thus, constantly endangered in militaryterms.4 Therefore, the opinion has devel-oped that support for the bastion of theindependent Baltic States and an encour-agement of the right of self-determinationof the Baltic people against the presump-tions and the pressure of the non-Balticpeople (especially those of the Russians),would be the best solution for the Ger-man interests.5 Unfortunately, this under-standing came to late.

An extremely unfavourable factor isthe small Baltic population. Only six mil-lion people live in the area, among theman unusually high number of descendantsof late immigrants such as Russians, Poles,Germans, Jews, White Russians, Swedishand others. Estonia and Lithuania (exceptfor the areas of Petseri, Vilnius, andKlaipeda) were nationally quite uniform,

whereas Latvia�s situation in this respectwas threatened. In recent years, as muchas 25% of Latvia�s population has beennon-Latvian.6

Another negative factor was the centu-ries-old alienation between the Baltic peo-ple and lack of a sense of community.Even while the Baltic States were independ-ent, little was done to remedy this situa-tion. Only when the threatening cloudsof World War II started gathering did,the Baltic peoples realize that they shareda common destiny. But then it was toolate to combine their powers on a largescale.7

In international literature one can findthe view that the independence of theBaltic States was just a short incident inworld history and that the Baltic peopledid not play a part in political, economicand military terms in the past. This opin-ion is completely wrong. In the course ofhistory, the fact went unnoticed that theBaltic and Finno-Ugrian people have beenable to stay in their present areas of settle-ment for 4,000 to 5,000 years, that about2,000 B.C. the Baltic peoples inhabited

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an area that extended from the Urals tothe Oder and from Estonia to CentralPoland and that from the birth of Christup to the sixth century the Baltic tribes,had reached a cultural peak that was quiteremarkable compared to their neigh-bours.8 For several centuries, the Latvianand Estonian tribes not only resisted thesimultaneous pressure of the Scandinavianand Slavic tribes, but also started coun-terattacks into the areas of the Swedes,Danes and Slavs.9 The Baltic peoplesshowed unusual persistence and braveryand were militarily successful against en-emies that often were technically betterequipped during the crusades. The Esto-nians� fight for freedom against theSwedes, Danes and Germans lasted from1191 to 122710 and the resistance of Latviaagainst the combined German powerslasted considerably longer � from 1186 to1290. The Order of the Brothers of theSword was destroyed and the LivonianOrder was severely beaten.11

The Lithuanians not only managed tohold their ground against intruders, butalso enlarged the area under their con-

trol several times until it stretched fromthe Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, becom-ing the largest state in medieval Europe.12

The combined powers of the Poles andthe Lithuanians stopped the advance ofthe Tartars and the Mongols towards Eu-rope, saved several Russian areas fromthe Mongolian yoke, slowed down theGermans� drive towards the East by beat-ing the German Order in 1410, and ab-sorbed the Ottomans� advance towardsthe Holy Roman Empire.13 Unfortu-nately, the Lithuanians lost their politi-cal and even cultural independence to aconsiderable extent during the unionwith Poland, although kings from theLithuanian Jagellons-Dynasty governedboth states for several centuries.14 ThePoles on their part made a historic mis-take when they tried to subjugate notonly the people of the states they hadconquered � White Russians, Ukrainiansand Latvians � but also the Lithuanians,who were their allies and much larger innumber. The Poles were not interestedin a confederation in which these peo-ples would have had equal rights.15 This

mistake cost the Poles, as well as the un-fortunate peoples who were linked tothem, dearly.

Although the German conquerorssaved the Latvians and Estonians frombecoming assimilated by the masses of theSlavs, connected them with Western cul-ture and did not try to Germanise them,they committed a crucial mistake in ex-ploiting these peoples in the interest ofGerman squires and merchants ever moremercilessly. A deep rift opened up betweenthe German immigrants and the nativepeoples, a rift that weakened the bastionof Livonia and was hard to overcome.Although Latvian and Estonian unitsfought bravely under their own com-manders, together with German troops ofthe Livonian League against the Russianintruders in several battles, the LivonianLeague fell apart. The conflict between theleading groups was to blame for this. Inthe following centuries the leading Ger-man social classes mainly tried to defendtheir own interests and privileges and failedto unite the native peoples against the su-premacy of foreign states.16

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Although the local landowners sub-jected the majority of Latvians, Estoni-ans, and Lithuanians to serfdom, thesepeoples did not lose their national andmilitary spirit even under the most se-vere conditions. The great Estonian re-volt of 1343 against Danish and Germansupremacy, which liberated the whole ofNorthern Estonia for a short period,proved this.17 In 1372, the Lithuaniansconquered the Kremlin in Moscow.18

During the Livonian War Latvian andEstonian peasant armies operated.19 Unitsof Latvian soldiers were among the troopsof Sweden and the Dukedom of Courland.Latvian soldiers fought not only in theirnative country, but also in Poland, Aus-tria, and the Netherlands and some sol-diers and seamen even showed up in thecolonies of the Dukedom of Courland,in Africa and America.20 In 1560, the Es-tonians even liberated a part of theircountry again for a short period oftime.21 During the Great Nordic War,twelve Latvian infantry battalions and ar-tillery units fought on the Swedish side.22

When Latvia and Estonia fell under Rus-

sian control, soldiers of these peoples werein Russia�s army and fleet, where they heldpositions at the end of the 19th and thebeginning of the 20th century.23 DuringNapoleon�s invasion and during theCrimean War, there were purely Latviannavy and army units in the fight againstthe invaders.24 When the Lithuanians cameunder Russian control, the opposite hap-pened. Lithuanian units volunteered forthe fight against the Russians in 1812.25

In the part of Lithuania that had fallen toPrussia, the Prussian army had two Lithua-nian cavalry regiments for many years.26

The times of the Russian administra-tion were nevertheless the hardest trial forthe Baltic peoples. Several revolts, under-taken by Estonians, Latvians and Lithua-nians against the local authorities of theRussian, German-Baltic and Polish land-owners and against the Russian adminis-tration, clearly show this. These uprisingsreached their peak in the great Polish-Lithuanian revolutions of 1830-1831 and1863-186527 , the Estonian Mahtras Warof 185828 , and the bloody revolution ofall three Baltic people, but especially of

the Latvians and Estonians, in 1905, whenthese countries were more or less undercontrol by their own people.29 Lithua-nian and, in smaller numbers, also Latvianemigrants also took part in the AmericanCivil War. The first victim of this warwas the Latvian Martiò¿ Buciò¿.30 Dur-ing the Spanish-American War, Lithuanianemigrants even sent their own militaryunits.31 All the above shows that the pe-riod of oppression that lasted for centu-ries could not suppress the national con-sciousness and the instinct for truth, jus-tice and solidarity among the Baltic peo-ple. Latvians and Estonians not only hadtraining opportunities in the Russianarmy and fleet, but were also able to gainexperience in the highest commandingpositions. The Catholic Lithuanians werenot accepted as officers into the Russianarmed forces.32 Instead the political lead-ers of Lithuania had � due to the longperiod of proud independence � the clear-est and the farthest-reaching political goal:the restoration of Lithuania�s independ-ence. The part of the Lithuanian popula-tion that was under Russian control was

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more strongly oppressed economically andculturally than the other Baltic people.Although the political goals of the Latviansand Estonians were not as far-reaching asthose of the Lithuanians, these peopleswere able to create a solid economic andcultural foundation for greater self-deter-mination and, eventually, for independ-ence. 33

The lessons of World War I andthe fight for freedom

Since 1795, all the Baltic states, withthe exception of a small area in Prussiainhabited by Lithuanians, were under Rus-sian rule. Except for the short period ofNapoleon�s invasion, the Baltic peoplesdid not have the slightest hope of gettingrid of the Russian control. A pact withGermany would only have meant strength-ening of the local German oligarchy. Be-cause of the Polish weakness and lack ofunderstanding, the Lithuanians bitterlyregretted their co-operation with themduring the revolutions of 1830 and 1863.The Russian Revolution of 1905 gave rise

to greater hopes among the Baltic peo-ple; the majority of the local leaders, how-ever, even then only hoped for an au-tonomy of their peoples Only unusuallybig international changes could help theBaltic peoples to gain the longed-for in-dependence. Extremely favourable condi-tions were created by World War I, theBolshevik Revolution in Russia, the col-lapse of the German Empire, the right ofself-determination of the people pro-claimed by the Entente and the wide-spread economic and political prepared-ness of the Baltic peoples for an independ-ent life.

The Baltic region � just like in earliergreat wars � became a battleground rightat the beginning of World War I, a factthat did harm especially to Lithuania andLatvia. The native soldiers that were mo-bilized in the Baltic area had to withstandfirst the advance of the German army, butlater also had to undertake the first inva-sion into East Prussia. Tens of thousandsof Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian sol-diers were put into Russian units, wherethey fought bravely under the command

of incompetent and corrupt Russian gen-erals. Right from the beginning of thewar, the soldiers showed excellent brav-ery, steadfastness, and contempt for death.Observers of the Battle of Augustova com-pared the 20 Russian Corps, which wasalmost completely comprised of the Bal-tic soldiers, to Napoleon�s guards. The suc-cess of the Baltic soldiers was described asthe Russians� success by the press. Roughly20.000 Latvians, as many Lithuanians, andmany Estonians fell in the name of Rus-sia�s glory, their people not gaining anyadvantages by that.34 In the big rearguardactions, however, two Latvian garrison-battalions were able to draw attention; 70%of the men were wiped out.35

Latvian politicians achieved the crea-tion of national Latvian light-infantryunits. From 1 August 1915 and onwards,they consisted of some battalions, later ofeight combat regiments and one reserveregiment that were combined in two bri-gades, for a short period in one divi-sion.36 These units, commanded by theirown officers, broke through the Germanfront lines several times by using new tac-

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tics and rescued Russian units out of hope-less situations. Due to their bravery andsuccesses they were so different from Rus-sian units, that they drew the attentionnot only of Western military observers,but also of the international press.37 Un-fortunately, these excellent Latvian unitswere thirsty for glory and wanted to getattention and thus let themselves get ma-noeuvred into hopeless situations, pay-ing a high toll of lives during the offen-sive of July 1916 and the heroic offensivesof Christmas 1916 and New Year 1917.They all led to negative reactions amongthe soldiers. The complete national-Latvianunits consisted of approximately 45,000men. About 10,000 Latvian soldiers foundtheir death in these units, e.g. during thedefence of Riga in September 1917.38 Alltogether about 35,000 Latvian soldiers fellin Latvian and Russian units during WordWar I.39 The Latvian soldiers found a wayof drawing the attention of the Russiansand their allies to their victims, but theLatvian people did not gain any advan-tages from these victims of World War I.Only after the Revolution of 1917 did

two Latvian regions � Vidzeme andKurzeme � get autonomy; Latgale did notreceive it, and the whole area of Latviawas not united into one national terri-tory. After all, the Russian governmenthad to take into account the morale amongthe Latvian units.40

The Estonian political leaders were longin doubt whether it was worthwhile hav-ing the Russian government draw up Es-tonian national units. They were afraidthat all Estonian units might be annihi-lated in one single battle, whereas with adistribution of the soldiers along thewhole, long Russian front, there was hopethat the basis of the Estonian peoplewould survive.41 Yet in the end, the opin-ion prevailed that national units wouldbe necessary for the achievements of theirpolitical goals. On 21 April, the first Es-tonian infantry regiment was formed.42

Due to the weakness and the retreat ofneighbouring Russian units, this regi-ment suffered a great deal when defend-ing its positions, just as the Latvian regi-ments did.43 Only as late as 19 December,did the Estonians get permission to es-

tablish an Estonian division, somethingthey had really done already. In contrastto the Latvian brigades, who were pureinfantry units, the Estonian division wasallowed to raise an artillery brigade, a cav-alry regiment and a technical unit.44

Maybe because the units were formed solate, the commanders of the Estonian di-vision (in contrast to the Latvian com-manders) managed to avoid militarily andpolitically unnecessary bloodshed and toprevent a distribution of the Estonianunits across Russia after the breakdownof the front. Some Latvian units brokeup; others were transferred to Russia,where, after the Bolshevik Revolution,they were forced to fight as a special divi-sion for the Bolsheviks, while their homewas being occupied by German troops.45

Later, an Estonian soviet-division wasformed in Russia.46

As the representatives of the Lithua-nian people abroad had demanded fullindependence right at the beginning ofthe war, the commanders of the Russianarmed forces tried to prevent the forma-tion of national Lithuanian units. The

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first four Lithuanian battalions and twosquadrons were created as late as Augustand September 1917.47 Many Latvian andEstonian officers were in the Russianarmy, even in the highest ranks, but therewere only few Lithuanian officers. Towardsthe end of the war, Lithuanians weretrained as officers in spite of their reli-gious belief. Now there were some Lithua-nian officers among the lower ranks, butthere were virtually none in the higherranks. Those soldiers who remained onthe Bolshevik side after the revolution dis-persed for the most part.48

In February and March 1918, units ofthe Estonian division � in co-operationwith the Germans � helped liberate thelater proclaimed Estonian Republic, but inMarch the German military administra-tion disarmed the Estonian units; onlybadly armed militias remaining.49

The Lithuanians did not do any bet-ter. In January 1918, a Lithuanian battal-ion deserted to the Germans in the Rovnoarea in the Ukraine. Until August, theGermans used this battalion for garrisonduties, but then sent it to Lithuania, where

it was immediately disbanded.50 The Ger-man authorities did not approve of theformation of Lithuanian self-protectionunits. As the Latvians were considered tobe the most radical, all men fit for servicethat had been in the Russian army werebrought into prison camps.51

The Latvian light-infantry units thatwere distributed across all of Russia wereof greatest importance on the front inthe Russian Civil War. To a certain de-gree, this was also true of the EstonianSoviet-units. These units showed extraor-dinary bravery, discipline, and sense ofresponsibility in the fulfilment of mili-tary tasks under the command of theirown officers. They also differed very muchfrom the revolutionary Russian units, that� for the most part � were very undisci-plined. 52 Some Latvian and Estonianofficers who were cast away in Russia werealso appointed to highest position in thearmed forces of Soviet Russia. They com-manded brigades, divisions, armies andeven army groups and fronts.53 TheLatvian Colonel Joachims Vacietis waseven in command of the whole armed

forces during critical times.54 Latvian unitsheld the front and won the battles ofKasan�j, Orla, Perekop and others, thatdecided the outcome of the Civil War.55

Military observers of the Entente and Ger-many acknowledged the importance of theLatvian units and tried to win them over.All of them, however, made a crucial mis-take because they regarded the Latvians asmercenaries that would fight in the nameof anything for money, but they did notpromise independence and social justice.56

Two Latvian regiments and a Lithuanianbattalion nonetheless fought for the alliesin the Far East, where they sustained heavylosses, while the Estonian legion played arole in Northern Russia.

When the German Empire collapsed,the national governments of Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania had the chance tostart their work. Although Soviet Russiahad given up the Baltics in the Treatiesof Berlin and Brest-Litovsk, its govern-ment nonetheless tried to re-conquer themafter Germany�s breakdown.

World War I was over. The right ofself-determination for the people had been

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declared, and the League of Nations hadbeen founded. But several small states,among them the Baltic States, still had tofight hard to protect their independence.The Baltic States were dragged into theconflict between the communist and anti-communist powers, into the imperialis-tic contest of several states and into theattempts by the communist and anti-com-munist Russian governments to get theBaltic States under their control again.57

The proclamation of independence bythe Baltic States was not sufficient. TheBaltic States had to use their own armedforces in order to defend their nationalinterests. The leaders of the Baltic Stateshad to recognize that the Western powersignored the right of self-determinationthat they themselves had declared58 andthat they only took advantage of the Bal-tic States in their own national interestand in order to get support for the anti-communist forces in Russia. Moreover,these leaders did not get any promise of afuture independence for the Baltic peo-ple.59 The democratic government of Ger-many, which approved of Baltic independ-

ence in principle, was too weak to influ-ence the huge administrational and mili-tary machinery, which for the most partwas led or influenced by people who werein favour of imperialism. Some of theGerman revolutionary forces on their partsympathized with or were against any con-tinuation of the war against Soviet Rus-sia in the interest of the Entente. The lat-ter did not promise any support for Ger-many�s victims nor consider any compen-sation in the peace treaty.60 The eigth andtenth German armies were supposed todefend the Baltic region until the BalticStates were able to defend themselves. Butwar-weary and influenced by Bolshevikpropaganda, they retreated to the Germanborders and dispersed.61 The voluntaryunits that took their place came underthe influence of politically short-sightedand reactionary people. After some suc-cessful battles against the Bolshevik forcesthat threatened not only the Baltic Statesbut also Germany, these people manoeu-vred the voluntary units into the fightagainst the anti-communist forces in theBaltic States. The best example was the

Battle of Cesis (Wenden) in June 1919against the Estonian and Latvian troops.The German armies could have gained thestatus of liberators of the Baltic States, ashad happened in Finland. But instead theyearned the eternal hatred and suspicion ofEstonia and Latvia. If the Battle of Cesishad ended with victory for the Germantroops, this would have been reason enoughfor an occupation of Germany by the ar-mies of the Entente. We have to empha-size that the attack on the Estonian andLatvian troops was made although the Ger-man command had given contrary orders.A disadvantageous outcome of the Battleat Cesis would have exposed the BalticStates to a complete pincer movement bythe Bolsheviks. But the national forces won,and the German reputation was severelydamaged.62

All of the above shows that the BalticStates could not rely on any declarations.They really needed their own armed forces.Similarly, strong co-operation was essen-tial.

When World War I was coming to anend, only Estonia was practically able to

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form a small army in a short period oftime. The largest part of the forces, in-cluding the commanding ranks, had sur-vived, but they were lacking arms andmoney. German help was very reluctantand small. Support by the British fleetand the Finns was most important, butnevertheless the Estonians had to relymainly on their own abilities, their re-sourcefulness and their toughness.63

The majority of the Latvian soldierswere in Russia or in German Prisoner ofWar camps. The Latvian troops that werein Russia were used by the Russian Sovietgovernment to oppose in the name of aSoviet Latvia the Latvian national gov-ernment. At that time, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of SovietRussia was the Latvian Colonel JoachimsVacietis, who was a Latvian patriot, butstill was loyal to Russia�s Soviet govern-ment, hoping to find support for Latvia�sindependence there.64 At first, there wereno soldiers, no weapons, and no moneyin Latvia. There was a very radical atmos-phere among the population, who hadsuffered tremendously during the war.

This situation was aggravated by the nega-tive attitude of the leaders of the Germancivilian government and of the majorityof the military commanders towardsLatvian independence and the creation ofthe national Latvian forces. These peoplewere still influenced by imperialistic andcolonialistic ideas.65

In Lithuania, the military units were bet-ter preserved, but they did not have anyqualified officers, weapons, or money. AsLithuania was right on the Russian-Germanborder and as Germany as well as Lithuaniawas in conflict with Poland, the Germangovernment agreed upon partial support forthe state of Lithuania. This support droppedwhen Lithuania made official claims for theKlaipeda (Memel) region.66

All the Baltic States were economicallyextremely weakened. Furthermore, Latviaand, to a large extent, Lithuania were verymuch destroyed. Financial and economicsupport by the Western powers was verysmall and came under very unfavourableconditions. Weapons and other materialdelivered was mostly worn out and dam-aged.67

The Baltic States, that were virtuallyforeign to one another, started some kindof diplomatic co-operation, especiallyLatvia, Estonia and Finland, whereasLithuania was only partially involved. Butthe newly formed military forces oper-ated independently from one another.68

Yet, some remarkable examples of co-operation should be mentioned as theyalways ended with important military orpolitical victories that gave the states in-volved the same advantages and sense ofsecurity. The co-operation between theEstonian and the Latvian Northern Armyin the battles at Cesis and Jugla (Jegel) inJune and July 1919 should be especiallymentioned, although the neutrality of theLatvian Southern Group, which was un-der German control, was a negative fac-tor.69 The Estonian army also covered andprotected a part of the Latvian border inthe East until December 1919. In the sum-mer of 1919, it actively took part in thefights against the Bolshevik forces that werethreatening Latvia.70 The Lithuanian armyon its part held its ground against theBermondt Army without any Estonian or

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Latvian support for a long time and fi-nally defeated it. This was in the interestof all the Baltic States.71 Unfortunately,one has to point out the belated co-op-eration between the Latvian and Lithua-nian armies in November 1919 in thisconnection. The Lithuanians are not re-ally to blame for their late involvementbecause they had to fear possible aggres-sion by the Polish troops.72 Despite thefact that Poland did not recognize an in-dependent Lithuania, but was aiming at aPolish-Lithuanian Union, Poland prom-ised not to take advantage of Lithuania�ssituation during the threat by Bermondt.Its army even protected the Eastern bor-der of Lithuania, while the largest part ofLithuania�s troops was involved in fightswith Bermondt.73 Co-operation betweenthe Latvian and Polish armies during theoffensive in January 1920 against the So-viet forces was very successful. We have tostress that Poland was the only big statethat did not demand any payment for itshelp.74

To be historically true, we must alsoemphasize that Germany, whose voluntary

units liberated Western Latvia, helpedwith the formation of new Latvian troopsfrom January until May 191975 and sup-ported the Lithuanian army just as long,did not receive any compensation.76

The considerable help to Estonia bythe Royal Navy from December 1918 un-til January 1920 has to be mentioned aswell as the support by British and Frenchnaval units during the fights of theLatvian army against the Bermondt Armyin October and November 1919. The pres-ence of the British fleet itself was somekind of guarantee and moral support forthe independence fighters in the BalticStates.77

The Russian Soviet government, who -at the beginning of the invasion � hadtolerated the formation of military forcesby the Soviet governments in Latvia,Lithuania, and Estonia for political rea-sons, later tolerated their disintegrationbecause of new political considerationsand made peace with the national gov-ernments of the Baltic States. The real rea-son for this disintegration of the Baltic

Soviet troops was the violent and shortsighted politics of the Soviet governmentand the aversion of the troops themselvesto fighting against national forces. Mostof the Baltic soldiers mobilized by theSoviets found ways of going over to thenational forces in order to continue theirfight together with them.78

Viewed in its entirety, another nega-tive factor was the insignificant mutualdemands by the Baltic States to correctthe borderlines that were a disadvantageto the common military and politicaloutline.79 However, the Baltic States wereable to solve their problems rather early,in 1920 and 1921.

During the wars of liberation of theBaltic States, only two attempts weremade to consolidate the action of thearmed forces. The British General Frank.G. March initiated the first one on 26August 1919. The anti-Bolshevik troopsof General Yudenich, Estonian andLatvian troops, the anti-Bolshevik Rus-sian-German troops of Bermondt as wellas the Polish and the Lithuanian armies

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were supposed to start a common offen-sive against the Bolshevik troops.80 Thesecond attempt, initiated by the BritishGeneral Arthur J. Turner, was made on6 January 1920 and was supposed to cre-ate a military alliance among the BalticStates. Representatives of the Estonian,Latvian, and Lithuanian armies agreedin Valga/Valka (Walk) upon regular meet-ings and the standardization of war ma-terial, but a political agreement or a de-fensive alliance did not follow this meet-ing. The political leaders of the BalticStates missed a unique chance to gaingreater security and international pres-tige for their states.81

After initial misjudgement of what washappening and apathy in the history ofthe wars of liberation, one could witnessa spontaneous growth and more strengthamong the national forces. A clear exam-ple is the formation of a national armyin Latvia.82 Estonia showed the greateststability. Latvia showed the same level ofstability after it had overcome difficul-ties that originated from external andinternal negative forces. There was less sta-

bility in Lithuania. The interference inpolitics by the army often created dan-gerous situations that could have endedwith a catastrophe.83 Latvia and partlyEstonia, too, were negatively influencedby the service of some of their troops inthe Latvian and Estonian Soviet divi-sions. However, these divisions, whichfought at the heart of the Red Army andwon crucial victories over anti-Soviet Rus-sian forces that were averse to independ-ence of the Baltic States, indirectly helpedto secure the independence of the BalticStates.84 Yet, one has to keep in mindthat the Baltic States had to fear an at-tack by Soviet Russia through the pe-riod of their independence. The Sovietgovernment was only waiting for theright moment to consolidate its powerin the Baltic States. Such favourable con-ditions developed in 1939/1940 and thenagain in 1944/1945.

Though poorly armed and their ac-tions often impeded by foreign politi-cians, the armies of all three Baltic Stateswere enormously successful on the bat-tlefield.

At the end of the war, the Estoniannational army consisted of 74,500 menand had 39 artillery batteries, 10 armouredtrains, 8 armoured cars, 28 aircraft and10 warships. During the war of libera-tion, the Estonian army lost 3,588 soldiers(2,236 of them fell at the front) and had13,775 injured.85 The Latvian army had �at the end of the war � 76,394 men, 91pieces of artillery, 707 light and heavymachineguns, 5 armoured trains, 8 ar-moured cars, 5 tanks and 19 aircraft. Itlost 3,046 men and had 4,085 injured.86

At the time, the Lithuanian army had60,000 men in four divisions and 3 cav-alry regiments, 48 pieces of artillery, 450heavy machineguns, 4 armoured cars, 1armoured train, and 18 aircraft. Duringthe war, Lithuania lost 614 men and an-other 822 died of their injuries. Therewere 1,175 injured and 154 invalids. 87 InWorld War I, the Latvians had lost about35,000 men, the Lithuanians approxi-mately 15,000. The exact number for Es-tonia is not known. During the Russiancivil war, the Latvians lost at least 20,000men. The Estonian casualties were high

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in number, as well. Lithuanians also foughtin the British and American units thatfought for the Entente in Siberia.

This overview shows the military spiritand the absent fear of death among theBaltic peoples. It also shows that, becauseof the unfavourable geographic situationand the historical conditions, the Balticslost a great part of their �national strength�in the battle for the interests of foreignpowers, without gaining a real advantagefor their own states. Considering theoverall political and military situationas well as the conditions that were unfa-vourable for the independence of theBaltic States, one has to say that the Bal-tic politicians and their military leaderswere very successful and showed extraor-dinary competence in securing the inde-pendence of the Baltic States. Their co-operation could have been more exten-sive, but we have to admit that the Bal-tic States were not really able to help oneanother as they all had to suffer fromthe collapse of the economy that theWorld War I and the exploitation by theoccupying powers had brought about.

The Situation of the Baltic Statesafter the War of Liberation

In the first decade of independence,the leaders of the Baltic States were some-what optimistic about their military situ-ation. They had full confidence in theLeague of Nations and believed that thepeople of the world seriously wanted peaceafter the extraordinarily destructive andbloody World War I. They were fully con-fident also not only about the treatiesmade, but also about the self-interest ofthe great powers, which would not allowone state or a bloc of states to gain con-trol over the Baltic States.88

The leaders of the Baltic States did eve-rything imaginable to foster peace, over-all co-operation and disarmament. Theynot only signed, but also ratified all in-ternational treaties that had these goals.89

It was not the fault of the Baltic States,but because of the egoistic interests ofthe great powers that all these treaties re-mained no more than paper and were notbrought fully to life.

In their resistance to the Soviet Unionand, later, to Nazi Germany, the BalticStates defended the goals of the League ofNations and remained members up to thelast day of their independence.90

The political leaders of the Baltic Statestried to forget that they had not beenaccepted into the League of Nations in1920 only because the other states fearedthat due to their prominent geographi-cal situation, they might have to helpdefend the independence of these states.91

In 1921, at last, the majority of the mem-bers of the League of Nations had thecourage to accept the Baltic States intotheir number.92 The lack of a commonspirit and courage was typical of the ac-tions of the League of Nations during itsentire existence. It was paralyzed by theexaggerated egoism of its member statesand by the lack of intention to seriouslyco-operate and support peace. The mem-bers soon realized that they had to relyon their own moral, economic and mili-tary power. Thus, the smaller states alwaysemphasized their complete neutrality incases of conflicts.

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Hopes that the League of Nationswould guarantee the Baltic States� inde-pendence grew weaker. Yet, the leaders ofthese states believed the victorious pow-ers of World War I would be able to main-tain their leadership position for a longtime and that it was in their interest tosupport the independence of the BalticStates, directly or indirectly.93

But the Baltic States were mistaken inthis respect, as well. They viewed with con-cern the disagreement between the UK,France, the USA, Japan and Italy as well astheir economic and even military compe-tition and their lack of co-operation. How-ever, the two biggest potential threats toBaltic independence, Germany and theSoviet Union, were weak due to war andrevolution, a fact that somewhat lessenedthese worries. Until 1933, the Baltic Stateseven saw a democratic Germany as a guar-antor of independence.94

The gigantic neighbour in the East, theSoviet Union, caused the greatest concern.Although the Baltic States did everythingto give the Soviet Union convenient ac-cess to their ports in order to build eco-

nomic ties with them, it was clear that theloss of the Baltic coast was very painful,not only because of political prestige, butalso for practical reasons. The Gulf of Fin-land, which also meant the Russian partof the Baltic Sea, was covered with ice forsix to seven months of the year. Duringthese months, the navy as well as the mer-chant fleet of Russia were captives of theice and they could not be stationed inthe ports of the Baltic States. It was veryinconvenient for a great power to be de-pendent upon the small Baltic States forthe transport of goods, especially as it reallyhad to fear that these states might soonbe under the influence of hostile greatpowers or power blocs.95

Another concern was the aim of worldrevolution declared by the Soviet Union.A seventh of the Latvian population as wellas a large number of Estonians and Lithua-nians had remained in the Soviet Union.Among these Balts, the flames of hateagainst the democratic governments of theBaltic States were fanned and the Commu-nist Information Bureau (KOMINFORM)supported by the Soviet Union as well as

Baltic organizations in Russia repeatedlypromised the re-introduction of the so-viet system in the Baltic States by revolu-tionary means. 96

Spies, saboteurs and political agitatorswere continuously pouring across theborders of the Soviet Union into theBaltic States. This could not lead to goodrelationships between the Baltic States andthe Soviet Union, although the latter hadbeen the first one to recognize the inde-pendence of the Baltic States and hadwaived all claims to their territory.97

The Baltic States� fear of the SovietUnion was later somewhat calmed by thefact that the most extreme groups wereremoved and those in power wanted toavoid wars as long as the social system wasnot consolidated and the armed forceswere not ready for an offensive.98

The growing military power of NaziGermany was a real concern as well as itsaggressive ideology and its open effortsto expand which were also aimed at theBaltic States and Eastern Europe in gen-eral. From 1933 and onwards, militaryplanners in the Baltic States had to reckon

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with an invasion from the West as well asfrom the East.

At least there was some hope that theneighbouring quarrelling powers wouldnot allow each other to take up positionin the Baltic region, but would rather keepit as a kind of a buffer zone between eachother, at least as long as they did not in-tend any open conflict.99

The self-destructive policy of the West-ern powers and the real, ideological, de-mographical, and military weakness ofPoland, the �fifth European great power�,created real concern among the leaders ofthe Baltic States during the last years be-fore World War II. In Latvia and Estonia,they did not fear any military conflictbetween Lithuania and Poland because ofthe Vilnius area conflict. Still, the latterwas a senseless hindrance to political andmilitary co-operation between all the smallstates situated between Germany and theSoviet Union and to a concept of somekind of defence system in an obviouslyhopeless situation.100

During the first post-war years, Latviaand Estonia regarded the UK as its strong-

est ally, whereas Lithuania saw the samein Germany and Poland in France. To-wards the end of World War I, the Brit-ish were without doubt interested to sup-port the efforts undertaken by the BalticStates to reach independence in order toweaken their enemy, Germany. Moreover,they wanted to create possibly long-last-ing chaos for their potential competitorRussia, no matter whether it was Bolshe-vik or anti-Bolshevik.101 Later, the UKsupported the Baltic States only to pre-vent the Soviet Union from invadingEurope through their territory and inorder to tie them to itself economically.

From the point of view of the UK,the Baltic States were too far away, geo-politically too endangered and economi-cally too unimportant. British militarybases in the Baltic region would have beenin constant danger. They would have beenright on the border zone of Russia andGermany, far away from the British Isles,and their access would have been verycomplicated because of the �closed� char-acter of the Baltic Sea. The missing agree-ment between the Baltic States also pre-

vented the possibility of far-reaching co-operation.102

Representatives of the UK admonishedthe Baltic as well as the Scandinavian Statesrepeatedly during the first post-war yearsto build closer political and military con-nections, but all in vain. It did not onlyseem to be unwise, but also dangerous tomake treaties of military support withseveral small states that did not get alongwith one another.103 The British did notwant to get involved in the meaninglessquarrels among the Baltic States, but theyused them, especially Estonia, as a basefor spying against the Soviet Union.104

After the emergence of the Third Reichof the Nazis, the British were aiming at aconfrontation between the latter and theSoviet Union, hoping both totalitarianpowers would destroy each other with-out the UK getting involved.105 When itbecame fully clear that German policy wasmore dangerous for the Western powersthan the Soviet Union, the UK reluctantlyapproached the Soviet Union shortly be-fore the war to induce Germany to cometo an agreement with the Western pow-

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ers. In this connection, the idea of a guar-antee for the Baltic States was initiated bythe Soviet Union. This suggestion wasdangerous for the Baltic States due to sev-eral suspicious conditions. The UK andFrance were in reality unable to give ef-fective guarantees to the Baltic States asGermany lay between them.106

The interest of France in the BalticStates was different from that of the UK.Both powers were political and economiccompetitors. As long as Germany did notgo directly against the UK economically,the latter was interested in a relativelystrong Germany as a useful business part-ner. However, it was France�s interest tokeep the weakened Germany down as longas possible and to build up a group ofnew allies under the leadership of an en-larged and strengthened Poland east ofGermany replacing Russia, which hadbeen lost as an ally. Moreover, France triedto get back the enormous amounts ofmoney invested in Russia by putting pres-sure on the state.107 Should it have beenpossible to come to a direct agreementwith Germany or the Soviet Union,

France was prepared to leave Poland andthe other East European states to theirfate.108

Nevertheless, there was some exchangeof information between the general staffsof France and the Baltic States. SeveralLatvian officers were trained at Frenchmilitary academies, and most of the Latvianwar ships were built in France.109 But thatwas all.

In the first post-war years, Latvia andEstonia refused to enter a military alli-ance with Poland as long as the latter didnot settle the conflict with Lithuania in away that satisfied both states. Because ofthat, Latvia and Estonia were not evenindirectly integrated into the French sys-tem of military alliances.110

Latvia and Estonia did not directly co-operate with Germany militarily, but Ger-man military literature and German mili-tary know-how were used to a large extent.

Lithuania had close connections withGermany for some time concerning mili-tary supply and the qualification of high-ranking officers.111 For a long time, Ger-many and the Soviet Union played Lithua-

nia off politically against Poland. AlthoughLithuania felt safe from further aggressionby Poland because of its co-operation withthem, Germany and the Soviet Union didnot help Lithuania re-gain the Vilnius re-gion nor did they plan to protect Lithua-nia from potential further aggression byPoland. Germany�s only intention in caseof a Polish attack was to take back theKlaipeda (Memel) region that it had lostto Lithuania in the Treaty of Versailles.112

The aggressiveness of Nazi Germany inthe question of re-gaining the Klaipeda(Memel) region put an end to the closemilitary co-operation between Germanyand Lithuania.113 With the Soviet Union,Lithuania did not maintain any militaryco-operation at all. It only bought a lim-ited number of expensive field guns.114

As the Western powers were not interestedin an obligation to defend the East Euro-pean states and the League of Nations wasnot a safeguard for safety and peace, theonly option was a regional military bloc.There were two realistic possibilities: aneutral Nordic bloc of the Scandinavianand Baltic States, or a defensive alliance of

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all states from the Arctic Ocean to the BlackSea that had a common border with theSoviet Union.115

To the Baltic States, a Scandinavian-Baltic bloc seemed to be the best solu-tion. This bloc would have been situatedwholly ti the north of the Central Euro-pean area of conflict between Germanyand the Soviet Union, and the problemsconcerning territory between Poland andRumania on the one hand and the SovietUnion on the other would not have af-fected it directly either. But the politi-cians of the Scandinavian states were ofthe opinion that the Soviet Union wouldsoon try to take up its position on theBaltic coast again and thus absolutely re-fused to enter into any kind of connec-tions with the Baltic States. TheScandinavian states felt quite safe in theirisolation as a peninsula and in their long-lasting tradition of neutrality.116 There-fore, Finland and the Baltic States hadonly one option, to come to an agree-ment among each other and to find abetter solution. Until 1922, the orienta-tion towards the Baltic States was predomi-

nant in Finland; then its orientationshifted towards Scandinavia. Finland�spoliticians regarded the Baltic States asmore endangered than their own state.Finland is so far up north that it cannothave the linking function that is so charac-teristic of the Baltic States. Historically andpolitically, Russia had already previouslyconsidered Finland to be an autonomousentity. Moreover, it would not see the cru-cial necessity of having bases in Finland ifit could have them in the Baltics. In caseof a war, the Gulf of Finland, which sepa-rates these states from Finland, would havemade an alliance with the Baltic States dif-ficult. The united navies of Finland andthe Baltic States were also too weak to keepthe strong Soviet navy in the Eastern partof the Gulf. But especially, the Finns feareda co-operation with Poland, which theyregarded as a danger to their security. Thatis why Finland wanted to get as close aspossible to the neutral Scandinavian blocand refused to co-operate militarily withthe Baltic States.117 The only element ofco-operation was that Finnish military ob-servers took part in general staff meetings

of the Baltic States and Poland in the 1920sand the beginning 1930s. The most seniorofficers of Finland, Estonia and Latvia vis-ited each other several times and observedmilitary manoeuvres. In individual cases,Estonia and Latvia took advantage of therecently created Finnish armamentsindustry.118 Except for Lithuania, the Bal-tic States did not make use of the highlydeveloped Swedish armaments industry.Economic considerations were the reason.Sweden did not need the products of theBaltics; thus, the expensive weapons andammunition would have had to be paidwith cash, which the Baltic States couldnot afford because of their financial diffi-culties. The British as well as the Frenchdemanded that the Baltic States should buyweapons and ammunition primarily fromtheir states if they wanted to sell their goodsin the UK and France. However, it wasmainly used and very old weapons thatwere sold to the Baltic States. In case of awar, there would have been no hope ofsecuring a continuous supply with spareparts and ammunition from these coun-tries. The traffic with Sweden was muchless disturbed and safer.119

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For military protection, the BalticStates either had to join together or theyhad to seek co-operation with the strong-est neighbour of the Soviet Union: Po-land, and its ally, Romania. Such co-opera-tion would automatically have dragged theBaltic States into the Polish border dis-putes with Germany and the Soviet Un-ion, and further into the conflicts in theBalkans and the border disputes of Roma-nia and the Soviet Union. Seen from theoutside, Poland was a big and powerfulstate, but in reality, it was unstable andweak. A large part of the Polish territorywas not ethnically Polish, especially alongthe border with the Soviet Union. Onlytwo thirds of Poland�s population werePolish, the rest was composed of Ukrain-ians, WhiteRussians, Germans, Lithuaniansand Jews. Only five percent of Poland�sborder was common with friendly Roma-nia. With the latter, Poland did not main-tain close relations although a military con-vention had been concluded. Everywhereelse Poland bordered hostile states: Ger-many, the Soviet Union, and Lithuania,with all of which it had border disputes.

The border with neutral Latvia was only106 km long. The latter had been Poland�sally during the wars of liberation. But Po-land�s action against Lithuania, whose his-torical capital and wide border areas it hadoccupied in 1920, as well as the threat posedto Lithuanian independence in general andterritorial claims also against Latvia forcedit to avoid closer relations with this state.120

Theoretically, Lithuania and Poland wereeven at war, and in 1926 Lithuania was theonly one of the Western neighbours ofRussia to conclude a non-aggression treatywith the USSR.121 Poland protected Lithua-nia against a possible attack by the Sovietswith its territory which stretched north-wards to the east of Lithuania. But themilitary leaders of the Baltic States did nothave a high opinion of the big Polish armybecause of its old-fashioned organization.From a strictly practical point of view,Estonia would have been willing to ap-proach Poland, but Latvia as Lithuania�sneighbour refused to do so. Because ofLatvia�s opposition, the project of a mili-tary alliance between Estonia, Latvia andPoland failed.122

There were only two alternatives left: amilitary union of Estonia, Latvia andLithuania; and the union Estonia-Latvia.For many years, Lithuania demanded thata military union of the Baltic States bearmed mainly against Poland. But Latviaand Estonia rejected this demand. Polandmight have been the only source of fairlyreliable support against an attack by Ger-many or the Soviet Union. Until 1933,Lithuania was also little interested in acloser union of the Baltic States as it re-garded Germany and the Soviet Union asnatural allies against Poland, whichLithuania considered to be its main en-emy.123

A military union of Estonia and Latviawas the only option left. So it was; butthis union was not a very important fact,as we will see later.124 In the long line ofneighbours of the USSR, each state con-sidered itself to be less endangered thanthe others for some reasons. For each stateits own, often egoistic, interests were moreimportant than the common ones. Thefeeling of a common destiny and a com-mon region was still poorly developed.

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Latvia�s Military Situation

After the overview of the unfriendlygeneral situation, we have to take a closerlook at the military conditions in each ofthe Baltic States. Latvia (65,791.4 km2) wasthe largest of the Baltic States and was situ-ated in the middle of this group of states.With regard to population (1939:2,001,900), it was in second place. Thecommon border (1939) with friendly Es-tonia was 374.6 km long (19.94%), the onewith the hostile Soviet Union 351,3 km(18.66%). The common border with Po-land was 105,9 km long (5.64%), and theone with friendly Lithuania 570.4 km(30.3%). The coast was 479 km long(25.46%), one fourth of the overalllength.125 No natural obstacles, disregard-ing small rivers, lakes, marshland, and smallwoodlands, protected this state boundary.In case of an invasion by the Soviets, thedefence was planned to really start in themiddle of the state, along the line Pededze,Lake Lubans and Aiviekste (Ewst), an areawith broad marshlands and large wooded

areas and further along the Daugava(Düna), which would also have been animportant natural hindrance in case of aGerman invasion.126

Concerning food and clothing, Latviawas self-sufficient. But it was completelydependent on foreign states for fuel andheating, disregarding the large supply ofwood and the power generation startedin the last years of Latvia�s independence.Latvia�s industry was the most developedof all the Baltic States. The metallurgicalindustry, the car-parts industry, precisionengineering, the manufacture of appli-ances and instruments (e.g. the world�ssmallest camera �Minox�), aircraft and shipconstruction in Riga and Liepaja and thearsenal in Riga have to be mentioned. Thelatter built guns and machine guns as wellas infantry- and artillery-ammunition.Latvia also produced mines and anti-sub-marine weapons.127

75% of Latvia�s population wereLatvians, the rest was made up of severalnationalities who were represented onlyin small percentages (1938): 10.6% Rus-sians, 4.8% Jews, 3.2% Germans, 2.5%

Polish, 1.4% White Russians, furtherLithuanians, Estonians and others. Theminorities had complete cultural au-tonomy and in the Latvian army theirsense of Latvian citizenship was strength-ened.128 The Latvian army was comprisedof 2,200 officers and 23,000 sergeants andother ranks in 1938. The annual draft wasabout 13,500 men, but it decreased dur-ing the last years of independence. Thepolice had only about 3,100 men, theborder guard had about 100 officers and1,100 men. The Voluntary Home Guardreached 35,000 men. According toAmerican information, the trained re-serves were about 170,000 men, whereasthe untrained reserves were 20,000. Intheory, Latvia could deploy an army of200,000 men, but in reality only 130,000to 180,000 could be armed. In times ofpeace, 10 out of 1,000 inhabitants ofLatvia were members of the armed forces,the ratio for the Home Guard was 28out of 1,000 citizens. These figureschanged from year to year, of course.Latvia was divided into 15 defence re-gions. During the last years of independ-

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ence, the troops were supposed to be mo-bilised within three days (i.e. 72 hours).

In times of peace, the armed forces hadfour infantry divisions, with a total of 12infantry regiments and one cavalry regi-ment. Each infantry division had one fieldartillery regiment. The First, Second andThird Infantry Regiments and the KurzemeArtillery Regiment belonged to the FirstDivision, whose headquarters was in Liepaja(Liebau). The Second Division consistedof the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth InfantryRegiments as well as the Vidzeme ArtilleryRegiment. This division�s headquarters wasin Riga. The Third Division consisted ofthe Seventh, Eight and Ninth Infantry Regi-ments and the Zemgale Artillery Regiment.The Fourth Division had the Tenth, Elev-enth and Twelfth Infantry Regiments theCavalry Regiment and the Latgal ArtilleryRegiment. Its headquarters was inDaugavpils (Dünaburg). The TechnicalDivision consisted of the Engineer Regi-ment, the Tank Regiment (later the motor-ized brigade), the Air Force Regiment, theIntelligence Unit, the Armoured TrainRegiment and the Coastal Artillery Regi-

ment. The four field artillery regimentsmentioned above, the heavy artillery regi-ment, the anti-aircraft regiment, the spe-cial artillery section, the tank regiment andthe coastal artillery regiment were underthe control of the Chief of Staff of theArtillery concerning training, weaponsand organisation. The Staff Battalion,which corresponded to an elite guard unitin other armies, was independent. All na-val forces were united in a squadron un-der the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

In times of peace, an infantry regimenthad two battalions � 50 officers, 700 ser-geants and men, the reinforced regimentshad three battalions � 80 officers, 1,220sergeants and other ranks. In case of a war,each regiment would have been enlargedup to three battalions. The weapons con-sisted of English Ross-Enfield M-14 rifles,Lewis-light-machine-guns and Vickers-Bertier heavy machineguns, all with cali-bre 7.7 mm. The production of lightmachineguns of the type �Bren� had beenstarted in the state. They were more use-ful in combat. During the last years, the

regiments also received 47 mm Böhler anti-tank guns and 7 cm Skoda infantry guns.Further, they were equipped with 81 mmStoks mortars. Each regiment had recon-naissance companies; some also had bicy-cle and ski companies. The cavalry regi-ment had five squadrons and one heavymachinegun squadron, the remountsquadron, two bicycles squadrons and onebattery, all together 1,200 horses and 1,200men, four cannons, English Lee-Enfield7.7 carbines, Madsen light machinegunsand Vickers heavy machineguns. At an ex-perimental stage, there were also bicyclebattalions and motorcycle companies thatwere planned to join the army.

Each artillery regiment had two unitswith two gun batteries and one howitzerbattery; thus the whole regiment had sixbatteries with 24 guns and six howitzers.All regiments had English 18 Pounder(8.38 cm) guns and 4.5" (11.43 cm) howit-zers. English 13 Pounder (7.62 cm) andRussian 75 mm (M-02) guns were in re-serves. For war times, three units (36 guns)and one to two anti-aircraft batteries (fourto eight guns), which was 40 to 44 guns

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altogether, was intended for each fieldartillery regiment.

The heavy artillery regiment consistedof three units, including the anti-aircraftbatteries that were organized into an in-dependent anti-aircraft battalion. In theheavy artillery regiment, there were atleast 30 heavy guns or howitzers of dif-ferent type and production country. Ex-cept for some German howitzers, all thesewere out-of-date. Out of the four trainsof the Armoured Train Regiment, threewere in Daugavpils (Dünaburg) and onein Riga. With regards to material, sixarmoured trains and 6" Canet ship gunswere intended for two batteries of rail-way artillery.

The overall firepower comprised: six10.5 cm, one 152 mm (6"), 10 77 mm,three 12 pounder howitzers and five 6"Canet Guns, two 38 mm anti-aircraft gunsand 36 heavy machineguns. In times ofpeace, the regiment had 40 officers and245 sergeants and other ranks.

In the sea coastal fortress Daugavgriva(Dünamünde), the Coastal Artillery Regi-ment had five batteries (20 guns), one

search light battery and one auxiliary ship.As weapons, they had Russian 3", 6"Vickers and 6" Canet Guns and one anti-aircraft battery. In times of peace, the regi-ment had 500 men. Mobile railroad coastalbatteries were in preparation. The anti-aircraft regiment had 15 batteries � Rus-sian 3" (76-mm) and 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns. It had about 1,000 men. Anti-aircraft batteries were also formed for alldivisions, except the Third.

The Autotank-Regiment had six ar-moured cars, two heavy, one medium andsix light tanks as well as 18 tankettes (asmall tracked reconnaissance vehicle). Al-together six armoured cars and 27 tanks.Moreover, it had 40 trucks and 15 mo-torcycles. For times of war, each divisionwas supposed to have three tankettes (21altogether). In 1938, the regiment was re-structured into a motorized brigade withfive battalions in three motorized groups.Furthermore, motorized anti-tank unitswere planned.

The engineer regiment consisted of twobattalions and 500 men, including thebridge and the pontoon company. The

intelligence battalion had four companies.The air force regiment had three units,

100 to 150 aircraft in three fighter squad-rons in Riga, one reconnaissance squad-ron in Gulbene, one long distance recon-naissance squadron in Krustpils and onenaval aviation wing in Liepaja.

The Latvian navy had one minelayergunboat, two minesweeper-minelayerboats, two submarines, one auxiliary sub-marine and some motorboats. A mine-layer (3,000 tons), four submarines andtwelve hydroplanes were planned. Therewas also a coastal observation service.

The border guard brigade had fivebattalions and one fast patrol boat. Theself-defence organisation was divided into19 Home Guard regiments and consistedof cavalry and motorcycle-units with atankette, one railroad Home Guard regi-ment, one aircraft Home Guard regimentas well as several Home Guard Battalions.It also included 12,000 women. The AirHome Guard had 24 aircraft. In contrastto the other Baltic States, the HomeGuard organization in Latvia was not sub-ordinate to the Ministry of War, but to

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the Ministry of Social Affairs. Neverthe-less, 150 active officers and 100 sergeantsprovided military training in the organi-zation.129

Of all the Baltic States, Latvia had thebest traffic network. In 1940, there were1.880 km of highways, 9.621 km of first-class roads, 7.625 cars, 4.321 motorcycles,3,466 km of railway tracks, 294 locomo-tives, 11 motor wagons and 6.684 wagons.Further, there were three large seaports andseveral small ones. In 1940, the Latvianmerchant fleet had 89 steamers, seven mo-tor ships and seven sailing ships, altogether103 ships with 120.676 register tons. Thecivilian aviation system had a large numberof training and sport planes as well as twomiddle-sized passenger aircraft.130

In times of war, Latvia planned to op-erate with 130.000 men in seven divisions,two regiments of special cavalry squadronwith a strength of two regiments, threemotorized brigades, three to four bicyclebattalions, three to four special artilleryunits, and one fleet. A Supply Divisonand garrison unit would be kept in re-serve.

Should the Soviet Union attack thecovering force would consist of one bat-talion and one company of the SeventhRegiment in Vilaka and Liepna, one bat-talion and two companies of the NinthRegiment in Ludza, Zilupe and Karsava,one battalion and one company of theTenth Regiment in Daugavpils, later inKârsava and Dagda. Together with threeto four battalions of the border guardand a mounted battery these forces wouldhave had to defend a front line of 200 to260 km from the Estonian border toPiedruja and Semgallen respectively. Thus,real defence was not planned for the firstdays, just a delaying action.

The Fourth and Third Division withthe First Cavalry Regiments, but withoutthe Eight and Twelfth Infantry Regimentwere supposed to cover the mobilizationof the forces and the occupation of thedefence line Malupe � Pededze � Litene �Lubana � Varaklani � Livani � Daugavpilsand to withdraw to the line Pededze �Lake Lubana � Krustpils. They were sup-posed to accomplish that by following theEstonian troops with their left wing and

� in their centre - by using the naturaldefence line in the marshland around theLake Lubans and the widespread forestsin the north. Should the Fourth Divi-sion still be able to move east if necessary,the command of the Third Division couldeasily lose connection to the Seventh andEight Regiments that were further north.To subordinate these regiments to theThird Division after the arrival of the Firstand Second Division at the front wouldhave been very problematic. A retreat ofthe Fourth Division along the left bankof the Daugava into the area of the Aiviekstewould have been very difficult, too. TheSecond Division was supposed to deployeast of Rezekne. The fourth mobilizationplan had three prepared alternatives: A, D,and K. Alternative A intended a deploy-ment of armed forces for a defence againstan attack by the Soviet Union, whereas op-tion D planned the same if Germany at-tacked. Alternative K consisted of simulta-neous defence against the Soviet Union andGermany.

Option A had been worked out in alldetails; option D had been prepared rela-

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tively thoroughly. Option K was onlyoutlined in rudiments as a co-operationbetween Nazi Germany and the SovietUnion appeared to be hardly imaginable.

According to option A, the mainforces should be deployed on the lineSkrudaliena-Lielborna-Izvalta-Andrupene-Kaunata-Stocerova-Berzgale-Nautreni-(Rogovka)-Tilza-marshes north of Tilza-Kuprova-Liepna-Pededze River, withother troops covering them. After thisdeployment, the following was planned:either a defence on this line, an offensivein order to re-gain the third of Latgalelost during the mobilization or a retreatto the line of the Lake Lubana in orderto prepare the decisive defence battle. TheFirst Division Group (three divisions)would have operated on the right andthe Second Division Group (two divi-sions) on the left. The border betweenthese two division groups would havebeen the northern bank of the LakeLubans-Karsava. The Supreme Com-mander would have had two divisions inthe areas of Madona, Barkava, Lubana andCesvaine at his disposal. Each division

would have received one unit of heavyartillery and a certain number of recon-naissance flight hours. Positions were sup-posed to be occupied by the fifth day ofmobilization, which seems to have beentoo optimistic.

Option D comprised the defenceagainst Germany. The main idea was todeploy the armies some kilometres northof the southern state border as protec-tion by the Lithuanian army was ex-pected. Engineer plans did exist, but onlyfor limited works. The forces were sup-posed to operate in two division groups,whereas the cover units should remain atthe eastern border.

Option K existed only in outlines. Threedivisions were supposed to operate towardsthe south, four towards the east.

After the ceding of bases to the So-viet Union in 1939, a fifth mobilizationand defence plan was worked out, butnow a defence of the state was almostimpossible. According to options A andD of plan four, a further defence of theDaugava line was provided for. In caseof an attack by the Soviet Union, a fur-

ther retreat to Lithuania and a follow-ing internment in Germany wasplanned.131 Neither Latvia nor the otherBaltic States believed that each or all to-gether would have to fight without anysupport by one or the other great power.Treaties or even plans, however, for sucha co-operation did not exist, not even withneighbouring Poland. Military observersof the great powers classified the Latvianarmed forces to be behind the Finnishand Estonian forces regarding the degreeof readiness. Soldiers and regular officerswere considered to be good to very good.Their endurance and courage werepraised, but cruelty that had been sup-posedly noticed was criticized. The assess-ment of higher officers was altogether bad,with some remarkable exceptions. Reasonswere old age, insufficient training, lack-ing initiative and bureaucratic mentality.Regarding supply and weapons, Latvia�sarmy was considered to be better thanEstonia�s, but worse than Lithuania�s. Inthe opinion of the US observers, the di-visions that would have had to be estab-lished after the beginning of the war could

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have moved to the front as late as 30 to60 days after the proclamation of the mo-bilization. Active divisions could havereached the front within 24 hours. Themorale and composure of the Latvianarmy were rated high. Thus, success wasexpected not only in defensive, but alsoin offensive battles.132

The Military Situation in Estonia

Regarding the area (47,549 km2) andpopulation (1939: 1,133,917), Estonia wasthe smallest Baltic state, but its borderswere the longest. The common border withfriendly Latvia was 374.5 km (9.4%) long,the one with the hostile USSR 258 km(6.3%), of which 145 km went across the84 km long and 31 km broad Lake Peipsi,a further two km across the endangeredMehikoorma Strait and across the LakePskov, which was a little more narrowthan the Lake Peipsi. The coastal bordercomprised 1,159 km as the crow flies. Be-cause of the many bays and 818 islands,the coastal border was some 3,449 kmlong (84.3%).133

The section between the Gulf of Fin-land and Lake Peipsi was relatively easy toprotect, the Narva River being a naturalobstacle. The area north as well as southof the river is marshy and wooded. Onlya seven to eight km broad gap along theWest-East railroad and the highway waseasily accessible for a potential enemy. Thechain of lakes made up by the Lake Peipsiand the Lake Pskov was a great advantage.Regarding defence, the area south of theLake Pskov was less favourable, but nothopeless. The area is sandy and withoutany transport routes. In the middle sec-tion, there was a deep valley in a north-south direction that could be used fordefence. The marshy and wooded area ofthe Lida and Vruda Rivers extendedwidely. Should these positions be lost, theEstonian army could retreat to the linePjusa-Pskov-Pankjavitsa-Laura-Liepna, the9 km wide middle section between Pskovand Pankjavista being the most endan-gered. Furthermore, the Estonians couldretreat to the line Lake Võrtsjärv-EmajõgiRiver-Lake Peipsi. A defence of the longcoastal border was virtually impossible.

The navy and the coastal batteries alonecould defend Tallinn, which was also pro-tected by several islands. With the help ofthe Finnish fleet, Estonia could close offthe Gulf of Finland between Tallinn andPorkkala with a mine field.134

Concerning food and clothing, Esto-nia was self-sufficient. Yet, the situationconcerning food was not as good as inLithuania or Latvia. Shale (about 5,500,000tons [sic]), out of which petrol and ma-chine oil were produced and which wasalso used as fuel, was an important natu-ral resource.

Regarding the ethnic composition ofthe population, Estonia was the mosthomogeneous. 88.2% of the populationwere Estonians, 8.2% Russians, 1.5% Ger-mans, 0.7% Swedish, and 0.5% Latvians.135

Usually 0.98% to 1.2% of the populationwere in the armed forces. The number ofthose drafted was 12,000 men, but it de-creased in the last years. In earlier years,the armed forces consisted of 14,000 to17,000 men, but in 1938 there were only11,358 men (1,358 officers). The policehad 1,200 men, the border guard 1,200

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men, and the Home Guard units 60,000men. According to the Intelligence Serv-ice of the USA, the total number of peo-ple organized, including police, borderguard and Home Guard unit was 51,000men, including reserves 121,000 men andincluding untrained reserves 161,000 men(14.2% of the population). The whole statehad three defence districts (correspond-ing to the number of divisions in timesof peace) and eight defence counties (cor-responding to the number of brigades intimes of war).

In times of peace, the Estonian armyhad three infantry divisions. The staff ofthe First Division was in Rakvere andcomprised the defence counties Narva andVõru-Järva. The First Infantry Regiment,the Fourth and Fifth Infantry Battalion,the First and Second Artillery Group andtwo trains of the Armoured Train Regi-ment in Tapa belonged to this division.The staff of the Second Division was lo-cated in Tartu (Dorpat). The defence coun-ties of Tartu, Petseri-Võru and Valga wereunder its command. The Seventh Infan-try Regiment, the Second, Third and

Eighth Infantry Battalion, the PartisanBattalion Kuperjanov, the Cavalry Regi-ment, the Third and Fourth ArtilleryGroup and two tank platoons belongedto this division. The staff of the ThirdDivision was in Tallinn. The defence coun-ties Harju, Pärnu-Viljandi and Lääne-Saarebelonged to it. The Sixth, Ninth, andTenth Infantry Battalion and the PartisanBattalions Kaleva, Scouts and Sakala, theFifth Artillery Group, the Tank Regiment,the Engineer and Intelligence as well asthe Guard Battalion were in this division.At the beginning of 1940, the FourthDivision in Viljandi and Pärnu was cre-ated.

The First and Seventh Infantry Regi-ments were active units. Each regimenthad 2.000 men. The recruits were trainedin independent battalions that were sup-posed to be transformed into regimentsin case of war. Half of the staff and lineofficers of these regiments were regularofficers. In case of war, there would havebeen 14 infantry regiments, each one hav-ing 3.331 men (107 officers). In each di-vision, two brigades with two infantry

regiments each were planned. The normalpersonnel strength of a division in peace-time was 100 officers, 400 sergeants, and2,500 men. In peacetime, the regimentshad two battalions each; in wartime itwould have been three. The weapons ofthe infantry were obsolete: Russian 7.62-mm-rifles from 1891, Madsen lightmachinegun, calibre 7,69 mm and Rus-sian Maxim heavy machinegun, calibre7.62 mm, from 1905 and 1910. There werealso English 7.7-mm Lewis lightmachineguns in reserve. The arsenal of theWar Department started to standardize thecalibre to 7.69 mm. Towards the end ofindependence, it was planned to equip theinfantry with infantry guns and anti-tankweapons. Experiments with heavy mor-tars, calibre 81 mm, with anti-tank riflesfrom Solothurn, with anti-tank cannonsfrom Bofors, calibre 37 mm, and withheavy anti-tank guns from Rheinmetallwere undertaken. In Võru and Narva, therewas already anti-tank batteries.

The First Cavalry Regiment was inTartu. It had three sabre, one machinegun,and one skiing and bicycle squadron, one

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combat vehicle company (six tanks andsix tankettes) as well as a technical unit.The weapons were: English Ross-Enfield-Mid. 14 rifles, calibre 7.7 mm, six heavymachine guns, 16 light machineguns andthe weapons of the armoured vehicles. Incase of war, the regiment would have hadto operate together with Latvian units inthe area of Laura between Boberikova andVöborka. As a quick retreat was plannedfor the Latvian army at the beginning ofthe war, the Estonian cavalry might havebeen able to form a link between theLatvian and the Estonian armies. The FirstCavalry Regiment was also the basis forthe Second Cavarly Regiment, whichwould have been raised in Tartu at thebeginning of a war.

In the Estonian army, there were fiveartillery units. The first and the thirdgroup were active units. According to theLeague of Nations and to informationfrom the German Intelligence Service, Es-tonia had more than 70 field guns and 60heavy guns besides anti-aircraft guns andinfantry guns in 1938. The artillery wasdivided into 11 field, six heavy and 17

coastal defence batteries. The division-ar-tillery was organized in artillery groups.The First Division had the first artillery-group (four batteries) in Olgino and thesecond group in Rakvere � heavy artilleryand material for another four batteries.The third artillery-group (with four ac-tive batteries in Pskov) and the fourthgroup belonged to the Second Division� two batteries in Tartu and one in Võru.The fifth artillery-group of the Third Di-vision, with material for four new batter-ies, was under the command of the FourthDivision that was to be created. In its place,a new, sixth group was created in Tallinn(Reval). This group was supposed to havetowing vehicles, which did not arrive bythe beginning of the war. Thus, old Rus-sian guns had to be used.

Each battery had four guns or howit-zers and 90 men (four officers) with 60horses in peacetime. Most guns were out-dated, Russian 76 mm guns from 1902,English 84 mm and French 76 mm can-nons, English light howitzers, calibre 114mm, Russian heavy 102 mm cannons fromSchneider (1910), English 102 mm, Ger-

man 150 mm and Russian 152 mm howit-zers (the latter from Schneider, 1909).Horses were used to tow all guns. Towingvehicles were still in an experimental stage.

According to Estonian information,the coastal artillery had 10 batteries: one30.48 cm (12") battery in Äigna, 20.32 cm(8") batteries in Suuropi and Viimsi, two152.4 mm batteries in Äigna, two inNaissaare, one in Suuropi and two 13 cmbatteries in Viimsi. The anti-aircraft artil-lery had three batteries with twelve guns,one searchlight and one chemical defencecompany.

In the last years, the tank regiment hadthree tank and armoured car companies,one transport company, one training com-pany, and two batteries. One unit hadfour old heavy English tanks Mark V,twelve old light Renault-17 tanks, six mod-ern Polish TK 3 tankettes, 12 self-madeCrossley-Austin armoured cars. In reserve,there were several heavy armoured vehi-cles of the type Garford. The regimenthad about 400 men. In 1924, Estonia stillhad two armoured trains regiments, lateronly one with 350 men. The regiment had

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one heavy broad-gauge armoured railway-train with one 152 mm, two 119 mm, two105 mm cannons and four heavy-machineguns, two light broad gauge and one nar-row-gauge armoured train, each with two76 mm guns, eight heavy machinegunsand six light machineguns.

The air force consisted of three airdivisions, in Rakvere, Tartu, and Tallinn,as well as of the naval aviation division inTallinn with auxiliary units. Each divi-sion had two reconnaissance squadron andone fighter squadron with nine aircrafteach, the naval aviation division had onereconnaissance squadron (six aircraft) andone fighter squadron (four aircraft). Al-together, there were 54 reconnaissance and27 fighter aircraft as well as 10 naval air-craft, a total of 91, but 125 when count-ing the training aircraft. In 1937, therewere 540 men in the air force.

The engineer regiment had three engi-neer battalions, each having one gas-war-fare, railroad, search light, transport, work,training, and reconnaissance company. Thereconnaissance battalion had three recon-naissance and one other company.

The base for the Estonian navy wasTallinn. The fleet comprised the Sea andthe Peipsi Divisions, the coastal artilleryand the garrison administration, altogether2.100 men (of whom 900 were in the coastalartillery). Initially, the fleet had two largedestroyers, one torpedo boat, six gunboats(two on the Lake Peipsi), two minelayers,two mine boats, two patrol boats (one onthe Lake Peipsi), four icebreakers, threevessels of the hydrographical service, fivetenders and one tug. The largest part ofthese ships was old and worn-out. The main-tenance of this fleet demanded tremendousresources.

In 1933, the Estonian government soldthe two large destroyers and agreed upona programme for the development of anew fleet. Two submarines, eight patrolboats, twelve torpedo boats and ten fastpatrol boats were planned. As funds werescarce, the programme was cut down totwo U-minelayers, four motortorpedo-boats, and twelve aircraft. During the lastyears of Estonia�s independence, the navyhad two submarines, four motortorpedo-boats, four gunboats (two on the Lake

Peipsi), two patrol boats (one on the LakePeipsi), one customs cutter, five icebreak-ers, four hydrographical ships, five ten-ders and one tug. Altogether the tonnagewas 5.200 tons, not including the icebreak-ers and those ships that belonged to thesea route Civilian Maritime Administra-tion.136 The Estonian merchant fleet had304 ships (143 steamboats, 60 motor shipsand motor sailing ships as well as 101 sail-ing ships) with 214.000 register tons.137

In Tallinn, there was a large arsenal withdepartments for machineguns, artillery,optics, foundry, smithy, handguns, elec-tronics, carpentry, leather goods, andmuch more. Ammunition for rifles andartillery was produced there, shells andarmy rifles as well as light and heavy ma-chine-guns were produced for the HomeGuard units.138

The number of cars in 1940 was 3,618;there were 2,476 trucks, 285 busses and1,401 motorcycles. Estonia had 195 steamand 22 electric and motor locomotives,529 passenger and 5,633 goods wagons,three radio stations, six commercialairplanes, eleven ports and twelve airports.

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The total length of the railway system was1,702 km.The total length of first orderhighways was 2,531 km and second-orderhighways 8,168 km.139

In case of a war, 100,000 men in eightbrigades and in the navy were supposedto be mobilized. The amount of uniformsand equipment was sufficient, but theweapons were generally bad and outdated.The Estonians relied on the competenceof their intelligence, who would have dis-covered any movement of Soviet troopstowards Estonia early. They also believedin the ability of their defence county of-ficials to mobilize the soldiers within oneto 24 hours.

The First Infantry Regiment and theFirst Artillery Group were in Narva,Narva-Jõesuu, Kuurtna and Vasknarva, twoarmoured trains were in Tapa, and oneair force squadron was in Rakvere. Theseforces had to reinforce the border guardunits, to occupy the line of defence alongthe Narva River, to close off the rivercrossings at Narva-Jõesuu, Krivasoo andVasknarva, and to observe the enemy�smovement in the Gulf of Finland and up

to the line Mustvee-Oudova, where thearea of responsibility of the Second Di-vision began. 50 steel-concrete bunkerswere erected at the threatened sector be-tween Riigi and Kulgu. The staff of thearmy had calculated that the Soviets wereable to move three to four divisions tothe Narva front within seven days. Theactive units of the Estonians were able totake their positions on the first day andto counter the attack by the enemy forthe next three days. Although the Sovietair force might be able to attack maintargets, they would not be able to con-fuse the decentralized Estonian system ofmobilization. The regiments would havegathered by train, by car, and throughnight marches. They could have beenmobilized within three days, and withinthe next two days they would already havebeen at the assembly points. On the fifthday, the First, Fourth and Fifth InfantryRegiments, the First and the Second Ar-tillery Group would have reach the front,the Tenth Infantry Regiment would be inRakvere, the Reserves-Regiment in Tallinn,and the Scouts-Regiment in the area of

Haapsalu. However, the US observers as-sumed that the Estonian army would notbe completely ready for war in less thanseven to 10 days after the beginning ofthe war.

The Seventh Regiment, the Third Ar-tillery Group, the First Cavalry Regiment,one anti-tank company, one armoured carand tank company, one armoured trainand the Second Air Division were plannedto be at the front of Petseri. These forceswould have had to defend the line LakePskov-Irbosk Valley-Velje Lake, then forfive days the line Piussa-Petseri-Pankjavitsa-Laura, then Piussa-Lepssaare-Vastsellina-Misso. They also would have had to watchthe movements by the enemy on theLatvian territory. In the south, there wereno fortifications. Instead, artillery andfield fortifications would have had to dothe job. The enemy was expected to needfive to seven days to move three to fourdivisions and tank and artillery units fromPskov to Ostrov. In order to absorb theoffensive, the Estonians would have hadthe Kaleva and the Põlva-Sakala Regimentat their disposal on the sixth day, the Sec-

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ond Kuperjanov Regiment from Pskovto Misso, the Seventh, Eighth and ThirdInfantry Regiment, the First Cavalry Regi-ment, the Fifth, Fourth and Third Artil-lery Group, the Sixth Infantry Regimentclose to Ape, and the Ninth Infantry Regi-ment in the area of Pärnu-Mõisaküla. Thiswould be all of Estonia�s forces.

As the Soviet Union had only very weakforces on the Lake Peipsi (some landingcrafts), the two gunboats of the Estoniansand three more sent by the base in Tartucould have defended the shore line rea-sonably well for two to three days, espe-cially the dangerous strait of Mehikoorma,where the Lake Peipsi and the Lake Pskovmeet each other. Local self-protection unitswould have supported the war ships.

In the Baltic Sea, the Estonian navycould not compete with that of the So-viet Union. Nevertheless, it was widelyknown that the Soviet Navy Commandwas afraid of the strait between Aegnaand Porkkala. Soviet submarines couldpass this strait in order to sink Estoniansupply vessels, and ships could launchlanding crafts. To prevent any provoca-

tion of the Russian fleet, the Estonianfleet could only start laying mines afterthe start of hostilities. The submarineminelayer would protect the area aroundthe island of Suursaar and Tütarsaar andthe minelayers on the line Äigna-Porkkala. With support by the Finns,another mine field in the area of Suur-saar, Tütarsaar and Lavansaar could havebeen laid out, while submarines and alarge Finnish armoured vessel (with 8"guns) would have offered protection dur-ing the operation.

At worst, the Estonians would try toretreat to their capital and to fight a finalbattle of despair, or to flee to their is-lands. According to calculations of Ameri-can observers, the ammunition could lastfor about two weeks of fighting. But sup-posedly the army could only defend Es-tonia one or two weeks if no other statesthan Latvia supported them.

In case of an attack from the SovietUnion, Estonia intended to co-operate withLatvia, something it did not want to doin case of a German attack. Estonians con-sidered a German attack on Lithuania to

be possible; they also thought that Latviamight be endangered. But even shortlybefore the World War II, they were con-vinced that for the next ten years Ger-many was not interested in an occupa-tion of the Estonian islands as a base fortheir actions against the Soviet Union.140

Estonia�s military planners saw danger onlyin an attack by the Soviets. Estonia regardedits other neighbours and Poland as its natu-ral allies and hoped for a German inter-vention, but it did not expect any helpfrom Western European powers. The Esto-nians were worried because the Finnsavoided any relationship with the BalticStates to protect their Eastern borders andsought protection in the Scandinavianbloc. The Scandinavian States publicly pro-claimed that they did not wish to get intoany kind of relations with the highly en-dangered Baltic States. Moreover, the Es-tonians were worried about the unsteadyforeign policy of Latvia. Estonia�s militaryplanners doubted whether Latvia reallyintended to resist any ultimatum or anopen invasion. Estonians were especiallyworried by missing fortifications on

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Latvia�s eastern border and by the Latvians�plan to retreat to the line Pededze-LakeLubans, which opened the whole south-ern front of Estonia and virtually destroyedits defence system. There were also prob-lems with direct co-operation under com-mon command. Until the abrupt changein the Latvian military command in 1940,Estonia�s military command did not relyupon Latvia�s preparedness and ability tocommand the armed forces under mod-ern combat conditions. The Estonians be-lieved that in case of co-operation, theLatvian Supreme Command would tryto use the Estonian army not to defend itsown country, but Latvia.141

Western observers all agreed that theEstonian army was the best one of allBaltic States although it was most poorlyarmed and had the shortest training forsoldiers. The Estonian officers were be-lieved to be highly qualified, the Esto-nian soldiers were said to be tenacious,brave, intelligent and patriotic. In co-operation with the armed forces of thegreat powers, the Estonian army was re-garded to be a potential force not only

for defensive, but also for offensive ac-tions.142

The Military Situationin Lithuania

With a population of 2,575,300,Lithuania was the largest Baltic state. Itsarea (55,670 km2) was the second largest.The length of the border was 1,367 km.Lithuania did not have a common bor-der with the Soviet Union, but 525 km(37.7%) bordered hostile Poland, 272 km(20.5%) the dangerous German Reich, andonly 570.4 km (41.8%) bordered friendlyLatvia. The border regions were in themain completely open, except for a smallsection from Zarasai to Giedraiciai in thenortheast, where a group of lakes was situ-ated, and another section in the South-west, where the Nemunas River formedthe natural border to Germany. In thecoastal area, the Lithuanian part of theKurzeme Spit was separated from the restof Lithuania by the German part and theKurzeme Lagoon. Furthermore, Lithua-nia had only limited sovereignty in the

Klaipeda (Memel) region (2,848 km2). Ger-many did everything possible to keep theidea of separatism alive in this region.Because of the lost, nationally mixedVilnius region (3,244 m2), Lithuania wastechnically at war with her second largestneighbour, Poland.143

Concerning food supply, Lithuania wasnot only self-sufficient but even exportedfood. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia,however, its industry was not very devel-oped.

The population was more uniform thanin Latvia. 80.6% were Lithuanian, 7.15%Jewish, 4.1% German, 3.04% Polish, 2.3%Russian, 0.7% Latvian, 0.2% White Russian,etc. 80% of the population were Catholic,in contrast to Lithuania�s northern neigh-bours, who were mainly Lutheran.144

In 1939, the army of Lithuania con-sisted of 24,000 men (1,100 officers, 500war administrators, 1,400 sergeants). Onaverage, 1.25% of the population were inthe armed forces; 13,000 to 17,000 menwere drafted each year. The police had4,000 men, the border guard 3,500 men,and in the Home Guard units there were

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55.000 men. In theory, Lithuania couldhave mobilized up to 250,000 men. Outof technical and financial considerations,only 120,000 to 135,000 men were sup-posed to be mobilized.

The Lithuanian army consisted of threeinfantry divisions; a fourth division wasbeing formed. The First, Third andFourth Infantry Regiment as well as theFirst and Second Artillery Regiment be-longed to the First Division in Panevezys.In the Second Division, whose headquar-ters were in Kaunas, were the Second,Fifth and Ninth Infantry Regiment andthe Third Artillery Regiment. The Sixth,Seventh and Eighth Infantry Regimentand the Fourth Artillery Regiment werein the Third Division, whose headquar-ters were in Siauliai. Towards the end ofindependence, only one artillery unit hadbeen formed in the Fourth Division,which was being established in Kedainiai.

Most of the infantry weapons wereobsolete, but modernization did takeplace. The army had 7.9 mm Mauser-Mod.24 rifles, Praga light machineguns andMaxim M. 08 heavy machineguns. There

were experiments with Stokes-Brandttrench mortars, infantry guns and anti-tank guns. One infantry regiment had2,279 men.

The cavalry brigade with headquartersin Kaunas had three regiments: The Hus-sar Regiment in Kaunas, the Ulan Regi-ment in Alytus, later in Taurage, and theDragoon Regiment in Taurage, later inVilnius. There was also a unit of mountedartillery, three bicycle companies and onearmoured car company. Each cavalry regi-ment had about 1,000 men.

The field artillery had about 120 gunsin 10 units. These guns were mostly out-dated: French 75 mm Schneider M. 97 andRussian Putilov M. 02 75 mm cannons. Theheavy artillery had 48 pieces in six units.The weapons were 155 mm and 105 mmhowitzers made in Germany. In reserve,there were also English 127 mm and FrenchSchneider guns, calibre 155 mm. The anti-aircraft unit had 150 modern Swiss Oerlikon20 mm and 12 old English 75 mm cannonsfrom Vickers, modern sound detectors andsearchlights. During the last years of inde-pendence, there was no fortress artillery and

no armoured trains anymore, as they wereconsidered to be impractical.

In Kaunas there was a tank battalionwith twelve light French Renault M 26/27 tanks and 51 Swedish tankettes madeby Skoda as well as one armoured car com-pany with twelve armoured vehicles madeby Renault and Landskrona.

Each of the three divisions had oneengineer battalion. A reconnaissance bat-talion was also planned for each division,but up to the end of the independencethere were only two such battalions.

The Lithuanian army had the strong-est air force of all the Baltic States. Someof the reconnaissance, training and fighteraircraft (of the type �Anbo�) were pro-duced in Lithuania. The air force had eightair stations and four landing strips at itsdisposal. It was divided into reconnaissance(three squadrons), fighter (four squadrons),bomber (one squadron) and traininggroups (two squadrons) and had schools,workshops and supply units. Some of theaircraft were out-dated, but in their placemodern machines were arriving. In 1937,795 men served in the air force. In 1939

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the air force had 110 air craft, 80 in theunits and 30 in reserve.

The fleet had only one patrol vessel withmine laying capability and six armouredcustoms boat. Six submarines, several fastpatrol boats, minelayers and coastal bat-teries were planned. But the loss ofKlaipeda destroyed these plans for arma-ment.

The weapon factory Radviliskis hadproduced rifle, machinegun and artilleryammunition since 1938. It also repairedrifles and completed orders of the airforce.

In contrast to Latvia, the Home Guardorganization in Estonia and Lithuania wassubordinate to the War Ministry. Lithua-nia�s Home Guard unit was divided into12 infantry regiments and one dragoonregiment. There were also engineer, recon-naissance, air and Naval Home GuardUnits that were partly motorized. Plansthat included the training of Home Guardmembers for partisan war were not real-ized.145

Concerning traffic routes and meansof transportation, Lithuania was the weak-

est of the Baltic States. In 1939, Lithuaniahad only 1,526 km of railroad and 1,481km of solid roads. It had 205 locomo-tives, 313 passenger and 4,351 goods wag-ons, 1,765 cars, 298 trucks, 298 buses and619 special cars. The merchant fleet con-sisted of only 11 ships with 10,299 regis-ter tons. Moreover, Lithuania had onlytwo ports, i.e. in Klaipeda (Memel) andSventoji. In the whole state, there wereonly two radio stations, in the last yearjust one.146

In contrast to Latvia and Estonia,Lithuania really had only one friendlyneighbour: Latvia. It had to reckon witha direct attack by Germany or Poland andwith an indirect attack by the Soviet Un-ion through Latvia or Poland. In case ofa war, Lithuania could only operate withfive infantry divisions and two cavalrybrigades. Active units were the First Regi-ment in Ukmerge, the Seventh in Taurageand Zemaiciu Naumiestis and the Ninthin Marijampole and Vilkaviskis. Theirstock was enlarged and they were rein-forced by artillery. Until 1939, the SixthRegiment in Klaipeda and Plunge was also

an active unit; then it was transferred toTelsiai.

Until 1935, the mobilization plans con-sisted of mobilizing the units within oneweek after the beginning of the war (12days according to the US information).Stasys Rastikis achieved a decentralizationof the mobilization and thus shortenedthe time span to 24-72 hours. Weaponsand clothing were divided among the mo-bilization points. A quick modernizationof the equipment now also took place.

Although Lithuania sought to reclaimthe Vilnius region from Poland, its plansfor war against Poland were of completelydefensive nature. Just as defensive werethe plans for a resistance to potential at-tacks by Germany or the Soviet Union.The Lithuanian army hoped for a sup-port by Latvia in these two cases or evenfor an active involvement of the Westernpowers. The defence plans against Polandand Germany had priority, those againstthe Soviet Union were of second impor-tance. The Lithuanian Army Commandhoped to be able to fight for two weekswithout foreign support.

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In case of an invasion by Polish orSoviet troops, a retreat to the line Kaunas-Nevezis was planned, later to the DubysaRiver. With its high banks, this river wasalmost the only natural obstacle in theinner part of the country. A defence linewith bunkers also existed there. In case ofa German attack, a retreat to the Dubysawas planned, as well. The retreat to theDubysa after an attack from the Eastwould have meant the giving up of thelargest part of the state and a simultane-ous opening of the southeast front ofLatvia. In case of a Polish or Russian at-tack, a retreat towards Germany after theloss of the Dubysa-line was intended.During a German attack, the Lithuanianswanted to retreat into the Latvian terri-tory after the loss of the Dubysa-line.

During the last two years of their in-dependence, Lithuanians started the en-largement of the peace time strength ofthe armed forces. The Third Infantry Regi-ment was intended to be the basis for afourth division in the region Kedainiai-Raseiniai-Seredzius. When the Vilnius re-gion was regained in 1939, the Lithua-

nian army command transferred the FirstInfantry Regiment and the Third Dra-goon Regiment to that place.147

Western observers did not judge theLithuanian army in friendly terms. Theyregretted the unusual influence of politicsand chauvinism in the Lithuanian officercorps. According to their judgement, manyhigh-ranking officers of Lithuania werepolitical creatures who were incompetentto fulfil their tasks and were not interestedin their completion. Positive changes inthe command of the Lithuanian army couldonly be noticed in the very last years ofindependence. In contrast to the other ar-mies of the Baltic States, the Lithuaniansoldiers� quality was judged to be only sat-isfactory, the main reasons being the lowgeneral education and insufficient train-ing. Nevertheless, the soldiers were regardedto be tenacious, physically strong, modestand especially suitable for the partisan war.Although everyone acknowledged that theequipment of the Lithuanian army wasmore modern than that of the other BalticStates, they still assumed that this armycould not be used in offensive actions.

However, there was no doubt that it wassuitable for a defensive war. The opinionthat the Lithuanians would be more fitfor a partisan war than the other Balticpeoples is interesting. Observers viewed theextraordinarily frequent change of the WarMinister, the Supreme Commanders andthe Chiefs of Staff as well as the intriguesin the army undertaken by various politi-cal groups negatively. All of this not onlyinfluenced the officers� morale, but alsothe morale among the soldiers in an unfa-vourable way.148

As a gap in the defence system alongthe border with the Soviet Union haddeveloped due to the politically independ-ent line of Lithuania, it can be assumedthat western military observers regardedthis aspect as highly important. Nobody,however, blamed Poland.

The Military Co-operation of theBaltic States

Latvia and Estonia were the only statesin Northeast Europe that had concludeda military alliance. This alliance was based

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on traditions from the war of liberation.The basis of this alliance was the treaty of7 July 1921, which was extended in thetreaties of 1 November 1923, and 17 Feb-ruary 1934. The alliance was of a defen-sive character. The Estonian-Latvian de-fence treaty of 1934 gave similarly inter-ested states the opportunity to join.149

On 12 September 1934, all three BalticStates � Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania �came together in the Baltic Entente, butthe treaty only consisted of a general co-operation among the states and regularconferences of the Foreign Ministers, butnot of military co-operation.150 Estoniaand Latvia categorically refused to con-clude a military treaty with Lithuaniabefore the latter had solved its conflictswith Poland and Germany. However amilitary treaty was not concluded whenLithuania was forced in March of 1938to re-establish diplomatic relations withPoland and when it lost the Klaipeda(Memel) region to Germany in March of1939.

Despite the existing military treaty,military co-operation between Estonia and

Latvia was really very meagre. There was �to a small extent � an exchange of officersto learn about the military training ofthe other state, to establish connections,and to learn the language of the neigh-bour. In 1930 and especially in 1931, large,common army and navy manoeuvres ofboth states took place, but were not re-peated in the following years. In individualcases, the three Baltic States exchangedweapons or sold them to one another. Toa small extent, the arsenals of all three statesalso co-operated.

During the whole period of their in-dependence, the Baltic States were not ableto agree upon common defence plans incase of a threat. The self-interests of eachstate seemed to be more important thanthe common interests. Each Baltic statehoped - for little convincing reasons - thatit would be able to prevent the loss of itsindependence, even if one or both of theothers had already lost it. Western observ-ers pointed out the extraordinary fear thatshowed in all foreign policy actions ofthe Baltic States. Each Baltic state had thestrong wish to avoid any provocation of

the Soviet Union. A military union ofthe Baltic States was considered to bepossible reason for an attack by the So-viet Union. Yet, there are indications thatat the time of the creation of the BalticEntente in 1934, it was in the interest ofthe Soviet Union to have a Baltic militarybloc between itself and emerging NaziGermany. This view changed later, of course.From 1933 on, the Baltic States also avoidedprovoking Nazi Germany, which did notwant to see a Baltic military bloc come intoexistence. The German diplomatic repre-sentatives repeatedly pointed out the hos-tile relationship with Lithuania because ofthe Klaipeda (Memel) region to Latvia andEstonia, and tried to use the disagreementbetween Latvia and Estonia by showingitself as the understanding and benevolentgreat power to the latter. Poland too re-peatedly pointed out to Latvia and Esto-nia that it did not want any military agree-ment of the Baltic States with Lithuania.Therefore, all three Baltic States tried toremain absolutely neutral and even weak-ened their conditions to the League ofNations (refusal of the obligations of the

146

members of the League of Nations men-tioned in Article 16).

A Baltic bloc could have mobilized anarmy of 550,000 men, which would havebeen a notable force even on an interna-tional scale. One has to remember thatneither the Soviet Union nor Germanyor Poland, because of the constant threatto their borders, would have been able toturn their entire forces or a substantialpart of them against the Baltic States un-der any conditions. The Vilnius and theKlaipeda (Memel) problems were trickyand dangerous, but a military union ofthe Baltic States could have been formedbecause of the international situation with-out being influenced by threats of cer-tain states, threats that were not seriousanyway. Among the international commu-nity, self-confidence, unity, and power israted higher than the splitting up offorces and the idea of neutrality. Westernobservers have made many ironic remarksabout the extreme individualism of theBaltic politicians, about the exaggeratedemphasis on solely nationalist interests,and about the inability to co-operate in

the common interest and for the protec-tion of security. The great powers tookcare not to reach any military agreementswith the individualistic, small Baltic States,which were not connected to one another.

Of course, the question arises howmuch the Baltic States could have co-op-erated militarily and what they could havedone to foster such a co-operation evenbefore a treaty had been concluded. Theanswer is: A lot!

It is a sad fact that the Baltic States �during the whole period of their inde-pendence � felt very foreign to one an-other and that they really did not knoweach other. It often happened that theEstonians, Latvians and Lithuanianstreated each other not only with benevo-lent humour, but even with sarcasm. Un-fortunately, the latter happened a lot onan international level, during talks betweenrepresentatives of these peoples and thoseof the great powers. Measures that sup-ported mutual learning of history, cul-ture, and economy of the neighboursstarted late and remained small. There wasalmost no understanding of the common

fate and the common goal, and very littlewas done to foster mutual respect andfriendship as well as the development of aco-operation. Such efforts came too late,were too small and too �official� to reachlarger parts of the population. Much morecould have been done!

Each Baltic state had a different nationallanguage. There was no common linguafranca. Older generations were partly ableto communicate in Russian, to a small ex-tent also in German, but in Lithuania inPolish. It would have been perfect if thecitizens of the Baltic States would haveunderstood the language of the other twostates, but this was virtually impossible.Because of the geographic situation, it wasimportant for the population of the Bal-tic States to learn international languages,making it even more difficult to learn thelanguages of the neighbouring states inaddition. Sure, there were people that spokethese languages, but they were only a few.After the war, the Baltic States stressed theirindependence from Russia and Germanyand their attachment to Western Europe.Thus, Russian or German were rejected as

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the first foreign language. However, theycould not decide which of the western lan-guages, English or French, should be cho-sen as the first foreign language. So, Eng-lish and French were taught at the sametime, German being the second foreignlanguage. School graduates, however, hadonly acquired a basic knowledge of theselanguages and did not normally use themin everyday life. The majority of the high-ranking officers could also communicatein Russian, but the younger ones hardlyunderstood the language. On the otherhand, the majority of the older officers �with few exceptions � spoke neither Eng-lish nor French, and a large part did notspeak German, either. An agreement on acommon foreign language that could havebeen used for mutual communication inthe Baltic States would have been highlynecessary. Scandinavians understand with-out difficulty all their languages; never-theless they can all also communicate inEnglish and mostly in German.

During the whole period of independ-ence, the Baltic States did not develop aneconomic union. The small states even com-

peted with each other economically andwere unfit for broader economic co-op-eration. Estonian shale could have partlysolved the fuel problem, but the quarry-ing started too late and was too little. Re-garding fuel, the Baltic States were depend-ent upon Poland and even more so uponthe western powers, which on their partwere far away from sources of raw mate-rial. Latvian water power also remainedunused for common economic measures.

Without any effort, a standardizationof the organization of the armed forcescould have been implemented, as well as aunifying of ranks, badges, etc., but noth-ing happened.

Each of the Baltic States spent aboutone fifth of its budget on weapons andthe daily needs of the armed forces. Theseamounts were tiny compared to the pur-pose aimed at, but they were tremendousfor the small states that had suffered a lotand had to do it without any internationalhelp, especially when compared to the largerand luckier countries. Thus, the resourceshad to be used wisely. The supply of thearmed forces with uniforms, towing ma-

chines and food posed no problems. Butweapons were a very great problem. Theyhad been acquired during the struggle forliberation in insufficient amounts. Theyconsisted of different systems, were for themost part out-dated, and partly even de-fective and without spare parts.

The weaponry had to be standardizedand modernized. If the three states hadacted together, it would have been easier,more convenient, and also cheaper. Be-cause of political and economic combi-nations, the governments of the BalticStates and their troops did not co-oper-ate, though. The weapons of the armedforces of the Baltic States were, thus, var-ied and made up of very different sys-tems, which also limited the possibilitiesof a co-operation extremely. Not even anagreement on the standardization of am-munition was reached. The Estonians usedRussian ammunition; the Lithuaniansused German, and the Latvians Englishammunition. In case of a war, ammuni-tion supply would have been very limitedand in Estonia�s and Latvia�s case even im-possible. If the three states had been able

148

to agree on common ammunition for lightweapons, they would have become inde-pendent from foreign states at least in thisrespect and would have saved a lot ofmoney by producing the material neededin their own state. In addition, they couldhave helped each other out. Finland pro-duced light artillery and mortars herself.The Baltic States, with nearly double thepopulation, could have accomplished thateven more easily. During all years of itsindependence, Lithuania built fairly goodtraining and fighting aircraft. Latvia didso as well during the last years of inde-pendence. But the Baltic States did not co-operate in this respect either, but wastedresources in mutual competition.

The supply of heavy weapons had tobe concentrated on states that were acces-sible most conveniently in terms of traf-fic and from which spare parts could alsobe received in wartime. Sweden wouldhave been the best choice. Due to eco-nomic considerations, the Baltic Statesordered nearly no weapons in Sweden.The latter had few economic relations tothe Baltic States, whose products it did

not need. Moreover, Sweden demandedpayment in cash. The UK and France, onthe other hand, threatened not to takeproducts from the Baltic States if weap-ons were not bought from them. Usually,the Baltic States received only out-datedweapons for a price that was at least twiceas high as for the English and Frenchforces. Lithuania also bought a few weap-ons from the Soviet Union, but their gunswere also out-dated and very expensive.The Baltic States also feared to have rela-tions to a state whose political leaders sup-ported elements that were aiming at theireventual incorporation into the SovietUnion. The weapons became more andmore complicated and more and moreexpensive, making a close co-operationbetween the Baltic States essential. In 1939,a modern English destroyer already costa fortieth of the whole Latvian defencebudget. Today twice the annual budgetof 1939 would be needed to buy one sin-gle supersonic aircraft, to say nothing ofmissiles.

The question of a supreme commandin wartime was also important. It seems as

if the Baltic States hoped to co-operatewith some great powers, which would havetaken over command then, of course. Therewere no treaties between the Baltic Statesand the western powers nor any plans forpotential co-operation in wartime. Therewere arrangements between Latvia and Es-tonia for a potential common supremecommand in wartime. But questions ofprestige and about military qualificationas well as political considerations andmemories from the war of liberation werebrought up. Estonia regarded its supremecommand as more competent, which west-ern military observers confirmed in theirevaluations. The Latvian forces, on theother hand, would have been nearly twiceas strong. The Estonians had a low opin-ion of the long-time Latvian War Minis-ter, who had not supported them in theBattle of Cesis (Wenden) and in times ofpeace had not cared about the completionof his military knowledge, but - accordingto several observers � wanted to becomesupreme commander. The Estonians alsoremembered how they were forced duringthe war of liberation to hold a consider-

149

able part of the Latvian front althoughtheir forces were urgently needed some-where else. The fact that the Latvians werein an extraordinarily unpleasant situationhad been forgotten. The Latvians on theirpart had the suspicion that the Estoniansupreme commander would try to use theLatvian forces mainly for the defence ofEstonia, whereas the Estonians thought theLatvian supreme commander would use theEstonian forces mainly for the defence ofLatvia. The defence plans of both states werediametrically opposite. Nevertheless, theplans provided for co-operation betweenthe Latvian Eighth Daugavpils Infantry withits Fourth Battalion and the Estonian FirstCavalry Regiment at the beginning of awar.

Shortly before World War II, theLithuanians did not raise any objectionsthat a Latvian general would commandthe combined forces of the Baltic States,but the Latvian government did not wantto be politically connected with Lithua-nia. Thus, the question of a common su-preme command remained unsolved.Western observers pointed out that the

supreme command only started to put re-ally highly qualified and gifted officersinto leading positions during the last yearbefore the catastrophe. They would havebeen able to command troops undermodern combat conditions. Names shallnot be mentioned in this article.

The Baltic States shared a common fate.A militarily advantageous situation wouldhave come up for them in connectionwith a democratic and liberal Russia be-hind them, as many Western observerspointed out. But such a situation did notexist. If the Soviet Union threatened Eu-rope, only a common resistance of allEuropean states would evoke hopes fordeliverance. In the opinion of Russian andWestern observers, the individual BalticStates were militarily without value, butjoined together they would have been asignificant enemy. Much could have beendone to consolidate this defence powerover 20 years, but almost nothing hap-pened. External factors are partly respon-sible for this, but to a large extent theleaders of the Baltic States have to takeresponsibility, too. The Baltic States were

not the only ones, the �regional guilty�.The Scandinavian States as well as the statesin the Balkans had to learn the hard wayduring World War II. At any rate, thearmies of the Baltic States had a great moralimportance for the strengthening of na-tional self-confidence of the Baltic peopleand could have posed a considerable threatto a potential attacker.

1 Offprint from Acta Baltica 1969, INSTITUTUMBALTICUM.

2 For a general overview, the following sourcescan be referred to: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs (London), The Baltic States (London: Ox-ford University Press, 1938); Louis Tissot, La Baltique(Paris: Payot, 1940); Max Friederichsen, DieZentraleuropäischen Randstaaten mit besondererBerücksichtigung des Baltischen Dreibund-ProblemsLettland, Estland und Litauen (Rifa: Selbstverlag, 1921).

3 United States of America National Archives,Record Group 165 � Military Intelligence Divi-sion (Hence: USA, N.A., R.G. 165) � General Analy-sis.

4 Already during World War I did Theobaldvon Berthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Ger-man Reich, comment on General Ludendorff�sproject of the annexation of the Baltic territory,pointing out the difficulties such an incorpora-tion would implicate.

5 Such views were already met with response inGerman Reichstag-discussions from 1916-1918. See

150

ed. Andersons, Latvijas vçsture 1914-1920, Stock-holm: DAUGAVA, 1967), pp. 165-166, 216, 272-273, 286-287.

6 Royal Institute, pp. 30-38.7 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Entente

� The Initial Phase�, Pro Baltica, Mélanges dédiés àKaarel R. Pusta (Stockholm: Publication du Comitédes amis de K. R. Pusta, 1965), pp. 41-42, 50. Hence:Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente � The InitialPhase.

8 Marija Gimbutas, The Balts (New York:Frederick A. Präger, 1963), pp. 21-29, 43-172.

9 Ibid., pp. 153-158; Alfred Bilmanis, A History ofLatvia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1951), pp. 33, 35; Ewald Uustalu, The History ofEstonian People (London: Boreas Publishing Co.,1952), pp. 31-32.

10 Uustalu, pp. 32-48.11 A. Bîlmanis, pp. 53-83.12 Constantine R. Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian

Nation (New York: Lithuanian Cultural Institute,Historical Research Section, 1948), pp. 45-145.

13 Ibid., pp. 146-160.14 Ibid., pp. 161-163, 229-250.15 Ibid., pp. 265-352.16 Edgar Dunsdorfs, Arnolds Spekke, Latvijas

Vçsture 1500-1600 [Latvia�s History 1500-1600], Stock-holm: Daugava, 1964, pp. 67-73, 172-184.

17 Uustalu, pp. 54-56.18 C. R. Jurgela, p. 100.19 Dunsdorfs, Spekke, 1500-1600, pp. 41-42, 67-

73, 127-141, 172-184, 678-680.20 Edgar Anderson, The Couronians and the West

Indies, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Uni-

versity of Chicago, August 1956, pp. 59, 110, 146,229, 309, 311.

21 Dunsdorfs, 1500-1600, pp. 127, 129.22 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Latvijas vôsture 1600-1710

(Stockholm: Daugava, 1962), pp. 50, 100-102, 159-165.

23 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Mûþîgais latvieðu ka?avîrs[Eternal Latvian Soldier] (Melbourne, Australia:Generâïa Kârïa Goppera fond, 1967), pp. 189-192;Edgars Andersons, Latvieðu cîòas vçstures notikumos[The Latvians� Fights in the course of history], inLAIKS, XIX, No. 26 (1959), April 1, 1967.

24 Edgars Andersons, �Krimas kaº� Latvijâ�[Crimean War in Latvia], in Ceïa Zîmes, No. 9,March 1952, pp. 367-372; No. 10, July 1952, pp.450-455.

25 Jurgela, pp. 385, 394.26 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December

20, 1963.27 Jurgela, pp. 408-416, 427-456.28 Uustalu, pp. 109-110.29 Bruno Kalnins, De Baltiska staternas frihetskamp

[The Fight for Freedom of the Baltic States], Stock-holm: Tidens Förlag, 1950, pp. 33-42.

30 Dr. Constantine R. Jurgela, personal inter-view on November 21, 1968.

31 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December20, 1963.

32 Ibid.33 Ibid.34 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 34-38; Pulkv.

[Col.] Dr. Gustavs Grînsbergs, letter from Janu-ary 22, 1962; Colonel Elmar Lipping, letter fromApril 17, 1963; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, interview on

November 16, 1968.35 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 47-49.36 Ibid., pp. 78-85, 92-93.37 Ibid., pp. 90-92, 96-97.38 Ibid., pp. 97-104, 107-109, 113-133, 218-225.39 Ibid., p. 225.40 Ibid., 186-189.41 Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920 [Estonia�s Fight

for Freedom 1918-1920], Tallinn: VabadussõjaAjaloo komitee, 1937-1939; I, pp. 53, 63-70, 525-526; E. Andersons, 1914-1920, p.207.

42 Ibid.43 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 70-71, 93-95; Kindral

[General] Johan Unt, Tallinn: Kaitsevägede Staabi,VI, Osakonna kirjastus, 1931, pp. 28-29, 31.

44 Eesti, Haridusministeerium [Estonia, Depart-ment of Education], Eesti Maa, Rahvas ja Kultuur[Estonia, People and Culture], Tartu, 1926, pp. 17-19, 34-37, 62, 268.

45 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 225-226, 276-277, 301.

46 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 123-124; JohannesTipner, Punaarmee Eesti vaeosade võitlustest 1917-1920[The Fights of the Estonian Units in the Red Army],Tallinn: Eesti riiklik kirjastus, 1957, pp. 20-22.

47 Kari Archyvas, I, pp. 73-79, 84, 100-101, 234,268, IV, 182-190.

48 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209.49 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 84-86; Unt, p. 34.50 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209.51 Ibid., pp. 226-226.52 Ibid., pp. 257-260, 301-309.53 Ibid., pp. 310, 592.54 Ibid., p. 307.

151

55 Ibid., pp. 586-591.56 Ibid., pp. 328-330; Winfried Baumgarten,

Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918, München: Oldenbourg,1966, pp. 240-241.

57 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 624-626.58 Edgars Andersons, �British Policy Toward

the Baltic States�, Journal of Central European Af-fairs, Vol. XIX, No. 3, October 1959, pp. 276-283,285-286.

59 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 475-494, 499-500.

60 Ibid., pp. 343-346.61 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 277-278.62 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 394-398, 406-

414, 427-441, 456-471.63 Ibid., pp. 415-417; Edgars Andersons, �An

Undeclared Naval War�, Journal of Central Euro-pean Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 1, April 1962, pp. 41-50.

64 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 367-376.65 Ibid., pp. 352-363.66 Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos deðimtmetis 1918-

1928 , Kaunas: Iðleido Vyriausias LietvuosNepriklausomybés 10 metu saukakatuvémskomitetas, 1930 [The First Ten Years of Lithuania1918-1928, Kaunas: Highest Committee for thePreparation of the Tenth Anniversary of Lithua-nia�s Independence, 1930], pp. 64-65; Karo ArchyvasI [War Archives], pp. 140, 161-; Friedrich Janz, DieEntstehung des Memelgebietes [The Origin of theMemel-Region], Berlin-Lichterfelde: Edwin Runge,1928, pp. 59-60.

67 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 490-492.68 Edgars Anderson, Toward the Baltic Entente �

The Initial Phase, p. 44.69 Ibid., pp. 43-44.70 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 553, 556, 568.71 Ibid., pp. 506-536.72 Ibid., pp. 536-537.73 J. Þukauskas, Jonas Steponavièius, Lietuvos

kariuomené, Kaunas: Iðleido Sajunga ginkluotomskraðto pajegoms remti [Lithuania�s Army, editedby the Association for the Support of the ArmedForces of the Country], 1938, p. 8; KonstantinasÞukas, Þvilgsnis i praeiti [Look into the Past], Chi-cago: Terra, 1959, p. 394.

74 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 568-575.75 Ibid., pp. 367-375, 378-383, 394-398, 406-414,

434-441.76 Forschunganstalt für Kriegs- und

Heeresgeschichte, Darstellungen aus denNachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps[Research Institute for War and Military History,Descriptions of the Post-War Fights of GermanTroops and Volunteer Corps], Berlin: E.S. Mittleru. Sohn, 1936-1939, I, p. 128; II, p. 58; III, pp. 159,161-162, 167-168, 203, 206-208.

77 Edgars Andersons, An Undeclared Naval War,pp. 43-78.

78 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 404-406, 445,552.

79 Edgars Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente �The Initial Phase, pp. 50-51.

80 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,First Series, 1919-1929. ed. Ernest Llewellyn Wood-ward, Rohan Butler, J. P. T. Bury (London: H. M.Stationery Office, 1947-1961), III, pp. 54, 69, 72-73,81-82, 86-87, 93, 225. 81 Les Problémes de la Baltique

(Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie,Division des relations internationales et del�éducation, Bulletin, No. 8/9, Publications de laConciliation internationale, 1934), pp. 731-732;Frank Percy Crozier, Impressions and Recollections(London: T. W. Laurie, 1930), pp. 245-246.

82 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 566-567, 584,615.

83 Ibid., p. 600.84 Ibid., pp. 586-592.85 Ibid., pp. 566-567.86 Ibid., p. 584.87 Ibid., p. 615.88 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. P 00/115; Germany,

Foreign Office, Microcopy T-120, R. 1466, D596533; 3. 2783, E 378494-95; Latvju Enciklopçdîja,Stockholm: Trîs Zvaigznes, 1950-51, I, pp. 108-109, 528-529.

89 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. I.00/71; 860. M.00/56;Fçlikss Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ [The Change ofTimes], Stockholm: Memento, II, pp. 256-260, 349-374.

90 Bîlmanis, pp. 386-387.91 League of Nations, The Records of the First As-

sembly, 1920, Plenary Session, 27th Meeting, Annex6, pp. 634-636; John Spencer Bassett, The League ofNations. A Chapter in World Politics, London:Longman, Green & Co., 1928, pp. 101-102.

92 British Documents, First Series, XI, pp. 714-715,732-737; League of Nations, Records of the SecondAssembly, Plenary Sessions, 16th Plenary Meeting,pp. 318-319, Annex A, 334; Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ[The Change of Times], II, pp. 181-191.

93 Former long-term Secretary of the War Minis-

152

try of Latvia, Pulkv. [Col.] Pçteris Kaòeps, letterfrom March 24, 1962.

94 Edvards Virza, ed. Z. A. Meirovics, Riga: Z. A.Meirovica piemiòas fonda izdevums, 1935, pp.85-86, 90-91; Vilhelms Munters, �Meirovicaârpolitikas orientâcija [Orientation of Meirovics�Foreign Policy], in Sçjejs, Vol. I, No. 3 (1937), pp.235-236; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 1466,D 595311-12.

95 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24,1962.

96 Latvijas PSR Zinâtòu Akademija, Vçstures unmateriâlâs kultûras institûts, Latvijas PSR Vçsture,III [Scientific Acadamey of the Latvian SSR, Insti-tute of History and Material Culture, History ofthe Latvian SSR, Vol. III], ed. K. Strazdiòð, Riga,1959, pp. 338, 356-361, 370-372; Jürgen von Hehn,Die Entstehung der Staaten Lettland und Estland, derBolschewismus und die Großmächte [The Origin ofthe States of Estonia and Latvia, Bolshevism andGreat Powers], ed. Horst Jablonovski, WernerPhilipp, Vol. IV (Osteuropa-Institut an der FreienUniversität Berlin, Historische Veröffentlichungen,1956, pp. 127-128, 163.

97 Latvijas PSR Vçsture, III, pp. 232-239, 244-245,247, 249, 156-258, 274; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. pp/18, 21; 860. P. pp. B/8, 14, 32, 860. I. 00/92; 860. N.00/62; 860. P. 00/50; 860. I. 00/31, 33, 45, 60; 860.N. 00/55; 860. N. 00/B./3; Germany, Foreign Of-fice, T-120, R. 2778, E. 374516.

98 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24,1962.

99 Ibid.100 Ibid.

101 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 276-289.102 Edward W. Polson Newman, Britain and the

Baltic, London: Methuen & Co., 1930, pp. 224-226; John Duncan Gregory, On the Edge of Diplo-macy (Rambles and Reflections 1902-1928), London:Hutchinson & Co., 1929, pp. 87-88.

103 United States of America, Department of State,Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, Russia, 1918, Washington, D.C.: Govern-ment Printing Office, 1931-32, II, pp. 839-841, 849.

104 Interview with the leader of the former intel-ligence service of the Eastern part of Poland, JerþyNiezbrzycka (pseudonym: Richard Wraga) onJuly 11, 1964.

105 Ibid.106 Jânis Ritenis, �Great Britain and the Baltic

States During the Anglo-French and Soviet Talksof 1939�, Unpublished Master�s Thesis, Depart-ment of Politics, University of Adelaide, Febru-ary 1966.

107 Cap. Jerþy Niezbrzycka, interview on July 11,1964.

108 Ibid.109 Col. Edvins Mednis, letter from March 11,

1964; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2781, E.377014-16; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomatija [Secret Di-plomacy], pp. 81-84, 90-91, 96-98, 215-216; USA,Nat. Arch., R. G. 165.

110 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Un-ion, 1920-1927�, Lituanus, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1966),pp. 37-38, 44-45, 48.

111 Col. Edvîns Mednis, letter from March 11,1964.

112 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Un-

ion, 1927-1934�, Lituanus, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1967),pp. 6-8; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. 00/105; Germany,Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2311, E 154-226; R. 2777,E 374025-26; R. 2779, E 374974-76.

113 Capt. Jerzy Niebrzycki, interview on July 11,1964.

114 USA, Nat. Arch., RG, 165, DD 21/8, fromSeptember 20, 1935.

115 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

116 Ibid.117 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 37, 49-50;

Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, 1962.118 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/60, 61; 760. I. 6111/

119, 120, 121; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R.1466, D 596349, 51-52, 62, 68-71; R. 3605, E 685736; Latvijas Saeima, VIII Session, 10th meeting,kol. 354-355; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomâtija, pp. 132,133, 139, 217, 220.

119 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

120 Ibid.121 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/141; 860. P. 00/102;

Leonas Sabaliûnas, �The Politics of the Lithua-nian-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1926�,Lituanus, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 101.

122 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

123 Edgars Andersons, 1927-1934, pp. 17-19, 22-28.124 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 356-357,

42-44.125 Latvia Country and People, ed. Jânis Rutkis (Stock-

holm:: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), p. 154.

153

126 Lt. Col. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April27, 1967.

127 Ibid.128 Latvia Country and People, pp. 302-303.129 USA, Nat. Arch., Rg 165, 10641-355/5, 2621-

74/1, 2587/52-6, 2621-53/7, 2667-D-59; Col.-Lieut.Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April 27, 1967, May5, 1967; League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book1938 (Geneva: Series of League of Nations Publi-cations, IX, Disarmament, C. 206, M. 112, 1938,IX), pp. 566-567; Kurt Passow Taschenbuch des Heers,Ausgabe 1939 [Pocketbook of the Army, 1939 edi-tion] (Munich, 1939), p. 229; Latvija i ejo armija(Moscow, 1938), pp. 60-61, 80-81; Col. PçterisKaòeps, letter from January 23, 1963; Col.-Lieut.Jânis Druvaskalns, letter from March 19, 1963;Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Plûmanis, MS. 1962 (Mobilisa-tion); Col.-Lieut. Jûlijs Íikulis, letter from January13, 1964, February 17 and March 2, 1964; Gen.Voldemârs Skaistlauks, letter from March 21, 1962;Gen. Eduards Kalniò, letter from August 20, 1962;Col.-Lieut. V. Ginters, letter from March 7, 1963;Col.-Lieut. K. Zîverts, letter from February, 1963;Capt. Adolfs Blâíis, letter from August 26 andOctober 19, 1963; Capt. Kârlis T. Dakteris, letterfrom April 29, 1967; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, letterfrom July 12, 1962; Col.-Lieut. Pçteris Dzçrve, let-ter from December 10, 1962, and February 4, 1963;Capt. Antons Buls, letter from October 15, 1962,and August 4, 1967; Capt. Teodors Dreimanis,letter from January 24, 1962, and March 2, 1967;Col.-Lieut. Vilis Hâzners, January 31, 1967 (con-nection); Col.-Lieut. Jânis Rucels, August 3 and16, 1962, March 18, 1967; Eng. Kârlis Irbîtis, April

19, 1967; Capt. Edgars Mittenbergs, February 19and August 26, 1962, March 18, 1967; Capt. RobertsRiks, December 16, 1960; Capt. Kârlis Ercums,November 2, 1968; Capt. Arvîds Strazdiò, No-vember, 1962.

130 Rutkis, pp. 237, 451-457; Latvijas TirdzniecîbasFlote [Latvia�s Merchant Fleet], 1934, 1940; FormerMinister Dr. Alfreds Valdmanis, letter from Feb-ruary 15 and March 10, 1963; Air Pictorial, 1957,pp. 254-257; H. Volck, �The Irbîtis Line�; Eng. K.Irbîtis, letter from April 19 and 28, 1967.

131 Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter fromAugust 8, 1962, April 27 and May 2, 1967; USA,Nat. Arch., RG 165, 1064-355/5; Germany, ForeignOffice, T-454, R. 92, 53 (Gen. Oskars Dankers).

132 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-41/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67/2; 10641-355/5.

133 Villibald Raud, Estonia, New York: The Nor-dic Press, 1953, p. 33.

134 Maj. Kohn Madise, letter from April 4, 1966;USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, S. 2503-118.

135 Raud, p. 34.136 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; Capt. Elmar

Lipping, correspondence from 1966; USA, Nat.Arch., RG 165, 2780-1; 2775-3/9; 2780-1, 2, 3, 5/1;2881-DD-2. 7/1; 2584-44/7, 9, 10; 2737-18/1.

137 Raud, pp. 73-76.138 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, Estonia - passim.139 Raud, p. 76.140 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; USA, Nat.

Arch., RG 165, November 20, 1937.141 Germany, Foreign Office, MC T-120, R. 1807,

411573-75; Gen. Rudolfs Bangerskis, Mana mûþaatmiòas [Memories of My Life], Copenhagen:

Imanta, 1959, II, pp. 91-92.142 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6.143 Anicetas Simutis, The Economic Reconstruction

of Lithuania After 1918, New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 1942, pp. 15-16.

144 Ibid., pp. 12-14.145 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-55/1; 2587-53/

6, 7, 11; 2724-DD-21/9; 10641-342/3; Gen StasysRastikis, letter from April 12, 1959, and January 4,1963; interview on June 12, 1959; Gen. MikasReklaitis, letter from February 3 and 14, 1964;Col.-Lieut. Kazys Alik�auskas, �Lietuvoskariuomene� (ms., 1958)

146 Royal Institute, pp. 191-194.147 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-52/7; 10641-

342/3; Gen. Stasys Rastikis, letter from April 12,1959, and January 4, 1963; interview on June 12,1959.

148 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67; 10641-342/2.

149 Ibid., 2584-67/2; Sîpols, Dzimtenes nodevîba(Betrayal of the Fatherland), pp. 140-141.

150 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2584-67/1, 2731-10/1; RG 84, 760. M. 605/48 Bangerskis, II, p. 93.