Ulm Campaign

9
Ulm Campai gn The Ulm Campaign consisted of a series of French and Bavarian  military maneuvers and battles to outank and capture an  Austrian  army in 1805 during the  War of the Third Coalition. It took place in the vicinity of and inside the  Swabian  (then  Bavarian) city of  Ulm. The French Grand e Armée ,ledby Napo leon Bona parte , co m- prised 210,000 troops organized into seven  corps, and hoped to knock out the Austrian army in the  Danube before  Russian  re inf orce ment s could arrive. Thro ugh rapid marching, Napoleon conducted a large wheeling maneuver that captured an Austrian army of 23,000 un- der  General Mack  on October 20 at Ulm, bringing the total number of Austrian  prisoners  in the campaign to 60, 000. The campai gn is gen era lly reg ard ed as a str ate gi c masterpiece and was inuential in the development of the Schlieen Plan in the late 19th century. [4] Th e vi ct or y at Ul m did no t end the wa r, si nc e a larg e Rus- sian army under Kutuzov was still near  Vienna. The Rus - sians withdrew to the northeast to await reinforcements and to link up with surviving Austrian units. The French followed and captured Vienna on November 12. On De- cember 2, the decisive French victory at  Austerlitz  re- mov ed Austri a from the war. The resu lting Treaty of Pressburg  in late December brought the Third Coalition to an end and left Napoleonic France as the major pow er in Central Eur ope , lea di ng to the WaroftheFourthCoali- tion with Prussia and R ussia the following year. 1 Prelud e Europe had been by then embroiled in the  French Rev- olutionary Wars  since 1792. After ve years of war, the French Republic subdued the First Coalition  in 1797. A Second Coalition  was formed in 1798 but this too was defeated by 1801.  Britain  remained the only opponent for the new French Consulate. In Mar ch 180 2, Franc e and Britain agreed to end hostilities under the  Treaty of Amiens . For the rst time in ten years, all of Europe was at peace. Ther e were many prob lems betw een the two sides and implementing the agreements they had reached at Amiens seemed to be a growing challenge. Britain re- sented having to turn over all colonial conquests since 1793 and France was angry that British troops had not evacuated the island of  Malta. [5] The tense situation only worsened when Napoleon sent an expeditionary force to crush the Haitian Revolution. [6] In May 1803, Britain de- clared war on France. 1.1 Third Coali ti on In December 1804, an Anglo-Swedish  agreement led to the creation of the Third Coalition. British Prime Minis- ter William Pitt spent 1804 and 1805 in a urry of diplo- matic activity to form a new coalition against France. Mutual suspicion between the British and the Russians eased in the face of several French political mistak es and by April 1805 the two had signed a treaty of alliance. [7] Having been defeated twice in recent memory by France and keen on revenge, [8] Austria also joined the coalition a few months later. [9] 1.2 Fren ch Mili tary Pre parat ion s Prior to the formation of the Third Coalition, Napoleon had assembled the “Army of England”, an invasion force meant to strike at the  British Isles, around six camps at Boulogne in Northern Fran ce. Altho ugh they ne ver set foot on British soil, Napoleon’s troops received careful and invaluable training for any possible military opera- tion. Although boredom qu ickly set in among the troops, Napoleon paid many visits to conduct lavish parades in order to maintain their morale. [10] The men at Boulogne formed the core for what Napoleon would later call "La Grande Armée" (The Great Army). At the start, this French army had about 200,000 men organized into seven corps, which were large eld units, each containing about 36 to 40  cannon each and capable of independent action until other corps could arrive. [11] On top of these forces, Napoleon created a  cavalry  re- serve of 22,000 troopers organized into two  cuirassier divisions, four mounted dragoon divisions and two divi- sions of dismounted dragoons and light cavalry, all sup- ported by 24  artillery  pieces. [11] By 1805, La Grande Armée had grown to a force of 350,000, [12] was well equipped, well trained, and possessed a competent o- cer class where almost all from sergeants to marshals had experience in the recent revolutionary wars. 1.3 Aus tria n Mili tary Pre parat ion s Archduke Charles, brother of the Austrian Emperor, had started to reform the Austrian army in 1801 by taking away power from the  Hofkriegsrat  (Aulic Council), the military-politica l council respons ible for decision-ma king in the Austrian armed forces. [13] Charles was Austria’s best eld commander, [14] but he was unpopular with 1

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Ulm Campaign

The Ulm Campaign consisted of a series of French andBavarian military maneuvers and battles to outank andcapture an Austrian army in 1805 during the War ofthe Third Coalition. It took place in the vicinity of andinside the Swabian (then Bavarian) city of Ulm. TheFrenchGrande Armée,ledbyNapoleonBonaparte, com-prised 210,000 troops organized into seven corps, andhoped to knock out the Austrian army in the Danubebefore Russian reinforcements could arrive. Throughrapid marching, Napoleon conducted a large wheeling

maneuver that captured an Austrian army of 23,000 un-der General Mack on October 20 at Ulm, bringing thetotal number of Austrian prisoners in the campaign to60,000. Thecampaign is generallyregarded as a strategicmasterpiece and was inuential in the development of theSchlieffen Plan in the late 19th century.[4]

The victory at Ulm did not end the war, since a large Rus-sian army under Kutuzov was still near Vienna. The Rus-sians withdrew to the northeast to await reinforcementsand to link up with surviving Austrian units. The Frenchfollowed and captured Vienna on November 12. On De-cember 2, the decisive French victory at Austerlitz re-

moved Austria from the war. The resulting Treaty ofPressburg in late December brought the Third Coalitionto an end and left Napoleonic France as the major powerinCentral Europe, leading to theWaroftheFourthCoali-tion with Prussia and Russia the following year.

1 Prelude

Europe had been by then embroiled in the French Rev-olutionary Wars since 1792. After ve years of war, theFrench Republic subdued the First Coalition in 1797. ASecond Coalition was formed in 1798 but this too wasdefeated by 1801. Britain remained the only opponentfor the new French Consulate. In March 1802, Franceand Britain agreed to end hostilities under the Treaty ofAmiens. For the rst time in ten years, all of Europe wasat peace. There were many problems between the twosides and implementing the agreements they had reachedat Amiens seemed to be a growing challenge. Britain re-sented having to turn over all colonial conquests since1793 and France was angry that British troops had notevacuated the island of Malta.[5] The tense situation only

worsened when Napoleon sent an expeditionary force tocrush the Haitian Revolution.[6] In May 1803, Britain de-clared war on France.

1.1 Third Coalition

In December 1804, an Anglo-Swedish agreement led tothe creation of the Third Coalition. British Prime Minis-ter William Pitt spent 1804 and 1805 in a urry of diplo-matic activity to form a new coalition against France.Mutual suspicion between the British and the Russianseased in the face of several French political mistakes andby April 1805 the two had signed a treaty of alliance.[7]

Having been defeated twice in recent memory by France

and keen on revenge,[8]

Austria also joined the coalitiona few months later.[9]

1.2 French Military Preparations

Prior to the formation of the Third Coalition, Napoleonhad assembled the “Army of England”, an invasion forcemeant to strike at the British Isles, around six camps atBoulogne in Northern France. Although they never setfoot on British soil, Napoleon’s troops received carefuland invaluable training for any possible military opera-tion. Although boredom quickly set in among the troops,Napoleon paid many visits to conduct lavish parades inorder to maintain their morale.[10]

The men at Boulogne formed the core for what Napoleonwould later call "La Grande Armée" (The Great Army).At the start, this French army had about 200,000 menorganized into seven corps, which were large eld units,each containing about 36 to 40 cannon each and capableof independent action until other corps could arrive.[11]

On top of these forces, Napoleon created a cavalry re-serve of 22,000 troopers organized into two cuirassierdivisions, four mounted dragoon divisions and two divi-sions of dismounted dragoons and light cavalry, all sup-ported by 24 artillery pieces.[11] By 1805, La GrandeArmée had grown to a force of 350,000,[12] was wellequipped, well trained, and possessed a competent offi-cer class where almost all from sergeants to marshals hadexperience in the recent revolutionary wars.

1.3 Austrian Military Preparations

Archduke Charles, brother of the Austrian Emperor, hadstarted to reform the Austrian army in 1801 by takingaway power from the Hofkriegsrat (Aulic Council), the

military-political council responsible fordecision-makingin the Austrian armed forces.[13] Charles was Austria’sbest eld commander,[14] but he was unpopular with

1

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2 2 CAMPAIGN

the royal court and lost much inuence when, againsthis advice, Austria decided to go to war with France.Karl Mack became the new main commander in Aus-tria’s army, instituting reforms on the infantry on theeve of war that called for a regiment to be composed offour battalions of four companies rather than the olderthree battalions of six companies. The sudden changecame with no corresponding officer training, and as a re-sult these new units were led by commanders who hadnot been given sufficient tactical training in using theirunits.[15]Austrian cavalry forceswere regarded as thebestin Europe, but the detachment of many cavalry units tovarious infantry formations precluded the hitting powerof their massed French counterparts who could at the or-ders of Napoleon amass a whole corps of cavalry to in-uence the battle.[15]

2 Campaign

European strategic situation in 1805 before the start of the UlmCampaign.

The UlmCampaign lasted for nearlya month and saw theFrench army under Napoleon deliver blow after blow totheconfused Austrians. It culminated on October 20 withthe loss of an entire Austrian army.

2.1 Austrian Plans & Preparations

General Mack thought that Austrian security relied onsealing off the gaps through the mountainous Black For-est area in Southern Germany that had witnessed muchghting during the campaigns of the French Revolution-ary Wars. Mack believed that there would be no action inCentral Germany. Mack decided to make thecity of Ulmthe centerpiece of his defensive strategy, which called fora containment of the French until the Russians under Ku-tuzov could arrive and alter the odds against Napoleon.

Ulm was protected by the heavily fortied Michelsbergheights, giving Mack the impression that the city was vir-tually impregnable from outside attack.[16]

Fatally, the Aulic Council decided to make NorthernItaly the main theater of operations for the Habsburgs.Archduke Charles was assigned 95,000 troops and di-rected to cross the Adige River with Mantua, Peschiera,and Milan as the initial objectives.[17] The Austriansbased an army of 72,000 men on Ulm. Nominally com-manded by Archduke Ferdinand, the army’s real author-ity was Mack. Austrian strategy required that ArchdukeJohn with 23,000 troops secure the Tyrol and provide thelink between his brother Charles’s army and his cousinFerdinand’s army.[17] The Austrians also detached indi-vidual corps to serve with the Swedish in Pomerania andthe British in Naples, though these were designed to con-fuse the French and divert their resources.

2.2 French Plans & Preparations

The French concentrated around the Rhine from early to mid-September. 210,000 troops of the Grande Armée prepared tocross into Germany and encircle the Austrians.

In both the campaigns of 1796 and 1800, Napoleon hadenvisaged the Danube theater as the central focus ofFrench efforts, but in both instances the Italian theaterbecame the most important. The Aulic Council thoughtNapoleon would strike in Italy again. Napoleon had otherintentions: 210,000 French troops would be launched

eastwards fromthecampsofBoulogneandwouldenvelopGeneral Mack’s exposed Austrian army if it kept march-ing towards theBlack Forest.[1] Meanwhile, Marshal Mu-rat would conduct cavalry screens across the Black Forestto fool the Austrians into thinking that the French wereadvancing on a direct west-east axis. The main attackin Germany would be supported by French assaults inother theaters: Marshal Masséna would confront Charlesin Italy with 50,000 men of the Armée d'Italie, St. Cyrwould march to Naples with 20,000 men, and MarshalBrune would patrol Boulogne with 30,000 troops againsta possible British invasion.[18]

Murat and Bertrand conducted reconnaissance betweenthearea borderingtheTyrol andtheMainasSavary, chiefof the planning staff, drew up detailed road surveys of

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2.4 Battle of Wertingen 3

the areas between the Rhine and the Danube.[18] The leftwing of the Grande Armée would move from Hanover innorthern Germany and Utrecht in the Netherland to fallon Württemberg; the right and center, troops from theChannel coast,wouldconcentrate along theMiddle Rhinearound cities like Mannheim and Strasbourg.[18] WhileMurat was making demonstrations across the Black For-est, other French forces would then invade the Germanheartland and swing towards the southeast by capturingAugsburg, a move that was supposed to isolate Mack andinterrupt the Austrian lines of communication.[18]

2.3 The French invasion

The French invasion in late September and early October caught

the Austrians unprepared and severed their lines of communica-tion.

On September 22, Mack decided to hold the Iller lineanchored on Ulm. In the last three days of Septem-ber, the French began the furious marches that wouldplace them at the Austrian rear. Mack believed that theFrench would not violate Prussian territory, but whenhe heard that Bernadotte's I Corps had marched throughPrussian Ansbach, he made the critical decision to stayand defend Ulm rather than retreat to the south, whichwould have offered a reasonable opportunity at savingthe bulk of his forces.[19] Napoleon had little accurateinformation about Mack’s intentions or maneuvers; heknew that Kienmayer's Corps was sent to Ingolstadt eastof the French positions, but his agents greatly exagger-ated its size.[20] On October 5, Napoleon ordered Neyto join Lannes, Soult, and Murat in concentrating andcrossing the Danube at Donauwörth.[21] The French en-circlement, however, was not deep enough to preventKienmayer’s escape: the French corps did not all arriveat the same place – they instead deployed on a long west-east axis – and the early arrival of Soult and Davout atDonauwörth incited Kienmayer to exercise caution andevasion.[21] Napoleon gradually became more convinced

that the Austrians were massed at Ulm and ordered size-able portions of the French army to concentrate aroundDonauwörth; on October 6, three French infantry and

cavalry corps headed to Donauwörth to seal off Mack’sescape route.[22]

Realizing the danger of his position, Mack decided togo on the offensive. On October 8, he commandedthe army to concentrate around Günzburg and hoped to

strike at Napoleon’s lines of communication. Mack in-structed Kienmayer to draw Napoleon further east to-wards Munich and Augsburg. Napoleon did not seri-ously consider the possibility that Mack would cross theDanube and move away from his central base, but he didrealize that seizing the bridges at Günzburg would yielda large strategic advantage.[23] To accomplish this objec-tive, Napoleon sent Ney’s Corps to Günzburg, completelyunaware that the bulk of the Austrian army was head-ing to the same destination. On October 8, however, thecampaign witnessed its rst serious battle at Wertingenbetween Auffenburg’s troops and those of Murat andLannes.

2.4 Battle of Wertingen

Main articles: Battle of Wertingen and Battle ofGünzburgFor reasons not entirely clear, on October 7 Mack or-

Battle of Günzburg, October 9, 1805

dered Franz Xavier Auffenburg to take his division of5,000 infantry and400cavalry fromGünzburgto Wertin-gen in preparation for the main Austrian advance out ofUlm.[23] Uncertain of what to do and having little hopefor reinforcements, Auffenburg was in a dangerous po-sition. The rst French forces to arrive were Murat’scavalry divisions – Louis Klein's 1st Dragoon Division,Marc Antoine de Beaumont’s 3rd Dragoon Division, andNansouty’s 1st Cuirassier Division. They began to assaultthe Austrian positions and were soon joined by NicolasOudinot's grenadiers, who were hoping to outank theAustrians from the northeast. Auffenburg attempted a re-

treat to the southwest, but he was not quick enough: theAustrians lost nearly their entire force, 1,000 to 2,000 ofwhich were taken prisoner.[24] The Battle of Wertingen

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4 2 CAMPAIGN

had been an easy French victory.

The strategic situation from October 7 to 9. With Mikhail Ku-tuzov too far away to offer signicant aid, the Austrians found themselves in a precarious position.

The action at Wertingen convinced Mack to operate onthe left bank of the Danube instead of making a directeastwards retreat on the right bank. This would requirethe Austrian army to cross at Günzburg. On October 8,Ney was operating under Louis Alexandre Berthier's di-rections that called for a direct attack on Ulm the fol-lowing day. Ney sent in Jean-Pierre Firmin Malher's3rd Division to capture the Günzburg bridges over theDanube. In the Battle of Günzburg, a column of this di-vision ran into some Tyrolean jaegers and captured 200

of them, including their commander Konstantin GhilianKarl d'Aspré, along with two cannons.[25] The Austriansnoticed thesedevelopmentsand reinforcedtheir positionsaround Günzburg with three infantry battalions and 20cannons.[25] Malher’s division conducted several heroicattacks against the Austrianpositions, but all failed. Mackthen sent in Ignaz Gyulai with seven infantry battalionsand fourteen cavalry squadrons to repair the destroyedbridges, but this force was charged and swept away by thedelayed French 59th Infantry Regiment.[26] Fierce ght-ing ensued and the French nally managed to establish afoothold on the right bank of the Danube. While the Bat-tle of Günzburg was being fought, Ney sent Louis HenriLoison's 2nd Division to capture the Danube bridges atElchingen, which were lightly defended by the Austrians.Having lost most of the Danube bridges, Mack marchedhis army back to Ulm. By October 10, Ney’s corps hadmade signicant progress: Malher’s division had crossedto the right bank, Loison’s division held Elchingen, andPierre Dupont de l'Étang's 1st Division was heading to-wards Ulm.

2.5 Haslach-Jungingen and Elchingen

Main articles: Battle of Haslach-Jungingen and Battle ofElchingenThe demoralized Austrian army arrived at Ulm in the

The strategic situation from October 11 to 14. The French hurl themselves westwards to capture the Austrian army.

early hours of October 10. Mack was deliberating hiscourse of action and the Austrian army remained inactiveat Ulm until the 11th. Meanwhile, Napoleon was oper-ating under awed assumptions: he believed the Austri-ans were moving to the east or southeast and that Ulmwas lightly guarded. Ney sensed this misapprehensionand wrote to Berthier that Ulm was, in fact, more heavilydefended than the French originally thought.[27] Duringthis time, the Russian threat to the east began to pre-occupy Napoleon so much that Murat was given com-mand of the right wing of the army, consisting of Ney’sand Lannes’s corps.[28] The French were separated in twomassive wings at this point: the forces of Ney, Lannes,and Murat to the west were containing Mack while thoseof Soult, Davout, Bernadotte, and Auguste Marmont tothe east were charged with guarding against any possibleRussian and Austrian incursions. On October 11, Neymade a renewed push on Ulm; the 2nd and 3rd divisionswere to march to the city along the right bank of theDanube while Dupont’s division, supported by one dra-goon division, was to march directly for Ulm and seizethe entire city. The orders were hopeless because Neystill did not know that the entire Austrian army was sta-tioned at Ulm.The 32nd Infantry Regiment in Dupont’s divisionmarched from Haslach towards Ulm and ran into fourAustrian regiments holding Boengen. The 32nd car-ried out several ferocious attacks, but the Austrians heldrm and repulsed every one. The Austrians ooded thebattle with more cavalry and infantry regiments to Ulm-Jungingen hoping to score a knockout blow against Ney’scorps by enveloping Dupont’s force. Dupont sensed whatwas happeningandpreemptedtheAustriansby launchinga surprise attack on Jungingen, during which he took asprisoner at least 1,000 of theAustrians.[27] RenewedAus-trian attacks drove these forces back to Haslach, whichthe French managed to hold. Dupont was eventually

forced to fall back on Albeck, where he joined LouisBaraguey d'Hilliers's foot dragoons division. The effectsof the Battle of Haslach-Jungingen on Napoleon’s plans

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2.6 Battle of Ulm 5

are not fully clear, but the Emperor may have nallyascertained that the majority of the Austrian army wasconcentrated at Ulm.[29] Accordingly, Napoleon sent thecorps of Soult and Marmont towards the Iller, meaninghe now had four infantry and one cavalry corps to dealwith Mack; Davout, Bernadotte, and the Bavarians werestill guarding the region aroundMunich.[29]Napoleon didnot intend to ght a battle across rivers and ordered hismarshals to capture the important bridges around Ulm.He also began shifting his forces to the north of Ulm be-cause he expected a battle in that region rather than anencirclement of the city itself.[30] These dispositions andactions would lead to a confrontation at Elchingen on the14th as Ney’s forces advanced on Albeck.At this point in thecampaign, theAustriancommand staffwas in full confusion. Ferdinand began to openly opposeMack’s command style and decisions, charging that thelatter spent his days writing contradictory orders that leftthe Austrian army marching back and forth.[31] On Octo-ber 13, Macksent two columns out of Ulmin preparationfor a breakout to the north: one under Johann SigismundRiesch headed towards Elchingen to secure the bridgethere and the other under Franz von Werneck went northwith most of the heavy artillery.[32] Ney hurried his corpsforward to reestablish contact with Dupont, who was stillnorth of the Danube. Ney led Loison’s division to thesouth of Elchingen on the right bank of the Danube to be-gan the attack. Malher’s division crossed the river farthereast and moved west toward Riesch’s position. The eldwas a partially wooded ood plain, rising steeply to the

hill town of Elchingen, which had a wide eld of view.[33]

The French cleared the Austrian pickets from a bridge,then a regiment boldly attacked and captured the abbeyat the top of the hill at bayonet point. During the Battleof Elchingen, the Austrian cavalry was also defeated andReisch’s infantry ed toward Ulm. Neywas giventhe titleDuke of Elchingen for his impressive victory.[33]

2.6 Battle of Ulm

Main article: Battle of UlmOn October 13, Soult’s IV Corps fell on Memmingen

from the east. After a minor clash that resulted in16 French casualties, General-Major Karl Spangen vonUyternesse surrendered 4,600 soldiers, eight guns, andnine colors. The Austrians were low on ammunition, cutoff from Ulm, and completely demoralized by the confu-sion reigning at army headquarters.[34]

More actions took place on the 14th. Murat’s forcesjoined Dupont at Albeck just in time to drive off an Aus-trian attack from Werneck; together Murat and Dupontbeat the Austrians to the north in the direction ofHeidenheim. By night on the 14th, two French corpswere stationed in the vicinity of the Austrian encamp-

ments at Michelsberg, right outside of Ulm.[35] Mackwas now in a dangerous situation: there was no longerany hope of escaping along the north bank, Marmont

Marshal Murat proved instrumental during the Ulm Campaign.

Mack surrenders to Napoleon at Ulm by Paul-Émile Boutigny

and the Imperial Guard were hovering at the outskirtsof Ulm to the south of the river, and Soult was movingnorth from Memmingen to prevent the Austrians escap-ing south to the Tyrol.[35] Troubles continued with the

Austrian command as Ferdinand overrode the objectionsof Mack and ordered the evacuation of all cavalry fromUlm, a total of 6,000 troopers.[36] Murat’s pursuit wasso effective, however, that only eleven squadrons joinedWerneck at Heidenheim.[36] Murat continued his harass-ment of Werneck and forced him to surrender with 8,000men at Treuchtlingen on October 19; Murat also tookan entire Austrian eld park of 500 vehicles, then swepton towards Neustadt an der Donau and captured 12,000Austrians.[36][37]

Events at Ulm were nowreaching a conclusion. On Octo-ber 15, Ney’s troops successfullycharged the Michelsberg

encampments and on the 16th the French began to bom-bard Ulm itself. Austrian morale was at a low point andMack began to realize that there was little hope of res-

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6 3 AFTERMATH

cue. On October 17, Napoleon’s emissary, Ségur, signeda convention with Mack in which the Austrians agreed tosurrender on October 25 if no aid came by that date.[36]

Gradually, however, Mack heard of the capitulations atHeidenheim and Neresheim and agreed to surrender vedays before schedule on October 20. Fifteen hundredtroops from the Austrian garrison managed to escape, butthe vast majority of the Austrian force marched out onOctober 21 and laid down their arms without incident, allwith the Grande Armée drawn up in a vast semicircle ob-serving the capitulation (see infobox picture).[36] The of-cerswere permittedto leave, pending their signatures ona parole in which they agreed not to take up arms againstFrance until they were exchanged. More than ten generalofficers were included in this agreement, including Mack,Johann von Klenau, Maximilian Anton Karl, Count Bail-let de Latour, Prince Liechtenstein, and Ignaz Gyulai.[38]

3 Aftermath

On December 2, 1805, the French crushed a combined Russo-Austrian army in the Battle of Austerlitz. Austria agreed to end her participation in the Third Coalition with the Treaty of Press-burg on December 26.

As the Austrians were marching out of Ulm to surrender,a combined Franco-Spanish eet was being destroyedat the Battle of Trafalgar. This decisive British victoryended the naval threat from France and ensured Britishnaval domination untilWorld War I. Despite this setback,the Ulm Campaign had been a spectacular victory andhad witnessed the elimination of an entire Austrian army

at very little cost for the French. The 8th bulletin of theGrande Armée described the scale of the achievement:Marshal Augereau's arrival from Brest with the newlyformed VII Corps gave the French one more piece ofgood news. In the Capitulation of Dornbirn on 13November, Franjo Jelačić's division was cornered andforced to surrender. The Russians withdrew to the north-east after Mack’s capitulation and Vienna fell on Novem-ber 12. The Allies were thoroughly defeated at the Bat-tle of Austerlitz in December and Austria was perma-nently knocked out of the Third Coalition a few weekslater. The French victory highlighted the effectiveness of

la manoeuvre sur les derrières, a special type of strategicenvelopment rst used by Napoleon in his Italian cam-paign in 1796.[39] The maneuvercalledfora pinning force

that would occupy a broad front of the enemy line whileother supporting units positioned themselves at a speciclocation in the enemy’s ank or rear.[40] As the enemy be-came more embroiled with the pinning force, the ank-ing troops would attack at a critical spot and seal the vic-tory. In the Ulm Campaign, Murat’s cavalry served asthe pinning force that fooled the Austrians into thinkingthe main French attack would come from the Black For-est. As Murat lulled the Austrians towards Ulm, the mainFrench forces crashed through Central Germany and sep-arated Mack’s army from the other theaters of the war.

3.1 Signicance

The Schlieffen Plan , emphasizing maneuver and envelopment,

owed much to the Ulm Campaign

The UlmCampaign isconsidered to be one of the greatesthistorical examples of a strategic turning movement.[41]

Historians often analyze the campaign on a wide strategiclevel that does not include tactical confrontations, eventhough these were common and relevant.[41] The deci-sive victory at Ulm is also believed to be a product ofthe long training and preparation the Grande Armée re-ceived at the camps of Boulogne.[41] The Grande Arméecarried little baggage, invaded enemy territory at har-vest time, and marched far faster than the Austrians hadexpected.[42] The campaign highlighted the utility of theCorps d'Armée system; corps went on to become the fun-damental strategic building block for the major wars inthe nineteenthand twentiethcenturies.[43] A typical corpsmight have three infantry divisions,a lightcavalrybrigadefor reconnaissance, and reserve artillery batteries in ad-dition to those attached to each division; their increasedsize allowed them to ght without support for long periodsof time, as Ney did, and their durability permitted themto spread out and subsist by requisitioning local food.[42]

The French needed about one eighth the transport usedby contemporary armies, giving them a level of mobil-ity and exibility unseen at that time: invasions of South

Germany by Marlborough or Moreau covered a narrowfront, but the Grande Armée invaded in 1805 on a frontthat was 100 miles (161 km) wide, an action that took

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7

the Austrians by complete surprise and caused them tounderestimate the gravity of the situation.[43]

4 Notes

[1] David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 384.

[2] Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. p. 41

[3] Battle of Austerlitz (1960) Vernon Johns Society, Ac-cessed September 29, 2006

[4] Richard Brooks (editor), Atlas of World Military History.p. 156. It is a historical cliché to compare the SchlieffenPlan with Hannibal 's tactical envelopment at Cannae (216 BC); Schlieffen owed more to Napoleon’s strategic maneu-ver on Ulm (1805).

[5] David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 304[6] Chandler p. 320

[7] Chandler p. 328. The Baltic was dominated by Russia,something Britain wasn't comfortable with since it pro-vided valuable commodities like timber, tar and hemp,crucial supplies to Britain’s empire. Britain supported theOttoman Empire against Russian incursions towards theMediterranean. Meanwhile, French territorial rearrange-ments in Germany occurred without Russian consultationand Napoleon’s annexations in the Po valley increasinglystrained relations between the two.

[8] France had defeated Austrian in the War of the FirstCoalition (1792–1797) and the War of the Second Coali-tion (1798–1801)

[9] Chandler p. 331

[10] Chandler p. 323

[11] Chandler p. 332

[12] Chandler p. 333

[13] Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. p. 31

[14] Andrew Uffindell, GreatGenerals of theNapoleonic Wars.p. 155

[15] Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. p. 32

[16] Fisher & Fremont-Barnes p. 36

[17] David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 382

[18] Chandler p. 385

[19] Frederick Kagan, The End of the Old Order . p. 389

[20] Kagan p. 393

[21] Kagan p. 395

[22] Kagan p. 397

[23] Kagan p. 400

[24] Kagan p. 404

[25] Kagan p. 408

[26] Kagan p. 409

[27] Kagan p. 412

[28] Kagan p. 414

[29] Kagan p. 417

[30] Kagan p. 420

[31] Kagan p. 421

[32] Fisher& Fremont-Barnes,TheNapoleonic Wars: Rise and Fall of an Empire. p. 39–40

[33] Fisher & Fremont-Barnes p. 40

[34] Smith, p 204

[35] David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 399

[36] Chandler p. 400

[37] Chandler says Trochtelngen but this cannot possibly becorrect because it is 55 km to the west of Ulm. On theother hand, Treuchtlingen is a far better candidate sinceit is in the expected direction, that is, 48 km northeast ofNeresheim and 91 km northeast of Ulm. Chandler alsonames Neustadt, which could be either be Neustadt amder Donau (148 km east of Ulm!) or a mistake.

[38] (French) DOUZIÈME BULLETIN DE LA GRANDEARMÉE. Status of Austrian officers and general officers,after the affaires d’Elchingen, Wertingen, Memmingen,Ulm, etc. Munich, Munich, 5 brumaire an 14 (27 octobre1805.) Histoire-Empire.org. May 6, 2010.

[39] Chandler p. 402

[40] Chandler p. 186

[41] Trevor Dupuy, Harper Encyclopedia of Military History.p. 816. Ulm was not a battle; it was a strategic victory socomplete and so overwhelming that the issue was never se-

riously contested in tactical combat . Also, This campaignopened the most brilliant year of Napoleon’s career. Hisarmy had been trained to perfection; his plans were fault-less.

[42] Richard Brooks (editor), Atlas of World Military History.p. 108

[43] Brooks (editor) p. 109

5 References

• Brooks, Richard (editor). Atlas of World MilitaryHistory. London: HarperCollins, 2000. ISBN 0-7607-2025-8

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8 6 EXTERNAL LINKS

• Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon.New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ISBN 0-02-523660-1

• Dupuy, Trevor N., Harper Encyclopedia of MilitaryHistory. New York: HarperCollins, 1993. ISBN 0-

06-270056-1• Fisher, Todd & Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The

Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an Empire.Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2004. ISBN 1-84176-831-6

• Kagan, Frederick W. The End of the Old Order .Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2006. ISBN 0-306-81137-5

• Smith, Digby. The Napoleonic Wars Data Book.London: Greenhill, 1998. ISBN 1-85367-276-9

• Uffindell, Andrew. Great Generals of theNapoleonic Wars. Kent: Spellmount Ltd., 2003.ISBN 1-86227-177-1

• (French) DOUZIÈME BULLETIN DE LAGRANDE ARMÉE. Status of Austrian officersand general officers, after the affaires d’Elchingen,Wertingen, Memmingen, Ulm, etc. Munich,Munich, 5 brumaire an 14 (27 octobre 1805.)Histoire-Empire.org. May 6, 2010.

6 External links• Ulm Campaign animated battle map by Jonathan

Webb

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9

7 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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