Post on 08-Feb-2017
Master Thesis
Political Science | International Relations
Name: Elze van Langen
Student ID: 10786201
Supervisor: Dr. L. W. Fransen
Second reader: Dr. F. Boussaid
Date: 11 August 2016
Word count: 19.371
The securitisation of climate change A discourse analysis of the NATO and its member states
2
Abstract
Although the representation of environmental concerns in the security agenda is increasingly
recognised, the securitisation of climate change remains a topic of contestation. This thesis
elaborates on the question how the visions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
and its member states correspond regarding the securitisation of climate change. This research
draws on the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016) and presents a comparative analysis of
discourses on climate security. The discourses of the US, Germany and the Netherlands are
analysed and complemented with the discourse of the NATO, which touches upon the lack of
attention that has been given to climate security discourses within international organisations
(IOs). This thesis argues that NATO generally constructs climate change as a territorial danger,
which corresponds most with the discourse of the US. Although the leadership role of the US
within NATO can be a plausible explanation for the similarity, it is argued that NATO’s vision
may best be explained by its traditional identity of a military alliance. Despite expressions of
fear for the militarisation of climate change, this thesis suggests that the short-term political
implications of NATO’s vision are limited, since its mandate and policies concerning climate
change are largely vague and undecided.
Cover photo by Isaac Cordal
The cement sculpture is created by street artist Isaac Cordal and belongs to a larger installation called ‘Follow the Leaders’.
The artwork serves as a metaphor for power-mad businessmen who run our capitalist global order. However, after a picture
went viral online, this sculpture was renamed by social media users as ‘Politicians talking about climate change’ (Cordal 2011;
Sullivan 2014).
3
Preface
Since several years, I am fascinated by the global issue of climate change. When I started to
read more about this topic for my MA thesis project, I discovered an article by George Marshall
(2014). In an attempt to explain the difficulties for our global society to find a collective
response to climate change, Marshall found the answer in something we all share: our human
brain. The exceptionally amorphous problem of climate change provides us with so many
uncertainties that our human brain is incapable to fully address the issue. It touches upon our
cognitive blind spots, fear of death and perception of threats. This made me realise that climate
change is largely socially constructed, and that the way and to what extent it is perceived as a
security threat can have great political implications. I decided to write my thesis about the
securitisation of climate change, in which I analysed the discourse of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), an IO which traditionally is not involved with climate change. While I was
still writing my thesis, I applied for an internship at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within
two weeks I was hired as an intern at the ambassador for international organisations. Hence, I
will continue to work with the NATO and many other interesting institutions. I am looking
forward to the career that lies ahead of me, and I uphold the ambition to work with climate
issues in the future.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Luc Fransen for his valuable guidance and advice, and
dr. Farid Boussaid for taking the time to read my thesis as a second reader. I would also like to
thank Ariane Berends for her support as a study advisor and involvement throughout the
process. Subsequently, I would like to acknowledge the interview respondents, who provided
me with new insights and information: Rob de Rave (HCSS), Louise van Schaik (Clingendael
Institute), Michel van Winden (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Wilbert van der Zeijden
(PAX for Peace). Lastly, I would like to thank the people who are close to me and have been of
great support throughout my study.
4
Table of contents List of tables and figures 6 Abbreviations 7 1. Introduction 8
1.1. Research topic 8 1.2. Research structure 9
2. Research design 10
2.1. Research question 10 2.2. Analytical framework: Analysing climate security discourses 11 2.3. Research design: Comparative design 11 2.4. Relevance 14 2.5. Outlook: the argument 14
3. Theoretical framework: The securitisation of climate change 16
3.1. The climate-security nexus 16 3.2. The theory of securitisation (Copenhagen School) 19 3.3. The influx of risk into the field of security 21 3.4. Differentiating securitisation: threat or risk? 24 3.5. Analytical framework of climate security discourses 25 3.6. Normative implications of securitising climate change 27
4. The United States and Germany: Territorial versus individual climate security 30
4.1. United States: Climate change as a territorial danger 30 4.1.1. The US and the NATO 30 4.1.2. The general climate debate 30 4.1.3. The securitisation of climate change 32 4.1.4. Political consequences 34 4.1.5. Conclusion 34
4.2. Germany: Climate change as an individual insecurity 35 4.2.1. Germany and the NATO 35 4.2.2. The general climate debate 35 4.2.3. The securitisation of climate change 37 4.2.4. Political consequences 38 4.2.5. Conclusion 39
4.3. Conclusion: Territorial versus individual climate security 39 5. The Netherlands: Climate change as a planetary insecurity 40
5.1. Introduction 40 5.2. The Netherlands and the NATO 41 5.3. The general climate debate 41 5.4. The securitisation of climate change 44 5.5. Political consequences 49 5.6. Conclusion 50
6. The NATO: Climate change and territorial defence 51
6.1. Introduction 51 6.2. A short history of the NATO 51 6.3. The securitisation of climate change 53
5
6.4. Political consequences 58 6.5. Conclusion 59
7. Conclusions 60 7.1. Research question: a comparative analysis 60 7.2. Normative implications 61 7.3. Limitations and recommendations for further research 62
References 63
Appendix I: Interviews 70
6
List of tables and figures
Figure 1.1: Research structure
Figure 2.1: Hierarchical comparative design
Table 3.1: Important keywords distinguishing between the danger and risk dimension
Figure 3.1: The space of politics and security
Table 3.2: A typology of climate security discourses
7
Abbreviations
CCMS Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CCPI Climate Change Performance Index
COP Conference of the Parties
DOD US Department of Defence
DPCR NATO Defence Planning Capability Review
EC European Commission
EU European Union
GHG Greenhouse Gases
IO International organisation
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KNMI Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut
LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn
NAS Dutch National Adaptation Strategy
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA US National Climate Assessment
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NMP Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan
PA NATO Parliamentary Assembly
PBL Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving
RIVM Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu
STC NATO Science and Technology Committee
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
VROM Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer
8
1. Introduction
1.1. Research topic
The changing climate has already started to reshape our world. Droughts, floods, rising sea
levels and water scarcity have made climate change an issue of security policies. The climate-
security nexus is part of the larger context of broadening the definition of security, a
development that has taken place since the 1980s (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.1)1. The
intensification of the environmental debate and the changing strategic environment has even
brought the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as an intergovernmental military
alliance into the realm of environmental politics (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 80). The most recent
Strategic Concept of 2010 revealed NATO’s concern about the future impact of climate change
on areas of interest to the alliance (NATO 2010: 13). In the run-up to the UN Climate Change
Conference in Paris (COP21) in 2015, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly (PA) urged the allied
governments to support an ambitious legally-binding global agreement (NATO PA 2015).
While all NATO member countries agree on the likely impacts of climate change on
international security, every single state has a different opinion on how much and which
impacts it might have, as well as to what extent climate change should be integrated in foreign
and security policies (Vitel 2015: 6). There are many possibilities to frame climate change as a
security issue. In other words, the way in which the securitisation of climate change develops,
can have many different outcomes. The reason for this is because climate security discourses
can be important for the legitimisation of certain policies or actions, which normally would not
have been approved when there was no recognition of climate change at all (Diez et al. 2016:
ch.1, 1.2).
Hence, the recognition of climate change by a military alliance that traditionally does
not focus on environmental issues and which conception of security lies within the traditional
state-centric approach, is an interesting but controversial development. The way the NATO as
an international organisation (IO) and its individual members construct climate change as a
security issue, can have normative implications. It can give climate change more prominence
within the political agenda, but it can also expand the military’s policy reach (idem: ch.1, 1.4).
A comparative analysis of the climate security discourses within the United States (US),
1 References of Diez et al. (2016) will not be showed in page numbers, but in (sub)chapters. This is because the eBook version of the source is used, which does not provide page numbers.
9
Germany and the Netherlands, as well as within the NATO, can provide a fuller picture on the
different visions and interactions concerning the climate-security nexus.
1.2. Research structure
Following this introduction on the overall research topic and the second chapter of the thesis’
research design, chapter 3 will explain the theories which are useful for an understanding of
the nexus between climate change and security. This part will elaborate on the theory of
securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School and the incorporation of the logic of risk in
securitisation theory, which ultimately will arrive at the analytical framework on climate
security discourses and the normative implications of securitisation. Chapter 4 will elaborate
on the climate security discourses of the US and Germany as two members of the NATO. In
chapter 5, these cases are complemented with an empirical analysis of the climate security
discourse in the Netherlands. The NATO and the way it securitises climate change will be
explored in chapter 6. Consequently, conclusions will be drawn from these different cases in
chapter 7 (figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: The research structure
•Climate security
•Research design
Introduction
• Securitisation
• Analytical framework of climate security
discourses
Theory•US & Germany
•The Netherlands
•NATO
Analysis
•Conclusions
Combination theory & analysis
10
2. Research design
2.1. Research question
In 2010, former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for the alliance to play
a significant role in the global response to climate change (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 80). In
NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept of 2010 was recognised that “key environmental and
resource constraints”, including climate change, “will further shape the future security
environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO
planning and operations” (NATO 2010: 13). Although the NATO has received great scholarly
attention, research on the alliance and the way it constructs climate change as an emerging
security challenge is scarcely represented in the literature.
Studies on securitisation have traditionally focused on either a case study concerning a
single country or a global overview, with the danger of failing to reconstruct thorough
securitisation dynamics. Recently, Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.2) addressed this gap by providing
a systematic comparative analysis of discourses on climate change and security in four
countries. The authors developed a six-fold matrix which allowed them to trace securitisations
in more detail than so far has been done. It also clarifies the connections between security,
threat and risk. Furthermore, it makes such securitisations more applicable to empirical
analyses and enables the engagement with the normative debate surrounding securitisation.
This thesis will further elaborate on the analysis of Diez et al. (2016) by assessing the
securitisation of climate change in the Netherlands and comparing it to the discourses in the
US and Germany, which are already analysed by the authors. Although they took the state as
the main referent object in their research, the literature has not yet offered a comprehensive
understanding of climate security discourses within IOs (idem: 726). This research paper aims
to address this gap in the literature by analysing the securitisation of climate change within the
NATO, and by consolidating these findings with analyses of its NATO members the Netherlands,
Germany and the US. This thesis will therefore elaborate on the question:
How do the visions of the NATO and its member states correspond with regard to the
securitisation of climate change?
11
2.2. Analytical framework: Analysing climate security discourses
This thesis will use the analytical framework on climate security discourses developed by Diez
et al. (2016), because it provides a recent and comprehensive method to analyse and compare
the securitisation on climate change in different cases. The framework consists of a six-fold
matrix of securitisation with two dimensions. On one dimension it distinguishes between
‘threatification’ (the construction of security as an existential threat) and ‘riskification’ (a more
diffuse logic of security). On the other dimension it distinguishes between three different levels
of referent objects, which climate change is seen to threaten the most: the territorial, individual
and planetary level.
On the territorial level, states are seen as the main referent objects. However, Diez et
al. (2016: ch.2, 2.2) acknowledge that other group entities can also be the referent object, such
as the NATO. This means that the NATO as an alliance with 28 member states can produce
articulations in terms of territorial danger or territorial risk. This argument is supported by
McDonald (2013: 46-47) who argues that IOs play a key role in the provision of security in
international contexts. Since climate change poses a threat to both states and individuals as
components of international society, IOs in general are powerfully advanced in linking climate
change to international security.
Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.3) acknowledge that their comparative research of four
countries might run the risk of methodological nationalism, which might reinforce the
boundaries of states. This is in conflict with the (to a large degree) transnational character of
debates on climate change and the importance of transnational actors in these debates, such
as international expert panels and NGOs. However, they also argue that climate policies
eventually need to be adopted in national contexts in which political debates on climate change
largely take place. The approach in this thesis meets this ambivalent issue by highlighting the
linkages between the national contexts of the Netherlands, Germany and the US with the
international context of the NATO.
2.3. Research design: Comparative design
In this thesis a comparative design is applied in relation to a qualitative research strategy, which
means the research design takes the form of a multiple-case study (Bryman 2012: 74). A case
study can be defined as an intensive examination of a single unit (setting) for the purpose of
understanding a larger number of similar units (Gerring 2004: 341). This can be exemplified as
12
the external validity or generalisability (Bryman 2012: 69). Hence, a multiple-case study is a
research design in which the number of cases exceeds one. This research design has been
chosen because this thesis has the ambition of theory-building instead of theory-testing and
uses information-rich cases. The design has the advantage that it allows the researcher to
examine the operation of generative causal mechanisms in divergent or similar contexts (idem:
74).
This thesis will elaborate on the NATO and three member states, namely the US,
Germany and the Netherlands. The US is a relevant case in this study, since it fulfils a role of
leadership within the NATO. From a military perspective, the US is most dominant with its high
military expenditures (approximately 70 percent of total NATO expenditures) (Elshout & Koelé
2016: 10-11). However, its overall performance on climate change can be measured as poor,
concerning its high emission levels and slow adoption of federal climate policies (Diez et al.
2016: ch.3, 3.1). Germany is an interesting case as well, since it has long been hesitant towards
military involvement through the NATO (Carstensen 2016), as well as in its national debate on
climate security. Accordingly, Germany is called an ambivalent forerunner in the field of climate
change. While it is a highly industrialised country with a strong economic performance, it is also
characterised by progressive climate policies (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4).
The climate security discourses within the cases of Germany and the US, mainly
obtained from the secondary source of Diez et al. (2016), will be compared with the discourse
of the Netherlands, obtained from primary sources. The Netherlands has been chosen as a case
because it is seen as a loyal NATO member and is known for its ambition to play a leading role
in environmental policies, though its performance on climate change is far behind Germany
(WRR 2010: 9; Dutch Ministry of Defence 2013: 8; Germanwatch and CAN 2016).
Besides the systematic comparative analysis of the three NATO members, the climate
security discourse of the NATO will be analysed as well. A reason for this is, despite the fact that
climate policies eventually have to be implemented in national contexts, international and
transnational actors are influencing these national debates (Diez et al. 2016: ch1, 1.3). Although
the NATO and the Netherlands will receive special attention in this study, it will not be
appropriate to compare an international organisation on a one-to-one basis with a nation-state.
Therefore, the analysis of the NATO will be positioned above the comparative analysis of the
three member countries (figure 2.1).
13
Figure 2.1: The hierarchical comparative design
The combination of data-collection methods is typical for case studies, which makes the
strategy of triangulation appropriate (Eisenhardt 1989: 534). Triangulation in this thesis refers
to an approach that uses “multiple methods of investigation and sources of data” (Bryman
2012: 392). In this study, a discourse analysis on 63 relevant documents has been carried out.
These include policy papers and government reports and statements from the member states’
ministries in the sectors of defence, foreign affairs and the environment, as well as strategic
concepts, treaties and resolutions of the NATO. Reports of research institutes and think tanks
have been analysed, most of them can be found in the Dutch case, such as the ‘Advisory Council
on International Affairs’ (AIV), ‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’ (WRR) and
Clingendael Institute. Also, attention has been given to discursive entrepreneurs through
opinion pieces and autobiographies. Consequently, civil society reports, newspaper articles,
online news articles, and a radio fragment are used to reflect the broader debate.
The choice of the documents is based on their importance, considering the time they
were published and the public and/or political attention they received, and the extent to which
the document links climate change to security. The documents were published in the time span
of 1949 until 2016, but most of them find their origin between 1988 and 2016. The evident
explanation for this is that the amount of publications increased due to the increased attention
for the environment. Discourses can be defined as ‘selective representations of complex
phenomena’ that traverse the conventional boundaries of different disciplines (Fairclough
2013: 3-4). In order to reconstruct the broader debate, discover linkages between actors and
find certain motivations behind securitising moves, semi-structured interviews have been
conducted with several policy-makers and experts within the field of climate change and
security.
NATO
The Netherlands
Germany(Diez et al. 2016)
United States(Diez et al. 2016)
14
2.4. Relevance
This thesis wishes to make an empirical as well as a theoretical contribution. Empirically this
thesis aims to provide a better understanding of how the NATO frames the emerging security
challenge of climate change and to what extent this corresponds to the securitisation of climate
change of its members, considering the Netherlands, Germany and the US. Theoretically this
thesis aims to contribute to the debate about securitisation and elaborate on the underexposed
aspects of the literature by using the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.2). The
aim is to develop a better understanding of the logic of risk and its relationship with security,
and of the effects of the related languages on political decision-making (idem: ch.2, 2.1).
There are many possibilities to frame climate change as a security issue and these
different discourses are of importance for the legitimisation of certain policies, such as military
security policies. Therefore, it is relevant to analyse discourses on climate security and to assess
its normative implications. Whether these discourses can be perceived as a good or a bad thing,
“depends on the exact ways in which the securitisation of climate change unfolds” (Diez et al.
2016: ch.1, 1.2). When such a discourse brings climate change on the political agenda and thus
facilitates political decision-making, it can be a good thing. But when such a discourse helps to
expand the military’s policy reach and neglects climate policy, it can be a bad thing as well. How
this takes place is in turn a consequence of several structural factors, such as the influence of
discursive entrepreneurs or the historical evolution of a political institution (ibid.).
The way the NATO and the Netherlands as a NATO member construct climate change
as a security issue, can thus matter in the legitimisation of policies. In this sense, the question
of whether the linkage of climate change and security is a good or a bad thing depends on how
the securitisation of climate change in these cases unfolds. In comparatively analysing the
NATO as an international alliance and three of its member states, it is possible to assess to what
extent the climate security discourse of the NATO corresponds to the discourses of its members
and what further conclusions can be drawn.
2.5. Outlook: the argument
This thesis shows that the vision of the NATO with regard to the securitisation of climate change
corresponds most to the climate security discourse of the US. Both actors generally frame
climate change in terms of a territorial danger, while Germany primarily constructs the issue as
an individual risk and the Netherlands generally frames climate change as a planetary risk.
15
Although the reason for the similar discourses of the NATO and the US touches upon the
leadership role of the US within the alliance, this thesis argues that NATO’s vision is largely
influenced by its traditional identity of a military alliance which is built on the principle of
collective territorial defence.
16
3. Theoretical framework: The securitisation of climate change
This chapter will elaborate on the theories concerning climate change and security. After the
development of the climate-security nexus is discussed, the theory on securitisation developed
by the Copenhagen School is explained. This theory on the narrow conceptualisation of security
forms the basis for the rest of the chapter, in which the incorporation of risk as a broadening
of the securitisation theory is described. Subsequently, attention is given to the analytical
framework on climate security discourses developed by Diez et al. (2016). The chapter
concludes with the normative implications of the securitisation on climate change.
3.1. The climate-security nexus
The growing appeal of ‘climate security’ in international politics represents a recent and
sufficiently successful introduction of concerns about the environment into the security
agenda. Despite this increased recognition, the nexus between environmental change and
security continues to be a topic of contestation (Trombetta 2008: 585). First, Trombetta (2008:
585) argues that environmental problems are often overruled by ‘more urgent threats’. This
can actually be understood as the perceived urgency of threats, since the human brain tends
to recognise visible and recent threats, such as terrorist violence, as more urgent. Widely
shared by cognitive psychologists, climate change is an exceptionally amorphous problem. “It
provides us with no defining qualities that would give it a clear identity: no deadlines, no
geographic location, no single cause or solution and, critically, no obvious enemy” (Marshall
2014).
Second, the contestation remains whether the environment can be considered as a
security issue (Trombetta 2008: 585). This refers to the debate on security studies between the
‘traditionalists’ and the ‘non-traditionalists’. The traditional conception of security is supported
by political realists, who argue that security is centred around the military threat and the use
of force. They take the state as the referent power-exercising object (Biswas 2011: 2). The
increasing attention for the international economic and environmental dimensions from the
1970s and the rising concerns on identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s
contributed to the dissatisfaction about the military and nuclear focus of security imposed by
the Cold War. This generated the debate about the conceptualisation of security, in which the
17
traditional notion of security was increasingly criticised by its insufficiency to explain emerging
threats (Buzan et al. 1998: 2; Biswas 2011: 2).
Political scientists including Ullman (1983); Jahn, Lemaitre and Waever (1987); Nye and
Lynn-Jones (1988); Brown (1989); Matthews (1989); Nye (1989); Haftendorn (1991); Crawford
(1991) and Tickner (1992) explicitly argued for a widening of the concept of security (Buzan et
al. 1998: 2). The incorporation of the environment into the realm of security initially appeared
to be a reasonable idea, since it could increase the political relevance of environmental
problems (Trombetta 2008: 586). According to Buzan (1991: 433) “environmental security
concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support
system on which all other human enterprises depend.” Others welcomed the concept since it
emphasises different values like ecology, ‘globality’, and governance over values like identity,
territoriality and sovereignty, traditionally associated with the nation-state. Yet others
mentioned that environmental security could analytically contribute to a better understanding
of new typologies of vulnerability and the associated potential for conflict (Trombetta 2008:
586).
Traditional security analysts opposed this development by arguing that the progressive
widening of security endangered its intellectual coherence, incorporating so many issues that
its essential meaning became void (Buzan et al. 1998: 2). This argument implied concerns about
the possible evocation of “confrontational practices associated with the state and the military
which should be kept apart from the environmental debate” (Trombetta 2008: 586). These
concerns encompassed the possibilities of generating new competencies for the military -the
militarisation of the environment rather than the greening of security- or the rise of
nationalistic attitudes to protect the national environment. Moreover, security could
undermine the cooperative efforts in order to deal with environmental problems, introducing
a zero-sum rationality in which winners and losers could be created. Similar objections centred
around the southern perception of environmental security as a security discourse of northern
countries (ibid.).
As the debate between the traditionalists and the non-traditionalists went on, the
concept of environmental security slowly gained popularity. In April of 2007 the issue of climate
change was discussed for the first time in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although
state representatives remained divided over whether climate change and, more generally,
environmental degradation could be considered as a security issue (Trombetta 2008: 586),
18
narratives about environmentally induced conflicts entered decisively onto the world stage. In
that same year, the violence in Darfur was attributed to a combination of resource scarcities,
demographic pressures, and climate change by influential actors such as the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon.
Well-known security pundits like Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jeffrey Sachs shaped the
academic and even popular discussion by emphasising the connection between environmental
degradation and violent conflict. Along with these climate conflict narratives came other
predictions about the threat of so-called ‘climate refugees’ (Trombetta 2008: 592; Hartmann;
2013; 47). Research on environmental conflict and the corresponding narratives created an
intense academic debate in which not only the empirical validity of claims and methodologies
were addressed, but also the normative implications. Critics argued that the debate eliminated
the responsibility of developed countries, represented people in the Third World as villains, and
attempting to frame environmental problems in terms of national security (Trombetta 2008:
593; Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4).
Trombetta (2008: 593) argues that the climate security debate has shown two
tendencies which can be translated into two discourses. The first one is influenced by a national
security discourse with an emphasis on conflicts and population displacement, in which the
threat to global order and stability has gained prominence. While this discourse is largely
informed by reactive and defensive measures, the second discourse challenges these security
practices by outlining the inadequacy of military responses and preparation in dealing with
environmental issues. Instead, it shifts the attention to the concept of vulnerability and
suggests the promotion of both mitigation and adaptation to environmental change. It argues
that preventive measures to ensure safety and resilience provide the best results.
These two aspects – one inspired by reactive measures, and the other by preventive
measures - are both present in climate security discourses of western countries (idem: 594).
These aspects can be connected to two important concepts within the securitisation of climate
change: the concept of threat and the concept of risk. These terms will receive more attention
in the next paragraphs, in which theories on the social construction of security will be explained.
19
3.2. The theory of securitisation (Copenhagen School)
The narrow definition of security finds its traces in realism, which can be identified as the
mainstream approach in security studies. Realists tend to see environmental degradation as an
issue of ‘low’ politics rather than a matter of ‘high’ politics, such as security. Constructivists and
poststructuralists deliberately received more support by challenging this narrow perspective.
They argue instead for a non-traditionalist approach of security, suggesting that threats are
socially constructed (Trombetta 2008: 587).
The theory of securitisation, developed by the Copenhagen School and mainly
associated with the research of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, is considered as “[t]he most
innovative and thoughtful attempt to conceptualise the social construction of security issues”
(ibid.). From a social-constructivist perspective it examines how problems are transformed into
issues of security by differentiating security and the securitisation process from its purely
political stance (Buzan et al. 1998: 4-5; Biswas 2011: 3). The theory is relevant in this debate
because it investigates the implications of widening the security agenda and gives specific
attention to environmental problems. Furthermore, it has been influential in the academic and
political debate, since it warned for the risk of framing environmental issues in security terms
(Trombetta 2008: 587-588).
The Copenhagen School argues that in the securitisation theory objective threats do not
exist. Instead, any issue can go through a process of securitisation, in which it is transformed
into a security issue. This happens through a speech act, a discursive process in which an issue
is constructed by a political community as an existential threat. An issue only becomes
securitised when it is accepted as a threat by the audience in wider society. As such, this
transformation does not necessarily mean that a real threat prevails, but that the issue is
framed in such a way that the perception of a security threat is created. As a consequence, the
method of dealing with the issue will be transformed (Trombetta 2008: 588; Biswas 2011: 4).
As such, securitisation can be perceived as a more extreme form of politicisation.
According to Buzan et al. (1998: 23-24) a public issue can be placed on a spectrum ranging from
non-politicised, through politicised, to securitised. In other words, an issue can be completely
absent in public debate and decision, through being part of public policy, to being presented as
an existential threat. The latter phase of securitisation gives rise to emergency measures and
justifies actions that are outside the normal boundaries of political procedure. In a security
analysis three types of units are involved, in which a distinction is made between referent
20
objects (things which are seen as threatened from existence with a legitimate claim to survival),
securitising actors (actors who securitise issues by indicating a referent object as existentially
threatened), and functional actors (actors who neither are the referent object nor the
securitising actor, but who are affecting the decisions in a certain sector) (idem 1998: 35-36).
However, according to Trombetta (2008: 588) the Copenhagen School’s theory on
securitisation has problematic consequences. Although a political community has the decision
whether or not to securitise an issue, “[o]nce an issue is securitised the logic of security
necessarily follows”. This logic brings with it a set of practices which are associated with the
traditional logic of security, suggesting a zero-sum understanding of security and an ultimate
form of antagonism (ibid.; Trombetta 2014: 136). It allows for emergency measures that go
beyond otherwise binding rules (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). The broadening of the security agenda
can therefore have dangerous consequences, since this rationality of security will spread to
other contexts from which it previously had been excluded (Trombetta 2008: 589).
Alongside the problematic consequences in the theory of securitisation, the process of
securitisation does not seem analytically accurate when applied to environmental issues (ibid.).
The most notable peculiarities that the Copenhagen School identified in the environmental
sector can ironically be associated with the amorphous problem of climate change. The theory
of securitisation is associated with the inscription of enemies and issues governed by decrees
rather than democratic procedures (Trombetta 2014: 136). However, the Copenhagen School
argues that environmental securitisation has not been successful (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4),
since “few appeals to environmental security have mobilised exceptional measures or inscribed
enemies in any context” (Trombetta 2008: 589).
Yet other authors such as Trombetta (2008), Brauch (2009), Brzoska (2009) and Parsons
(2010) criticise this argument and clearly recognise securitisation processes, especially in the
field of climate change (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). Bourbeau (2015: 384) criticises the
securitisation theory for underdeveloping and undertheorising the scale or variation of
securitisation. Although a large amount of research has been done on the absolute distinction
between securitised and un-securitised issues, no further differentiation is made when an issue
has entered the security realm. As such, he argues that security is mainly perceived as a one-
size-fits-all concept. Consequently, previously mentioned authors say we need to contextualise
securitisation: “that what the Copenhagen School considers the inherent ‘grammar’ of
securitising moves is merely one form of securitisation prevalent in military sectors and western
21
contexts” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). According to these authors Buzan et al. have a too narrow
definition of securitisation, hence they look at climate change discourses through a lens that
keeps them from seeing securitisation.
In the climate security debate, such a contextualisation of climate change has led to the
explanation of a diversity of versions of securitisation. Although these theories have
contributed to our understanding of securitisation mainly by differentiating between various
referent objects of security, they are still relatively close to the Copenhagen School formulation
and remain largely theoretical in nature (ibid.). Diez et al. (2016) recently developed an
analytical framework which proposes a more deductive way of distinguishing climate security
discourses by creating two dimensions. The first dimension includes different levels of referent
objects, while the other addresses the conceptualisation of risk in the climate security
literature. The scholars argue that the literature largely ignores or does not draw systematically
on the notion of risk (idem: 431). In order to distinguish climate security discourses in a
systematic way, this thesis will use their framework, which will be discussed later in this
chapter. First will be elaborated on the concept of risk.
3.3. The influx of risk into the field of security
One of the long-established criticisms of the Copenhagen School by authors belonging to the
so-called Paris School, comes from a presumed ‘sociological’ approach of securitisation. This
has led to a flourishing literature on the growing relevance of risk in security practices. The
criticism pointed to the failure of Buzan et al. to “see the emergence of security framing through
day-to-day bureaucratic practices and routines, as well as diffuse forms of power in
decentralised networks, including private actors such as the insurance industry” (Diez et al.
2016: ch.1, 1.4). In light of the growing awareness surrounding the uncertainty and complexity
of contemporary threats, scholars, bureaucratic planners and insurance brokers are
increasingly using the concept of risk in order to conceptualise current security dynamics, as
well as ‘resilience’ as a strategy of societies and individuals to prepare for endogenous or
exogenous shocks as situations of risk (ibid.; Trombetta 2008: 590; Bourbeau 2015: 375; Diez
et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4).
Although the risk-security literature often uses the term ‘securitisation’, it effectively
implies that the logic of the security field has already been transformed. Corry (2012: 241-243)
distinguishes two groups of risk theorists who share assumptions about the logic of security,
22
but reach different conclusions with regard to the generation of risk and the way it is dealt with.
The first group draws upon the theory of world risk society developed by sociologist Ulrich Beck.
Risk society can be defined as a social scenario, a scenario which describes the transformation
process of late modern society into its probable result: a risk society (Rasmussen 2001: 289;
Beck & Holzer 2007: 3). This (western) society is increasingly confronted with the unwelcomed
side effects of successful modernisation, which nobody completely understands and which
results in a diversity of possible futures (Giddens 1999: 3; Beck & Holzer 2007: 3). As such, it is
a society that is increasingly concerned with the future (and with security), which generates the
conception of risk. The idea of risk is associated with the will to control, and particularly with
the aspiration to control the future (Giddens 1999: 3).
In a risk society external risks are transformed into manufactured risks, since they are
created by the progression of human development (idem: 4). According to Beck this happened
through the process of ‘reflexive modernisation’, in which risks have become the consequences
of modernisation itself instead of the consequences of a lack of modernity, as was the case in
the industrial society (Bulkely 2001: 432-433). Since most situations of manufactured risk are
inherently ambiguous and reflexive, responsibility can neither easily be assumed nor attributed.
This applies both to circumstances where risk is an energising principle (financial markets), and
where risk needs to be limited (health risks, or ecological risks) (Giddens 1999: 7-8). As such,
the ecological risk of climate change is perceived as a paradigmatic example in Beck’s theory of
risk society, since environmental problems can hardly be assigned to one particular source or
actor and its sources as well as its experiences transcend temporal, spatial and social limits
(Bulkely 2001: 432; Matten 2004: 378).
The second group of risk theorists is inspired by French philosophers such as Foucault
and Bourdieu. For them, “risk is neither a modernist tool for calculating insurance premiums
nor a vain pretence at being in control of the uncontrollable global age, but is itself a particular
rationality of government that works to legitimate certain technologies of power” (Corry 2012:
242). They show how logics of risk facilitate increasing securitisation of populations by focusing
on the institutions and practitioners of security, bringing new domains of human life under
governmental control. In this way risk is not an inevitable feature of a macro-sociological
transformation. Rather, risk is used purposively as a strategy by institutions as a mode of
‘governmentality’ in order to secure their role as providers of security and protection and to
mask some of their failures (Bigo 2002: 65).
23
Foucault developed the concept of governmentality in 1977 which summarises the
concerns about the working of the government. The neologism consisting of ‘govern’ and
‘mentality’ points to the processes of governing and the mentality of a government as the way
of thinking about how the governing happens. It is thus a rationality (a practice) and an art of
(a way of thinking about) government (Foucault et al. 1991: 2-3). Theorists on risk and
governmentality are pessimistic about the situation of populations and discuss the normative
implications of securitisation (Corry 2012: 243). One example is the securitisation of climate
change in the US in 2009, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched its Center on
Climate Change and National Security. Hartmann (2013: 46) argues that the linkages between
climate change, conflict, and natural disasters produced by the defence interests of the US, do
not only threaten a distortion of climate policy, but also further militarise development and
humanitarian assistance.
Despite the different assumptions, both groups of risk theorists argue that security is
not an objective ‘good’ as it is for realists. Instead, they follow the Copenhagen School in
considering security issues as socially constructed and changeable. They both argue that
security is increasingly being thought of in terms of risks rather than threats. Although for
different reasons, both groups are concerned about the ever-expanding security agenda which
they see as partly driven through the concept of risk. Therefore, they ask primarily the question
of ‘what does security do?’ rather than ‘what should security do?’ (Corry 2012: 243).
This thesis will follow these arguments and will draw primarily on the perspective of the
second group, who’s assumptions correspond to what Eckersley (2004: 9) categorises as critical
constructivism: a combination of critical theory and constructivism. Critical constructivism
critically questions the internal, rather than the external, norms and values existent in
understandings and practices in modern society. For the analytical ambition of this thesis the
approach can be used as a method to unmask contradictions, tensions and hidden forms of
powers within and between ideas and practices in climate security discourses. Furthermore,
critical constructivism can help to explore changes in thought and practice which may help to
identify the normative implications of securitisation (idem: 8).
24
3.4. Differentiating securitisation: threat or risk?
Although in the literature there is no single definition of risk, several features are common to
most conceptualisations. Risk presents a relatively long-term potential threat that is typified by
a radical uncertainty and leads to a more diffuse sense of anxiety. Risks are often perceived as
manageable, and “invite the calculation of the incalculable” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). In
contrast, security threats are direct, existential and urgent, for example the drowning of islands
or violent resource conflicts. Security threats are inclined to be identifiable or even
personifiable (such as certain practices, a specific country or group of people), whereas risks
are often more diffuse and lead to more diffuse referent objects (potentially risky behaviour,
risk-areas or risk-groups) (ibid.). Hence, risk policies are focused on precaution, and
programmes on risk-reduction intent to increase the resilience of a referent object (Corry 2012:
245). Where threats are uninsurable because they lead to devastation, risk is typically the
object of insurance (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4).
When a risk is invoked as an existential threat and insurance is no longer possible, a
security logic sets in. Such a logic demands emergency measures in order to prevent the threat
from occurring under any circumstances. In contrast, a risk-based approach constitutes of
mitigation to the possible consequences of climate change (ibid.) and adaptation to changing
conditions and new risks (O’Brien 2012: 667). Considering the features of the conceptualisation
of risk, it appears to be an appropriate way of framing the threats caused by climate change.
Corry (2012) made a contribution to the identification of threats by distinguishing between
‘securitisation’ and ‘riskification’ as two opposing logics of security. The scholar links
securitisation to the direct defence of a referent object against an existential threat, while he
refers riskification to the governance of a referent object in order to control ‘conditions of
possibility’ for damage against it. Thus, riskification focuses on the probable harm and requires
a different mentality of governing than securitisation (Corry 2012: 256).
Although Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.4) largely agree with this characterisation of security
and risk, they argue that risk is “a variation of security rather than a category separate from it”.
According to these scholars, this argument is not only supported by the fact that risk is generally
classified under security considerations, but is also backed by the historical development of the
security-risk debate. Therefore, their analytical framework distinguishes between riskification
and ‘threatification’ which they see both as variations of securitisation. In this way securitisation
forms a continuum on which risk and danger as two poles can intersect. This supports the
25
argumentation that in climate security discourses arguments on risk can include references to
existential threats for the purpose to bolster argumentative force (ibid.).
The inclusion of risk results in an enlargement of the scope of security, whereas the
original formulation of the Copenhagen School relies on a strict distinction between normal
politics and securitisation. While literature on climate change policy has provided essential
insights into different logics of securitisation, the problem that this widening runs counter to
the dichotomous theory of Buzan et al. is largely ignored. The analytical framework posed by
Diez et al. (2016) therefore comprises politicisation as a third process next to the two
possibilities of securitisation: threatification and riskification. In this way it is possible to
conceptualise the area between politics and security as another continuum. As a consequence,
political arguments can have both a securitising and a politicising effect (idem: 494).
3.5. The analytical framework of climate security discourses
Central to the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) is a two-dimensional
conceptual matrix, which on one dimension distinguishes between threatification and
riskification as two versions of securitisation. On the other dimension, the matrix consists of
three different levels of referent objects. Consequently, the matrix covers six categories of
climate security discourses which are all able to change the nature of politics (idem: ch.2, 2.2).
By adding the logic of risk to the field of security, Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) ask how this will
change the security realm, what the relationship is between risk and security and if the related
languages differ in their effects on political decision-making. Although these questions are not
necessarily new, the authors argue they have not been answered in a fully comprehensive and
consistent manner. This paragraph will elaborate on the theoretical considerations of the
framework.
Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) argue for a re-conceptualisation of politics, security and risk,
in which risk is seen as a sub-category of security and in which the concept of securitisation
(Copenhagen School) is re-labelled as ‘threatification’. While the scholars recognise that risk
also calls upon threats, threatification increases the urgency of those threats. It therefore refers
to the extreme threats of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation process, summarised under
the label ‘danger’ (table 3.1). Subsequently, Politics, Risk and Danger are developed as poles of
a triangle in which political debates stretch out. Dependent on its articulation, an issue can be
‘threatified’, ‘riskified’ or ‘politicised’ (figure 3.1). In the latter form the political relevance of
26
the issue is increased without referring to a threat. An issue can also be ‘de-securitised’ and
thus ‘re-politicised’ when its invocation of security is weakened in either form (ibid.).
Table 3.1: Important keywords distinguishing between the danger and risk dimension (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.1)
Figure 3.1: The space of politics and security (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.1)
Besides the distinction between the two types of securitisation, there is the second dimension
consisting of three levels of referent objects which are based on existing literature on climate
security: the territorial, individual and planetary level. The territorial level is based on the
environmental conflict discourse with the conceptualisation of the state as the main referent
object. However, territorial articulations may also be assigned to other group entities. Central
in this level is the defence of a specific territorial order. In contrast, the individual level comes
from the environmental security discourse which is closely linked to human security. In this
27
case the referent object is the individual or a global society of individuals. Consequently, the
planetary level comes from the ecological security discourse with its holistic and cosmological
outlook. Here it is the planetary ecosystem that is threatened, or the biosphere as a whole
(idem: ch.2, 2.2). These three levels of referent objects combined with the two logics of
securitisation form a typology of six categories of climate security discourses. These are
summarised in table 3.2, in which illustrations of typical speech acts are provided as an
example.
Table 3.2: A typology of climate security discourses (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.2)
3.6. Normative implications of securitising climate change
The Copenhagen School considers the closures to the political debate and hence the
constraints to deliberation as the most important normative concern of securitisation. There
may also be other less formal normative implications, such as the purposive closure to the
debate by discursive entrepreneurs. Although several authors raised their concerns about the
normative consequences of securitisation, not all types and stages of securitisation are
necessarily ‘bad’. Securitisation in for instance its first stage leads to an opening up of the
political agenda, which is clearly not harmful. In order to estimate whether the other stages are
‘bad’ depends on a consideration of various normative concerns and an assessment of the kind
28
of measures that are taken by taking into account the specific context (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2,
2.5).
In light of the debates about the morality of securitisation, the differentiation of the
various climate security discourses of Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.5) gives rise to the question of
“whether some forms of securitisation may be normatively preferable to others.” This is
particularly the case when comparing the articulations of risk and danger and considering the
different levels of referent objects in the analytical framework. Some theorists argue that a risk-
based approach may be less problematic than a securitisation based on danger, since it does
not necessarily imply emergency measures as anticipated by the Copenhagen School (Corry
2012: 255). However, others say that exceptional precautionary measures can be legitimised
in a risk-based articulation, in the case of uncertain and incalculable risks. A third argument,
coming from the Paris School, even highlights the idea of hidden securitisations in riskifications
which also have their dangers.
Despite these somewhat ambiguous propositions, at the diagnostic and prognostic level
there are significant differences between risk- and danger-centred discourses. Yet, it is
important to recognise that “the goal of risk-based measures is not to eradicate the risk
completely but to manage and govern it, and to contain it at a tolerable level” (Diez et al. 2016:
ch.2, 2.5). The normative question that arises here is: ‘tolerable for whom?’ This has mainly to
do with the difference between industrialised countries (dominant in climate security debates
and connected to mitigation and adaptation) and developing countries (mostly seen as
endangered but very much neglected from a western perspective in terms of mitigation).
When assessing the different levels of referent objects, some remarks can be made by
questioning if some are normatively more preferable. On the territorial level, climate
securitisation in terms of national security conceptions and conflicts between states or groups
can be highly problematic. In a positive way, the discourse helps to bring climate change on the
agenda of coalitions that would normally not have taken climate change seriously, such as the
UN Security Council or the NATO. However, it can also distract the attention from efforts of
climate change mitigation to rather adaptation measures and interferences in countries at risk,
which can ultimately take the form of military intervention (ibid.; Hartmann 2010: 241). But in
the end, it depends on the time and the context whether a territorial securitisation can have
positive or negative consequences (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5).
29
The individual level seems to be more suitable for climate security discourses, since the
pitfalls of the territorial level can be avoided (Detraz & Betsill 2009: 307). In a positive way, the
individual discourse focuses on the people who are most vulnerable to climate change and
stays away from national security conceptions based on the traditional state-centred security
logic. Nevertheless, individual securitisation has the danger that the ones seen as vulnerable
are becoming the ones who are dangerous themselves. For instance, when climate change
threatens poor populations in developing unstable countries in their human security, it
becomes easy for securitising actors to make a dangerous territorial argument. This argument
can focus on failing states, terrorism and large-scale migration movements, which in turn can
lead to concerns of national security for industrialised countries (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5).
The discourse of the planetary level can be perceived as the least problematic, because
it underlines the interdependency of the whole international community and its surrounding
ecosystem. It calls for the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) and for sustainable measures
in economic activity. However, the planetary approach might be too weak to produce a policy
output that can be considered as successful, and has difficulties in producing the same degree
of attention compared to arguments with a clearer referent object. Moreover, the discourse
has a thin line with the ambiguous framing of climate change in the past and can therefore be
dismissed as unworldly and naïve. The Kyoto Protocol which aims at a reduction of GHG
emissions and its doubtful success is an example of this discourse (ibid.).
30
4. The United States and Germany: Territorial versus individual climate security
This chapter will elaborate on the dominant climate security discourses within the US and
Germany. While the US constructs climate change as a territorial danger, in Germany are
individual framings dominant. In both cases, the relationship between the member country and
the NATO is briefly explained, followed by an elaboration on the general climate debate, the
securitisation of climate change and the main actors in the debate, the political consequences
and a short conclusion. This chapter is based on secondary sources, in which the book of Diez
et al. (2016) is used as the main source and guide for further research of the cases of the
Netherlands and the NATO.
4.1. The United States: Climate change as a territorial danger
4.1.1. The United States and the NATO
Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the US has been a leading country of the
NATO. The current US defence expenditures are twice as much as European expenditures and
count for 70 percent of the total NATO expenditures (Elshout & Koelé 2016: 10-11). From a
purely military perspective, one can say the US is capable of independent military action and
therefore does not need its European allies (Erdmann 2013). However, the need and value of
the NATO has been firmly established within the national strategy and army doctrine of the US
for years (Schmidt 1994). The NATO serves not only as an important source of stability and
economic prosperity, but NATO allies also contribute in a fundamental way to the legitimacy of
American foreign policy. Furthermore, in a world which is increasingly dominated by different
power blocks such as Russia and China, the alliance forms a powerful basis of mutual
democratic values and economic interests (Erdmann 2013; De Rave 2016).
4.1.2. The general climate debate
The US is usually seen as a stumbling block to an international treaty in which the reduction of
GHG emissions is presented. The country is by far the largest contributor of emissions in history
with 339,174 metric tons or 28 percent between 1850 and 2007 (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.1).
Although China has now surpassed the rate of US emissions, the US can still be seen as one of
31
the largest emitters per capita (World Bank 2013). “The high emissions output and the slow
adoption of meaningful federal climate legislation or international commitments have led to
the US ranking in the lower regions of most international climate policy tables” (Diez et al. 2016:
ch.3, 3.1).
Although the overall climate performance of the US can be seen as poor, from the late
1960s the environment became a great policy concern in the country. Due to a vigorous
environmental and scientific advocacy community and the implementation of progressive laws,
the US evolved into an environmental forerunner (idem: ch.3, 3.2). After years of political and
public awareness of climate change, in the late 1990s support for firm environmental regulation
increasingly disappeared and more sceptical attitudes towards climate change took over the
domestic political landscape (Grundmann & Scott 2014: 222). This trend consolidated during
the presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009). Increasing opposition against environmental
and climate policies came from both Congress with anti-environmental Republicans and an
effective non-governmental lobby in which the business community was particularly showing
its stance (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.2).
After Democrat Barack Obama was elected as President in 2009, climate issues made
their entry again in the top of America’s political agenda (Vig 2013: 98-102). Obama argued for
‘a new era of global cooperation on climate change’ and his statements were backed by a
Democratic majority in Congress and more support from the public and even the business
community. However, this optimistic picture was short-lived due to “the failed UNFCCC
negotiations in Copenhagen in late 2009 and the Democrat’s defeat in the Senate in the mid-
term elections of 2010, and later in the House of Representatives” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.2).
In the following years Obama’s attempts to push for climate legislation and invest in renewable
energies did not succeed.
Nevertheless, climate change remained on the agenda, due to the contribution of
domestic advocacy efforts, international pressure, greater media coverage and climate friendly
policies set by individual states such as California. In 2014, reports from the National Climate
Assessment (NCA) and think tank CNA highlighted the seriousness of climate change and its
consequences for US security (ibid.). Although on emission levels the US still performs poorly,
the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) has recently discovered positive signals. Where
in 2015 the CCPI ranked the US on place 46, this changed in 2016 to place 34. This mainly comes
32
from the CCPI policy ranking, in which the US climbed from place 35 to 12 partly due to its
efforts towards international climate negotiations (Germanwatch & CAN 2016).
4.1.3. The securitisation of climate change
Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.3) distinguish the debate on climate security in the US in two phases:
the first phase in the 1980s and 1990s centred around environmental security on a planetary
and individual level, while the second phase from the mid-2000s focused solely on climate
change as a territorial danger. Early arguments in the 1970s on climate security mainly focused
on issues such as food security and sea level rise, which can be categorised in the planetary and
individual level. Although these arguments were overshadowed by the Soviet threat, after the
Cold War non-traditional security issues gained more attention. The lack of a clear enemy gave
room to ‘new discourses of danger’, in which climate change slowly became one of the most
serious environmental security concerns.
Until the 1990s, the general focus on climate change was more international and framed
as a planetary or individual danger in order to claim the need for an international climate
regime. While statements of climate change as a planetary or individual danger were often
conflated with the destruction of the ozone layer and later with global warming, these
articulations gradually became more cautious and were rather described in long-term risks. This
representation led to difficulties in the mobilisation of more support in public and political
circles. Together with the increasing impact of climate sceptics and their campaigns against
binding agreements to combat climate change, the general climate debate as well as the
climate security debate lost prominence in the late 1990s.
After Bush was elected as President in 2001 and the ‘war on terror’ started ensuing from
the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the so called ‘soft’ climate issues were almost
excluded from the US security sector. While funding was cut, executive orders were reversed,
institutions were renamed and important personnel replaced, opposition and dissatisfaction
with Bush’s moves eventually helped the second phase of the climate security debate to
emerge. The appearance of a study in 2003 commissioned by Andrew Marshall, an influential
defence adviser of the US Department of Defence (DOD), marked the beginning of the
territorial danger discourse in the US (ibid.). The report stated in an alarming way that climate
change “should be elevated beyond a scientific debate to a US national security concern”
(Schwartz & Randall 2003: 3).
33
Because this report was in variance with the official stance of the Bush administration
on climate change, it had limited political impact. However, it paved the way for a broad range
of climate security studies which significantly reduced the amount of planetary references.
Climate change increasingly became a topic of US national security and its image from being an
abstract, distant and global environmental concern transformed into an issue with immediate
consequences for US security. Hence, the Bush administration was put under pressure by the
opposition to give climate change considerable political attention. Together with the fourth
assessment report of the ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (IPCC), this created
awareness of climate change and its security implications among the general public and within
military and political circles (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.3).
When Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.4) took a closer look to the climate security discourses
within Congressional debates and think tank reports in the US, they saw 2007 as the year in
which the territorial danger discourse gained prominence. “The most common articulation
presents US national security as threatened by the direct physical and the indirect socio-
economic and political effects of climate change” (ibid.). The installations and training
procedures of the US military were mentioned as mainly threatened by the direct dangers of
climate change. An important CNA report in 2007 depicted climate change as a ‘threat
multiplier’ that could exacerbate instability and conflict in states which were already fragile.
Within this discourse, climate change could not only further destabilise certain regions, but
could also lead to the spread of terrorist ideologies and even nuclear war. In this way, the
connections between climate change and military interventions were easily made (ibid.).
Among influential actors in the US, Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.5) discovered that
environmental NGOs are since the turn of the millennium relatively absent in climate security
discourses. Instead, security think tanks largely influence the debate. This is because in the US
experienced politicians and high-ranked military officers are often employed in these think
tanks. Also, think tanks facilitate the heavy workload of active politicians by providing policy
concepts and talking points. Besides this thin line with the government, think tanks maintain
good connections with the media and with other non-governmental actors. Hence, they are
able to provide cover for government actors who wish to go public with a new and perhaps
provocative view.
Not only institutions, but also individual actors can be discursive entrepreneurs in such
a debate. Actors such as Kurt Campbell, Sherri Goodman, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko actively
34
engaged in reframing climate change as a national security issue. The engagement of the
military in the climate security debate was an important part of their strategy, since the military
enjoys an extremely good reputation in politics and among a large amount of the US public.
Environmental NGOs kept away from the climate security debate, partly because of their lack
of expertise in the security field and partly because they did not want to damage their
environmental and liberal image. Another unusual feature in the second debate in the US was
the lesser involvement of research institutions or scientists, especially in comparison with
Germany. The catchy and policy-oriented language of think tanks received much more
attention, since they construed the complex scientific argumentation into political language
and received great prestige as security experts (ibid.).
4.1.4. Political consequences
According to a think tank expert, “the climate security debate has not scored a goal but has
moved the ball a bit across the field” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.6). Three important political
consequences underlie this debate. First, the climate security discourse enabled politicians,
regardless of their political stance, to speak about climate change without having the fear to be
labelled, and thus bridged the gap between the liberals and the conservatives. Second, climate
change received increased attention and caused the issue to enter the realm of high politics,
which contributed to more initiatives on climate legislation. Furthermore, the debate had a
strong effect on the American defence, security and intelligence sector and its focus changed
from mitigation to adaptation measures (ibid.).
4.1.5. Conclusion
The securitisation of climate change in the US underwent a transformation from an emphasis
on planetary and individual risk in the 1980s and 1990s to a focus on arguments of territorial
danger from the mid-2000s. The security think tanks were highlighted as the most important
actors in the second debate, since their national security conceptions gained incredible
attention within policy circles and among the wider public and because of the strong reputation
of the military. The predominant territorial danger discourse particularly affected the security
and defence sector and tended to a political approach of adaptation.
35
4.2. Germany: Climate change as an individual insecurity
4.2.1. Germany and the NATO
West Germany became a member of the NATO in 1955, when its status as an occupied country
came to an end. With Germany’s reunification in 1990, the “former German Democratic
Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in its membership of NATO” (NATO 2016c).
Germany’s membership played an important role in NATO’s enlargement with the inclusion of
Central and Eastern European democracies (NATO 2016d). In line with its foreign policy
consensus as a ‘civilian power’ after the Second World War, Germany has long maintained a
restrained approach towards military involvement. In the alliance it depended on US leadership
in the fields of military policy and ‘hard power’ (Overhaus 2004: 551; Carstensen 2016).
Germany spent in 2015 1,18 percent of its GDP on the military, which is under the 2 percent
norm of the NATO and even less than its expenditures in 2014 (NATO 2016e). However,
Germany recently committed to enhance its military role in the NATO, partly as a consequence
of the unease about Russian assertiveness (Carstensen 2016).
4.2.2. The general climate debate
While the US is depicted as the fallen forerunner in climate policies, Germany is a significantly
different case and rather seen as a forerunner, though an ambivalent one. “Germany has been
a consistent advocate of binding international climate agreements, passed various rounds of
legislation to curb CO2 emissions and reduced emissions to a considerably higher extent than
many other countries” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.1). The country managed to decrease its
emissions by 26 percent between 1990 and 2012, and thus performed better than its original
reduction aims of 21 percent set in Kyoto. In this way Germany helped to accomplish the
reduction targets of the European Union (EU) (Werland 2012: 55). Accordingly, with a 22nd
place, Germany takes a high position in the CCPI (Germanwatch & CAN 2016).
However, during the 1950s and 1960s Germany’s rapidly growing economy led to
perceptible environmental pollution and the country lagged far behind on environmental
protection. In this time, the US introduced new environmental policies. Together with the UN
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 held in Stockholm, this provided an important
drive for German environmentalism. Reports such as the ‘Limits to Growth’ developed by the
Club of Rome and the UN Brundtland report strongly influenced the German environmental
36
debate (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2). Such political occurrences resulted in growing
environmental awareness among the German public, which subsequently demanded
appropriate government response (Feindt 2002; Roth & Rucht 2008). In the 1970s and 1980s
various movements contributed to the formation of actors such as as the Green Party and
Greenpeace Germany, which led to more changes in policy and government institutions (Diez
et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2).
Scholars have recognised, with the ambivalences of Germany’s policies in mind, that its
position toward climate protection can best be characterised by extremes. Krück et al. (1998:
2) argue that from the late 1970s the country transformed from a laggard to a leader ‘almost
overnight’. Core concepts such as ‘sustainable development’ and ‘ecological modernisation’
began to prevail over the ‘limits to growth’ model and materialised in policies. After Germany’s
reunification in 1990, environmental issues became inferior to other political issues, such as
social and economic concerns. However, with its reputation as a civilian power, Germany
carried on in supporting international efforts to tackle climate change. In 1998, a new coalition
government between Greens and Social Democrats overcame the relative stagnation in climate
policymaking. The coalition initiated a program of ecological modernisation, which led to a big
progression in Germany’s energy and environmental policies (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2).
After a new coalition government (CDU/CSU-SPD) was elected in 2005 with Angela
Merkel as chancellor, Merkel decisively continued to support Germany’s role of international
leadership in climate policies (ibid.). However, the ambivalence of its policies is still present.
Despite the significant cuts in emissions and investments in renewable energy, it is unlikely that
Germany will meet its own CO2 reduction target in 2020. The decrease in emissions has slowed
down remarkably since 2000, and between 2011 and 2013 carbon emissions even rose (Clean
Energy Wire 2015; Burck et al. 2012: 5). Also, some contradictory developments played a role,
such as the withdrawal from the production of nuclear energy which actually led to an increase
in the importance of coal (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.1). However, a few days before the
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris of the UNFCCC, environmental minister Hendricks
started to advocate for the phase out of coal until 2035/2040. It is expected that this will
influence the environmental future of Germany (Germanwatch & CAN 2016).
37
4.2.3. The securitisation of climate change
Since the emergence of the first debates on environmental security in the 1970s, discourses of
individual danger and risk together with planetary framings of security have been dominant.
Because of its Nazi past, the German military has suffered from a bad reputation and has been
a topic of contestation among the general public. Together with a long-established
environmental concern, an influential Green Party, a strong scientific community as well as an
active civil society sector, this has resulted in a context in which, in contrast to the US, the
discourse on territorial danger has not flourished (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.1).
Diez et al. (2016: ch.4, 4.3) separate the climate security discourse in Germany in two
periods. The first phase of climate security discourses started from the 1970s and lasted until
the mid-1990s. These discourses were characterised by “the depletion of the ozone layer, the
‘Limits to Growth’ debate, and the invocation of a ‘climate catastrophe’” (ibid.). Particularly,
the debate called for the need of behavioural change in order to save human society from
environmental dangers. From the 1980s, the securitisation of climate change functioned as an
agenda-setter and resulted in advanced policies to decrease carbon emissions. Although these
policies were equivocal, such a trajectory in a firmly industrialised country with a powerful car
industry showed the success of securitisation.
In the course of the climate security debate, parliamentarians and scientists increasingly
used the narrative of ‘climate catastrophe’. Although not everybody believed in these dramatic
framings, the call from scientists to create governmental research groups was immediately
heard. In 1987, the ‘Enquete Commission for Preparation for the Protection of the Atmosphere’
was established in order to investigate the status of the atmosphere and to propose protection
measures in national or international contexts (ibid.). The commission, which consisted of nine
parliamentarians and nine scientific experts, indicated the strong influence of science in the
German debate on climate change (Altenhof 2002). Largely due to the commission’s work,
political attention for climate change increased and reached its peak with the first COP of the
UNFCCC in 1995 in Berlin.
Although the second phase was still characterised by framings of individual danger
which were occasionally combined with planetary articulations, the narrative of global warming
came much more into focus. In the early 2000s new discursive entrepreneurs appeared. The
security think tank Adelphi emerged as one of the most import actors. “The securitisation of
climate change in Germany is a consequence of the voices of a multitude of actors and
38
coalitions from different sectors such as science, civil society, bureaucracy, government and
the media” (Diez et al. 2016: ch4, 4.4). The German debate is much more predicated upon
scientific findings and the international climate debate with references to for instance the IPCC
and the World Bank, when compared to the US. Due to its broad basis in society, individual
entrepreneurs such as in the US case were not that visible (idem: ch.4, 4.3).
After the discouraging Copenhagen Summit in 2009, a change in discourses occurred
when most actors in science and civil society stopped in articulating ‘horror scenarios’ in order
to achieve policy change. Instead, various discursive entrepreneurs started to aspire the
promotion of a certain ‘good global citizen’ stance (ibid.). This attitude actually fitted “into a
broader discourse of guilt in German political culture after the Second World War” (Berger
2012). This is in line with Germany as a ‘civilian power’ whose foreign and security policy is
often depicted as peaceful and restrained. Individual and planetary risk articulations are most
appropriate in this context, which leave no room for emergency measures and the inclusion of
the armed forces in climate policy (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.3).
4.2.4. Political consequences
The Federal Foreign Office is seen as the main authority to address climate change in Germany,
whereby development policy and preventive security are regarded as most important in
avoiding an increase of the dangers and risks connected to climate change. Securitisation in
Germany achieved great political attention for climate change, combined with framings of the
‘climate catastrophe’ Germany continued to set high emission reduction targets. The German
debate has not only influenced the domestic energy politics (retraction of nuclear energy and
great investments in renewable energy), but also affected foreign and development policy. In
contrast, the effects on military planning were limited since the German Federal Armed Forces
have only published two reports on the security threat of climate change until now. The
increased framings in terms of individual and planetary risk led the German government to
involve the insurance industry into the climate security debate, by supporting the creation of
certain finance mechanisms that cover “the increased risks of 500 million individuals through
climate change by 2020” (Diez et al. 2016: ch4, 4.5).
39
4.2.5. Conclusion
The German climate security discourse consisted of individual, and to a lesser extent, planetary
articulations. From the mid-1990s, individual risk has been specifically dominant, but
articulations often mixed risk and danger together. A multitude of discursive entrepreneurs
played a role in the securitisation process, in which scientific organisations and NGOs have been
incredibly influential compared to the US. Furthermore, the historically tarnished status of the
military resulted in the relative absence of territorial discourses and thus a very limited role for
the military in the climate security debate. Instead, Germany focused on developmental
policies by helping developing countries with sustainable development and climate adaptation,
as well as the economic opportunities that come from a reorientation towards climate
adaptation and mitigation policies.
4.3. Conclusion: The United States and Germany: Territorial versus individual
climate security
The climate security discourse in Germany opposes the securitisation of climate change in the
US. While the US mainly draws on the territorial danger discourse in especially the second
phase, in Germany individual security, with a focus on risk, prevailed. In Germany, a great
diversity of discursive entrepreneurs was involved in the climate security debate. After the
Second World War, Germany’s image as a civilian power resulted in a strong influence of NGOs
and scientific organisations. Its military suffered from a bad reputation, which prevented the
emergence of a territorial discourse. In contrast, the powerful reputation of the US army and
the dominance of security think tanks (represented by politicians and military officers) in the
US climate security debate, created the perception of climate change as a danger to national
security. When comparing the performance on combating climate change, the US is running
far behind Germany. The countries differ strongly on the output of GHG emissions as well as
the implementation of climate policies and the commitment to international agreements.
40
5. The Netherlands: Climate change as a planetary insecurity
5.1. Introduction
The Netherlands is connected to climate change in a unique way. A few facts about this country,
where 26 percent of its land surface is below sea level and 59 percent is prone to river flooding,
reveal that an expected sea level rise critically threatens the nation (PBL 2008). The Netherlands
perceives itself as part of a global whole where all humans are interdependent and must share
solutions. This social identity strongly influences the country’s actions (Pettenger 2007: 68).
Although the domestic unrest in the early 2000s negatively affected the Dutch climate agenda
and the struggle with reducing its GHG emissions continues (idem: 63), the Netherlands
currently seems to strive again for global leadership in climate policies (idem: 51).
The Dutch climate security discourse connects to its identity; climate change is mainly
framed as a planetary or individual risk. The country recently committed to the EU’s request to
develop a comprehensive climate change adaptation strategy, which will be announced in
2016. Together with plans to integrate climate change into security policy, the Netherlands has
a chance to better its position on the CCPI. Due to the limited success in the reduction of
emissions, the country is ranked at place 35 (compared to place 40 in 2015), which is just behind
the US (place 34) and far behind Germany (place 22) (Germanwatch & CAN 2016).
In this chapter, the relationship between the Netherlands and the NATO is briefly
described, followed by an elaboration on the general climate debate, the securitisation of
climate change, the political consequences and a short conclusion. The analysis of the Dutch
climate debate is largely based on the work of Pettenger (2007). In this book, called ‘The Social
Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses’, she dedicates a
chapter to the formation of climate change policy in the Netherlands from the 1980s (idem:
13). This source is used in order to explain the general development of the Dutch climate
debate, and because it provides a good structure for a discourse analysis of securitisation. For
this analysis, publications of relevant actors in the climate debate are used, ranging from Dutch
ministries, (government) research institutions, think tanks and discursive entrepreneurs.
41
5.2. The Netherlands and the NATO
The Netherlands is one of the founders of the NATO and considers the alliance as the keystone
of its security policies. The small country acknowledges that it is not able to guarantee its own
safety. Therefore, it strives for intensive military cooperation with similar states and a strong
European Union (WRR 2010: 9; Dutch Ministry of Defence 2013: 8). Recently, the NATO
criticised the Dutch armed forces for their insufficient capabilities and contribution to NATO
forces. Through the ‘NATO Defence Planning Capability Review’ (DPCR), the NATO expressed
its concerns about the Dutch defence budget and the readiness of the armed forces. European
NATO members spend on average 1,43 percent of their GDP on defence. The Netherlands is
with 1,14 percent far below average (De Volkskrant 2016). Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-
Plasschaert stated that until now, the defence budget is increased with half a billion euros and
that improvements are being made, although it will take multiple years to make the Dutch
armed forces sufficiently capable again (Radio Een Vandaag 2016).
5.3. The general climate debate
A culmination of several processes contributed in the late 1960s to a growing environmental
concern among the Dutch public. Although the rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s
had led to higher material living standards than before, it also started to raise doubts among
an increasing number of people about the immaterial quality of life (Cramer 1989: 103). In the
early 1970s, as in Germany, public concern in the Netherlands was further evoked through the
report of the ‘Limits to Growth’ issued by the Club of Rome and the UN Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm (ibid.; Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.2). Most Dutch political parties
started to recognise environmental issues such as pollution and environmental degradation.
This resulted in the legislation of various environmental laws and regulations and the
establishment of a special department in 1971, which is currently called the ‘National Institute
of Public Health and the Environment’ (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu - RIVM)
(Cramer 1989: 103).
In 1972, the Dutch government provided for the first time a proper overview of Dutch
environmental policy in the ‘Urgence Memorandum on the Environment’ (‘Urgentienota
Milieuhygiëne’) (VROM 2001). In this period, a large amount of environmental action groups
was created in order to influence government policy or mobilise the public, such as the ‘Dutch
Society for the Preservation of the Waddensea’ (Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de
42
Waddenzee) in 1965 and the ‘Environmental Defence League’ (Vereniging Milieudefensie) in
1972 (Cramer 1989: 103-105). However, the socio-economic stagnation that set in after the oil
crisis in 1973 had a clear impact on Dutch society. A growing unemployment rate combined
with a government confronted with a shrinking income from taxes and increasing social welfare
expenditures, led to a further economic slowdown. This changed the idealistic mentality of
people towards the environment, and political concern and response decreased (idem: 107-
108; Dijkink & Van der Wusten 1992: 7).
In the late 1980s the publication of two documents had a significant impact on
environmental consciousness and policymaking in the Netherlands. The first document was the
Brundtland Report published by the UN in 1987, which introduced the concept of ‘sustainable
development’. In 1988, the second document was produced by the RIVM called the ‘Concern
for Tormorrow’ (‘Zorgen voor Morgen’) (Pettenger 2007: 55). This report provided the first
national outlook in which an alarming prediction was made about future environmental
problems. Furthermore, the publication marked the beginning of nature and environmental
planning which was first executed by the RIVM and is currently done by the ‘Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency’ (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving – PBL). The impact
of the two reports, together with severe weather events in the late 1980s, led to the formation
of the first ‘National Environmental Policy Plan’ in 1989 (Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan – NMP1)
(ibid.; RIVM 2013). The NMP1 serves as an ambitious and comprehensive plan which is created
to guide policymaking in the future. The plan did not only show the leading role of the Dutch
government in defining and addressing environmental degradation (top-down perspective),
but was also in itself a global pioneering expression of environmental policy and even served as
a source of inspiration for other states and organisations, such as the EU. Since its adoption,
“the national plans have served as guides for all subsequent governmental policies and laws,
and precipitated five major changes2 in political perspective” (Pettenger 2007: 56-58).
Scientific information plays an important role in the rise of Dutch environmental
consciousness and self-awareness of the country’s own contribution to climate change (idem:
60). The reports of the IPCC are seen as the most fundamental sources of knowledge about
climate change. Both the ‘Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute’ (Koninklijk Nederlands
Meteorologisch Instituut – KNMI) and the PBL use IPCC reports (PBL & KNMI 2015). While the
2 Due to the length of this chapter, these changes will only partly be discussed. Many of the principles initiated in NMP1 were maintained and strengthened through subsequent versions of the NMP (Pettenger 2007: 58).
43
Dutch recognise their responsibility in this debate, this acknowledgement is challenged by the
material realities of its GHG emissions and its energy-intensive developed society. Compared
with other European states, the Netherlands produces a significant amount of GHG emissions
per capita and even saw this level increasing in the period between 1990 and 2000.
Consequently, the country reconsidered its goals and policies around the reduction of
emissions to set a more realistic timetable (Pettenger 2007: 60-61).
In 1998, the Netherlands joined the EU to sign the Kyoto Protocol. In 1999 and 2000 it
produced documents considering domestic and international climate measures: Part I and
respectively Part II of the ‘Climate Policy Implementation Plan’. The Dutch government
encouraged these measures globally by hosting the COP6 in The Hague in 2000. However, the
optimism of the government and the Dutch citizens “about a multilateral approach to climate
change was severely wounded when the meeting failed to come to agreement on measures to
meet the Kyoto Protocol Goals” (idem: 61). The subsequent meeting in Bonn also failed because
of the withdrawal of the US and its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. Although the newly
published NMP4 in 2001 showed the Dutch conviction to progressively reduce its emissions in
an international and EU-based response, this optimism quickly faded when Dutch politics and
society started to experience a transition (ibid.; VROM 2001: 33).
The elections in 2002 combined with several disturbing events disrupted the generally
stable flow of politics in the country and reduced the citizen’s trust in the democratic
government (Pettenger 2007: 63; Hendriks et al. 2012: 133). Ten days before the elections on
6 May 2002, Pim Fortuyn, popular leader of the extreme right party ‘Lijst Pim Fortuyn’ (LPF),
was murdered by a white man who was supposed to be a green activist (Pennings & Keman
2002: 4). A week after the assassination, LPF Chairman Peter Langendam stated: “the bullet
came from Left” (Halsema 2016: 102). He blamed the leftist parties - Fortuyn’s political
opponents - for the incitement of hatred and specifically proclaimed environmental party
‘Green Left’ (‘GroenLinks’) as responsible for the violence. Gradually, murderer Volkert van der
Graaf was identified by Fortuyn’s heirs and the public as someone who belonged to GroenLinks.
While in fact he did not have any ties with the party, GroenLinks’ reputation transformed from
“a welcome opposition party to an undesirable political player” (idem: 114).
The hatred against GroenLinks and leftist parties in general caused the Dutch population
to lose interest in the issue of climate change. In 2004, the already nervous Dutch were again
startled by the assassination of film director Theo van Gogh, carried out by an Islamic extremist.
44
Since Van Gogh was a good friend of Fortuyn and had similar populist ideas, his murder drew
the focus of the national debate to issues of migration and terrorism (Pettenger 2007: 63;
Halsema 2016: 107). Concurrently, progressive environmental policy decreased with the
election of a more conservative government. “As the State Secretary for the Environment,
Pieter van Geel said: ‘It is nostalgia to profile the Netherlands as the leader it might once have
been in the area of environmental issues’” (Pettenger 2007: 64).
However, from 2004 the Netherlands started to reinvent its climate policies and
attempted to retake its role as European environmental leader. It placed great importance on
the EU to promote its climate policies. With the ‘Climate Policy Evaluation Memorandum 2005:
On the way to Kyoto’ (‘Evaluatienota Klimaatbeleid 2005: Onderweg naar Kyoto’), climate
change officially returned on the Dutch policy agenda (idem: 64-67). In 2007, the Dutch
government established the ‘Second State Delta Committee’ with the impetuous storm surge
of 1953 in mind. The committee provided advice on the protection of the Netherlands against
the expected effects of climate change, such as more rainfall and sea level rise (Verduijn et al.
2012: 469). The suggestions had several policy results, such as the ‘Delta Program’ in which
important steps were being taken to make the country more climate proof.
Following the request from the European Commission (EC) to all member states to
propose a comprehensive climate adaptation strategy by 2017, the Dutch government
announced the ‘National Adaptation Strategy’ (NAS) for 2016. Where the Delta Program
focuses on water-related themes, the NAS focuses on all sectors that will feel the impact of
climate change, such as agriculture, energy and infrastructure. Furthermore, the consequences
of global climatic effects for the Netherlands will be described (Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke
Adaptatie 2016). This global view is further reflected in the ‘Planetary Security Conference’,
which was hosted by the Netherlands in The Hague in November 2015. The initiative of Bert
Koenders, Minister of Foreign Affairs, provides an international platform for the discussion of
the impacts of climate change on security (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015: 5).
5.4. The securitisation of climate change
The development of the Dutch environmental policies in general can be typified by a shift in
focus from direct and subsequent action to prevention and planning (VROM 2001: 20). The
environmentalist movement which rapidly expanded from the late 1960s carried out a
cosmological worldview in which “they opposed developments that visibly attacked the
45
‘organic foundations of the life-world’” (Cramer 1989: 101-102). In this period, a planetary
danger discourse prevailed and led, through the publication of documents such as the ‘Limits
to Growth’ report, to further public and political concern (idem: 103). After a period of socio-
economic stagnation in the Netherlands and decreasing attention for the environment, the
Brundtland Report (1987) and the Dutch RIVM document ‘Zorgen voor Morgen’ (1988) raised
new environmental awareness (Pettenger 2007: 55).
Since the Brundtland Report introduced the concept of sustainable development, it has
become one of the primary norms in climate change policy in the Netherlands. The Dutch
define this norm as “economic development that places equal emphasis on the economy and
the environment, and as requiring economic, political, and social processes to be changed
today to avoid passing pollution problems to future generations” (idem: 52). The norms of
‘Stewardship’, ‘Equity’, the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ and the ‘Precautionary Principle’ embody
the Dutch definition of sustainable development (ibid.). These principles can be found in the
RIVM report, which was produced in order to explore the long-term environmental
consequences for the Netherlands in a global context (RIVM 1988: 8). It signifies the growing
need for a risk-based approach, while framing climate change as a planetary issue:
“As environmental issues are becoming more widespread, a global and structural preventive approach is urgently
necessary. Climate change and ozone depletion can cause globally significant risks for the environment and public
health and can have extensive damaging consequences. This means that the current generation is expected to let
the long-term benefits of measures outweigh the costs that will be incurred in the coming decades” (idem: 28).
The year of 1989 is seen as the year that environmental consciousness reached its highest
point, in which the Dutch government emerged as the leading actor in addressing
environmental degradation (Pettenger 2007: 57). The emergence of green parties and pressure
groups and the general greening of politics occurred more or less at the same time (Dijkink &
Van der Wusten 1992: 10). In her Christmas message, Queen Beatrix called for a Dutch
response in terms of a planetary danger:
“The earth is slowly dying… We human beings ourselves have become a threat to the planet. Those who no longer
wish to disregard the insidious pollution and depredation of the environment are driven to despair” (Pettenger
2007: 57).
46
The publication of the NMP1 in that same year, urgently titled ‘Choose or Lose’ (‘Kiezen of
Verliezen’), marked the beginning of a significant transformation in Dutch environmental policy
(ibid.). The report resulted from joint policymaking between the former ‘Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and Environmental management’ (‘Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en
Milieubeheer’ – VROM) and four other ministries, which showed the need for coordination of
environmental planning in overlapping policy fields (idem: 56). The publication focused on the
so-called ‘approach to risk’, in which a remarkable attempt was made in making risks
quantifiable and which laid the groundwork for environmental effect-oriented policies (VROM
1989).
“The approach to risk should help to ensure that risks regarding its nature and scope become clearer and better
comparable, also for the population. Too often, only the undesirable effects are taken into account, while the
chance of the occurrence of these effects is neglected” (idem: 12).
In this period, climate change was variously depicted as a planetary danger or risk, though the
NMP1 showed the increasing dominance of the planetary risk discourse (VROM 2001: 20):
“The international acceptance of the Dutch strategy will further be promoted. Agreement on policies and policy
principles at the international level reinforces the Dutch policy and promotes the control of transboundary risks.
This strategy represents a new challenge for a renewed effort to promote the safety and thus to harmonize human
activity and the environment, the ecological suitability” (VROM 1989: 27).
In 2001, the fourth version of the NMP, the NMP4 titled ‘One World and One Will: Working on
Sustainable Development’ (‘Een Wereld en een Wil: Werken aan Duurzaamheid’) came out
(VROM 2001). The publication presented a broader and more future-oriented vision, in which
seven environmental problems were discussed that international society faces over the period
to 2030. The report shows the continuation of the planetary discourse in the Netherlands,
combined with articulations on the individual level:
“Climate change threatens the security and health of people in many different ways, as well as the stability,
diversity and survival of natural ecosystems” (VROM 2001: 49).
While this quotation tends towards the threatification of climate change, the overall document
fits more in a discourse of risk, referring to scenario planning and the credible establishment of
47
the Precautionary Principle (VROM 2001; Pettenger 2007: 62). However, the Dutch
environmental conviction was still very much in tension with the well-established norm of
Economic Efficiency and its merchant identity. Moreover, the NMP4 was published during a
time of Dutch political transition and economic recession, which eventually did not prove very
successful. The country was incapable to meet its goal of a 3 percent reduction in GHG
emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 and the Dutch mind was quite damaged after the failures of
the COP6 and the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. These developments led to a loss of
interest in climate change among the Dutch public (Pettenger 2007: 63-64).
A few years later, the Climate Policy Evaluation Memorandum 2005 was published and
marked a return of climate change on the Dutch policy agenda (idem: 67). The report showed
the increased attention for climate adaptation next to mitigation, and argued that more
attention needed to be drawn to risks of flooding and other effects of climate change in future
spatial policy (VROM 2005: 31-32):
“In the Netherlands, adaptation has recently been given a higher place on the political agenda. The Netherlands
is most vulnerable to climate change impacts on water and adaptation in this area is obviously the most
developed” (idem 31).
Subsequently, in 2008, the Second State Delta Committee announced suggestions on how to
defend the country against the water-related impacts of climate change. Although no real crisis
occurred, “the committee managed to create awareness and set the agenda for climate
adaptation policy and the issue of safety in Dutch water management” (Verduijn et al. 2012:
469). It succeeded by using several framing strategies, in which it used the story of the Dutch
delta identity, generated a sense of collectiveness and urgency, and created a crisis narrative
(ibid.).
“Our Committee’s mandate is therefore unusual: we have been asked to come up with recommendations, not because a disaster has occurred, but rather to avoid one” (Veerman 2008: 7).
This quotation marks the riskification of climate change, because the committee acknowledges
the undeniable and uncertain consequences of climate change and stresses the need for flood
risk management (Verduijn et al. 2012: 476). Although the report unites the Netherlands as a
48
(territorial) risk area, the articulations of risk refer to human security and place the Netherlands
within the global community. Hence the speech acts are individual and planetary.
In July 2008, former Dutch Minister of Defence Eimert van Middelkoop requested
advice at the AIV on the “likely implications of climate change for the international security
situation over the next twenty years”, as well as the implications for the international role of
the Dutch armed forces. This report, called ‘Climate Change and Security’, was one of over forty
research requests from the Ministry of Defence, which would all be used for drawing a future
plan for the Dutch military (AIV 2009: 3). This highlights the growing awareness that also the
military was no longer able to neglect the possible impacts of climate change as a ‘threat
multiplier’. The AIV report refers to reports from the IPCC, KNMI and the EU, as well as papers
that consider the need for climate mitigation and adaptation (AIV 2008) and the proposition of
a proactive approach to risks (WRR 2008).
The identification of climate change as a potential security threat is in Dutch public
documents largely limited to the inclusion of climate change in analyses concerning the
changing security environment. However, increasing consideration has been given to
anticipation on climate risks, such as disaster risk reduction (Van Schaik et al. 2015: 35). The
‘International Security Strategy’ of 2013 acknowledges climate change as a ‘new’ issue that
increasingly dictates the international security agenda (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).
In 2010, climate change has been included in the Defence report ‘Explorations: Guidance for
the Armed Forces of the Future’ (‘Verkenningen: Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de
Toekomst’). It identifies climate change as one of the eight driving forces of possible insecurity
for the Netherlands and discusses the future role of the Dutch armed forces (Dutch Ministry of
Defence 2010). The report addresses the need for climate proof defence materials and
versatility of the military in for instance natural disasters, abroad but also inland:
“Sea level rise may threaten towns in the coastal regions of the Netherlands, as well as the supporting
infrastructure of port facilities and oil refineries. Reliance on the armed forces for assistance can arise in case of
flooding” (Dutch Ministry of Defence 2010: 82).
Van Schaik (2016) argues that the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs seem to consider
climate change as a security threat, but that thus far it has not been specifically operationalised
in security policies. However, the Dutch integrated approach of defence, development and
49
diplomacy offers potential for the integration of climate change into security policy. A first
attempt of this was made in an update of the Dutch international security strategy, in which
framings of planetary risk were dominant (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Van Schaik
et al. 2015: 35-36):
“Problems regarding climate, water and raw materials can cause or exacerbate conflict and should therefore be
part of early warning systems. Building a resilient population in rural and densely populated areas against the
effects of climate change is the challenge for the coming decades and fits within a forward-looking foreign policy.
The Netherlands can take responsibility for a liveable and sustainable world by using its knowledge and expertise
in order to help prevent instability elsewhere” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014: 17).
Subsequently, the Planetary Security Conference was organised by the Dutch government to
create political awareness and involvement for the implementation of an integrated climate
agenda (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). It showed the willingness of the Dutch to play
a leading role (Van Winden 2016). The danger dimension of climate change and the presence
of the military at the conference demonstrated a tendency towards threatification (Van Schaik
2016). However, the risk dimension seems to become more dominant in Dutch climate security
discourses, which is supported by the supporting reports of the forthcoming NAS (PBL 2015a;
PBL 2015b):
“The National Adaptation Strategy could be perceived as a national business case: a project plan with the
objectives of the adaptation strategy, the required investments, the consequences of the possible
implementation, the risk analysis, and a long-term planning” (PBL 2015a: 109).
5.5. Political consequences
The Dutch government can be seen as the leading actor in the climate security discourse, the
role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to become increasingly important. Individual
discursive entrepreneurs hardly played a role in the climate security debate. A growing number
of reports on climate security describe the global effects of climate change on the country,
which shows the planetary level of the Dutch discourse. According to the Dutch, climate change
transcends national boundaries and therefore calls for an international and integrated
approach (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The Dutch approach of defence,
development and diplomacy, for which the country is known internationally, presents a way to
50
integrate climate change in development and security policies (Van Schaik 2014: 36; Van Schaik
2016).
In normative terms, the planetary security discourse can be perceived as the least
problematic of the different levels, because it underlines the interdependency of the
international community and its surrounding ecosystem. At the same time, the planetary
approach has difficulties in producing an adequate degree of attention and does often lead to
weak and unsuccessful policy outputs (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5). This refers to the integration
of climate change in Dutch security policies that thus far has not been specifically developed
(Van Schaik 2016). However, in recent years more sectors have become involved in climate
policy, including the military. The Netherlands took an important step with the organisation of
the Planetary Security Conference, which reflects the Dutch global view and tradition to
maintain the international legal system (Van Winden 2016). Although the climate security
discourse consisted of articulations in terms of danger, the overall development in the
Netherlands can be seen as a move towards a planetary riskification of climate change.
5.6. Conclusion
The climate security discourse in the Netherlands resembles more with the German discourse
on the individual and planetary level than with the dominant territorial security discourse in
the US. In the Netherlands, planetary framings prevail, combined with articulations on the
individual level. This relates to the Dutch recognition that the Netherlands forms part of a global
whole and is largely dependent on other countries in for example trade and the military. The
Dutch discourse from the 1960s until now can generally be typified by a development in which
climate change is increasingly perceived as a risk, in which precaution, scenario planning and
risk reduction are of growing importance. These measures, together with initiatives such as the
Planetary Security Conference, show the growing Dutch commitment and ambition to play a
global leading role on the issue of climate change.
51
6. The NATO: Climate change and territorial defence
6.1. Introduction
Since the NATO first recognised the environment as a security issue in 1969, the alliance has an
ambivalent vision on climate change (Risso 2016: 3). Especially since the end of the Cold War,
the alliance has continuously confirmed its broadened approach to security. Although NATO
has increasingly announced its commitment to address climate change, its mandate and
policies concerning the issue remain vague and largely undecided (Korteweg & Podkolinkski
2009: 59). This can be explained by the fact that NATO is a community of many different states
in which a common ground for climate change is hard to reach. Another explanation is the
traditional military identity of the alliance, which is struggling with its own commitment to a
broader non-traditional approach to security (Van der Zeijden 2016).
Hence, the dominant climate security discourse is strongly connected to NATO’s original
mission: the collective defence of its own territory. Although the alliance recognises climate
change as a threat-multiplier, articulations about the connection between climate change and
security are often centred on clear threats to its security environment such as instability,
conflict and migration (NATO/CCMS 1995: 38). It therefore largely constructs climate change
as a territorial danger. Despite this expressed urgency, climate change has since Russia’s
annexation of Crimea been largely overshadowed by the immediate military threat of Russia
(NATO 2014; De Rave 2016; Van der Zeijden 2016). As shown in this chapter, this recent
reorientation of NATO and its members does not mean that its attention for climate change
has disappeared, but it indicates NATO’s struggle with this amorphous problem.
In this chapter, NATO’s history is briefly described, followed by an elaboration on the
alliance’s securitisation of climate change, the political consequences and a short conclusion.
This chapter is based on the analysis of internal documents published by NATO, such as
Strategic Concepts, research reports, speeches and press statements, as well as documents
about NATO from external actors.
6.2. A short history of the NATO
The NATO was created as part of a broader attempt to serve three purposes: “deterring Soviet
expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North
American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration” (NATO
52
2015a). On 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by twelve states
from North-America and Europe; Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Canada and the US. The members agreed
on the united efforts for collective military defence and the maintenance of peace and security.
Article 5 is considered as the most important part of the treaty, in which the NATO members
agreed on the mutual defence in case of an armed attack by any external party against one or
more of the members (NATO 1949).
Given the accomplishment of NATO’s primary mission with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, fundamental questions about whether the alliance is still necessary or relevant have
emerged (Weinrod 2012: 1). Furthermore, in the fields of International Relations and Security
Studies, the politico-strategic identity and actions of the NATO are among the topics which
received the most controversy. NATO’s evolution in the past decennia, concerning the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 attest to the ongoing
demand for a comprehensive and clear understanding of NATO’s role. After 1989 the NATO
started a process of reorientation which had approximately two consequences (Ciut 2002: 35;
De Rave 2016).
Alongside NATO’s traditional role concerning the territorial defence of its members, the
alliance started to conduct so-called ‘out-of-area’ operations in order to create security at a
distance. These operations were often connected to new security-related issues such as cyber
defence, counterpiracy, counterterrorism, missile defence, energy security and climate change.
This development runs parallel with the reorientation of several national armed forces,
including the Dutch and German armed forces. Cuts in military expenditures (referred to as the
‘peace dividend’) and the creation of mobility were important factors in this development,
whereby the heavy military means were partly or completely replaced by lighter versions that
were more suitable for out-of-area operations in for instance Afghanistan (Weinrod 2012: 1;
De Rave 2016).
Since its establishment, membership of the NATO has increased from 12 to 28
countries. Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Georgia as partner
countries have declared the ambition to NATO membership (NATO 2015b). In recent years the
alliance also developed security and politically based partnerships with a significant amount of
nations in Europe, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, as well as with international
organisations such as the African Union, the UN, and the World Bank (Weinrod 2012: 1). The
53
NATO also established bilateral structured relationships with Russia and Ukraine, but since the
Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation with Russia has been suspended while cooperation with
Ukraine has been intensified (idem; NATO 2016a; NATO 2016b).
Furthermore, Russia’s annexation in Ukraine in 2013, the first annexation since the
Second World War, can be seen as a wake-up call for the NATO. It caused the member countries
to realise that the security environment on the East and the South had changed and that this
required a change in NATO’s strategy. Particularly, the downing of the passenger flight MH17
of Malaysia Airlines caused by the violence in eastern Ukraine, brought the conflict closer to
the allies (NATO 2016a; De Rave 2016). These developments have recently led to a shift which
focuses on the largest reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the Cold War.
Currently, sixteen European member countries have agreed to increase their defence
expenditures.
The changing security environment on NATO’s borders was the central theme of the
NATO summit on 8 and 9 July 2016 in Warsaw. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg presented
the alliance’s attitude towards Russia in the words ‘defence’, ‘deterrence’ and ‘dialogue’. He
announced that NATO’s focus will be on the collective defence of its territory: “We have to
adapt to a world which has by all means become more dangerous” (Elshout & Koelé 2016).
6.3. The securitisation of climate change
The NATO recognised security challenges related to the natural environment for the first time
in 1969, when it initiated the ‘Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society’ (CCMS).
Together with the Science Committee, the CCMS was launched in order to become a key
component of NATO’s ‘third dimension’, in addition to its military and political dimensions. The
swift pace of industrialisation and economic transformations resulted in the fact that all NATO-
countries had to face air and water pollution, industrial waste problems and urbanisation. In
this time, criticism increased among wide sectors of the public about the damaging economic
effects on the environment. The CCMS provided a forum where NATO-members and partner
countries could cooperate and share knowledge on health, social and environmental issues. It
was meant to bring new life to the alliance, both in the engagement with themes far outside its
traditional scope and in the media attention it received to regain public support (NATO/CCMS
1995: 34; Risso 2016: 3-9).
54
The launch of the CCMS was therefore an attempt to respond to the public’s concerns,
as in the US, Germany and the Netherlands. But it also marked a crucial step towards a new
strategic concept of the NATO, in which the label ‘environment’ introduced subjects such as
crisis management and disaster relief. The work of the CCMS could be seen as “an attempt to
redefine the security concept of the alliance and the idea of what constituted a threat. It was a
first tangible sign that the alliance was moving towards a different kind of defence, which was
not only military defence but defence of their populations and their wellbeing.” (Risso 2016:
11). In the end of the 1970s, experts recognised the success of the CCMS in the past years, in
which the general focus seemed to have moved from territorial to individual security with more
focus on risk. Hence, NATO’s redefined discourse on security became more similar to especially
German and Dutch discourses, because of more recognition for an individual and risk-based
approach. But with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by the Soviet Union, NATO’s attention
quickly shifted back to military defence and the CCMS began to suffer from a lack of political
support (idem: 28-29).
After the Cold War with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO’s state
representatives recognised the need for a strategic transformation. The alliance increasingly
identified non-traditional security threats in an enlarged regional and global context, similar to
planetary articulations in the US, German and Dutch discourses, and exemplified in the new
Strategic Concept of 1991 (NATO/CCMS 1995: 38):
“But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance
objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences
from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as
the indispensable defence dimension” (NATO 1991).
This security concept broadened NATO’s mission to cooperation with Eastern countries,
promotion of political stability and democracy, and mitigation of environmental problems.
Following the US DOD, the NATO recognised the link between environmental issues, stability
and conflict (Butts 1993: 6-7).
In occasion of the Plenary Meeting of the NATO in Washington D.C. in 1995, the CCMS
launched a pilot study called ‘Environment and Security in an International Context’. The pilot
study, co-chaired by the US and Germany, presented “the relationship between environmental
change and security at the regional, international, and global levels” (NATO/CCMS 1995: 34). It
55
demonstrated that the NATO was seeking for a solution on how to combine the environment
with security, which tended to a riskification of climate change:
“Its main goal is to elaborate conclusions and recommendations to integrate environmental considerations in
security deliberations and to integrate security considerations in national and international environmental policies
and instruments. These conclusions and recommendations are guided by the principles of sustainable
development and a precautionary approach, emphasizing preventive measures and strategies” (ibid.).
However, the CCMS report actually revealed many articulations which fit into a territorial
danger discourse. The assessment of the links between the environment and security showed
a strong emphasis on conflict and violence. Furthermore, the report indicated the linkage
between the original treaty and the non-traditional threat of the environment, and therefore
demonstrated that the NATO is still connected to the traditional (military) conception of
security:
“With reference to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, any issue can be brought before the Alliance for the
purpose of consultation with other Member States when one Member State perceives the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of the Member States is threatened. This could conceivably include an
environmental issue (NATO/CCMS 1995: 38)”.
In order to anticipate on the further security and political developments since the Strategic
Concept in 1991, NATO state representatives agreed on a new strategy in Washington D.C. on
NATO’s 50th anniversary in 1999. The alliance again highlighted its broad approach to security,
and put more emphasis on taking account of the global context and the importance of
developing an effective cooperation with regional and international institutions, such as the UN
and European institutions. This resulted in a shift of NATO’s discourse from a territorial to a
planetary focus on climate security (NATO 1999).
In that time, the main security challenge of the alliance was located outside its territory,
albeit in its direct neighbourhood; the Balkans. It therefore adopted a policy for the execution
of ‘out of area’ operations, which led the NATO-countries to slowly transform their armed
forces into so called ‘expeditionary’ forces. From the 2000s, the US climate security discourse
slightly started to transform in a territorial danger discourse with the US as driving force of the
global expansion of NATO’s operations, with “ISAF in Afghanistan, the counter-piracy operation
56
in the Gulf of Aden and the Iraq training mission” (Korteweg & Podkolinkski 2009: 6). The
expansion of these ‘out of area’ operations has been the subject of notable friction between
NATO’s members. When considering the role of NATO in responding to climate change, this is
a significant issue “because it is precisely these kinds of operation that are most likely to expand
if NATO is called to intervene in climate-related disaster and conflict zones in the coming
decades” (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 81).
The Strategic Concept of 2010 is the first concept in which the NATO explicitly mentions
climate change as affecting areas of NATO’s concern. These areas could belong either to its
territory or to its global operations. Thus, the alliance’s climate security discourse was largely
centred on the territorial danger discourse:
“Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing
energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the
potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations (NATO 2010).”
In that same year, former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated that the NATO could
function as an important forum for international dialogue on the security-related challenges of
climate change. Although he says the alliance’s policy on climate change has not been entirely
developed, NATO could be involved on the basis of “three words: consultation, adaptation, and
operation” (Rasmussen 2010). Consultation refers to the intensification of international
dialogue with other institutions, the scientific community and NGOs. Adaptation means that
the alliance must seek to reduce its carbon footprint of its forces in order to adapt to security
challenges of climate change. Operation means the recognition that NATO’s forces can be the
‘first responder’ to the consequences of climate change, thus addressing its impacts directly
(ibid.). Again, NATO’s traditional role in terms of military operation was linked to the non-
traditional phenomenon of climate adaptation.
In 2014, NATO state representatives gathered in Wales for one of the most important
summits after the Cold War. One year after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Russian
threat was the first topic on the summit’s agenda. The increased attention on Russia’s
aggression led to criticism about the lack of attention that was given to climate change.
Although the alliance continued to acknowledge the security threat of climate change in the
Wales Summit Declaration, it did not offer revisions by using the exact same statement as in
NATO’s last Strategic Concept (NATO 2010; NATO 2014; Yeo 2014).
57
While Russia demanded most of NATO’s attention, climate change lingered in the
background and seemed to receive more attention in the run to the UN COP21 in Paris. On 20
March 2015 a Special Report called ‘Climate Change, International Security, and the way to
Paris 2015’ was published by the NATO PA’s Science and Technology Committee (STC)’. The
NATO PA, which is institutionally segregate from NATO, stressed the need for more attention
for climate change on NATO’s agenda:
“No matter the outcome [of the Paris COP21], the Assembly, and this Committee in particular, should continue to
serve as a forum for climate change discussions among legislators of the Euro-Atlantic community. This is essential
to mobilise public support and political impetus. The Committee and Assembly should also continue to push that
climate change is included more visibly on the political agenda at NATO (Vitel 2015: 11).”
While the previous citation is full of good intentions, it shows how difficult it is for an alliance
consisting of a diversity of states to present it as one influential actor in climate change policies.
Another quote supports this finding:
“While all NATO member states agree that climate change can impact international security, individual states'
opinions vary on how much and what kind of impact it might have, or how integrated climate change goals should
be in their foreign and security policies” (idem: 6).
On 12 October 2015 the NATO PA adopted resolution 427 on ‘Climate Change and International
Security’, in which it urged the member governments in seven points to negotiate on a
successful agreement at the COP21 in Paris, and to recognise risks related to climate change in
their security and foreign policies. It further called upon the support of the ‘Green Defence
Framework’ which NATO adopted in 2013 in order to contribute to climate change mitigation
(NATO PA 2015). Similar statements were made by Deputy Assistant Secretary General for
Emerging Security Challenges Jamie Shea, who represented the NATO during a speech at the
Planetary Security Conference in The Hague in November 2015:
“My sense is that when it comes to involving a security community like NATO, the debate has started, but it is still
in an embryonic stage. I will do my best from inside the organisation to push things ahead, but I need your support
and your pressure from outside the organisation to convince us that this is something that is fundamental for our
future security” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015: 26).
58
His argument confirms the vagueness and indecisiveness of NATO’s mandate and policies
concerning climate change. It shows the complexity of the issue for a coalition which consists
of 28 different states which all have different visions. In this sense, the dominant territorial
danger discourse of the NATO can be explained by the great influence of the US, which also
frames climate change as a territorial danger. However, the territorial danger discourse is firmly
connected to NATO’s original mission, which is the collective defence of its own territory. The
amorphous problem of climate change, that provides the alliance with no obvious enemy, is a
complicated phenomenon for a traditionally military alliance.
Korteweg and Podkolinkski (2009: 59) argue that NATO links the main concerns
identified with climate change to specific crises, such as state failure, as well as the melting
Arctic as a geopolitical space. “In this sense, climate change is considered to be a catalyst for
other threats and NATO focuses on the threat rather than the catalyst” (ibid.). It is therefore
not a surprise that NATO frames climate change primarily as a territorial danger. The NATO will
always look through a ‘military lens’ to security threats and will naturally use the capabilities it
has (Van der Zeijden 2016). Hence, NATO’s vague and largely undecided mandate regarding
climate change reveals the struggle with the perceived urgency of the climate threat and with
its own identity. This is exemplified in the following statement, especially through the
ambiguous word ‘fight’:
“We face many challenges. Some can be solved. Some must be fought. But if we want a more secure world, there
is one fight we must avoid. Fighting the planet. Climate change will pose security challenges for us all. Together,
we can meet them. Fight the planet, and we all lose. Peace and Security, that’s our mission (NATO 2009)”.
Obviously, climate change is currently overshadowed by the military threat of Russia, the
‘enemy’ that was ironically an important reason for NATO’s establishment.
6.4. Political consequences
NATO officials Shea and Rasmussen can be considered as important norm entrepreneurs, next
to certain NATO departments such as the ‘Science for Peace and Security Programme’ (merger
between the CCMS and the Science Committee) who stress the need for more involvement of
NATO in the climate debate (Risso 2016: 30). On the other hand, The NATO strongly tends to
perceive immediate threats that require emergency measures as more urgent. Russia’s
59
annexation of Crimea and its recent military assertiveness is such an example that clearly
overrules an amorphous threat-multiplier like climate change. Although in the past decennia
the NATO has increasingly voiced the security threat of climate change, its mandate and policies
concerning the issue remain largely undetermined (Korteweg & Podkolinkski 2009: 59).
When considering the general territorial danger discourse of the NATO, some argue that
this is a positive development, since it helps to bring climate change as a serious policy concern
on NATO’s agenda (Van Schaik 2016; Van Winden 2016). However, such a discourse can also
be problematic, because it is closely linked to national security conceptions and conflict.
Expressions from NATO related to climate change have led to criticism from actors such as ‘PAX
for Peace’, that charge the alliance with broadening its remit. They argue that the alliance will
use the accessible capabilities for any security issue, hence they fear the militarisation of
climate change (Rasmussen 2010; Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5; Van der Zeijden 2016). However,
since Russia is at the moment NATO’s greatest concern and its policies on climate change
appear to be vague, it is expected that the short-term political consequences of NATO’s
territorial danger discourse remain limited.
6.5. Conclusion
The overall climate security discourse of the NATO comes closest to the discourse of the US, in
which climate change as a territorial danger prevails. This is not a great surprise, since the US
has been the leading country of the alliance since its establishment. While the NATO in the past
decennia increasingly voiced the need to address the security threat of climate change and has
tried to put more emphasis on the risk dimension in terms of crisis management and disaster
relief, its dominant discourse remains based on the threatification of climate change. This is in
line with NATO’s military identity and main purpose of collective defence, in which a focus on
immediate threats to its territorial environment is the common denominator.
60
7. Conclusions
7.1. Research question: a comparative analysis
This thesis has elaborated on the question:
How do the visions of the NATO and its member states correspond with regard to the
securitisation of climate change?
By employing the analytical framework on climate security discourses of Diez et al. (2016), this
thesis argued that NATO’s vision on climate change can generally be described as a climate
security discourse of territorial danger. Besides NATO’s vision, the visions of its member states
with regard to the securitisation of climate change vary among each other. Primarily based on
the research of Diez et al. (2016), the dominant climate security discourse of the US can be
specified as a territorial danger, while in Germany the discourse is generally based on individual
security with a focus on risk. Based on primary sources, the discourse in the Netherlands
appears to relate to planetary security, also with an emphasis on risk.
Consequently, the vision of the NATO corresponds most closely with the vision in the
US, both actors experience climate change as a territorial danger. The climate security
discourses of Germany and the Netherlands are more different from NATO’s vision. Two
explanations underlie this conclusion. First, the US has a considerably greater influence on the
policies of the NATO than the European countries. An important example is that US defence
expenditures count for 70 percent of the total NATO expenditures and are twice as much as
the expenditures of all European members together. Second, the territorial danger discourse
of the NATO corresponds with its traditional role as provider of peace and security for its
members, based on the principle of collective military defence. In the case of a non-traditional
security issue such as climate change, the alliance will look from its own (military) perspective
and will use the accessible capabilities to react.
Drawing on these results, this thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of climate
security discourses within IOs, which is identified as a gap in the literature. With regard to the
first explanation considering the great influence of the US in the NATO, a climate security
discourse can be the result of one or more powerful actors within such an IO. However, this
61
thesis argued that NATO’s climate security discourse of territorial danger can best be explained
by its traditional identity of a military alliance. Although NATO has during the years increasingly
announced its commitment to address climate change, its mandate and policies concerning the
issue remain vague and largely undecided. This shows the struggle of the traditionally oriented
NATO with its commitment to a broader non-traditional approach to security. Hence, according
to this research a discourse within an IO can largely depend on factors such as its traditional
mandate, historical evolution and political identity.
7.2. Normative implications
This thesis has provided a comparative analysis of the climate security discourses of the NATO
and its member states, which enables the engagement with the normative debate surrounding
securitisation. By linking theory and analysis, NATO’s territorial danger discourse may be
perceived as problematic. The alliance is built on the traditional notion of (military) security.
Therefore, the principle of collective defence is automatically linked to any security issue. As
such, climate change can be a legitimisation for NATO to interfere in countries at risk, which
can ultimately take the form of military intervention.
While some express the fear of militarisation, others rather see NATO’s involvement in
climate change as a positive development. It is positive in the sense that a large coalition takes
climate change seriously, and that NATO’s military strength can be of great help in for instance
natural disasters. The territorial danger discourse in the US has also resulted in positive
consequences; it brought climate change into the realm of high politics and bridged the gap
between liberal and conservative politicians. However, scholars such as Hartmann also criticise
the US discourse, since it links climate change, conflict and natural disasters, which in turn
threatens the distortion of climate policy and militarises development and humanitarian
assistance.
The fear of policy distortion and militarisation is of less importance in the climate
security discourses of Germany and the Netherlands. The general German discourse of
individual risk stayed away from national security conceptions. The historically tarnished status
of the German military resulted in a very limited role in the climate security debate. Instead,
the debate positively influenced domestic energy politics and focused on the people who are
most vulnerable to climate change through foreign and development policy. The Dutch
planetary discourse with a growing influence of risk is also less problematic than the territorial
62
articulations of the NATO and the US. It emphasises the interdependency of the international
community and its surrounding ecosystem. However, this discourse provides difficulties for the
Dutch to maintain the political attention for climate change, and to not end up in ambiguous
and ineffective policy outputs. Consequently, the short-term normative implications of NATO’s
territorial danger discourse may be perceived as limited, considering its undetermined
mandate and policies on climate change and the military threat of Russia.
7.3. Limitations and recommendations for further research
Although this research has been carefully conducted, given the limited time frame it is
inevitable to identify research limitations. Firstly, the number of NATO member states which
have been examined could have been increased. This would have made the comparative
analysis more complete and the results more credible. Secondly, in order to keep within the
time limit and required length of the research paper, a selection of the most important and
diverse documents has been made. However, it is possible that not all types of relevant
publications have been equally included. In future research, more attention can be given to
actors that are less influential in direct terms, such as civil society actors.
The same argument can be made for the number of participants that have been
interviewed. Although these were four persons originating from different backgrounds and
working in different sectors of society, a larger number would have probably given more
information about the evolving climate security discourses. Furthermore, the style of
interviewing might have influenced the integrity of the answers of the interviewees and the
interpretation of their responses, since several interviews have been conducted via Skype or
over the phone.
In order to further address the identified gap in the literature concerning climate
security discourses within IOs, future research could be conducted with other global
institutions than the NATO, such as the EU. By using a similar method of comparative analysis
between an IO and its member countries, more insights could be drawn from the origin and
characteristics of climate security discourses within IOs. Furthermore, it can also provide a
better understanding of an institution in general. However, the question remains to what
extent discourses of IOs can be generalised, since such organisations may differ considerably in
their origin, structure and mandate.
63
References
AIV (Advisory Council on International Affairs) (2008). Climate, Energy and Poverty Reduction.
The Hague: Advisory Council on International Affairs.
AIV (Advisory Council on International Affairs) (2009). Climate Change and Security. The
Hague: Advisory Council on International Affairs.
Altenhof, R. (2002). Die Enquete-Kommissionen des Deutschen Bundestages. Wiesbaden:
Westdeutsche Verlag.
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage Publications.
Beck, U. and Holzer, B., (2007). “Organizations in World Risk Society”. In: Pearson, C. M., Roux-
Dufort, C., Clair, J. A. (red.) International handbook of organizational crisis management,
1-24. London: Sage Publications.
Berger, T. U. (2012). War, guilt, and world politics after World War II. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Bigo, D., (2002). “Security and immigration: toward a critique of the governmentality of
unease”, Alternatives: global, local, political, 27(1), pp. S63-S63.
Biswas, N. (2011). “Is the environment a security threat? Environmental security beyond
securitization”, International Affairs Review, 20(1), 1.
Bourbeau, P. (2015). “Resilience and international politics: Premises, debates,
agenda”, International Studies Review, 17(3), pp.374-395.
Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods. Oxford University Press.
Bulkeley, H. and Moser, S.C. (2007). “Responding to climate change: governance and social
action beyond Kyoto”, Global environmental politics, 7(2), 1-10.
Burck, J., Hermwille, L. and Krings, L. (2012). “The Climate Change Performance Index”,
Results 2013, Bonn, Berlin.
Butts, K. H. (1993). “NATO Contributions to European Environmental Security”, Strategic
Studies Institute: US Army War College.
Buzan, B., (1991). “New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century”, International
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), pp.431-451.
Buzan, B., Waever, O. and De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis.
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Carstensen, J. (2016). “Germany’s Plans for Enhanced Role in NATO Come Amid Concerns
64
About Russian Actions, Intentions”, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/james-
carstensen/germanys-plans-enhanced-role-nato-come-amid-concerns-about-russian.
Consulted on 20 June 2016.
Ciut, F., 2002. “The End (s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative
Transformation”, Contemporary Security Policy, 23(1), pp.35-62.
Clean Energy Wire (2015). Germany’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Targets,
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
and-climate-targets. Consulted on 16 June 2016.
Cordal, I. (2011). “Follow the leaders”, http://cementeclipses.com/Works/follow-the-leaders/.
Consulted on 20 June 2016.
Corry, O., (2012). “Securitisation and ‘riskification’: Second-order security and the politics of
climate change”, Millennium-Journal of International Studies,40(2), pp.235-258.
Cramer, J., 1989. “The rise and fall of new knowledge interests in the Dutch environmental
movement”, Environmentalist, 9(2), pp.101-120.
Depledge, D. and Feakin, T., (2012). “Climate change and international institutions:
implications for security”, Climate Policy, 12(sup01), pp. S73-S84.
Detraz, N. and Betsill, M.M., 2009. “Climate change and environmental security: for whom the
discourse shifts”, International Studies Perspectives,10(3), pp.303-320.
Diez, T., von Lucke, F. and Wellmann, Z., (2016). The Securitisation of Climate Change: Actors,
Processes and Consequences. Routledge.
Dijkink, G. and Van Der Wusten, H., 1992. “Green politics in Europe: The issues and the
voters”, Political Geography, 11(1), pp.7-11.
Dutch Ministry of Defence (2010). Verkenningen: Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de
toekomst. The Hague: Ministry of Defence.
Dutch Ministry of Defence (2013). In het belang van Nederland. The Hague: Ministry of
Defence.
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). Veilige Wereld, Veilig Nederland: Internationale
Veiligheidsstrategie. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014). Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid: Turbulente
Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015). Planetary Security: Peace and Cooperation in Times
65
of Climate Change and Global Environmental Challenges. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
Eckersley, R., 2004. The green state: rethinking democracy and sovereignty. MIT Press.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). “Building theories from case study research”, Academy of
management review, 14(4), 532-550.
Elshout, A., and Koelé, T. (2016). “Afschrikking is de sleutel tot onze veiligheid”. De Volkskrant,
11 juni: 10-11.
Erdmann, M. (2013). “NATO: What’s in it for the United States”.
http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/02/13/erdmann/. Consulted on June 17 2016.
Fairclough, N. (2013). “Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language”, New
York: Routledge.
Feindt, P.Η., (2002). “Gemeinsam gegen Niemanden”, Forschungsjournal Soziale
Bewegungen, 15(4), pp.20-28.
Foucault, M., Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P., (1991). The Foucault effect: Studies in
governmentality. University of Chicago Press.
Gerring, J. (2004). “What is a case study and what is it good for?”, American political science
review, 98(2), 341-354.
Giddens, A. (1999). “Risk and responsibility”, The modern law review, 62(1), 1-10.
Grundmann, R. and Scott, M. (2012). “Disputed climate science in the media: Do countries
matter?”, Public Understanding of Science, 23(2): 220-235.
Halsema, F. (2016). Pluche. Amsterdam: Ambo Anthos.
Hartmann, B., 2010. “Rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: rhetoric, reality and
the politics of policy discourse”, Journal of International Development, 22(2), pp.233-
246.
Hartmann (2013). “Shifting lines in the sand”. In: Sygna, L., O’Brien, K., Wolf, J. (red.) A
changing environment for human security, 46-55. London: Earthscan.
Hendriks, F., Ostaaijen, J. van, and Boogers, M. (2012). “Voor en na Fortuyn. Veranderingen
En continuïteiten in het burgeroordeel over het democratisch bestuur in Nederland”,
Beleid en Maatschappij, 2012 (39) 2.
Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie (2016). “Nationale Adaptatie Strategie 2016”,
http://www.ruimtelijkeadaptatie.nl/nl/nas2016. Consulted on 22 June 2016.
Klem, M. H. (2010). Het Nederlandse Veiligheidsbeleid in een veranderende wereld. The
66
Hague: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid.
Krück, C., Borchers, J. and Weingart, P. (1999). “Climate research and climate politics in
Germany: Assets and hazards of consensus-based risk management”, In: Edwards, P.,
Miller, C. (red.) Changing the Atmosphere, 1-47. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lucke, F. von, Wellmann, Z. and Diez, T., 2014. “What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate
Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach”, Geopolitics, 19(4), pp.857-884.
Matten, D. (2004). “The impact of the risk society thesis on environmental politics and
management in a globalizing economy–principles, proficiency, perspectives”, Journal
of Risk Research, 7(4), 377-398.
Marshall, G. (2014). “Hear no climate evil”,
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329820.200-understand-faulty-thinking-
to-tackle-climate-change/#.U_NGl2M9VTP. Consulted on 10 May 2016.
McDonald, M., 2013. “Discourses of climate security”, Political Geography,33, pp.42-51.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington
D.C.: NATO.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (1991). The Alliance's New Strategic Concept.
Rome: NATO.
NATO/CCMS (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation/ Committee on The Challenges of Modern
Society) (1995). Environment and Security in an International Context. Washington D.C.:
NATO/CCMS.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (1999). The Alliance's Strategic Concept.
Washington D.C.: NATO.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2009). “NATO – Climate change”,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ef5O48_sPzM. Consulted on 2 July 2016.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2010). Strategic Concept: Active Engagement,
Modern Defence. Lisbon: NATO.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2015a). “A short history of NATO”,
http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html. Consulted 27 June 2016.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2015b). “Enlargement”,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm Consulted 27 June 2016.
NATO PA (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Parliamentary Assembly) (2015c). Resolution
427 on Climate Change and International Security. Stavanger: NATO PA STC.
67
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2016a). “Relations with Russia”,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm. Consulted 27 June 2016.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2016b). “Relations with Ukraine”,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm. Consulted 27 June 2016.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2016c). “Member countries”,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm?selectedLocale=en. Consulted
27 June 2016.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2016d). “60 Years of Germany in NATO”,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_121378.htm. Consulted 27 June 2016.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (2016e). Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries
(2008-2015). Brussels: NATO.
O’Brien, K., 2012. “Global environmental change II: From adaptation to deliberate
transformation”, Progress in Human Geography, 36(5), pp.667-676.
Overhaus, M. (2004). “In search of a post-hegemonic order: Germany, NATO and the
European security and defence policy”, German Politics, 13(4), 551-568.
PBL.nl (2008). “Correctie formulering over overstromingsrisico Nederland in IPCC-rapport”,
http://www.pbl.nl/dossiers/klimaatverandering/content/correctie-formulering-over-
overstromomgsrisico. Consulted on 27 June 2016.
PBL & KNMI (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving & Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch
Instituut) (2015). Klimaatverandering. Samenvatting van het vijfde IPCC-assessment en
een vertaling naar Nederland. The Hague: PBL & KNMI.
PBL (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving) (2015a). Aanpassen aan klimaatverandering:
Kwetsbaarheden zien, kansen grijpen. The Hague: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving.
PBL (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving) (2015b). Wereldwijde klimaateffecten: Risico’s en
kansen voor Nederland. The Hague: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving.
Pennings, P. J. M. and Keman, J. E. (2002). “The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2002:
Fortuyn versus the Establishment”, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: Department of
Political Science.
Pettenger, M. E. (2007). The social construction of climate change: Power, knowledge, norms,
discourses. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Radio Een Vandaag (2016). “Kamer praat over kritiek NAVO op krijgsmacht”. Radio Een
Vandaag, NPO. 24 mei.
68
Rasmussen, M. V. (2001) “Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 30: 285-308.
Rasmussen, A. F. (2010). “NATO and Climate Change”,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anders-fogh-rasmussen/nato-and-climate-
change_b_392409.html. Consulted on 1 July 2016.
Rave, R. de (2016). The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Interview held on 8 June 2016.
Risso, L. (2016). “NATO and the Environment: The Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society”, Contemporary European History. 1-31.
RIVM (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu) (1988). Zorgen voor Morgen: Nationale
milieuverkenning 1985-2010. Bilthoven: Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu.
RIVM (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu) (2013). “25 jaar Zorgen voor Morgen”,
http://www.rivm.nl/Documenten_en_publicaties/Algemeen_Actueel/Nieuwsberichte
n/2013/25_jaar_Zorgen_voor_Morgen. Consulted on 21 June 2016.
Roth, R. and Rucht, D. eds., (2008). Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: ein
Handbuch. Campus Verlag.
Schaik, L. van (2016). Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Interview
held on 10 June 2016.
Schaik, L. van, Maas, E., Dinnissen, R. and Vos, J. (2015). Beyond scares and tales: climate-
proofing Dutch foreign policy. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
Schmidt, P. (1994). Germany, France and NATO. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.
Schwartz, P. and Randall, D., 2003. An abrupt climate change scenario and its implications for
United States national security. California Institute of Technology.
Stoltenberg, J. (2016). “Press Statement”,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_130321.htm?selectedLocale=en.
Consulted on 2 July 2016.
Sullivan. J. (2014). “Waiting for climate change”.
https://artistsandclimatechange.com/2014/05/11/waiting-for-climate-change/.
Consulted on 20 June 2016.
Sygna, L., O’Brien, K.L. and Wolf, J., (2013). A changing environment for human
security. London: Earthscan.
Trombetta, M.J., 2008. “Environmental security and climate change: analysing the
discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(4), pp.585-602.
69
Trombetta, M.J., 2014. “Linking climate-induced migration and security within the EU: insights
from the securitization debate”, Critical Studies on Security,2(2), pp.131-147.
Veerman, C. (2008). Working together with water. A living land builds for its future. The
Hague: Secretariat Delta Committee.
Verduijn, S. H., Meijerink, S. V. and Leroy, P. (2012). “How the Second Delta Committee set
the agenda for climate adaptation policy: A Dutch case study on framing strategies for
policy change”, Water alternatives, 5(2), 469.
Vig, N.J., 2013. “Presidential powers and environmental policy”, Environmental Policy: New
Directions for the 21st Century, pp.84-108.
Vitel, P. (2015). Climate Change, International Security and the way to Paris 2015. NATO PA
STC.
Volkskrant.nl (2016). “Flinke kritiek van NAVO: Nederland investeert te weinig in defensie”,
http://www.volkskrant.nl/politiek/flinke-kritiek-van-navo-nederland-investeert-te-
weinig-in-defensie~a4269292/. Consulted on 23 June 2016.
VROM (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer) (1989). Kiezen of Verliezen:
Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan (NMP). The Hague: SDU Uitgeverij’s.
VROM (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer) (2001). Een Wereld en een
Wil: Werken aan Duurzaamheid (NMP4). The Hague: SDU Uitgeverij’s.
VROM (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer) (2005). Evaluatienota
Klimaatbeleid 2005: Onderweg naar Kyoto. The Hague: SDU Uitgeverij’s.
Weinrod, W.B., 2012. “The Future of NATO”, Mediterranean Quarterly, 23(2), pp.1-13.
Werland, S. (2012). Debattenanalyse Rohstoffknappheit. Berlin.
Winden, M. van (2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview held on 9 June 2016.
WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid). Onzekere veiligheid:
Verantwoordelijkheden rond fysieke veiligheid. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press.
Yeo, S. (2014). “Climate security threat remains hidden behind current conflicts”,
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/09/05/climate-security-threat-remains-
hidden-behind-current-conflicts/. Consulted on 1 July 2016.
Zeijden, W. van der (2016). PAX for Peace. Interview held on 8 June 2016.
70
Appendix I: Interviews
Interviewee: Rob de Rave
Organisation: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)
Profession: Colonel and strategic analyst
Type of interview: Personal
Date: 8 June 2016
Interviewee: Louise van Schaik
Organisation: Clingendael Institute
Profession: Coordinator EU in the World/ Senior Research Fellow
Type of interview: Phone
Date: 10 June 2016
Interviewee: Michel van Winden
Organisation: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inclusive Green Growth Department
Profession: Strategic Policy Advisor, organiser of the Planetary Security Conference
Type of interview: Phone
Date: 9 June 2016
Interviewee: Wilbert van der Zeijden
Organisation: PAX for Peace
Profession: Program manager Defence and Security Policy
Type of interview: Skype
Date: 8 June 2016