- aktuell DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR WEHRTECHNIK e.V.

Die neutrale Dialog- und Informationsplattform

1

2016

14.09.2016 Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, mit der DWT- aktuell übersenden wir Ihnen aktuelle Informationen, ggf. auch kurzfristig, häufig auch im Originaltext. DWT- aktuell wird nur als E-Mail und ausschließlich an Fördernde Mitglieder (FM) und Persönliche Mitglieder (PM) der DWT als zusätzlicher Mehrwert Ihrer Mitgliedschaft ver-teilt. Wir möchten ausdrücklich darauf hinweisen, dass einige der aufgeführten Original-E-Mails hier ggf. erst kurzfristig eingegangen sind. Daraus können sich enge Terminsetzungen ergeben. Bitte be-achten Sie die angegebenen Termine. Auf diese hat die DW T keinen Einfluss. Vielfach lohnt es sich aber, auch nach dem offiziellen Termin noch den Kontakt mit dem Versender herzustel-len. Bei allen Aspekten zu diesen E-Mails wenden Sie sich bitte direkt an die unten aufgeführten Kontakte.

1. Einladungen zur Vorbesprechung einer Indienreise

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, PSt Beckmeyer wird voraussichtlich in der Zeit vom 5. - 7. Dezember 2016 in Begleitung einer Wirtschaftsdelegation zum Thema bilaterale Kooperation im Bereich der Sicherheits- und Ver-teidigungsindustrie nach Indien reisen. Die Reise soll dazu dienen, Anliegen der deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie mit Blick auf eine verstärkte Kooperation mit IND Unternehmen anzusprechen. Gerne laden wir Sie als Vertreter von Industrie und Verbänden zur Vorbereitung der Delegati-onsreise nach Indien am 28. September 2016 von 10:30 - 11:30 Uhr in die Hannoversche Str. 28-30 in10115 Berlin, Raum HS 5.009 zu einer Vorbesprechung mit nachfolgender Tagesord-nung ein. TOP 1 – Bericht über den Stand der Planungen, Skizzierung des Reiseverlaufs und der bereits vorgesehenen Programmpunkte TOP 2 – Diskussion über inhaltliche Schwerpunkte der Reise und Gesprächspartner Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amtes, des Bundesministeriums des Innern und des Bundesministe-riums der Verteidigung werden voraussichtlich ebenfalls anwesend sein. Bitte teilen Sie unter buero-iva4@bmwi.bund.de und birgit.bansse@bmwi.bund.de bis zum 20.September 2016 mit, ob Sie bzw. ein Vertreter an der Vorbesprechung teilnehmen werden. Vielen Dank! Mit freundlichen Grüßen und den besten Wünschen zum Wochenende, Birgit Banße ____________________________________________

2

Referat IV A 4 (Sicherheits- und Verteidigungswirtschaft, Stahl- und Metallerzeugung) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie HAUSANSCHRIFT: Hannoversche Str. 28-30, 10115 Berlin Postanschrift: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie Scharnhorststraße 34-37, 10115 Berlin Telefon: 030 - 18 615-72 57 Telefax: 030 - 18 615 50 54 34 e-mail: birgit.bansse@bmwi.bund.de Internet: http://www.bmwi.de

2. COMMIT-Veranstaltungsvorschau 2. Halbjahr 2016 Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

gerne möchten wir Sie auf unsere bevorstehenden Außenwirtschaftsveranstaltungen für die nächsten Monate aufmerksam machen und zu einer Teilnahme herzlich einladen:

GUS-Länder

Termin Veranstaltung

19. - 23. Sep-tember

Unternehmerreise nach Moskau und Tatarstan unter Leitung von Staatssek-retär Dr. Günther Horzetzky, Russland (NRW.International) kurzfristige Anmeldung noch möglich

23. - 28. Oktober Geschäftsanbahnung Lebensmittelverarbeitung und Verpackungsmaschinen Belgorod und Woronesch, Russland (BMWi-Markterschließung)

September - Ok-tober

Hospitation russischer Ärzte in Deutschland (Administration des Gebiets Chanty-Mansijsk)

August - Oktober Hospitation russischer Ärzte in Deutschland (Administration des Gebiets Tjumen)

November (vo-rauss.)

Unternehmerreise nach Baschkortostan, Russland (COMMIT GmbH)

November (vo-rauss.)

Unternehmerreise nach Turkmenistan mit Teilnahme am Tag der Deutschen Wirtschaft (COMMIT GmbH)

28. Nov. - 01. Dez.

Informationsreise für Unternehmen der Abfallwirtschaft aus Russland (BMWi-Markterschließung)

Europa

Termin Veranstaltung

18.- 21. Oktober Solutions - Made in Bayern mit Unternehmen der IT-Sicherheitsindustrie aus Frankreich (Bayern International)

08. November Informationsveranstaltung Augenoptik Estland, Lettland, Litauen in Berlin (BMWi-Markterschließung)

3

Naher und Mittlerer Osten

Termin Veranstaltung

23. - 29. September Unternehmensreise nach Isfahan, Tabriz und Teheran, Iran (ZAB Bandenburg)

Kaukasus

Termin Veranstaltung

17. - 21. September Georgian-German Day of Science in Tiflis (BMBF)

Nähere Informationen sowie ein laufend aktualisiertes Veranstaltungsverzeichnis finden Sie

auch unter www.commit-group.com

Commit Project Partners GmbH

Kastanienallee 71, 10435 Berlin

Tel.: +49 30 2061648-0

3. Neues BMWi Innovationsprogramm: Anmeldung zur Kick-off- Veranstaltung (26.09.) sowie neuer Newsletter siehe hierzu Anlage Kick-off

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, mit E-Mail von Mitte Juli hatten wir Sie bereits auf die Kick-off-Veranstaltung zum neuen Innova-tionsprogramm Diversifizierung der Verteidigungsindustrie des Bundesministeriums für Wirt-schaft und Energie aufmerksam gemacht. Gern möchten wir Ihnen mit dieser E-Mail weitere Informationen zum Programm der Veranstal-tung sowie eine Möglichkeit zur Anmeldung übermitteln. Weiterhin möchten wir Sie auch auf unseren neuen Newsletter zum Innovationsprogramm hinweisen. Wir wären Ihnen dankbar, wenn Sie diese Informationen auch in Ihren Netzwerken weiter- geben würden. Kick-off-Veranstaltung am 26.09. in Berlin Am 26. September 2016 stellt das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) das „Innovationsprogramm zur Unterstützung von Diversifizierungsstrategien von Unternehmen der Verteidigungsbranche in zivile Sicherheitstechnologien“ in Berlin der Öffentlichkeit vor. Ziel der Veranstaltung ist es, über Inhalte und Rahmenbedingungen des Förderprogramms zu informieren sowie Möglichkeiten der Vernetzung zu bieten. Die Veranstaltung richtet sich insbe-sondere an F&E-Verantwortliche aus der Verteidigungsindustrie, an Bedarfsträger ziviler Si-cherheitstechnologien, an Vertreter der zivilen Sicherheitsindustrie und an Interessierte der ein-schlägigen Forschungs- und Wissenschaftseinrichtungen sowie Hochschulen. Das Veranstaltungsprogramm sowie weitere Informationen zur Veranstaltung und zur Anmel-dung finden Sie unter http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Service/veranstaltungen,did=775938.html bzw. im Anhang zu dieser E-Mail.

4

Newsletter zum neuen Innovationsprogramm Begleitend zum Förderprogramm des BMWi wird zu aktuellen Anlässen ein neuer Newsletter erscheinen. Dieser Newsletter bietet Ihnen eine kompakte Übersicht zu Neuigkeiten (Förder-möglichkeiten, Veranstaltungshinweise, laufende Projekte etc.) im Zusammenhang mit dem Innovationsprogramm. Eine Möglichkeit, den Newsletter des BMWi kostenfrei zu abonnieren, finden Sie unter: https://swm.vditz.com/newsletter. Ansprechpartner Sollten Sie Fragen zur Veranstaltung oder zum Newsletter haben, können Sie gern unseren Projektträger kontaktieren: Dr. Thorsten Fischer, VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH, VDI-Platz 1, 40468 Düsseldorf, Tel.: +49 211 62 14-628, Fax: +49 211 62 14-484, E-Mail: fischer_t@vdi.de und Internet: www.vditz.de. Mit freundlichen Grüßen Im Auftrag Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie Referat IV A 4 - Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie; Stahl- und Metallerzeugung HAUSANSCHRIFT: Hannoversche Str. 28-30 10115 Berlin POSTANSCHRIFT: Scharnhorststraße 34-37 10115 Berlin Tel.: (030) 18 615 - 5632 E-Mail: BUERO-IVA4@bmwi.bund.de

4. Israel – Auslandsmesse Cyberbereich siehe hierzu Anlage CYBER

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, vom 31.01.2017 bis zum 01.02.2017 findet die Cybertech International Conference in Tel Aviv statt. Sie wurde offiziell in das Auslandsmesseprogramm 2017 aufgenommen. Zur Zeit läuft die Ausschreibung zur Ermittlung der Messedurchführungsgesellschaft. Diese internationale Kon-ferenz und Ausstellung für Netzsicherheit ist nunmehr in einem einjährigen Turnus etabliert. Anbei erhalten Sie ein Datenblatt zur Cybertech 2017 in Tel Aviv. Dieses können Sie auch über folgenden Link unter http://www.auma.de/de/messedatenbank/seiten/messemessenauma-messedatenbank.aspx abrufen. Ich bitte Sie um eine kurze Rückmeldung ob Sie an einer Delegationsreise unter Leitung eines Staatssekretärs zur Cybertech Messe in Tel Aviv interessiert sind. Vielen Dank. Mit freundlichen Grüßen Birgit Banße Referat IV A 4 (Sicherheits- und Verteidigungswirtschaft, Stahl- und Metallerzeugung) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

5

5. The German Marshall Fund of the United States siehe hierzu Anlage New Realism

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, In meinem jüngsten Policy Paper argumentiere ich, gemeinsam mit Claudia Major, dass die Idee einer EU Verteidigungsstrategie immer mehr Befürworter erhält. Doch um die EU als glaubwürdigen Akteur im Verteidigungsbereich wieder zu etablieren, muss die Erarbeitung der Strategie vor allem von einem „Neuen Realismus“ getrieben sein. For a “New Realism” in European Defense: The Five Key Challenges an EU Defense Strategy Should Address http://www.gmfus.org/publications/new-realism-european-defense-five-key-challenges Mit besten Grüßen Dr. Christian Mölling Senior Resident Fellow, Security Policy The German Marshall Fund of the United States M:+049.152.22.78.06.06 profile:http://www.gmfus.org/profiles/christian-mölling-0 mail: cmoelling@gmfus.org | www.gmfus.org | twitter:@Ce_moll

6. Die Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik informiert Dokumentation "Deutsches Forum Sicherheitspolitik" siehe hierzu Anlage BAKS Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, dass ich mich kurzfristig mit dem nächsten Infobrief an Sie wende, hat einen guten Grund: Der Dokumentationsband des "Deutschen Forums Sicherheitspolitik 2015: Wie sicher ist Deutschland - in einer Welt aus den Fugen" liegt vor.

Vom grenzüberschreitenden Feldzug des „Islamischen Staats“ bis zu Anschlägen von Einzeltätern in Europa, von der Flüchtlingswelle über das Mittelmeer bis zur Russland-Ukraine-Krise – die Trennschärfe zwischen äußerer und innerer Sicherheit ist endgül-tig verloren gegangen. Das dritte Deutsche Forum Sicherheitspolitik befasste sich da-her mit den Bedrohungen und Risiken für die Sicherheit Deutschlands von innen und außen. Mit der jährlichen High-Level-Veranstaltung will die Bundesakademie ihren Teil dazu beitragen, Lösungsansätze für relevante sicherheitspolitische Themen zu entwi-ckeln und zu diskutieren. Auch wenn die Konferenz schon einige Monate vorbei ist, so sind die Grundströmun-gen des dort geführten Diskurses nach wie vor hoch aktuell. Ich wünsche Ihnen deshalb eine informative, aber vor allem anregende Lektüre. Mit freundlichen Grüßen Den vollen Text finden Sie in Anlage BAKS. Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp Präsident der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik

6

7. Die Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik informiert Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016 Verpflichtungen in der NATO Mehr Geld für die Bundeswehr von Karl-Heinz Kamp siehe hierzu Anlage Bw Verpflichtungen

Am 26. Januar 2016 kündigte Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen an, in den kommenden 15 Jahren insgesamt 130 Milliarden Euro in die Ausrüstung der Bundeswehr investieren zu wollen. Zwar traf diese Ankündigung auf deutlich weniger Kritik als erwartet, allerdings wurde gefragt, wofür diese Mittel denn genau benötigt würden. Der allgemeine Hinweis, die Bundeswehr sei unterfinanziert, wird von vielen Kommentatoren als nicht hin-reichend empfunden. Dabei lässt sich der künftige Finanzbedarf ganz wesentlich aus den Verpflichtungen ableiten, die Deutschland im Rahmen der NATO zur Rückversicherung der osteuropäischen Bündnispartner übernimmt.

Den gesamten Beitrag finden Sie in der Anlage Bw Verpflichtungen.

8. Messen 2016

Security and Defence Exhibitions 2016 und 2017 finden Sie hier: http://cco-germany.eu/messeuebersicht/ Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich an: CCO Creative Consulting GmbH · Sonnenstr.10 · 856 22 Feldkirchen Tel . : +49 89 90 09 83 -3 Fax : +49 89 9 009 83-40 E-Ma i l: cco@cco-germany.eu · www. cco-germany.eu EXHIBITION MARKETING & SERVICES

9. Informationsbrief 11/16 zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung

siehe hierzu Anlage Info-Brief

Der Informationsbrief 11/16 enthält folgende Themen:

Veranstaltungshinweis: SAVE THE DATE zum BMBF-Workshop „Sichere Gesellschaften: unlo-cking innovation – neuartige Sicherheitslösungen für sich wandelnde Bedrohungslagen“ vom 8. - 9. November 2016 in Brüssel

Hinweise zum neuen Innovationsprogramm des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie

Aktuelle Ergebnisse aus der Sicherheitsforschung – Projekte stellen sich vor: Erweiterte Sicher-heit in der Luftfrachtkette (ESecLog)

Links

10. Das DEU NATEX OFFICE berichtet So erreichen Sie das DEU NATEX OFFICE Oberstleutnant Marco Wassmer Oberstleutnant Andre Seidel Email: DEUNATEXOffice@ncia.nato.int Phone: +32 2 707 8571

7

8

10. Globale Strategie für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU siehe hierzu Anlage EU Security

Die neue globale Strategie für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU unter dem Titel

„Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe“

ist von der Hohen Beauftragten Mogherini dem Europäischen Rat vorgestellt worden. Die engli-sche Version finden Sie in der Anlage EU Security. 11. Klausurtagung „Die SKB und ihre Partner in der Wirtschaft"

Am 21.06.2016 fand die 2. Klausurtagung SKB in Berlin unter der Leitung des Inspekteurs der Streitkräftebasis, Generalleutnant Martin Schelleis, statt. In den sechs Workshops ergab sich ein reger Gedankenaustausch zu anstehenden Fragen der Zusammenarbeit SKB - Wirtschaft. Die Ergebnisse der Workshoparbeit finden Sie auf der DWT-Homepage oder hier:

Workshop 1, Ergebnisbericht UiE Unterbringung im Einsatz

Workshop 1, Ergebnispräsentation

Workshop 2, Ergebnisbericht FITSA Funktio. IT-Sicherheitsarchi. für Einsätze der Bw

Workshop 2, Ergebnispräsentation

Workshop 3, Ergebnispräsentation Sensorikbereitstellung

Workshop 4, Ergebnispräsentation Personal

Workshop 5, Ergebnispräsentation ABC-Schutz

Workshop 6, Ergebnispräsentation GeoInfo-Datengewinnung

12. DWT / SGW Jahresplanung Rest 2016 und 2017

Alle Informationen hierzu finden Sie tagesaktuell auf der DWT-Homepage.

www.dwt-sgw.de

Hinweis: Sollte Ihnen lediglich die „Print-Version“ dieser Ausgabe vorliegen, finden Sie alle genannten Anlagen demnächst auf der DWT-Homepage unter dem Register Aktuelles / Infos. Mit freundlichen Grüßen Claus Dördrechter, Oberst a.D. Stv Geschäftsführer Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrtechnik e.V. (DWT) Hochstadenring 50, D-53119 Bonn Tel.: +49 228 41098-24 Mobil: +49 172 7624776 Fax: +49 228 41098-29 claus.doerdrechter@dwt-sgw.de

Seite 1 von 4

Kick-off-Veranstaltung zum

„Innovationsprogramm zur Unterstützung von Diversifizierungsstrategien von Unternehmen der

Verteidigungsbranche in zivile Sicherheitstechnologien“ 26. September 2016 im Konferenzzentrum des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie, Scharnhorststr. 34-37, 10115 Berlin,

Raum Eichensaal, Zugang über die Invalidenstraße 48,

9:30 Uhr bis ca. 16:30 Uhr

Die Veranstaltung im Überblick

Am 26. September 2016 stellt das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) das „Innovationsprogramm zur Unterstützung von Diversifizierungsstrategien von Unternehmen der Verteidigungsbranche in zivile Sicherheitstechnologien“ in Berlin der Öffentlichkeit vor.

Die Verteidigungsindustrie ist eine Schlüsselbranche von nationalem Interesse, die aus sicherheits-, technologie- und wirtschaftspolitischer Sicht eine hohe strategische Bedeutung aufweist. Diese Schlüsselbranche ist in Deutschland infolge globaler Veränderungen mit einem zunehmend schwierigen Marktumfeld konfrontiert. Der Erhalt und die Weiterentwicklung wehrtechnischer Kompetenzen lassen sich vor diesem Hintergrund kaum mehr durch den alleinigen Umsatz mit Rüstungsgütern erreichen. Demgegenüber hat der Markt für zivile Sicherheitstechnologien überdurchschnittliche Wachstumsperspektiven. Für die deutsche Verteidigungsindustrie bietet sich die Chance, am künftigen Wachstum und technischen Fortschritt des zivilen Sicherheitsmarktes zu partizipieren. Durch Teilnahme an der dynamischeren zivilen Sicherheitsforschung können gezielt Synergieeffekte für den wehrtechnischen Bereich genutzt und das bestehende wehrtechnische Produktportfolio um zivile Sicherheitslösungen erweitert werden. Die Diversifizierung ist allerdings mit zahlreichen Unwägbarkeiten verbunden und stellt Unternehmen der Verteidigungsbranche vor Herausforderungen.

Das Innovationsprogramm des BMWi hat das Ziel, die Risiken für Verteidigungsunternehmen abzumildern, wenn sie ihr Produktspektrum auf zivile Sicherheitstechnologien ausdehnen möchten. Gegenstand der Förderung sind experimentelle Entwicklungsaktivitäten für innovative Produkte und Verfahren. Prioritär gefördert werden Verbundprojekte unter der Konsortialführung eines Verteidigungsunternehmens und der Beteiligung von Unternehmen der zivilen Sicherheitswirtschaft, Hochschulen und Forschungseinrichtungen sowie zivilen Endnutzern.

Ziel der Veranstaltung ist es, über Inhalte und Rahmenbedingungen des Förderprogramms zu informieren sowie Möglichkeiten der Vernetzung zu bieten. Die Veranstaltung richtet sich insbesondere an F&E-Verantwortliche aus der Verteidigungsindustrie und an Bedarfsträger ziviler Sicherheitstechnologien sowie an Interessierte aus den Bereichen zivile Sicherheitswirtschaft, Hochschulen und Forschungseinrichtungen.

Das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie sowie der Projektträger VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH freuen sich auf Ihre Teilnahme!

Seite 2 von 4

Programm der Kick-off-Veranstaltung zum

„Innovationsprogramm zur Unterstützung von Diversifizierungsstrategien von Unternehmen der Verteidigungsbranche in zivile Sicherheitstechnologien“

Moderation: Sascha Hermann und Dr. Thorsten Fischer, VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH

ab 9:30 Uhr Registrierung und Begrüßungskaffee

10:40 Uhr Begrüßung und Vorstellung des Programms

Staatssekretär Matthias Machnig, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

11:00 Uhr Statement Verteidigungsindustrie

Thomas Kühn, Airbus Defence and Space GmbH, Leitung Ausschuss F&T und Innovation des Bundesverbands der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie (BDSV) e.V.

11:15 Uhr Podiumsdiskussion

• Prof. Dr. Gabi Dreo Rodosek, Sprecherin des ForschungszentrumsCyber Defence (CODE), Universität der Bundeswehr München

• Dr. Karsten Michael, Leiter der Abteilung Wissenschaft undTechnik, Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe

• Dr. Thomas Weise, Rheinmetall AG, stellvertretende LeitungAusschuss F&T und Innovation des BDSV (angefragt)

• Ministerialrat Ulf Zumkley, Referatsleiter Sicherheits- undVerteidigungsindustrie, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

• N. N., Plath GmbH (angefragt)

12:00 Uhr Mittagspause

13:30 Uhr Vorstellung der Richtlinie

Dr. Christian Stursberg, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

14:00 Uhr Vorstellung des Projektträgers und der Förderrahmenbedingungen

Dr. Karin Reichel, VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH

14:30 Uhr Bilanz, Ausblick und Verabschiedung

Ministerialdirektor Dr. Wolfgang Scheremet, Leiter der Abteilung Industriepolitik, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

14:45 Uhr Abschiedskaffee mit Möglichkeit der individuellen Förderberatung

ca. 16:30 Uhr Ende der Veranstaltung

Seite 3 von 4

Allgemeine Hinweise Es wird keine Teilnahmegebühr erhoben. Leistungen Im Leistungsumfang sind Pausenimbiss und Mittagessen enthalten. Registrierung Projektträger VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH Postfach 10 11 39 40002 Düsseldorf Telefax: +49 211 6214-182

fachliche Fragen: Dr. Thorsten Fischer Tel.: +49 211 6214-628 E-Mail: fischer_t@vdi.de

Anmeldung: Martina Müller Tel.: +49 211 6214-231 E-Mail: mueller_m@vdi.de

Die Teilnehmerzahl ist begrenzt. Registrierungen müssen in Textform erfolgen.

Wir bitten um Registrierung bis zum 16. September 2016.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass Ihre Registrierung durch uns mittels E-Mail bestätigt werden muss. Erst dann gelten Sie als für den Workshop angemeldet. Registrierungen, die nach Erreichen der maximalen Teilnehmerzahl eingehen, können leider nicht mehr berücksichtigt werden. Wir empfehlen eine frühzeitige Anmeldung.

Sollte sich eine sehr hohe Nachfrage ergeben, behalten wir uns vor, die Anträge auf Registrierungen hinsichtlich der Institution zu sichten. Die Sichtung erfolgt, um sicherzustellen, dass keine Institution/Einrichtung überrepräsentiert ist. Veranstaltungsort 26. September 2016 im Konferenzzentrum des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie, Scharnhorststr. 34-37, 10115 Berlin,

Raum Eichensaal, Zugang über die Invalidenstraße 48,

Anfahrt siehe http://www.bmwi.de/DE/service,did=8300.html Bedingungen An- und Abmeldungen müssen in Textform erfolgen. Sollten Sie an der Veranstaltung nicht teilnehmen können, ist es nach Absprache möglich, einen Ersatzteilnehmer zu benennen.

Muss die Veranstaltung aus unvorhergesehenen Gründen abgesagt werden, erfolgt eine sofortige Benachrichtigung. In diesem Fall besteht keine Verpflichtung zur Erstattung der für den Teilnehmenden entstehenden Kosten.

Seite 4 von 4

Antrag auf Registrierung für die Teilnahme an der Kick-off-Veranstaltung zum

„Innovationsprogramm zur Unterstützung von Diversifizierungsstrategien von Unternehmen der Verteidigungsbranche in zivile Sicherheitstechnologien“

26. September 2016 im Konferenzzentrum des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie, Scharnhorststr. 34-37, 10115 Berlin,

Raum Eichensaal, Zugang über die Invalidenstraße 48

Bitte zurücksenden an:

VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH Frau Martina Müller Postfach 10 11 39 40002 Düsseldorf

Telefax: +49 211 6214-182 / E-Mail: mueller_m@vdi.de

Hiermit beantrage ich verbindlich meine Registrierung zur Kick-off-Veranstaltung „Innovationsprogramm zur Unterstützung von Diversifizierungsstrategien von Unternehmen der Verteidigungsbranche in zivile Sicherheitstechnologien“.

Titel1

Name1

Vorname1

Institution1

Abteilung

Straße/Postfach

PLZ, Ort1

Telefon

E-Mail

Ich stimme zu, dass meine mit “1” gekennzeichneten Daten den Teilnehmenden der Veranstaltung zur Verfügung gestellt werden.

Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass während der Veranstaltung Fotoaufnahmen gemacht werden, die das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie bzw. der Projektträger VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH für die Berichterstattung in Newslettern und im Internet nutzen wird. Mit dem Registrierungsantrag erklärt sich der Antragsteller mit dieser Nutzung einverstanden.

Der Zutritt zur Veranstaltung kann nur bei Vorlage der Anmeldebestätigung sowie mit einem gültigen Lichtbildausweis gewährleistet werden.

Bitte kalkulieren Sie bei Ihrer Anreise ausreichend Zeit für die Sicherheitskontrollen beim Zutritt zur Veranstaltung im BMWi ein (Personen- bzw. Taschenscanner). Vielen Dank für Ihr Verständnis.

Cybertech Tel Aviv

Messegelände

Tel Aviv, IsraelThe Israel Trade Fairs & Convention Center

Termin

31.01.-01.02.2017

Turnus: jährlich

Gründungsjahr: 2014

Veranstalter

Arrowmedia Israel Ltd.P.O. Box: 710744424 Kfar SabaIsraelFon: +972 74 703-1211Fax: +972 9 767-1857

cyber@israeldefense.co.il

Projektteam

https://www.cybertechisrael.com/

Branchenschwerpunkte

IT und Kommunikationstechnik, Software (Branche 42), Sicherheit, Katastrophenschutz (Branche 72)

Angebotsschwerpunkte

Datenbanken, Datenschutz, Datenübertragung, Internet, Internetsicherheit, IT-Dienstleistungen, Software

Zutritt / Öffnungszeiten

Fachbesucher:täglich

Deutsche Beteiligung 1/2017

BMWiBeteiligungsform:Firmengemeinschaftsausstellung (G)Informationszentrum (IZ)Durchführung:

print_md_W_Messedetailseite_OffBet.rdl

Copyright AUMA - alle Angaben ohne Gewähr (Stand: 13.06.2016, 15:31 Uhr) 1/2

auma.de

Achten Sie auf geprüfte Kennzahlen.Ungeprüfte Daten sind Angaben des Veranstalters.

Kennzahlen 1/2016

Prüfung Nein

AusstellerzahlenAussteller 217

BesucherzahlenBesucher 12 000

Ausstellerstruktur

Herkunft der Aussteller 2016 unter anderem ausArgentinien, Australien, Belgien, Brasilien, Bulgarien, China (Volksrepublik), Dänemark , Deutschland, Ecuador, Estland, Finnland, Frankreich, Ghana, Griechenland, Großbritannien, Guatemala, Indien, Irland, Israel, Italien, Japan, Kanada, Korea (Republik), Mexiko, Niederlande, Nigeria, Österreich, Panama, Philippinen, Polen, Portugal, Ruanda, Rumänien, Russische Föderation, Schweden, Schweiz, Serbien, Singapur, Slowenien, Spanien, Südafrika, Taiwan, Thailand, Tschechische Republik, Türkei, Ukraine, Ungarn, USA, Vietnam

Copyright AUMA - alle Angaben ohne Gewähr

Copyright AUMA - alle Angaben ohne Gewähr (Stand: 13.06.2016, 15:31 Uhr) 2/2

auma.de

| Europe Program |

Policy Brief

1G|M|F April 2016

2016 | No. 117

The EU governments and institutions are considering developing something like a “White Book on Defense.” It should outline and operationalize the defense dimension of the new “EU Global Strategy,” the successor to the 2003 EU Security Strategy that will be adopted in summer 2016.

Such a document should be informed by what we are calling a new realism in defense. A realistic approach would mean starting with a sober analysis of both the current state and the expected future developments of European defense and the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This, and not unrealisti-cally high ambitions, should serve as the basis for rephrasing Europe’s defense and security concept and the role of the EU in this. Whatever is stated in the document, it should not be driven by unrealistically high ambitions but rather by the determination and the ability to implement the statements in the years following the publication of such a strategy. The new Defense White Book needs to be practical, to include only those statements that member states are deter-mined and able to realize in the few years following publication. Such a strategy should address the five

In Brief: The idea of developing an EU defense strategy is gaining traction. To reinvent the EU as a credible defense actor, the next moves should be driven by a “new realism.” Despite the growing need for military power, Europe’s defenses are in a deplorable state, with a dysfunctional industrial base, little political unity, and a severely underdeveloped defense policy. To be more capable as a union, Europe must still to be guided by a global assessment — yet the EU must also become more selective if it wants sustainable results. The EU’s approach to defense has to undergo a phase of recovery and restraint. The initial step is a baseline assessment of today’s defense and industrial capabilities, where they will stand in 2030, and which improvements are possible. Flagship projects such as integrating NATO’s Framework Nation concept into the EU and launching a big European unmanned aerial vehicle program can help to implement such a new approach, while also offering short-term political boost.

For a “New Realism” in European Defense: The Five Key Challenges an EU Defense Strategy Should Addressby Claudia Major and Christian Mölling

2G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

most relevant realities of European Defense: 1) the growing need for military power, 2) a deplorable state of Europe’s defense, 3) a dysfunctional industrial base, 4) divided members, and 5) a weak center. Applying realism in this situation would lead to a reassessment of the EU’s goals in defense.

Military Power: More Important and More Integrated into Civilian Policies The ability to act depends on the ability to exert mili-tary power, and Europe is losing capacity while others are gaining. Regionally and globally, the importance of military power has increased. Many governments have invested considerably in building up their military capabilities over the last decade, thereby weakening Europe’s power comparatively. This true for Russia and China, but also for many other actors in the Middle East and Asia. Europe’s military weakness has increased the likelihood of conflict in its neighbor-hood and beyond, as weakness invites other actors to test one’s capacity (and willingness) to act. Indeed, as the balance of military parities changes, so do calcula-tions. Military weakness may in fact tempt others to use force and thus seek a military solution to conflict or to the pursuit of interest.

And in reverse, sufficient military power makes room for political solutions, and thus supports and enables non-military policy tools. This is true for crisis management, where violence is already the dominant instrument, as in Kosovo or Mali, or where violence is the part of the objective, as in terrorism or war economies like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But this is also true for classical deterrence, where

sufficient military power dissuades adversaries from seeking military solutions to conflicts of interest.

Not only has military might returned to the fore, but security more broadly has gained new importance. Internal and external security are more intensely inter-twined, as demonstrated by the link between counter-terrorism and operations against the self-proclaimed Islamic State group. As a result, security has become so complex that we now talk about resilience as much as protection. Since the complete elimination of threats and vulnerabilities, for instance from cyber or terror attacks, is unattainable, experts now focus on building resilience or quickly identifying, halting, and recov-ering from assault. Another key element in today’s security environment is that defense and deterrence demand more civilian resources, because the threats to the European way of life have become more diverse.

As a result, the three main future tasks of the military remain in the spectrum between crisis management and territorial defense, and need to be modernized.

Deterrence: Military conflict — as a conventional war or as part of hybrid warfare — remains a risk for which Europeans must prepare. Military capabilities offer protection and also serve as a deterrent, helping prevent attack and enabling political solutions for conflicts.

Especially at early stages of escalation, deterrence is not only about threatening to use force, but about neutralizing the opponent’s opportunities to exploit the weaknesses of societies such as minority issues or asymmetric dependencies (like energy or raw mate-rials). Internal security is crucial — including a robust police and strong civilian administrative structures.

Resilience: The interconnectedness and openness of Western societies bestow them with great strength, but also leave them vulnerable to attack. Societies have to be empowered to better resist and quickly recover from attacks on their values, their cities, or their infrastructure. This requires intensified coordination

The ability to act depends on the ability to exert military power, and Europe is losing capacity while others are gaining.

3G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

between national and European levels and civil and military entities.

Defense: For the protection of territory and national institutions against military attack, defense remains a condition sine qua non. However, crisis management cannot be neglected, because European states cannot guarantee their security through territorial defense alone. In light of global interdependences, they will be required to defend their security outside of Europe as well. Here, the military remains an instrument of last resort in acute emergencies. The use of political and economic tools to defend and support a stable inter-national order has to be the highest priority, because such an order supports the openness and intercon-nectedness from which Europe benefits so tremen-dously.

Illusions of Sovereignty Created the Sad State of European DefenseThe need for military power is growing, but European defense is in a deplorable state, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. It has lost about 25 percent of its capabilities during the last decade through budget cutbacks.

It will take a long time for Europe’s defense capabili-ties to recover from the peacetime divestment and the austerity decisions taken during the financial crisis. It generally takes as long to get out of a mess as it took to get into it. Headlines about NATO’s new spearhead force and increasing defense budgets are misleading: Short-term military measures like the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) only rearrange existing capabilities without adding a single new solider. Increases in defense budgets can only offer new capabilities if they are sustained at significant levels over many years. Besides, so far only few states have committed to spend more.

European states have caused this dreadful state of their defense. While they have rhetorically recognized that military cooperation and specialization are necessary, the actual ambitions, let alone real progress toward

sharing, fall well short of the size of the problems. Quantitatively, European countries would outmatch Russian forces in almost all categories. Yet, because 28 EU and NATO countries treat their forces as national instead of European forces, the military power in Europe might be even less than the sum of its parts.

The reason is that Europeans desperately hang on to the illusion of their sovereignty, strength, autonomy, and independence. But in reality they are weak, inter-connected, and dependent on others. Countless and repeated rational arguments and even the perception of a growing threat have not changed governments’ approach significantly. Although defense austerity has continuously diminished the means available for defense since 2009, Europeans have clung to their illusion and continue to accept the destructive loss of capabilities. As a result, states have lost control over their security and given up power and international influence. None of Europe’s states has enough capabili-ties to offer an effective defense posture. This, quite ironically, eventually leads to a loss in sovereignty. The less a state can protect its citizens, the less sovereign it is — and the more dependent it is on the support of others to supply its missing power resources.

European Defense is Losing its Industrial BaseMilitary power needs to be backed by a defense tech-nology industrial base (DTIB). While the EU has a declared policy for an EU defense technological and industrial base (EDTIB), the EU governments have

It will take a long time for Europe’s defense capabilities to recover from the peacetime divestment and the austerity decisions taken during the financial crisis.

4G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

constantly developed away from an internal defense market or an industrial landscape that contributes to efficient defense investment and capability develop-ment in Europe. Instead of being a defense industrial community, Europe is caught between nationalist defense industrial and procurement policies, industrial globalization, and ineffective EU regulations.

The traditional preference of governments to buy national, i.e. to buy domestically as long as possible, has led to unnecessary but costly duplications of defense industrial capacities, like more than 20 producers of armored vehicles, all products very similar in design.

From an industrial point of view, European countries will soon have significantly fewer programs and less equipment — and hence, less to earn for industries by production and service, and more overcapacities. Industries react to this by scaling down, or by focusing their business outside of Europe via exports, which have become a lifeline of the industry. At the same time, key components, technologies, and raw mate-rials for platforms used in Europe have to be imported from outside, such as high-end semiconductors or rare earth minerals, meaning European armed forces have to accept non-European dependencies in their supply lines. These dependencies are likely to increase. The EDTIB may further shrink, since the domestic consol-idation into national champions, which some states favor, prevents a further Europeanization and drives companies, and thus the industrial backup of military power, out of Europe.

A Europe Divided by Several Trenches Defense has returned to Europe as a preoccupation, yet the EU has not benefitted from it. While NATO and coalitions of the willing have gained in impor-tance, the EU is further slipping into insignificance for two overarching reasons.

First, the EU as a political union — that is, an entity that constantly offers common solutions to common problems — is degrading. National governments and

EU-institutions are promoting national or institutional self-interest. Nobody fights for a union that protects the common good and a distinctive European way of life. EU-institutions search the business case for their institutional survival; the primary purpose of activities seems to be to introduce language into official texts to generate taskings for them. As a consequence, of these political and institutional problems, European security and defense related policies and other external policies of the EU are hardly connected in a consistent and systematic manner. Even worse, there is already a lack of consistency within European defense, with the activities in this area being scattered in various policy fields with different institutional competences and approaches. To put it simply, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been de facto

more about crisis management than about defense in its traditional and narrow sense. The European Defense Agency should support EU States in deliv-ering capabilities. But it is hardly connected to the various formats of bi-, mini-, and multilateral defense cooperation between the member states. The Commis-sion aims for a role in defense, as shown in the Task Force, the 2007 Defense package, or the “new Deal for defense.” Yet many member states consistently block it.

Second, there is also a gap between those inside the defense establishment who underscore the neces-sity and value of more Europe in defense, and those outside who remain reluctant to accept it or whose commitment is just rhetorical. However, the greatest challenge remains the lack of interest of the member states to stick to the agreed objectives of European defense and to implement them. In practice, they silently approve the current silo or pillar structure and

Nobody fights for a union that protects the common good and a distinctive European way of life.

5G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

accept that defense within the EU therefore remains in an infant state.

CSDP is a Widely Discredited BrandCSDP is the place where defense should traditionally happen within the EU, but it does not. Instead, the EU’s main defense dimension seems to be paralyzed. It is unable to respond to the changes in the secu-rity environment and to adapt its toolbox. Instead it follows the mantra from the old days of CSDP, that it is about operations. However, a high number of accomplished and ongoing operations as such do not legitimize CSDP’s existence these days. The other task of CSDP, i.e. generating capabilities, has not delivered significant results.

New narratives like “defense matters” did not resonate because the EU did not run its activities in support of its words. The EU “Defense Council” of 2013 that came up with this bold term wanted to “increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP” and to “…help to enhance the security of European citizens and contributes to peace and stability in our neighborhood and in the broader world.” Three months later, Russia invaded a country in Europe’s neighborhood and changed borders by force. While the EU played a role in generating and maintaining the consensus on sanc-tions against Russia, it has no role in defense: NATO took over this dimension.

To date, other deliverables under the new narrative, such as the four flagship projects (air-to air refueling, European drone program, governmental satellite communication, and cyber defense) have not gener-ated substantial enough results to give evidence to a proclaimed change of mind set in defense cooperation.

What is more, CSDP has lost its unique selling point; other organizations can also claim that they offer crisis management in both its military and civilian dimen-sions, like NATO and the UN.

The resulting key problem for the future use of the framework is that governments and EU institutions

have spent CSDP’s credit. This is not only true with regard to commentators, think tanks, and national decision-makers. The EU’s competitors and those seeking its support have also taken note of CSDP’s growing insignificance. Why, in view of the past achievements, or lack thereof, should any actor seriously believe that the EU will implement what it proclaimed and thus improve the defense dimen-sion? Due to the lack of a political impetus, progress in CSDP has become mainly theoretical and mostly addresses technical issues. Institutional engineering and yet another tiny reform of the EU Battlegroups bear witness to this.

Elements of a Sustainable Narrative to Define an EU Role in DefenseThe only way to defend Europe’s way of life and its common goods is a European way. Governments do not have the capacity to defend core values and interests individually. To become more capable as a union, the EU needs a global assessment, yet the EU must also become more selective in its engagement to reach sustainable results in security policy and there-fore regain trust, power, and influence. Member states must figure out, based on their priorities and available resources, what capabilities they want to give up before they lose them anyway.

If the EU and the member states make the effort and draft a new defense document, they should do so with a great deal of realism. This new realism needs to reflect determination and resources, not on the temporary ambitions to make headlines at summits. The new document should take into account the fact

While the EU played a role in generating and maintaining the consensus on sanctions against Russia, it has no role in defense.

6G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

that the conditions for effective defense have become less favorable for the EU and more diversified.

Four elements should guide the potential document.

1. A phase of consolidation: The Union has to consoli-date its power. For the coming years, the EU should plan and prepare its comeback into the security business. It has to limit itself to essential tasks in security, instead of doing everything a little and nothing convincingly. Europe has reduced its role in global security. A lack of political unity and mili-tary capability indicate that it will continue going down this road for some time at least. Instead of doing this by default, the EU should acknowledge and steer the process, letting partners know which elements of security the EU can provide and which others will have to deliver.

2. Balancing internal and external power interde-pendencies as a long-term objective: The primary challenge for the EU is to effectively manage EU-internal interdependencies as well as those that exist between the Union and its members on the one hand and other actors, such as the United States or China, on the other. In both cases, the solution is not to talk the EU and its members into a new illusion (such as strategic autonomy). Quite the opposite: It is about convincing Europeans that the EU can balance its interdependencies better, that is, retain the power to influence others while accepting the influence of others on its own policies.

3. A political response to the changing security envi-ronment: The new threat environment is only part of the problem; the other is the state of the Union and its foreign policy. To approach the future of European defense seriously, the EU would need to respond on a political level, and not with technical engineering. And it needs to respond not to the crises of the day but to the ongoing changes in the security environment that these crises reveal. It also needs to address the internal conditions for defense, namely the capability crunch and the growing inter-dependence of European states’ defense.

4. A comprehensive approach to deterrence, resilience, and defense: The EU can build upon its achievements, such as the comprehensive approach. The latter does not (only) have to cover operations. Rather, the Union needs a comprehensive approach to prepared-ness. The new priorities of EU security and defense policy are deterrence and defense, wherein the civilian dimension has a significant impact. Here, the EU can still build upon existing achievements to transform into a civil-military connectivity power.

Recommendations: Military Flagship Projects with Political ReachThe defense dimension of this narrative can be implemented by launching concrete projects that embody one or several of the elements that the narra-tive outlines. The minimal recognizable consensus on European defense is that all governments want to stay militarily capable. A recovery of the EU as a framework for defense can start in those areas where member states have, in principle, shown political leadership.

The industrial dimension is the only potential unique selling point left for a role for the EU and its insti-tutions in defense. It is not that the EU has been successful in fostering a defense industry, but it is the only actor that has the potential at all.

A relevant and capable defense industrial base for Europe is primarily a strategic factor. While an EDTIB would still be too small to generate substantial growth and employment in Europe, it would make a tremen-dous contribution to sustain military capabilities and a certain level of autonomy — hence its strategic relevance. This implies a distinctively European and political approach to the DTIB. A “buy national”

The new threat environment is only part of the problem; the other is the state of the Union and its foreign policy.

7G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

approach will not generate this industrial basis nor can a purely liberal market approach, as this market generates political power resources and not consumer goods. However, to achieve such political capabili-ties, a more economic and efficient defense industry remains critical. It is up to the Europeans to consoli-date their EDTIB to make it fit for survival.

Europeanizing the Framework Nation ConceptThe Union should transfer the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) (as currently implemented in NATO) into the EU and apply it to EU Battlegroups (EUBG). This would generate the necessary political momentum around military projects that have the potential to organize and keep capabilities on a more systematic basis, support EU-NATO cooperation, and retable the political questions to which EU member states still need to find answers. The FNC’s core idea is to build clusters of smaller and bigger member states that coordinate the commitment of key equipment and forces to the cluster on a long-term basis. This is scal-able, from individual projects up to larger formations.

Most EU states are members of NATO and have approved the FNC. Moreover, the EUBG Concept is built on similar concepts, but has run out of political steam and military relevance. The FNC provides a more tangible and realistic answer to the demands of European defense than EU-Battlegroups and thus can reinvigorate cooperation in defense among EU members to increase sustainability in such multina-tional frameworks. Politically, it represents a renewed approach to European burden sharing. It also raises central questions: how much dependence are member

states willing to accept — or have to accept — in order to ensure interoperability and guarantee access to core capabilities? Applying the FNC to the battlegroups would allow for a long-term cooperation of the units currently only operating on a six-months basis and would equip them with a greater range of capabilities. The resulting quickly deployable EU-Brigade could get an immediate task, namely the protection of and crisis management at the Southern flank.

Furthermore, fusing the EUBG and FNC on concep-tual, doctrinal, and procedural levels would offer a transmission belt between the EU and NATO, thus allowing Finland and Sweden to participate in NATO developments below the threshold of membership.

The Essence of Realism: A Defense Sector ReviewNew realism starts with Europe knowing the realities of its own defense sector. Such a baseline for realistic defense strategies can result from a European Defense Review 2030. This would offer governments a candid assessment of what is available today and in 15 years’ time in terms of both capabilities and industrial base. It would provide a more systematic base for the future work on European defense and could spur a debate about developments from a truly European perspec-tive. The description of gaps and duplications would enable the development of well-grounded suggestions to identify future areas of cooperation within the EU context.

As the growing interdependencies among EU member states’ security and defense policies will also become visible, questions about efficient and legitimate ways to organize these political interdependencies can be discussed. The review should be conducted by an inde-pendent commission to keep the process political but protect it from national politics.

Political and Institutional Principles: From CSDP to Multiple Geometries The experiences of the past have shown that coopera-tion among 28 nations is cumbersome, ineffective, and often falls victim to politics. Out of this frustra-tion, states have developed cooperation in smaller

The industrial dimension is the only potential unique selling point left for a role for the EU and its institutions in defense.

8G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

groups, in and outside EU structures. These seem to deliver more results, as shown in the recent integration of German and Dutch military units. Inside the EU, the bold idea of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), agreed upon in the Lisbon Treaty, has never materialized.

It is therefore necessary to develop a way to gradually integrate defense, which could build upon existing ideas (core Europe in defense, PESCO, concentric circles, variable geometry, Europe at different speeds). The allegation that such an approach would affect European unity is not tenable — as such unity has not (yet) been delivered in defense. Rather, enabling those who are willing and able can have a motivating effect on the other Europeans, and therefore enable European defense as such. A small group of willing and able states would form a European Defense Core. Around this inner circle, the remaining states would form two or three additional circles, access to which would depend equally upon capability and willingness.

A second option would be a differentiation according to tasks. In this case, the circles would not be defined according to the level of capability and willingness to commit to defense, but according to the tasks that member states are most keen to carry out. Several circles with distinctive tasks would co-exist, rather than be sequenced according to defense quality. A deterrence and defense circle, a crisis management circle, and a stabilization and post crisis reconstruc-tion circle would all be conceivable.

A Truly European UAV Program as an Industrial DriverThe EU needs to send a strong signal to its defense industry. The development of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms and related technologies is one of the few options left to develop something significant to engage with the regulatory, industrial, and political challenges to a more European DTIB. While European governments have officially declared their support for such a strategic project, the steps undertaken to imple-ment it are insufficient at least.

Industries are driven by contracts and money, not political declarations. While Europe is talking about EURO-MALE drones and the bilateral U.K.-French project is making small steps, others are doing bold things. Australia is going to invest €16 billion into the development of UAVs. The United States is consid-ering investing several billion to keep the cutting edge in this technology, also vis-à-vis Europe.

If the EU and its governments want to send a bold signal, heard by industry, partners, and adversaries in the world alike, they would pledge €20 billion for research and development of a truly European drone program.

A UAV program developed and produced by Euro-pean companies would allow the existing rules for the internal market to be applied to one of the last projects foreseeable that have the economic size and technological potential to shape Europe’s industrial and technological landscape. It can drive consolida-tion and smart specialization of industries and prevent further degradation of the EDTIB through parallel national programs and non-EU procurements. This goes well beyond the military aerospace sector because the project is by definition dual use and incorporates many technologies from key (civilian) industries like IT and space. It would also push change in production processes and cooperation among civilian and defense companies, thus preparing Europe for the challenges of the next generation of industrial production and the just-established U.S. “Third offset strategy” for defense. It would also get the EU talking about support for strategic exports and regulation, since inter-European demand will not be enough to revitalize industry. The United States and Asia are growing markets that are

The EU needs to send a strong signal to its defense industry.

9G|M|F April 2016

| Europe Program | Policy Brief

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone.

About the AuthorsDr. Claudia Major is a senior associate in the International Security Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin. Dr. Christian Mölling is a senior resident fellow for security policy with GMF based in Berlin.

About the Europe ProgramThe Europe Program at GMF enhances understanding of the challenges facing the European Union and the potential implications for the transatlantic relationship. It contributes to the European and transatlantic policy debate through policy-oriented research, analysis, and convening to help improve the political, economic, financial, and social stability of the EU and its member states. The Europe Program focuses on the following key areas: integration and disintegration in the EU; Germany’s role in Europe and the world; challenges in the EU’s neighborhood; reconnecting Southern European member states; migration; the rise of populism; and EU energy security.

About GMFThe German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF contributes research and analysis and convenes leaders on transatlantic issues relevant to policymakers. GMF offers rising leaders opportunities to develop their skills and networks through transatlantic exchange, and supports civil society in the Balkans and Black Sea regions by fostering demo-cratic initiatives, rule of law, and regional cooperation. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

1744 R Street NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 | F 1 202 265 1662 | E info@gmfus.org

especially attractive for civilian producers of UAV technologies.

To contribute to European and global security effec-tively, the EU has to innovate again, in political unity, military capability, and institutional landscape. The degree of “new realism” in an EU Defense Strategy — and by extension in EU defense in action — will be the first indicator of whether or not the Union is up to this challenge.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | ISSN 2366-0805 Seite 1/4

Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016

Verpflichtungen in der NATO Mehr Geld für die Bundeswehr von Karl-Heinz Kamp

Am 26. Januar 2016 kündigte Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen an, in den kommenden 15

Jahren insgesamt 130 Milliarden Euro in die Ausrüstung der Bundeswehr investieren zu wollen. Zwar traf

diese Ankündigung auf deutlich weniger Kritik als erwartet, allerdings wurde gefragt, wofür diese Mittel

denn genau benötigt würden. Der allgemeine Hinweis, die Bundeswehr sei unterfinanziert, wird von

vielen Kommentatoren als nicht hinreichend empfunden. Dabei lässt sich der künftige Finanzbedarf

ganz wesentlich aus den Verpflichtungen ableiten, die Deutschland im Rahmen der NATO zur

Rückversicherung der osteuropäischen Bündnispartner übernimmt.

An der finanziellen Forderung der Ministerin überraschte nicht nur die Höhe der Summe, sondern vor allem die

Tatsache, dass sie – abgesehen von Protesten der Linken - kaum auf Widerstand im politischen Berlin stieß. Man

stelle sich vor, ein Ansinnen von 130 Milliarden Euro Verteidigungsinvestitionen wäre vor vier oder fünf Jahren

von einem Regierungsmitglied erhoben worden – die Forderung nach einem sofortigen Rücktritt wäre diesem

sicher gewesen. Stattdessen stellte der Wehrbeauftragte, Hans-Peter Bartels, am gleichen Tag seinen

Jahresbericht vor und sprach ebenfalls von „existenziellen Ausrüstungslücken“ bei den Streitkräften.

Allerdings war der geforderte Gesamtbetrag nicht genau aufgeschlüsselt und stellt eher eine Richtgröße

dar. Laut der Ministerin geht es bei den bisherigen Planungen um einen „moderaten Anstieg, der sich

verstetigt“: so sollen beispielweise pro Jahr zusätzlich drei bis vier Milliarden Euro allein für militärisches

Gerät aufgewendet werden. Auch sollen die in der Vergangenheit beschlossenen Begrenzungen bei der Zahl

von Waffensystemen nicht mehr gelten, ebenso wenig wie das einstige Prinzip, Truppenverbände nur mit

70 Prozent des erforderlichen Geräts auszurüsten.

Aus der fehlenden Detaillierung der Forderung wurden in der Presse vor allem zwei Kritikpunkte abgeleitet:

Zum einen wurde bemängelt, dass die Ausrüstungsinitiative angegangen würde, noch ehe das neue

Weißbuch veröffentlicht worden sei. Damit würden Sachentscheidungen getroffen, ohne die

sicherheitspolitische Lagebestimmung abzuwarten – das Weißbuch würde also entwertet. Zum anderen

wurde bemängelt, dass aus der reinen Forderung nach militärischer Ausrüstung nicht zu erkennen sei,

wofür und für welche Szenarien diese Rüstungsmittel denn gefordert würden. Der allgemeine Hinweis auf

die langjährige Unterfinanzierung der Streitkräfte reiche nicht aus.

Der Einwand, dass man erst das Weißbuch abwarten müsse, entwertet sich von selbst, wenn man die

Entwicklungen der letzten beiden Jahre nachvollzieht. Als in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2014 die Idee eines

neuen Weißbuchs Gestalt annahm, waren insbesondere die Entwicklungen in Osteuropa noch nicht

abzusehen. Seither hat sich Russland aus der bestehenden europäischen Sicherheitsordnung verabschiedet

und stellt für die östlichen NATO-Mitglieder einer reale und für einige von ihnen eine vitale Bedrohung dar.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016 Seite 2/4

Der Schwenk der russischen Führung zu einer Politik, die auch die gewaltsame Änderung von Grenzen in

Europa in Kauf nimmt, um der vermeintlichen Weltmachtrolle Russlands Geltung zu verleihen, ist offenbar

nachhaltig und dürfte sich in der kommenden Dekade nicht umkehren. Angesichts des russischen

Streitkräfteaufwuchses an seinen Westgrenzen und der Drohgebärden Moskaus waren Struktur-

entscheidungen zur Stärkung von Abschreckung und Verteidigungsfähigkeit im Bündnisrahmen

erforderlich, die nicht auf den Abschluss des Weißbuchprozesses warten konnten. Stattdessen wurden

diese fundamentalen Lageänderungen in den Weißbuchprozess – also die öffentliche Debatte zur

Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr – einbezogen.

Die Frage nach der Begründung für die Budgetforderung ergibt sich ebenfalls zu einem erheblichen Anteil aus

den sicherheitspolitischen Veränderungen seit 2014. Von der Annahme ausgehend, dass die Partnerschaft mit

Russland dauerhaft sei, hatten die NATO und die Mehrzahl ihrer Mitglieder die Fähigkeiten zur Landes- und

Bündnisverteidigung erheblich zurückgefahren. Stattdessen wurden Streitkräfte für das militärische

Krisenmanagement optimiert – zunächst auf dem Balkan, später „out of area“ vor allem in Afghanistan.

Russlands völkerrechtswidrige Annexion der Krim setzte jedoch Abschreckung und Verteidigung wieder an

die Spitze der sicherheitspolitischen Agenda, traf zugleich viele NATO-Mitglieder aber militärisch

weitgehend unvorbereitet. Die NATO fasste 2014 in Wales sehr weitreichende Beschlüsse zur militärischen

Verstärkung des Bündnisses. Mittlerweile hat die atlantische Allianz diese Beschlüsse vom Wales-Gipfel

teilweise umgesetzt und gemäß der Lageentwicklung in Russland fortentwickelt. Entsprechend groß sind

die Erwartungen an den Folgegipfel im Juli in Warschau und damit an die „großen Vier“ in der NATO: USA,

Großbritannien, Frankreich und Deutschland. Die USA haben sich für viele Europäer unerwartet stark

engagiert und tragen die Hauptlast bei der Wiederherstellung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit der NATO in

Osteuropa. So sind die 2014 im Rahmen der „European Reassurance Initiative“ bereitgestellten Mittel auf

3,4 Milliarden US-Dollar angewachsen und kommen nicht nur NATO-Staaten zu. Allerdings erwartet

Washington eine faire Lastenteilung von Seiten der europäischen Verbündeten. Frankreich sieht seinen

militärischen Schwerpunkt in Afrika und hat dort erhebliche militärische Verpflichtungen übernommen.

Damit sind es Deutschland und Großbritannien, die aufgrund ihrer militärischen Fähigkeiten neben den

USA einen signifikanten Anteil werden leisten müssen. Für Deutschland ergibt sich diese Verpflichtung

nicht nur aus seinem politischen, wirtschaftlichen und letztlich auch militärischen Gewicht sowie aus der

zentralen Bedeutung der NATO für seine Sicherheit, sondern auch aus der Tatsache, dass es sich im Kalten

Krieg stets auf die Solidarität seiner übrigen NATO-Partner verlassen konnte.

Verbesserung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit der NATO

Mit Blick auf Warschau hat sich die NATO für ihre militärischen Entscheidungen auf vier Grundsätze

verständigt: Erstens, eine Balance zwischen den Maßnahmen gegen die Bedrohungen aus dem Osten und

jenen aus dem Süden zu wahren, da die NATO-Mitglieder je nach ihrer geografischen Lage unterschiedliche

Bedrohungswahrnehmungen hegen. Zweitens soll es eine Balance zwischen einer glaubwürdigen „Forward

Presence“ und effektiven Verstärkungsmaßnahmen geben. Drittens muss, ganz im Geiste des Grund-

gedankens des Harmel-Berichts von 1967 die Balance zwischen dem Schutz vor Russland und dem Dialog

mit Russland gewährleistet sein. Viertens geht es um die Balance bei den Verteidigungsausgaben, sowohl

zwischen den NATO Mitgliedsländern als auch zwischen der Höhe der Verteidigungsausgaben und dem

Anteil der Investitionen. Auf der Grundlage dieser Überlegungen hat die NATO fünf Felder (sogenannte

„Work Strands“) priorisiert, in denen die Verbesserung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit umgesetzt werden soll

und zu denen Deutschland wesentliche militärische Beiträge leisten muss:

1. Readiness Action Plan

Hier geht es vor allem um die neue schnelle Eingreiftruppe (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force –

VJTF), um die sechs kleinen Aufbaustäbe in Osteuropa (NATO Force Integration Units – NFIU), das

Multinationale Korps Nordost und die Multinationale Division Südost.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016 Seite 3/4

2. Hybride Kriegsführung

Verbesserungen werden vor allem unter den Schlagworten Resilienz, Cyber-Defence und NATO-

EU Kooperation angestrebt.

3. Stärkung von Abschreckung und Verteidigung

Kernaufgaben sind die Schaffung einer glaubhaften und adäquaten militärischen Präsenz in

Osteuropa (Enhanced Persistent Presence) sowie effizienter Nachschubwege (Reinforcement).

4. Raketenabwehr

Die auf der Basis amerikanischer Abfangsysteme aufgebauten Fähigkeiten müssen vervollständigt

und den neuen Anforderungen angepasst werden.

5. Finanzielle Unterfütterung

Zur Finanzierung der ambitionierten Beschlüsse von Wales hatten sich die NATO-Mitglieder erneut

auf das sogenannte „Defense Investment Pledge“ verständigt, demzufolge sich die Mitgliedsstaaten

dazu verpflichten, mindestens zwei Prozent ihres Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) für die Verteidigungs-

ausgaben aufzuwenden und mindestens 20 Prozent der Ausgaben für Investitionen zu verwenden.

Gerade im dritten Work Strand – der Abschreckung und Verteidigung – sind die NATO-Verteidigungs-

minister bei ihrem letzten gemeinsamen Ministertreffen im Februar 2016 weitreichende Verpflichtungen

eingegangen, die nun auf dem Weg nach Warschau konkretisiert werden.

Entscheidend ist, dass gerade unter dem Aspekt der Abschreckung gegenüber Russland eine militärische Präsenz

möglichst vieler NATO-Staaten (allen voran der USA) in Osteuropa erforderlich ist. Im Kalten Krieg galt gleiches

für die NATO-Stationierungen an der innerdeutschen Grenze, denen zudem die Funktion eines „Stolperdrahts“

(Tripwire) zukam: Jede Aggression gegen die NATO-Streitkräfte hätte mehrere Mitgliedsstaaten direkt betroffen,

eine weitergehende militärische Reaktion der NATO ausgelöst und damit das Risiko für einen Angreifer

erheblich erhöht. Würde dieser rational zwischen Kosten und Nutzen abwägen, müsste ihm ein Angriff als

aussichtslos oder wenig erfolgreich erscheinen – das Ziel von der Abschreckung wäre erreicht. Debattiert wird

allerdings seit langem, ob die erforderlichen Streitkräftestationierungen permanent oder mit Rücksicht auf

Russland, dem man einst zugesagt hatte, keine signifikanten Militärkapazitäten in Osteuropa dauerhaft zu

stationieren, rotierend („persistent“) sein sollen. Mit der Einigung der Verteidigungsminister auf eine „Enhanced

Persistent Presence“ scheint nun ein Mittelweg gefunden. Es bleibt bei rotierenden Stationierungen, allerdings

werden diese derart verstärkt (enhanced), dass zu jedem Zeitpunkt ein adäquates Dispositiv vor Ort ist, um

jegliche Aggression mit einem erheblichen Eskalationsrisiko zu behaften.

Wenn die Staats- und Regierungschefs in Warschau zustimmen, werden im Baltikum drei mechanisierte

Bataillone mit je circa 1.200 Soldaten stationiert, eines davon in Litauen unter deutscher Beteiligung und

voraussichtlich deutscher Führung. Ein viertes Bataillon in Polen ist ebenfalls wahrscheinlich. Für die

stationierten NATO-Verbände oder die Schnelle Eingreiftruppe gilt auch das Prinzip des „Tripwire“: Sie

werden große russische Streitkräftemassierungen nicht aufhalten können, zumal Moskau gezeigt hat, dass

es in Manövern kurzfristig 60.000 bis 100.000 Mann zu massieren vermag. Stattdessen speist sich der

Abschreckungseffekt daraus, dass die Verletzung des Stolperdrahtes eine weitergehende militärische

Antwort der NATO auslösen würde.

Allerdings greift diese Logik nur, wenn ein potentieller Angreifer damit rechnen muss, dass die NATO in der

Lage ist, im Konfliktfall rasch Verstärkung in die betroffene Region zu bringen. Auch hier spielt Deutschland

eine zentrale Rolle, nicht nur aufgrund seiner politischen und militärischen Bedeutung sondern auch

aufgrund der geografischen Lage. Im Ost-West Konflikt existierte eine gewaltige „Nachschub-Industrie“

mit der damaligen Bundesrepublik als Drehscheibe. Jährliche REFORGER-Übungen (Return of Forces to

Germany) stellten ein effizientes militärisches „Reinforcement“ sicher. Teile dieser Fähigkeiten müssen

künftig wieder hergestellt werden.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016 Seite 4/4

Wie dringend dieser kostenintensive Aufbau von „Forward Presence“ und Verstärkungsfähigkeiten ist,

haben jüngste NATO-Manöver gezeigt. Mitte März führte die NATO die jährliche CMX-Übung (Crisis

Management Exercise) durch. Dieser Übung, die Verfahren übt ohne konkrete Streitkräftebewegungen zu

beinhalten, lag erstmals nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges wieder ein Szenario zur Bündnisverteidigung

nach Artikel 5 des NATO-Vertrags zugrunde. Die Ergebnisse des fiktiven aber an real möglichen Szenarien

orientierten Verlaufs waren ernüchternd. Während die politischen Entscheidungsprozesse zeitgerecht

erfolgten, konnte die NATO militärisch mit dem simulierten Aufwuchs der gegnerischen Streitkräfte nicht

Schritt halten. Für viele NATO-Mitglieder war dieses Ergebnis ein Augenöffner und zeigt, welche

Anstrengungen noch unternommen werden müssen.

Konsequenzen für den deutschen Verteidigungshaushalt

Damit ergibt sich für Deutschland – neben den seit vielen Jahren bemängelten Ausrüstungslücken

beziehungsweise der Teilausstattung von Verbänden mit 70 Prozent ihres Geräts – auch aus den jüngsten

Verpflichtungen gegenüber der NATO ein erheblicher Finanzbedarf, der sich zu den ohnehin laufenden

Verpflichtungen in Afghanistan, in Afrika oder auf dem Balkan hinzuaddiert.

Mit seiner Zustimmung zum „Defense Investment Pledge“ steht Deutschland in der Kritik, weil der

Verteidigungshaushalt derzeit nur 1,19 Prozentanteil vom BIP beträgt. Deutschlands Verweis auf das

gestiegene BIP verfängt nur bedingt, wie Präsident Obama bei seinem Besuch in Deutschland wieder

betont hat. Auch bei den Investitionen liegt Deutschland unter den geforderten 20 Prozent. Dennoch

bleibt das Zwei Prozent-Ziel der NATO eine hochpolitische Zahl, da der deutsche Verteidigungs-

haushalt nach jetzigem Stand nahezu verdoppelt werden müsste. Möglicherweise würde ein solch

sichtbarer Zuwachs deutscher Militärmacht Bedenken in Europa oder in der NATO auslösen.

Bei der „Enhanced Persistent Presence“ kommen auf Deutschland erhebliche Ausgaben für die

rotierende Stationierung von Streitkräften in Osteuropa zu, die noch von den notwendigen

Investitionen im Bereich des „Reinforcements“ ergänzt werden.

Um eine Spaltung der NATO in Ost und Süd zu vermeiden, muss auch der Bedrohungs-

wahrnehmung der südlichen Mitglieder Rechnung getragen werden. Hier leistet die deutsche

Marine einen ständig wachsenden Beitrag, etwa indem zu den schon laufenden Operationen im

Mittelmeer kürzlich noch die Überwachungsmission in der Ägäis hinzugekommen ist. Gleichzeitig

muss die Marine in der Ostsee Präsenz zeigen und bleibt auch Teil des NATO-Marineverbandes im

Nordatlantik. All dies geschieht von dem Hintergrund, dass die Marine in den vergangenen Jahren

die stärksten Sparmaßnahmen hat durchstehen müssen. Die Luftwaffe investiert große Beträge für

eine dauerhafte Präsenz im türkischen Incirlik, weil man die Bekämpfung des IS als eine langfristige

Aufgabe ansieht.

Um all diese Aufgaben wahrnehmen zu können, hat die Ministerin angekündigt, die künftige

Truppenstärke nach oben offen halten zu wollen und zunächst 7.000 Soldaten mehr einstellen zu

müssen. Auch da sieht sie sich im Einklang mit dem Wehrbeauftragten, der schon vor einigen

Monaten auf einen erheblichen personellen Mehrbedarf verwiesen hatte.

Angesichts dieser Erfordernisse scheint die geforderte Summe von 130 Milliarden Euro über 15 Jahre

noch eher konventionell geschätzt. Unstreitig ist aber, dass angesichts der fundamental geänderten

Sicherheitslage eine deutliche Erhöhung der Ausgaben für die Bundeswehr unabdingbar ist.

Karl-Heinz Kamp ist Präsident der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik in Berlin. Der Autor gibt seine

persönliche Meinung wieder.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | ISSN 2366-0805 Seite 1/4

Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016

Verpflichtungen in der NATO Mehr Geld für die Bundeswehr von Karl-Heinz Kamp

Am 26. Januar 2016 kündigte Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen an, in den kommenden 15

Jahren insgesamt 130 Milliarden Euro in die Ausrüstung der Bundeswehr investieren zu wollen. Zwar traf

diese Ankündigung auf deutlich weniger Kritik als erwartet, allerdings wurde gefragt, wofür diese Mittel

denn genau benötigt würden. Der allgemeine Hinweis, die Bundeswehr sei unterfinanziert, wird von

vielen Kommentatoren als nicht hinreichend empfunden. Dabei lässt sich der künftige Finanzbedarf

ganz wesentlich aus den Verpflichtungen ableiten, die Deutschland im Rahmen der NATO zur

Rückversicherung der osteuropäischen Bündnispartner übernimmt.

An der finanziellen Forderung der Ministerin überraschte nicht nur die Höhe der Summe, sondern vor allem die

Tatsache, dass sie – abgesehen von Protesten der Linken - kaum auf Widerstand im politischen Berlin stieß. Man

stelle sich vor, ein Ansinnen von 130 Milliarden Euro Verteidigungsinvestitionen wäre vor vier oder fünf Jahren

von einem Regierungsmitglied erhoben worden – die Forderung nach einem sofortigen Rücktritt wäre diesem

sicher gewesen. Stattdessen stellte der Wehrbeauftragte, Hans-Peter Bartels, am gleichen Tag seinen

Jahresbericht vor und sprach ebenfalls von „existenziellen Ausrüstungslücken“ bei den Streitkräften.

Allerdings war der geforderte Gesamtbetrag nicht genau aufgeschlüsselt und stellt eher eine Richtgröße

dar. Laut der Ministerin geht es bei den bisherigen Planungen um einen „moderaten Anstieg, der sich

verstetigt“: so sollen beispielweise pro Jahr zusätzlich drei bis vier Milliarden Euro allein für militärisches

Gerät aufgewendet werden. Auch sollen die in der Vergangenheit beschlossenen Begrenzungen bei der Zahl

von Waffensystemen nicht mehr gelten, ebenso wenig wie das einstige Prinzip, Truppenverbände nur mit

70 Prozent des erforderlichen Geräts auszurüsten.

Aus der fehlenden Detaillierung der Forderung wurden in der Presse vor allem zwei Kritikpunkte abgeleitet:

Zum einen wurde bemängelt, dass die Ausrüstungsinitiative angegangen würde, noch ehe das neue

Weißbuch veröffentlicht worden sei. Damit würden Sachentscheidungen getroffen, ohne die

sicherheitspolitische Lagebestimmung abzuwarten – das Weißbuch würde also entwertet. Zum anderen

wurde bemängelt, dass aus der reinen Forderung nach militärischer Ausrüstung nicht zu erkennen sei,

wofür und für welche Szenarien diese Rüstungsmittel denn gefordert würden. Der allgemeine Hinweis auf

die langjährige Unterfinanzierung der Streitkräfte reiche nicht aus.

Der Einwand, dass man erst das Weißbuch abwarten müsse, entwertet sich von selbst, wenn man die

Entwicklungen der letzten beiden Jahre nachvollzieht. Als in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2014 die Idee eines

neuen Weißbuchs Gestalt annahm, waren insbesondere die Entwicklungen in Osteuropa noch nicht

abzusehen. Seither hat sich Russland aus der bestehenden europäischen Sicherheitsordnung verabschiedet

und stellt für die östlichen NATO-Mitglieder einer reale und für einige von ihnen eine vitale Bedrohung dar.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016 Seite 2/4

Der Schwenk der russischen Führung zu einer Politik, die auch die gewaltsame Änderung von Grenzen in

Europa in Kauf nimmt, um der vermeintlichen Weltmachtrolle Russlands Geltung zu verleihen, ist offenbar

nachhaltig und dürfte sich in der kommenden Dekade nicht umkehren. Angesichts des russischen

Streitkräfteaufwuchses an seinen Westgrenzen und der Drohgebärden Moskaus waren Struktur-

entscheidungen zur Stärkung von Abschreckung und Verteidigungsfähigkeit im Bündnisrahmen

erforderlich, die nicht auf den Abschluss des Weißbuchprozesses warten konnten. Stattdessen wurden

diese fundamentalen Lageänderungen in den Weißbuchprozess – also die öffentliche Debatte zur

Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr – einbezogen.

Die Frage nach der Begründung für die Budgetforderung ergibt sich ebenfalls zu einem erheblichen Anteil aus

den sicherheitspolitischen Veränderungen seit 2014. Von der Annahme ausgehend, dass die Partnerschaft mit

Russland dauerhaft sei, hatten die NATO und die Mehrzahl ihrer Mitglieder die Fähigkeiten zur Landes- und

Bündnisverteidigung erheblich zurückgefahren. Stattdessen wurden Streitkräfte für das militärische

Krisenmanagement optimiert – zunächst auf dem Balkan, später „out of area“ vor allem in Afghanistan.

Russlands völkerrechtswidrige Annexion der Krim setzte jedoch Abschreckung und Verteidigung wieder an

die Spitze der sicherheitspolitischen Agenda, traf zugleich viele NATO-Mitglieder aber militärisch

weitgehend unvorbereitet. Die NATO fasste 2014 in Wales sehr weitreichende Beschlüsse zur militärischen

Verstärkung des Bündnisses. Mittlerweile hat die atlantische Allianz diese Beschlüsse vom Wales-Gipfel

teilweise umgesetzt und gemäß der Lageentwicklung in Russland fortentwickelt. Entsprechend groß sind

die Erwartungen an den Folgegipfel im Juli in Warschau und damit an die „großen Vier“ in der NATO: USA,

Großbritannien, Frankreich und Deutschland. Die USA haben sich für viele Europäer unerwartet stark

engagiert und tragen die Hauptlast bei der Wiederherstellung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit der NATO in

Osteuropa. So sind die 2014 im Rahmen der „European Reassurance Initiative“ bereitgestellten Mittel auf

3,4 Milliarden US-Dollar angewachsen und kommen nicht nur NATO-Staaten zu. Allerdings erwartet

Washington eine faire Lastenteilung von Seiten der europäischen Verbündeten. Frankreich sieht seinen

militärischen Schwerpunkt in Afrika und hat dort erhebliche militärische Verpflichtungen übernommen.

Damit sind es Deutschland und Großbritannien, die aufgrund ihrer militärischen Fähigkeiten neben den

USA einen signifikanten Anteil werden leisten müssen. Für Deutschland ergibt sich diese Verpflichtung

nicht nur aus seinem politischen, wirtschaftlichen und letztlich auch militärischen Gewicht sowie aus der

zentralen Bedeutung der NATO für seine Sicherheit, sondern auch aus der Tatsache, dass es sich im Kalten

Krieg stets auf die Solidarität seiner übrigen NATO-Partner verlassen konnte.

Verbesserung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit der NATO

Mit Blick auf Warschau hat sich die NATO für ihre militärischen Entscheidungen auf vier Grundsätze

verständigt: Erstens, eine Balance zwischen den Maßnahmen gegen die Bedrohungen aus dem Osten und

jenen aus dem Süden zu wahren, da die NATO-Mitglieder je nach ihrer geografischen Lage unterschiedliche

Bedrohungswahrnehmungen hegen. Zweitens soll es eine Balance zwischen einer glaubwürdigen „Forward

Presence“ und effektiven Verstärkungsmaßnahmen geben. Drittens muss, ganz im Geiste des Grund-

gedankens des Harmel-Berichts von 1967 die Balance zwischen dem Schutz vor Russland und dem Dialog

mit Russland gewährleistet sein. Viertens geht es um die Balance bei den Verteidigungsausgaben, sowohl

zwischen den NATO Mitgliedsländern als auch zwischen der Höhe der Verteidigungsausgaben und dem

Anteil der Investitionen. Auf der Grundlage dieser Überlegungen hat die NATO fünf Felder (sogenannte

„Work Strands“) priorisiert, in denen die Verbesserung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit umgesetzt werden soll

und zu denen Deutschland wesentliche militärische Beiträge leisten muss:

1. Readiness Action Plan

Hier geht es vor allem um die neue schnelle Eingreiftruppe (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force –

VJTF), um die sechs kleinen Aufbaustäbe in Osteuropa (NATO Force Integration Units – NFIU), das

Multinationale Korps Nordost und die Multinationale Division Südost.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016 Seite 3/4

2. Hybride Kriegsführung

Verbesserungen werden vor allem unter den Schlagworten Resilienz, Cyber-Defence und NATO-

EU Kooperation angestrebt.

3. Stärkung von Abschreckung und Verteidigung

Kernaufgaben sind die Schaffung einer glaubhaften und adäquaten militärischen Präsenz in

Osteuropa (Enhanced Persistent Presence) sowie effizienter Nachschubwege (Reinforcement).

4. Raketenabwehr

Die auf der Basis amerikanischer Abfangsysteme aufgebauten Fähigkeiten müssen vervollständigt

und den neuen Anforderungen angepasst werden.

5. Finanzielle Unterfütterung

Zur Finanzierung der ambitionierten Beschlüsse von Wales hatten sich die NATO-Mitglieder erneut

auf das sogenannte „Defense Investment Pledge“ verständigt, demzufolge sich die Mitgliedsstaaten

dazu verpflichten, mindestens zwei Prozent ihres Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) für die Verteidigungs-

ausgaben aufzuwenden und mindestens 20 Prozent der Ausgaben für Investitionen zu verwenden.

Gerade im dritten Work Strand – der Abschreckung und Verteidigung – sind die NATO-Verteidigungs-

minister bei ihrem letzten gemeinsamen Ministertreffen im Februar 2016 weitreichende Verpflichtungen

eingegangen, die nun auf dem Weg nach Warschau konkretisiert werden.

Entscheidend ist, dass gerade unter dem Aspekt der Abschreckung gegenüber Russland eine militärische Präsenz

möglichst vieler NATO-Staaten (allen voran der USA) in Osteuropa erforderlich ist. Im Kalten Krieg galt gleiches

für die NATO-Stationierungen an der innerdeutschen Grenze, denen zudem die Funktion eines „Stolperdrahts“

(Tripwire) zukam: Jede Aggression gegen die NATO-Streitkräfte hätte mehrere Mitgliedsstaaten direkt betroffen,

eine weitergehende militärische Reaktion der NATO ausgelöst und damit das Risiko für einen Angreifer

erheblich erhöht. Würde dieser rational zwischen Kosten und Nutzen abwägen, müsste ihm ein Angriff als

aussichtslos oder wenig erfolgreich erscheinen – das Ziel von der Abschreckung wäre erreicht. Debattiert wird

allerdings seit langem, ob die erforderlichen Streitkräftestationierungen permanent oder mit Rücksicht auf

Russland, dem man einst zugesagt hatte, keine signifikanten Militärkapazitäten in Osteuropa dauerhaft zu

stationieren, rotierend („persistent“) sein sollen. Mit der Einigung der Verteidigungsminister auf eine „Enhanced

Persistent Presence“ scheint nun ein Mittelweg gefunden. Es bleibt bei rotierenden Stationierungen, allerdings

werden diese derart verstärkt (enhanced), dass zu jedem Zeitpunkt ein adäquates Dispositiv vor Ort ist, um

jegliche Aggression mit einem erheblichen Eskalationsrisiko zu behaften.

Wenn die Staats- und Regierungschefs in Warschau zustimmen, werden im Baltikum drei mechanisierte

Bataillone mit je circa 1.200 Soldaten stationiert, eines davon in Litauen unter deutscher Beteiligung und

voraussichtlich deutscher Führung. Ein viertes Bataillon in Polen ist ebenfalls wahrscheinlich. Für die

stationierten NATO-Verbände oder die Schnelle Eingreiftruppe gilt auch das Prinzip des „Tripwire“: Sie

werden große russische Streitkräftemassierungen nicht aufhalten können, zumal Moskau gezeigt hat, dass

es in Manövern kurzfristig 60.000 bis 100.000 Mann zu massieren vermag. Stattdessen speist sich der

Abschreckungseffekt daraus, dass die Verletzung des Stolperdrahtes eine weitergehende militärische

Antwort der NATO auslösen würde.

Allerdings greift diese Logik nur, wenn ein potentieller Angreifer damit rechnen muss, dass die NATO in der

Lage ist, im Konfliktfall rasch Verstärkung in die betroffene Region zu bringen. Auch hier spielt Deutschland

eine zentrale Rolle, nicht nur aufgrund seiner politischen und militärischen Bedeutung sondern auch

aufgrund der geografischen Lage. Im Ost-West Konflikt existierte eine gewaltige „Nachschub-Industrie“

mit der damaligen Bundesrepublik als Drehscheibe. Jährliche REFORGER-Übungen (Return of Forces to

Germany) stellten ein effizientes militärisches „Reinforcement“ sicher. Teile dieser Fähigkeiten müssen

künftig wieder hergestellt werden.

Copyright: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik | Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 12/2016 Seite 4/4

Wie dringend dieser kostenintensive Aufbau von „Forward Presence“ und Verstärkungsfähigkeiten ist,

haben jüngste NATO-Manöver gezeigt. Mitte März führte die NATO die jährliche CMX-Übung (Crisis

Management Exercise) durch. Dieser Übung, die Verfahren übt ohne konkrete Streitkräftebewegungen zu

beinhalten, lag erstmals nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges wieder ein Szenario zur Bündnisverteidigung

nach Artikel 5 des NATO-Vertrags zugrunde. Die Ergebnisse des fiktiven aber an real möglichen Szenarien

orientierten Verlaufs waren ernüchternd. Während die politischen Entscheidungsprozesse zeitgerecht

erfolgten, konnte die NATO militärisch mit dem simulierten Aufwuchs der gegnerischen Streitkräfte nicht

Schritt halten. Für viele NATO-Mitglieder war dieses Ergebnis ein Augenöffner und zeigt, welche

Anstrengungen noch unternommen werden müssen.

Konsequenzen für den deutschen Verteidigungshaushalt

Damit ergibt sich für Deutschland – neben den seit vielen Jahren bemängelten Ausrüstungslücken

beziehungsweise der Teilausstattung von Verbänden mit 70 Prozent ihres Geräts – auch aus den jüngsten

Verpflichtungen gegenüber der NATO ein erheblicher Finanzbedarf, der sich zu den ohnehin laufenden

Verpflichtungen in Afghanistan, in Afrika oder auf dem Balkan hinzuaddiert.

Mit seiner Zustimmung zum „Defense Investment Pledge“ steht Deutschland in der Kritik, weil der

Verteidigungshaushalt derzeit nur 1,19 Prozentanteil vom BIP beträgt. Deutschlands Verweis auf das

gestiegene BIP verfängt nur bedingt, wie Präsident Obama bei seinem Besuch in Deutschland wieder

betont hat. Auch bei den Investitionen liegt Deutschland unter den geforderten 20 Prozent. Dennoch

bleibt das Zwei Prozent-Ziel der NATO eine hochpolitische Zahl, da der deutsche Verteidigungs-

haushalt nach jetzigem Stand nahezu verdoppelt werden müsste. Möglicherweise würde ein solch

sichtbarer Zuwachs deutscher Militärmacht Bedenken in Europa oder in der NATO auslösen.

Bei der „Enhanced Persistent Presence“ kommen auf Deutschland erhebliche Ausgaben für die

rotierende Stationierung von Streitkräften in Osteuropa zu, die noch von den notwendigen

Investitionen im Bereich des „Reinforcements“ ergänzt werden.

Um eine Spaltung der NATO in Ost und Süd zu vermeiden, muss auch der Bedrohungs-

wahrnehmung der südlichen Mitglieder Rechnung getragen werden. Hier leistet die deutsche

Marine einen ständig wachsenden Beitrag, etwa indem zu den schon laufenden Operationen im

Mittelmeer kürzlich noch die Überwachungsmission in der Ägäis hinzugekommen ist. Gleichzeitig

muss die Marine in der Ostsee Präsenz zeigen und bleibt auch Teil des NATO-Marineverbandes im

Nordatlantik. All dies geschieht von dem Hintergrund, dass die Marine in den vergangenen Jahren

die stärksten Sparmaßnahmen hat durchstehen müssen. Die Luftwaffe investiert große Beträge für

eine dauerhafte Präsenz im türkischen Incirlik, weil man die Bekämpfung des IS als eine langfristige

Aufgabe ansieht.

Um all diese Aufgaben wahrnehmen zu können, hat die Ministerin angekündigt, die künftige

Truppenstärke nach oben offen halten zu wollen und zunächst 7.000 Soldaten mehr einstellen zu

müssen. Auch da sieht sie sich im Einklang mit dem Wehrbeauftragten, der schon vor einigen

Monaten auf einen erheblichen personellen Mehrbedarf verwiesen hatte.

Angesichts dieser Erfordernisse scheint die geforderte Summe von 130 Milliarden Euro über 15 Jahre

noch eher konventionell geschätzt. Unstreitig ist aber, dass angesichts der fundamental geänderten

Sicherheitslage eine deutliche Erhöhung der Ausgaben für die Bundeswehr unabdingbar ist.

Karl-Heinz Kamp ist Präsident der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik in Berlin. Der Autor gibt seine

persönliche Meinung wieder.

Veröffentlicht: 09.08.2016 1/5

1. Veranstaltungshinweis: SAVE THE DATE zum BMBF-Workshop „Sichere Gesellschaften: unlocking innovation – neuartige Sicherheitslösungen für sich wandelnde Bedrohungslagen“ vom 8. - 9. November 2016 in Brüssel .......................................................... S.2

2. Hinweise zum neuen Innovationsprogramm des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie .............................................................................................................................................. S.2

3. Aktuelle Ergebnisse aus der Sicherheitsforschung – Projekte stellen sich vor: Erweiterte Sicherheit in der Luftfrachtkette (ESecLog) .................................................................................. S.3

4. Links .................................................................................................................................................. S.5

Informationsbrief zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung 11/16

2/5

Am 8. und 9. November 2016 veranstaltet das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) einen Workshop zum europäischen Sicherheitsforschungsprogramm. Der Workshop trägt den Titel „Sichere Gesellschaften: unlocking innovation – neuartige Sicherheitslösungen für sich wandelnde Be-drohungslagen“ und findet im Comics Art Museum in Brüssel statt.

Auf der Veranstaltung werden gemeinsam mit Vertretern der Europäischen Kommission die Erwartun-gen an und Erfahrungen mit innovations- und marktnahen Förderinstrumenten der europäischen Sicherheitsforschung diskutiert sowie Impulse für die mittel- und langfristige Weiterentwicklung des Pro-gramms gegeben. Im Fokus steht dabei die Frage, wie Unternehmen europäische Verbundprojekte gezielt nutzen können, um ihre Forschungs- und Innovationskraft zu steigern sowie neue Märkte in Eu-ropa zu erschließen.

Die Veranstaltung richtet sich neben Verantwortlichen aus Unternehmen auch an Vertreter von For-schungsinstituten und Hochschulen sowie an staatliche und private Endnutzer. Ihnen wird in der Veran-staltung ein breiter Raum gegeben, sich mit ihren jeweiligen Perspektiven in die Diskussion einzubrin-gen.

Herzlich eingeladen sind sowohl Akteure, die sich im europäischen Sicherheitsforschungsprogramm bereits engagieren, als auch neue Interessenten, die das Innovationspotenzial der europäischen Sicherheitsforschung kennenlernen und nutzen möchten.

Ein detailliertes Programm und ein Anmeldeformular werden Ihnen Anfang September 2016 über den Verteiler des BMBF-Informationsbriefs zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung zugehen. Wir bitten Sie, sich den Termin bei Interesse schon jetzt in Ihrem Kalender vorzumerken.

zurück

Kick-off-Veranstaltung am 26.09.2016 in Berlin

Am 26. September 2016 stellt das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) das „Innova-tionsprogramm zur Unterstützung von Diversifizierungsstrategien von Unternehmen der Vertei-digungsbranche in zivile Sicherheitstechnologien“ in Berlin der Öffentlichkeit vor.

Ziel der Veranstaltung ist es, über Inhalte und Rahmenbedingungen des Förderprogramms zu informie-ren sowie Möglichkeiten der Vernetzung zu bieten. Die Veranstaltung richtet sich insbesondere an F&E-Verantwortliche aus der Verteidigungsindustrie, an Bedarfsträger ziviler Sicherheitstechnologien, an Vertreter der zivilen Sicherheitsindustrie und an Interessierte der einschlägigen Forschungs- und Wis-senschaftseinrichtungen sowie Hochschulen.

Das Innovationsprogramm des BMWi ist ein eigenständiges Förderprogramm. Im Zuge der Programm-umsetzung wird die Erzielung von Synergien mit dem bestehenden Rahmenprogramm der Bundesre-gierung „Forschung für die zivile Sicherheit“, das durch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und For-schung betreut wird, angestrebt.

2. Hinweise zum neuen Innovationsprogramm des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie

1. Veranstaltungshinweis: SAVE THE DATE zum BMBF-Workshop „Sichere Gesellschaften: unlocking innovation – neuartige Sicherheitslösungen für sich wandelnde Bedrohungslagen“ vom 8. - 9. November 2016 in Brüssel

3/5

Das Veranstaltungsprogramm sowie weitere Informationen zur Veranstaltung und zur Anmeldung fin-den Sie unter:

http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/E/einladung-innovationsprogramm-unterstuetzung-diversifizierungsstrategien-unternehmen,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf

Newsletter zum neuen Innovationsprogramm

Begleitend zum Förderprogramm des BMWi wird zu aktuellen Anlässen ein neuer Newsletter erschei-nen. Dieser Newsletter bietet Ihnen eine kompakte Übersicht zu Neuigkeiten (Fördermöglichkeiten, Veranstaltungshinweise, laufende Projekte etc.) im Zusammenhang mit dem Innovationsprogramm.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass es sich hierbei um ein eigenständiges Format handelt, das sich inhaltlich vom vorliegenden Informationsbrief des BMBF zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung unterscheidet.

Eine Möglichkeit, den Newsletter des BMWi kostenfrei zu abonnieren, finden Sie unter:

https://swm.vditz.com/newsletter

Ansprechpartner Dr. Thorsten Fischer, VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH, VDI-Platz 1, 40468 Düsseldorf, Tel.: +49 211 62 14-628, Fax: +49 211 62 14-484, E-Mail: fischer_t@vdi.de und Internet: www.vditz.de zurück

Leicht zu kontrollierender Fracht-Fingerabdruck für jede Luftfrachtsendung

Fast 70 Prozent der Luftfracht wird in Passagiermaschinen befördert. Auf deutschen Flughäfen wurden laut Statistischem Bundesamt im Jahr 2015 rund 4,3 Millionen Tonnen Luftfracht empfangen oder ver-sandt. Zum Schutz vor Terrorismus und Manipulation müssen die Kontrollen Sicherheit auf höchstem Niveau gewährleisten, internationalen Anforderungen entsprechen und gleichzeitig wirtschaftlich tragbar sein. Das vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) geförderte Projekt „Erweiterte Sicherheit in der Luftfrachtkette (ESecLog)“ hatte sich vor diesem Hintergrund zum Ziel gesetzt, neue Lösungen für die Kontrolle von Luftfracht zu schaffen. In Zukunft sollen Container und Paletten noch schneller und zuverlässiger auf Gefahren untersucht werden können.

Das Forschungsprojekt

Die Forschungspartner haben im Projekt ESecLog einen übergreifenden Ansatz verfolgt, um bei der Kontrolle von Luftfracht die gesamte Prozesskette vom Absender bis hin zur Verladung in das Flugzeug in den Blick zu nehmen. Dafür haben die Projektpartner unter Koordination des Fraunhofer-Institut für Fabrikbetrieb und -automatisierung (IFF) in Magdeburg ein System erforscht, mit dem Fracht in kürzes-ter Zeit berührungslos auf Manipulationen überprüft werden kann. Durch die gezielte Prüfung mehrerer Frachtmerkmale an verschiedenen Punkten der Luftfrachtkette können Veränderungen frühzeitig er-kannt werden. Weitere Partner in diesem Projekt waren das Bremer Institut für Produktion und Logistik GmbH, die Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM) in Berlin, die Panalpina Welttrans-port GmbH, die Airbus DS Airborne Solutions GmbH (ADAS) in Bremen sowie die Viaboxx GmbH in

3. Aktuelle Ergebnisse aus der Sicherheitsforschung – Projekte stellen sich vor: Erweiterte Sicherheit in der Luftfrachtkette (ESecLog)

4/5

Königswinter. Als assoziierte Partner haben die Lufthansa Cargo AG in Frankfurt am Main, der City-Airport Bremen, das Luftfahrt-Bundesamt in Braunschweig sowie die NXP Semiconductors GmbH in Hamburg mitgearbeitet.

Das Ergebnis von ESecLog ist ein Fracht-Fingerabdruck-Informationssystem zur sicheren Kennzeich-nung und Überprüfung von Luftfrachtsendungen. Mit einer Kombination einzelner Merkmale wird für jedes Packstück ein eigener Fracht-Fingerabdruck erzeugt, der durch das neue Informationssystem entlang der gesamten Transportkette vom Versender über das Lager bis hin zur Verladung ins Flug-zeug kontrolliert werden kann.

Eines der Kontrollmerkmale ist dabei das RFID-Siegel, welches packstückindividuell auf Luftfracht-Packstücke aufgebracht wird. Das RFID-Siegel hat im Rahmen des ESecLog-Konzepts zwei zentrale Funktionen. Zum einen wird das Packstück durch eine auf dem RFID-Transponder gespeicherte ESecLog-Kennung (ID) eindeutig identifizierbar. Zum anderen verfügt das RFID-Siegel über einen Si-cherungsdraht. Ist der Sicherheitsdraht gerissen, muss das betroffene Packstück auf weitere Sicher-heitsmerkmale überprüft werden. Durch eine berührungslose RFID-Lesung kann das Packstück schnell identifiziert und der Status des Siegels abgefragt werden.

Ein weiterer wichtiger Bestandteil des ESecLog-Konzepts ist das Tracking eines Frachtguts auf dem Flughafenvorfeld. Das Tracking ermöglicht es, die Positionen der Luftfrachtpaletten und -container (so-genannte ULDs) auf dem Vorfeld des Flughafens kontinuierlich zu überprüfen, um entsprechend schnell auf sicherheitsrelevante Ereignisse reagieren zu können – so zum Beispiel auf das Verlassen gültiger Fahrwege oder das unplanmäßige Stoppen. Zu diesem Zweck werden die Luftfrachtpaletten und -container mit passiven RFID-Tags ausgestattet. Diese können von Lesegeräten auf den Schleppfahr-zeugen und den Transportanhängern automatisch identifiziert werden. Zusätzlich registriert ein passiver Funkschalter ein mögliches Öffnen eines Containers.

Ausblick

Die Erforschung eines Fracht-Fingerabdruck-Informationssystems ist ein wichtiger Beitrag, um vor allem aufwändige Nachkontrollen von Luftfracht durch kosten- und zeitintensive Röntgenscans und manuelle Prüfungen zu vermeiden. In Zusammenarbeit mit den Endanwendern werden die Ergebnisse von ESecLog in Form von Demonstratoren evaluiert und entsprechend neue Prüfungsstrategien für Berei-che inner- und außerhalb der Sicherheitszone des Flughafens erarbeitet. Die ESecLog-Lösung trägt zu einer wesentlichen Reduzierung des Prüfaufwands und zu einer nahtlosen Integration der neuen Prüf-prozesse in die Logistikabläufe der Luftfracht bei. Damit kann die Sicherheit an Flughäfen für das Bo-den- und Flugpersonal sowie die Passagiere deutlich erhöht werden.

Projektkoordination

Olaf Poenicke, Fraunhofer-Institut für Fabrikbetrieb und -automatisierung IFF, Sandtorstr. 22, 39106 Magdeburg, Tel.: +49 391 40 90-337

E-Mail: olaf.poenicke@iff.fraunhofer.de

Weitere Informationen unter: http://www.eseclog.de/index.php

zurück

5/5

www.sifo.de – BMBF-Seite zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung

www.sifo-informationsbrief.de – Informationsbrief zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung

www.sifo-securityresearchmap.de – Landkarte zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung

www.sifo-nks.de – Nationale Kontaktstelle für die EU-Sicherheitsforschung

www.sifo-dialog.de – Fachdialog Sicherheitsforschung

zurück

4. Links

Herausgeber: VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH, VDI-Platz 1, 40468 Düsseldorf E-Mail: vditz@vdi.de, Internet: http://www.vditz.de Geschäftsführer: Dipl.-Ing. Sascha Hermann Amtsgericht Düsseldorf HRB 49295, USt.-ID: DE 813846179 Ansprechpartner: Dr. Andreas Hoffknecht - Projektträger des BMBF - Programm "Forschung für die zivile Sicherheit" Telefon: +49 211 6214-456, E-Mail: hoffknecht@vdi.de Dr. Thorsten Fischer - Nationale Kontaktstelle Sicherheitsforschung Telefon: +49 211 6214-628, E-Mail: fischer_t@vdi.de Der Informationsbrief wird im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) herausgegeben.

Hinweis gemäß § 33 des BDSG: Der Versand des Informationsbriefes erfolgt über eine Adressdatei, die mit Hilfe der automati-sierten Datenverarbeitung geführt wird.

Falls Sie diesen Informationsbrief in Zukunft nicht mehr erhalten wollen, klicken Sie bitte hier. Falls Sie diese Mail weitergeleitet bekommen haben und auch in Zukunft über Neuigkeiten zur zivilen Sicherheitsforschung informiert werden wollen, können Sie diesen Informationsbrief hier abonnieren.

Shared Vision, Common Action:A Stronger Europe

A Global Strategy for theEuropean Union’s Foreign And Security Policy

June 2016

Shared Vision, Common Action:A Stronger Europe

A Global Strategy for theEuropean Union’s Foreign And Security Policy

Contents

Foreword by Federica Mogherini 03

Executive Summary 07

A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” 13

1. A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens’ Interests 13 2. The Principles Guiding our External Action 16 3. The Priorities of our External Action 18 3.1 The Security of Our Union 18 3.2 State and Societal Resilience to our East and South 23 3.3 An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises 28 3.4 Cooperative Regional Orders 32 3.5 Global Governance for the 21st Century 39 4. From Vision to Action 44

Acknowledgements 53

03European Union Global Strategy

Foreword by Federica Mogherini

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Vice-President of the European Commission

The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before. Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens’ lives. In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. This is even more true after the British referendum. We will indeed have to rethink the way our Union works, but we perfectly know what to work for. We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action.

None of our countries has the strength nor the resources to address these threats and seize the opportunities of our time alone. But as a Union of almost half a billion citizens, our potential is unparalleled. Our diplomatic network runs wide and deep in all corners of the globe. Economically, we are in the world’s G3. We are the first trading partner and the first foreign investor for almost every country in the globe. Together we invest more in development cooperation than the rest of the world combined. It is also clear, though, that we are not making full use of this potential yet. A vast majority of our citizens understands that we need to collectively take responsibility for our role in the world. And wherever I travel, our partners expect the European Union to play a major role, including as a global security provider. We will deliver on our citizens’ needs and make our partnerships work only if we act together, united. This is exactly the aim of the Global Strategy for European Foreign and Security Policy.

European Union Global Strategy04

“Global” is not just intended in a geographical sense: it also refers to the wide array of policies and instruments the Strategy promotes. It focuses on military capabilities and anti-terrorism as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It deals with peace-building and the resilience of States and societies, in and around Europe. The European Union has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so, because we are the best in this field. However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do justice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and women serving under the European flag for peace and security – our own security, and our partners’. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand.

The Strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union. This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values. Yet we know that such priorities are best served when we are not alone. And they are best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism. This is no time for global policemen and lone warriors. Our foreign and security policy has to handle global pressures and local dynamics, it has to cope with super-powers as well as with increasingly fractured identities. Our Union will work to strengthen our partners: We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO, while we will also connect to new players and explore new formats. We will invest in regional orders, and in cooperation among and within regions. And we will promote reformed global governance, one that can meet the challenges of this 21st

century. We will engage in a practical and principled way, sharing global responsibilities with our partners and contributing to their strengths. We have learnt the lesson: my neighbour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses. So we will invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game.

All of this will make each of our Member States – and each citizen of our Union – better off. All these goals can only be achieved by a truly united and committed Europe. Joining all our cultures together to achieve our shared goals and serve our common interests is a daily challenge, but it is also our greatest strength: diversity is what makes us strong.

Yes, our interests are indeed common European interests: the only way to serve them is by common means. This is why we have a collective responsibility to make our Union a stronger Union. The people of Europe

05European Union Global Strategy

need unity of purpose among our Member States, and unity in action across our policies. A fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union, it calls for an outward- and forward-looking European foreign and security policy. This Global Strategy will guide us in our daily work towards a Union that truly meets its citizens’ needs, hopes and aspirations; a Union that builds on the success of 70 years of peace; a Union with the strength to contribute to peace and security in our region and in the whole world.

Federica Mogherini

07European Union Global Strategy

Executive Summary

We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects.

We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological progress – alongside our deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.

1. Our Shared Interests and Principles

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.

European Union Global Strategy08

The EU will advance the prosperity of its people. Prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goalsworldwide, including in Europe. A prosperous Union also hinges on an open and fair international economic system and sustainable access to the global commons. The EU will foster the resilience of its democracies. Consistently living up to our values will determine our external credibility and influence.

The EU will promote a rules-based global order. We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peacefuland sustainable world. The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.

We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.

In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world. In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world. In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights. The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external partnerships. In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key players in a networked world.

09European Union Global Strategy

2. The Priorities of our External Action

To promote our shared interests, adhering to clear principles, the EU will pursue five priorities.

The Security of our Union. The EU Global Strategy starts at home. Our Union has enabled citizens to enjoy unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity. Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders. We will therefore enhance our efforts on defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications. Member States must translate their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties into action. The EU will step up its contribution to Europe’s collective security, working closely with its partners, beginning with NATO.

State and Societal Resilience to our East and South. It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa. Under the current EU enlargement policy, a credible accession process grounded in strict and fair conditionality is vital to enhance the resilience of countries in the Western Balkans and of Turkey. Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), many people wish to build closer relations with the Union: our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation in these countries. But resilience is also a priority in other countries within and beyond the ENP. The EU will support different paths to resilience, targeting the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility, as well as develop more effective migration policies for Europe and its partners.

An Integrated Approach to Conflicts. When violent conflicts erupt, our shared vital interests are threatened. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach. Implementing the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ through a coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal is essential. But the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded. The EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement

European Union Global Strategy10

when a new crisis erupts. The EU will act at different levels of governance: conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya have local, national, regional and global dimensions which must be addressed. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by us alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships, which the EU will foster and support.

Cooperative Regional Orders. In a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore. Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU’s own peace and development in the 21st century, and this is why we will support cooperative regional orders worldwide. In different regions – in Europe; in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa; across the Atlantic, both north and south; in Asia; and in the Arctic – the EU will be driven by specific goals.

Global Governance for the 21st Century. The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system. The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.

3. From Vision to Action

We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent way. To fulfil our goals, we must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union.

A Credible Union. To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is vital. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values. A stronger Union also requires investing in all dimensions of foreign policy. In particular, investment in security and defence is a matter of urgency. Full spectrum defence

11European Union Global Strategy

capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners’ capacities, and to guarantee Europe’s safety. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, to acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, defence cooperation must become the norm. The EU will systematically encourage defence cooperation and strive to create a solid European defence industry, which is critical for Europe’s autonomy of decision and action.

A Responsive Union. Our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. The Common Security and Defence Policy must become more responsive. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored, and might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential. Development policy also needs to become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities.

A Joined-up Union. We must become more joined up across our external policies, between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of our policies. This is particularly relevant to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, migration, and security, notably counter-terrorism. We must also systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions.

This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of and ambition for a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference in the world. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others. It is now up to us to translate this into action.

13European Union Global Strategy

Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe

We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects. We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological progress – alongside our deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.

1. A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens’ Interests

Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action.

A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy

European Union Global Strategy14

Peace and Security

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. This means that Europeans, working with partners, must have the necessary capabilities to defend themselves and live up to their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties.

Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world.

Prosperity

The EU will advance the prosperity of its people. This means promoting growth, jobs, equality, and a safe and healthy environment. While a prosperous Union is the basis for a stronger Europe in the world, prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) worldwide, including in Europe. Furthermore, with most world growth expected to take place outside the EU in near future, trade and investment will increasingly underpin our prosperity: a prosperous Union

“Europeans, working with partners, must have the necessary capabilities to defend themselves and live up to their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions.”

“Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests.”

15European Union Global Strategy

hinges on a strong internal market and an open international economic system. We have an interest in fair and open markets, in shaping global economic and environmental rules, and in sustainable access to the global commons through open sea, land, air and space routes. In view of the digital revolution, our prosperity also depends on the free flow of information and global value chains facilitated by a free and secure Internet.

Democracy

The EU will foster the resilience of its democracies, and live up to the values that have inspired its creation and development. These include respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. They encompass justice, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination, pluralism, and respect for diversity. Living up consistently to our values internally will determine our external credibility and influence.

To safeguard the quality of our democracies, we will respect domestic, European and international law across all spheres, from migration and asylum to energy, counter-terrorism and trade. Remaining true to our values is a matter of law as well as of ethics and identity.

A Rules-Based Global Order

The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. As a Union of medium-to-small sized countries, we have a shared European interest in facing the world together. Through our combined weight, we can promote agreed rules to contain power politics and contribute to a peaceful, fair and prosperous

world. The Iranian nuclear agreement is a clear illustration of this fact. A multilateral order grounded in international law, including the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is the only guarantee

“Living up consistently to our values internally will determine our external credibility and influence.”

“As a Union of medium-to-small sized countries, we have a shared European interest in facing the world together.”

European Union Global Strategy16

for peace and security at home and abroad. A rules-based global order unlocks the full potential of a prosperous Union with open economies and deep global connections, and embeds democratic values within the international system.

2. The Principles Guiding our External Action

We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. In charting the way between the Scylla of

isolationism and the Charybdis of rash interventionism, the EU will engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contingency. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.

Unity

In a more complex world of global power shifts and power diffusion, the EU must stand united. Forging unity as Europeans – across institutions, states and peoples – has never been so vital nor so urgent. Never has our unity been so challenged. Together we will be able to achieve more than Member States acting alone or in an uncoordinated manner. There is no

clash between national and European interests. Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world. The interests of our citizens are best served through unity of purpose between Member

“Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.”

“Forging unity as Europeans has never been so vital nor so urgent. There is no clash between national and European interests. Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together.”

17European Union Global Strategy

States and across institutions, and unity in action by implementing together coherent policies.

Engagement

In a more connected world, the EU will reach out and engage with others. In light of global value chains, galloping technological advances and growing migration, the EU will participate fully in the global marketplace and co-shape the rules that govern it. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. Retreat from the world only deprives us of the opportunities that a connected world presents.

Environmental degradation and resource scarcity know no borders, neither do transnational crime and terrorism. The external cannot be separated from the internal. In fact, internal policies often deal only with the consequences of external dynamics. We will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging in and with the wider world.

Responsibility

In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. There is no magic wand to solve crises: there are no neat recipes to impose solutions elsewhere. However, responsible engagement

“The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. Retreat from the world only deprives us of the opportunities that a connected world presents.”

“We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights.”

European Union Global Strategy18

can bring about positive change. We will therefore act promptly to prevent violent conflict, be able and ready to respond responsibly yet decisively to crises, facilitate locally owned agreements, and commit long-term. We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights.

Partnership

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Co-responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order.

In pursuing our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will partner selectively with players whose cooperation is necessary to deliver global public goods and address common challenges. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key actors in a networked world. We will do so through dialogue and support, but also through more innovative forms of engagement.

3. The Priorities of our External Action

To promote our shared interests, adhering to clear principles, we will pursue five broad priorities.

3.1 The Security of Our Union

The EU Global Strategy starts at home. Over the decades, our Union has enabled citizens to enjoy unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity. We will build on these achievements in the years ahead. Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and

“The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships.”

19European Union Global Strategy

energy insecurity endanger our people and territory. The politics of fear challenges European values and the European way of life. To preserve and develop what we achieved so far, a step change is essential. To guarantee our security, promote our prosperity and safeguard our democracies, we will strengthen ourselves on security and defence in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law. We must translate our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity into action, and contribute more to Europe’s collective security through five lines of action.

Security and Defence

As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped,

trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.

Europeans must be able to protect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in developing our partners’ security and defence capacities, carrying out these tasks in cooperation with others. Alongside external crisis management and capacity-building, the EU should also be able to assist in protecting its Members upon their request, and its institutions.

“The EU Global Strategy starts at home. To preserve and develop what we achieved so far, a step change is essential. We must translate our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity into action.”

“As Europeans we must take greater responsibil-ity for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats.”

European Union Global Strategy20

This means living up to our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity and includes addressing challenges with both an internal and external dimension, such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security, organised crime and external border management. For instance, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations can work alongside the European Border and Coast Guard and EU specialised agencies to enhance border protection and maritime security in order to save more lives, fight cross-border crime and disrupt smuggling networks.

When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of

the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States.

Member States need the technological and industrial means to acquire and sustain those capabilities which underpin their ability to act autonomously. While defence policy and spending remain national prerogatives, no Member State can afford to do this individually: this requires a concerted and cooperative effort. Deeper defence cooperation engenders interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency and trust: it increases the output of defence spending. Developing and maintaining defence capabilities requires both investments and optimising the use of national resources through deeper cooperation.

The EU will assist Member States and step up its contribution to Europe’s security and defence in line with the Treaties. Gradual synchronisation

“The EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO.”

21European Union Global Strategy

and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices can enhance strategic convergence between Member States. Union funds to support defence research and technologies and multinational cooperation, and full use of the European Defence Agency’s potential are essential prerequisites for European security and defence efforts underpinned by a strong European defence industry.

Counter-terrorism

Major terrorist attacks have been carried out on European soil and beyond. Increased investment in and solidarity on counter-terrorism are key. We will therefore encourage greater information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Member States and EU agencies. This entails shared alerts on violent extremism, terrorist networks and foreign terrorist fighters, as well as monitoring and removing unlawful content from the

media. Alongside, the EU will support the swift recovery of Members States in the event of attacks through enhanced efforts on security of supply, the protection of critical infrastructure, and strengthening the voluntary framework for cyber crisis management. We will deepen work on education, communication, culture, youth and sport to counter violent extremism. We will work on counter-radicalisation by broadening our partnerships with civil society, social actors, the private sector and the victims of terrorism, as well as through inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue. Most crucially of all, the EU will live up to its values internally and externally: this is the strongest antidote we have against violent extremism. We will also further develop human rights-compliant anti-terrorism cooperation with North Africa, the Middle East, the Western Balkans and Turkey, among others, and work with partners around the world to share best practices and develop joint programmes on countering violent extremism and radicalisation.

Cyber Security

The EU will increase its focus on cyber security, equipping the EU and assisting Member States in protecting themselves against cyber threats while maintaining an open, free and safe cyberspace. This entails strengthening

“The EU will live up to its values internally and externally: this is the strongest antidote we have against violent extremism.”

European Union Global Strategy22

the technological capabilities aimed at mitigating threats and the resilience of critical infrastructure, networks and services, and reducing cybercrime. It means fostering innovative information and communication technology (ICT) systems which guarantee the availability and integrity of data, while ensuring security within the European digital space through appropriate policies on the location of data storage and the certification of digital products and services. It requires weaving cyber issues across all policy areas, reinforcing the cyber elements in CSDP missions and operations, and further developing platforms for cooperation. The EU will support political, operational and technical cyber cooperation between Member States, notably on analysis and consequence management, and foster shared assessments between EU structures and the relevant institutions in Member States. It will enhance its cyber security cooperation with core partners such as the US and NATO. The EU’s response will also be embedded in strong public-private partnerships. Cooperation and information-sharing between Member States, institutions, the private sector and civil society can foster a common cyber security culture, and raise preparedness for possible cyber disruptions and attacks.

Energy Security

The Energy Union represents an integrated effort to work on the internal and external dimensions of European energy security. In line with the goals of the Energy Union, the EU will seek to diversify its energy sources, routes and suppliers, particularly in the gas domain, as well as to promote the highest nuclear safety standards in third countries. Through our energy diplomacy, we will strengthen relations worldwide with reliable energy-producing and transit countries, and support the establishment of infrastructure to allow diversified sources to reach European markets.

However, binding infrastructure agreements with third countries can have a differentiated impact on the security of supply within the Union or hinder the functioning of the internal energy market. Therefore, such

“Through our energy diplomacy, we will strengthen relations worldwide with reliable energy-producing and transit countries, and support the establishment of infrastructure to allow diversified sources to reach European markets.”

23European Union Global Strategy

agreements must be transparent and any new infrastructure must be fully compliant with applicable EU law, including the Third Energy Package. Internally, the EU will work on a fully functioning internal energy market, focus on sustainable energy and energy efficiency, and develop coherently reverse flow, interconnection, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage infrastructure.

Strategic Communications

The EU will enhance its strategic communications, investing in and joining-up public diplomacy across different fields, in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners. We will improve the consistency and speed of messaging on our principles and actions. We will also offer rapid, factual rebuttals of disinformation. We will continue fostering an open and inquiring media environment within and beyond the EU, also working with local players and through social media.

3.2 State and Societal Resilience to our East and South

It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us

and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. Together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But the reverse holds true as well. To ensure sustainable security, it is not only state

“It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.”

European Union Global Strategy24

institutions that we will support. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.

Enlargement Policy

Any European state which respects and promotes the values enshrined in our Treaties may apply to become a Member of the Union. A credible enlargement policy grounded on strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool to enhance resilience within the countries concerned,

ensuring that modernisation and democratisation proceed in line with the accession criteria. A credible enlargement policy represents a strategic investment in Europe’s security and prosperity, and has already contributed greatly to peace in formerly war-torn areas.

Within the scope of the current enlargement policy, the challenges of migration, energy security, terrorism and organised crime are shared between the EU, the Western Balkans and Turkey. They can only be addressed together. Yet the resilience of these countries cannot be taken for granted. The EU enjoys a unique influence in all these countries. The strategic challenge for the EU is therefore that of promoting political reform, rule of law, economic convergence and good neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans and Turkey, while coherently pursuing cooperation across different sectors.

EU policy towards the candidate countries will continue to be based on a clear, strict and fair accession process. It will focus on fundamental requirements for membership first and feature greater scrutiny of reforms, clearer reform requirements, and feedback from the European Commission and Member States, as well as local civil societies. At the same time, EU support for and cooperation with these countries must deliver concrete benefits today, and must be communicated well. This means cooperating

“A credible enlargement policy represents a strategic investment in Europe’s security and prosperity, and has already contributed greatly to peace in formerly war-torn areas.”

25European Union Global Strategy

on counter-terrorism, security sector reform, migration, infrastructure, energy and climate, deepening people-to-people contacts, and retailoring some of the EU’s assistance with the aim of visibly improving citizens’ wellbeing.

Our Neighbours

State and societal resilience is our strategic priority in the neighbourhood. Many people within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) both to the east and to the south wish to build closer relations with the Union. Our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation and is not aimed against any country. Within this group are currently countries such as Tunisia or Georgia, whose success as prosperous, peaceful and stable democracies would reverberate across their respective regions. The ENP has recommitted to Eastern Partnership and southern Mediterranean countries wishing to develop stronger relations with us. We will support these countries in implementing association agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). We will also think creatively about deepening tailor-made partnerships further. Possibilities include the creation of an economic area with countries implementing DCFTAs, the extension of Trans-European Networks and the Energy Community, as well as building physical and digital connections. Societal links will also be strengthened through enhanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges, research cooperation and civil society platforms. Full participation in EU programmes and agencies will be pursued alongside strategic dialogue with a view to paving the way for these countries’ further involvement in CSDP. Resilience is a strategic priority across the EU’s east and south both in countries that want stronger ties with the EU and in those – within and beyond the ENP – that have no wish to do so. The EU will support different paths to resilience to its east and south, focusing on the most acute dimensions of fragility and targeting those where we can make a meaningful difference.

Resilience in our Surrounding Regions

The EU will pursue a multifaceted approach to resilience in its surrounding regions. While repressive states are inherently fragile in the long term, there are many ways to build inclusive, prosperous and secure societies. We will therefore pursue tailor-made policies to support inclusive and accountable

European Union Global Strategy26

governance, critical for the fight against terrorism, corruption and organised crime, and for the protection of human rights. Repression suffocates outlets for discontent and marginalises communities. The EU will therefore promote human rights through dialogue and support, including in the most difficult cases. Through long-term engagement, we will persistently seek to advance human rights protection. We will pursue locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors, and support fragile states in building capacities, including cyber. We will work through development, diplomacy, and CSDP, ensuring that our security sector reform efforts enable and enhance our partners’ capacities to deliver security within the rule of law. We will cooperate with other international players, coordinating our work on capacity-building with the UN and NATO in particular.

States are resilient when societies feel they are becoming better off and have hope in the future. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States. We will fight poverty and inequality, widen access to public services and social security, and champion decent work opportunities, notably for women and youth. We will foster an enabling environment for new economic endeavours, employment and the inclusion of marginalised groups. Development funds should catalyse strategic investments through public-private partnerships, driving sustainable growth, job creation, and skills and technological transfers. We will use our trade agreements to

“Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States. We will nurture societal resilience also by deepening work on education, culture and youth to foster pluralism, coexistence and respect.”

27European Union Global Strategy

underpin sustainable development, human rights protection and rules-based governance.Societal resilience will be strengthened by deepening relations with civil society, notably in its efforts to hold governments accountable. We will reach out more to cultural organisations, religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders, and speak out against the shrinking space for civil society including through violations of the freedoms of speech and association. Positive change can only be home-grown, and may take years to materialise. Our commitment to civil society will therefore be long-term. We will nurture societal resilience also by deepening work on education, culture and youth to foster pluralism, coexistence and respect.

Finally, the EU will seek to enhance energy and environmental resilience. Energy transition is one of the major challenges in our surrounding regions, but must be properly managed to avoid fuelling social tensions. Climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict, in light of their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water and food scarcity. Mirroring security sector reform efforts, energy and environmental sector reform policies can assist partner countries along a path of energy transition and climate action. Through such efforts, we will encourage energy liberalisation, the development of renewables, better regulation and technological transfers, alongside climate change mitigation and adaptation. We will also support governments to devise sustainable responses to food production and the use of water and energy through development, diplomacy and scientific cooperation.

A More Effective Migration Policy

A special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees. We will significantly step up our humanitarian efforts in these countries, focusing on education, women and children. Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. Through development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation we will work with countries of origin to address and prevent the root causes of displacement, manage migration, and fight trans-border crime. We will support transit countries by improving reception and asylum capacities, and by working on migrants’ education, vocational training and livelihood opportunities. We must stem irregular flows by making returns more effective as well as by ensuring regular channels for human mobility. This

European Union Global Strategy28

means enhancing and implementing existing legal and circular channels for migration. It also means working on a more effective common European asylum system which upholds the right to seek asylum by ensuring the safe, regulated and legal arrival of refugees seeking international protection in the EU. At the same time, we will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity. We will establish more effective partnerships on migration management with UN agencies, emerging players, regional organisations, civil society and local communities.

3.3 An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises

We increasingly observe fragile states breaking down in violent conflict. These crises, and the unspeakable violence and human suffering to which they give rise, threaten our shared vital interests. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south, while considering engagement further afield on a case by case basis. The EU will foster human security through an integrated approach.

All of these conflicts feature multiple dimensions – from security to gender, from governance to the economy. Implementing a multi-dimensional approach through the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution is essential. But the scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded further. There are no quick fixes to any of these conflicts. Experience in Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan and elsewhere highlights their protracted nature. The EU will therefore pursue a multi-phased approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle. We will invest in prevention, resolution and stabilisation, and

“Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. We will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity.”

29European Union Global Strategy

avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere. The EU will therefore engage further in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries. None of these conflicts plays out at a single level of governance. Conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya often erupt locally, but the national, regional and global overlay they acquire is what makes them so complex. The EU will therefore pursue a multi-level approach to conflicts acting at the local, national, regional and global levels. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by the EU alone. We will pursue a multi-lateral approach engaging all those players present in a conflict

and necessary for its resolution. We will partner more systematically on the ground with regional and international organisations, bilateral donors and civil society. Greater cooperation will also be sought at the regional and international levels. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships.

Pre-emptive Peace

It has long been known that preventing conflicts is more efficient and effective than engaging with crises after they break out. Once a conflict does erupt, it typically becomes ever more intractable over time. The EU enjoys a good record on pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy. We will therefore redouble our efforts on prevention, monitoring root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change – which is a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement.

“The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south, while considering engagement further afield on a case by case basis. We will pursue a multi-level ap-proach to conflicts acting at the local, national, regional and global levels; a multi-lateral ap-proach engaging all players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution.”

European Union Global Strategy30

Early warning is of little use unless it is followed by early action. This implies regular reporting and proposals to the Council, engaging in preventive diplomacy and mediation by mobilising EU Delegations and Special Representatives, and deepening partnerships with civil society. We must develop a political culture of acting sooner in response to the risk of violent conflict.

Security and Stabilisation

The EU will engage more systematically on the security dimension of these conflicts. In full compliance with international law, European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives, notably civilians. The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises, especially to help fight terrorism .

It must be able to provide security when peace agreements are reached and transition governments established or in the making. When they are not, the EU should be ready to support and help consolidating local ceasefires, paving the way for capacity building. At the same time, through a coherent use of internal and external policies, the EU must counter the spill-over of insecurity that may stem from such conflicts, ranging from trafficking and smuggling to terrorism. When the prospect of stabilisation arises, the EU must enable legitimate institutions to rapidly deliver basic services and security to local populations, reducing the risk of relapse into violence and allowing displaced persons to return. We will therefore seek to bridge gaps in our response between an end of violence and long-term recovery, and develop the dual – security and development – nature of our engagement.

Conflict Settlement

Each conflict country will need to rebuild its own social contract between

“European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee securi-ty and protect human lives, notably civilians. The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises, especially to help fight terrorism.”

31European Union Global Strategy

the state and its citizens. The Union will support such efforts, fostering inclusive governance at all levels. When the “centre” is broken, acting only top-down has limited impact. An inclusive political settlement requires action at all levels. Through CSDP, development, and dedicated financial instruments, we will blend top-down and bottom-up efforts fostering the building blocks of sustainable statehood rooted in local agency. Working at the local level – for instance with local authorities and municipalities – can help basic services be delivered to citizens, and allows for deeper engagement with rooted civil society. Working in this direction will also improve our local knowledge, helping us distinguish between those groups we will talk to without supporting, and those we will actively support as champions of human security and reconciliation.

The EU will also foster inclusive governance at all levels through mediation and facilitation. At the same time, we will develop more creative approaches to diplomacy. This also means promoting the role of women in peace efforts – from implementing the UNSC Resolution on Women, Peace and Security to improving the EU’s internal gender balance. It entails having more systematic recourse to cultural, inter-faith, scientific and economic diplomacy in conflict settings.

Political Economy of Peace

The EU will foster the space in which the legitimate economy can take root and consolidate. In the midst of violent conflict, this means ensuring humanitarian aid access to allow basic goods and services to be provided.

It also means working to break the political economy of war and to create possibilities for legitimate sustenance to exist. This calls for greater synergies between humanitarian and development assistance, channelling our support to provide health, education, protection, basic goods and legitimate employment. When the prospects for stabilisation arise, trade and development – working in synergy – can underpin long-term peacebuilding.

“A political economy of peace calls for greater synergies between humanitarian and develop-ment assistance, channelling our support to provide health, education, protection, basic goods and legitimate employment.”

European Union Global Strategy32

Restrictive measures, coupled with diplomacy, are key tools to bring about peaceful change. They can play a pivotal role in deterrence, conflict prevention and resolution. Smart sanctions, in compliance with international and EU law, will be carefully calibrated and monitored to support the legitimate economy and avoid harming local societies. To fight the criminal war economy, the EU must also modernise its policy on export control for dual-use goods, and fight the illegal trafficking of cultural goods and natural resources.

3.4 Cooperative Regional Orders

In a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore. As complex webs of power, interaction and identity, regions represent critical spaces of governance in a de-centred world. Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU’s own

peace and development in the 21st century. This is why we will promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas. Regional orders do not take a single form. Where possible and when in line with our interests, the EU will support regional organisations. We will not strive to export our model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences. Cooperative regional orders, however, are not created only by organisations. They comprise a mix of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional relations. They also feature the role of global players interlinked with regionally-owned cooperative efforts. Taken together these can address transnational conflicts, challenges and opportunities. In different world regions, the EU will be driven by specific goals. Across all regions, we will invest in cooperative relationships to spur shared global responsibilities.

“This cooperation is a fundamental rationale for the EU’s own peace and development in the 21st

century. This is why we will promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas.”

33European Union Global Strategy

The European Security Order

The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of borders and the peaceful settlement of disputes are key elements of the European security order. These principles apply to all states, both within and beyond the EU’s borders.However, peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its core. The EU will stand united in upholding international law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country’s right to choose its future freely.

Managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge. A consistent and united approach must remain the cornerstone of EU policy towards Russia. Substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia are premised upon full respect for international law and the principles underpinning the European security order, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. We will not recognise Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. We will strengthen the EU, enhance the resilience of our eastern neighbours, and uphold their right to determine freely their approach towards the EU. At the same time, the EU and Russia are interdependent. We will therefore engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap.

In addition to those foreign policy issues on which we currently cooperate, selective engagement could take place over matters of European interest too, including climate, the Arctic, maritime security, education, research and cross-border cooperation. Engagement should also include deeper societal ties through facilitated travel for students, civil society and business. Spanning the region, the EU will foster cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE, as a Europe-wide organisation stretching into Central Asia with a

“Substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia are premised upon full respect for international law. At the same time, we will engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap.”

European Union Global Strategy34

transatlantic link, lies at the heart of the European security order. The EU will strengthen its contribution within and its cooperation with the OSCE as a pillar of European security.

A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa

The Mediterranean, Middle East and parts of sub-Saharan Africa are in turmoil, the outcome of which will likely only become clear decades from now. Solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography, migration and climate change, and to seizing the opportunity of shared prosperity. The EU will intensify its support for and cooperation

with regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa and the Middle East, as well as functional cooperative formats in the region. However, regional organisations do not address all relevant dynamics, and some reflect existing cleavages. We will therefore also act flexibly to help bridge divides and support regional players in delivering concrete results. This will be achieved by mobilising our bilateral and multilateral policies and frameworks as well as by partnering with civil societies in the region. The EU will follow five lines of action. First, in the Maghreb and the Middle East, the EU will support functional multilateral cooperation. We will back practical cooperation, including through the Union for the Mediterranean, on issues such as border security, trafficking, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, water and food security, energy and climate, infrastructure and disaster management. We will foster dialogue and negotiation over regional conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the EU will work closely with the Quartet, the Arab League

“We will foster dialogue and negotiation over regional conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the EU will work closely with the Quartet, the Arab League and all key stakeholders to preserve the pros-pect of a viable two-state solution based on 1967 lines with equivalent land swaps, and to recreate the conditions for meaningful negotiations.”

35European Union Global Strategy

and all key stakeholders to preserve the prospect of a viable two-state solution based on 1967 lines with equivalent land swaps, and to recreate the conditions for meaningful negotiations. The EU will also promote full compliance with European and international law in deepening cooperation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Second, the EU will deepen sectoral cooperation with Turkey, while striving to anchor Turkish democracy in line with its accession criteria, including the normalisation of relations with Cyprus. The EU will therefore pursue the accession process – sticking to strict and fair accession conditionality – while coherently engaging in dialogue on counter-terrorism, regional security and refugees. We will also work on a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, and cooperate further with Turkey in the fields of education, energy and transport.

Third, the EU will pursue balanced engagement in the Gulf. It will continue to cooperate with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and individual Gulf countries. Building on the Iran nuclear deal and its implementation, it will also gradually engage Iran on areas such as trade, research, environment, energy, anti-trafficking, migration and societal exchanges. It will deepen dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on regional conflicts, human rights and counter-terrorism, seeking to prevent contagion of existing crises and foster the space for cooperation and diplomacy .

Fourth, in light of the growing interconnections between North and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the EU will support cooperation across these sub-regions. This includes fostering triangular relationships across the Red Sea between Europe, the Horn and the Gulf to face shared security challenges and economic opportunities. It means systematically addressing cross-border dynamics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions through closer links with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel.

“We will deepen dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on regional conflicts, human rights and counter-terrorism, seeking to prevent contagion of existing crises and foster the space for cooperation and diplomacy. ”

European Union Global Strategy36

Finally, we will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We will intensify cooperation with and support for the African Union, as well as ECOWAS, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in eastern Africa, and the East African Community, among others. We must enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and jobs in Africa. The Economic Partnership Agreements can spur African integration and mobility, and encourage Africa’s full and equitable participation in global value chains. A quantum leap in European investment in Africa is

also needed to support sustainable development. We will build stronger links between our trade, development and security policies in Africa, and blend development efforts with work on migration, health, education, energy and climate, science and technology, notably to improve food security. We will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa, and assist African organisations’ work on conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and organised crime, migration and border management. We will do so through diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as trust funds to back up regional strategies.

A Closer Atlantic

The EU will invest further in strong bonds across the Atlantic, both north and south. A solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to effective global governance. NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains

“The EU will invest further in strong bonds across the Atlantic, both north and south. A solid transatlantic partnership helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to effective global governance.”

“We will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We must enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and jobs in Africa.”

37European Union Global Strategy

the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world. The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security.

With the US, the EU will strive for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, TTIP demonstrates the transatlantic commitment to shared values and signals our willingness to pursue an ambitious rules-based trade agenda. On the broader security agenda, the US will continue to be our core partner. The EU will deepen cooperation with the US and Canada on crisis management, counter-terrorism, cyber, migration, energy and climate action.

In the wider Atlantic space, the Union will expand cooperation and build stronger partnerships with Latin America and the Caribbean, grounded on shared values and interests. It will develop multilateral ties with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and with different regional groupings according to their competitive advantage. We will step up political dialogue and cooperation on migration, maritime security and ocean life protection, climate change and energy, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and countering organised crime and terrorism. We will pursue a free trade agreement with Mercosur, build on the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba, and invest in deeper socio-economic connections with Latin American and Caribbean countries through visa facilitation, student exchanges, twinning, research cooperation and technical projects. We will also actively support the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements in the region, as we are doing in Colombia.

A Connected Asia

There is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security. In light of the economic weight that Asia represents for the EU – and vice versa – peace and stability in Asia are a prerequisite for our prosperity. We will deepen economic diplomacy and scale up our security role in Asia.

The EU will engage China based on respect for rule of law, both domestically and internationally. We will pursue a coherent approach

European Union Global Strategy38

to China’s connectivity drives westwards by maximising the potential of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, and the ASEM and EU-ASEAN frameworks. The EU will also deepen trade and investment with China, seeking a level playing field, appropriate intellectual property rights

protection, greater cooperation on high-end technology, and dialogue on economic reform, human rights and climate action. In parallel, the EU will deepen its economic diplomacy in the region, working towards ambitious free trade agreements with strategic partners such as Japan and India, as well as ASEAN member states, with the goal of an eventual EU-ASEAN agreement. We will also develop a more politically rounded approach to Asia, seeking to make greater practical contributions to Asian security. We will expand our partnerships, including on security, with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and others. We will continue to support state-building and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan together with our regional and international partners. We will promote non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula. In East and Southeast Asia, we will uphold freedom of navigation, stand firm on the respect for international law, including the Law of the Sea and its arbitration procedures, and encourage the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. We will help build maritime capacities and support an ASEAN-led regional security architecture. In Central and South Asia, we will deepen cooperation on counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking and migration, as well as enhance transport, trade and energy connectivity. Across the Indo Pacific and East Asian regions, the EU will promote human rights and support democratic transitions such as in Myanmar/Burma.

A Cooperative Arctic

With three Member States and two European Economic Area members being Arctic states, the EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining

“The EU will deepen trade and investment with China, seeking a level playing field, intellectual property rights protection, greater cooperation on high-end technology, dialogue on economic reform, human rights and climate action.”

39European Union Global Strategy

a low-tension area, with ongoing cooperation ensured by the Arctic Council, a well-functioning legal framework, and solid political and security cooperation. The EU will contribute to this through enhanced work on climate action and environmental research, sustainable development, telecommunications, and search & rescue, as well as concrete cooperation with Arctic states, institutions, indigenous peoples and local communities.

3.5 Global Governance for the 21st Century

Without global norms and the means to enforce them, peace and security, prosperity and democracy – our vital interests – are at risk. Guided by the values on which it is founded, the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, which ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting access

to the global commons. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system. The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.

Reforming

A commitment to global governance must translate in the determination to reform the UN, including the Security Council, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Resisting change risks triggering the erosion of such institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all EU Member States. The EU will stand up for the principles of accountability, representativeness, responsibility, effectiveness and transparency. The practical meaning of such principles will be fleshed out case-by-case. We will continue to call upon members of the UN Security

“The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system.”

European Union Global Strategy40

Council not to vote against credible draft resolutions on timely and decisive action to prevent or end mass atrocities. Across multilateral fora – and in particular the UN, the IFIs and the international justice organisations – the EU will strengthen its voice and acquire greater visibility and cohesion. We will work towards an increasingly unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund.

Investing

Believing in the UN means investing in it, notably in its peacekeeping, mediation, peacebuilding and humanitarian functions. The EU and its Member States, as already the first contributor to UN humanitarian agencies, will invest even further in their work. CSDP could assist further and complement UN peacekeeping through bridging, stabilisation or other operations. The EU will also enhance synergy with UN peacebuilding efforts, through greater coordination in the planning, evolution and withdrawal of CSDP capacity-building missions in fragile settings.

Implementing

The EU will lead by example by implementing its commitments on sustainable development and climate change. It will increase climate financing, drive climate mainstreaming in multilateral fora, raise the ambition for review foreseen in the Paris agreement, and work for clean energy cost reductions. The SDGs will inform the post-Cotonou partnership

and drive reform in development policy, including the EU Consensus on Development. Moreover, implementing the SDGs will require change across all internal and external policies, galvanising public-private partnerships, and leveraging the experience of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in providing technical assistance and building capacities in developing and middle income countries.

Deepening

As the world’s largest economy, the EU is a prime mover in global trade and

“The EU will lead by example by implementing its commitments on sustainable development and climate change.”

41European Union Global Strategy

investment, areas in which rules can be deepened further. Our prosperity hinges on an open and rules-based economic system with a true level playing field, which our economic diplomacy will further promote. We will pursue comprehensive free trade agreements with the US, Japan, Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others as building blocks of global free trade. Ambitious agreements built on mutual benefits such as TTIP and CETA can promote international regulatory standards, consumer protection, as well as labour, environmental, health and safety norms. New generation trade agreements which include services, the digital economy, energy and raw materials can reduce legal fragmentation and barriers, and regulate access to natural resources. The EU will ensure that all its trade agreements are

pursued in a manner that supports returning the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to the centre of global negotiations. Connected to the EU’s interest in an open and fair economic system is the need for global maritime growth and security, ensuring open and protected ocean and sea routes critical for trade and access to natural resources. The EU will contribute to global maritime security, building on its experience in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. As a global maritime security provider, the EU will seek to further universalise and implement the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including its dispute settlement mechanisms. We will also promote the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources and biological diversity and the growth of the blue economy by working to fill legal gaps and enhancing ocean knowledge and awareness.

Widening

We will seek to widen the reach of international norms, regimes and institutions. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems remains a growing threat to Europe and the wider world. The EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes. We will use every

“Our prosperity hinges on an open and rules-based economic system with a true level playing field, which our economic diplomacy will further promote.”

European Union Global Strategy42

means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme. The EU will actively participate in export control regimes, strengthen common rules governing Member States’ export policies of military – including dual-use – equipment and technologies, and support export control authorities in third countries and technical bodies that sustain arms control regimes. The EU will also promote the responsibility to protect, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law. We will support the UN Human Rights Council and encourage the widest acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

Developing

At the frontiers of global affairs, rules must be further developed to ensure security and sustainable access to the global commons. The EU will be a forward-looking cyber player, protecting our critical assets and values in the digital world, notably by promoting a free and secure global Internet. We will engage in cyber diplomacy and capacity building with our partners, and seek agreements on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace based on existing international law. We will support multilateral digital governance and a global cooperation framework on cybersecurity, respecting the free flow of information. In space, we will promote the autonomy and security of our space-based services and work on principles for responsible space behaviour, which could lead to the adoption of an international voluntary code of conduct. On energy, we will encourage multilateral mechanisms aimed at ensuring sustainable energy patterns both by developing our own sustainable policies and by deepening dialogue with major energy

“The EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementa-tion and enforcement of multilateral disarma-ment, non-proliferation and arms control trea-ties and regimes. We will use every means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme.”

43European Union Global Strategy

consumers and producers. On health, we will work for more effective prevention, detection and responses to global pandemics. Global rules are also necessary in fields such as biotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics and remotely piloted systems, to avoid the related security risks and reap their economic benefits. On all such issues, the EU will promote exchanges with relevant multilateral fora to help spearhead the development of rules and build partnerships at the frontiers of global affairs.

Partnering

The EU will lead by example on global governance. But it cannot deliver alone. It will act as an agenda-shaper, a connector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web of players. It will partner with states and organisations, but also with the private sector and civil society. On the vast majority of global governance issues, we will work with the UN as the framework of the multilateral system and a core partner for the Union,

with other core partners such as the US, with regional organisations, and with like-minded and strategic partners in Asia, Africa and the Americas. The EU will also invest in pivotal non-state actors, particularly within civil society. In spite of increasing repression, global civil society is growing and fostering new types of activism. The EU will sharpen the means to protect and empower civic actors, notably human rights defenders, sustaining a vibrant civil society worldwide.

The format to deliver effective global governance may vary from case to case. On cyber, global governance hinges on a progressive alliance between states, international organisations, industry, civil society and technical experts. On maritime multilateralism, the EU will work with the UN and its specialised agencies, NATO, our strategic partners, and ASEAN. On humanitarian action, sustainable development and climate change, the EU will partner with the UN and the G20, as well as new donors, civil society and the private sector. On counterterrorism, we will deepen dialogue with the UN, while building broad partnerships with states, regional organisations,

“The EU will invest in pivotal non-state actors. We will sharpen the means to protect and empower civic actors, notably human rights defenders, sustaining a vibrant civil society worldwide.”

European Union Global Strategy44

civil society and the private sector on issues such as countering violent extremism and terrorist financing.

4. From Vision to Action

We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent and coordinated way. To fulfil our goals, however, we must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union.

A Credible Union

To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is essential. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values. A stronger Union requires investing in all dimensions of foreign policy, from research and climate to infrastructure and mobility, from trade and sanctions to diplomacy and development.

In this fragile world, soft power is not enough: we must enhance our credibility in security and defence. To respond to external crises, build our partners’ capacities and protect Europe, Member States must channel a sufficient level of expenditure to defence, make the most efficient use of

resources, and meet the collective commitment of 20% of defence budget spending devoted to the procurement of equipment and Research & Technology. Capabilities should be developed with maximum interoperability

“A sectoral strategy, to be agreed by the Council, should further specify the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from this Strategy.”

“To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is essential. In this fragile world, soft power is not enough.”

45European Union Global Strategy

and commonality, and be made available where possible in support of EU, NATO, UN and other multinational efforts. While a sectoral strategy, to be agreed by the Council, should further specify the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from this Strategy, some such areas can already be highlighted in line with commitments made by the European Council.

First, European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges. Europeans must improve the monitoring and control of flows which have security implications. This requires investing in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, including Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, satellite communications, and autonomous access to space and permanent earth observation. As regards counter-terrorism, Member States must implement legislation concerning explosives, firearms and Passenger Name Records (PNRs), as well as invest in detection capabilities and the cross-border tracing of weapons. Second, Europeans must invest in digital capabilities to secure data, networks and critical infrastructure within the European digital space. We must develop capabilities in trusted digital services and products and in cyber technologies to enhance our resilience. We will encourage greater investments and skills across Member States through cooperative research and development, training, exercises and procurement programmes. Third, regarding high-end military capabilities, Member States need all major equipment to respond to external crises and keep Europe safe. This means having full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabilities, including strategic enablers.

To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, nationally-oriented

“To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.”

European Union Global Strategy46

defence programmes are insufficient to address capability shortfalls. We remain far from achieving our collective benchmarks, including 35% of total equipment spending in collaborative procurement. The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. An annual coordinated review process at EU level to discuss Member States’ military spending plans could instil greater coherence in defence planning and capability development. This should take place in full coherence with NATO’s defence planning process. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has a key role to play by strengthening the Capability Development Plan, acting as an interface between Member States and the Commission, and assisting Member States to develop the capabilities stemming from the political goals set out in this Strategy.

Defence cooperation between Member States will be systematically encouraged. Regular assessments of EDA benchmarks can create positive peer pressure among Member States. Crucially, EU funding for defence research and technology, reflected first in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework, and then in a fully-fledged programme in the next budget cycle, will prove instrumental in developing the defence capabilities Europe needs.

A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP. It can also stimulate growth and jobs. A solid European defence, technological and industrial base needs a fair, functioning and transparent internal market, security of supply, and a structured dialogue with defence relevant industries. Furthermore, ensuring participation of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the defence sector can improve innovation and investment in the military technologies of tomorrow.

A Responsive Union

We live in a world of predictable unpredictability. We will therefore equip ourselves to respond more rapidly and flexibly to the unknown lying ahead. A more responsive Union requires change. We need it in diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as investment in the knowledge base underpinning our external action. First, our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score. Our diversity is a tremendous asset provided we stand

47European Union Global Strategy

united and work in a coordinated way. Cooperation between Member States can strengthen our engagement in the world. A Member State or a group of Member States who are willing and able to contribute may be invited by the High Representative (HR), under the responsibility of the Council, to implement agreed positions of the Council. The HR shall keep the Council fully informed and shall ensure consistency with agreed EU policies.

Second, CSDP must become more rapid and effective. Europeans must be ready to rapidly respond to crises in full compliance with the UN Charter. This requires Member States to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces through training and exercises. We must develop the capacity for rapid response also by tackling the procedural, financial and political obstacles which prevent the deployment of the Battlegroups, hamper force generation and reduce the effectiveness of CSDP military operations. At

the same time, we must further develop our civilian missions – a trademark of CSDP – by encouraging force generation, speeding up deployment, and providing adequate training based on EU-wide curricula. A responsive CSDP also requires streamlining our institutional structure. We must strengthen operational planning and conduct structures, and build closer connections

“EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score. Our diversity is a tremendous asset provided we stand united and work in a coordinated way.”

“We must develop the capacity for rapid response also by tackling the procedural, financial and political obstacles which prevent the deployment of the Battlegroups. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored in this domain. If successful and repeated over time, this might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential.”

European Union Global Strategy48

between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these may be deployed in the same theatre. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored in this domain. If successful and repeated over time, this might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential.

Third, development policy will become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities. We reaffirm our collective commitment to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in line with DAC principles. Development funds must be stable, but lengthy programming cycles limit the timely use of EU support, and can reduce our visibility and impact. The availability of limited sums for activities on the ground, notably for conflict prevention and civil

society support, should be made more flexible. Across the Commission, flexibility will be built into our financial instruments, allowing for the use of uncommitted funds in any given year to be carried on to subsequent years to respond to crises. This will also help fill the gaps between financial instruments and budgetary headings. In parallel, the time has come to consider reducing the number of instruments to enhance our coherence and flexibility, while raising the overall amount dedicated to development.

Responsive external action must be underpinned by a strong knowledge base. Targeted approaches to resilience, conflict prevention and resolution require deeper situational awareness. The EU will invest in the EEAS and coordinate better across institutions and Member States. Putting our diverse national cultures at the service of our shared interests is a challenge, but the pool of talent available to us is unrivalled. To make the most of this, we will invest in people, particularly those on the ground. This means equipping our delegations with the necessary expertise, including on sectoral issues and in local languages, valuing experience in and of a region, beefing up the political sections of delegations, and encouraging operational staff to use their expertise more politically. It means strengthening the participation of women in foreign policy-making. It means investing in the EU Conflict Early Warning System, and making all our external engagement conflict- and rights-sensitive. We will also pursue greater information sharing and joint reporting, analysis and response planning between Member

“Development policy will become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities.”

49European Union Global Strategy

State embassies, EU Delegations, Commission services, EU Special Representatives and CSDP missions. We will encourage cross-fertilisation between us and regional and international organisations, civil society, academia, think tanks and the private sector. We will do so both in traditional ways – through dialogue, cooperation and support – and through innovative formats such as exchanges, embedded personnel and joint facilities, harnessing knowledge and creativity in our system.

A Joined-up Union

Finally, our external action will become more joined-up. Over the years, important steps have been taken to this effect: these include institutional innovations, such as the Lisbon Treaty’s creation of the double-hatted High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). A strong EEAS working together with other EU institutions lies at the heart of a coherent EU role in the world. Efforts at coherence also include policy innovations such as the “comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises” and joint programming in development, which must be further enhanced. New fields of our joined-up external action include energy diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and economic diplomacy.

A more prosperous Union requires economic priorities to be set in relations with all countries and regions, and integrated into the external dimensions of all internal policies. A more prosperous Union calls for greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the EIB and the private sector. The Sustainable Development Goals also represent an opportunity to catalyse such coherence. Implementing them will generate coherence between

“Joint programming in development must be further enhanced. New fields of our joined-up ex-ternal action include energy diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and economic diplomacy. A more prosperous Union calls for greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the EIB and the private sector. We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies.”

European Union Global Strategy50

the internal and external dimensions of our policies and across financial instruments. It allows us to develop new ways to blend grants, loans and private-public partnerships. The SDGs also encourage us to expand and apply the principle of policy coherence for development to other policy areas, and encourage joint analysis and engagement across Commission services, institutions and Member States. We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies. The migration phenomenon, for example, requires a balanced and human rights-compliant policy mix addressing the management of the flows and the structural causes. This means overcoming the fragmentation of external policies relevant to migration. In particular, we will develop stronger links between humanitarian and development efforts through joint risk analysis, and multiannual programming and financing. We will also make different external policies and instruments migration-sensitive – from diplomacy and CSDP to development and climate – and ensure their coherence with internal ones regarding border management, homeland security, asylum, employment, culture and education.

In security terms, terrorism, hybrid threats and organised crime know no borders. This calls for tighter institutional links between our external action and the internal area of freedom, security and justice. Closer ties will be fostered through joint Council meetings and joint task forces between the EEAS and the Commission. Defence policy also needs to be better linked to policies covering the internal market, industry and space. Member State efforts should also be more joined-up: cooperation between our law enforcement, judicial and intelligence services must be strengthened. We must use the full potential of Europol and Eurojust, and provide greater support for the EU Intelligence Centre. We must feed and coordinate intelligence extracted from European databases, and put ICT – including big data analysis – at the service of deeper situational awareness. Our citizens need better protection also in third countries through joint contingency plans and crisis response exercises between Member States.

We must become more joined-up in our security and development policies. CSDP capacity building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law work by the Commission. Capacity Building for Security and Development can play a key role in empowering and enabling our partners to prevent and respond to crises, and will need to be supported financially by the EU. Our peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from

51European Union Global Strategy

“We must now swiftly translate this vision into action.”

short-term crisis management to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle. Long-term work on pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights must be tied to crisis response through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions and diplomacy.

Finally, we will systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions, as well as foster closer coordination regarding digital matters. Greater awareness and expertise on such issues is needed within the EEAS and the Commission. Better coordination between institutions would also add consistency and spread best practices, helping us build a stronger Union and a more resilient, peaceful and sustainable world.

The Way Ahead

This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of, and ambition for, a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference to its citizens and in the world. We must now swiftly translate this into action. First, we will revise existing sectoral strategies, as well as devise and implement new thematic or geographic strategies in line with the political priorities of this Strategy. Such work must begin with clear procedures and timeframes agreed promptly by all relevant players. Second, the EU Global Strategy itself will require periodic reviewing in consultation with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. On a yearly basis we will reflect on the state

of play of the Strategy, pointing out where further implementation must be sought. Finally, a new process of strategic reflection will be launched whenever the EU and its Member States deem it necessary to enable the Union to navigate effectively our times. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others.

53European Union Global Strategy

All EU Member States:

Foreign Ministers

Defense Ministers

Development Ministers

Secretaries General

COREPER

PSC

National Points of Contact

Political Directors

Defence Policy Directors

Security Directors

EUMC

European Commission:

College

Commissioners’ Group on External Action

Informal Task Force

EPSC

European Parliament

EU Member States’ National Parliaments

Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees

InterParliamentary Conference

Acknowledgements

European Union Global Strategy54

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)

European Investment Bank (EIB)

Adelphi

Amnesty International

Aspen Institute Italia

Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB)

Budapest Centre for Genocide and Atrocities Prevention

Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute

BUSINESSEUROPE

Carnegie Europe

Carnegie Washington

Central European Policy Institute (CEPI)

Central European University

Center for European Perspective Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Commission of the Bishops’ Conference of the European Community

(COMECE)

Compagnia di S. Paolo

CONCORD

Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP-EU)

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)

Egmont

Elcano Royal Institute

Erasmus and Erasmus Mundus Alumni

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECPDM)

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

European Leadership Network (ELN)

European Peacebuilding Office (EPLO)

European Policy Centre (EPC)

European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

European Think Tanks Group (ETTG)

European Stability Initiative (ESI)

55European Union Global Strategy

European Values

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)

Friends of Europe

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS)

Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales (ID-

DRI)

Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)

Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA)

Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)

Institute for Political Science and International Relations (ISPRI)

Institute of International Relations (IIR)

International Trade Unions Confederation (ITUC)

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

Italo-Latin America Institute (IILA)

Jean Monnet Community

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Latvian Institute of International Relations

London School of Economics (LSE)

National Defence Institute (IDN)

New Strategy Center (NSC)

NGO Voice

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI)

Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)

Swedish Institute for International Affairs (UI)

The Diplomatic Academy of the University of Nicosia

The German Marshall Fund (GMF)

The Hague Institute for Global Justice

Transparency International

University of Malta

Special thanks to our partners that have contributed with initiatives and

ideas: Brazil, Georgia, Japan, Norway, US.

European Union Global Strategy56

This Strategy wouldn’t have been possible without the daily work of the

European External Action Service (EEAS), and in particular the Strategic

Planning Division, and the tireless dedication and inspiring thinking of

Nathalie Tocci.

http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en