Case 2:13-cv-0153ffi-WBR EECc iDoeDtrJefot ]Fi I etiie23f25gD3i:Pa...

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Case 2:13-cv-0153ffi-WBR EEC c iDoeDtrJefot ]F i I etiie23f25gD3i:P algacpecllf 151

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP RONALD L. OLSON (State Bar No. 44597)[email protected] W. SPIEGEL (State Bar No. 78935)[email protected] C. SOLTMAN (State Bar No. 277418)[email protected] South Grand Avenue, Thirty-Fifth FloorLos Angeles, CA 90o7l-1560Telephone: (213) 683-9100Facsimile: (213) 687-3702

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP(Pro hac vice applications to be filed)Br a d s . k a r [email protected] THEODORE V. WELLS, JR. [email protected] BETHA. WILKINSON [email protected] y n n b . Ba y a r [email protected] 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 Telephone: (212) 373-3000 Facsimile: (212) 757-3990

Attorneys for Defendants NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and NFL PROPERTIES LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CASE NO '13CV0478W RBB

NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1441

COMPLAINT FILED:San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2013-00031265- CU-PO-CTL January 23, 2013

TYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU, a minor, and HUNTER SEAU, a minor, by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau; and BETTE HOFFm AN, as trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust,

Plaintiffs,

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NFL PROPERTIES LLC; RIDDELL, INC.; ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORP.; RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, LLC; EB SPORTS CORP.; and RBG HOLDINGS CORP.,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF CIVILACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1441

mailto:[email protected]






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Case 2:13-cv-0143ffi-WBR EB> c iDoeDtrJefot IF i I etie23f25PD3i:P agaged 151

TO THE CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, for the reasons set forth below,

Defendants National Football League (“NFL”) and NFL Properties LLC (“NFLP,”

and together with the NFL, the “NFL Defendants”), by their undersigned attorneys,

file this Notice of Removal to remove the claims against them in this action from

the Superior Court of the State of California, San Diego County, to the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1367, 1441 and 1446. Removal is made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the

basis of federal question jurisdiction. The grounds for removal are as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. On February 5 and 6, 2013, the NFL Defendants were served

by Plaintiffs, the children and trustee of the trust of former NFL player Tiaina B.

Seau, Jr. (“Junior Seau”), who is deceased, with a Summons and Complaint (the

“Complaint”) filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, San Diego

County, No. 37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL. On February 4, 2013, Plaintiffs

filed an amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint”) in the Superior Court of

the State of California, San Diego County. Copies of these papers and other

documents filed in the action are annexed as Exhibit A .

2. The Amended Complaint alleges that decedent Junior Seau

played in the NFL from 1990-2009, where he purportedly “sustained injuries

leading to his death.” (Am. Comp. | 21.) The Amended Complaint further

alleges, among other things, that the NFL fraudulently concealed “the risks of head

injuries in NFL games and practices, including the risks associated with returning

to physical activity too soon after sustaining a sub-concussive or concussive

injury,” failed to enact “return-to-play rules consistent with proper medical

management of MTBI,” and “withheld” from NFL players information about “the

kind of repetitive traumatic impacts to the head to which [they] were exposed” and

- 2 - NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF CIVILACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1441

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about the risks posed by those impacts. (Am. Compl. ^ 229, 243, 260-61.) The

Amended Complaint purports to allege causes of action for fraudulent

concealment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, negligent hiring,

negligent retention and wrongful death against the NFL Defendants. (Am. Compl.

^ 226-321.) The Amended Complaint also alleges a cause of action for wrongful

death due to negligence, design defects, and failure to warn against Riddell, Inc.;

All American Sports Corp.; Riddell Sports Group, Inc.; Easton-Bell Sports, Inc.;

Easton-Bell Sports, LLC; EB Sports Corp.; and RBG Holdings Corp. (collectively,

the “Riddell Defendants”). (Am. Compl. ^ 322-47.) Plaintiffs seek recovery of

compensatory and punitive damages, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorneys’

fees. (Am. Compl. p. 57.)

3. The relationship between the NFL Defendants and Junior Seau

was governed by various collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) that were

executed and operative during his career. The CBAs are the product of exhaustive

arm’s-length negotiations between, the NFL Management Council (the exclusive

bargaining representative of the NFL), and the NFL Players Association (the

exclusive bargaining representative of NFL players), and “represent[] the complete

understanding of the parties on all subjects covered [t]herein.” (CBA Art. II § 1

(1993-2010).) The CBAs include, among other terms, provisions relating to player

medical care and safety, rule-making, and dispute resolution.

II. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL

4. This Court has original jurisdiction of this action under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 because the action is one that is founded on a claim or right “arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” A defendant may

remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 if the complaint presents

a federal question, such as a federal claim. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,

390 U.S. 557, 560, 88 S. Ct. 1235, 1237, 20 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1968).

5. Federal question jurisdiction exists in this case based on


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Case 2:13-cv-0(D538-WBR BDO c iDoeDtilent ]F i I etiejjBDEflHBlJ3 algageof 051

complete preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

(“LMRA”) of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830

F.2d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[I]f federal law completely preempts a state law

claim and supplants it with a federal claim, the state law claim may be removed to

federal court.”).

6. To the extent that any of the claims in the Amended Complaint

is not preempted, it “form[s] part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. This Court thus has supplemental jurisdiction over all parties and claims.

See Bobadilla-German v. Bear Creek Orchards, Inc., 641 F.3d 391, 394 (9th Cir.

2011) (holding that district court “had jurisdiction over [plaintiffs’] state-law

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367”); Garcia v. Am. Red Cross, No. CV-92 2513, 1992

WL 470325, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1992) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for

remand based on lack of jurisdiction over a pendent party co-defendant); Maxwell

v. N a t’l Football League, No. 11-cv-08394 R(MANx), Order at 2 (C.D. Cal. Dec.

8, 2011) (“As long as at least one federal claim is present, this Court can exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367”); Duerson v. N a t’l Football League, No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at

*6 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012) (“Federal jurisdiction thus exists over [plaintiff’s

negligence] claim, and the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

rest of Duerson’s claims.”).

7. Section 301 of the LMRA provides that the federal courts have

original jurisdiction over all “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has held that

“questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal

consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be

resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the

context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.” Allis-

Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985); see also Hubbard v. United


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Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff’s

fraud and RICO claims were preempted because allegations “involve[d] violation

of a right created by the CBA”). Thus, section 301 preempts tort claims seeking to

vindicate “state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of

[collective bargaining] agreements” and also claims “substantially dependent upon

analysis of the terms of [a collective-bargaining] agreement.” Allis-Chalmers, 471

U.S. at 213, 220; Young, 830 F.2d at 1001 (holding that plaintiff’ s fraud and

misrepresentation claims were preempted by section 301).

8. Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted because resolution of those

claims is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of [the CBAs]”

or “substantially dependent” on an analysis of the relevant provisions of the CBAs.

Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 215, 220; see also Maxwell, Order at 2

(concussion-related negligence claim against NFL preempted); Pear v. N a t’l

Football League, No. 11-cv-08395 R(MANx), Order at 2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011)

(same); Barnes v. N a t’l Football League, No. 11-cv-08395 R(MANx), Order at 2

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011) (same); Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *4, 6 (same);

Stringer v. N a t’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 909-10 (S.D. Ohio 2007)

(wrongful death claim arising out of heat-related illness against the NFL preempted

because resolution of the claim was substantially dependent upon an analysis of

CBA provisions related to NFL player medical care and treatment).

9. For example, resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims will require

interpretation of provisions of the CBAs relating to player medical care and rule

making. See, e.g., NFL CBA Art. XLIV § 1 (1993-2010) (requiring physician on

staff of Member Clubs to inform a player in writing if he has a physical condition

that “could be significantly aggravated by continued performance”); NFL CBA

Art. XLIV § 2 (1993-2010) (“[F]ull-time head trainers and assistant trainers . . .

[must] be certified by the National Athletic Trainers association.”); NFL

Constitution and Bylaws Art. XIX § 19.5 (1990-2010) (requiring that the home


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Case 2:13-cv-0ffi53ffi-WBR EE c iDoeDtrJefot ]F i I etiedBDEflPDHlJ3 agacpeCEf 059

team provide a doctor and ambulance for each game); NFL Constitution and

Bylaws Art. Art. XVII § 17.16(E) (1990-2010) (“All determinations of recovery

time for major and minor injuries must be by the club’s medical staff and in

accordance with the club’s medical standards” for players categorized as

“Reserve/Injured” on the Reserve List); NFL CBA Art. XIII § 1(a) (1993-2010)

(creating a Joint Committee to study, among other things, player safety issues);

NFL CBA Art. XIII § 1(b)-(c) (1993-2010), Art. XIII § 1(d) (2002-10) (mandating

procedures for review, investigation and resolution of disputes involving proposed

rule changes that “could adversely affect player safety”).1 The Court will be

required to interpret these benefits provisions to determine the scope of the NFL’s

duty and to determine whether the NFL acted reasonably in light of those

provisions. See Maxwell, No. 11-cv-08394 R(MANx), Order at 2.

10. Indeed, two separate district courts considering allegations

similar to those alleged here have recently determined that the NFL properly

removed complaints brought by former NFL players because resolution of their

concussion-related negligence claims was substantially dependent on, and

inextricably intertwined with, an analysis of CBA provisions concerning medical

care and treatment of NFL players. In Maxwell, Pear and Barnes, the Central

District of California, finding Stringer “to be persuasive,” held that plaintiffs’

negligence claims—premised, among other things, on allegations that the NFL

failed “to ensure accurate diagnosis and recording of concussive brain injury so the

condition can be treated in an adequate and timely manner”—were preempted

because “[t]he physician provisions of the CBA must be taken into account in

determining the degree of care owed by the NFL and how it relates to the NFL’s

1 See Clarett v. N a t’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 142 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In the [CBA], the union agreed to waive any challenge to the Constitution and Bylaws and thereby acquiesced in the continuing operation of the . . . rules contained therein.”); see also Brown v. N a t’l Football League, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[The NFL Constitution and Bylaws were] bargained for and included within the scope of the CBA.”).


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Case 2:13-cv-0(D43ffi-WBR BDd c iDoeDti1e1t ]F i I ediei3D2S'2ia?133a@age(>f 051

alleged failure to establish guidelines or policies to protect the mental health and

safety of its players.” Maxwell, Order at 2; Pear, Order at 2; Barnes, Order at 2;

Compl. | 3 (alleging that the NFL had a duty “to provide players with rules and

information that protect players as much as possible”); see also Duerson, 2012 WL

1658353, at *4 (“A court could plausibly interpret those provisions to impose a

duty on the NFL’s clubs to monitor a player’s health and fitness to continue to play

football . . . . The NFL could then reasonably exercise a lower standard of care in

that area itself. Determining the meaning of the CBA provisions is thus necessary

to resolve Duerson’s negligence claim.”). Having determined that at least one

federal claim was present, the Central District of California exercised supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Maxwell, Order at 2; Pear, Order at 2;

Barnes, Order at 2; see also Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *6.

11. Plaintiffs’ claims also are preempted by section 301 because the

purported duties Plaintiffs allege the NFL Defendants had and breached were

created by the CBAs and are not based on an independent duty “owed to every

person in society.” See United Steelworkers o f Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 370

71, 110 S. Ct. 1904, 1910, 109 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1990) (holding in the context of a

labor dispute involving unionized employees that, absent an independent duty

running from defendants “to every person in society,” any such duty to plaintiffs

must arise out of the CBA); see also Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 540-41 (9th

Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim was

preempted because plaintiffs “failed to show a separate, independent duty upon

which to base this claim”). Plaintiffs’ claims hinge fundamentally on the NFL’s

purported failure to implement adequate rules, regulations, and guidelines

regarding player health and safety. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. | 4.) The CBAs and

NFL Constitution, however, establish the duty of the NFL and its member clubs to

implement and enforce rules regarding professional football. See, e.g., NFL CBA

Art. XIII § 1(b)-(c) (1993-2010) (mandating procedures for review, investigation


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C ase 2:13-cv-01438-WBR BDO c iDoeDtilefot ]F i I edie3 3D2S2D:^B1cPa@egeOE 059

and resolution of disputes involving proposed rule changes that “would adversely

affect player safety”); NFL Constitution Art. XI, § 11.2 (1990-2010) (delegating to

the NFL, and its member clubs, the obligation to “amend[] or change[]” all

“[p]laying rules,” and further requiring that all proposed rule changes be presented

to the NFL prior to a vote).

III. REMOVAL IS PROCEDURALLY PROPER

12. The Southern District of California is the federal district in

which the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego—where

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint—is located.

13. This Notice of Removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b),

which states that “notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed

within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise,

of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such

action or proceeding is based.”

14. Written notice of the filing of this Notice of Removal will be

provided to Plaintiffs, and a copy of this Notice will be filed in the appropriate

state court, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). This Notice of Removal is signed

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

15. Counsel for the Riddell Defendants has consented to the

removal of the action. All defendants thus have consented to removal of the

action. See Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1998) (“All

defendants must join a notice of removal.”).

16. In filing this Notice of Removal, the NFL Defendants do not

waive any defenses that may be available to them, including without limitation

jurisdiction, venue, standing, or procedures for the disposition of this action in

accordance with the terms of the CBA. Nor do the NFL Defendants admit any of

the factual allegations in the Complaint; they expressly reserve the right to contest

those allegations at the appropriate time.


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Case 2:13-cv-0(D43ffi-WBR EDS c iDoeDtrJent ]F i I idcle03DT2?PD3f133agagecg 059

WHEREFORE, the NFL Defendants remove the above-captioned

action brought against them in the Superior Court of the State of California,

San Diego County.

DATED: February 28, 2013 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP-and-PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

By: s/ Nicholas C. Soltman________________NICHOLAS C. SOLTMAN [email protected]

Attorneys for Defendants NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and NFL PROPERTIES LLC



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J Superior Court of California, County of San Diego - Register of Actions

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Case Information

Case Number: 37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL Date Filed: 01/23/2013Case Title: Seau vs. National Football League [IMAGED] Case Status: PendingCase Category: Civil - Unlimited Location: CentralCase Type: PI/PD/WD - Other Judicial Officer: William S. DatoCase Age: 30 days Department: C-67

Future Events

Participants

Name Role Representation

All American Sports Corp Defendant

Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002 Trust Plaintiff

Casey, David S Jr; Strauss, Steven M

EB Sports Corp Defendant

Easton-Bell Sports Inc Defendant

Easton-Bell Sports LLC Defendant

NFL Properties LLC Defendant

National Football League Defendant

RBG Holdings Corp Defendant

Riddell Inc Defendant

Riddell Sports Group Inc Defendant

Q 2 K K-

Representation -

Name Address Phone Numb

CASEYJR, DAVID S

CASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCAVILLA BLATT & PENFIE 110 Laurel Street San Diego CA 92101

(619) 2381811

STRAUSS, COOLEY LLP 4401 EASTGATE MALL SAN DIEGO CA (858)550-

https://roa.sdcourt.ca.gov/roa/faces/CaseSearch.xhtmlEX A, PAGE 10

https://roa.sdcourt.ca.gov/roa/faces/CaseSearch.xhtml

CCaes 3 ;2a-C-c(0MT5&/ABB BDdEUnmieinite1H11 - F i l edl (03/02113 1 P atpage afc1 5139

STEVEN M 92121 6000

D

ROA# Entry Date Short/Long Entry Filed By Document Cart

13 02/12/2013 Summonsissued.

12 02/04/2013

Original Summons filed by Seau, Tyler; Seau, Sydney; Seau,Jake;Seau, Hunter; Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002Trust.\nRefers to: National Football League; NFL Properties LLC; Riddell Inc; All American Sports Corp; Riddell Sports Group Inc; Easton-Bell Sports Inc; Easton-Bell Sports LLC; EB Sports Corp;RBG Holdings Corp; Seau, Gina

Seau,Tyler(Plaintiff);Seau,Sydney(Plaintiff);Seau,Jake(Plaintiff); Seau, Hunter (Plaintiff); Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002 Trust (Plaintiff)

OriginalSummons

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Amended Complaint (First) filed by Seau, Tyler; Seau, Sydney; Seau, Jake; Seau, Hunter; Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002

Seau,Tyler(Plaintiff);Seau,Sydney(Plaintiff);Seau,Jake



CCaes 3 ;ia-Ci-(0MT5&:MABB BDoEUimieintelrtDI - F i l edl (03/22/28/ 1 P apag(3 4fc1 3139

11 02/04/2013

Trust.\nRefers to: National Football League; NFL Properties LLC; Riddell Inc; All American Sports Corp; Riddell Sports Group Inc; Easton-Bell Sports Inc; Easton-Bell Sports LLC; EB Sports Corp;RBG Holdings Corp; Seau, Gina

(Plaintiff); Seau, Hunter (Plaintiff); Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002 Trust (Plaintiff)

AmendedComplaint(First)

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10 01/28/2013

Case reassigned from Judge Trapp, Randa to William Dato effective 01/28/2013

Notice of CaseReassignmentSD

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01/28/2013Miscellaneous Minute Order Finalized.

Minute Order Add to Cart

01/28/2013 Summonsissued.

01/25/2013

Original Summons filed by Seau, Tyler; Seau, Sydney; Seau, Jake;Seau, Hunter; Seau, Gina;Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002Trust.\nRefers to: National Football League; NFL Properties LLC; Riddell Inc; All American Sports Corp; Riddell Sports Group Inc; Easton-Bell Sports Inc; Easton-Bell Sports LLC; EB Sports Corp;

Seau,Tyler(Plaintiff);Seau,Sydney(Plaintiff);Seau,Jake(Plaintiff);Seau,Hunter(Plaintiff);Seau,Gina(Guardian Ad Litem)

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CCas e> ;2a-C-c(0MT5S1AABB B)oEUraeinite1HH - F i l edl 63/02/13/ 1 P aLgeadi.<4 Sfc1 3LB9

RBG Holdings Corp

6 01/25/2013

Application and Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem (Jake Seau) filed by Seau,Jake.\nRefers to: Seau, Gina

Seau,Jake(Plaintiff)

Application and Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem (Jake Seau)

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5 01/23/2013

Application and Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem filed by Seau,Hunter.\nRefers to: Seau, Gina

Seau,Hunter(Plaintiff)

Application and Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem

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4 01/24/2013 Case initiation form printed.

Notice of CaseAssignmentSD

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4 01/24/2013Case initiation form printed.

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3 01/23/2013Case assigned to Judicial Officer Trapp, Randa.

2 01/23/2013

Civil Case Cover Sheet filed by Seau, Tyler; Seau, Sydney; Seau, Jake;Seau, Hunter; Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002Trust.\nRefers to: Seau, Gina; National Football League; NFL Properties LLC; Riddell Inc; All American Sports Corp; Riddell Sports Group

Seau,Tyler(Plaintiff);Seau,Sydney(Plaintiff);Seau,Jake(Plaintiff); Seau, Hunter (Plaintiff); Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B

Civil Case Cover Sheet

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CCas e> 2a3i-001]5H-11-EB oEUumieinite1H11 - F i l edl <03/22/28/ 1 P apag§ <0101 3139

Inc; Easton-Bell Sports Inc; Easton-Bell Sports LLC; EB Sports Corp; RBG Holdings Corp

Seau Jr 2002 Trust (Plaintiff)

1 01/23/2013

Complaint filed by Seau, Tyler; Seau, Sydney; Seau, Jake;Seau, Hunter; Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002Trust.\nRefers to: Seau, Gina; National Football League; NFL Properties LLC; Riddell Inc; All American Sports Corp; Riddell Sports Group Inc; Easton-Bell Sports Inc; Easton-Bell Sports LLC; EB Sports Corp;RBG Holdings Corp

Seau,Tyler(Plaintiff);Seau,Sydney(Plaintiff);Seau,Jake(Plaintiff); Seau, Hunter (Plaintiff); Bette Hoffman as trustee of the Tiaina B Seau Jr 2002 Trust (Plaintiff)

Complaint Add to Cart

1

THE INFORMATION IN THIS REGISTER OF ACTIONS IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT W ARRANTY BY THE SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT AS TO CONTENT OR ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION. The Entry Date on the Register of Actions may not always reflect the actual filing date of a document and not all documents filed with the Court are listed on the Register o f Actions. It is recommended that users refer to the case file for confirmation.



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COOLEY LLP • 2313 JiiH 23 PM 3-23STEVEN M. STRAUSS (99153) ([email protected])4401 Eastgate Mall CLERKff.l/crUCS vSan Diego, CA 92121 SAN DiiiuU JUNTWUtV '*•* hflTelephone: (858)550-6000 . ■;Facsimile: (858) 550-6420 :

CASEY GERRY SCHENK. FRANCAVILLA BLATT &PENFIELD, LLPDAVID S. CASEY, JR. (060768) ([email protected])FREDERICK SCHENK (086392) ([email protected])110 Laurel Street San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 238-1811 Facsimile: (619) 544-9232

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CENTRAL DIVISION

TYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU, a minor, and HUNTER SEAU, a minor, by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau; and BETTE HOFFMAN as trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust.

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NFL PROPERTIES LLC; RIDDELL, INC.; ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORP.; RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, LLC; EB SPORTS CORP.; AND RBG HOLDINGS CORP.

Defendants.

VIA FAXCase No. 37-2013-O0031265-CU-PO-CTL

Plaintiffs’ Complaint For Damages and Demand For Jury Trial

1. Fraudulent Concealment2. Fraud3. Negligent Misrepresentation4. Negligence5. Negligent Hiring6. Negligent Retention7. Wrongful Death - NFL Defendants8. Wrongful Death ~ Riddell Defendants

C o o le y LLP Atto«h£vs Ay LawSan ptEco

TYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU, a minor,

and HUNTER SEAU, a minor, by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau; and BETTE

HOFFMAN, trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust hereby file this Complaint for Damages

against Defendants, the National Football League (“NFL”) and NFL Properties LLC (“NFL1.

EX A, PAGE 15




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Properties”) (collectively “NFL Defendants”),. Riddell, Inc, (d/b/a Riddell Sports Group, Inc.), All

American Sports Corporation, (d/b/a Riddell/All American), Riddell Sports Group, Inc., Easton-

Bell Sports, Inc., Easton-B^l Sports, LLC, EB Sports Corp., and RBG Holdings Corp.

(collectively “Riddell Defendants”), and allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION< £

1. The NFL is America’s most successful sports organization, generating multi

billion dollar profits and le g its of devoted fans. On average, the NFL generates approximately

$9,300,000,000.00 per year. As the organizer, marketer and face of professional football, the

NFL zealously protects these profits and the game that produces them.

2. This success comes at a price for the players who make the game great. For many

decades, evidence has linked repetitive mild traumatic brain injury (“MTBI”) to long-term

neurological problems. -THe^NFL was aware of the evidence and the risks associated with

repetitive traumatic brain hfjuries for many decades, but deliberately ignored and actively

concealed the information froirj the players, including the late Junior Seau.

3. Since its inception, the NFL has controlled and regulated every aspect of the game

of professional football, particularly with respect to player safety and health. The NFL has used

this authority to compel all NFL players and participants to follow the policies, rules, and

regulations the NFL has enact

the NFL has held itself out as

;d and imposed. As the governing body of professional football,

the guardian and authority on the issue of player safety and has

unilaterally shouldered for itself a duty to provide players with rules and information that protect

players as much as possible from short-term and long-term health risks.

4. The NFL’s rolejas the guardian of player health and safety began in the 1930s and

continues up through the present day. The NFL has exercised its supervisory role through its

unilateral decisions to issue rules to improve upon NFL football’s public acceptance, to make a

profit, and to address issueNjgf player safety. The NFL has also unilaterally and voluntarily

chosen how to spend its fim ^to investigate and regulate many different circumstances affecting

player health and safety, including, but not limited to, requiring players to wear certain

equipment, designating somi player gear as illegal, and ultimately deciding what helmet brand2.

EX A, PAGE 16

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should be recognized as the official equipment of the NFL. During these decades, the NFL

voluntarily provided teams and players with information and regulations that directly affected the

short and long term health of NFL players, including Junior Seau.

5. NFL players and their families, including Junior Seau, looked to the NFL for

guidance on player safety issues.

6. Although the NFL voluntarily assumed its role as the unilateral guardian of player

safety, the NFL has exacerbated the health risk to players by promoting the game’s violence and

lauding players for returning to play despite being rendered unconscious and/or disoriented due to

their exposure to sub-concussive and concussive forces. Today, the NFL and its agents continue

to market the ferocity and brutality of the sport.

7. The NFL has long been aware that violent on-field collisions can lead to latent

head injuries which may have debilitating long-term effects on players. Since the 1950s and

1960s, a substantial body of medical and scientific evidence has demonstrated neuro-cognitive

injuries in the sport of football as a result of MBTI. During these decades, the NFL voluntarily

participated in the work of various entities studying the performance and effectiveness of safety

gear to reduce the risk of neurological injury. The NFL’s participation was a voluntary

continuance of the historic duty it had assumed in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite

this awareness, the NFL ignored, minimized, disputed, and actively suppressed broader awareness

of the link between sub-concussive and concussive injuries in football and the chronic neuro-

cognitive damage, illnesses, and decline suffered by former players.

8. By the early 1990s, the consensus among experts in the scientific community was

that many football players had developed brain injuries as a consequence of multiple “dings,”

sub-concussive injuries, and concussions.

9. In 1994, the NFL created and/or decided to fund the NFL’s so-called Mild

Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (the “MTBI Committee”) ostensibly to research and study

MTBI affecting NFL players.

10. Through its MTBI Committee, the NFL voluntarily inserted itself into the

scientific research and discussion concerning the link between sub-concussive and concussive3.

EX A, PAGE 17

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impacts sustained by NFL players and short-term and long-term impairment of the brain. By

voluntarily inserting itself into the MTBI research and public discourse, the NFL gratuitously

undertook a responsibility (a) to make truthful statements; (b) not to wrongfully advance

improper, biased, and falsified industry-generated studies; (c) not to discredit well-researched and

credible studies that came to a conclusion that did not comport with the NFL’s financial and

political interests; and, (d) to inform all former players, all current players, and the football-

playing public, including young people and their families, regarding the risks of MTBI in

football.

11. Instead of adhering to these duties, the NFL produced industry-funded, biased, and

falsified research that claimed that-concussive and sub-concussive head impacts in football do not

present serious, life-altering risks. The NFL also actively sought to suppress the findings of other

members of the medical community that showed the link between on-field sub-concussive and

concussive head impacts and post-career neuro-cognitive damage, illness and decline.

12. For sixteen years, the NFL actively and continuously denied any link between

MTBI sustained by former NFL players in NFL games and practices and the neurological

symptoms and problems (such as headaches, dizziness, loss of memory, dementia and ALS) from

which they now suffer. The NFL made its biased and falsified position known by way of

gratuitous press releases, publications in scientific literature, and other communications.

13. The NFL intended for the general public, NFL players, the late Junior Seau, his

family and participants at every level of the game to rely on the misinformation it propagated.

14. The NFL’s active and purposeful concealment and misrepresentation of the severe

neurological risks of repetitive MTBI exposed players to dangers they could have avoided had the

NFL provided them with truthful and accurate information. Junior Seau sustained numerous and

repetitive injuries over his career while in the NFL and has been diagnosed by the National

Institutes of Health to have been suffering from Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) and

related neurodegenerative disorders and diseases which were caused by the NFL’s acts and/or

omissions.

15. The NFL concealed and misrepresented these risks by: (a) historically ignoring the4.

EX A, PAGE 18

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true risks of MTBI in NFL football; (b) failing to disclose the true risks of repetitive MTBI to

NFL players; and (c) since 1994, deliberately spreading misinformation concerning the cause and

effect relationship between MTBI in NFL football and latent neurodegenerative disorders and

diseases.

16. These acts and omissions caused the neurodegenerative diseases, including, the

debilitating and latent disease known as CTE, which caused Junior Seau’s tragic death.

17. On information and belief, the NFL’s motive to ignore and misrepresent the link

between MTBI sustained in NFL play and neuro-cognitive injury and decline was economic. The

NFL knew or suspected that any rule changes that sought to recognize that link and the health risk

to NFL players would impose an economic cost that would significantly and adversely change the

profit margins enjoyed by the NFL and its teams.

18. On information and belief, all NFL policies and decisions relevant to the conduct

alleged herein occurred primarily in the NFL corporate offices in New York.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

19. Jurisdiction is based upon the California Constitution Article 6, Section I 0.

20. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 395(A) of the California Code of

Civil Procedure.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

PLAINTIFFS

21. Tiaina B. Seau, Jr., (“Junior Seau”) deceased, was a player in the NFL for 20

consecutive seasons, where he sustained injuries leading to his death on May 2, 2012. Junior

Seau played for the San Diego Chargers (1990-2002), the Miami Dolphins (2003-2005), and the

New England Patriots (2006-2009). At all times decedent was a resident in the State of

California.

22. Tyler Seau is the son of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in the State

of California.

23. Sydney Seau is the daughter of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in

the State of California.5.

EX A, PAGE 19

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24. Jake Seau is the son of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in the State

of California.

25. Hunter Seau is the son of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in the

State of California.

26. Gina Seau is the parent and guardian of Jake Seau and Hunter Seau, both of whom

are minors, and brings this action as guardian ad litem on their behalf.

27. Bette Hoffman is the trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust, and is a resident

of and domiciled in the State of California. As trustee, Ms. Hoffman brings this action as a

survival action on behalf of the estate of decedent and all successors-in-interest therein pursuant

to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30. The statement required by Code of Civil Procedure

section 377.32 is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A.

28. Plaintiffs Tyler Seau, Sydney Seau, Jake Seau, a minor, and Hunter Seau, a minor,

by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau, bring this action as specified in Section

377.60, subd. (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

DEFENDANTS

29. Defendant NFL, which maintains its offices at 345 Park Avenue, New York, New

York, is an unincorporated association consisting of separately owned and independently-

operated professional football teams which operate out of many different cities and states within

this country. The NFL is engaged in interstate commerce in the business of, among other things,

promoting, operating, organizing, and regulating the major professional football league in the

United States. The NFL is not, and has not been, the employer of Junior Seau, who was

employed during his career in professional football by the independent clubs (hereinafter

“Teams” or “Clubs”) set forth below. The United States Supreme Court held in American

Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 14 2201, 2212-13 (2010), that each team that is a member of the

NFL is a legally distinct and separate entity from both the other teams and the NFL itself. The

NFL regularly conducts business in California.

30. Defendant NFL Properties, LLC is the successor-in-interest to National Football

League Properties, Inc. (“NFL Properties”) and a limited liability company organized and6.

EX A, PAGE 20

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existing under the laws of the state of Delaware with its headquarters in the state of New York.

NFL Properties is engaged in, among other activities, approving, licensing, and promoting

equipment used by all the NFL teams. NFL Properties regularly conducts business in California.

Together with the NFL, Defendant NFL Properties is referred to herein as the "NFL Defendants.”

31. Defendant Riddell, Inc, (d/b/a Riddell Sports Group, Inc.) is a corporation

organized and existing under the laws of the state of Illinois and whose principal place of

business is in the State of Illinois. Riddell is engaged in the business of designing,

manufacturing, selling and distributing football equipment, including helmets, to the NFL and

since 1989 has been the official helmet of the NFL. Riddell, Inc., regularly conducts business in

the state of California.

32. Defendant All American Sports Corporation, (d/b/a Riddell/All American), is a

corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and is engaged in the

business of designing, manufacturing, selling and distributing football equipment including

helmets, to the NFL and since 1989 has been the official helmet of the NFL. All American Sports

Corporation regularly conducts business in the state of California.

33. Defendant Riddell Sports Group, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal

place of business at 6255 N. State Highway, #300, Irving, Texas 76038. Riddell Sports Group,

Inc., regularly conducts business in the state of California.

34. Defendant Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with a principal

place of business at 7855 Haskell Avenue, Suite 200, Van Nuys, California 91406 and is a parent

corporation of Riddell Sports Group, Inc. Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. designs, develops, and markets

branded athletic equipment and accessories, including marketing and licensing products, under

the Riddell brand. Easton-Bell Sports regularly conducts business in the state of California.

35. Defendant Easton-Bell Sports, LLC is the parent corporation of Easton-Bell

Sports, Inc. and is incorporated in Delaware, with a principal place of business at 152 West 57th

Street, New York, New York 10019. Easton-Bell Sports, LLC regularly conducts business in the

state of California.

36. Defendant EB Sports Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of7.

EX A, PAGE 21

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business at 7855 Haskell Avenue, Van Nuys, California 91406.

37. Defendant RBG Holdings Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place

of business at 7855 Haskell Avenue, Suite 350, Van Nuys, California 91406.

38. Defendants Riddell, Inc., Riddell Sports Group Inc., All American Sports

Corporation, Easton-Bell Sports, Inc., EB Sports Corp., Easton-Bell Sports, LLC, and RBG

Holdings Corp., shall hereinafter be referred to collectively as the “Riddell Defendants.”

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS AGAINST THE NFL DEFENDANTS

39. The NFL oversees America’s most popular spectator sport, acting as a trade

association for the benefit of the thirty-two independently operated Teams.

40. The NFL has, since its inception in the first half of the twentieth century, governed

and promoted the game of football, by acting as the governing body, establishing rules related to

player health and safety, League policies, and Team ownership.

41. The NFL generates revenue mostly through marketing sponsorships, licensing

merchandise, and by selling national broadcasting rights to the games. The Teams share a

percentage of the League’s overall revenue.

42. Annually, the NFL redistributes approximately $4 billion in radio, television, and

digital earnings to the Teams or approximately $125 million per Team. Those revenue numbers

have increased since 2009.

43. The NFL enjoys partial monopoly power through an anti-trust exemption granted

via the Federal Sports Broadcasting Act that allows the NFL to sell television rights for all 32

Teams as a single unit.

The NFL Uses Its Influence To Encourage Violent Play

44. The NFL Defendants have had enormous influence over the game of football at all

levels of the game because of their financial power, monopoly status, and high visibility.

45. This influence has been expanded over many decades through their use of the

media. Through NFL films, the NFL Network, and www.NFL.com, the NFL Defendants have

promoted NFL football via every mass communication medium available.8.

EX A, PAGE 22

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46. Part of the NFL Defendants’ strategy to promote NFL football is to glorify the

brutality and ferocity of NFL football, in part by lauding and mythologizing the most brutal and

ferocious players and collisions, and simultaneously propagating the fraudulent representation

that “getting your bell rung,” “being dinged,” and putting big hits on others is a badge of courage

which does not seriously threaten one’s health.

47. As a result of this strategy, the NFL Defendants have propagated the false myth

that collisions of all kinds, including brutal and ferocious collisions, many of which lead to short

term and long-term neurological damage to players, are an acceptable, desired, and natural

consequence of the game, and a measure of the courage and heroism of players involved at every

level of the game.

48. As a result of this strategy, and the overwhelming influence of the NFL

Defendants at every level of the game, the NFL Defendants have also generated for themselves

and others billions of dollars every year by promoting a product of brutality and ferocity and

inculcating in players at every level of the game the false and life-threatening ideas that (a) brutal,

ferocious, and debilitating collisions are a required and desired outcome in the game of football;

and (b) playing despite repetitive head impacts is a laudable and desirable goal.

49. NFL Films is an agent and instrumentality of the NFL Defendants devoted to

producing promotional films for the NFL. To propagate the NFL’s image of the game as brutal

and violent, NFL Films has created numerous highlight features that focus solely on the hardest-

hits in pro football. These featured videos are marketed and sold to advance the NFL’s culture of

violence as entertainment.

50. The list of videos created by NFL Films glorifying violent plays includes, but is

not limited to, the following titles: “NFL: Moment o f Impact” (2007); “NFL’s 100 Greatest

Tackles” (1995); “Big Blocks and King Size Hits" (1990); “The Best o f Thunder and Destruction

- NFL’s Hardest Hits”; “NFL Films Video: Strike Force” (1989); “The NFL’s Greatest Hits”

(1989); “Crunch Course”; “Crunch Course IF (1988); “Crunch Masters”; “In the Crunch”

(1987); “NFL Rocks”; “NFL Rocks: Extreme FootbalF (1993).

51. These videos contain numerous explicit examples of how the NFL Defendants9.

EX A, PAGE 23

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market and glorify the violent nature of the NFL. For instance, the back cover of 2007 film

"Moment o f Impact" advertises the film as follows: “First you hear the breathing, then you feel

the wind coming through your helmet’s ear hole. Suddenly you’re down, and you’re looking

through your helmet’s ear hole. Pain? That’s for tomorrow morning. Right now you’ve gotta

focus - focus on the play and try not to focus on the next moment of impact.”

52. These films deemphasize the acute and chronic risks associated with head impacts.

Moreover, they utilize players, including Junior Seau, to spread the fraudulent message that brutal

violence is a necessary part of the sport. In 1993’s "NFL Rocks," Junior Seau offered his opinion

on the measure of a punishing hit: “If I can feel some dizziness, I know that guy is feeling double

[that].” In a segment of the same film, former Houston Oilers receiver Ernest Givens is quoted as

saying: “I get knocked out a lot, I get concussions, I get broken noses, that is part of being a

receiver, that’s what separates you from being a typical receiver than a great receiver.” Former

Dallas Cowboys receiver Michael Irvin recites a similar unawareness of the risks of concussions:

“Before the game, I go to the [defensive backs] and tell them, ‘Hey, you know I’ll trade a

concussion for a reception!”’

53. NFL Films, therefore, advances the NFL Defendants’ agenda to promote the most

violent aspects of NFL football and to urge players at every level of the game to disregard the

results of violent head impacts. This promotes a culture in which playing hurt or with an injury,

including MTBI, is both expected and acclaimed. Moreover, failure to play through such an

injury creates the risk that the NFL player will lose playing time, a starting position, and possibly

a career.

54. This attitude within the League and its players continued in the decades of the

1980s, 1990s and 2000s, with players lauded for their “head hunting” skills. As recently as

October 2010, the NFL fined some players for what it characterized as “illegal and dangerous

hits”, and yet the NFL Defendants sought to profit by selling photos of the illegal hits on its

website for between $54,95 and $249.95.

55. Within this culture, the NFL Defendants purposefully profit from the violence they

promote.10.

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Injuries Resulting From This Violence

56. Medical science has known for many decades that repetitive and violent jarring of

the head or impact to the head can cause MTBI with a heightened risk of long term, chronic

neuro-cognitive injury. .

57. The American Association of Neurological Surgeons (the “AANS”) has defined a

concussion as “a clinical syndrome characterized by an immediate and transient alteration in brain

function, including an alteration of mental status and level of consciousness, resulting from

mechanical force or trauma.” The AANS defines traumatic brain injury (“TBI”) as:

a blow or jolt to the head, or a penetrating head injury that disrupts the normal function of the brain. TBI can result when the head suddenly and violently hits an object, or when an object pierces the skull and enters brain tissue. Symptoms of a TBI can be mild, moderate or severe, depending on the extent of damage to the brain.Mild cases may result in a brief change in mental state or consciousness, while severe cases may result in extended periods of unconsciousness, coma or even death.

58. MTBI generally occurs when the head either accelerates rapidly and then is

stopped, or is rotated rapidly. The results frequently include, among other things, confusion,

blurred vision, memory loss, nausea, and sometimes unconsciousness.

59. Medical evidence has shown that symptoms of MTBI can appear hours or days

after the injury, ■

60. Once a person suffers an MTBI, he is up to four times more likely to sustain a

second one. Additionally, after suffering even a single sub-concussive or concussive blow, a

lesser blow may cause MTBI, and the injured person requires more time to recover.

61. Clinical and neuro -p athol ogi cal studies by some of the nation’s foremost experts

demonstrate that multiple head injuries, concussions, or repeated traumatic head impacts

(including sub-concussive and concussive blows) sustained during an NFL player’s career can

cause severe neuro-cognitive problems such as depression and early-onset of dementia.

62. Studies on many former football players, including former NFL players, have

established that football players who sustain repetitive head impacts while playing the game have

suffered and continue to suffer brain injuries that result in any one or more of the following11.

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conditions: early-onset of Alzheimer’s Disease, dementia, depression, deficits in cognitive

functioning, reduced processing speed, attention and reasoning, loss of memory, sleeplessness,

mood swings, personality changes, neurological deficits impacting judgment, and the debilitating

and latent disease known as CTE. The latter condition involves the slow build-up of the Tau

protein within the brain tissue that causes diminished brain function, progressive cognitive

decline, and many of the symptoms listed above. CTE is also associated with an increased risk of

suicide.

63. CTE is found in athletes, including football players and boxers, with a history of

repetitive head trauma. The changes in the brain caused by repetitive trauma are thought to begin

when the brain is subjected to that repetitive trauma, but symptoms may not appear until months,

years, or even decades after the last traumatic impact or the end of active athletic involvement.

64. Papers and studies documenting autopsies on over thirty former NFL players show

that over ninety percent-of the players suffered from CTE.

65. As a result, published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that concussive

and sub-concussive head impacts while playing professional football are linked to a significant

risk of permanent brain injury.

66. Published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that 28% of the NFL

retirees studied suffered from depression, whereas the prevalence of depression in the general

population is 9.5%.

67. Published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that 36% of NFL retirees,

age 65-75, who were studied suffered from dementia, whereas the prevalence of dementia in the

general population for the same age group is merely 2.2-6.5%.

68. Published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that retired players with

three or more reported concussions had a fivefold prevalence of mild cognitive impairment (MCI)

and a threefold prevalence o f significant memory problems, compared to other retirees.

69. In a study of NFL retirees, 11.1 % of all respondents reported having a diagnosis of

clinical depression.

70. At all times, the NFL’s unique position afforded it unparalleled access to the12. .

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readily accessible data above relating the effect of head impacts on football players. The NFL

Defendants have know or should have known about the risks for MTBI, the scientific studies

linking repeated concussive and sub-concussive head impacts with a significant risk for

permanent brain injury, including CTE, and about the increased incidence of depression,

dementia, cognitive impairment and memory problems in retired NFL players.

The NFL Was in a Superior Position of Knowledge and Authority and Owed a Duty to Players Like Junior Seau

71. At all times, the NFL’s unique historical vantage point at the apex of the sport of

football, paired with its unmatched resources as the most well-funded organization devoted to the

business of the game, has afforded it unparalleled access to data relating to the effect of head

impacts on football players and made it an institutional repository of accumulated knowledge

about head injuries to players.

72. The NFL is the organizer, marketer and public face of professional football in the

United States. The NFL governs each of the individual teams, collects and distributes revenue

among the teams, and authorizes the sport’s rules.

73. From its inception, the NFL adopted the role of protecting players, informing

players of safety concerns, and imposing unilaterally a wide variety of rules to protect players

from injuries that were costly to the player, the game, and profits. For instance, the NFL recently

stated that “[sjince its earliest days, the league has continuously taken steps to ensure that the

game is played as fairly as possible without unnecessary risk to its participants, including making

changes and enhancements to game safety rules.”

(www.nflhealthsasfety.com/commitment/regulations) (2011-2012),

74. On information and belief, the NFL has continuously received and paid for

professional advice regarding health risks associated with playing football. This advice and

knowledge placed the NFL in a position of ongoing superior knowledge to the players regarding

the health risks associated with concussive and sub-concussive injuries. Combined with the

NFL’s unilateral power to set rules and policies, the NFL at all relevant times was in a position to

dictate how the game would be played and to define the risks to players.13.

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75. For these reasons, players and their families have relied on the NFL to: 1)

intervene in matters of player safety, 2) to recognize issues of player safety, and 3) to be truthful

on the issue of player safety.

76. By its position, representations and actions to set rules and policies, the NFL

assumed a duty to adhere to these goals.

77. The NFL’s historical actions in connection with an assumed common law duty to

make the game safer and inform players of necessary safety information include, but are not

limited to, the following: adding a field judge (1929); establishing hash-marks at 10 yards horn

the sidelines (1933); establishing the penalty of unnecessary roughness for a deliberate rough

contact on the passer after the pass is made (1938); making helmets mandatory (1943); adding a

back field judge (1947); establishing a rule that the ball is dead when a runner touches the ground

with any part of his body except his hands while in the grasp of an opponent (1955); establishing

a rule that the ball is dead immediately if the runner touches the ground with any part of his body

except his hands after being contacted by a defensive player (1956); establishing a penalty for

grabbing the face mask of any opponent except a runner (1956); establishing a penalty of

grabbing the face mask of any opponent (1962); requiring that goal posts be offset from the goal

line (1966); establishing a rule that a player who signals for a fair catch cannot block or initiate

contact with one of the kicking team’s players until the ball touches a player (1967); establishing

a rule that a defensive player who jumps or stands on a teammate or who is picked up by a

teammate cannot attempt to block an opponent’s kick (1973); establishing a rule that no receiver

can be blocked below the waist after moving beyond the line of scrimmage (1974); establishing a

rule that eligible receivers who take a position more than two yards from the tackle cannot be

blocked below the waist (1974); establishing a rule that a defender is not permitted to run or dive

into a ball carrier who has fallen to the ground untouched (1976); establishing a rule that it is

illegal for a defensive lineman to strike an opponent above the shoulders during his initial charge

(1977) (previously the NFL made this illegal only during the first step); establishing that it is

illegal for a wide receiver to clip an opponent anywhere (1977); establishing rules as to

mandatory equipment (1979); establishing that it is illegal for a player in the backfield to chop an14.

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outside rusher on a pass play (1979); establishing that it is illegal to throw a punch or forearm or

to kick an opponent (1979); and establishing that it is illegal to strike, swing, or club an opponent

in the head, neck or face (1980).

78. As the sport’s governing entity (with monopolistic power), the NFL has made it

known to players and teams alike that the NFL actively and pervasively governs player conduct

and health and safety both on and off the field. In public statements since its inception, the NFL

has stated that its goals include taking necessary steps for the safety, health and well-being of

players and their families.

79. Thus, since its inception, and continuing into the present, the NFL has been in a

position that affords it a special relationship to NFL players as the guardian of their health and

safety. For that reason, from its inception and continuing into the present, the NFL owed a duty

of reasonable care to keep NFL players informed of safety risks, to inform NFL players truthfully,

and not to mislead NFL players about the risks of permanent neurological damage that can occur

from MTBI incurred while playing football.

80. On information and belief, over the past two decades, the NFL continued to

exercise this common law duty and its unilateral authority to investigate and advise NFL players

on many diverse and important topics, and that should have included the recognition of

circumstances that can precipitate MTBI, the long-term potential consequences of MTBI to NFL

players, and solutions for players who have sustained MTBI.

81. Moreover, from 1994 until 2010, the NFL publicly conducted head injury research

and openly disputed that any short-term or long-term harmful effects arose from football-related

sub-concussive and concussive injuries. The NFL propagated its own falsified research to

support its position, despite its historic role as the guardian of player safety, and despite the fact

that independent medical scientists had already come to the opposite conclusion.

82. As such, the NFL continued its existing common law duty to provide truthful

scientific research and information about the risks of concussive and sub-concussive injuries to

NFL players, including Junior Seau, who relied on the NFL’s research and pronouncements on

that subject.15.

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The NFL Knew the Dangers and Risks Associated with Repetitive Head Impacts and Concussions

83. For decades, the NFL has been aware that multiple blows to the head can lead to

long-term brain injury, including but not limited to memory loss, dementia, depression, and CTE

and its related symptoms.

84. For instance, between 1952 and 1994, numerous studies were published in medical

journals including the Journal o f the American Medical Association, Neurology, the New England

Journal o f Medicine, and Lancet warning of the dangers of single concussions, multiple

concussions, and/or football-related head trauma from multiple concussions. These studies

collectively established that:

• repetitive head trauma in contact sports, including boxing and football, has potential dangerous long-term effects on brain function;

• encephalopathy (dementia pugilistica) is caused in boxers by repeated sub-concussive and concussive blows to the head;

• acceleration and rapid deceleration of the head that results in brief loss of consciousness in primates also results in a tearing of the axons (brain cells) within the brainstem;

• with respect to mild head injury in athletes who play contact sports, there is a relationship between neurologic pathology and length of the athlete’s career; immediate retrograde memory issues occur following concussions; mild head injury requires recovery time without risk of subjection to further injury;

• head trauma is linked to dementia;

• a football player who suffers a concussion requires significant rest before being subjected to further contact; and,

• minor head trauma can lead to neuropathological and neurophysiological alterations, including neuronal damage, reduced cerebral blood flow, altered brainstem evoked potentials and reduced speed of information processing.

85. In fact, as early as 1928, pathologist Harrison Martland described the clinical

spectrum of abnormalities found in “almost 50 percent of fighters [boxers] . . . if they ke[pt] at the

game long enough” (the “Martland study”). The article was published in the Journal o f the

American Medical Association. The Martland study was the first to link sub-concussive blows

and “mild concussions” to degenerative brain disease.

16.

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86. In 1937, the American Football Coaches Association published a report warning

that players who suffer a concussion should be removed from sports demanding personal contact.

87. In 1962, Drs. Serel & Jaros looked at the heightened incidence of chronic

encephalopathy in boxers and characterized the disease as a “Parkinsonian” pattern of progressive

decline.

88. A 1963 study by Drs. Mawdsley & Ferguson published in Lancet found that some

boxers sustain chronic neurological damages as a result of repeated head injuries. This damage

manifested in the form of dementia and impairment of motor function.

89. In the 1960s and 70s, the development of the protective face mask in football

allowed the helmeted head to be used as a battering ram. By 1975 the number of head and neck

injuries from football that resulted in permanent quadriplegias in Pennsylvania and New Jersey

lead to the creation of the National Football Head and Neck Registry, which was sponsored by the

National Athletic Trainers Association and the Sports Medicine Center at the University of

Pennsylvania.

90. In the early 1980s, the Department of Neurosurgery at the University of Virginia

published studies on patients who sustained MTBI and observed long-term damage in the form of

unexpected cognitive impairment. The studies were published in neurological journals and

treatises within the United States.

91. In 1982, the University of Virginia and other institutions conducted studies on

college football teams that showed that football players who suffered MTBI suffered pathological

short-term and long-term damage. With respect to concussions, the same studies showed that a

person who sustained one concussion was more likely to sustain a second, particularly if that

person was not properly treated and removed from activity so that the concussion symptoms were

allowed to resolve.

92. The same studies showed that two or more concussions close in time could have

serious short-term and long-term consequences in both football players and other victims of brain

trauma.

93. By 1991, three distinct medical professionals/entities, all independent from the17.

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NFL—Dr. Robert Cantu of the American College of Sports Medicine, the American Academy of

Neurology, and the Colorado Medical Society—developed retum-to-play criteria for football

players suspected of having sustained head injuries.

94. On information and belief, by 1991, the NCAA football conferences and

individual college teams’ medical staffs, along with many lower-level football groups had

disseminated information and adopted criteria to protect football players even remotely suspected

of having sustained concussions.

95. In 1999, the National Center for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research at the

University of North Carolina conducted a study involving eighteen thousand (18,000) collegiate

and high school football players. The research showed that once a player suffered one

concussion, he was three times more likely to sustain a second in the same season.

96. In 1999, former Pittsburgh Steeler and Hall of Fame inductee Mike Webster filed

with the NFL a request that he receive complete disability benefits based on the fact that he had

sustained repeated and disabling head impacts while a player for the Steelers. In 1999, Webster

submitted extensive medical reports and testimony that stated that Webster suffered from

“traumatic or punch drunk encephalopathy [brain disease]” sustained from playing football that

left Webster totally and permanently disabled as of 1991.

97. The NFL’s own physician independently examined Webster and concluded that

Webster was mentally “completely and totally disabled as of the date of his retirement and was

certainly disabled when he stopped playing football sometime in 1990.”

98. Webster died in 2002 at the age of fifty. In December 2006, his estate received an

unpublished opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which stated

that the NFL Plan had acknowledged that the multiple head injuries Webster sustained during his

playing career (1974-1990) “. . . had caused Webster eventually to suffer total and permanent

mental disability. . . .”

99. Thus, the NFL, through its own expert medical testimony and the expert testimony

submitted by Webster knew and accepted that repetitive traumatic brain injuries sustained by a

Hall of Fame player led to long-term encephalopathy and permanent mental disability.18.

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100. A 2000 study, which surveyed 1,090 former NFL players, found that more than

sixty (60) percent had suffered at least one concussion, and twenty-six (26) percent had suffered

three (3) or more, during their careers. Those who had sustained concussions reported more

problems with memory, concentration, speech impediments, headaches, and other neurological

problems than those who had not been concussed.

101. Also in 2000, a study presented at the American Academy of Neurology’s 52nd

Annual Meeting and authored by Dr. Barry Jordan, Director of the Brain Injury Program at Burke

Rehabilitation Hospital in White Plains, New York, and Dr. Julian Bailes, surveyed 1,094 former

NFL players between the ages of 27 and 86 and found that: (a) more than 60% had suffered at

least one concussion in their careers, with 26% of the players having three or more and 15%

having five or more; (b) 51% had been knocked unconscious more than once; (c) 73% of those

injured said they were not required to sit on the sidelines after their head trauma; (d) 49% of the

former players had numbness or tingling; 28% had neck or cervical spine arthritis; 31 % had

difficulty with memory; 16% were unable to dress themselves; 11% were unable to feed

themselves; and (e) eight suffered from Alzheimer’s disease.

102. In 2004, a convention of neurological experts in Prague met with the aim of

providing recommendations for the improvement of safety and health of athletes who suffer

concussive injuries in ice hockey, rugby, football, and other sports based on the most up-to-date

research. These experts recommended that a player never be returned to play while symptomatic,

and coined the phrase, “when in doubt, sit them out.”

103. This echoed similar medical protocol established at a Vienna conference in 2001.

104. These two conventions were attended by predominately American doctors who

were experts and leaders in the neurological field. '

105. The University of North Carolina’s Center for the Study of Retired Athletes

published survey-based papers in 2005 through 2007 that found a strong correlation between

depression, dementia, and other cognitive impairment in NFL players and the number of

concussions those players had received.

106. An article in 2010 in the New England Journal o f Medicine entitled “Traumatic ■ 19.

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Brain Injury—Football, Warfare, and Long-Term Effects,” demonstrated that even mild

“traumatic brain injury” (“TBI”) can have lasting consequences that are manifest later in the

football player’s life.

107. Indeed, while the NFL knew for decades of the harmful effects of sub-concussive

and concussive injuries on a player’s brain, it actively concealed these facts from players and the

public.

108. While other sports were making changes to play safer, the NFL consistently and

publicly denied that football-related impacts had any connection to long-term brain injury. As

recently as 2009, the league’s medical committee continued to assert that there were no long-term

negative health risks associated with concussions or other football-related head impacts.

109. The NFL deliberately concealed the fact that playing in the NFL could lead to

permanent irreversible brain damage from players. Instead of being honest about the dangers and

working with both players and the medical community to minimize them, the league repeatedly

asserted that professional football players were at no greater risk of brain or neurological injury

than the public at large.

110. On information and belief during every decade referenced above, the NFL was

advised by physicians of all kinds regarding the risks associated with playing the game of

football, including the risks associated with head impacts and MTBI.

111. As described above, the NFL has known for decades that MTBI can and does lead

to long-term brain injury, including, but not limited to, memory loss, dementia, depression, and

CTE and its related symptoms.

112. Rather than take immediate measures to protect NFL players from these known

dangers, between the 1950s and 1994, the NFL failed to disseminate to then-current and former

NFL players relevant health information it possessed regarding the significant risks associated

with MTBI.

The NFL Voluntarily Undertook the Responsibility of Studying Head Impacts In Football, Yet Fraudulently Concealed Their Long-Term Effects.

113. In 1994, then NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue agreed to fund a committee to20.

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study the issue of head injury in the NFL. The NFL voluntarily and unilaterally formed the MTBI

Committee to study the effects of concussions and sub-concussive injuiy on NFL players.

114. By the time of the MTBI Committee’s formation in 1994 independent scientists

and neurologists alike were already convinced that all concussions—even seemingly mild ones—

were serious injuries that can permanently damage the brain, impair thinking ability and memory,

and hasten the onset of mental decay and senility, especially when they are inflicted frequently

and without time to properly heal.

115. With the MTBI Committee, the NFL voluntarily inserted itself into the private and

public discussion and research on the effects of repetitive head impacts in football. Through its

voluntary creation of the MTBI Committee, the NFL affirmatively assumed a duty to use

reasonable care in the study of concussions and post-concussion syndrome in NFL players; the

study of any kind of brain trauma relevant to the sport of football; the nse of information

developed; and the publication of data and/or pronouncements from the MTBI Committee.

116. Rather than exercising reasonable care in these duties, the NFL immediately

engaged in a course of fraudulent and negligent conduct, which included dissemination of

disinformation designed to (a) dispute accepted and valid neuroscience regarding the connection

between repetitive traumatic brain injuries and concussions and degenerative brain disease such

as CTE; and (b) to create a falsified body of research which the NFL could cite as proof that

truthful and accepted neuroscience on the subject was inconclusive and subject to doubt.

117. The NFL’s status in football gave the MTBI Committee’s pronouncements on

concussions authority and validity. The MTBI Committee was purportedly geared toward

“improvfing] player safety” and for the purpose of instituting “rule changes aimed at reducing

head injuries.” Players like Junior Seau, therefore, reasonably relied on the NFL’s

pronouncements and/or silence on this vital health issue.

118. The NFL did not appoint any neuropathologist to the MTBI Committee.

119. The MTBI Committee was publicized by the NFL as independent from the NFL,

consisting of a combination of doctors and researchers.

120. The MTBI Committee, however, was not independent. It consisted of at least five21.

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(5) persons who were already affiliated with the NFL.

121. Instead of naming a noted neurologist or a physician trained to treat head injuries

to chair the MTBI Committee, Commissioner Tagliabue appointed Dr. Elliot Pellman, a

rheumatologist who lacked any specialized training or education relating to concussions, and who

was a paid physician and trainer for the New York Jets. Dr. Pellman had reportedly been fired by

Major League Baseball for lying to Congress regarding his resume. At no time was Dr. Pellman

independent of the NFL, because he was paid on an ongoing basis by an NFL Team.

122. Dr. Pellman would chair the MTBI Committee from 1994-2007, and his leadership

of the Committee came under frequent and harsh criticism related to his deficient medical

training, background, and experience.

123. Dr. Pellman and two other MTBI Committee members, Dr. Ira Casson, a

neurologist, and Dr. David Viano, a biomedical engineer, worked to discredit scientific studies

that linked head impacts and concussions received by NFL players to neuro-cognitive disorders

and disabilities.

124. The MTBI Committee did not publish its first findings on active players until

2003. In that publication, the MTBI Committee stated, contrary to years of (independent)

findings, that there was no long term negative health consequence associated with concussions.

125. The MTBI Committee published its subsequent findings in a series of sixteen (16)

papers between 2003 and 2009. According to the MTBI Committee, all of their findings

supported a conclusion that there was no long term negative health consequence associated with

concussions or sub-concussive injuries sustained by NFL players. These findings regularly

contradicted the research and experiences of neurologists who treat sports concussions and the

players who endured them.

126. For example, in 2004 the MTBI Committee published a conclusion in which it

claimed that its research found no risk of repeated concussions in players with previous

concussions and that there was no “7-to-10 day window of increased susceptibility to sustaining

another concussion.”

127. In a comment to this publication, one independent doctor wrote that “[t]he article22.

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sends a message that it is acceptable to return players while still symptomatic, which contradicts

literature published over the past twenty years suggesting that athletes be returned to play only

after they are asymptomatic, and in some cases for seven days.”

128. As a further example, an MTBI Committee conclusion in 2005 stated that

“[p]layers who are concussed and return to the same game have fewer initial signs and symptoms

than those removed from play. Return to play does not involve a significant risk of a second

injury either in the same game or during the season.” “These data suggest,” the MTBI Committee

reported, “that these players were at no increased risk” of subsequent concussions or prolonged

symptoms such as memory loss, headaches, and disorientation.

129. Yet, a 2003 NCAA study of 2,905 college football players found just the opposite;

“Those who have suffered concussions are more susceptible to further head trauma for seven to

10 days after the injury.”

130. Support for this same conclusion was developed as early as 1982 in studies

conducted at the University of Virginia.

131. Dr. Pellman and his group stated repeatedly that the NFL study showed “no

evidence of worsening injury or chronic cumulative effects of multiple [MTBI] in NFL players.”

132. Yet, the 2003 report by the Center for the Study of Retired Athletes at the

University of North Carolina found a link between multiple concussions and depression among

former professional players with histories of concussions. A 2005 follow-up study by the Center

showed a connection between concussions and both brain impairment and Alzheimer’s disease

among retired NFL players. ..

133. Other contrary conclusions that the MTBI Committee published at the behest,

urging, and sponsorship of NFL over several years include, but are not limited to, the following:

Drs. Pellman and Viano stated that because a “significant percentage of players returned to play

in the same game [as they suffered a concussion] and the overwhelming majority of players with

concussions were kept out of football-related activities for less than 1 week, it can be concluded

that mild [TBIs] in professional football are not serious injuries”; that NFL players did not show a

decline in brain function after a concussion; that there were no ill effects among those who had23.

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three (3) or more concussions or who took hits to the head that sidelined them for a week or more;

that “no NFL player experienced the second-impact syndrome or cumulative encephalopathy

from repeat concussions”; and that NFL players’ brains responded and healed faster than those of

high school or college athletes with the same injuries.

134. The MTBI Committee’s papers and conclusions were against the weight of the

scientific evidence and based on biased data-coflection techniques. They received significant

criticism in the scientific and medical media from independent doctors and researchers and were

met with skepticism in peer review segments following each article’s publication.

135. Moreover, the conclusions of the MTBI Committee completely contradicted the

testimony of the NFL’s own paid expert submitted in connection with Mike Webster’s permanent

disability application.

136. Renowned experts Dr. Robert Cantu and Dr. Julian Bailes wrote harshly critical

reviews of the studies’ conclusions.

137. Dr. Cantu observed that the extremely small sample size and voluntary

participation in the MTBI Committee’s study suggested there was bias in choosing the sample.

According to Dr. Cantu, no conclusions should be drawn from the NFL study.

138. A different scientist who reviewed the MTBI Committee’s work further stated that

the NFL appeared to be primarily preparing a defense for when injured players eventually sued,

and that it seemed to be promoting a flawed scientific study to justify its conclusion that

concussions do not have adverse effects on players.

139. Also, the MTBI Committee failed to include hundreds of neuropsychological tests

done on NFL players in the results of the Committee’s studies on the effects of concussions and

was selective in its use of injury reports.

140. For instance, the results reported by Dr. Pellman and the MTBI Committee

selectively excluded at least 850 baseline tests. In a paper published in Neurosurgery in

December 2004, Dr. Pellman and the other MTBI Committee members reported on the baseline

data for 655 players and the results for 95 players who had undergone both baseline testing and

post-concussion testing. They concluded that NFL players did not show a decline in brain24.

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function after suffering concussions. Their further analysis purportedly found no ill effects

among those who had three or more concussions or who took hits to the head that kept them out

for a week or more. The paper did not explain where the players in the study groups came from

specifically or why certain player data was included and that data from hundreds of other players

was not.

141. Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz has stated that the “data that hasn’t shown up makes their

work questionable industry-funded research.”

142. Pellman subsequently fired William Barr, a neuropsychologist for the New York

Jets, after Dr. Barr presented at a conference some NCAA study findings that contradicted NFL

practices.

143. As described in the following paragraphs, when faced with studies which tended to

show a causal link between MTBI and cognitive degeneration, the NFL, through the MTBI

Committee, produced contrary findings that were false, distorted, and deceptive to NFL players,

participants in football nationwide, and the public at large.

144. Between 2002 and 2007, Dr. Bennet Omalu examined the brain tissue of deceased

NFL players, including Mike Webster, Terry Long, Andre Waters, and Justin Strzelczyk. Dr,

Omalu concluded that the players suffered from CTE. These individuals suffered multiple

concussions during their NFL careers, and later in life exhibited symptoms of deteriorated

cognitive functions, paranoia, panic attacks, and depression. Dr. Omalu’s findings were

published in Neurosurgery, where he concluded that Webster’s and Long’s respective deaths

were partially caused by CTE and were related to multiple concussions suffered during their

activity in the NFL.

145. In response to Dr. Omalu’s articles, the MTBI Committee wrote a letter to the

editor of Neurosurgery asking that Dr, Omalu’s article be retracted.

146. In another Neurosurgery article published in 2007, Dr. Cantu reached a similar

conclusion regarding Andre Waters as Dr. Omalu had reached regarding Mike Webster and Terry

Long.

147. A 2003 study, partially authored by Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz, analyzed data from25.

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almost 2,500 retired NFL players and found that 263 of the retired players suffered from

depression. The study found that having three or four concussions meant twice the risk of

depression and five or more concussions meant a nearly three-fold risk.

148. The NFL’s MTBI Committee attacked these studies.

149. In November 2003, Dr. Guskiewicz was scheduled to appear on HBO’s “Inside the

NFL” to discuss his research. Dr. Pellman called Dr. Guskiewicz in advance and questioned

whether it was in the best interest of Dr. Guskiewicz to appear on the program. On the program,

Dr. Pellman stated unequivocally that he did not believe the results of the study led by Dr.

Guskiewicz.

150. In 2005, Dr. Guskiewicz performed a clinical follow-up study, and found that

retired players who sustained three or more concussions in the NFL had a five-fold prevalence of

mild cognitive impairment in comparison to NFL retirees without a history of concussions. In

doing this research, Dr. Guskiewicz conducted a survey of over 2,550 former NFL athletes.

151. The MTBI Committee attacked and sought to undermine the study, stating: “We

want to apply scientific rigor to this issue to make sure that we’re really getting at the underlying

cause of what’s happening. . . . You cannot tell that from a survey.”

152. In August 2007, the NFL issued a concussion pamphlet to players which stated:

Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having more than one or two

concussions leads to permanent problems if each injury is managed properly. It is important to

understand that there is no magic number for how many concussions is too many. Research is

currently underway to determine if there are any long-term effects of concussion[s] in NFL

athletes.

153. At the same time, NFL Commissioner Roger Good ell said, “We want to make sure

all NFL players . . . are fully informed and take advantage of the most up to date information

and resources as we continue to study the long-term impact of concussions.” Yet, the “most up to

date information” included the various independent studies indicating a causal link between

multiple concussions and cognitive decline in later life, information which the NFL did not share

with players.26.

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154. Goodell also stated, “[bjecause of the unique and complex nature of the brain, our

goal is to continue to have concussions managed conservatively by outstanding medical personnel

in a way that clearly emphasizes player safety over competitive concerns.”

155. Players like Junior Seau relied to their detriment on the NFL’s disinformation, all

of which was contrary to the findings of the independent scientists who had studied the issue,

including Drs. Guskiewicz, Cantu, Omalu, and Bailes, regarding the causal link between multiple

head injuries and concussions and cognitive decline.

156. In February 2007, Dr. Pellman resigned as chair of the Committee, following

increasing media scrutiny over the MTBI Committee’s studies. He was replaced as chair by Dr.

Ira Casson and Dr. David Viano, but remained a member of the Committee.

157. Dr. Guskiewicz, research director of the University of North Carolina’s Center for

the Study of Retired Athletes, said at the time that Dr. Pellman was “the wrong person to chair the

committee from a scientific perspective and the right person from the league’s perspective.”

158. Regarding Dr. Pellman’s work, Dr. Guskiewicz stated, “[w]e found this at the high

school level, the college level and the professional level, that once you had a concussion or two

you are at increased risk for future concussions,” but “[Dr. Pellman] continued to say on the

record that’s not what they find and there’s no truth to it.”

159. Drs. Casson and Viano continued to dismiss outside studies and overwhelming

evidence linking dementia and other cognitive decline to brain injuries. In 2007, in a televised

interview on HBO’s Real Sports, Dr. Casson unequivocally stated that there was no link between

concussions and depression, dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or “anything like [that] whatsoever.”

160. In June 2007, the NFL convened a concussion summit for team doctors and

trainers. Independent scientists, including Drs. Cantu, and Guskiewicz, presented their research

to the NFL.

161. Dr. Julian Bailes, a neurosurgeon from West Virginia University, briefed the

MTBI Committee on the findings of Dr. Omalu and other independent studies linking multiple

NFL head injuries with cognitive decline. Dr. Bailes recalled that the MTBI’s Committee’s

reaction to his presentation was adversarial: “The Committee got mad . . . we got into it. And27.

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I’m thinking, ‘This is a . . . disease in America’s most popular sport and how are its leaders

responding? Alienate the scientist who found it? Refuse to accept the science coming from

him?’”

162. At the summit, Dr. Casson told team doctors and trainers that CTE has never been

scientifically documented in football players. ~

163. In 2008, Boston University’s Dr. Ann McKee found CTE in the brains of two

more deceased NFL players, John Grimsley and Tom McHale. Dr. McKee stated, “the easiest

way to decrease the incidence of CTE [in contact sport athletes] is to decrease the number of

concussions.” Dr. McKee further noted that “[t]here is overwhelming evidence that [CTE] is the

result of repeated sublethal brain trauma.”

164. A MTBI Committee representative characterized each study as an “isolated

incident” from which no conclusion could be drawn, and said he would wait to comment further

until Dr. McKee’s research was published in a peer-reviewed journal. When Dr. McKee’s

research was published in 2009, Dr. Casson asserted that “there is not enough valid, reliable or

objective scientific evidence at present to determine whether . . . repeat head impacts in

professional football result in long[-]term brain damage.” ,

165. In 2008, under increasing pressure, the NFL commissioned the University of

Michigan’s Institute for Social Research to conduct a study on the health of retired players. Over

1,000 former NFL players took part in the study. The results of the study, released in 2009,

reported that “Alzheimer’s disease or similar memory-related diseases appear to have been

diagnosed in the league’s former players vastly more often than in the national population—

including a rate of 19 times the normal rate for men ages 30 through 49.”

166. The NFL responded to these results by claiming that the study was incomplete,

and that further findings would be needed. NFL spokesperson Greg Aiello stated that the study

was subject to shortcomings and did not formally diagnose dementia. Dr. Casson implied that the

Michigan study was inconclusive and stated that further work was required. Other experts in the

field found the NFL’s reaction to be “bizarre,” noting that “they paid for the study, yet they tried

to distance themselves from it.”28.

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167. At a Congressional hearing in October 2009, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell

acknowledged that the NFL owes a duty to the public at large to educate them as to the risks of

concussions due to the League’s unique position of influence: “In addition to our millions of fans,

more than three million youngsters aged 6-14 play tackle football each year; more than one

million high school players also do so and nearly seventy five thousand collegiate players as well.

We must act in their best interests even if these young men never play professional football.”

168. In January 2010, the House Judiciary Committee held further hearings on football

player head injuries. Representative Conyers observed that “until recently, the NFL had

minimized and disputed evidence linking head injuries to mental impairment in the future.”

169. In the 2010 Congressional hearings, Dr. Casson gave testimony that denied the

validity of other non-NFL studies and stated that “[tjhere is not enough valid, reliable or objective

scientific evidence at present to determine whether or not repeat head impacts in professional

football result in long term brain damage.”

170. The members of the MTBI Committee, however, knew of the decades-old studies

linking MTBI to long-term neurological problems. Casson, a MTBI Committee member since its

inception, stated before Congress on January 4, 2010, that he was “the lead author of a landmark

paper on brain damage in modem boxers that was published in the [Journal of the American

Medical Association] in 1984.” That paper, which referenced the many studies documenting

CTE in boxers, studied eighteen former and active boxers and found that eighty-seven percent of

the professional boxers had definite evidence of brain damage. Specifically, the study determined

that the subjects performed particularly poorly on neuropsychological tests measuring short-term

memory.

171. In his written statement to Congress, Casson stated that he has “been concerned

about the possibility of long term effects on the brain related to football for close to thirty years.”

Dr. Casson offered that one of the reasons he “was asked to be on the NFL MTBI committee was

because of [his] knowledge of and experience treating boxers with chronic traumatic

encephalopathy (CTE).”

172. This testimony contradicted Casson’s testimony that “there is not enough valid,29.

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reliable or objective scientific evidence at present to determine whether or not repeat head

impacts in professional football result in long term brain damage.”

The NFL’s New Committee

173. In 2010, the NFL re-named the MTBI Committee the “Head, Neck, and Spine

Medical Committee” (the “Medical Committee”) and announced that Dr. Pellman would no

longer be a member of the panel. Drs. H. Hunt Batjer and Richard G. Ellenbogen were selected

to replace Casson and Viano. The two new co-chairmen selected Dr. Mitchel S. Berger to serve

on the new Medical Committee.

174. The new Committee admitted that the data collected by the NFL’s former

appointed brain-injury leadership was “infected,” and that there was an “inherent conflict of

interest that was there in many areas, that was not acceptable by any modem standards or not

acceptable to us.”

175. In June 2010, scientific evidence linked multiple concussions to yet another

degenerative brain disease—-Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”), commonly referred to as

“Lou Gehrig’s Disease.”

176. In June 2010 the NFL finally informed players about the risk of repeated brain

injury. It issued a warning poster and pamphlet, which warned active players .of the long term

risks associated with multiple concussions, including dementia, memory loss, and CTE. It quoted

the Center for Disease Control’s conclusions that, “traumatic brain injury can cause a wide range

of short or long term changes affecting thinking, sensation, language or emotions.” The NFL also

informed players, “[tjhese changes may lead to problems with memory or communication,

personality changes, as well as depression and early onset dementia. Concussions and conditions

resulting from repeated brain injury can change your life and your family’s life forever.”

177. On February 17, 2011, former Chicago Bears and New York Giants player Dave

Duerson committed suicide at age 50. Duerson had suffered months of headaches, blurred vision,

and faltering memory. After his death, Dr. Cantu determined that Duerson was suffering from

CTE. '

178. In October 2011, Dr. Mitchel Berger of the NFL’s new Head, Neck, and Spine30.

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Medical Committee announced that a new study was in the planning process. He admitted that

the MTBI Committee’s previous long-range study was useless because “[t]here was no science in

that.” Dr. Berger further stated that data from the previous study would not be used. “We’re

really moving on from that data. There’s really nothing we can do with that data in terms of how

it was collected and assessed.”

179. Why in 1994 (and far earlier) the NFL (and its MTBI Committee) failed to share

accurate information and take appropriate actions is difficult to comprehend in light of the fact

that the NFL has known for decades that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term brain

injury, including memory loss, dementia, depression, and CTE and its related symptoms. Instead,

the NFL misled players, coaches, trainers, and the public, and actively spread disinformation.

180. It took decades for the NFL to admit that there was a problem and sixteen years to

admit that its information was false and inaccurate. The NFL’s conduct in this regard is willful

and wanton and exhibits a reckless disregard for the safety of its players and the public at large.

At a minimum, the NFL acted with callous indifference to the duty it voluntarily assumed to

Junior Seau and players at every level of the game.

181. As a direct result of the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentations by the

NFL, former players, including Junior Seau, had for many decades been led to believe that the

symptoms of early-onset dementia, loss of memory, headaches, confusion, insomnia, depression

and the inability to function were not caused by their play in the NFL. And, as a result of this

willful and malicious conduct, these former players were deprived of medical treatment, incurred

expenses, lost employment, suffered humiliation, and sustained other damages to be specified.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS AGAINST THERIDDELL DEFENDANTS

182. The Riddell Defendants have operated as a business through designing,

developing, manufacturing, selling, and distributing football equipment, including helmets, in one

form or another, since 1922.

183. As early as the 1930s, players began using helmets during football games. These

early helmets were constructed from pieces of cobbled leather.31.

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184. In the early 1940s, John T. Riddell, who later formed John T. Riddell

Incorporated, invented the first plastic suspension helmet. In 1949, plastic helmets became

legalized.

185. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and continuing to present day, the

Riddell Defendants have designed, developed, manufactured, sold, and distributed equipment

used in the NFL, including equipment used by Junior Seau, including, but not limited to, the

following:

(a) In the 1950s, the Riddell Defendants manufactured a face-mask component for its

helmets, which was eventually patented.

(b) In 1962, the Riddell Defendants used a “U” shaped nose protector with a shell

(known as the TK2) molded out of polycarbonate. The Riddell Defendants also designed an

open/closed cell foam and composite liner system for this model to increase the efficiency of the

webbed suspension.

(c) In 1963, the Riddell Defendants developed the TAK-29 helmet, which was the

first to use air inflation for fitting the helmet snug to the head. The TAK-29 shell, like the TK2,

displayed the protective polycarbonate plastic, in addition to including tough shock and cut-

resistant face-mask attachment straps.

(d) In 1969, recognizing that head protection was a key factor in helmet design

requiring durable head protection, the Riddell Defendants constructed a micro-fit helmet model

with injection molding technology to create a one piece shell to improve the structural integrity of

the entire helmet. ■

(e) In 1973, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed an air cushion helmet whose interior system consisted of individual vinyl air cushions

with layers of fitting and energy absorbing foam. When a blow was struck, the air in the cushion

was expelled through a single vent, greatly reducing the initial impact. With the exhausting of the

air cushion, the compressed fitting foam was further compressed, reducing impact.

(f) In 1977, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed a stainless steel face-mask which offered greater bend resistance that prevented helmet32.

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breakage at the drill holes.

(g) In 1981, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed an Air Cushion Engineered helmet.

(h) In 1982, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed a Ml 55 helmet model with a combination of foam and liquid-filled cells used for

padding. On impact, the liquid would be throttled from one cell to the next, resulting in energy

attenuation. The Ml 55 helmet model included one-piece injection-molded face-masks which

were mar and rust-resistant, in addition to polyurethane face mask straps and universal jaw pads.

(i) In 2002, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed the Riddell Revolution helmet designed with the intent of reducing the risk of

concussion.

(j) In 2003, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed a real-time, Head Impact Telemetry System (HITS) to monitor and record significant

incidences of head impact sustained during a football game or practice. The system measured the

location, magnitude, duration, and direction of head acceleration and transmitted that information

wirelessly to the sideline.

(k) In 2006, the Riddell Defendants provided a research grant to the University of

Pittsburgh Medical Center for head injury research. The study compared rates of high school

athletes who wore the Riddell Revolution helmet with those who wore traditional helmets.

(1) In 2007, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed an individual helmet system, Revolution IQ HitsTM, allowing players to monitor the

number and severity of impacts received during games and practices. On-board electronics

record every impact, allowing players to upload and evaluate each occurrence on their home ‘

computers.

(m) In 2011, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed the 360 helmet which uses energy-managing materials and a face mask attachment

system to disperse the energy of frontal impacts. According to Riddell, it developed this helmet

using over 1.4 million impacts collected through Riddell’s HITS technology.33.

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186. The Riddell Defendants’ helmets are currently the official helmets of the NFL. As

the official helmets for the NFL, the Riddell logo is the only helmet logo the NFL allows to be

displayed on helmets worn by players during NFL games. Upon information and belief, Junior

Seau wore Riddell helmets at times while playing and/or practicing during his NFL career.

187. The Riddell Defendants at all times herein mentioned engaged in the business of

selling, manufacturing, designing, testing, engineering, marketing, modifying, assembling,

inspecting, distributing, and controlling the helmets and other similar equipment for use by Junior

Seau and within the NFL.

188. Players did not know the long-term effects of concussions and relied on the NFL

and Riddell to protect them.

The Riddell Defendants* Duty to Protect Against the Long-Term Risk of Concussions

189. Despite years of science and medicine linking the risk of long term brain injury

from repeat concussions, it was not until the release of the Revolution Helmet wherein a

notification reminding players to “sit out” if they suffer a concussion was placed on the

Revolution helmet.

190. Around the same time period, the Riddell Defendants developed the HITS system

to monitor the severity and incident of impacts that a player receives.

191. Based on a 2003 University of Pittsburgh Medical Center study funded by a grant

from the Riddell Defendants, the Riddell Defendants began to market the Revolution helmet as

reducing concussions by 31 %.

192. However, both the HITS system and the Revolution helmet, both created by the

Riddell Defendants and their employees have been criticized by experts for their inaccurate

marketing as being safer in reducing the risk of concussion.

193. A study published in the Journal of Neurosurgery showed that the study by UPMC

was flawed in that is discounted low impact hits and in turn proved that the Revolution did not

reduce the risk of concussions.

194. Even to this day the Riddell Defendants do not acknowledge a link between repeat34.

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concussions and later life cognitive problems.

195. In fact, the Riddell Defendants have never warned any player or retired player of

the long-term health effects of concussions.

ALLEGATIONS REGARDING JUNIOR SEAU

Junior Sean’s Rise as an NFL Superstar

196. Junior Seau joined the NFL in 1990 as a member of the San Diego Chargers.

197. For the next twenty seasons, he was one of the league’s best linebackers, a position

which caused him to suffer repeated subconcussions and concussions.

198. Recognized as a powerful, positive, and versatile force on the football field, Junior

Seau was named to the Pro Football Hall of Fame’s All-Decade Team of the 1990s and for 12

consecutive years was selected to play in the NFL’s all-star Pro Bowl. In 2000, he became the

highest paid linebacker in the NFL.

199. Junior Seau was also known for his work off of the field improving the lives of

others. In 1992, he founded the Junior Seau Foundation. The Foundation provided more than $4

million of funding for San Diego community services for children and young adults, including

hundreds of scholarships to college-bound students through the Scholars of Excellence program.

200. From his own childhood, Junior Seau knew how the holidays could be particularly

painful for low-income families. He annually played Santa Claus, taking 250 children to buy

gifts for friends and family through his Shop with a Jock Program and funded Thanksgiving

dinner in his restaurant for 700 homeless shelter residents, victims of domestic violence, and

military families.

201. During his life, Junior Seau’s years of philanthropic spirit and work were

celebrated both by the San Diego community and nationally. His charisma as a celebrity player

inspired his fellow athletes to make contributions to their own communities. As a result of these

efforts, he was selected as the NFL’s Man of the Year in 1994 and honored by President George

W. Bush with the Volunteer Service Award in 2005.

202. The Junior Seau revered by his fans and community also had a family. Seau’s

family life was a loving and warm haven. Junior Seau had four children whom he loved and35.

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adored, sons Tyler, Jake, and Hunter and a daughter Sydney. At the beginning of his career, Seau

was a loving parent and husband, regarded as a “teddy bear” by his children.

The NFL’s Failures and Misrepresentations Expose Junior Seau to Long-Term Brain Injury

203. During his professional career, Junior Seau led his teams to two Super Bowls and

was known by teammates for his focus, discipline, and intensity as a teammate and a player.

204. Nicknamed the ‘Tasmanian Devil”, Seau was extolled by the NFL, the fans, and

his peers for his on-field aggression and zeal. He was known as a warrior, the invincible patriarch

who could be depended on to play through injuries.

205. His body received countless blows which caused injuries over the years. The

impacts that his body routinely absorbed caused subconcussions and concussions due to the

significant force of the impacts.

206. Junior Seau suffered from extensive injuries throughout his NFL career, including,

among many others, a chronic tom rotator cuff, shattered bones in his forearm, chronic ankle,

knee, shoulder, toe injuries, back pain, and severe bruising all over his body on a regular basis.

Yet he rarely missed games for these injuries or even complained about pain or injuries. Instead,

he received injections for pain and inflammation to play through his ever-present injuries.

207. As alleged above, the NFL engaged in a deliberate and systematic campaign to

ignore, conceal and fraudulently misrepresent the facts about football-related impacts and long

term brain injury. As a result, Junior Seau was not armed with critical information necessary for

his own safety.

208. He suffered innumerable blows directly to his head during his NFL career, both

sub-concussive and concussive. ■ Several times he was hit in the head so hard that he sustained

facial lacerations.

209. Seau also suffered from and reported symptoms of head injuries from playing in

NFL games, including dizziness during and after playing, dizziness when he turned his head, and

becoming dazed after being hit during games. .

210. On numerous occasions, Seau left the field because he was dazed. He would sit on36.

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the sidelines until he regained his bearings and he would then return to the game.

211. Seau often related that he had suffered concussions from playing and had

headaches from those concussions. He would regularly ask for pain medications, such as aspirin,

Motrin, Tylenol, Excedrin, from his family and friends and took them in to help ease the

headache pain.

212. By returning to games while he was still suffering the symptoms of

subconcussions or concussions, Junior Seau was exposed to the risk of greater trauma to his brain.

As shown by a recent study by the National Institutes of Health, Junior Seau suffered significant

long term brain damage, including CTE. Junior Seau reasonably relied on the NFL’s fraudulent

concealment and affirmative misrepresentations regarding the danger of subconcussions and

concussions and related symptoms and the danger of returning to play, which proximately caused

his injuries, including CTE.

Junior Seau Shows Symptoms of Injury

213. During the mid-1990’s, around the time of Junior Seau’s reports of dizziness and

other symptoms of concussion and secondary to repetitive hits, there was a noted change in his

behavior and functioning.

214. Junior Seau’s behavior became erratic. The man who was once the cornerstone of

his team and his family began exhibiting emotional instability.

215. During this time, Seau developed severe insomnia which plagued him until his

death. He would awake at 1:00-2:00 a.m. and not be able to return to sleep.

216. Seau always dreaded the “dumb jock” stereotype and cultivated his mind in

addition to his body. Always striving to improve his memory, concentration, problem-solving

skills, logical thinking and forethought, he was an avid student of chess. Those around him were

used to him being sharp, disciplined, ready to pounce not only physically but cognitively, But as

the seasons of abuse to his brain set in, others found that he became forgetful and unable to

concentrate or focus. Both at work and at home, people noticed that he could not remember their

discussions, he misplaced things and forgot appointments.

217. Unfortunately, Junior Seau’s spiral extended far beyond forgetfulness. His ' 37.

EX A, PAGE 51

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increasing emotional instability resulted in uncharacteristically self-destructive, aggressive and

violent behavior. He began to suffer extreme depression and became withdrawn from his family,

including his children. The changes in his behavior impacted his ability to relate to others. He

became unable to maintain meaningful relationships with those whom he loved or to form any

new meaningful relationships with others.

218. His children had to adapt to a new version of their father. When he was lost in

periods of depression he became irrational and unreachable. They would look into his eyes and

not recognize the person with whom they were now dealing.

219. In his business ventures, for many years, Junior Seau was responsible and

thorough. In the areas where he lacked experience or knowledge, he educated himself. He was

involved in his businesses, and the success of his businesses reflected such involvement.

220. As his brain disintegrated from repeated trauma, tasks and decisions that Seau

previously undertook became impossible for him. He made impulsive, ill-advised business

decisions that he formerly had been too savvy and thoughtful to make. He no longer listened to

his qualified advisors, could no longer discuss business figures and no longer possessed reasoned

business judgment.

Junior Seau Spirals Downward, Culminating In His Tragic Suicide

221. The once warm and gentle Junior became extremely irritable and short tempered.

He lashed out both verbally and physically at his staff, friends, and family. As a result, his

businesses and investments began to deteriorate and lose value.

222. The disciplined, heath conscious Junior Seau also disappeared. He previously had

been known for preaching good health through healthy eating and exercise. He had always been

careful about drinking in moderation and rarely drank during the football season. As his life

began to spiral and he became unable to cope, alcohol became a method of self-medicating for

Seau. He entered a devastating cycle of depression and alcohol abuse.

223. This cycle of depression magnified other vices which Seau had previously enjoyed

in moderation. He became a compulsive, manic gambler. Seau’s impulsivity and inability to

soundly reason threw him into gambling binges, where against the pleading of those close to him,38.

EX A, PAGE 52

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he lost significant amounts of money in an attempt to make back business losses.

224. The above mentioned problems, including insomnia, depression, alcohol abuse,

inability to relate to friends and family, irrational decisions, diminished cognitive function, and

gambling problems are all well established effects of neuro-degenerative injuries, including CTE.

Tragically, on May 2, 2012, these injuries and the problems which were proximately caused by

them, caused Junior Seau to take a gun and shoot himself in the chest, committing suicide. The

circumstances under which he committed suicide allowed his brain to be preserved and tested by

the National Institutes of Health. As part of the National Institutes of Health study, three different

doctors in a triple blind study concluded that Junior Seau’s brain evidenced “multi-focal

tauopathy consistent with a diagnosis of chronic traumatic encepholapathy.”

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

(Against the NFL1

225. Plaintiffs incorporate by-reference all of the preceding allegations set forth above

as if fully set forth herein.

226. Plaintiff Bette Hoffman brings this survival cause of action on behalf of the estate

of decedent and all successors-in-interest therein pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section

377.30.

227. The NFL has been aware of and understood the significance of the published

medical literature dating from as early as the 1950s that there is a serious risk of short-term and

long-term brain injury associated with repetitive traumatic impacts to the head to which NFL

players are exposed.

228. During that time period, the NFL knowingly and fraudulently concealed from

then-current NFL players and former NFL players the risks of head injuries in NFL games and

practices, including the risks associated with returning to physical activity too soon after

sustaining a sub-concussive or concussive injury.

229. From 1994 through June of 2010, the NFL’s fraudulent concealment continued.

During that time period, the NFL voluntarily funded and produced its own purported scientific39. .

EX A, PAGE 53

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ATTORNEYS AT L*W 5 an Diego

research and through that research repeatedly misrepresented to then-current and former NFL

players, the United States Congress, and the general public that there is no link (or an insufficient

scientific link) between MTBI in NFL activities and later-in-life cognitive/brain injury, including


230. Given the NFL’s superior and unique vantage point, Junior Seau reasonably

looked to the NFL for guidance on head injuries and concussions.

231. The NFL’s MTBI Committee published articles and the August 2007 concussion

pamphlet referenced above, all of which concealed and minimized the risks of repetitive brain

impacts the NFL knew existed for its then-current players and for its former players, who

reasonably relied on the NFL’s pronouncements and/or silence on this health issue.

232. The NFL’s concussion pamphlet created an atmosphere of trust that the NFL had

carefully undertaken its voluntary responsibility to research, test, study, and report accurate

findings to the players and former players. The NFL stated that c,[w]e want to make sure all NFL

players ... are fully informed and take advantage of the most up to date information and resources

as we continue to study the long-term impact of concussions.” .

233. The concealment was ongoing. Dr. Casson provided oral and written testimony at

the 2010 congressional hearings in which he continued to deny the validity of other studies. Dr.

Casson also denied the link between repetitive brain impacts and short- and long-term brain

damage in public interviews. .

234. The NFL, therefore, concealed material facts and information with the intent to

deceive and defraud, which caused Junior Seau to suffer the harm referenced above. Further, for

the time period prior to June 2010, the NFL’s concerted concealment of the risks to which players

had been exposed delayed Junior Seau’s ability to plan for the future and to seek appropriate

treatment of latent neurodegenerative conditions.

235. The NFL knew and expected that Junior Seau would rely on the inaccurate

information provided by the NFL, and Junior Seau did in fact reasonably rely on the inaccurate

information provided by the NFL during and after his NFL career.

236. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s fraudulent conduct, Junior Seau40.

EX A, PAGE 54

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suffered physical injury, including, but not limited to, existing and latent cognitive conditions that

created diminished cognitive function, non-economic losses, and economic losses including but

not limited to lost and/or reduced income during his life.

237. The despicable conduct of the NFL outlined above was fraudulent, malicious, and

oppressive and was done with the intent to defraud team coaches past and present NFL players,

and the general public. In addition, the despicable conduct of the NFL outlined above was done

with a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of Junior Seau and other NFL players.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages as allowed under Civil Code section 3294 and any

other applicable provisions of law.

238. As a result of the NFL’s misconduct as alleged herein, the NFL is liable to

Plaintiffs for, and Plaintiffs seek, the full measure of damages allowed under applicable law.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

FRAUD

(Against the NFL)

239. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding allegations set forth above




377.30. .

241. At least since the early 1950s the NFL knew that repetitive head impacts in

football games and full-contact practices created a risk of harm to NFL players that was similar or

identical to the risk of harm to boxers who receive the same or similar repetitive impacts to the

head during boxing practices and matches. '

242. The NFL knew that the risks of brain injury could be reduced by implementing

changes to the game, akin to the ones the NFL belatedly adopted in 2011, such as (1) the baseline

cognitive testing of players for comparison purposes during and after contact play, (2) the active

monitoring of players for signs of MTBI, (3) the employment of a neurologist on the sidelines,

and (4) retum-to-play rules consistent with proper medical management of MTBI.41.

EX A, PAGE 55

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243. The NFL, however, withheld the information it knew about the risks of head

injuries in the game from then-current NFL players and former NFL players and ignored the

known risks to all NFL players.

244. On information and belief, the NFL deliberately delayed implementing the

changes to the game it knew could reduce players’ exposure to the risk of life-altering head

injuries because those changes would be expensive and would reduce the profitability of the

League.



long-term brain injury.associated with repetitive traumatic impacts to the head to which NFL


246. The NFL and its agents — employed to formulate the MTBI committee and

populate the published scientific literature with “studies” intent on disputing the conclusions of

independent researchers regarding the long-term chronic disabilities and injuries associated with

head injury — made these material misrepresentations with the intent to defraud players like

Junior Seau.



248. During that time period, the NFL knowingly and fraudulently concealed from then

current NFL players of the risks of head injuries in NFL games and practices, including the risks

associated with returning to physical activity too soon after sustaining a sub-concussive or

concussive injury.

249. Beginning in 1994, the NFL and its agents funded and created a falsified body of

purported scientific research that misrepresented to then-current NFL players, all former NFL

players, the United States Congress, and the general public that there was no scientifically proven

link between repetitive sub-concussive and concussive injuries sustained during football and brain

injury, including but not limited to CTE and its related symptoms.

250. The NFL and its agents — employed to populate the published scientific literature42.

EX A, PAGE 56

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■ with “studies” intent on disputing the conclusions of independent researchers regarding the long

term chronic disabilities and injuries associated with head injury — made these material

misrepresentations with the intent to defraud the decedent Junior Seau.

251. During his career and after retirement from the NFL, Junior Seau justifiably and

reasonably relied on the NFL’s omissions and misrepresentations to his detriment.

252. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s fraudulent conduct, Junior Seau












THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

(Against the NFL)





377.30. .

257. A special relationship exists between the NFL and players like Junior Seau

sufficient to impose a duty on the NFL to disclose accurate information to the players.

258. Prior to 1994, the NFL knew that repetitive head impacts in football games and43.

EX A, PAGE 57

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practices created a risk of harm to NFL players that was similar or identical to the risk o f harm to

boxers who receive repetitive impacts to the head during boxing practices and matches.

259. Prior to 1994, the NFL was aware of and understood the significance of the

published medical literature demonstrating the serious risk of both short-term and long-term

adverse consequences from the kind of repetitive traumatic impacts to the head to which NFL

players were exposed.

260. The NFL, however, withheld this information from team coaches, physicians,

trainers, and other personnel, and NFL players and ignored the risks to NFL players.

261. Before June of 2010, the NFL made material misrepresentations to its players,

former players, the United States Congress, and the public at large that there was no scientifically

proven link between repetitive traumatic head impacts and later-in-life cognitive/brain injury,

including CTE and its related symptoms.

262. Defendant NFL, therefore, misrepresented the dangers players faced in returning

to action after sustaining a head injury and the long-term effects of continuing to play football

after a head injury.

263. The NFL’s MTBI Committee made public statements, published articles, and

issued the concussion pamphlet to its players, which the NFL knew or should have known were

misleading, downplaying and obiuscating to NFL players the true and serious risks of repetitive

traumatic head impacts.

264. The MTBI Committee made material misrepresentations on multiple occasions,

including but not limited to testimony at congressional hearings and other information issued to

current and former NFL Players.

265. Junior Seau’s reliance on the NFL’s misrepresentations was reasonable, given the

NFL’s superior and unique vantage point on these issues.

266. The Defendant’s misrepresentations included the false statement that present NFL

players were not at an increased risk of short-term and long-term adverse consequences if they

returned too soon to an NFL games or practices after suffering head trauma and, therefore, that

former players had not been exposed to such increased risk during their time in the NFL.44.

EX A, PAGE 58

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267. The NFL’s misrepresentations included ongoing and baseless criticism of

legitimate scientific studies that set forth the dangers and risks of head impacts which NFL

players regularly sustained.

268. The NFL made these misrepresentations and actively concealed true information at

a time when it knew, or should have known, because of its superior position of knowledge, that

players faced serious health problems if they returned to a game too soon after sustaining a

concussion.

269. The NFL knew or should have known the misleading nature of its statements when

they were made.

270. The NFL made the misrepresentations and actively concealed information

knowing that Junior Seau would and did rely on the misrepresentations or omissions in, among

other things, how the players addressed the concussive and sub-concussive injuries they

sustained. For the time period prior to June 2010, the NFL’s concerted concealment of the risks

to which present and former players had been exposed on the playing field delayed Junior Seau’s

ability to plan for the future and to seek appropriate treatment of his latent neurodegenerative

conditions.

271. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligent misrepresentations, Junior

Seau suffered physical injury, including, but not limited to, existing and latent cognitive

conditions that created diminished cognitive function, non-economic losses, and economic losses

including but not limited to lost and/or reduced income during his life.



FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENCE

(Against the NFLJ


as if folly set forth herein.

274. Plaintiff Bette Hoffman brings this survival cause of action on behalf of the estate45.

EX A, PAGE 59

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377.30.

275. Between 1933 and 1968, the NFL assumed and carried out a duty to inform and

advise players and teams of the foreseeable harm that can arise from such things as the use of

leather helmets, the need to wear hard plastic helmets to reduce head wounds and internal injury

and the grabbing of an opponent’s facemask—to minimize or avoid head and neck injuries.

These warnings and imposed safety rules were furnished by the NFL because it had assumed a

duty to provide a safe environment for players and because of its superior knowledge of the risks

of injury to players.

276. Based on information and belief, the NFL voluntarily inserted itself into the tasks

assumed by others to develop helmet safety standards and to reduce the risk of head injury while

playing football. Despite its voluntary participation in these activities, the NFL negligently failed

to adopt these standards for a considerable period of time after others had done so.

277. During this time period, the NFL knew or should have known of medical or

scientific literature regarding the risks of short- and long-term neuro-cognitive disabilities and

deficits to athletes exposed to MTBI.

278. During this time period, the NFL knew or should have known that it was the

practice in the NFL to compel or cajole players to play with injuries, including sub-concussive

injuries, concussive injuries and injuries involving a loss of consciousness.

279. During this time period, the NFL had superior knowledge, (as compared to the

NFL players themselves) that athletic sporting events causing sub-concussive and concussive

injuries posed a serious risk of short-term and long-term cognitive disabilities.

280. Increasingly, during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the NFL (and the marketing arm

of the NFL) marketed the game of football as acceptably violent, and it rewarded its most violent

players. This marketing technique was directed to the general public and organized football

players everywhere. In pursuing these concerted marketing techniques, the NFL knew or should

have known that its conflation of concussive-inducing violence with heroism would induce NFL

players and those who aspired to play in the NFL to play with reckless violence.. 46.

EX A, PAGE 60

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281. In its marketing scheme, the defendant NFL developed print and film packages

that were widely distributed throughout the United States to media outlets and organized football

programs as a powerful method to convince current players and those in college and high school

football that the greater the hit the bigger the accolades.

282. During this time period, the failure of the NFL to publicize within the League, and

to the public at large, the mounting evidence in the scientific literature of the evolving and

chronic neuro-cognitive problems amongst former players caused then-current players and retired

players to believe that their physical and psychological problems (as described herein) were

neither serious nor related to football. Instead, the NFL increasingly promoted the brutality and

ferocity of NFL play. These commissions or omissions caused players to ignore the need for

necessary treatment. Likewise, these omissions and commissions had the institutional effect of

reducing the interest in helmet safety research, avoiding changes in rule-playing to minimize head

injury, avoiding the need to promulgate rules affecting the retum-to-play rules when concussive

events are detected, and avoiding establishing programs to educate players about the long-term

health risks of sub-concussive and concussive impacts.

283. In the early 1990s, the NFL voluntarily undertook to study the issue of neuro-

cognitive injuries in former NFL players.

284. In 1994, in connection with that voluntary undertaking, the NFL created the

aforementioned MTBI Committee.

285. By voluntarily undertaking to study and report on the issue of the neuro-cognitive

effects of head impacts in professional football, the NFL assumed a duty to exercise reasonable

care in the MTBI Committee’s work and the NFL and its agents’ public statements about the

substance of the Committee’s work.

286. However, the MTBI Committee negligently performed the NFL’s voluntarily

undertaken research mission.

287. In addition, from 1994 through June of 2010, the NFL and its MTBI Committee

made material misrepresentations to players, former players, the United States Congress, and the

public at large that there was no scientifically valid link between repetitive traumatic head47.

EX A, PAGE 61

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impacts and Iater-in-life cognitive/brain injury, including CTE and its related symptoms.

288. Given the NFL’s superior and unique vantage point on the issue of head injuries

and concussions, the Plaintiffs reasonably relied to their detriment on the NFL’s actions and

omissions on the subject.

289. Junior Seau reasonably relied to his detriment on the NFL’s actions and omissions

on the subject.

290. The NFL’s failure to exercise reasonable care in its voluntarily assumed duty

increased the risk that players like Junior Seau would suffer long-term neuro-cognitive injuries.

291. Under all of the above circumstances, it was foreseeable that the NFL’s failure to

exercise reasonable care in the execution of its voluntarily undertaken duties would cause or

substantially contribute to the personal injuries suffered by Junior Seau.

292. The NFL’s failure to exercise reasonable care in the execution of its voluntarily

undertaken duties proximately caused or contributed to Junior Seau’s injuries, and ultimately his

death.

293. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligence, Junipr Seau suffered

physical injury, including, but not limited to, existing and latent cognitive conditions that created

diminished cognitive function, non-economic losses, and economic losses including but not

limited to lost and/or reduced income during his life.

294. As a result of die NFL’s misconduct as alleged herein, the NFL is liable to


FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT HIRING

fAgainst the NFL!





377.30.48.

EX A, PAGE 62

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297. The NFL voluntarily and gratuitously inserted itself into the business of studying

(and subsequently rendering expert opinions about) the relationship between repetitive head

impacts in football and brain injury.

298. In doing so, the NFL assumed a duty to players like Junior Seau to retain and

employ persons within the MTBI Committee who were professionally competent to study and

render opinions on the relationship between repetitive head impacts in football and brain injury

and to ensure that those whom it hired had no conflict of interest and that each had the

professional and personal qualifications to conduct those studies and render opinions that were

scientifically rigorous, valid, defensible, and honest.

299. The NFL breached its duty to Junior Seau by hiring persons who:

a. were unqualified;

b. were not competent to engage in rigorous and defensible scientific

research;

c. were not competent to render valid and defensible opinions;

d. created fraudulent industry-funded research; and/or

e. attacked as not credible the valid and defensible research and opinions

generated by neuro-scientists who were unconnected to and not paid by the NFL.

300. The NFL’s negligence in this regard resulted in a body of falsified industry-funded

research that purposefully and/or negligently contested and suppressed valid and truthful

biomedical science. The NFL’s negligence allowed the MTBI Committee to use falsified

industry-funded research to mislead Junior Seau, other former NFL players, and the general

public regarding the risks associated with repetitive head impacts in the game of football.

301. As a result of the NFL’s negligence, Junior Seau sustained brain injuries that were

progressive and latent and did not take protective measures or seek the diagnosis and treatment he

would have sought had he been told the truth.

302. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligent hiring, Junior Seau


created diminished cognitive function, non-economic losses, and economic losses including but49.

EX A, PAGE 63

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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT RETENTION

/Against the NFL')





377.30.

306. The NFL knew or should have known that the controlling members of the MTBI

Committee demonstrated an ongoing lack of competence, objectivity and inadequate judgment to

study and render expert opinions on the issue of the relationship between repetitive head impacts

in football and brain injury.

307. The NFL voluntarily assumed a duty to Junior Seau not to allow those

incompetent persons it had hired within the MTBI Committee to continue to conduct incompetent

and falsified studies and render incompetent opinions on the relationship between repetitive head


308. During the time period when the MTBI Committee was conducting its purported

research and rendering its purported opinions, the NFL knew or should have known that the

purported research and opinions of the MTBI Committee were false and indefensible.

309. The NFL breached its duty to Junior Seau by allowing these incompetent and

unqualified persons, under the auspices and with the imprimatur of the NFL:

a. to continue to create incompetent and indefensible research,

b. to continue to render invalid and indefensible opinions, and

c. to continue to attack the credible and defensible research and opinions of

neuro-scientists not connected to or paid by the NFL.50.

EX A, PAGE 64

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310. The NFL’s negligence allowed the incompetent members of the MTBI Committee

to continue to advance their false and incompetent research and opinions in an attempt to suppress

valid bio-medical science. The NFL’s negligence allowed the MTBI Committee members to

mislead Junior Seau, other former NFL players, and the general public regarding the permanent

brain injury risks associated with repetitive head impacts in the game of football.

311. As a result of the NFL’s failure, Junior Seau sustained brain injuries that were


would have sought had they been told the truth.

312. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligent retention, Junior Seau






SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

WRONGFUL DEATH

(Against the NFL Defendants!



315. Plaintiffs Tyler Seau, Sydney Seau, Jake Seau and Hunter Seau are Junior Seau’s

natural children and therefore are entitled to bring this wrongful death action pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60.

316. As a direct and proximate cause of the conduct alleged herein, the NFL

Defendants caused Junior Seau to develop neuro-cognitive brain diseases, including CTE.

317. As a result of these neuro-cognitive brain diseases, Junior Seau suffered from

insomnia, depression, anxiety, and other injuries.

318. Junior Seau’s untimely death on May 2, 2012 was a direct and proximate result of51.

EX A, PAGE 65

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having suffered multiple past traumatic brain injuries while playing professional football for the

NFL from 1990-2009.

319. As a direct and proximate result of the untimely death of Junior Seau, his

respective survivors have been deprived of the earnings, maintenance, guidance, support and

comfort that they would have received for the rest of their natural lives, and have suffered

commensurate pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses because of Junior Seau’s wrongful death.

320. As a result of the NFL Defendants’ misconduct as alleged herein, Defendants are

liable to Plaintiffs for, and Plaintiffs seek, the full measure of damages allowed under applicable

law.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

WRONGFUL DEATH

(AGAINST THE RTDDBt.!. DEFENDANTS')






Negligence Supporting Wrongful Death

323. The Riddell Defendants were negligent in their design, testing, assembly,

manufacture, marketing, and engineering of the helmets as described herein.

324. The Riddell Defendants owed a duty of care to the players in their design, testing,

manufacture, assembly, marketing and sale of the helmets and all components and sub-assemblies

of the helmets.

325. The Riddell Defendants should have been well aware that since 1928 repeated

blows to the head can lead to CTE, commonly known as “punch-drunk syndrome”.

. 326. The Riddell Defendants breached their duty of reasonable care by failing to

provide necessary and adequate safety and instructional materials and warnings of the risk and52.

EX A, PAGE 66

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means available to reduce and/or minimize the risk of concussive brain injuries while playing

football using their helmets.

327. At the time the helmets were designed, manufactured, sold and distributed by the

Riddell Defendants, the helmets were defective in their manufacturing and unreasonably

dangerous and unsafe for their intended purpose because they did not provide adequate protection

against the foreseeable risk of concussive brain injury. The Riddell Defendants’ failure to design

the helmets to design and manufacturing specifications resulted in, among other things, the

following:

(a) Negligently failing to manufacture the subject helmet with a safe means of

attenuating and absorbing the foreseeable forces of impact in order to minimize and/or reduce the ■

forces and energy directed to the player’s head;

(b) Negligently manufacturing the subject helmet with a shock attenuating system

which was not safely configured;

(c) Negligently failing to properly and adequately inspect and/or test the helmet .

model;

(d) Other acts of negligence that may be discovered during the course of this matter;

and

(e) Failure to warn players that its helmets wouldn’t protect against concussive brain

injury. .

Design Defect Supporting Wrongful Death

328. Also, at the time the helmets used by Junior Seau were designed, manufactured,

sold, and distributed by the Riddell Defendants, the helmets were defective in design,

unreasonably dangerous, and unsafe for their intended purpose because they did not provide

adequate protection against the foreseeable risk of concussive brain injury. The design defects

include, but are not limited to the following:

(a) The lack of a safe means of attenuating and absorbing the foreseeable forces of

impact in order to minimize and/or reduce the forces and energy directed to the player’s head;

(b) An unsafe shock attenuating system; and53.

EX A, PAGE 67

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(c) Insufficient protection against concussive injuries.

329. The defective design and unreasonably dangerous condition were a proximate and

producing cause of the personal injuries suffered by Junior Seau and other damages, including but

not limited to, economic damages and non-economic damages.

330. The Riddell helmets did not perform in the manner that would be expected by a

reasonable consumer in that they did not adequately protect players from the risks of concussive

and sub-concussive injuries.

331. Additionally, the benefits, if any, of the design of the Riddell helmets were

outweighed by the risks to players using those helmets as the helmets did not adequately protect

players from the risks of concussive and sub-concussive injuries.

332. A safer alternative design was economically and technologically feasible at the

time the product left the control of the Riddell Defendants.

333. At all times, the helmets were being used for the purpose for which they were

intended or in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable to the Riddel] Defendants.

Failure to Warn Supporting Wrongful Death

334. Also, the Riddell Defendants knew or should have known of the substantial

dangers involved in the reasonably foreseeable use of the helmets.

335. The Riddell Defendants failed to provide necessary and adequate safety and

instructional materials and warnings of the risk and means available to reduce and/or minimize

the risk of concussive brain injuries while playing football.

336. The Riddell Defendants failed to provide necessary and adequate information,

warnings, and/or instructional materials regarding the fact that other model helmets provided

greater shock attenuation from blows to the head area.

337. The Riddell Defendants ignored 18 years of published literature, read by their

general counsel Richard Lester, warning of the dangers of concussive injuries until 2002, when a

warning involving return to play after a concussion was placed on all Riddell helmets. The

warning was still defective and inadequate and remains today defective and inadequate because it

does not warn about the later life cognitive effects of concussive injury. ■54.

EX A, PAGE 68

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338. The Riddell Defendants knew that these substantial dangers were not readily

recognizable to an ordinary consumer or user and that such person would use these products

without inspection for defects.

339. Junior Seau neither knew, nor had reason to know of the existence of the

aforementioned defects, or increased risks of harm.

340. Junior Seau was using the helmets in a reasonably foreseeable manner at all times.

■ 341. Riddell Defendants failure to warn players of the risks of substantial harm

associated with the foreseeable use of their products was a substantial factor in causing Junior

Seau’s harm.

Riddell’s Wrongful Death Liability

342. Riddell Defendant’s negligence, design defect and failure to warn were a

proximate and legal cause of the wrongful death of Junior Seau as alleged herein.

343. As a direct and proximate cause of the conduct alleged herein, the Riddell




345. Junior Seau’s untimely death on May 2, 2012 was a direct and proximate result of

having suffered multiple past traumatic brain injuries while using equipment designed, developed,

manufactured, sold and distributed by the Riddell Defendants.





As a result of the Riddell Defendants’ misconduct as alleged herein, Defendants are liable to


/ / /

55.

EX A, PAGE 69

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

A. Against the NFL Defendants as follows:

As to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action

an award of all compensatory damages allowed under law against the NFL Defendants;

As to the First and Second Causes of Action an award of punitive damages as to

the NFL defendants;

B. Against the Riddell Defendants as follows:

As to the Eighth Cause of Action an award of all compensatory damages allowed

under law against the Riddell Defendants;

C. An award of prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys fees; and

D. An award of such other and further relief as may be appropriate; and

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all matters so triable.

Dated: January 22,2013

m m b y t ipSTEVEN M. STRAUSS (99153)

Steven M. Strauss

Attorney for Plaintiffs

56.

EX A, PAGE 70

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#

E X H I B I T A

EX A, PAGE 71

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*

I COOLEY LLPSTEVEN M. STRAUSS (99153) ([email protected])

2 4401 Eastgate Mall San Diego, CA 92121-1909 Telephone: (858) 550-6000

3 Facsimile: (8S8) 550-6420

4 CASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCA VILLA BLATT & PENFIELD, LLP

5 DAVID S. CASEY, JR. (060768) ([email protected])FREDERICK SCHENK (086392) ([email protected])

6 110 Laurel Street San Diego, CA 92101

7

S

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Telephone: (619)238-1811 Facsimile: (619) 544-9232


101 1 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO4 1 12

CENTRAL DIVISION

13 .TYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY Case No.

14 SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU, a minor,and HUNTER SEAU, a minor, by and through Declaration of Bette Hoffman In Support

15 thetr Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau; and of Complaint Commencing SurvivalBETTE HOFFMAN as trustee of the Tiaina B. Action by Bette Hoffman on Behalf o f the

16 Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust, TIAINA B. SEAU, JR., 2002 TRUST

17 Plaintiffs,

IS V.19 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NFL

PROPERTIES LLC; RIDDELL, INC.; ALL20 AMERICAN SPORTS CORP.; RIDDELL

SPORTS GROUP, INC.; EASTON-BELL21 SPORTS, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS,

LLC; EB SPORTS CORP.; AND RBG22 HOLDINGS CORP.

2324

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Defendants.

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EX A, PAGE 72




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I, Bette Hoffman, hereby declare as follows:

1. 1 am a plaintiff in the above entitled action. I have personal knowledge of the facts

set forth below, and if called as a witness to testify, I could and would competently testify thereto.

2. The decedent, Tiatna B, Seau, Jr., died on May 2, 2012 in San Diego County,

California. A true and correct copy of his death certificate is attached,

3. No proceeding is now pending in California for the administration of the

decedent’s estate.

4. T am the presently serving sole trustee of the T1AJNA B. SEAU, JR., 2002

TRUST, also known as the TIAINA B. SEAU TRUST, dated October 18, 2002. The trust is in

full force and effect.

5. As sole trustee, I am authorized to commence litigation with respect any property

of the trust. Therefore, I am authorized to act on behalf o f the decedent’s successors in interest

(as defined in Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) with respect to the

decedent’s interest in the action or proceeding.

6. N o o th er person has a superior right to com m ence the action o r proceeding or to be

substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding.* ■ -

- I declare under penalty o f perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on January /^ 2 0 1 2 at San Diego, California.

H 99M /S D

C o X E r L I P

Sam Oii.cc2.

Decl. of Bette Hoffman i/s/o Complaint

EX A, PAGE 73

CaEas®: £31©ve00&7B3WAR3B BDcEaooiETnfe 1 1 - 1F i FdeOBOZSZHl 3P s RgagKQSf 15139

1ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Ngjno, Stole Bar AtimWr, “ Jd addflSS).’

“ C ooky LLP Casey Gerry Schenk Franuaviita Blatt & Penfteld Steven M. Struass (99153) David Casey (060768)4401 Eastgate M ail 110 Laurel Street San Diego CA 92121 San Diego CA 92101

TELEPHONE NO.: 85855 0 -6 0 00 FAX NO.:

ATTORNEY FOR (WBruerJL T Y L E R S E A U , e t al.

FOH COUM USE ONLY

Z B T 3 J & I 2 3 FM 3 - 2 $

VIA FAX

s u p e r io r c o u rt o f ca lifo rh ia , c o u n t y o f San D ie g o stre e t address: 330 W e s t B ro a d w a yMAILING ADDRESS:

CITY AND ZIP CODE: San D iegO 92101 BRANCH NAME: C en tra l , ,

CASE NAME:

C iV tL CASE COVER SHEET 1 •/ 1 Unlimited 1 1 Limited

(Amount (Amount demanded demanded is exceeds $25,000) $25,000 or less)

Complex Case Designation

C D Counter C D Joinder Filed with first appearance by defendant

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3,402)

CASE NUMflFR:

3 7 ^2 0 1 3 -0 0 0 3 1 2 6 5 -C U P O -C T LJUDGE;

DEPT:

Items 7-6 below must be completed (see instructions on page 2).1. Check one box below for the case type that

Auto Tort0 Auto (22)1 —I Uninsured motorist (46) .Other PI/PDfWD (Personal InjuryfProperty Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort□ Asbestos (04)□ Product liability (24)I I Medical malpractice (45)[Z D Other Pl/PD/WO (23)

Noh-PlfPDMD (Other) TortBusiness tort/unfair business practice (D7) Civil rights (08) 'Defamation (13)Fraud (16)Intellectual property (19)Professional negligence (25)Other non-Pl/PD/WQ tort (35)

Employment1 I Wrongful termination (36)I 1 Other employment (15)

best describes this case:Contractn Breach of contract/warranty (OB) n Rule 3.740 collections (09)I__| Other collections (09)I---1 Insurance coverage (18)I. J Other contract (37)RealI Property -I I Eminent dam ainfinverse condemnation (14)I I Wrongful eviction (33)I \ Other real property (26)Unlawful Detainer I I Commercial (31)E D Residential (32)E D Drugs (3B)Judicial Review

Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400-3.403)

I Antitrust/Trade regulation (03) ‘Construction defect (10)Mass tort (40)Securities litigation (23)

Environmental/Toxic tort (30)I Insurance coverage claims arising from the

above listed provisionally complex case types (41)

Enforcement of JudgmentE D Enforcement of Judgment (20)

Miscellaneous Civil ComplaintE D RICO (27)I ' I Other complatnl (not specified above) (42)

Miscellaneous Civil Petition E D Partnership and corporate governance (21) f I Olher petition (not specified above) (43)

Asset forfeiture (05)Petition re; arbitration award (11)Writ of mandate (02)

. . . Other judicial review (39)_____This case I •/ I is I I is not complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the factors requiring exceptional judicial management: ___

d. I D Large number of witnessese. i / I Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts

in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal courtf . a Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision

2.

a. I Ib . n

Large number o f separately represented parties Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel

issues that will be time-consuming to resolvec. I I Substantial amount o f documentary evidence

3. Remedies sought (check all thatapply): a.I / I monetary b.l I nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief c. [/Jpun itive4. Number of causes of action (specify): E ig h t5. This case I I Is I / I is not a class action suit. -6. if there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You may use form CM-015.)

Date: 9/22/2013 Steven M. Strauss

(TVPEOR PRINT NAME!_____________________► A h EtTa^v Ia a J(

' ’( S i g n a t u r e o f p A r ty 15r ATTORNEY

NOTICE• Plaintiff must file 1his cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed

under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result in sanctions.

• File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule. - -• If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all

other parties to the action or proceeding.• Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only.

Form Adopted For Mandatory UsoJudicial Council of CaliforniaCM-OIOfRev. July 1.2007]

CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET CaL Rtlos or Court, rules 2.30. 3-220. 3-400-3.403* 3,740: Cal. Standards or Judical Administration* std. 3,10

wmr.mufttofo. ca.gov

EX A, PAGE 74

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGOSTREET ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway MAILING AO DRESS: 330 West Broadway CITY AND 2IP CODE: San Diego. CA 92101 BRANCH NAME: Central TELEPHONE NUMBER: (519J 450-7070

PLAINTIFF(S) / PETIT lONER(S); Tyler Seau et.al.

DEFENDANT(S) / RESPONDENT(S)! National Football League et.al.

SEAU VS, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT AND CASE NUMBER:

CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Judge: Randa Trapp Department C-70

COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED: 01/23/2013

TYPE OF HEARING SCHEDULED DATE TIME DEPT JUDGE

A case m anagem ent statement must be completed by counsel fo r all parties o r self-represented litigants and tim ely filed with the court a t least 15 days prior to the initial case m anagem ent conference. (San Diego Local Rules, D ivision II, CRC Rule 3.725).

A ll counsel o f record o r parties in pro per shall appear a t the Case Management Conference, be fam iliar w ith the case, and be fully prepared to participate effectively in the hearing, Including discussions o f ADR* options.

IT IS THE DUTY OF EACH PLAINTIFF (AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT) TO SERVE A CO PY OF THIS NOTICE WITH THEC O M PLAIN T (AND CROSS-COMPLAINT), THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION FORM (SDSCFORM #CIV-730), A STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) (SDSC FORM #CIV-359) AND OTHERDOCUM ENTS AS SET OUT IN SDSC LOCAL RULE 2.1.5.

A L L COUNSEL W ILL BE EXPECTED TO BE FAM ILIAR WITH SUPERIOR COURT RULES W HICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED ASDIVISION II, AN D W ILL BE STRICTLY ENFORCED.

T IM E STANDARDS: The fo llow ing tim efram es app ly to general civil cases and must be adhered to unless you have requested and been granted an extension o f tim e. General civil cases consist o f all civil cases except: small cla im s proceedings, c iv il petitions, unlawful detainer proceedings, probate, guardianship, conservatorship, juvenile , parking citation appeals, and fam ily law proceedings.

C O M PLAINTS: Complaints and all o ther docum ents listed in SDSC Local Rule 2.1.5 m ust be served on all named defendants, and a Certificate o f Service (SDSC form #C IV-345) filed w ithin 60 days o f filing.

D EFEN D AN T’S APPEARANCE: Defendant must generally appear within 30 days o f service o f the complaint. (P laintiff maystipulate to no more than 15 day extension which must be in writing and filed w ith the Court.) (SDSC Local Rule 2.1.6)

JU R Y FEES: In order to preserve the right to a ju ry trial, each party demanding a ju ry trial shall pay an advance ju ry fee in theam ount o f one hundred fifty dollars ($150) fo r each party on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference in the action.

‘ ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): THE COURT ENCOURAGES YOU TO CONSIDER UTILIZING VARIOUS ALTER N ATIVES TO TRIAL, INCLUDING M EDIATION AND ARBITRATION, PRIOR TO THE CASE M ANAGEMENT CONFERENCE PARTIES M AY FILE THE ATTACHED STIPULATIO N TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (SDSC FORM #CIV-359)

SDSC CIV-721 (Rev. 08-12)

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT

EX A, PAGE 75

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

CASE NUMBER: 37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL CASE TITLE:Seau vs. National Football League

NOTICE: All plaintiffs/cross-eomplainants in a general civil case are required to serve a copy of the following three forms on each defendant/cross-defendant, together with the complaint/cross-complaint:

(1) this Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information form (SDSC form #CIV-730),(2) the Stipulation to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) form (SDSC form #CIV-359), and(3) the Notice of Case Assignment form (SDSC form #CIV-721).

Most civil disputes are resolved wilhout filing a lawsuit, and most civil lawsuits are resolved without a trial. The courts, community organizations, and private providers offer a variety of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes to help people resolve disputes without a trial. The San Diego Superior Court expects that litigants will utilize some form of ADR as a mechanism for case settlement before trial, and it may be beneficial to do this early in the case.

Below is some information about the potential advantages and disadvantages of ADR, the most common types of ADR, and how to find a local ADR program or neutral. A form for agreeing to use ADR is attached (SDSC form #CIV-359).

Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of ADRADR may have a variety of advantages or disadvantages over a trial, depending on the type of ADR process used and the particular case:

Potential Disadvantages • May take more time and money if ADR does not

resolve the dispute ■ Procedures to learn about the other side’s case (discovery),

jury trial, appeal, and other court protections may be limited or unavailable

Most Common Types of ADRYou can read more information about these ADR processes and watch videos that demonstrate them on the court’s ADR webpage at httn://www.sdcourt.ca.oov/adr. ,

Mediation: A neutral person called a ''mediator" helps the parties communicate in an effective and constructive manner so they can try to settle their dispute. The mediator does not decide the outcome, but helps the parties to do so.Mediation is usually confidential, and may be particularly useful when parties want or need to have an ongoing relationship, such as in disputes between family members, neighbors, co-workers, or business partners, or when parties want to discuss non-legaf concerns or creative resolutions that could not be ordered at a trial.

Settlement Conference: A judge or another neutral person called a "settlement officer" helps the parties to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their case and to discuss settlement- The judge or settlement officer does not make a decision in the case but helps the parties to negotiate a settlement. Settlement conferences may be particularly helpful when the parties have very different ideas about the likely outcome of a trial and would like an experienced neutral to help guide them toward a resolution.

Arbitration: A neutral person called an "arbitrator" considers arguments and evidence presented by each side and then decides the outcome of the dispute. Arbitration is less formal than a trial, and the rules of evidence are usually relaxed. If the parties agree to binding arbitration, they waive their right to a trial and agree to accept the arbitrator's decision as final. With nonbinding arbitration, any party may reject the arbitrator’s decision and request a trial. Arbitration may be appropriate when the parties want another person to decide the outcome of their dispute but would like to avoid the formality, time, and expense of a trial.

Potential Advantages* Saves time* Saves money■ Gives parties more control over the dispute

resolution process and outcome* Preserves or improves relationships

, SDSC CIV 730 (Rev 12-10) ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

EX A, PAGE 76Page: 1

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Other ADR Processes: There are several other types of ADR which are not offered through the court but which may be obtained privately, including neutral evaluation, conciliation, factfinding, mini-trials, and summary jury trials. Sometimes parties will try a combination of ADR processes. The important thing is to try to find the type or types of ADR that are most likely to resolve your dispute. Be sure to learn about the rules of any ADR program and the qualifications of any neutral you are considering, and about their fees.

Local ADR Programs for Civil Cases

Mediation: The San Diego Superior Court maintains a Civil Mediation Pane! of approved mediators who have met certain minimum qualifications and have agreed to charge $150 per hour for each of the first two (2) hours of mediation and their regular hourly rate thereafter in court-referred mediations.

On-line mediator search and selection: Go to the court’s ADR webpage at www.sdcourt.ca.Qov/adr and click on the "Mediator Search" to review individual mediator profiles containing detailed information about each mediator including their dispute resolution training, relevant experience, ADR specialty, education and employment history, mediation style, and fees and to submit an on-line Mediator Selection Form (SDSC form #CIV-005). The Civil Mediation Panel List, the Available Mediator List, individual Mediator Profiles, and Mediator Selection Form (CIV-005) can also be printed from the court’s ADR webpage and are available at the Mediation Program Office or Civil Business Office at each court location.

Settlement Conference: The judge may order your case to a mandatory settlement conference, or voluntary settlement conferences may be requested from file court if the parties certify that: (1) settlement negotiations between the parties have been pursued, demands and offers have been tendered in good faith, and resolution has failed; (2) a judicially supervised settlement conference presents a substantial opportunity for settlement; and (3) the case has developed to a point where all parties are legally and factually prepared to present the issues for settlement consideration and further discovery for settlement purposes is not required. Refer to SDSC Local Rule 2.2.1 for more information. To schedule a settlement conference, contact the department to which your case is assigned.

Arbitration: The San Diego Superior Court maintains a panel of approved judicial arbitrators who have practiced law for a minimum of five years and who have a certain amount of trial and/or arbitration experience. Refer to SDSC Local Rules Division II. Chapter 111 and Code Civ. Proc. 5 1141.10 etsea or contact the Arbitration Program Office at (619) 450-7300 for more information.

More information about court-connected ADR: Visit the court’s ADR webpage at www.sdcourt.ca.Qov/adr or contact the court’s Mediation/Arbitration Office at (619)450-7300.

Dispute Resolution Programs Act (DRPA) funded ADR Programs: The following community dispute resolution programs are funded under DRPA (Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 465 et seq ):

■ In Central, East, and South San Diego County, contact the National Conflict Resolution Center (NCRC) at www.ncrconline.com or (619) 238-2400.

■ In North San Diego County, contact North County Lifeline, Inc. at www.nclifeline.org or (760) 726-4900.

Private ADR: To find a private ADR program or neutral, search the Internet, your local telephone or business directory, or legal newspaper for dispute resolution, mediation, settlement, or arbitration services.

Legal Representation and Advice

To participate effectively in ADR, it is generally important to understand your legal rights and responsibilities and the likely outcomes if you went to trial. ADR neutrals are not allowed to represent or to give legal advice to the participants in the ADR process. If you do not already have an attorney, the California State Bar or your local County Bar Association can assist you in finding an attorney, information about obtaining free and low cost legal assistance is also available on the California courts website at www.courtinfo.ca.aov/selfhelp/loweost.

SDSC c iv -720 (Rev 12-10] ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION

EX A, PAGE 77

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http://www.sdcourt.ca.Qov/adr

http://www.sdcourt.ca.Qov/adr

http://www.ncrconline.com

http://www.nclifeline.org

http://www.courtinfo.ca.aov/selfhelp/loweost

C C s e 2313V0V»150WHB BDcBacuene i t 1 - 1F i lEille(03(Z2!52;B31 3P agaglS97(Sf (115139

/ '■

TO PER iOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

STREET a d d re s s : 330 West Broadway

m ailing a o d re s s : 330 West Broadway

c ity , s ta te , a zip code: San Diego, CA 92101-3827

b ra n c h name. Central

PLAINTIFF(S): Tyler Seau et.al.

OEFENDANT(S): National Football League et.al.

SHORT TITLE: SEAU VS. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

FOR COURT l/SE ONE V

STIPULATION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION {ADR)

CASE NUMBER:37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

Judge: Rarda Trapp Department: C-70

The parties and their attorneys stipulate that the m atter is a t issue and the claims in th is action shall be submitted to 1he fo llow ing alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process. Selection o f any o f these options w ill not de lay any case management timelines.

□ Mediation (court-connected) I I Non-binding private arbitration

□ Mediation (private) I I Binding private arbitration

□ Voluntary settlement conference (private) D Non-binding judicial arbitration (discovery until 15 days before trial)

□ Neutral evaluation (private) □ Non-binding judicial arbitration (discovery until 30 days before trial)

□ Other {specif/ e.g., private mini-trial, private judge, etc.):

It is also stipulated that the following shall serve as arbitrator, mediator or other neutral: (Name)

Alternate neutral (for court Civil Mediation Program and arbitration only):

Date: □ate:.

Name of Plaintiff Name of Defendant

Signature Signature

Name of Plaintiffs Attorney Name of Defendant's Attorney

Signature Signature

If there are more parties and/or attorneys, please attach additional completed and fully executed sheets.

It is the duty of the parties to notify the court of any settlement pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1385. Upon notification of the settlement, the coun will place this matter on a 45-day dismissal calendar.

No new parties may be added without leave of court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 01/24/2013 ' JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

SDSCCJV-3S3 (Rev 12-10) STIPULATION TO USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

EX A, PAGE 78

Page; 1

/

casase 231366)@0153W-HB BDcEaaoeme 1 1 - 1F i !e(fe03(Z]2S2181 3P agsga07df 15139

Superior Court of California County of San Diego

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO IMAGING DEPARTMENT

This case has been assigned to an Imaging Department and original documents attached to pleadings filed with the court will be imaged and destroyed. Original documents should not be filed with pleadings. If necessary, they should be lodged with the court under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1302(b).

On August 1, 2011 the San Diego Superior Court began the Electronic Filing and Imaging Pilot Program (“Program”). As of August 1, 2011 in all new cases assigned to an Imaging Department all filings will be imaged electronically and the electronic version of the document will be the official court file. The official court file will be electronic and accessible at one of the kiosks located in the Civil Business Office and on the Internet through the court’s website. This Program will be expanding to other civil courtrooms over time.

You should be aware that the electronic copy of the filed document(s) will be the official court record pursuant to Government Code section 68150. The paper filing will be imaged and held for 30 days. After that time it will be destroyed and recycled. Thus, you should not attach any original documents to pleadings filed with the San Diego Superior Court. Original documents filed with the court will be imaged and destroyed except those documents specified in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1806. Any original documents necessary for a motion hearing or trial shall be lodged in advance of the hearing pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1302(b).

It is the duty of each plaintiff, cross-complainant or petitioner to serve a copy of this notice with the complaint, cross-complaint or petition on all parties in the action.

On all pleadings filed after the initial case originating filing, all parties must, to the extent it is feasible to do so, place the words “IMAGED FILE” in all caps immediately under the title of the pleading on all subsequent pleadings filed in the action.

Please refer to the General Order - Imaging located on the San Diego Superior Court website at:

http://www.sdcourt.ca. gov/C ivill magi ng GeneralO rd er

Page: 2

EX A, PAGE 79

http://www.sdcourt.ca

CaCase 131<3ve!V3075!3W-raB BDcBaaoeme 1t 1 - 1F i Fded3(Z)E52B313P agage17(2f (115139

r-

CIV-010A11ORNEY (Name, Stote Sar number, and address):Cooley LLP Casey Geriy Schenk Francavilla Blatt & Penfield Steven M. Strauss (99153) David Casey (060768)4401 Eastgate Mall 110 Laurel Street San Diego CA 92121 San Diego CA 92101

TELEPHONE NO.: 858550-6000 FAX NO. fOptaral):E-MAIL ADDRESS (Opaonal):

attorney forfWBmaL TYLER SEAU, et a!.

FOR COURT USE ONL Y

F I L E D Clark of the Superior Court

J A N 2 2 2513B y : K . H IL L , D e p u tySUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San DiegO

street address: 330 West BroadwayMAILING ADDRESS:

city and zip code San Diego 92101branch name Central .

PLAiNTiFFypETrriONER; TYLER SEAU et al,

defendant/respondent: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al.

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM— CIVIL

UZ3 EX PARTE

CASE NUMBER:

3 7 -2 0 1 3 -0 0 0 3 1 2 6 5 -C U -P O -C T L

NOTE: This form is for use In civil proceedings in which a party is a minor, an incapacitated person, or a person for whom a conservator has been appointed. A party who seeks the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a family law or juvenile proceeding should use form FL-935. A party who seeks the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a probate proceeding should use form DE-350/GC-tOO. An individual cannot act as a guardian ad litem unless he or she is represented by an attorney or is an attorney.

1. Applicant (name): Gina Seal) isa. I / I the parent of (name): H u n te r Seaub I .... I the guardian of (name):c. t n the conservator of (name): -d. I I a party to the suit.e. i. | the minor to be represented (if the minor is 14 years of age or older).f. I I another interested person (specify capacity):

2. This application seeks the appointment of the following person as guardian ad litem (state name, address. and telephone number): Gina Seau

' 4110 Rancho Las Brisas Trail San Diego, CA 92130

3- .The ouarriian ad litem is to renrflsent the interests of the following person {slats, name, address and telephone number i-_________Hunter Seau4110 Rancho Las Brisas Trail San Diego, CA 92130

4. t ne person to be represented is:--------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------- -------------------- ----------------------- --------a. LZD a minor (date o f birth): 09/11/00b. □ an Incompetent person.c. □ a person for whom a conservator has been appointed.

5. The court should appoint a guardian ad litem because;a. CZH the person named in item 3 has a cause or causes of action on which suit should be brought (describe):

Hunter Seau is a minor and requires the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem to commence and litigate a wrongful death case relating to his father's death.

I I Continued on Attachment 5a.

-------------------------------------------- -- --------------------- -—— — Pape 1 of2

“ i S S ' APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT codeorcwe™*^.cw^opev.Januay 1,1008! OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM— CIVIL §372auwt

EX A, PAGE 80

casase :E313v0)ai^W-raB BDcEaaoiena 1 1 - 1F i Ffia03(Z]ES2131 3P agag®27(3f 115139

_ PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER; TYLER SEAU et al.

de fendan t/responden t: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al.

CASE NUMBER

37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

5. b. I 1 more than 10 days have elapsed since the summons in the above-entitled matter was served on the person namedin item 3, and no application (or the appointment of a guardian ad litam has been made by the person identified in item 3 or any other person.

c. U J the person named in item 3 has no guardian or conservator of his or her estate.

d. L / I the appointment of a guardian ad litem is necessary for the following reasons (specify):

... . Hunter Seau is a minor and requires the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem to commence andlitigate a wrongful death case relating to his father's death.

I— 1 Continued on Attachment 5d.

6. The proposed guardian ad litem's relationship to the person he or she wil! be representing is:a. I / I related (state relationship): Motherb. □ not related (specify capacity): '

7. The proposed guardian ad litem is fully competent and qualified to understand and protect the rights of the person he or she will represent and has no interests adverse to the interests of that person. (If there are any issues of competency or qualification or any possible adverse interests, describe and explain why the proposed guardian should nevertheless be appointed):

I I Continued on Attachment 7.

Steven M. Strauss ► U J(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY)

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

I consent to the appointment as guardian ad litem under the above petition.Date: / - 2 .2 -/ 3

-------------------------------- ►__ f f i l m(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (^/ (SIGNATURE OF PROPOSED GUArV an AD LITEM)

ORDER C Z1 EX PARTE

THE COURT FINDS that it is reasonable and necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for the person named in item 3 of the application, as requested.

THE COURT ORDERS that (name): (1 “) | rA r \ - C ilA , is hereby appointed as the guardian ad litem for (name): p r 'for the reasons set forth in item 5 of the application. . u ' 'Date: _

J A N 2 2 2013 --------- JUDICIAL OFFICER

I i SIGNATURE FOLLOWS LAST A T T A C H M E N T j- ( Q g E R T J . T R tN T A G O S T A

CIV-010 (Rev. January ], 2003J APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT PagaZsfZ

OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM— CIVIL

EX A, PAGE 81

Casase: 131<3v0V30I®31Wra3B BDdaaooiETnfe lit- 1 - 1F i ieifed3Z]252131 3P agage37df (115139

CIV-010ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address):

_ Cooley LLP Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Biatt & PenfieldSteven M. Strauss (99153) David Casey (060768)4401 Eastgate Mall 1 ] 0 Laurel StreetSan Diego CA 92121 San Diego CA 92101

TELEPHONE NO.: 858550-6000 FAX NO (Optional).

E-MAIL ADDRESS (Opbonal):

ATTORNEY FOR (Na/ne): TYLER SEAU, et al.SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San DiegO

s t re e t address: 330 West BroadwayMAILING ADDRESS

CITY AND ZIP CODE

BRANCH NAME

San Diego 92101 Central

PLAINTIFF^PETITIONER: TYLER SEAU et al.

d e fe n d a n t/re s p o n d e n t: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, e t a l .

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM—CIVIL

E H EX PARTE

FOR COURT USE ONL Y

Clerk t

JAN 2 5 2013

CASE NUMBER:

37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

NOTE: This fo rm is fo r use in c iv il proceedings in which a pa rty is a m inor, an incapacitated person, o r a pe rson fo r whom a conserva to r has been appointed. A pa rty w ho seeks the appointm ent o f a guardian ad litem in a fam ily law or ju ve n ile proceed ing shou ld use fo rm FL-935, A pa rty who seeks the appointm ent o f a guard ian ad litem in a probate proceed ing shou ld use fo rm DE-350/GC-100. An ind iv idua l cannot a c t as a guardian ad litem unless he o r she is represented by an a tto rney o r is an attorney.

S/<T \,,L ,

f o r

Applicant (name): Gina Seaua. LY.J the parent of (name): Jake Seau

L ,- i the guardian of (name):I I the conservator of fname):L I a party to fire suit.

the mi nor to be represented (if the minor is 14 years of age or older). I I another interested person (specify capacity):

2. This application seeks the appointment of the following person as guardian ad litem (state name, address, and telephone number):

Gina Seau4110 Rancho Las Brisas Trail San Diego, CA 92130The quardiaa.ad litem is to represent the interests Of the followinc person (state name, address and lelenhone number)-_________

Jake Seau4110 Rancho Las Brisas Trail San Diego, CA 92130 i ne person to oe represented is:

3.

a, [ ? 1 a minor (date o f birth): 10/18/95b, □ an incompetent person.c. n a person for whom a conservator has been appointed.

The court should appoint a guardian ad litem because:a' L-CJ the person named in item 3 has a cause or causes of action on which suit should be brought (describe):

Jake Seau is a minor and requires the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem to commence and litigate a wrongful death case relating to his father’s death.

L — J Continued on Attachment 5a.

Form Adopted for Mandatory UseJudicial Council of Catifbmia

CJV-010 [Rev. January 1, 2008J

Page 1 of 2

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM—CIVIL

Code of Civil Procedure, § 372 et seq.

EX A, PAGE 82

Casase £31<3/0V30783WAEB BDcEaaoffirnfe 1t 1 - 1F i ieille(0l3(Z2l52B21 3P a§sge47(5f 15139

CIV-010

„ PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER; TYLER SEAU et □!.

defendant/respondent- N A T IO N A L F O O T B A L L LEAGUE, et al.

MSCMJWeSR “ “ ” TZJl3 1 - a o |3 - » 3 ( 2 ^ <“ * 4

5. b, i 1 more than 10 days tiavs elapsed since the summons in the above-entitled matter was served on the person namedin item 3, and no application tor the appointment of a guardian ad litem has been made by the person Identtflad In item 3 or any other person.

o. 1Y* I the person named in item 3 has no guardian or conservator of his or her estate,

d. (■/"! tie appointment Of a guardian ad Stem is necessary for the following reasons (specify):

Jake Seau is a minor and requires the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem to commence and litigate ' a wrongful death case relating to his father's death

i I Continued on Attachment 5d.

6. The proposed guardian ad (item's relationship to the person he or she wlli bo representing is: a- G D related (state relationship}: Motherb. □ not related (specify capacity):

7. The proposed guardian ad litem is fury competent and qualified to understand and protect the rights ot the person he or she wlli represent ant) has no interests adverse to the interests of that person. (If there are anyhduos of competency or qualification or any possible adverse interests, describe and explain why the proposed guardian should nevertheless be appointed):

i I Continued on Attachment 7 .

Steven M. Strauss_________ I - 3{TYPE Oft PRINT NANF)

UA(SIGNATURE 0* ATTORNEY)

] tfeci re under penalty of perjury under ihfc taws of the State of California that the foregoing Is True and correct. Data

Jake Seau f / 2 ^ / Z d * ^ s{TYPE Oft PRINT NAME) (StGNA.1

CONSENT TO ACT AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM

o x t / ^*NT) ^

I consent to the appointment as guardian ad litem under the above petition

- j p u p b i AjG ina Se

{TY P£ O ft PR IN T NAME)d lfllk o Q U t -(SIGNATURE OF ? p GUARDIAN AD LITEM)

ORDER □ EX PARTE

THE COURT FINOS (hat it is reasonable and necessary » appoint a guardian ad Jitem for the person named m item 3 of the appfication, as reauested.

THE COUFfT ORDERS that (name): - iT a JjLiG S<? O. ^is hereby appointee as the guardian ad iitem for (name); t"7 I (A AL CAforthe reasons set forth in item 5 of the application. —

Date: m 2 s 2m ^

CTMMO [Rov. JprArtWy I, 2006) APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM— CIV!L

EX A, PAGE 83

Casase 13©velV301’83\1/-raB BDdaacm r1t- 1 - 1F i ! ei1le0H3lZ2521313P agag®57(6f 015139

>1 SUt...JONS

(CITACION JUDICIAL)NOTICE TO DEFENDANT:(AVISO AL DEMAN DADO):NATIONAL FOO TBALL LEAGUE; NFL PRO PERTIES LLC; R IDDELL, INC.;ALL AM ERICAN SPORTS CORP.; RIDDELL SPO RTS GRO UP, INC.; [Additional Parties A ttachm ent Form is A ttached]YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF:(LO ESTA DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):T Y LE R SEAU, an individual; SYD N E Y SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU,a m inor.and HUNTER SEAU,a m inor, by and through tne ir G uard ian ad Litem G ina Seau;and BETTE HOFFM AN as trustee o f the T ia ina B Seau,Jr.2002 trust

SUM-100FOR COURT USE ONL Y

(SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE)

C k rt o! •' i >.W1

JAN 2 5 2013

NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information below.

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be ir proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinto.cs.gov/setfhelp). your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you If you cannot pay the filing tee. ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible tor free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (wwwJawhelpcaliforms.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courfinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of $10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case iA VISO! Lo ban demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 d/as, la code puede dec/dir on su contra sin escuchar su version. Lea la informacidn a continuacion

Tiene 30 DiAS DE CALENDARIO despues de que le entreguen esta citacion y papeles legates para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta code y hacer que se entregue una copia ai demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefonica no to protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correctc si desea que procesen su caso en Is corte Es poslble que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos tormularios de la code y mas intormacion en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucone.ca.gov), en la biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en le corte que le quede mas cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentacidn. pida al secretario de la code que Is de un formulario de exencidn de pago de cuotas. Si no presents su respuesta a tiempo, puede oerder el caso por mcumphmiento y la code le podra quitar su sueldo, dinerc y bienes sin mas advedenaa

Hay otros requisitos legates Es recomendable que llame a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remision a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado. es posibte que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legates gratuitos de un programa de serv/c/os legates sin fines de luc.ro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitic web de California Legal Services, fwww.iawheipcaiifornia.orgj, en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, fwww.sucorte.ca.gav) o poniendose en contacto can la code o el colegio de abogados locales. A WSO: Por ley, la code tiene derecho a reclamar ias cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperacidri de $10,000 o mas de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesidn de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que pagar el gravamen de la code antes de que la code pueda desschar el caso.

The name and address of the court is:(El nombre y direccion de la corte es):S uperior Court of the S tate of Californ ia, C ounty of San Diego Centra! D ivision330 W es t Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101

CASS NUMBER.(Afum&v de! Caso)

The name, address, and telephone number of p la in tiffs attorney, or pia intiff w ithout an attorney, is.(El nombre, la diroccidn y el numero de telefono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es): Steven M. Strauss, CO O LEY LLP, 4401 Eastgate Mall, San D iego, CA 92121; (858) 550-6000

DATE:(Fecha) JAN 2 8 2013

Clerk, by (Secretario)

, Deputy (Adjunto)

(For proof o f service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).)(Para prueba de entrega de esta citation use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)).

NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served

Form Adopted lor Mandatory UseJudicial Council or CaliforniaSU M -100 [Rev. July 1. 2009]

1. □ as an individual defendant2, □ as the person sued under the fictitious name o f (specify):

3. Q on behalf o f (specify):under: [U CCP 416.10 (corporation)

i I CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)O CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) HD other (specify):

4. d l by personal delivery on (dale):

I I CCP 416.60 (m inor)I I CCP 416.70 (conservatee)I I CCP 416.90 (authorized person)

e 1 of 1

SUMMONS American LegaiNel. inc www. Forms Worif/tow.com

Code of Civil Procedure §§412.20. 465 www courhnto.ee.qdv

EX A, PAGE 84

http://www.courtinto.cs.gov/setfhelp

http://www.courfinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp

http://www.sucone.ca.gov

http://www.iawheipcaiifornia.orgj

http://www.sucorte.ca.gav

Casase: 1313v0V30753\1/-raB BDdaaoojene fit- 1 - 1F i lEille(03(Z2!52B31 3P agage67(7f 115139

SUM-200(A)SHORT TITLE:TYLER SEAU, et al. v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al.

CASE NUMBER:

37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

INSTRUCTIONS j^ORUSE _This form may be used as an attachment to any summons if space does not permit the listing of all parties on the summons,

■+ If this attachment is used, insert the following statement in the plaintiff or defendant box on the summons: "Additional Parties Attachment form is attached."

List additional parties (Check only one box. Use a separate page for each type of party.):

CD Plaintiff IS Defendant CD Cross-Complainant [0 Cross-DefendantEASTON-BELL SPORTS, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, LLC; EB SPORTS CORP.; AND RBG HOLDINGS CORP.

Page 1 of 1.Page 1 of 1

Form Adopted for Mandatory UseJudicial Council of California

SUM~20Q(A) (Rev, January 1. 2007]

ADDITIONAL PARTIES ATTACHMENT Attachment to Summons American LegalNel, Inc.

www. For ms Workflow, oom

EX A, PAGE 85

Casase: 131<3v0S)€)&I53WABB BDcEaoojene 1t 1 - 1F i lE(ie(a3<Z)2S2131 3P agage77(8f (115139\

* " SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CENTRAL

MINUTE ORDER

DATE: 01/28/2013 TIME: 01:24:00 PM DEPT: C-70JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Randa Trapp CLERK: Anthony Shirley REPORTER/ERM: Not Reported BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT:

CASE NO: 37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL CASE INIT.DATE: 01/23/2013 CASE TITLE: Seau vs. National Football League [IMAGED]CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: PI/PD/WD - Other

APPEARANCES

The Court on its own motion herby recuses itself under CCP §170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii),

This case Is referred to the Presiding / Supervising Department for reassignment and a notice will be mailed to counsel.

Judge Randa Trapp

DATE: 01/28/2013 DEPT: C-70

MINUTE ORDER

EX A, PAGE 86

Page 1 Calendar No.

Casase: 231<&-0S)€)0I53WABB BDdaaoojene 1t 1 - 1F i lE(ie03(ZE52131 3P ageg887(9f (115139

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGOSTREET ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway MAILING ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway CITY AND ZIP CODE: San OiBgo, CA 92101 BRANCH NAME: Central TELEPHONE NUMBER: (619) 450-7067

FOX COURT USE ONLY

PLAINTIFF: Tyler Seau at.al.DEFENDANT: National Fool hail League et.al.Short Ti He: Seau vs. Nalienal Football League [IMAGED]

NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENTCASE NUMBER:37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

Filed: 01/23/2013

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE HAS BEEN REASSIGNED

to Judge William S. Dato, in Department C-67 due to the following reason: Recusal

All subsequent documents fried in this case must include the name of the new judge and the department number on the first page immediately below the number of the case. All counsel and self-represented litigants are advised that Division II of the Superior Court Rules is strictly enforced. It is the duty of each plaintiff (and cross-complainant) to serve a copy of this notice with the complaint (and cross-complaint).

ANY NEW HEARINGS ON THIS CASE WILL BE SCHEDULED BEFORE THE NEW JUDICIAL OFFICER

(Rove 06) NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT

EX A, PAGE 87

Casase: 131<3veO€)0I53WABB BDcEaooimie 1t 1 - 1F i Hsille(a3<Z!252831 3P ageg898£f (15139\

1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGOCentral330 West Broadway San Diego, CA 92101

SHORT TITLE: Seau vs. National Football League [IMAGED]

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILCASE NUMBER:

37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

1 certify that I am not a party to this cause. I certify that a true copy of NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT was mailed following standard court practices in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed as indicated below. The certification occurred at San Diego. California on 01/28/2013. The mailing occurred at Sacramento on 01/29/2013.

STEVEN MSTRAUSS COOLEY LLP 4401 EASTGATEMALL SAN DIEGO, CA 92121

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

Clerk of the Court, by:______ T-Es(rariJ______________________ ■_ Deputy

DAVID s CASEYCASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCAVILLA BLATT & PENFIE110 LAUREL STREET SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

EX A, PAGE 88

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es3 :E313/0V3ai W/-ACB BDcEaootETie 1t 1 - 1F i Fde®B2E52:8313P ageg9C8df 115139

y?EB};4f13PH M 2OFFICE 2 .

ivisic:? '

COOLEY LLP 2013 FEB - k PM S M S 1STEVEN M. STRAUSS (99153) ([email protected]) 1 04401 Eastgate Mall CLERK-SL7 t FIOR r r n rSan Diego, CA 92121 SAN DIEGO COU^TY'cAfeTelephone: (858)550-6000 v ( ,» ■Facsimile: (858) 550-6420 ‘

CASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCA VILLA BLATT &PENFIELD, LLP XDAVID S. CASEY, JR. (060768) ([email protected])FREDERICK SCHENK (086392) ([email protected])110 Laurel Street San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619)238-1811 Facsimile: (619) 544-9232


SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CENTRAL DIVISION

Case No.37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTLTYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU, a minor, and HUNTER SEAU, a minor, by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau; and BETTE HOFFMAN as trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust.

Plaintiffs,

v. -

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NFL PROPERTIES LLC; RIDDELL, INC.; ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORP.; RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, LLC; EB SPORTS CORP.; RBG ■ HOLDINGS CORP., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint For Damages and Demand For Jury Trial

1. Fraudulent Concealment2. Fraud3. Negligent Misrepresentation4. Negligence5. Negligent Hiring6. Negligent Retention7. Wrongful Death-NFL Defendants8. Wrongful Death - Riddell Defendants

TYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU, a minor,

and HUNTER. SEAU, a minor, by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau; and BETTE

HOFFMAN, trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust hereby file this Complaint for Damages

1.

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against Defendants, the National Football League and DOES 1 through 50 (“NFL”), NFL

Properties LLC (“NFL Properties”) (collectively “NFL Defendants”), Riddell, Inc. (d/b/a Riddell

Sports Group, Inc.), All American Sports Corporation, (d/b/a Riddell/All American), Riddell

Sports Group, Inc., Easton-Bell Sports, Inc., Easton-Bell Sports, LLC, EB Sports Corp., RBG

Holdings Corp., and DOES 51 through 100 (collectively “Riddell Defendants”), and allege as

follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. The NFL is America’s most successful sports organization, generating multi

billion dollar profits and legions of devoted fans. On average, the NFL generates approximately

$9,300,000,000.00 per year. As the organizer, marketer and face of professional football, the

NFL zealously protects these profits and the game that produces them.

2. This success comes at a price for the players who make the game great. For many

decades, evidence has linked repetitive mild traumatic brain injury (“MTBI”) to long-term

neurological problems. The NFL was aware of the evidence and the risks associated with

repetitive traumatic brain injuries for many decades, but deliberately ignored and actively

concealed the information from the players, including the late Junior Seau.

3. Since its inception, the NFL has controlled and regulated every aspect of the game

of professional football, particularly with respect to player safety and health. The NFL has used

this authority to compel all NFL players and participants to follow the policies, rules, and

regulations the NFL has enacted and imposed. As the governing body of professional football,

the NFL has held itself out as the guardian and authority on the issue of player safety and has

unilaterally shouldered for itself a duty to provide players with rules and information that protect

players as much as possible from short-term and long-term health risks.

4. The NFL’s role as the guardian of player health and safety began in the 1930s and

continues up through the present day. The NFL has exercised its supervisory role through its

unilateral decisions to issue rules to improve upon NFL football’s public acceptance, to make a

profit, and to address issues of player safety. The NFL has also unilaterally and voluntarily

chosen how to spend its funds to investigate and regulate many different circumstances affecting2.

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player health and safety, including, but not limited to, requiring players to wear certain

equipment, designating some player gear as illegal, and ultimately deciding what helmet brand

should be recognized as the official equipment of the NFL. During these decades, the NFL

voluntarily provided teams and players with information and regulations that directly affected the

short and long term health of NFL players, including Junior Seau.

5. NFL players and their families, including Junior Seau, looked to the NFL for

guidance on player safety issues.

6. Although the NFL voluntarily assumed its role as the unilateral guardian of player

safety, the NFL has exacerbated the health risk to players by promoting the game’s violence and

lauding players for returning to play despite being rendered unconscious and/or disoriented due to

their exposure to sub-concussive and concussive forces. Today, the NFL and its agents continue

to market the ferocity and brutality of the sport.

7. The NFL has long been aware that violent on-field collisions can lead to latent

head injuries which may have debilitating long-term effects on players. Since the 1950s and

1960s, a substantial body of medical and scientific evidence has demonstrated neuro-cognitive

injuries in the sport of football as a result of MBTI. During these decades, the NFL voluntarily

participated in the work of various entities studying the performance and effectiveness of safety

gear to reduce the risk of neurological injury. The NFL’s participation was a voluntary

continuance of the historic duty it had assumed in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite

this awareness, the NFL ignored, minimized, disputed, and actively suppressed broader awareness

of the link between sub-concussive and concussive injuries in football and the chronic neuro-

cognitive damage, illnesses, and decline suffered by former players,

8. By the early 1990s, the consensus among experts in the scientific community was

that many football players had developed brain injuries as a consequence of multiple “dings,”

sub-concussive injuries, and concussions.

9. In 1994, the NFL created and/or decided to fund the NFL’s so-called Mild

Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (the “MTBI Committee”) ostensibly to research and study

MTBI affecting NFL players.3.

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10. Through its MTBI Committee, the NFL voluntarily inserted itself into the

scientific research and discussion concerning the link between sub-concussive and concussive

impacts sustained by NFL players and short-term and long-term impairment of the brain. By

voluntarily inserting itself into the MTBI research and public discourse, the NFL gratuitously

undertook a responsibility (a) to make truthful statements; (b) not to wrongfully advance

improper, biased, and falsified industry-generated studies; (c) not to discredit well-researched and

credible studies that came to a conclusion that did not comport with the NFL’s financial and

political interests; and, (d) to inform all former players, all current players, and the football-

playing public, including young people and their families, regarding the risks of MTBI in

football.

11. Instead of adhering to these duties, the NFL produced industry-funded, biased, and

falsified research that claimed that concussive and sub-concussive head impacts in football do not

present serious, life-altering risks. The NFL also actively sought to suppress the findings of other

members of the medical community that showed the link between on-field sub-concussive and

concussive head impacts and post-career neuro-cognitive damage, illness and decline.

12. For sixteen years, the NFL actively and continuously denied any link between

MTBI sustained by former NFL players in NFL games and practices and the neurological

symptoms and problems (such as headaches, dizziness, loss of memory, dementia and ALS) from

which they now suffer. The NFL made its biased and falsified position known by way of

gratuitous press releases, publications in scientific literature, and other communications.

13. The NFL intended for the general public, NFL players, the late Junior Seau, his

family and participants at every level of the game to rely on the misinformation it propagated.

14. The NFL’s active and purposeful concealment and misrepresentation of the severe

neurological risks of repetitive MTBI exposed players to dangers they could have avoided had the

NFL provided them with truthful and accurate information. Junior Seau sustained numerous and

repetitive injuries over his career while in the NFL and has been diagnosed by the National

Institutes of Health to have been suffering from Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) and

related neurodegenerative disorders and diseases which were caused by the NFL’s acts and/or4.

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omissions.

15. The NFL concealed and misrepresented these risks by: (a) historically ignoring the

true risks of MTBI in NFL football; (b) failing to disclose the true risks of repetitive MTBI to

NFL players; and (c) since 1994, deliberately spreading misinformation concerning the cause and

effect relationship between MTBI in NFL football and latent neurodegenerative disorders and

diseases.

16. These acts and omissions caused the neurodegenerative diseases, including, the

debilitating and latent disease known as CTE, which caused Junior Seau’s tragic death.

17. On information and belief, the NFL’s motive to ignore and misrepresent the link

between MTBI sustained in NFL play and neuro-cognitive injury and decline was economic. The

NFL knew or suspected that any rule changes that sought to recognize that link and the health risk

to NFL players would impose an economic cost that would significantly and adversely change the

profit margins enjoyed by the NFL and its teams.

18. On information and belief, all NFL policies and decisions relevant to the conduct

alleged herein occurred primarily in the NFL corporate offices in New York.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

19. Jurisdiction is based upon the California Constitution Article 6, Section I 0.

20. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 395(A) of the California Code of

Civil Procedure. '

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

PLAINTIFFS

21. Tiaina B. Seau, Jr., (“Junior Seau”) deceased, was a player in the NFL for 20

consecutive seasons, where he sustained injuries leading to his death on May 2, 2012. Junior

Seau played for the San Diego Chargers (1990-2002), the Miami Dolphins (2003-2005), and the

New England Patriots (2006-2009). At all times decedent was a resident in the State of

California.

22. Tyler Seau is the son of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in the State

of California.5.

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23. Sydney Seau is the daughter of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in

the State of California.

24. Jake Seau is the son of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in the State

of California.

25. Hunter Seau is the son of Junior Seau, and is a resident of and domiciled in the

State of California.

26. Gina Seau is the parent and guardian of Jake Seau and Hunter Seau, both of whom

are minors, and brings this action as guardian ad litem on their behalf.

27. Bette Hoffman is the trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau, Jr. 2002 Trust, and is a resident

of and domiciled in the State of California. As trustee, Ms. Hoffman brings this action as a

survival action on behalf of the estate of decedent and all successors-in-interest therein pursuant

to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30. The statement required by Code of Civil Procedure

section 377.32 is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A.

28. Plaintiffs Tyler Seau, Sydney Seau, Jake Seau, a minor, and Hunter Seau, a minor,

by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau, bring this action as specified in Section

377.60, subd. (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

DEFENDANTS

29. Defendant NFL, which maintains its offices at 345 Park Avenue, New York, New

York, is an unincorporated association consisting of separately owned and independently-

operated professional football teams which operate out of many different cities and states within

this country. The NFL is engaged in interstate commerce in the business of, among other things,

promoting, operating, organizing, and regulating the major professional football league in the

United States. The NFL is not, and has not been, the employer of Junior Seau, who was

employed during his career in professional football by the independent clubs (hereinafter

“Teams” or “Clubs”) set forth below. The United States Supreme Court held in American

Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 14 2201, 2212-13 (2010), that each team that is a member of the

NFL is a legally distinct and separate entity from both the other teams and the NFL itself. The

NFL regularly conducts business in California.6.

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30. Defendant NFL Properties, LLC is the successor-in-interest to National Football

League Properties, Inc. (“NFL Properties”) and a limited liability company organized and

existing under the laws of the state of Delaware with its headquarters in the state of New York.

NFL Properties is engaged in, among other activities, approving, licensing, and promoting

equipment used by all the NFL teams. NFL Properties regularly conducts business in California.

Together with the NFL, Defendant NFL Properties is referred to herein as the “NFL Defendants.”

31. Defendant Riddell, Inc, (d/b/a Riddell Sports Group, Inc.) is a corporation

organized and existing under the laws of the state of Illinois and whose principal place of

business is in the State of Illinois. Riddell is engaged in the business of designing,

manufacturing, selling and distributing football equipment, including helmets, to die NFL and

since 1989 has been the official helmet of the NFL. Riddell, Inc., regularly conducts business in

the state of California.

32. Defendant All American Sports Corporation, (d/b/a Riddell/All American), is a

corporation organized and existing'under the laws of the State of Delaware and is engaged in the

business of designing, manufacturing, selling and distributing football equipment including

helmets, to the NFL and since 1989 has been the official helmet of the NFL. All American Sports

Corporation regularly conducts business in the state of California.

33. Defendant Riddell Sports Group, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal

place of business at 6255 N. State Highway, #300, Irving, Texas 76038. Riddell Sports Group,

Inc., regularly conducts business in the state of California.

34. Defendant Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with a principal

place of business at 7855 Haskell Avenue, Suite 200, Van Nuys, California 91406 and is a parent

corporation of Riddell Sports Group, Inc. Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. designs, develops, and markets

branded athletic equipment and accessories, including marketing and licensing products, under

the Riddell brand. Easton-Bell Sports regularly conducts business in the state of California.

35. Defendant Easton-Bell Sports, LLC is the parent corporation of Easton-Bell

Sports, Inc, and is incorporated in Delaware, with a principal place of business at 152 West 57th

Street, New York, New York 10019. Easton-Bell Sports, LLC regularly conducts business in the7.

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state of California.

36. Defendant EB Sports Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of

business at 7855 Haskell Avenue, Van Nuys, California 91406.

37. Defendant RBG Holdings Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place

of business at 7855 Haskell Avenue, Suite 350, Van Nuys, California 91406.

38. Defendants Riddell, Inc., Riddell Sports Group Inc., All American Sports

Corporation, Easton-Bell Sports, Inc., EB Sports Corp., Easton-Bell Sports, LLC, and RBG

Holdings Corp., shall hereinafter be referred to collectively as the “Riddell Defendants.”

39. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or

otherwise, of defendants DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who

therefore sue said defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 474.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that each of the defendants designated

herein as a DOE defendant is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein

referred to and legally caused the injuries hereinafter alleged.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS AGAINST THE NFL DEFENDANTS

40. The NFL oversees America’s most popular spectator sport, acting as a trade

association for the benefit of the thirty-two independently operated Teams.

41. The NFL has, since its inception in the first half of the twentieth century, governed

and promoted the game of football, by acting as the governing body, establishing rules related to

player health and safety, League policies, and Team ownership.

42. The NFL generates revenue mostly through marketing sponsorships, licensing

merchandise, and by selling national broadcasting rights to the games. The Teams share a

percentage of the League’s overall revenue.

43. Annually, the NFL redistributes approximately $4 billion in radio, television, and

digital earnings to the Teams or approximately $125 million per Team. Those revenue numbers

have increased since 2009.

44. The NFL enjoys partial monopoly power through an anti-trust exemption granted8.

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via the Federal Sports Broadcasting Act that allows the NFL to sell television rights for all 32

Teams as a single unit.

i The NFL Uses Its Influence To Encourage Violent Play

45. The NFL Defendants have had enormous influence over the game of football at all

levels of the game because of their financial power, monopoly status, and high visibility.

46. This influence has been expanded over many decades through their use of the

media. Through NFL films, the NFL Network, and www.NFL.com, the NFL Defendants have

promoted NFL football via every mass communication medium available.

47. Part of the NFL Defendants’ strategy to promote NFL football is to glorify the

brutality and ferocity of NFL football, in part by lauding and mythologizing the most brutal and

ferocious players and collisions, and simultaneously propagating the fraudulent representation

that “getting your bell rung,” “being dinged,” and putting big hits on others is a badge of courage

which does not seriously threaten one’s health.

48. As a result of this strategy, the NFL Defendants have propagated the false myth

that collisions of all kinds, including brutal and ferocious collisions, many of which lead to short

term and long-term neurological damage to players, are an acceptable, desired, and natural

consequence of the game, and a measure of the courage and heroism of players involved at every

level of the game.

49. As a result of this strategy, and the overwhelming influence of the NFL

Defendants at every level of the game, the NFL Defendants have also generated for themselves

and others billions of dollars every year by promoting a product of brutality and ferocity and

inculcating in players at every level of the game the false and life-threatening ideas that (a) brutal,

ferocious, and debilitating collisions are a required and desired outcome in the game of football;

and (b) playing despite repetitive head impacts is a laudable and desirable goal.

50. NFL Films is an agent and instrumentality of the NFL Defendants devoted to

producing promotional films for the NFL. To propagate the NFL’s image of the game as brutal

and violent, NFL Films has created numerous highlight features that focus solely on the hardest-

hits in pro football. These featured videos are marketed and sold to advance the NFL’s culture of9.

EX A, PAGE 97

http://www.NFL.com

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violence as entertainment.

51. The list of videos created by NFL Films glorifying violent plays includes, but is

not limited to, the following titles: “NFL: Moment o f Impact” (2007); “NFL’s 100 Greatest

Tackles” (1995); “Big Blocks and King Size Hits” (1990); “The Best o f Thunder and Destruction

— NFL’s Hardest Hits”; “NFL Films Video: Strike Force” (1989); “The NFL’s Greatest Hits”

(1989); “Crunch Course”; “Crunch Course IF (1988); “Crunch M a s t e r s “In the Crunch”

(1987); “NFL Rocks”; “NFL Rocks: Extreme Football’ (1993).

52. These videos contain numerous explicit examples of how the NFL Defendants

market and glorify the violent nature of the NFL. For instance, the back cover of 2007 film

“Moment o f Impact' advertises the film as follows: “First you hear the breathing, then you feel

the wind coming through your helmet’s ear hole. Suddenly you’re down, and you’re looking

through your helmet’s ear hole. Pain? That’s for tomorrow morning. Right now you’ve gotta

focus - focus on the play and try not to focus on the next moment of impact.”

53. These films deemphasize the acute and chronic risks associated with head impacts.

Moreover, they utilize players, including Junior Seau, to spread the fraudulent message that brutal

violence is a necessary part of the sport. In 1993’s “NFL Rocks,” Junior Seau offered his opinion

on the measure of a punishing hit: “If I can feel some dizziness, I know that guy is feeling double

[that].” In a segment of the same film, former Houston Oilers receiver Ernest Givens is quoted as

saying: “I get knocked out a lot, I get concussions, I get broken noses, that is part of being a

receiver, that’s what separates you from being a typical receiver than a great receiver.” Former

Dallas Cowboys receiver Michael Irvin recites a similar unawareness of the risks of concussions:

“Before the game, I go to the [defensive backs] and tell them, ‘Hey, you know I’ll trade a

concussion for a reception!”’

54. NFL Films, therefore, advances the NFL Defendants’ agenda to promote the most

violent aspects of NFL football and to urge players at every level of the game to disregard the

results of violent head impacts. This promotes a culture in which playing hurt or with an injury,

including MTBI, is both expected and acclaimed. Moreover, failure to play through such an

injury creates the risk that the NFL player will lose playing time, a starting position, and possibly10.

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a career.

55. This attitude within the League and its players continued in the decades of the

1980s, 1990s and 2000s, with players lauded for their “head hunting” skills. As recently as

October 2010, the NFL fined some players for what it characterized as “illegal and dangerous

hits”, and yet the NFL Defendants sought to profit by selling photos of the illegal hits on its

website for between $54.95 and $249.95.

56. Within this culture, the NFL Defendants purposefully profit from the violence they

promote.

Injuries Resulting From This Violence

57. Medical science has known for many decades that repetitive and violent jarring of

the head or impact to the head can cause MTBI with a heightened risk of long term, chronic

neuro-cognitive injury.

58. The American Association of Neurological Surgeons (the “AANS”) has defined a

concussion as “a clinical syndrome characterized by an immediate and transient alteration in brain

function, including an alteration of mental status and level of consciousness, resulting from

mechanical force or trauma.” The AANS defines traumatic brain injury (“TBI”) as:

a blow or jolt to the head, or a penetrating head injury that disrupts the normal function of the brain. TBI can result when the head suddenly and violently hits an object, or when an object pierces the skull and enters brain tissue. Symptoms of a TBI can be mild, moderate or severe, depending on the extent of damage to the brain.Mild cases may result in a brief change in mental state or consciousness, while severe cases may result in extended periods of unconsciousness, coma or even death.

59. MTBI generally occurs when the head either accelerates rapidly and then is

stopped, or is rotated rapidly. The results frequently include, among other things, confusion,

blurred vision, memory loss, nausea, and sometimes unconsciousness.

60. Medical evidence has shown that symptoms of MTBI can appear hours or days

after the injury.

61. Once a person suffers an MTBI, he is up to four times more likely to sustain a

second one. Additionally, after suffering even a single sub-concussive or concussive blow, a

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lesser blow may cause MTBI, and the injured person requires more time to recover.

62. Clinical and neuro-pathological studies by some of the nation’s foremost experts

demonstrate that multiple head injuries, concussions, or repeated traumatic head impacts

(including sub-concussive and concussive blows) sustained during an NFL player’s career can

cause severe neuro-cognitive problems such as depression and early-onset of dementia.

63. Studies on many former football players, including former NFL players, have

established that football players who sustain repetitive head impacts while playing the game have

suffered and continue to suffer brain injuries that result in any one or more of the following

conditions: early-onset of Alzheimer’s Disease, dementia, depression, deficits in cognitive

functioning, reduced processing speed, attention and reasoning, loss of memory, sleeplessness,

mood swings, personality changes, neurological deficits impacting judgment, and the debilitating

and latent disease known as CTE. The latter condition involves the slow build-up of the Tau

protein within the brain tissue that causes diminished brain function, progressive cognitive

decline, and many of the symptoms listed above. CTE is also associated with an increased risk of

suicide.

64. CTE is found in athletes, including football players and boxers, with a history of

repetitive head trauma. The changes in the brain caused by repetitive trauma are thought to begin

when the brain is subjected to that repetitive trauma, but symptoms may not appear until months,

years, or even decades after the last traumatic impact or the end of active athletic involvement.

65. Papers and studies documenting autopsies on over thirty former NFL players show

that over ninety percent of the players suffered from CTE.

66. As a result, published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that concussive

and sub-concussive head impacts while playing professional football are linked to a significant

risk of permanent brain injury.

67. Published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that 28% of the NFL

retirees studied suffered from depression, whereas the prevalence of depression in the general

population is 9.5%.

68. Published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that 36% of NFL retirees,12.

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age 65-75, who were studied suffered from dementia, whereas the prevalence of dementia in the

general population for the same age group is merely 2.2-6.5%.

69. Published peer reviewed scientific studies have shown that retired players with

three or more reported concussions had a fivefold prevalence of mild cognitive impairment (MCI)

and a threefold prevalence of significant memory problems, compared to other retirees.

70. In a study of NFL retirees, 11.1% of all respondents reported having a diagnosis of

clinical depression.

71. At all times, the NFL’s unique position afforded it unparalleled access to the

readily accessible data above relating the effect of head impacts on football players. The NFL

Defendants have know or should have known about the risks for MTBI, the scientific studies

linking repeated concussive and sub-concussive head impacts with a significant risk for

permanent brain injury, including CTE, and about the increased incidence of depression,

dementia, cognitive impairment and memory problems in retired NFL players.

The NFL Was in a Superior Position of Knowledge and Authority and Owed a Duty to Players Like Junior Seau

72. At all times, the NFL’s unique historical vantage point at the apex of the sport of

football, paired with its unmatched resources as the most well-funded organization devoted to the

business of the game, has afforded it unparalleled access to data relating to the effect of head

impacts on football players and made it an institutional repository of accumulated knowledge

about head injuries to players.

73. The NFL is the organizer, marketer and public face of professional football in the

United States. The NFL governs each of the individual teams, collects and distributes revenue

among the teams, and authorizes the sport’s rules.

74. From its inception, the NFL adopted the role of protecting players, informing

players of safety concerns, and imposing unilaterally a wide variety of rules to protect players

from injuries that were costly to the player, the game, and profits. For instance, the NFL recently

stated that “[sjince its earliest days, the league has continuously taken steps to ensure that the

game is played as fairly as possible without unnecessary risk to its participants, including making13.

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changes and enhancements to game safety rules.”

(www.nflhealthsasfety.com/commitment/regulations) (2011-2012).

75. On information and belief, the NFL has continuously received and paid for

professional advice regarding health risks associated with playing football. This advice and

knowledge placed the NFL in a position of ongoing superior knowledge to the players regarding

the health risks associated with concussive and sub-concussive injuries. Combined with the

NFL’s unilateral power to set rules and policies, the NFL at all relevant times was in a position to

dictate how the game would be played and to define the risks to players.

76. For these reasons, players and their families have relied on the NFL to: 1)

intervene in matters of player safety, 2) to recognize issues of player safety, and 3) to be truthful

on the issue of player safety.

77. By its position, representations and actions to set rules and policies, the NFL

assumed a duty to adhere to these goals.

78. The NFL’s historical actions in connection with an assumed common law duty to

make the game safer and inform players of necessary safety information include, but are not

limited to, the following: adding a field judge (1929); establishing hash-marks at 10 yards from

the sidelines (1933); establishing the penalty of unnecessary roughness for a deliberate rough

contact on the passer after the pass is made (1938); making helmets mandatory (1943); adding a

back field judge (1947); establishing a rule that the ball is dead when a runner touches the ground

with any part of his body except his hands while in the grasp of an opponent (1955); establishing

a rule that the ball is dead immediately if the runner touches the ground with any part of his body

except his hands after being contacted by a defensive player (1956); establishing a penalty for

grabbing the face mask of any opponent except a runner (1956); establishing a penalty of

grabbing the face mask of any opponent (1962); requiring that goal posts be offset from the goal

line (1966); establishing a rule that a player who signals for a fair catch cannot block or initiate

contact with one of the kicking team’s players until the ball touches a player (1967); establishing

a rule that a defensive player who jumps or stands on a teammate or who is picked up by a

teammate cannot attempt to block an opponent’s kick (1973); establishing a rule that no receiver14.

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can be blocked below the waist after moving beyond the line of scrimmage (1974); establishing a

rule that eligible receivers who take a position more than two yards from the tackle cannot be

blocked below the waist (1974); establishing a rule that a defender is not permitted to run or dive

into a ball carrier who has fallen to the ground untouched (1976); establishing a rule that it is

illegal for a defensive lineman to strike an opponent above the shoulders during his initial charge

(1977) (previously the NFL made this illegal only during the first step); establishing that it is

illegal for a wide receiver to clip an opponent anywhere (1977); establishing rules as to

mandatory equipment (1979); establishing that it is illegal for a player in the backfield to chop an

outside rusher on a pass play (1979); establishing that it is illegal to throw a punch or forearm or

to kick an opponent (1979); and establishing that it is illegal to strike, swing, or club an opponent

in the head, neck or face (1980).

79. As the sport’s governing entity (with monopolistic power), the NFL has made it

known to players and teams alike that the NFL actively and pervasively governs player conduct

and health and safety both on and off the field. In public statements since its inception, the NFL

has stated that its goals include taking necessary steps for the safety, health and well-being of

players and their families.

80. Thus, since its inception, and continuing into the present, the NFL has been in a

position that affords it a special relationship to NFL players as the guardian of their health and

safety. For that reason, from its inception and continuing into the present, the NFL owed a duty

of reasonable care to keep NFL players informed of safety risks, to inform NFL players truthfully,

and not to mislead NFL players about the risks of permanent neurological damage that can occur

from MTBI incurred while playing football.

81. On information and belief, over the past two decades, the NFL continued to

exercise this common law duty and its unilateral authority to investigate and advise NFL players

on many diverse and important topics, and that should have included the recognition of

circumstances that can precipitate MTBI, the long-term potential consequences of MTBI to NFL

players, and solutions for players who have sustained MTBI.

82. Moreover, from 1994 until 2010, the NFL publicly conducted head injury research15.

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and openly disputed that any short-term or long-term harmful effects arose from football-related

sub-concussive and concussive injuries. The NFL propagated its own falsified research to

support its position, despite its historic role as the guardian of player safety, and despite the fact

that independent medical scientists had already come to the opposite conclusion.

83. As such, the NFL continued its existing common law duty to provide truthful

scientific research and information about the risks of concussive and sub-concussive injuries to

NFL players, including Junior Seau, who relied on the NFL’s research and pronouncements on

that subject.

The NFL Knew the Dangers and Risks Associated with Repetitive Head Impacts and Concussions

84. For decades, the NFL has been aware that multiple blows to the head can lead to

long-term brain injury, including but not limited to memory loss, dementia, depression, and CTE

and its related symptoms.

85. For instance, between 1952 and 1994, numerous studies were published in medical

journals including the Journal of the American Medical Association, Neurology, the New England

Journal o f Medicine, and Lancet warning of the dangers of single concussions, multiple

concussions, and/or football-related head trauma from multiple concussions. These studies

collectively established that:

• repetitive head trauma in contact sports, including boxing and football, has potential dangerous long-term effects on brain function;

• encephalopathy (dementia pugilistica) is caused in boxers by repeatedsub-concussive and concussive blows to the head;

• acceleration and rapid deceleration of the head that results in brief loss of consciousness in primates also results in a tearing of the axons (brain cells) within the brainstem;

• with respect to mild head injury in athletes who play contact sports, there is a relationship between neurologic pathology and length of the athlete’s career; immediate retrograde memory issues occur following concussions; mild head injury requires recovery time without risk of subjection to further injury; .

• head trauma is linked to dementia;

• a football player who suffers a concussion requires significant rest16.

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before being subjected to further contact; and,

• minor head trauma can lead to neuropathological andneurophysiological alterations, including neuronal damage, reduced cerebral blood flow, altered brainstem evoked potentials and reduced speed of information processing.

86. In fact, as early as 1928, pathologist Harrison Martland described the clinical

spectrum of abnormalities found in “almost 50 percent of fighters [boxers]. . . if they ke[pt] at the

game long enough” (the “Martland study”). The article was published in the Journal o f the

American Medical Association. The Martland study was the first to link sub-concussive blows

and “mild concussions” to degenerative brain disease.

87. In 1937, the American Football Coaches Association published a report warning

that players who suffer a concussion should be removed from sports demanding personal contact.

88. In 1962, Drs. Serel & Jaros looked at the heightened incidence of chronic

encephalopathy in boxers and characterized the disease as a “Parkinsonian” pattern of progressive

decline.

89. A 1963 study by Drs. Mawdsley & Ferguson published in Lancet found that some

boxers sustain chronic neurological damages as a result of repeated head injuries. This damage

manifested in the form of dementia and impairment of motor function.

90. In the 1960s and 70s, the development of the protective face mask in football

allowed the heimeted head to be used as a battering ram. By 1975 the number of head and neck

injuries from football that resulted in permanent quadriplegias in Pennsylvania and New Jersey

lead to the creation of the National Football Head and Neck Registry, which was sponsored by the

National Athletic Trainers Association and the Sports Medicine Center at the University of

Pennsylvania.

91. In the early 1980s, the Department of Neurosurgery at the University of Virginia

published studies on patients who sustained MTBI and observed long-term damage in the form of

unexpected cognitive impairment The studies were published in neurological journals and

treatises within the United States.

92. In 1982, the University of Virginia and other institutions conducted studies on

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college football teams that showed that football players who suffered MTBI suffered pathological

short-term and long-term damage. With respect to concussions, the same studies showed that a

person who sustained one concussion was more likely to sustain a second, particularly if that

person was not properly treated and removed from activity so that the concussion symptoms were

allowed to resolve.

93. The same studies showed that two or more concussions close in time could have

serious short-term and long-term consequences in both football players and other victims of brain

trauma.

94. By 1991, three distinct medical professionals/entities, all independent from the

NFL—Dr. Robert Cantu of the American College of Sports Medicine, the American Academy of

Neurology, and the Colorado Medical Society—developed retum-to-play criteria for football

players suspected of having sustained head injuries.

95. On information and belief, by 1991, the NCAA football conferences and

individual college teams’ medical staffs, along with many lower-level football groups had

disseminated information and adopted criteria to protect football players even remotely suspected

of having sustained concussions.

96. In 1999, the National Center for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research at the

University of North Carolina conducted a study involving eighteen thousand (18,000) collegiate

and high school football players. ■ The-research showed that once a player suffered one

concussion, he was three times more likely to sustain a second in the same season.

97. In 1999, former Pittsburgh Steeler and Hall of Fame inductee Mike Webster filed

with the NFL a request that he receive complete disability benefits based on the fact that he had

sustained repeated and disabling head impacts while a player for the Steelers. In 1999, Webster

submitted extensive medical reports and testimony that stated that Webster suffered from

“traumatic or punch drunk encephalopathy [brain disease]” sustained from playing football that

left Webster totally and permanently disabled as of 1991.

98. The NFL’s own physician independently examined Webster and concluded that

Webster was mentally “completely and totally disabled as of the date of his retirement and was18.

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certainly disabled when he stopped playing football sometime in 1990.”

99. Webster died in 2002 at the age of fifty. In December 2006, his estate received an

unpublished opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which stated

that the NFL Plan had acknowledged that the multiple head injuries Webster sustained during his

playing career (1974-1990) “. . . had caused Webster eventually to suffer total and permanent

mental disability. . .

100. Thus, the NFL, through its own expert medical testimony and the expert testimony

submitted by Webster knew and accepted that repetitive traumatic brain injuries sustained by a

Hall of Fame player led to long-term encephalopathy and permanent mental disability.

101. A 2000 study, which surveyed 1,090 former NFL players, found that more than

sixty (60) percent had suffered at least one concussion, and twenty-six (26) percent had suffered

three (3) or more, during their careers. Those who had sustained concussions reported more

problems with memory, concentration, speech impediments, headaches, and other neurological

problems than those who had not been concussed.

102. Also in 2000, a study presented at the American Academy of Neurology’s 52nd

Annual Meeting and authored by Dr. Barry Jordan, Director of the Brain Injury Program at Burke

Rehabilitation Hospital in White Plains, New York, and Dr. Julian Bailes, surveyed 1,094 former

NFL players between the ages of 27 and 86 and found that: (a) more than 60% had suffered at

least one concussion in their careers, with 26% of the players having three or more and 15%

having five or more; (b) 51% had been knocked unconscious more than once; (c) 73% of those

injured said they were not required to sit on the sidelines after their head trauma; (d) 49% of the

former players had numbness or tingling; 28% had neck or cervical spine arthritis; 31% had

difficulty with memory; 16% were unable to dress themselves; 11% were unable to feed

themselves; and (e) eight suffered from Alzheimer’s disease.

103. In 2004, a convention of neurological experts in Prague met with the aim of

providing recommendations for the improvement of safety and health of athletes who suffer

concussive injuries in ice hockey, rugby, football, and other sports based on the most up-to-date

research. These experts recommended that a player never be returned to play while symptomatic,19.

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and coined the phrase, “when in doubt, sit them out.”

104. This echoed similar medical protocol established at a Vienna conference in 2001.

105. These two conventions were attended by predominately American doctors who

were experts and leaders in the neurological field.

106. The University of North Carolina’s Center for the Study of Retired Athletes

published survey-based papers in 2005 through 2007 that found a strong correlation between

depression, dementia, and other cognitive impairment in NFL players and the number of

concussions those players had received.

107. An article in 2010 in the New England Journal o f Medicine entitled “Traumatic

Brain Injury—Football, Warfare, and Long-Term Effects,” demonstrated that even mild

“traumatic brain injury” (“TBI”) can have lasting consequences that are manifest later in the

football player’s life.

108. Indeed, while the NFL knew for decades of the harmful effects of sub-concussive

and concussive injuries on a player’s brain, it actively concealed these facts from players and the

public.

109. While other sports were making changes to play safer, the NFL consistently and

publicly denied that football-related impacts had any connection to long-term brain injury. As

recently as 2009, the league’s medical committee continued to assert that there were no long-term

negative health risks associated with concussions or other football-related head impacts.

110. The NFL deliberately concealed the fact that playing in the NFL could lead to

permanent irreversible brain damage from players. Instead of being honest about the dangers and

working with both players and the medical community to minimize them, the league repeatedly

asserted that professional football players were at no greater risk of brain or neurological injury

than the public at large.

111. On information and belief during every decade referenced above, the NFL was

advised by physicians of all kinds regarding the risks associated with playing the game of

football, including the risks associated with head impacts and MTBI.

112. As described above, the NFL has known for decades that MTBI can and does lead . 20.

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to long-term brain injury, including, but not limited to, memory loss, dementia, depression, and


113. Rather than take immediate measures to protect NFL players from these known

dangers, between the 1950s and 1994, the NFL failed to disseminate to then-current and former

NFL players relevant health information it possessed regarding the significant risks associated

with MTBI.

The NFL Voluntarily Undertook the Responsibility of Studying Head Impacts In Football.Yet Fraudulently Concealed Their Long-Term Effects.

114. In 1994, then NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue agreed to fund a committee to

study the issue of head injury in the NFL. The NFL voluntarily and unilaterally formed the MTBI

Committee to study the effects of concussions and sub-concussive injury on NFL players.

115. By the time of the MTBI Committee’s formation in 1994 independent scientists

and neurologists alike were already convinced that all concussions—even seemingly mild ones—

were serious injuries that can permanently damage the brain, impair thinking ability and memory,

and hasten the onset of mental decay and senility, especially when they are inflicted frequently

and without time to properly heal.

116. With the MTBI Committee, the NFL voluntarily inserted itself into the private and

public discussion and research on the effects of repetitive head impacts in football. Through its

voluntary creation of the MTBI Committee, the NFL affirmatively assumed a duty to use

reasonable care in the study of concussions and post-concussion syndrome in NFL players; the

study of any kind of brain trauma relevant to the sport of football; the use of information

developed; and the publication of data and/or pronouncements from the MTBI Committee.

117. Rather than exercising reasonable care in these duties, the NFL immediately

engaged in a course of fraudulent and negligent conduct, which included dissemination of

disinformation designed to (a) dispute accepted and valid neuroscience regarding the connection

between repetitive traumatic brain injuries and concussions and degenerative brain disease such

as CTE; and (b) to create a falsified body of research which the NFL could cite as proof that

truthful and accepted neuroscience on the subject was inconclusive and subject to doubt.21. '

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118. The NFL’s status in football gave the MTBI Committee’s pronouncements on

concussions authority and validity. The MTBI Committee was purportedly geared toward

“improving] player safety” and for the purpose of instituting “rule changes aimed at reducing

head injuries.” Players like Junior Seau, therefore, reasonably relied on the NFL’s

pronouncements and/or silence on this vital health issue.

119. The NFL did not appoint any neuropathologist to the MTBI Committee.

120. The MTBI Committee was publicized by the NFL as independent from the NFL,

consisting of a combination of doctors and researchers.

121. The MTBI Committee, however, was not independent. It consisted of at least five

(5) persons who were already affiliated with the NFL.

122. Instead of naming a noted neurologist or a physician trained to treat head injuries

to chair the MTBI Committee, Commissioner Tagliabue appointed Dr. Elliot Pellman, a

rheumatologist who lacked any specialized training or education relating to concussions, and who

was a paid physician and trainer for the New York Jets. Dr. Pellman had reportedly been fired by

Major League Baseball for lying to Congress regarding his resume. At no time was Dr. Pellman

independent of the NFL, because he was paid on an ongoing basis by an NFL Team.

123. Dr. Pellman would chair the MTBI Committee from 1994-2007, and his leadership

of the Committee came under frequent and harsh criticism related to his deficient medical

training, background, and experience.

124. Dr. Pellman and two other MTBI Committee members, Dr. Ira Casson, a

neurologist, and Dr. David Viano, a biomedical engineer, worked to discredit scientific studies

that linked head impacts and concussions received by NFL players to neuro-cognitive disorders

and disabilities.

125. The MTBI Committee did not publish its first findings on active players until

2003. In that publication, the MTBI Committee stated, contrary to years of (independent)

findings, that there was no long term negative health consequence associated with concussions.

126. The MTBI Committee published its subsequent findings in a series of sixteen (16)

papers between 2003 and 2009. According to the MTBI Committee, all of their findings22.

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supported a conclusion that there was no long term negative health consequence associated with

concussions or sub-concussive injuries sustained by NFL players. These findings regularly

contradicted the research and experiences of neurologists who treat sports concussions and the

players who endured them.

127. For example, in 2004 the MTBI Committee published a conclusion in which it

claimed that its research found no risk of repeated concussions in players with previous

concussions and that there was no “7-to-10 day window of increased susceptibility to sustaining

another concussion.”

128. In a comment to this publication, one independent doctor wrote that “[t]he article

sends a message that it is acceptable to return players while still symptomatic, which contradicts

literature published over the past twenty years suggesting that athletes be returned to play only

after they are asymptomatic, and in some cases for seven days.”

129. As a further example, an MTBI Committee conclusion in 2005 stated that

“[pjlayers who are concussed and return to the same game have fewer initial signs and symptoms

than those removed from play. Return to play does not involve a significant risk of a second

injury either in the same game or during the season.” “These data suggest,” the MTBI Committee

reported, “that these players were at no increased risk” of subsequent concussions or prolonged

symptoms such as memory loss, headaches, and disorientation.

130. Yet, a 2003 NCAA study of 2,905 college football players found just the opposite:

“Those who have suffered concussions are more susceptible to further head trauma for seven to

10 days after the injury.”

131. Support for this same conclusion was developed as early as 1982 in studies

conducted at the University of Virginia.

132. Dr. Pellman and his group stated repeatedly that the NFL study showed “no

evidence of worsening injury or chronic cumulative effects of multiple [MTBI] in NFL players.”

133. Yet, the 2003 report by the Center for the Study of Retired Athletes at the

University of North Carolina found a link between multiple concussions and depression among

former professional players with histories of concussions. A 2005 follow-up study by the Center23.

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showed a connection between concussions and both brain impairment and Alzheimer’s disease

among retired NFL players.

134. Other contrary conclusions that the MTBI Committee published at the behest,

urging, and sponsorship of NFL over several years include, but are not limited to, the following:

Drs. Pellman and Viano stated that because a “significant percentage of players returned to play

in the same game [as they suffered a concussion] and the overwhelming majority of players with

concussions were kept out of football-related activities for less than 1 week, it can be concluded

that mild [TBIs] in professional football are not serious injuries”; that NFL players did not show a

decline in brain function after a concussion; that there were no ill effects among those who had

three (3) or more concussions or who took hits to the head that sidelined them for a week or more;

that “no NFL player experienced the second-impact syndrome or cumulative encephalopathy

from repeat concussions”; and that NFL players’ brains responded and healed faster than those of

high school or college athletes with the same injuries.

135. The MTBI Committee’s papers and conclusions were against the weight of the

scientific evidence and based on biased data-collection techniques. They received significant

criticism in the scientific and medical media from independent doctors and researchers and were

met with skepticism in peer review segments following each article’s publication.

136. Moreover, the conclusions of the MTBI Committee completely contradicted the

testimony of the NFL’s own paid expert submitted in connection with Mike Webster’s permanent

disability application.

137. Renowned experts Dr. Robert Cantu and Dr. Julian Bailes wrote harshly critical

reviews of the studies’ conclusions.

138. Dr. Cantu observed that the extremely small sample size and voluntary

participation in the MTBI Committee’s study suggested there was bias in choosing the sample.

According to Dr. Cantu, no conclusions should be drawn from the NFL study.

139. A different scientist who reviewed the MTBI Committee’s work further stated that

the NFL appeared to be primarily preparing a defense for when injured players eventually sued,

and that it seemed to be promoting a flawed scientific study to justify its conclusion that24.

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concussions do not have adverse effects on players.

140. Also, the MTBI Committee failed to include hundreds of neuropsychological tests

done on NFL players in the results of the Committee’s studies on the effects of concussions and

was selective in its use of injury reports.

141. For instance, the results reported by Dr. Pellman and the MTBI Committee

selectively excluded at least 850 baseline tests. In a paper published in Neurosurgery in

December 2004, Dr. Pellman and the other MTBI Committee members reported on the baseline

data for 655 players and the results for 95 players who had undergone both baseline testing and

post-concussion testing. They concluded that NFL players did not show a decline in brain

function after suffering concussions. Their further analysis purportedly found no ill effects

among those who had three or more concussions or who took hits to the head that kept them out

for a week or more. The paper did not explain where the players in the study groups came from

specifically or why certain player data was included and that data from hundreds of other players

was not.

142. Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz has stated that the “data that hasn’t shown up makes their

work questionable industry-funded research.”

143. Pellman subsequently fired William Barr, a neuropsychologist for the New York

Jets, after Dr. Barr presented at a conference some NCAA study findings that contradicted NFL

practices. .

144. As described in the following paragraphs, when faced with studies which tended to

show a causal link between MTBI and cognitive degeneration, the NFL, through the MTBI

Committee, produced contrary findings that were false, distorted, and deceptive to NFL players,

participants in football nationwide, and the public at large.

145. Between 2002 and 2007, Dr. Bennet Omalu examined the brain tissue of deceased

NFL players, including Mike Webster, Terry Long, Andre Waters, and Justin Strzelczyk. Dr.

Omalu concluded that the players suffered from CTE. These individuals suffered multiple

concussions during their NFL careers, and later in life exhibited symptoms of deteriorated

cognitive functions, paranoia, panic attacks, and depression. Dr. Omalu’s findings were25.

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published in Neurosurgery, where he concluded that Webster’s and Long’s respective deaths

were partially caused by CTE and were related to multiple concussions suffered during their

activity in the NFL.

146. In response to Dr. Omalu’s articles, the MTBI Committee wrote a letter to the

editor of Neurosurgery asking that Dr. Omalu’s article be retracted.

147. In another Neurosurgery article published in 2007, Dr. Cantu reached a similar

conclusion regarding Andre Waters as Dr. Omalu had reached regarding Mike Webster and Terry

Long.

148. A 2003 study, partially authored by Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz, analyzed data from

almost 2,500 retired NFL players and found that 263 of the retired players suffered from

depression. The study found that having three or four concussions meant twice the risk of

depression and five or more concussions meant a nearly three-fold risk.

149. The NFL’s MTBI Committee attacked these studies.

150. In November 2003, Dr. Guskiewicz was scheduled to appear on HBO’s “Inside the

NFL” to discuss his research. Dr. Pellman called Dr. Guskiewicz in advance and questioned

whether it was in the best interest of Dr. Guskiewicz to appear on the program. On the program,

Dr. Pellman stated unequivocally that he did not believe the results of the study led by Dr.

Guskiewicz.

151. In 2005, Dr. Guskiewicz performed a clinical follow-up study, and found that

retired players who sustained three or more concussions in the NFL had a five-fold prevalence of

mild cognitive impairment in comparison to NFL retirees without a history of concussions. In

doing this research, Dr. Guskiewicz conducted a survey of over 2,550 former NFL athletes.

152. The MTBI Committee attacked and sought to undermine the study, stating: “We

want to apply scientific rigor to this issue to make sure that we’re really getting at the underlying

cause of what’s happening. . . . You cannot tell that from a survey.”

153. In August 2007, the NFL issued a concussion pamphlet to players which stated:

Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having more than one or two

concussions leads to permanent problems if each injury is managed properly. It is important to26.

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understand that there is no magic number for how many concussions is too many. Research is

currently underway to determine if there are any long-term effects of concussion[s] in NFL

athletes.

154. At the same time, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell said, “We want to make sure

all NFL players . . . are fully informed and take advantage of the most up to date information

and resources as we continue to study the long-term impact of concussions.” Yet, the “most up to

date information” included the various independent studies indicating a causal link between

multiple concussions and cognitive decline in later life, information which the NFL did not share

with players.

155. Goodell also stated, “[b]ecause of the unique and complex nature of the brain, our

goal is to continue to have concussions managed conservatively by outstanding medical personnel

in a way that clearly emphasizes player safety over competitive concerns.”

156. Players like Junior Seau relied to their detriment on the NFL’s disinformation, all

of which was contrary to the findings of the independent scientists who had studied the issue,

including Drs. Guskiewicz, Cantu, Omalu, and Bailes, regarding the causal link between multiple

head injuries and concussions and cognitive decline.

157. In February 2007, Dr. Pellman resigned as chair of the Committee, following

increasing media scrutiny over the MTBI Committee’s studies. He was replaced as chair by Dr.

Ira Casson and Dr. David Viano, but remained a member of the Committee.

158. Dr. Guskiewicz, research director of the University of North Carolina’s Center for

the Study of Retired Athletes, said at the time that Dr. Pellman was “the wrong person to chair the

committee from a scientific perspective and the right person from the league’s perspective.”

159. Regarding Dr. Pellman’s work, Dr. Guskiewicz stated, “[w]e found this at the high

school level, the college level and the professional level, that once you had a concussion or two

you are at increased risk for future concussions,” but “[Dr. Pellman] continued to say on the

record that’s not what they find and there’s no truth to it.”

160. Drs. Casson and Viano continued to dismiss outside studies and overwhelming

evidence linking dementia and other cognitive decline to brain injuries. In 2007, in a televised27.

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interview on HBO’s Real Sports, Dr. Casson unequivocally stated that there was no link between

concussions and depression, dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or “anything like [that] whatsoever.”

161. In June 2007, the NFL convened a concussion summit for team doctors and

trainers. Independent scientists, including Drs. Cantu, and Guskiewicz, presented their research

to the NFL.

162. Dr. Julian Bailes, a neurosurgeon from West Virginia University, briefed the

MTBI Committee on the findings of Dr. Omalu and other independent studies linking multiple

NFL head injuries with cognitive decline. Dr. Bailes recalled that the MTBI’s Committee’s

reaction to his presentation was adversarial: “The Committee got mad . . . we got into it. And

I’m thinking, ‘This is a . . . disease in America’s most popular sport and how are its leaders

responding? Alienate the scientist who found it? Refuse to accept the science coming from

him?”’

163. At the summit, Dr. Casson told team doctors and trainers that CTE has never been

scientifically documented in football players.

164. In 2008, Boston University’s Dr. Ann McKee found CTE in the brains of two

more deceased NFL players, John Grimsley and Tom McHale. Dr. McKee stated, “the easiest

way to decrease the incidence of CTE [in contact sport athletes] is to decrease the number of

concussions.” Dr. McKee further noted that “[t]here is overwhelming evidence that [CTE] is the

result of repeated sublethal brain trauma.”

165. A MTBI Committee representative characterized each study as an "isolated

incident*’ from which no conclusion could be drawn, and said he would wait to comment further

until Dr. McKee’s research was published in a peer-reviewed journal. When Dr. McKee’s

research was published in 2009, Dr. Casson asserted that “there is not enough valid, reliable or

objective scientific evidence at present to determine whether . . . repeat head impacts in

professional football result in long[-]term brain damage.”

166. In 2008, under increasing pressure, the NFL commissioned the University of

Michigan’s Institute for Social Research to conduct a study on the health of retired players. Over

1,000 former NFL players took part in the study. The results of the study, released in 2009,28.

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reported that “Alzheimer’s disease or similar memory-related diseases appear to have been

diagnosed in the league’s former players vastly more often than in the national population—

including a rate of 19 times the normal rate for men ages 30 through 49.”

167. The NFL responded to these results by claiming that the study was incomplete,

and that further findings would be needed. NFL spokesperson Greg Aiello stated that the study

was subject to shortcomings and did not formally diagnose dementia. Dr. Casson implied that the

Michigan study was inconclusive and stated that further work was required. Other experts in the

field found the NFL’s reaction to be “bizarre,” noting that “they paid for the study, yet they tried

to distance themselves from it.”

168. At a Congressional hearing in October 2009, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell

acknowledged that the NFL owes a duty to the public at large to educate them as to the risks of

concussions due to the League’s unique position of influence: “In addition to our millions of fans,

more than three million youngsters aged 6-14 play tackle football each year; more than one

million high school players also do so and nearly seventy five thousand collegiate players as well.

We must act in their best interests even if these young men never play professional football.”

169. In January 2010, the House Judiciary Committee held further hearings on football

player head injuries. Representative Conyers observed that “until recently, the NFL had

minimized and disputed evidence linking head injuries to mental impairment in the future.”

170. In the 2010 Congressional hearings, Dr. Casson gave testimony that denied the

validity of other non-NFL studies and stated that “[tjhere is not enough valid, reliable or objective

scientific evidence at present to determine whether or not repeat head impacts in professional

football result in long term brain damage.”

171. The members of the MTBI Committee, however, knew of the decades-old studies

linking MTBI to long-term neurological problems. Casson, a MTBI Committee member since its

inception, stated before Congress on January 4, 2010, that he was “the lead author of a landmark

paper on brain damage in modem boxers that was published in the [Journal of the American

Medical Association] in 1984.” That paper, which referenced the many studies documenting

CTE in boxers, studied eighteen former and active boxers and found that eighty-seven percent of29.

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the professional boxers had definite evidence of brain damage. Specifically, the study determined

that the subjects performed particularly poorly on neuropsychological tests measuring short-term

memory.

172. In his written statement to Congress, Casson stated that he has “been concerned

about the possibility of long term effects on the brain related to football for close to thirty years.”

Dr. Casson offered that one of the reasons he “was asked to be on the NFL MTBI committee was

because of [his] knowledge of and experience treating boxers with chronic traumatic

encephalopathy (CTE).”

173. This testimony contradicted Casson’s testimony that “there is not enough valid,

reliable or objective scientific evidence at present to determine whether or not repeat head

impacts in professional football result in long term brain damage.”

The NFL’s New Committee

174. In 2010, the NFL re-named the MTBI Committee the “Head, Neck, and Spine

Medical Committee” (the “Medical Committee”) and announced that Dr. Pellman would no

longer be a member of the panel. Drs. H. Hunt Batjer and Richard G. Ellenbogen were selected

to replace Casson and Viano. The two new co-chairmen selected Dr. Mitchel S. Berger to serve

on the new Medical Committee.

175. The new Committee admitted that the data collected by the NFL’s former

appointed brain-injuiy leadership was “infected,” and that there was an “inherent conflict of

interest that was there in many areas, that was hot acceptable by any modem standards or not

acceptable to us,”

176. In June 2010, scientific evidence linked multiple concussions to yet another

degenerative brain disease—Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”), commonly referred to as

“Lou Gehrig’s Disease.”

177. In June 2010 the NFL finally informed players about the risk of repeated brain

injury. It issued a warning poster and pamphlet, which warned active players of the long term

risks associated with multiple concussions, including dementia, memory loss, and CTE. It quoted

the Center for Disease Control’s conclusions that, “traumatic brain injury can cause a wide range30. 1

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of short or long term changes affecting thinking, sensation, language or emotions.” The NFL also

informed players, “[tjhese changes may lead to problems with memory or communication,

personality changes, as well as depression and early onset dementia. Concussions and conditions

resulting from repeated brain injury can change your fife and your family’s life forever.”

178. On February 17, 2011, former Chicago Bears and New York Giants player Dave

Duerson committed suicide at age 50. Duerson had suffered months of headaches, blurred vision,

and faltering memory. After his death, Dr. Cantu determined that Duerson was suffering from

CTE.

179. In October 2011, Dr. Mitchel Berger of the NFL’s new Head, Neck, and Spine

Medical Committee announced that a new study was in the planning process. He admitted that

the MTBI Committee’s previous long-range study was useless because “[tjhere was no science in

that.” Dr. Berger further stated that data from the previous study would not be used. “We’re

really moving on from that data. There’s really nothing we can do with that data in terms of how

it was collected and assessed.”

180. Why in 1994 (and far earlier) the NFL (and its MTBI Committee) failed to share

accurate information and take appropriate actions is difficult to comprehend in light of the fact

that the NFL has known for decades that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term brain

injury, including memory loss, dementia, depression, and CTE and its related symptoms. Instead,

the NFL misled players, coaches, trainers, and the public, and actively spread disinformation.

181. It took decades for the NFL to admit that there was a problem and sixteen years to

admit that its information was false and inaccurate. The NFL’s conduct in this regard is willful

and wanton and exhibits a reckless disregard for the safety of its players and the public at large.

At a minimum, the NFL acted with callous indifference to the duty it voluntarily assumed to

Junior Seau and players at every level of the game.

182. As a direct result of the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentations by the

NFL, former players, including Junior Seau, had for many decades been led to believe that the

symptoms of early-onset dementia, loss of memory, headaches, confusion, insomnia, depression

and the inability to function were not caused by their play in the NFL. And, as a result of this31.

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willful and malicious conduct, these former players were deprived of medical treatment, incurred

expenses, lost employment, suffered humiliation, and sustained other damages to be specified.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS AGAINST THERIDDELL DEFENDANTS

183. The Riddell Defendants have operated as a business through designing,

developing, manufacturing, selling, and distributing football equipment, including helmets, in one

form or another, since 1922.

184. As early as the 1930s, players began using helmets during football games. These

early helmets were constructed from pieces of cobbled leather.

185. In the early 1940s, John T. Riddell, who later formed John T. Riddell

Incorporated, invented the first plastic suspension helmet. In 1949, plastic helmets became

legalized.

186. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and continuing to present day, the

Riddell Defendants have designed, developed, manufactured, sold, and distributed equipment

used in the NFL, including equipment used by Junior Seau, including, but not limited to, the

following:

(a) In the 1950s, the Riddell Defendants manufactured a face-mask component for its

helmets, which was eventually patented.

(b) In 1962, the Riddell Defendants used a “U” shaped nose protector with a shell

(known as the TK2) molded out of polycarbonate. The Riddell Defendants also designed an

open/closed cell foam and composite liner system for this model to increase the efficiency of the

webbed suspension.

(c) In 1963, the Riddell Defendants developed the TAK-29 helmet, which was the

first to use air inflation for fitting the helmet snug to the head. The TAK-29 shell, like the 1K2,

displayed the protective polycarbonate plastic, in addition to including tough shock and cut-

resistant face-mask attachment straps.

(d) In 1969, recognizing that head protection was a key factor in helmet design

requiring durable head protection, the Riddell Defendants constructed a micro-fit helmet model32.

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with injection molding technology to create a one piece shell to improve the structural integrity of

the entire helmet.

(e) In 1973, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed an air cushion helmet whose interior system consisted of individual vinyl air cushions

with layers of fitting and energy absorbing foam. When a blow was struck, the air in the cushion

was expelled through a single vent, greatly reducing the initial impact. With the exhausting of the

air cushion, the compressed fitting foam was further compressed, reducing impact.

(f) In 1977, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed a stainless steel face-mask which offered greater bend resistance that prevented helmet

breakage at the drill holes.

(g) In 1981, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed an Air Cushion Engineered helmet.

(h) In 1982, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed a Ml 55 helmet model with a combination of foam and liquid-filled cells used for

padding. On impact, the liquid would be throttled from one cell to the next, resulting in energy

attenuation. The Ml 55 helmet model included one-piece injection-molded face-masks which

were mar and rust-resistant, in addition to polyurethane face mask straps and universal jaw pads.

(i) In 2002, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed the Riddell Revolution helmet designed with the intent of reducing the risk of

concussion,

(j) In 2003, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed a real-time, Head Impact Telemetry System (HITS) to monitor and record significant

incidences of head impact sustained during a football game or practice. The system measured the

location, magnitude, duration, and direction of head acceleration and transmitted that information

wirelessly to the sideline.

(k) In 2006, the Riddell Defendants provided a research grant to the University of

Pittsburgh Medical Center for head injury research. The study compared rates of high school

athletes who wore the Riddell Revolution helmet with those who wore traditional helmets.33.

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(1) In 2007, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed an individual helmet system, Revolution IQ HitsTM, allowing players to monitor the

number and severity of impacts received during games and practices. On-board electronics

record every impact, allowing players to upload and evaluate each occurrence on their home

computers.

(m) In 2011, the Riddell Defendants developed, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or

distributed the 360 helmet which uses energy-managing materials and a face mask attachment

system to disperse the energy of frontal impacts. According to Riddell, it developed this helmet

using over 1.4 million impacts collected through RiddelPs HITS technology.

187. The Riddell Defendants’ helmets are currently the official helmets of the NFL. As

the official helmets for the NFL, the Riddell logo is the only helmet logo the NFL allows to be

displayed on helmets worn by players during NFL games. Upon information and belief, Junior

Seau wore Riddell helmets at times while playing and/or practicing during his NFL career.

188. The Riddell Defendants at all times herein mentioned engaged in the business of

selling, manufacturing, designing, testing, engineering, marketing, modifying, assembling,

inspecting, distributing, and controlling the helmets and other similar equipment for use by Junior

Seau and within the NFL.

189. Players did not know the long-term effects of concussions and relied on the NFL

and Riddell to protect them. •

The Riddell Defendants’ Duty to Protect Against the Long-Term Risk of Concussions

190. Despite years of science and medicine linking the risk of long term brain injury

from repeat concussions, it was not until the release of the Revolution Helmet wherein a

notification reminding players to “sit out” if they suffer a concussion was placed on the

Revolution helmet.

191. Around the same time period, the Riddell Defendants developed the HITS system

to monitor the severity and incident of impacts that a player receives.

192. Based on a 2003 University of Pittsburgh Medical Center study funded by a grant34.

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from the Riddell Defendants, the Riddell Defendants began to market the Revolution helmet as

reducing concussions by 31 %.

193. However, both the HITS system and the Revolution helmet, both created by the

Riddell Defendants and their employees have been criticized by experts for their inaccurate

marketing as being safer in reducing the risk of concussion.

194. A study published in the Journal of Neurosurgery showed that the study by UPMC

was flawed in that is discounted low impact hits and in turn proved that the Revolution did not

reduce the risk of concussions.

195. Even to this day the Riddell Defendants do not acknowledge a link between repeat

concussions and later life cognitive problems.

196. In fact, the Riddell Defendants have never warned any player or retired player of

the long-term health effects of concussions.

ALLEGATIONS REGARDING JUNIOR SEAU

Junior Seau’s Rise as an NFL Superstar

197. Junior Seau joined the NFL in 1990 as a member of the San Diego Chargers.

198. For the next twenty seasons, he was one of the league’s best linebackers, a position

which caused him to suffer repeated subconcussions and concussions.

199. Recognized as a powerful, positive, and versatile force on the football field, Junior

Seau was named to the Pro Football. Hall of Fame’s All-Decade Team of the 1990s and for 12

consecutive years was selected to play in the NFL’s all-star Pro Bowl. In 2000, he became the

highest paid linebacker in the NFL.

200. Junior Seau was also known for his work off of the field improving the lives of

others. In 1992, he founded the Junior Seau Foundation. The Foundation provided more than $4

million of funding for San Diego community services for children and young adults, including

hundreds of scholarships to college-bound students through the Scholars of Excellence program.

201. From his own childhood, Junior Seau knew how the holidays could be particularly

painful for low-income families. He annually played Santa Claus, taking 250 children to buy

gifts for friends and family through his Shop with a Jock Program and funded Thanksgiving35.

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dinner in his restaurant for 700 homeless shelter residents, victims of domestic violence, and

military families.

202. During his life, Junior Seau’s years of philanthropic spirit and work were

celebrated both by the San Diego community and nationally. His charisma as a celebrity player

inspired his fellow athletes to make contributions to their own communities. As a result of these

efforts, he was selected as the NFL’s Man of the Year in 1994 and honored by President George

W. Bush with the Volunteer Service Award in 2005.

203. The Junior Seau revered by his fans and community also had a family. Seau’s

family life was a loving and warm haven. Junior Seau had four children whom he loved and

adored, sons Tyler, Jake, and Hunter and a daughter Sydney. At the beginning of his career, Seau

was a loving parent and husband, regarded as a “teddy bear” by his children.

The NFL’s Failures and Misrepresentations Expose Junior Seau to Long-Term Brain Injury

204. During his professional career, Junior Seau led his teams to two Super Bowls and

was known by teammates for his focus, discipline, and intensity as a teammate and a player.

205. Nicknamed the “Tasmanian Devil”, Seau was extolled by the NFL, the fans, and

his peers for his on-field aggression and zeal. He was known as a warrior, the invincible patriarch

who could be depended on to play through injuries. •

206. His body received countless blows which caused injuries over the years. The

impacts that his body routinely absorbed caused subconcussions and concussions due to the

significant force of the impacts.

207. Junior Seau suffered from extensive injuries throughout his NFL career, including,

among many others, a chronic tom rotator cuff, shattered bones in his forearm, chronic ankle,

knee, shoulder, toe injuries, back pain, and severe bruising all over his body on a regular basis.

Yet he rarely missed games for these injuries or even complained about pain or injuries. Instead,

he received injections for pain and inflammation to play through his ever-present injuries.

208. As alleged above, the NFL engaged in a deliberate and systematic campaign to

ignore, conceal and fraudulently misrepresent the facts about football-related impacts and long-36.

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term brain injury. As a result, Junior Seau was not armed with critical information necessary for

his own safety.

209. He suffered innumerable blows directly to his head during his NFL career, both

sub-concussive and concussive. Several times he was hit in the head so hard that he sustained

facial lacerations.

210. Seau also suffered from and reported symptoms of head injuries from playing in

NFL games, including dizziness during and after playing, dizziness when he turned his head, and

becoming dazed after being hit during games.

211. On numerous occasions, Seau left the field because he was dazed. He would sit on

the sidelines until he regained his bearings and he would then return to the game.

212. Seau often related that he had suffered concussions from playing and had

headaches from those concussions. He would regularly ask for pain medications, such as aspirin,

Motrin, Tylenol, Excedrin, from his family and friends and took them in to help ease the

headache pain.

213. By returning to games while he was still suffering the symptoms of

subconcussions or concussions, Junior Seau was exposed to the risk of greater trauma to his brain.

As shown by a recent study by the National Institutes of Health, Junior Seau suffered significant

long term brain damage, including CTE. Junior Seau reasonably relied on the NFL’s fraudulent

concealment and affirmative misrepresentations regarding the danger of subconcussions and

concussions and related symptoms and the danger of returning to play, which proximately caused

his injuries, including CTE.

Junior Seau Shows Symptoms of Injury

214. During the mid-1990’s, around the time of Junior Seau’s reports of dizziness and

other symptoms of concussion and secondary to repetitive hits, there was a noted change in his

behavior and functioning.

215. Junior Seau’s behavior became erratic. The man who was once the cornerstone of

his team and his family began exhibiting emotional instability.

216. During this time, Seau developed severe insomnia which plagued him until his37.

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death. He would awake at 1:00-2:00 a.m. and not be able to return to sleep.

217. Seau always dreaded the “dumb jock” stereotype and cultivated his mind in

addition to his body. Always striving to improve his memory, concentration, problem-solving

skills, logical thinking and forethought, he was an avid student of chess. Those around him were

used to him being sharp, disciplined, ready to pounce not only physically but cognitively. But as

the seasons of abuse to his brain set in, others found that he became forgetful and unable to

concentrate or focus. Both at work and at home, people noticed that he could not remember their

discussions, he misplaced things and forgot appointments.

218. Unfortunately, Junior Seau’s spiral extended far beyond forgetfulness. His

increasing emotional instability resulted in uncharacteristically self-destructive, aggressive and

violent behavior. He began to suffer extreme depression and became withdrawn from his family,

including his children. The changes in his behavior impacted his ability to relate to others. He

became unable to maintain meaningful relationships with those whom he loved or to form any

new meaningful relationships with others.

219. His children had to adapt to a new version of their father. When he was lost in

periods of depression he became irrational and unreachable. They would look into his eyes and

not recognize the person with whom they were now dealing.

220. In his business ventures, for many years, Junior Seau was responsible and

thorough. In the areas where he lacked experience or knowledge, he educated himself. He was

involved in his businesses, and the success of his businesses reflected such involvement.

221. As his brain disintegrated from repeated trauma, tasks and decisions that Seau

previously undertook became impossible for him. He made impulsive, ill-advised business

decisions that he formerly had been too sawy and thoughtful to make. He no longer listened to

his qualified advisors, could no longer discuss business Figures and no longer possessed reasoned

business judgment.

Junior Seau Spirals Downward, Culminating In His Tragic Suicide

222. The once warm and gentle Junior became extremely irritable and short tempered.

He lashed out both verbally and physically at his staff, friends, and family. As a result, his38.

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businesses and investments began to deteriorate and lose value.

223. The disciplined, heath conscious Junior Seau also disappeared. He previously had

been known for preaching good health through healthy eating and exercise. He had always been

careful about drinking in moderation and rarely drank during the football season. As his life

began to spiral and he became unable to cope, alcohol became a method of self-medicating for

Seau. He entered a devastating cycle of depression and alcohol abuse.

224. This cycle of depression magnified other vices which Seau had previously enjoyed

in moderation. He became a compulsive, manic gambler. Seau’s impulsivity and inability to

soundly reason threw him into gambling binges, where against the pleading of those close to him,

he lost significant amounts of money in an attempt to make back business losses.

225. The above mentioned problems, including insomnia, depression, alcohol abuse,

inability to relate to friends and family, irrational decisions, diminished cognitive function, and

gambling problems are all well established effects of neuro-degenerative injuries, including CTE.

Tragically, on May 2, 2012, these injuries and the problems which were proximately caused by

them, caused Junior Seau to take a gun and shoot himself in the chest, committing suicide. The

circumstances under which he committed suicide allowed his brain to be preserved and tested by

the National Institutes of Health. As part of the National Institutes of Health study, three different

doctors in a triple blind study concluded that Junior Seau’s brain evidenced “multi-focal

tauopathy consistent with a diagnosis of chronic traumatic encepholapathy.”

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

(Against the NFL)





377.30.

228. The NFL has been aware of and understood the significance of the published39.

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long-term brain injury associated with repetitive traumatic impacts to the head to which NFL


229. During that time period, the NFL knowingly and fraudulently concealed from

then-current NFL players and former NFL players the risks of head injuries in NFL games and

practices, including the risks associated with returning to physical activity too soon after

sustaining a sub-concussive or concussive injury.

230. From 1994 through June of 2010, the NFL’s fraudulent concealment continued.

During that time period, the NFL voluntarily funded and produced its own purported scientific

research and through that research repeatedly misrepresented to then-current and former NFL

players, the United States Congress, and the general public that there is no link (or an insufficient

scientific link) between MTBI in NFL activities and later-in-life cognitive/brain injury, including




232. The NFL’s MTBI Committee published articles and the August 2007 concussion

pamphlet referenced above, all of which concealed and minimized the risks of repetitive brain

impacts the NFL knew existed for its then-current players and for its former players, who

reasonably relied on the NFL’s pronouncements and/or silence on this health issue.

233. The NFL’s concussion pamphlet created an atmosphere of trust that the NFL had

carefully undertaken its voluntary responsibility to research, test, study, and report accurate

findings to the players and former players. The NFL stated that “[w]e want to make sure all NFL

players ... are fully informed and take advantage of the most up to date information and resources

as we continue to study the long-term impact of concussions.”

234. The concealment was ongoing. Dr. Casson provided oral and written testimony at

the 2010 congressional hearings in which he continued to deny the validity of other studies. Dr.

Casson also denied the link between repetitive brain impacts and short- and long-term brain

damage in public interviews.40.

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235. The NFL, therefore, concealed material facts and information with the intent to

deceive and defraud, which caused Junior Seau to suffer the harm referenced above. Further, for

the time period prior to June 2010, the NFL’s concerted concealment of the risks to which players

had been exposed delayed Junior Seau’s ability to plan for the future and to seek appropriate

treatment of latent neurodegenerative conditions.

236. The NFL knew and expected that Junior Seau would rely on the inaccurate

information provided by the NFL, and Junior Seau did in fact reasonably rely on the inaccurate

information provided by the NFL during and after his NFL career.













SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

FRAUD

(Against the NFL!





377.30.41.

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242. At least since the early 1950s the NFL knew that repetitive head impacts in

football games and full-contact practices created a risk of harm to NFL players that was similar or

identical to the risk of harm to boxers who receive the same or similar repetitive impacts to the

head during boxing practices and matches.

243. The NFL knew that the risks of brain injuiy could be reduced by implementing

changes to the game, akin to the ones the NFL belatedly adopted in 2011, such as (1) the baseline

cognitive testing of players for comparison purposes during and after contact play, (2) the active

monitoring of players for signs of MTBI, (3) the employment of a neurologist on the sidelines,

and (4) retum-to-play rules consistent with proper medical management of MTBI.

244. The NFL, however, withheld the information it knew about the risks of head

injuries in the game from then-current NFL players and former NFL players and ignored the

known risks to all NFL players.

245. On information and belief, the NFL deliberately delayed implementing the

changes to the game it knew could reduce players’ exposure to the risk of life-altering head

injuries because those changes would be expensive and would reduce the profitability of the

League,



long-term brain injuiy associated with repetitive traumatic impacts to the head to which NFL


247. The NFL and its agents — employed to formulate the MTBI committee and

populate the published scientific literature with “studies” intent on disputing the conclusions of

independent researchers regarding the long-term chronic disabilities and injuries associated with

head injuiy — made these material misrepresentations with the intent to defraud players like

Junior Seau.



249. During that time period, the NFL knowingly and fraudulently concealed from then42.

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current NFL players of the risks of head injuries in NFL games and practices, including the risks

associated with returning to physical activity too soon after sustaining a sub-concussive or

concussive injury.

250. Beginning in 1994, the NFL and its agents funded and created a falsified body of

purported scientific research that misrepresented to then-current NFL players, all former NFL

players, the United States Congress, and the general public that there was no scientifically proven

link between repetitive sub-concussive and concussive injuries sustained during football and brain

injury, including but not limited to CTE and its related symptoms.

251. The NFL and its agents — employed to populate the published scientific literature

with “studies” intent on disputing the conclusions of independent researchers regarding the long

term chronic disabilities and injuries associated with head injury — made these material

misrepresentations with the intent to defraud the decedent Junior Seau.

252. During his career and after retirement from the NFL, Junior Seau justifiably and

reasonably relied on the NFL’s omissions and misrepresentations to his detriment.













43.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

(Against the NFL1





377.30.

258. A special relationship exists between the NFL and players like Junior Seau

sufficient to impose a duty on the NFL to disclose accurate information to the players.

259. Prior to 1994, the NFL knew that repetitive head impacts in football games and

practices created a risk of harm to NFL players that was similar or identical to the risk of harm to

boxers who receive repetitive impacts to the head during boxing practices and matches.

260. Prior to 1994, the NFL was aware of and understood the significance of the

published medical literature demonstrating the serious risk of both short-term and long-term

adverse consequences from the kind of repetitive traumatic impacts to the head to which NFL

players were exposed.

261. The NFL, however, withheld this information from team coaches, physicians,

trainers, and other personnel, and NFL players and ignored the risks to NFL players.

262. Before June of 2010, the NFL made material misrepresentations to its players,

former players, the United States Congress, and the public at large that there was no scientifically

proven link between repetitive traumatic head impacts and later-in-Iife cognitive/brain injury,

including CTE and its related symptoms.

263. Defendant NFL, therefore, misrepresented the dangers players faced in returning

to action after sustaining a head injury and the long-term effects of continuing to play football

after a head injury.

264. The NFL’s MTBI Committee made public statements, published articles, and

issued the concussion pamphlet to its players, which the NFL knew or should have known were44.

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misleading, downplaying and obfuscating to NFL players the true and serious risks of repetitive

traumatic head impacts.

265. The MTBI Committee made material misrepresentations on multiple occasions,

including but not limited to testimony at congressional hearings and other information issued to

current and former NFL Players.

266. Junior Seau’s reliance on the NFL’s misrepresentations was reasonable, given the

NFL’s superior and unique vantage point on these issues.

267. The Defendant’s misrepresentations included the false statement that present NFL

players were not at an increased risk of short-term and long-term adverse consequences if they

returned too soon to an NFL games or practices after suffering head trauma and, therefore, that

former players had not been exposed to such increased risk during their time in the NFL.

268. The NFL’s misrepresentations included ongoing and baseless criticism of

legitimate scientific studies that set forth the dangers and risks of head impacts which NFL

players regularly sustained. .

269. The NFL made these misrepresentations and actively concealed true information at

a time when it knew, or should have known, because of its superior position of knowledge, that

players faced serious health problems if they returned to a game too soon after sustaining a

concussion.

270. The NFL knew or should have known the misleading nature <?f its statements when

they were made.

271. The NFL made the misrepresentations and actively concealed information

knowing that Junior Seau would and did rely on the misrepresentations or omissions in, among

other things, how the players addressed the concussive and sub-concussive injuries they

sustained. For the time period prior to June 2010, the NFL’s concerted concealment of the risks

to which present and former players had been exposed on the playing field delayed Junior Seau’s

ability to plan for the future and to seek appropriate treatment of his latent neurodegenerative

conditions.

272. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligent misrepresentations, Junior45.

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Seau suffered physical injury, including, but not limited to, existing and latent cognitive

conditions that created diminished cognitive function, non-economic losses, and economic losses

including but not limited to lost and/or reduced income during his life.



FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENCE

(Against the NFL)





377.30. •

276. Between 1933 and 1968, the NFL assumed and carried out a duty to inform and

advise players and teams of the foreseeable harm that can arise from such things as the use of

leather helmets, the need to wear hard plastic helmets to reduce head wounds and internal injury

and the grabbing of an opponent’s facemask—to minimize or avoid head and neck injuries.

These warnings and imposed safety rules were furnished by the NFL because it had assumed a

duty to provide a safe environment for players and because of its superior knowledge of the risks

of injury to players.

277. Based on information and belief, the NFL voluntarily inserted itself into the tasks

assumed by others to develop helmet safety standards and to reduce the risk of head injury while

playing football. Despite its voluntary participation in these activities, the NFL negligently failed

to adopt these standards for a considerable period of time after others had done so.

278. During this time period, the NFL knew or should have known of medical or

scientific literature regarding the risks of short- and long-term neuro-cognitive disabilities and

deficits to athletes exposed to MTBI.

279. During this time period, the NFL knew or should have known that it was the46.

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practice in the NFL to compel or cajole players to play with injuries, including sub-concussive

injuries, concussive injuries and injuries involving a loss of consciousness.

280. During this time period, the NFL had superior knowledge (as compared to the

NFL players themselves) that athletic sporting events causing sub-concussive and concussive

injuries posed a serious risk of short-term and long-term cognitive disabilities.

281. Increasingly, during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the NFL (and the marketing arm

of the NFL) marketed the game of football as acceptably violent, and it rewarded its most violent

players. This marketing technique was directed to the general public and organized football

players everywhere. In pursuing these concerted marketing techniques, the NFL knew or should

have known that its conflation of concussive-inducing violence with heroism would induce NFL

players and those who aspired to play in the NFL to play with reckless violence.

282. In its marketing scheme, the defendant NFL developed print and film packages

that were widely distributed throughout the United States to media outlets and organized football

programs as a powerful method to convince current players and those in college and high school

football that the greater the hit the bigger the accolades.

283. During this time period, the failure of the NFL to publicize within the League, and

to the public at large, the mounting evidence in the scientific literature of the evolving and

chronic neuro-cognitive problems amongst former players caused then-current players and retired

players to believe that their physical and psychological problems (as described herein) were

neither serious nor related to football. Instead, the NFL increasingly promoted the brutality and

ferocity of NFL play. These commissions or omissions caused players to ignore the need for

necessary treatment. Likewise, these omissions and commissions had the institutional effect of

reducing the interest in helmet safety research, avoiding changes in rule-playing to minimize head

injury, avoiding the need to promulgate rules affecting the retum-to-play rules when concussive

events are detected, and avoiding establishing programs to educate players about the long-term

health risks of sub-concussive and concussive impacts.

284. In the early 1990s, the NFL voluntarily undertook to study the issue of neuro-

cognitive injuries in former NFL players.47.

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285. In 1994, in connection with that voluntary undertaking, the NFL created the

aforementioned MTBI Committee.

286. By voluntarily undertaking to study and report on the issue of the neuro-cognitive

effects of head impacts in professional football, the NFL assumed a duty to exercise reasonable

care in the MTBI Committee’s work and the NFL and its agents’ public statements about the

substance of the Committee’s work.

287. However, the MTBI Committee negligently performed the NFL’s voluntarily

undertaken research mission.

288. In addition, from 1994 through June of 2010, the NFL and its MTBI Committee

made material misrepresentations to players, former players, the United States Congress, and the

public at large that there was no scientifically valid link between repetitive traumatic head

impacts and later-in-life cognitive/brain injury, including CTE and its related symptoms.

289. Given the NFL’s superior and unique vantage point on the issue of head injuries

and concussions, the Plaintiffs reasonably relied to their detriment on the NFL’s actions and

omissions on the subject.

290. Junior Seau reasonably relied to his detriment on the NFL’s actions and omissions

on the subject.

291. The NFL’s failure to exercise reasonable care in its voluntarily assumed duty

increased the risk that players like Junior Seau would suffer long-term neuro-cognitive injuries.

292. Under all of the above circumstances, it was foreseeable that the NFL’s failure to

exercise reasonable care in the execution of its voluntarily undertaken duties would cause or

substantially contribute to the personal injuries suffered by Junior Seau.

293. The NFL’s failure to exercise reasonable care in the execution of its voluntarily

undertaken duties proximately caused or contributed to Junior Seau’s injuries, and ultimately his

death.

294. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligence, Junior Seau suffered

physical injury, including, but not limited to, existing and latent cognitive conditions that created

diminished cognitive function, non-economic losses, and economic losses including but not48.

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limited to lost and/or reduced income during his life.



FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT HIRING

(Against the NFL!





377.30.

298. The NFL voluntarily and gratuitously inserted itself into the business of studying

(and subsequently rendering expert opinions about) the relationship between repetitive head


299. In doing so, the NFL assumed a duty to players like Junior Seau to retain and

employ persons within the MTBI Committee who were professionally competent to study and

render opinions on the relationship between repetitive head impacts in football and brain injury

and to ensure that those whom it hired had no conflict of interest and that each had the

professional and personal qualifications to conduct those studies and render opinions that were

scientifically rigorous, valid, defensible, and honest.

300. The NFL breached its duty to Junior Seau by hiring persons who:

a. were unqualified;

b. were not competent to engage in rigorous and defensible scientific

research;

c. were not competent to render valid and defensible opinions;

d. created fraudulent industry-funded research; and/or

e. attacked as not credible the valid and defensible research and opinions

generated by neuro-scientists who were unconnected to and not paid by the NFL.49.

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301. The NFL’s negligence in this regard resulted in a body of falsified industry-funded

research that purposefully and/or negligently contested and suppressed valid and truthful

biomedical science. The NFL’s negligence allowed the MTBI Committee to use falsified

industry-funded research to mislead Junior Seau, other former NFL players, and the general

public regarding the risks associated with repetitive head impacts in the game of football.

302. As a result of the NFL’s negligence, Junior Seau sustained brain injuries that were


would have sought had he been told the truth.

303. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligent hiring, Junior Seau






SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT RETENTION

(Against the NEL1





377.30.

307. The NFL knew or should have known that the controlling members of the MTBI

Committee demonstrated an ongoing lack of competence, objectivity and inadequate judgment to

study and render expert opinions on the issue of the relationship between repetitive head impacts

in football and brain injury.

308. The NFL voluntarily assumed a duty to Junior Seau not to allow those

incompetent persons it had hired within the MTBI Committee to continue to conduct incompetent50.

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and falsified studies and render incompetent opinions on the relationship between repetitive head


309. During the time period when the MTBI Committee was conducting its purported

research and rendering its purported opinions, the NFL knew or should have known that the

purported research and opinions of the MTBI Committee were false and indefensible.

310. The NFL breached its duty to Junior Seau by allowing these incompetent and

unqualified persons, under the auspices and with the imprimatur of the NFL:

a. to continue to create incompetent and indefensible research,

b. to continue to render invalid and indefensible opinions, and

c. to continue to attack the credible and defensible research and opinions of

neuro-scientists not connected to or paid by the NFL.

311. The NFL’s negligence allowed the incompetent members of the MTBI Committee

to continue to advance their false and incompetent research and opinions in an attempt to suppress

valid bio-medical science. The NFL’s negligence allowed the MTBI Committee members to

mislead Junior Seau, other former NFL players, and the general public regarding the permanent

brain injury risks associated with repetitive head impacts in the game of football.

312. As a result of the NFL’s failure, Junior Seau sustained brain injuries that were


would have sought had they been told the truth.

313. As a direct and proximate result of the NFL’s negligent retention, Junior Seau



not limited to lost and/or reduced income during his life. .



51.

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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

WRONGFUL DEATH

(Against the NFL Defendants)






317. As a direct and proximate cause of the conduct alleged herein, the NFL





having suffered multiple past traumatic brain injuries while playing professional football for the

NFL from 1990-2009.





321. As a result of the NFL Defendants’ misconduct as alleged herein, Defendants are

liable to Plaintiffs for, and Plaintiffs seek, the full measure of damages allowed under applicable

law.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

WRONGFUL DEATH

(Against the Riddell Defendants!


as if fully set forth herein.52.

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Negligence Supporting Wrongful Death

324. The Riddell Defendants were negligent in their design, testing, assembly,

manufacture, marketing, and engineering of the helmets as described herein.

325. The Riddell Defendants owed a duty of care to the players in their design, testing,

manufacture, assembly, marketing and sale of the helmets and all components and sub-assemblies

of the helmets.

326. The Riddell Defendants should have been well aware that since 1928 repeated

blows to the head can lead to CTE, commonly known as “punch-drunk syndrome”.

327. The Riddell Defendants breached their duty of reasonable care by failing to

provide necessary and adequate safety and instructional materials and warnings of the risk and

means available to reduce and/or minimize the risk of concussive brain injuries while playing

football using their helmets.

328. At the time the helmets were designed, manufactured, sold and distributed by the

Riddell Defendants, the helmets were defective in their manufacturing and unreasonably

dangerous and unsafe for their intended purpose because they did not provide adequate protection

against the foreseeable risk of concussive brain injury. The Riddell Defendants’ failure to design

the helmets to design and manufacturing specifications resulted in, among other things, the

following:

(a) Negligently failing to manufacture the subject helmet with a safe means of

attenuating and absorbing the foreseeable forces of impact in order to minimize and/or reduce the

forces and energy directed to the player’s head;

(b) Negligently manufacturing the subject helmet with a shock attenuating system

which was not safely configured;

(c) Negligently failing to properly and adequately inspect and/or test the helmet

model; .53.

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(d) Other acts of negligence that may be discovered during the course of this matter;

and

(e) Failure to warn players that its helmets wouldn’t protect against concussive brain

injury.

Design Defect Supporting Wrongful Death

329. Also, at the time the helmets used by Junior Seau were designed, manufactured,

sold, and distributed by the Riddell Defendants, the helmets were defective in design,

unreasonably dangerous, and unsafe for their intended purpose because they did not provide

adequate protection against the foreseeable risk of concussive brain injury. The design defects

include, but are not limited to the following:

(a) The lack of a safe means of attenuating and absorbing the foreseeable forces of

impact in order to minimize and/or reduce the forces and energy directed to the player’s head;

(b) An unsafe shock attenuating system; and

(c) Insufficient protection against concussive injuries.

330. The defective design and unreasonably dangerous condition were a proximate and

producing cause of the personal injuries suffered by Junior Seau and other damages, including but

not limited to, economic damages and non-economic damages.

331. The Riddell helmets did not perform in the manner that would be expected by a

reasonable consumer in that they did not adequately protect players from the risks of concussive

and sub-concussive injuries.

332. Additionally, the benefits, if any, of the design of the Riddell helmets were

outweighed by the risks to players using those helmets as the helmets did not adequately protect

players from the risks of concussive and sub-concussive injuries.

333. A safer alternative design was economically and technologically feasible at the

time the product left the control of the Riddell Defendants.

334. At all times, the helmets were being used for the purpose for which they were

intended or in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable to the Riddell Defendants.

54.

EX A, PAGE 142

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Failure to Warn Supporting Wrongful Death

335. Also, the Riddell Defendants knew or should have known of the substantial

dangers involved in the reasonably foreseeable use of the helmets.

336. The Riddell Defendants failed to provide necessary and adequate safety and

instructional materials and warnings of the risk and means available to reduce and/or minimize

the risk of concussive brain injuries while playing football.

337. The Riddell Defendants failed to provide necessary and adequate information,

warnings, and/or instructional materials regarding the fact that other model helmets provided

greater shock attenuation from blows to the head area.

338. The Riddell Defendants ignored 18 years of published literature, read by their

genera! counsel Richard Lester, warning of the dangers of concussive injuries until 2002, when a

warning involving return to play after a concussion was placed on all Riddell helmets. The

warning was still defective and inadequate and remains today defective and inadequate because it

does not warn about the later life cognitive effects of concussive injury.

339. The Riddell Defendants knew that these substantial dangers were not readily

recognizable to an ordinary consumer or user and that such person would use these products

without inspection for defects.

340. Junior Seau neither knew, nor had reason to know of the existence of the

aforementioned defects, or increased risks of harm.

341. Junior Seau was using the helmets in a reasonably foreseeable manner at all times.

342. Riddell Defendants failure to warn players of the risks of substantial harm

associated with the foreseeable use of their products was a substantial factor in causing Junior

Seau’s harm.

Riddell’s Wrongful Death Liability

343. Riddell Defendant’s negligence, design defect and failure to warn were a

proximate and legal cause of the wrongful death of Junior Seau as alleged herein.

344. As a direct and proximate cause of the conduct alleged herein, the Riddell

Defendants caused Junior Seau to develop neuro-cognitive brain diseases, including CTE.55.

EX A, PAGE 143

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having suffered multiple past traumatic brain injuries while using equipment designed, developed,

manufactured, sold and distributed by the Riddell Defendants.





As a result of the Riddell Defendants' misconduct as alleged herein, Defendants are liable to


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56.

EX A, PAGE 144

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. - 1F i ieiea3ZES2131 3P agagMESOT (115139

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

A. Against the NFL Defendants as follows:

As to the -First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action

an award of all compensatory damages allowed under law against the NFL Defendants;

As to the First and Second Causes of Action an award of punitive damages as to

the NFL defendants;

B. Against the Riddell Defendants as follows: .

As to the Eighth Cause of Action an award of all compensatory damages allowed

under law against the Riddell Defendants; _

C. An award of prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys fees; and

D. An award of such other and further relief as may be appropriate; and

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all matters so triable.

Dated: February 4, 2013

COOLEY LLPSTEVEN M. STRAUSS (99153)

Steven M. Strauss Attorney for Plaintiffs

57.

EX A, PAGE 145

CaCas® ;EB1(3/eG)eaiSS3WABB BDdaaaojeni(fe 1t 1 - IF i IgdetOBgBSSBBl 3P agagMl®® (115139

SUM-100A M E N D E D SUMMONS

(CITACION JUDICIAL)NOTICE TO DEFENDANT:(AVISO AL DEM AN DADO):NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NFL PROPERTIES LLC: RIDDELL, INC ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORP ; RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP, INC.: [Additional Parties A ttachm ent Form is Attached]YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF:(LO ESTA DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):TYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY SEAU, an individual: JAKE SEAU.a minor,and FIUNTER SEAU,a minor, by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau:and BETTE HOFFMAN as trustee of the Tiaina B. Seau.Jr,2002 trust

FOR COURT USB ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE)

2 n 2

e rrj'

FEB Cl 4 2U13

Cfeft o! the Suponbrdoun

---------NOTICE! You have been sued The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days.Ttead the informalion below.

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.coudrnfo.ca gov/self help), your county law library, or the coudhouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may wanl to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for tree legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifomia.org). Ihe California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp). or by contacting your local court or county bar association. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien tor waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of S10.QC0 or more In a civil case. The court's lien must be paid Defore the court will dismiss the case.;AVISOI Lo han demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 dlas. la carte puede decidir en su contra sin escucharsu version. Lea la informacion a continuacidn

Tiene 30 DIAS DE CALENDARIO despues de que le entreguen esta citacion y papeles legates para presenter one respuesta por escrito en esta code y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefonica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correctc si desea que procesen su caso en la code Es posible que haya un formulaho que L is te d pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la cone y mas informacion en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucorte.ea.gov,), en la biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en la code que le que de mas cerca. Si no puede pagarla cuota de presentacibn, pida al secretario de la code que le de un formulario de exencibn de pago de cuotas. Si no presents su respuesta a tiempo. puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y Is code le podra quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sin mas advertence

Hay otrus requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogadc inmediatamente Si no conoce a un abogado. puede Ifamar a un servicio de remision a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado. es posible que cumpla con los requisites para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programs de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar esros grupos sin fines de lucre en el sitio web de California Legal Services. (www.lawnelpcalilomia.orgJ, en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www sucorte.ca.gov) o poniendose en contacto con la code o el colegio de abogados locales, A VISO. Por ley la code tiene derecho a reolamar las cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperacidn de S10,000 6 mbs de valor racibida med/ante un acuerdo o una conceston de arbitraje en uncaso de derecho civil. Irene que pagar el gravamen de la code antes de que la code pueda desechar el caso.

The name and address of the court is:(El nombre y direccion de le corte es):Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego Centra! Division330 W est Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101

CASE NUMBER (Numero del Casoi

37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

IMAGED FILE

The name, address and telephone number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is:(El nombre. la direccion y el numero de telefono del abogado del demandante. o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es): Steven M. Strauss. COOLEY LLP. 4401 Eastgate Mall, San Diego, CA 92121; (858) 550-6000

DATE(Eecha) FEB 1 2 2013 Clerk, by

(Secretario)J. LANCETA , Deputy

(Adjunto)

(For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).)(Para prueba de entrega de esta citatidn use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)).

NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served1 [U as an individual defendant.2. □ as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify):

0 on behalf of (specify): under 0 CCP 416.10 (corporation)

I ] CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)□ CCP 416 .40 (association or partnership) 0 other (specify):

0 by personal delivery on (date):

□ CCP 416.60 (minor)3 CCP 416.70 (conservatee)

0 CCP 416.90 (authorized person)

Page 1 of 1Form AOopteo tor Mandatory use

Judicial Council of California SUM-100 fftev Juty 1,2009]

SUMMONS American LegalNet Inc www Forms Workflow com

Code of Civil Procedure §§412.20. 465 www couwnto.c3.gov

EX A, PAGE 146

VIA FAX

http://www.coudrnfo.ca

http://www.lawhelpcalifomia.org

http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp

http://www.sucorte.ea.gov

http://www.lawnelpcalilomia.orgJ

CaCase 131<3v0Vi0I83\1/-raB BDc iacMETll£ m- 1 - 1F i lEileli)30ZS2:B31 3P agegJeUQtSf (115139

SUM-200(A)

SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:

TYLER SEAU, et al. v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al. 37-2013-00031265-CU-PO-CTL

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

-► This form may be used as an attachment to any summons if space does not permit the listing o f all parties on the summons. If this attachment is used, insert the following statement in the plaintiff or defendant box on the summons: "Additional Parties Attachment form is attached."

L is t add itiona l parties (Check only one box. Use a separate page fo r each type o f party.):

D Plaintiff [X] Defendant □ Cross-Complainant □ Cross-DefendantEASTON-BELL SPORTS, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS. LLC; EB SPORTS CORP.; RBG HOLDINGS CORP., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive

Page 1_ of 1.

Page 1 of 1

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California

SUM-200{A) [Rev. January 1, 2007]

A D D IT IO N A L P A R T IE S A T T A C H M E N T A ttachm en t to Sum m ons American Legal Net. Inc.

VAVw.Forms Wortflc iv.com

EX A, PAGE 147

Case 2:13^cv-OI531!-AOB R DBc iEK[]gjatr1e1i t Fife dR}3<2 33/1/2 8Pag dF1|9£ dJ 161

JS 44 (Rev. 09/11) CIVIL CO VER SHEETThe JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. except as provided by local rules of court This form, approved by the Judicial Conference ot the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk o f Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet (SEE INSTRUCTIONS O N NEXT PAGE O E THIS h'OKM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFSTyler Seau, et al., (See attachment)

(b) County o f Residence o f First Listed Plaintiff*

DEFENDANTSNational Football League, et al., (See attachment)

County o f Residence o f First Listed Defendant New York(EXCEPT IN U.S. PU IN TJFF ( ASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name. Address, and Telephone Number)

(See attachment)

O N U S. PLAINTIEF CASES ONLY)NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES. USE THE LOCATION OF

THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED

Attorneys ( I fK n m n ) 13C V 0478W RBB

(See attachment)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X ” in One Box Only)

O I U.S. Government % 3 Federal QuestionPlaintiff (U.S. Government Nut a Party)

O 2 U.S. Government G 4 DiversityDefendant (Indicate Citizenship o f Parties in Item HI)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL P A RTI ES (Place an "X " in One Box fo r Plaintiff)(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box fo r Defendant)

PTF D EF PTF DEF Citizen of This State G 1 O 1 Incorporated o r Principal Place G 4 G 4

of Business In This State

Citizen o f Another State G 2 0 2 Incorporated and Principal Place G 5 0 5o f Business In Another State

Citizen or Subject of a 0 3 0 3 Foreign Nation 0 6 G 6 Foreign Country

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

C ( ONTKACT TO RTS FO RFEITUR E/PEN ALTY BANKRUPTCY O TH E R ST A TU TE S _ _ J□ 110 Insurance□ 120 Marine□ 130 Miller ActG 140 Negotiable Instrument G 150 Recovery of Overpayment

& Enforcement o f Judgment G 151 Medicare Act O 152 Recovery of Defaulted

Student Loans (Excl. Veterans)

O 153 Recovery of Overpayment o f Veteran's Benefits

G 160 Stockholders' Suits O 190 Other Contract G 195 Contract Product Liability□ 196 Franchise

R EAL PROPERTY

PERSO NA L INJURY O 310 Airplane □ 315 Airplane Product

Liability G 320 Assault, Libel &

Slander G 330 Federal Employers’

Liability G 340 Marine G 345 Manne Product

Liability O 350 Motor Vehicle G 355 Motor Vehicle

Product Liability G 360 Other Personal

Injury G 362 Personal Injury - M ed. M alpractice

C IVIL RIGHTS

PERSO NA L INJURYG 365 Personal Injury •

Product Liability O 367 Health Care/

Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability

G 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability

PERSO NA L PROPERTY' O 370 Other Fraud G 371 Truth in Lending O 380 Other Personal

Property Damage O 385 Property Damage

Product Liability

G 625 Drug Related Seizureof Property 21 U SC88I

O 690 Other

O 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 G 423 Withdrawal

28 USC 157

rwrr-HTV mews..G 820 Copyrights G 830 Patent G 840 Trademark

LABOR SO CIAL S F .C tR I TV

G 210 Land Condemnation G 220 Foreclosure G 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment G 240 Torts to Land G 245 Tort Product Liability G 290 All Other Real Property

G 440 Other Civil Rights G 441 Voting G 442 Employment G 443 Housing/

Accommodations G 445 Amer. w/Disabilities -

Employment G 446 Amer. w/Disabilities -

Other G 448 Education

PR ISONER PETITIONS

G 710 Fair Labor Standards Act

St 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations G 740 Railway tabo r Act G 751 Family and Medical

Leave Act O 790 Other Labor Litigation O 791 Empl Ret. Inc.

Security Act

O 861 HIA (1395ft)G 862 Black Lung (923)O 863 DIWC/D1WW (405(g)) O 864 SSID Title XVI O 865 RSI (405(g))

510 Motions to Vacate Sentence

Habeas Corpus:530 General 535 Death Penalty 540 Mandamus & Other 550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee -

Conditions of Confinement

IM M IG RATIONG 462 Naturalization Application G 463 Habeas Corpus -

Alien Detainee (Prisoner Petition)

G 465 Other Immigration Actions

FEDER AL TA X S H I SG 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff

or Defendant)O 871 IRS—Third Parly

26 USC 7609

O 375 False Claims Act G 400 State Reapporiionmcnt O 410 Antitrust G 430 Banks and Banking O 450 Commerce G 460 Deportation G 470 Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations G 480 Consumer Credit O 490 Cable/Sat TV G 850 Securities/Commodities/

Exchange G 890 Other Statutory Actions G 891 Agricultural Acts G 893 Environmental Matters G 895 Freedom of Information

ActG 8% Arbitration G 899 Administrative Procedure

Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision

G 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only) Transferred fromO I Original Sf 2 Removed from □ 3 Remanded from O 4 Reinstated or 3 5 another district a 6 Mu,I|distnct

Proceeding State Court________________ Appellate Court Reopened___________ /specify)__________ Litigation

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

CltC the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Du nut cite Jurisdictional statutes unless diversity) ,Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141. et seq ; 2 9 : 1 6 0 - N a t i o n a l L a b o r

Brief description o f cause: See Attachment R e l a t i o n s A c t

VII. REQUESTED IN □ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMANDS COMPLAINT: UNDER F.R.C P. 23 25,000.00

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint JURY DEMAND: (X Yes □ No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

iSee insiruciions):JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

FOR O FFIC E USE ONLY

RECEIPT# AMOUNT APPLYING II P JU D G E MAG JUDGE

Case 2:13 cv-ODa38-AOB R DBc LDmDeEni tn 1 1 t Fife dRM<2 3501/2 8Pag dRHge df d6ZL

Attachment to Civil Cover Sheet_ for Seau, et al. v. National Football League, et al.

Section I:

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTSTYLER SEAU, an individual; SYDNEY SEAU, an individual; JAKE SEAU, a minor, and HUNTER SEAU, a minor, by and through their Guardian ad Litem Gina Seau; and BETTE HOFFMAN, as trustee of the TIAINA B. SEAU, JR. 2002 Trust

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NFL PROPERTIES LLC; RIDDELL, INC.; ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORP.; RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, INC.; EASTON-BELL SPORTS, LLC; EB SPORTS CORP.; and RBG HOLDINGS CORP.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:Attorneys fo r Defendants National Football League and NFL Properties LLC:

COOLEY LLP STEVEN M. STRAUSS 4401 Eastgate Mall San Diego, CA 92121 Telephone: (858) 550-6000 Facsimile: (858) 550-6420

CASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCAVILLA BLATT & PENFIELD, LLPDAVID S. CASEY, JR.FREDERICK SCHENK 110 Laurel Street San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 238-1811 Facsimile: (619) 544-9232

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLPRONALD L. OLSONJOHN W. SPIEGELNICHOLAS C. SOLTMAN355 South Grand Avenue, Thirty-FifthFloorLos Angeles, CA 90071-1560 Telephone: (213) 683-9100 Facsimile: (213) 687-3702

(Pro Hac Vice applications to be filed) PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &

GARRISON LLP BRAD S. KARP THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.BETH A. WILKINSON LYNN B. BAYARD 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 Telephone: (212) 373-3000 Facsimile: (212) 757-3990

20101096.1

Case 2:13-cw-OD478-AOB R DBc LLDra]e:nitn1 1 t Fife dRM<2 50/1/2 8Pag ePfefigfe (2f 16ZL

Section VI:

Suit for fraudulent concealment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent retention and wrongful death against the National Football League and NFL Properties LLC, arising from and/or substantially dependent on collective bargaining agreements.

20101096.1

Case 2:13-cv-0153ffi-WBR EECc iDoeDtrJefot ]Fi I etiie23f25gD3i:Pa...

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