Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodelle:

Die Bedeutung von Reformen

M. Heipertz und M. Ward-Warmedinger*

Konferenz „Herausforderungen für die Finanzpolitik in Europa“, Berlin, 22. und 23. März 2007

*Papier und Vortrag entsprechen der persönlichen Position der Autoren und nicht notwendigerweise derjenigen der Europäischen Zentralbank

Gliederung

• Forschungsansatz

• Die Rolle der Finanzpolitik– Die Größe des öffentlichen Sektors– Tragfähigkeit– Wirtschaftswachstum– Bildung– Einkommensverteilung

• Die Rolle der Ordnungspolitik– Arbeitsmarkt– Weitere Märkte

• Synthese

Forschungsansatz

• Kontext: Debatte um sogenanntes „Europäisches Sozialmodell“ bzw. das „Nordische Modell“

• Fragestellung: Wie (erfolgreich) positionieren sich Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodelle westlicher Industriestaaten gegenüber den elementaren Herausforderungen, d.h.:

– Vergleichsweise geringes Wirtschaftswachstum i. V. m. hoher Arbeitslosigkeit– Globalisierung i. V. m. internationalem Wettbewerb– Demographischer Wandel

• Ansatz: Identifizierung von Erfolgsmustern im Hinblick auf Politikziele, Leistungsfähigkeit und Aufwand in den Bereichen:

– Tragfähigkeit– Solides Wachstum– Hohe Beschäftigungsrate– Guter Bildungsgrad– „Faire“ Einkommensverteilung– Effiziente Arbeits-, Produkt- und Finanzmärkte

• Methodische Vorbehalte: – Korrelative, keine kausalen Zusammenhänge– Überdeterminierung– Problematische Quantifizierung– Auswahl der Indikatoren

Gliederung

• Forschungsansatz

• Die Rolle der Finanzpolitik– Die Größe des öffentlichen Sektors– Tragfähigkeit– Wirtschaftswachstum– Bildung– Einkommensverteilung

• Die Rolle der Ordnungspolitik– Arbeitsmarkt– Weitere Märkte

• Synthese und Zusammenfassung

Der Wohlfahrtstaat bedingt die Größe des öffentlichen Sektors

Social public spending and total public spending in % of GDP, 2001

Gross total social public expenditure in % of GDP, 2001

IrelandUnited States

LuxembourgSpain

Japan United Kingdom

Portugal

NetherlandsGermanyItaly

Finland BelgiumGreece

AustriaFrance

Denmark

Sweden

y = 1.3388x + 14.445

R2 = 0.8865

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

55.0

60.0

10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0

Social public spending in % of GDP, 2001

Tota

l pub

lic s

pend

ing

in %

of G

DP, 2

001

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

Source: AMECO Database Source: OECD

Die nordischen und angelsächsischen Modelle erscheinen tragfähig

2005 gen. gov. balance (% of GDP)

2005 gross national debt (% of GDP)

Ageing-related fiscal burden 2050

S2 indicator (baseline scenario)

Ireland 1.0 27.6 7.8 2.9United Kingdom -3.5 42.8 4.0 4.9United States -3.8 65.0 n.a. n.a.group averages -2.1 45.1 5.9 3.9

France -2.9 66.8 3.2 4.0Germany -3.3 67.7 2.7 4.4Greece -4.5 107.5 n.a. n.a.Italy -4.1 106.4 1.7 3.1Portugal -6.0 63.9 10.1 10.5Luxembourg -1.9 6.2 8.2 9.5group averages -3.8 69.7 5.2 6.3

Austria -1.5 62.9 0.2 0.3Belgium 0.1 93.3 6.3 1.8Netherlands -0.3 52.9 5.0 1.3Spain 1.1 43.2 8.5 3.2group averages -0.2 63.1 5.0 1.7

Denmark 4.9 35.8 4.8 -2.2Finland 2.6 41.1 5.2 -0.9Sweden 2.9 50.3 2.2 -1.1group averages 3.5 42.4 4.1 -1.4

Other Japan -6.5 158.9 n.a. n.a.

Anglo-Saxons

Continental and Mediterranean States

Continental and Mediterranean Reformers

Nordics

Source: AMECO Database, Commission Services, EPC

Ein schlanker Staat begünstigt Wachstum

Change in total spending 1960-2000 versus change in per capita growth, 1960s-1990s

Ranking of per capita gross national income, PPP adjusted (2004) and its change 1980-2004

y = -0.1556x + 0.4228

R2 = 0.3626

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Change in total spending % of GDP

Cha

nge

in p

er c

apita

gro

wth

Portugal

GreeceSpain

Italy

Japan

Germany

France

IrelandFinlandSweden

Netherlands Belgium

Austria

LuxembourgUnited States

United KingdomDenmark

0123456789

1011121314151617

-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Change in the ranking since 1980

2004

cou

ntry

rank

ing,

from

17

(bes

t) to

1

(wor

st)

Source: AMECO, Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2005 Source: OECD

Ambitious expenditure reforms and trend growth

Social spending and potential growth performance

1

2

3

4

T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7

Tren

d G

DP

grow

th (%

)

Ambitious reformers Timid reformers

GermanyLuxembourg

Ireland

Greece

Belgium

Italy Finland

Netherlands

Portugal

France

United KingdomSweden

DenmarkSpainAustria

y = -0.225x + 0.9876

R2 = 0.2994

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

-2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0

Change in period average of total public social spending in % of GDP, 1980s-1990s

Cha

nge

in p

erio

d av

erag

e of

pot

entia

l GD

P gr

owth

rate

, 198

0s-1

990s

Source: Hauptmeier, Heipertz and Schuknecht (2006) Source: AMECO

Bildungsmisere liegt nicht an mangelnder Finanzierung

Public education spending and PISA reading scale Public education spending and PISA science scale

PortugalSpain

Sweden

France

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Finland

ItalyGreece

Ireland

UK

JapanUS

Germany

y = 9.4595x + 452.76R2 = 0.179

470

480

490

500

510

520

530

540

550

3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7

Public spending on education in % of GDP, 2002

Mea

n sc

ore

PISA

read

ing

scal

e, 2

003

Austria

PortugalDenmark

Spain

SwedenFrance

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Finland

Italy

Belgium

Greece

Ireland

UK

Japan

US

Germany

y = -2.0383x + 513.13

R2 = 0.0076

460

470

480

490

500

510

520

530

540

550

3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7

Public spending on education in % of GDP, 2002M

ean

scor

e P

ISA

sci

ence

sca

le, 2

003

Source: OECD

Hohe Sozialausgaben können Verteilungsgerechtigkeit begünstigen

Austria

Spain

Finland

Sweden

United Kingdom

Germany

Portugal

Netherlands

France

Japan

Denmark

Ireland

ItalyUnited States

Luxembourg

Greece

y = -0.0052x + 0.4129

R2 = 0.3255

0.2

0.22

0.24

0.26

0.28

0.3

0.32

0.34

0.36

0.38

0.4

12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Public social spending, about 2000

Gin

i coe

ffici

ent,

abou

t 200

0

GreeceGermanyAustria

US

FranceDenmark

Luxembourg

JapanItalyUK

Sweden

Finland

Ireland

Netherlands

y = 0.2462x + 1.6646

R2 = 0.2079

-4.0

-3.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

-10 -5 0 5 10

Change in social spending, mid 1980s-2000Ch

ange

in th

e Gin

i coe

fficie

nt,

mid

1980

s-20

00

Source: OECD

Gliederung

• Forschungsansatz

• Die Rolle der Finanzpolitik– Die Größe des öffentlichen Sektors– Tragfähigkeit– Wirtschaftswachstum– Bildung– Einkommensverteilung

• Die Rolle der Ordnungspolitik– Arbeitsmarkt– Weitere Märkte

• Synthese und Zusammenfassung

Ordnungspolitik 1: ArbeitsmarktEmployment rate, % of persons of working age (15-64)

Total unemployment rate, % of total labour force

Belgium

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Spain

SwedenUnited Kingdom

Austria

Denmark

Finland

Japan

Portugal

United States

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

45 50 55 60 65 70 75 801994

2005

Belgium Finland

France

Italy

AustriaDenmark

Germany

Greece

IrelandJapan

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Portugal

Spain

Sweden

United KingdomUnited States

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 201994

2005

Source: OECD (2006) Employment Outlook, OECD social indicators (2005). Note: The 45 degree line represents a ‘no change’ scenario over the time period considered. Countries above the line have increased their scores, whereas countries below have decreased them.

Public expenditure on active labour market measures as a percentage of GDP 2004

Proportion of public employees in total population % 2004

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

United

Stat

es

Greece

Japa

n

Luxe

mbourg Ita

ly

Austr

ia

Irelan

d

Portu

gal

Franc

e

United

King

dom

German

y

Belgi

um

Netherl

ands

Denmark

Finlan

d

Sweden

Spe

ndin

g as

a %

of G

DP

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

12.00%

14.00%

16.00%

18.00%

Japa

n

Greece

German

y

Nethe

rland

sAu

stria Ita

lySp

ain

Irelan

d

Luxe

mbourg

Unite

d Stat

es

Belgi

um

Portu

gal UK

Franc

e

Finlan

d

Swede

n

Denm

ark

% p

ublic

em

plo

ymen

t

Source: Employment Outlook 2004, 2005, 2006, AMECO and OECD. No Data available on ALMP expenditure for Spain. Note: Active measures include e.g training and job seekers support.

Strictness of EPL (aggregate measure: value 0 to 6 = low to high EPL) and the rate of youth unemployment (15 to 24 year olds)

Strictness of EPL (aggregate measure: value 0 to 6 = low to high EPL) and the rate of long term unemployment 2003 and the rate of long term unemployment 2003

Austria

Portugal

Denmark

Spain

Sweden

France

Netherlands

Finland ItalyBelgium

Greece

Ireland

UK

Japan

US

Germany

y = 0.0588x + 1.1498

P-value (0.10) R2 = 0.1855

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0

Youth unemployment rate 2003

EPL

2003

Austria

Portugal

Denmark

Spain

Sweden

France

NetherlandsFinland

ItalyBelgium

Greece

Ireland

UK

Japan

US

Germany

y = 0.0331x + 0.8984

P-value (0.05) R2 = 0.2608

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0

Long term unemployment rate 2003

EPL

2003

Source: OECD (2004, 2005) Employment Outlook, OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study Note: The equation shows the fit and significance (p-value) of the regression line

Ordnungspolitik 2: Produkt- und Finanzmarkt

Product market regulation: Aggregate measure (value 0 to 6 = low to high regulation)

Annual growth in labour productivity per hour versus the level of product market regulation

Denmark

Spain

AustriaBelgium

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Portugal

Sweden

UK

United States

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.01998

20

03

Luxembourg

Ireland

Portugal

Netherlands

Austria

UK

US

Spain

Sw eden

BelgiumDenmark

Germany

Finland

Italy

France

Greece

y = -2.2744x + 4.6163(0.06) R2 = 0.2189

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9

Degree of product market regulation 2003

Lab

ou

r p

rod

uc

tivi

ty g

row

th p

er

ho

ur

200

3

Source: The OECD Jobs Study, OECD Factbook 2006 Note: The 45 degree line represents a ‘no change’ scenario over the time period considered - countries below the line have become less regulated. The equation shows the fit and significance (p-value) of the regression line.

Credit market regulations (value 0 to 10 = high to low regulation)

The aggregate size of stock, bond and loan markets as a proportion of GDP

Austria Belgium

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Luxembourg Netherlands

Portugal

Spain

Sweden UKUS

5

6

7

8

9

10

5 6 7 8 9 101995

20

03

Source: Economic Freedom of the World 2001, 2003, ECB (2006) Note: The 45 degree line represents a ‘no change’ scenario over the time period considered. For the left hand panel, countries below the line have become less regulated, for the right hand panel, countries above the line have become less regulated.

Synthese: Einsatz und Ergebnis verschiedener Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodelle