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Glaucon's challengeM.M. Goldsmith aa Victoria University of WellingtonPublished online: 28 Jul 2006.

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 73, No. 3; September 1995

GLAUCON'S CHALLENGE 1

M.M. Goldsmith

At Republ ic 357a, Glaucon picks up the discussion of d ika iosune usually translated

as ' justice ' , but translated as 'moral i ty ' by Robin Waterfield. 2 Socrates, at the end of the just completed confrontation with Thrasymachus, has admitted that he is still unsure about what morality is, whether or not it is a r e t e and whether it makes its possessor happy or unhappy (354c).

Glaucon, too, is unsatisfied. He presses Socrates to continue the discussion. With Socrates' acquiescence, he then proceeds to distinguish three types of things described as 'good ' . In the first category is something 'welcomed for its own sake,

rather than because its consequences are desired'. These are harmless pleasures, agreeable at the time; they seem to be thought of as having no future consequences. In the second group are those things like intelligence, health and sight - both good in themselves and having good consequences. In the third are such things as exer- cise, medical treatment and ' any kind of moneymaking job ' - things which one

regards as unpleasant but which have beneficial consequences (357b-d). In which category does morali ty (or justice) belong? Socrates asserts that it

belongs in the second and best category; it is something that is welcome for itself and because of its good consequences.

But Glaucon points out that Socrates' view is not the usual view. Most people

put morality in the third category; it is something which is itself ' t rying ' or a 'nui- sance' but done for the sake of ' f inancial reward' or to make a 'good impression' . Without those good consequences, morality is best avoided. It is not something that one would want on its own. Morality is like medicine; one takes it for what it does for one, not for the delight of taking it. So, Glaucon asks Socrates to show what morality and immorali ty are like on their own, ' intr insically ' . 3 He wants to hear morality praised as he believes it ought to be, ' in and of itself' (358d).

I wish to thank my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington, and the members of the Western Conference for Political Thought for their helpful discussions of this paper. I am particularly grateful to Chris Parkin for his detailed commentary. See Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). All quotations are from this edition. For a discussion of translating dikaiosune), see Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) pp. 10-13. For discussions of Glaucon's challenge and the distinction between what morality and immorali- ty do in themselves (or intrinsically) and the external and social rewards and penalties they usually attract, see D. Sachs, 'A Fallacy in Plato's Republic' in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato - A Collection of Critical Essays, vol. II: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Religion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971) pp. 38-43; J.D. Mabbott, 'Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian' in Vlastos, op. cit., pp. 57-65; I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, vol. I: Plato on Man and Society (London: Routledge, 1962) pp. 85-89; C. Kirwan, 'Glaucon's Challenge', Phronesis 10 (1965) pp. 162-173; T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) pp. 184- 191; N. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979) pp. 79-80; Annas, op. cit. pp. 59-71; R.E. Alien, 'The Speech of Glaucon: On Contract and the Common Good'

356

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M.M. Goldsmith 357

Glaucon undertakes to revive Thrasymachus' position: he will explain the usual

view of morality; he will claim that it is 'pract ised reluctantly, as something necessary and not good' ; and he will contend that that position is reasonable - immorality provides a better life than morality (358b-c). In order to force Socrates to a proper defence of morality, Glaucon will praise the immoral life to the utmost of his power, so that Socrates will respond by praising morality (or justice) as it ought to be praised.

Glaucon's explanation of the origin of morality clarifies the position that he is expounding.

The idea is that although it 's a fact of nature that doing wrong is good and having wrong done to one is bad, nevertheless the disadvantages of having it done to one outweigh the benefits of doing it. Consequently, once people have experienced both committing wrong and being at the receiving end of it, they see that the disadvantages are unavoidable and the benefits are unat- tainable; so they decide that the most profitable course is for them to enter into a contract with one another, guaranteeing that no wrong will be given or received. [358e-359a]

Thus arise laws and conventions; what is legally ordained is just.

On this account morality is an unpleasant second best, 'a compromise between the ideal of doing wrong without having to pay for it, and the worst situation, which is having wrong done to one while lacking the means to exact compensat ion ' (359a). Clearly what is best is to do injustice or be immoral with impunity; what is worst is to suffer injustice or immorality without being capable of getting one's own back. So, because people think that they are more likely to lose by suffering injus- tice than they are to gain by doing it, they agree not to do injustice in return for avoiding suffering it.

It seems to me that if we rank Glaucon's version of the choices and compare those rankings to Socrates' rankings, some interesting aspects of Glaucon's chal- lenge and Socrates' response are revealed.

Firstly, on Glaucon's account 'committing wrong without having to pay for it ' is best. Let w be committing a wrong; c stand for the compensation for a wrong com- mitted; and s for suffering a wrong. On Glaucon's account w is preferable to s.

Plato's Socrates holds the contrary position: in the Gorgias, Socrates tells Polus that suffering wrong is preferable to doing it (469c ) . 4

It is implicit in the position adopted by Glaucon from Thrasymachus that wrong- doing pays. 5 The wrongdoer gains some kind of advantage from doing a wrong

which makes it worth doing, provided that the wrongdoer gets away with it, does

continued...

in S. Panagiotiou (ed.), Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1987) pp. 51-62. See also Crito 49b. See Republic 343b-344c, where Thrasymachus asserts that the wrongdoer gains advantage while the just and moral person acts in accordance with the interests of another.

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358 Glaucon' s Challenge

not have to pay back that advantage. Doing a wrong or injustice is thought of as getting something of value, suffering a wrong as being deprived of something of value. It seems reasonable to suppose that Glaucon's position is that compensation fully redresses a wrong. Thus suffering a wrong which is compensated leaves one in as good a situation as if one had never suffered the wrong, the value lost being returned to the sufferer. Presumably paying compensation for a wrong leaves one

(at least) with no advantage from committing a wrong: the value wrongly acquired being paid back in compensation. So, s + c = w - c. Thus it seems that what counts as the advantage of wrongdoing is the extra value that it brings to the wrongdoer, a value which is eliminated if the wrongdoer has to pay compensation for wrongs.

This conception of the advantage of wrongdoing, or injustice, accords with the other things Glaucon says. For example, the morality contract is based on the con- tractors' estimates that they will lose more from suffering wrongs than they will gain from doing them. Being willing to make such a contract makes sense as long as (1) not all wrongs are compensated and (2) a contractor believes that more uncompensated wrongs are suffered than will be committed by that contractor. If all wrongs were compensated, then wrongdoers would end up no better off than if they had not done wrongs; and the wrong-sufferers would end up no worse off than if the wrongs had not been committed. Glaucon's contract will be accepted if there are many who believe that they will suffer more uncompensated wrongs (either in

the number of wrongs or in the value of the deprivations) than the number or value of those they can get away with. They will be worse off without the agreement. Similarly, the few who believe they will get away with more than they suffer will be unwilling to contract. Perhaps they will see themselves as lions among the sheep, like Callicles in the Gorgias. Insofar as we think of acts of injustice transferring a benefit from the person who suffers such an act to the person who does it, the Glauconian contract depends on (the expectation of) successful wrongdoing being unequally spread among the population.

Moreover, this view seems generally to suppose that wrongdoing is desirable only for the sake of the advantages that it brings. There is no contention that injus- tice is desirable as a good of the category of things welcomed for their own sakes. Nor is wrongdoing presented as belonging to the category of things both good in themselves and good for their consequences. One commits wrongs, it seems, because wrongdoing confers advantages, not because it is wanted for itself.

Perhaps this should be clarified. What I am contending is that Glaucon's posi- tion is that one commits wrongs to satisfy one's desires, to get what one wants. I do not think that there is a suggestion that one commits wrongs just because they are wrongs - no suggestion that pure delight in wickedness moves the wrongdoer. Glaucon holds that wrongdoing is instrumental; the possibility of gratuitous evil is not considered. Indeed, Glaucon seems to regard morality (justice) and immorality (injustice) as contending on the same ground: the question is, which of these makes one better off?.

As i have argued above, Glaucon and Socrates disagree on how acts of doing

wrong and suffering wrong are to be ranked. They also differ on how moral and immoral (or just and unjust) lives are to be ranked. Glaucon challenges Socrates by

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M.M. Goldsmith 359

suggesting that an immoral life is more advantageous, so much so that the moral person would choose such a life if there were no danger of being caught and penal- ized. Glaucon recounts the tale of Gyges ' ring, which made its wearer invisible. The wearer could then do whatever he liked without fear of being caught. With such a ring the outwardly just man would take whatever he wanted from the market, enter any house and 'sleep with whomever he chooses' and release anyone from

prison. 'His behaviour would be identical' to the immoral (or unjust) man. People act morally because they are forced to; 'the point is that the rewards of immorality outweigh those of morality' . Being moral when one can be immoral and get away with it is foolish (359c-360e).

The life of immorality (or injustice) does not involve acting unjustly as a matter of principle. For such a person 'act unjustly' is not a categorical imperative. The immoral person is one who seeks the advantages gained by doing wrong, but does not do wrong for its own sake and so does not do wrong on every occasion. The immoral person does wrong when he can get away with it. But the moral or just

person will be one who always acts justly, or, at least, does not do wrong when he can get away with it (or thinks he can get away with it). The moral (just) person does act morally 'on principle' while the immoral person acts on the policy of seek- ing his own advantage.

Glaucon further specifies that his immoral person is to be an expert at wrongdo-

ing. He 'must get away with any crimes he undertakes in the proper fashion'; 'getting caught must be taken as a sign of incompetence, since the acme of immoral- ity is to give an impression of morality while actually being immoral' . Thus, the successful immoral person will have honour and reputation. Should that person be caught, he will have the ability either to argue his way out of it or to use force if

necessary, relying on his own strength, courage and financial resources or on friends (360d-361b).

So we can designate the immoral life as W: a life in which a person performs wrong or unjust acts whenever they seem to pay off and that person (generally or at least usually) gets away with them, that is, does not get caught and does not have to pay compensation for wrongful acts. But in addition to the natural outcome of acts of wrongdoing, the benefits and advantages obtained from those acts, Glaucon has described the successful immoral person as having a reputation for being moral, and thus acquiring the rewards, honour, offices and respect that goes with such a reputa- tion. Call those rewards r. So the consummate unjust person's life is W + r.

The moral person, on the other hand, is to be not only moral on principle but to have a reputation for immorality and to suffer pains and penalties which include tor- ture and even death (361b-d). Call the moral life J and the pains and penalties which are suffered p, so the life of the just person is J + p. These pains and penal- ties are not deserved by the just person, so we may think of each such item for a just person as an instance of suffering a wrong, s.

If we expand what Glaucon says to include the full range of possibilities, his challenge proposes the following ranking of lives:

G1. W + r

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360

G2. J + r

G3. W G4. J G5. W + p

G6. J + p

Glaucon" s Challenge

If the choices were really between G2 and G5, if the reputations for morality or immorality were (almost) never disconnected from the reality and so each brought the rewards and penalties which they are supposed to, then the just life would be the

better choice. By supposing that the rewards for a moral life and penalties for an immoral one might be detached or rearranged, Glancon reveals the underlying val-

ues in the ranking. The immoral person, receiving the rewards attached to a good reputation, lives the best life, then comes the moral person receiving the rewards of such a life, followed by the immoral person who does not get those rewards and the unrecognized, unpenalized moral person. At the bottom, the unjust person who gets the penalties still does better than the just person who is penalized. In Glaucon's ranking the consummate immoral person comes top and the model just person, stripped of all the rewards usually connected with a reputation for justice but sub- jected to the most severe criminal penalties, comes bottom.

What is evident in the ranking, as in Glaucon's discussion, is the notion that the

principal motive for moral conduct is the external rewards for the way one acts. The moral or just life, as Adeimantus points out, is recommended because it produces those rewards (362e-363a). Glaucon explici t ly requires that the consummate immoral person have the reputation and rewards of justice. Thus, stripping away the external rewards strips away the motive for acting justly.

But if only the rewards count, why is the immoral life with the rewards of a moral reputation better than the moral life with the same rewards? Should these two lives not rank equally, given that they both receive the rewards which attach to a reputation for justice?

But that objection fails to take account of the advantages gained by acts of injus- tice. As shown above, those acts are conceived of as appropriating a benefit or advantage. Thus the immoral life will include a number of acts of injustice, w, by which some benefit has been gained. Any single such act for which the immoral person has not had to pay compensation, - c, will make the immoral life better, more

advantageous, and so rank it above an otherwise similar moral life - a life in which no wrongs are committed and no such advantages acquired. It is on the basis of the possibility that an immoral life with penalties, W + p, will contain at least one such uncompensated injustice that it must rank higher than a moral life with penalties, J + p, which can contain no such, w, act. Although the only motive for moral conduct is that conventional rewards are attached to that conduct, the motives for immoral actions are the usual (natural) consequences of those actions.

Since the immoral life has advantages, one might conceive of a version of that life with penalties less severe than those mentioned by Glaucon. After all, those

penalties include torture and death by being impaled on a stake. Where would such a life rank? Clearly it would be better than G5, the immoral life with the full quota

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M.M. Goldsmith 361

of Glaucon's penalties. But there is a case for ranking some reduced penalty immoral lives as better than 4, the unrecognized, unpenalized moral life, J. As long as the uncompensated wrongs gave the immoral person greater benefits than the penalties imposed, the immoral life would be better than the moral life. So one might conceive of G3*, where the total compensations and pains, xc + yp, were of less value than the total advantages gained from uncompensated wrongs, zw. And G3*, although it is a version of G5, would be preferable to G4, J. On the values involved in Glaucon's ranking, the benefits and advantages of such a life make it better than a life without any such advantages or benefits.

Moreover, G2 can only be regarded as superior to G3* on the condition that the conventional rewards of the moral life are great enough so that they outweigh the advantages gained from unpenalized and uncompensated wrongs in a life in which the unjust man sometimes has to pay compensation or is penalized for wrongs.

The argument behind Glaucon's statement of the common view might be sketched like this:

(1)

(2) (3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

If.justice is better than injustice, then you do better from it. And the same is true of injustice. You do better by getting the advantages of satisfying your desires. The fewer restrictions on satisfying your desires, the more satisfac- tions you get. Restrictions on satisfying desires are of two types: (a) external (pro- hibitions and penalties); (b) internal (justice or morality). Being (carefully) unjust provides fewer restrictions on satisfying desires: it minimizes the danger of external restrictions, thus approaching the circumstances of Gyges ' ring, and it eliminates internal restrictions. You do better by (careful) injustice.

In line with Glaucon's presentation of the case, the sketch puts aside the possibil- ity that one might do better by seeking to be bribed with the conventional rewards for real or apparent justice.

The argument has several problems. Firstly, there is a problem about (3). As several commentators (notably Crombie and Irwin) have pointed out, a system of restrictions is required for social life. Without such a system everyone would be worse off. Glancon's contract makes the point that most people would be better off with such a system. But the carefully unjust person, and the possessor of Gyges' ring as well, benefits from the system of restrictions by being subject to fewer acts of injustice. So even the possessor of the ring would avoid actions that endangered the maintenance of the system. 6

Both Crombie and Irwin recognize that maintenance of the system imposes only a minor degree of self-restraint. They accept that (3) only needs a bit of modifica- tion, for example, add 'as long as the system of restrictions required for social life is

6 See Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, pp. 186-187; Crombie, Plato'sDoctrines, vol./, p. 87.

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362 Glaucon's Challenge

maintained'. But perhaps the restriction involved is even slighter than the commen- tators suppose. The maintenance of a system of morality is a 'public good' in that it is a good provided jointly by the independent actions of a large number of contribu- tors. It is in one's self-interest to contribute to such a good only if the benefit one gains outweighs the costs one incurs. That condition is fulfilled if one's contribu- tion will make the crucial difference to whether the good is provided or not Normally, a single action will not make a perceptible difference to the success or failure of the provision of such a public good. The carefully unjust man does not get caught or justifies himself when he does. He has no reputation for immorality. So it looks as if maintaining the system will impose few if any further restraints on his actions.

Secondly, (2) seemingly avoids the important question of which category of good justice and injustice belong to, by assuming that they are to be evaluated only by comparing their consequences for satisfying desires, Perhaps there isn't a prob- lem about putting aside the question of whether justice and injustice could be the sort of momentary, harmless pleasures that are included in the first category because, being personal characteristics, they obviously are not fleeting experiences.

It looks as if Glaucon simply begs the question by treating them as goods of the third category - things unpleasant but with beneficial consequences, like exercise and medical treatment. But it is odd to class personal characteristics as unpleasant but necessary instruments. No doubt it is easy to think of justice or morality as purely instrumental, like 'minding one's manners' in being a constraint on how one behaves; it is somewhat painful and a nuisance, but one does it for the sake of get- ting on better in some social situation. But thinking of immorality or injustice as a painfully necessary instrument adopted for some advantage seems somewhat odder: is injustice to be seen, like justice, as restricting how one might satisfy one's desires?

One possibility is that Plato simply slips up here by failing to recognize that Glaucon should have produced an argument showing that morality is a purely instrumental good. Another is that Glaucon is simply presented as begging the question. Nonetheless those explanations seem Unsatisfactory. Clearly the dialogue emphasizes the problem of what type of good justice is, Socrates expressed dissatis- faction with the previous discussion by complaining that he did not yet know what morality itself is. Glaucon proposes his classification of goods to discover what sort of good it is. He claims to be reasser t ing T h r a s y m a c h u s ' a rgument and Thrasymachus had asserted that the unjust or immoral man is superior in character (at Republic 344c). Moreover, Callicles' position (Gorgias 491e-492b) is substan- ti'vety similar. He contends that the superior man attempts to develop his desires and to increase his satisfactions rather than restrict them within the bounds of what is conventionally right. Again, Glaucon specifically asks Socrates to show what morality and immorality are intrinsically, on their own. The demand itself suggests that Glaucon is being presented as recognizing that they are not purely third catego- ry, instrumental goods.

It may be that the point here is to emphasize that the sole criterion for evaluating character traits on this theory is how they affect the satisfying of one's desires.

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M.M. Goldsmith 363

When Thrasymachus and Callicles contend for the superiority of the person who rejects the restrictions of conventional morality, the criterion that each uses is that such a person gets more satisfactions of desires. Glaucon challenges Socrates to produce any other criterion on which anyone can do better.

Socrates' values in the Republic and elsewhere suggest a different ranking of lives and a different criterion for doing better. After the discussion has moved to constructing the best state, identifying the virtues in the state and in the individual, showing the parallel between the different types of individuals and states, Glaucon provides a Platonic (or Socratic) ranking. He ranks the most moral life best and the most immoral life worst.

Socrates asks should he hire a town crier or himself proclaim that the son of Ariston has judged the happiest person to be the best and most moral person - that is, the person who possesses the highest degree of regal qualities and who rules as king over himself? And that he has also judged the unhappiest person to be the worst and most immoral person - that is, the person who possesses the highest degree of dictatorial qualities and rules as completely as possible as a dictator over himself and his community? [580a-c]

But if the best life is the most moral one and the worst is the most immoral one, where do the other possibilities fit in? The ranking on Socrates' values (call it the Platonic ranking) is not a simple reversal of the earlier ranking. That reversal would make the worst life that of the successfully immoral person, as Socrates proposes. But it would put the martyr's life as the best one.

A more likely re-ordering is one in which the just and unjust lives in each pair reverse their order, G2 over G1, G4 over G3 and G6 over G5. What would that involve? Socrates would only have to oppose the argument in favour of immorality by contending that 'you do betterby being moral'. But how might justice pay? The benefits of morality might outweigh those of immorality because morality was more efficacious in helping one satisfy one's desires. You don't do better without the restrictions of morality, you do better with them, because those restrictions help in desire satisfaction. Morality encodes the best ways of getting what you want. Such a line of argument might be suggested at Republic 351b-352a where Socrates attempts to show, against Thrasymachus, that immoral persons cannot Cooperate with each other. One consequence of losing the benefits of cooperation is satisfying fewer of one's desires. So, you do better, you get more of your desires satisfied, by being moral. 7

But Socrates does not attempt to meet Glaucon's case for immorality on these grounds, which essentially make morality a good because of its consequences. Instead, he contends that morality is better because its possession provides a good which outweighs both any satisfactions of desires immorality might provide and also any external rewards or penalties.

This seems close to David Gauthier's position in Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

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364 Glaucon ' s Challenge

So, I propose that the Platonic ranking should look like this:

P1. J + r

P2. J P3. J + p P4. W + p

P5. W P6. W + r 8

What is most striking about the ranking is that all the moral lives are better than the immoral lives. That exhibits the contention that the possession of morality and the psychological harmony it involves is the most important thing. Much less sig- nificant are the external, social rewards and penalties which Glaucon's challenge rated so highly.

The position about satisfying desires is also different. Clearly some desires, for example, the 'terrible, wild and lawless desires' mentioned at Republic 571b-572b, ought not to be satisfied. Again, some pleasures and satisfactions are better than others (584-587; 558e-589c). The moral person, possessing Platonic justice, satis- fies those desires which it is better to satisfy and suppresses desires it is worse to satisfy. The criterion for assessing personal character traits is no longer that of which helps satisfy desires, but which enables one to satisfy the right desires and refrain from satisfying the wrong ones. So, the Platonically moral person is better off and the immoral person worse off 'whether or not their condition is hidden from the eyes of gods and men' (580c). Moreover, since it is better to suffer wrong than to do it, P3 (the moral life with tortures and penalties) must rank above any of the immoral lives.

Should there be such a Platonic ranking at all? Surely what counts for Plato is whether one is a moral person or an immoral one, the rewards and penalties are unimportant. There is a sense in which the ranking obscures the lexical character of the values involved. But an ordinal ranking should not suggest that the value dis- tances between the alternatives are equal or similar. Admittedly, the value distance between P3 and P4 is not similar to that between P1 and P2 or P2 and P3. The dif- ferences in value among the first three lives are insignificant. But all ranking them requires is that there be some preference between alternatives.

As long as we remember that the distinctions involved in ranking the three ver- sions of the moral life can involve relatively trivial characteristics, it seems fairly straightforward to rank them. It is never, I think, suggested that the external penal- ties mentioned by Glaucon, viz., suffering, being torturedl being afflicted with physical pain, being reputed immoral, dying by being impaled on a stake, are good or desirable in themselves and/or in their consequences. These ills cannot outweigh the good of having Platonic justice in one's soul. That is what Socrates sets out to prove - that morality is desirable in itself and that one would choose it even if it were accompanied by all these penalties (i.e., that P3 ranks above P4). But Socrates

8 Nick Rengger suggested that it might be possible to give exemplars for each of the positions. Clearly Socrates at the end of his life occupies P3. One might suggest Hitler or Stalin for P6.

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M.M. Goldsmith 365

does not argue that experiencing suctgpenalties strengthens character; they are not themselves beneficial or ennobling. Martyrdom is not sought for its own sake. Although the Guardians are tested by being exposed tOpain and pleasure, it does not seem to be the case that the self-discipline involved is produced by their experiences (412e-414a). Consequently, P3 is worse than P2. In any case if these experiences do not provide some good, P2 must be at least as good as P3; in other words it must be weakly preferred to it. 9 So P2 and P3 are correctly ordered.

What about P1 and P2? Can the usual rewards consequent on a good reputation - these are listed by Adeimantus as power, a good marriage, being thought well of by gods and men - justify ranking P1 above P2? I think they can. I take it that there is nothing in themselves bad about these things, nor do they make a good per- son worse. Had Plato regarded honour and power in the form of political office as evil or corrupting, then he would have to have chosen different institutions for the best state of the Republic. After all, the Guardians hold political office and are hon- oured by other citizens. Again, towards the end of the Republic (580d-583a), Plato discusses how the pleasures experienced by the philosopher, the lover of honour and the lover of wealth are to be ranked. The philosopher turns out to be the best judge of these pleasures, and consequently how to live one's life, because the philosopher experiences all these types of pleasure. So there seems nothing harmful or debasing about having the rewards of honour and respect, provided that one does not rank them higher than the good of having justice in one's soul. So P1 must be at least as good as P2. If these rewards are of any value, no matter how small, no matter that their value is insignificant compared with the value of possessing Platonic justice, then P1 must be weakly preferred to P2.

At first glance the bottom half of the Platonic ranking also looks puzzling. It seems odd to say that P5 (the immoral life without rewards or penalties) is better than the immoral life with rewards (P6) and worse than the immoral life with penal- ties (P4). How can that be the case if, as has been argued above, a moral life with rewards (P1) is better than one without them (P2) which is in turn better than a moral life with penalties (P3)? Surely the immoral person would be better off with the rewards and without the penalties.

Understanding the ordering of the bottom half of the Platonic ranking requires that we remember that the situation of the moral person and the immoral person are different. The immoral person who escapes punishment is worse off than the one who is punished. This counter-intuitive position is taken by Socrates at Gorgias

472e:

On my view of it, Polus, a man who acts unjustly, a man who is thoroughly unjust, is thoroughly miserable, the more so if he doesn't get his due punish- ment for the wrongdoing he commits, the less so if he pays and receives

The notion of 'weak' preference is that for any two states, x and y, x is preferred to y or is indif- ferent to it. Whereas 'strong' preference requires that x be regarded as better than y, 'weak' preference only requires that x be at least as good as y; thus, between a and b, weak preference for a is the contrary of strong preference for b. See K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) pp. 11-17.

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366 Glaucon" s Challenge

what is due at the hands of both gods and men. 1°

Punishment is due to the immoral person; that person would be worse off for not receiving it.

The Gorgias position is asserted at Republic 335a-d and at 379b-380c. Nothing which is good can be harmful, damage anything or make it worse. If plays about, for example, the Trojan Wars are written,

the playwrights must either be prohibited from saying that God was respon- sible for these events, or if they do attribute them to God, they have to come up with an explanation which approximates to the one we're looking for at the moment, and say that what God did was right and good, in the sense that the people in question were being punished and therefore benefited; but poets should be prohibited from saying that these people were in a bad way as a result of being punished and that this was God's doing. [Republic 380a-b]

Thus, the immoral are benefited by the penalties imposed for their wrongdoing. Whereas the moral person receiving penalties is suffering injustice, the immoral per- son is 'suffering' justice. Having justice done to them makes them better off rather than worse off: P4 (the life of the rightly penalized immoral person) is to be ranked higher than P5 (the life of the unpenalized wrongdoer).

But what of the ordering of P5 and P6? Is the wrongdoer who receives rewards to be regarded as worse off than the one who does not? That seems to be Plato's view. It appears most clearly in the discussion of the tyrannical personality and the comparison between the tyrannical person and the philosopher (Republic 576a- 580c). The tyrannical (or immoral) person is driven by uncontrollable desires and can trust no one, must fear everyone. But the immoral person would become even more miserable by having the misfortune to end up as an actual ruler (578c). As a ruler, holding the highest office, such a person may be presumed to have a sufficien- cy of worldly goods and to receive at least outward honour and respect. The immoral person in that position (P6) is worse off than the merely private person (P5).

So, on the Platonic ranking, the moral person has the best life and the worst situ- ation is being a truly unjust person, a tyrant, who gets away with it. The rankings correctly exhibit the views expressed by Socrates in the Republic that what 'is impor- tant is having the quality of justice or morality in one's s0ul, that doing wrong is worse than suffering wrong, that external rewards and penalties are of only minor importance, that doing justice to someone cannot make that person worse off, that the wrongdoer is better off being punished for injustice.

Thus morality pays: you do better by having justice in your soul. Its good is more important than external goods; it outweighs them and external penalties. It makes you better off, not because it maximizes the satisfying of your desires but

10 Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald A. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987).

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M.M. Goldsmith 367

because it enables you better to satisfy the right desires and repress the wrong ones. Conventional wisdom, as Glaucon describes it, correctly recommends the moral life over the immoral one. But, as ranking the conventional preferences reveals, it does so for implicitly hedonistic reasons. The Platonic rankings are based on the right reasons for preferring the moral life.

Victoria University of Wellington Received December 1993 Revised November 1994

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