BOOK REVIEW

Hans-Helmuth Gander, Nils Godschmidt, and UweDathe (eds.): Phanomenologie und die Ordnung derWirtschaft. Edmund Husserl, Rudolf Eucken, WalterEucken, Michel Foucault

2009, Ergon Verlag, 178 + viii pp

Radu Cristescu

Published online: 3 August 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

The appeal of exploring the affinities between one of the great philosophers of the

20th century, Edmund Husserl, and one of the great German economists of the 20th

century, Walter Eucken, the preeminent figure of ordoliberalism and one of the

intellectual founding fathers of West Germany, is easily understandable. In cultural

terms one could say Eucken was born into philosophy. His father, Rudolf Eucken, a

philosopher who is all but forgotten today, was extraordinarily popular in the first

decades of the last century, even winning a Nobel Prize for literature. Walter

Eucken taught economics at Freiburg, where he met and befriended Husserl.

Eucken’s writings abound in methodological considerations, where Husserl is

referenced occasionally. Therefore, Husserl has long been suspected of holding the

key to a better understanding of Eucken, a claim taken more seriously after Michel

Foucault notoriously endorsed it. Foucault asserts that Husserl exerted an important

influence on Eucken and the other ordoliberals and, by implication, on the new form

of liberalism, which presumably dominated the West after the Second World War

(2004: 123f., 328). Yet Foucault’s presentation suffers both from a lack of formal

precision and from adopting a hurried bird’s eye perspective over a vast number of

sources, thinkers, and theories, meant to illustrate the emergence of a neoliberal

‘‘governmentality’’.

The volume under review tackles the theme of the relationship between

phenomenology and the theory of economic orders by exploring common themes

present in the works of the four authors mentioned above: Walter and Rudolf

Eucken, Husserl, and Foucault. The unifying theme of the book, as the editors

announce in the Introduction (p. vii), is the link between Eucken’s economics and

Husserl’s phenomenology and, more ambitiously, the possibility of a phenomeno-

logically grounded science of economics.

R. Cristescu (&)

Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

e-mail: raducristescu@yahoo.com

123

Hum Stud (2013) 36:441–449

DOI 10.1007/s10746-013-9283-z

Tracing the exact extent of Husserl’s influence on Eucken is not an easy matter.

Eucken’s main references, even in his methodological writings, are to other social

scientists and professional economists (Weber, Thunen, Schmoller, or Menger); the

problems he addresses were formulated in the great methodological debates

between German-speaking economists since the end of the 19th century; and his

theory of economic orders (Ordnungsokonomik), deemed as his chief contribution,

is not ostensibly indebted to phenomenology in particular. Furthermore, Eucken

never regarded recommended himself as a phenomenologist, or a disciple of Husserl

in particular.

The relationship between Walter Eucken and Husserl has been examined in a

relatively small number of previous works, ranging from the ones which argue that

Eucken’s methodology consistently applies phenomenological principles (see

Herrmann-Pillath 1991; Weisz 2000), to those that suggest phenomenology should

be counted as one influence among many in Eucken’s work (Goldschmidt 2002;

Klump 2003)—to those who consider this influence negligible (Pies 2001). That is

to say, there is no ruling consensus and much room for debate in respect to the

subject matter at hand.

The book’s structure reflects the range of interests and perspectives of its

contributors. A slim volume, it has within its 175 pages of text no less than ten

chapters, divided under three generous headings: Biographical, Analytical, and

Perspectives. What strikes here is the variety of perspectives—wide indeed:

historical-biographical, continental and analytical philosophy, heterodox econom-

ics, sociology, and political science.

Walter Eucken’s biography certainly invites researchers to trace the phenom-

enological connection. Eucken became a professor at Freiburg in 1928, around the

time of Husserl’s retirement, and he regarded the latter as a mentor and as a friend.

Their friendship grew during Husserl’s illness and increasing marginalisation.

Walter Eucken shared Husserl’s hostility towards the Nazi regime and opposed the

candidature for rectorship of Husserl’s apostate disciple, Martin Heidegger. That

does not, however, answer the question of the significance of this meeting outside

the purely personal realm.

The biographical section of the book consists of two chapters, written by Thomas

Vongehr and by Uwe Dathe, respectively. It shows very well how the meeting

between Eucken and Husserl happened not only by virtue of location, but also

because of Eucken’s long-standing admiration towards the philosopher. Evidence,

also presented here, indicates Rudolf Eucken’s high regard and early support for

Husserl’s career. These two chapters fail, however, to offer a satisfying answer to

crucial questions. How can Husserl’s substantive influence be traced through

Eucken’s biography and through his frequent personal exchanges with Husserl?

What were, if any, Eucken’s particular views on Husserl’s philosophy? It seems

there is no evidence of any sustained and fruitful discussions, let alone written

exchanges between Husserl and Eucken on economic or philosophical topics.

Opening the Analytical section, Ferdinand Fellmann’s chapter represents a brief

attempt to evaluate Husserl’s legacy by comparing it with Rudolf Eucken’s

‘philosophy as worldview (Weltanschauung)’. This chapter can be seen as a summary

of previous research, which made Fellmann’s reputation as a maverick Husserlian and

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as one of the few contemporary philosophers who engage with Rudolf Eucken’s work

(see Fellmann 1983, 1989). The thrust of Fellmann’s chapter is the ‘thesis on the idea

of philosophy’ (p. 38) that philosophy should reconcile a scientific approach to

philosophy (in Husserl’s terms) with philosophy as worldview (taking the term in

Rudolf Eucken’s sense, i.e., ‘‘the way in which people relate scientific knowledge

(wissenschaftliche Erkentnisse) with their self-understanding,’’ p. 38). A corroborated

reading of both philosophers, argues Fellmann, would show how the two converge

towards this idea, or at least how the elder Eucken’s work provides the adequate

framework for a new interpretation of Husserl. As such, Fellmann’s contribution falls

outside the stated scope of the volume, if not for some terminological clarifications

and a succinct but clear exposition of Rudolf Eucken’s main ideas. The latter’s

conceptual instruments are bound to seem quaint today after rusting unused for more

than half a century. Fellmann acknowledges this drawback, and helpfully walks the

reader through the meaning of ‘spiritual life,’ the ‘noological method,’ and

‘syntagma’—essential concepts in Rudolf Eucken’s philosophical language.

Rudolf Eucken is also the focus of the next chapter, authored by Jan Renker, who

discusses a common theme between Rudolf Eucken, Husserl, and Walter Eucken:

that of the ‘crisis of the modern world’. As Fellmann also noted, this is the theme

Rudolf Eucken was perhaps best known for in his time. He was celebrated chiefly as

a thinker of the ‘spiritual crisis’ of the Western world, induced by the simultaneous

disaggregation of spiritual values and the advancement of ‘material progress’. His

ethics was grounded in the possibility of imbuing material (technical, scientific, as

well as social) progress with new spiritual worth. The capacity to manipulate and

understand more of the natural and social world confronts the ever increasing desire

towards individual autonomy, happiness, and self-assertion.

In support of his conclusion, that the father begat the son also philosophically,

Renker adduces evidence that Walter Eucken also speaks of the spiritual roots of the

economic crisis, and of the necessity to understand its ‘deep dimensions’—

especially in his early writings, which are the focus of analysis here.

Renker shows the ambivalence of Rudolf Eucken’s analysis. Eucken’s diagnosis

of the spiritual crisis, his examination of the ‘spiritual problem’ (Geistesproblem) or

of the ‘human problem’ (Menschenproblem), did not lead him to reject modernity

wholesale, with its material, intellectual, economic, and political progress. Rudolf

Eucken’s diagnosis of the crisis is perhaps too vast to lend itself to a clear social

remedy. If the crisis he deplores stems from the ‘syntagma’ (in Fellmann’s

philosophical translation, the ‘paradigm’) of modernity, then nothing less than a

new form of spiritual life is needed. Understandably, he falls short of prescribing a

set of solutions for a problem that originates in intractable oppositions between

long-term developments, which in themselves are neither decidedly good, nor

decidedly evil. Because of this ambivalence, the significance of Rudolf Eucken’s

diagnose of a ‘spiritual crisis’ of the West for a social thinker such as his son (or, for

that matter, for social science in general) is not immediately apparent.

It is indeed likely that the father’s outlook influenced the son’s. Yet, that does not

amount to a convincing argument that Walter Eucken’s analysis of the spiritual

crisis ‘‘remains (…) within the framework of his father’s thought’’ (p. 60). First, that

framework is large enough for its conclusions to remain indeterminate. Besides, the

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knack for addressing the ‘spiritual’ causes of the crisis of the Western world was by

no means a preserve of the two Euckens. As Renker himself shows, similar ideas

were abundant around 1900. Walter Eucken’s contemporaries—among them,

Ortega y Gasset, Walter Lippmann, Schumpeter, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Hayek, and

the fellow ordoliberal Wilhelm Ropke, (to quote only those in Walter Eucken’s

intellectual vicinity)—were, at various times and lengths, discussing the crisis of the

West in similar terms. Perhaps more importantly, Walter Eucken never developed

his view of the spiritual crisis into a grand theory of civilisation.

To be fair, Renker is prepared to acknowledge these objections. He seems,

however, undecided between making the argument that his father’s influence was

important for Walter Eucken’s intellectual development, and arguing that Rudolf

Eucken’s philosophical views on the crisis of the modern world help explain the

son’s views on the economic order of the industrialised society. The first is a broad

argument, unspectacular maybe, but plausible; the latter is in need of better

evidence.

A clearer argument about theoretical transmission from father to son seems to be

possible from an epistemological perspective. Nils Goldschmidt identifies, in his

contribution, instances in the economist’s work where the influence of his father is

traceable. He mentions Walter Eucken’s appeal to the method of reduction (of the

sensory-empirical content to general statements) as a means to obtain true theories

and his criticism of empiricism as an arbitrary method of selecting observations. But

the most important influence Rudolf had on Walter Eucken is, argues Goldschmidt,

that he gave him the impetus towards a ‘‘critique of knowledge,’’ which prompted

the economist to question the epistemic foundations of his discipline and to rethink

them with the help of other theorists. This brings us back to Husserl.

Nils Goldschmidt tackles directly the question of Husserl’s influence on Eucken.

His argument is that such an influence can be detected in Eucken’s view on the

architectonics of science. Apart from some terminological and conceptual

similarities, Goldschmidt deems more important Eucken’s Husserlian claim to

rebuild the economic science from the ground up, in opposition to a purely

‘positivistic’ (i.e., empiricist) perspective. This aspiration towards a science

consisting of ‘‘universally valid truths, independent of arbitrariness and subjectiv-

ity,’’ based on ‘verites de raison,’ rather than tentative generalisations, a science that

rejects relativism, is better understandable, argues Goldschmidt, by reference to

Husserl. Goldschmidt rightly resists the temptation of reading too much in the

analogies between Walter Eucken and Husserl. He distinguishes clearly between the

economist’s ‘intention, i.e., the quest for truth,’ which he places under the influence

of Husserl, and a ‘strict methodological parallel’ between the two thinkers (p. 79;

emphasis in the original). Goldschmidt rejects the latter on account of it being

unsupported by careful reading. In other words, Walter Eucken borrows from

Husserl a certain idea of science, rather than a set of methodological instruments, or

a thoroughly phenomenological perspective.

This and Goldschmidt’s previous work (Goldschmidt 2002) reveals the pitfalls of

trying to discern the influence of the philosopher by picking out seemingly

analogous terms, without regard to the role these terms play in the economist’s

works. Although Goldschmidt identifies a series of Husserlian concepts in Eucken’s

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work (such as the particular use of ‘verites de raison’, or the analogy between

Eucken’s distinction ‘actuality/truth’ (Aktualitat/Wahrheit) and Husserl’s ‘law/fact’

(Gesetz/Tatsache) distinction), he points out that the methodological principle of

reduction, as understood by Eucken, has only a superficial similarity with Husserl’s

phenomenological reduction.

The next chapter in the volume, written by Hans Albert, illustrates the opposite

interpretation procedure: that of reconstructing Eucken’s methodology on a

different—and alien to Eucken—philosophical perspective: that of critical rational-

ism. The reader will not be surprised to find that, for the respected Popperian,

Eucken’s claim to have uncovered the empirical foundation of economic reasoning in

the ‘concentrated isolating abstraction’ (pointierend hervorhebende Abstraktion)

from ‘every-day experience’ (alltagliche Erfahrung) is nonsense. Drawing on his

earlier work (Albert 1984), as well as from fellow critical rationalist Willhelm

Meyer’s analysis (Meyer 2002), Albert directs his criticism to what Eucken famously

called ‘pointierend hervorhebende Abstraktion,’ a throwback to Weber’s ideal types,

alloyed with Thunen’s ‘isolating method’ and, as Goldschmidt argues, set on the

foundations laid out by Rudolf Eucken and Husserl. Albert argues that what Eucken

refers to as ‘observations’ (Beobachtungen), the first step towards theory building, are

by no means ‘simple observations’. Eucken’s ‘reduction of what is given’ (Reduktion

des Gegebenen) to the ‘pure instances’ (reine Falle) presupposes some theoretical

apparatus that allows the identification of relevant causal relationships.

In fact, argues Albert, Eucken fails to offer a serious treatment of the problem of

the relationship between theories and data. Since Eucken lacks a useful method-

ology of ‘reduction’ or ‘abstraction’ of the empirical data to ideal types, he cannot

claim that theories built on such foundations are necessarily true to the facts

independently of a certain ‘space–time context’ (Zeit-Raum-Bezug). Deduction from

such empirical foundations retains no ‘causal’ or ‘nomological’ explanatory power.

Hence, theories are merely tools for contextual descriptions, which cannot claim any

epistemic superiority to the other historical theories Eucken dismisses—with good

reason, according to Albert. In this sense, Eucken’s methodology represents ‘‘a

victory of historicism within economic thought’’ (p. 93).

These arguments extend also over Eucken’s theory of orders. Albert is

sympathetic towards Ordnungstheorie, and is not willing to deny its ‘fruitfulness,’

allegedly gained in spite of the stated methodological principles. Nevertheless, he

argues that the theory of orders suffers from Eucken’s reluctance to formulate his

theories as empirically falsifiable nomological hypotheses. As such, the theory of

orders does not explain (erklart) economic orders, but provides a rich impression-

istic account of institutional interdependencies, with some ‘heuristic relevance’ (p.

95). Albert’s contribution reveals the difficulties inherent in interpreting Eucken and

perhaps justifies unwittingly the research initiative behind the volume at hand.

Albert makes a series of judgements, which are bound to seem problematic for those

with different philosophical sensibilities. For instance, the appeal to ‘factual truths,’

which Eucken takes as exact descriptions of ‘everyday intuitions’ (tagliche

Anschauungen) and opposes to the ‘verites de raison,’ is considered by Albert as

contradictory to the rejection of empiricism the economist otherwise professes. In

the same vein, the Euckenian ‘reduction’ is described as a ‘quasi-induction’. These

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examples attest the necessity of spelling out more rigorously the exact sense of

Eucken’s terms by setting them in the appropriate philosophical context. There is a

great deal to clarify both in regards to Eucken’s use of concepts such as evidence

(Evidenz), intuition (Anschauung), or experience (Erfahrung), which serve as

foundational building blocks for his theories, but the exact meaning of which is

often obscure for someone accustomed with today’s prevailing economic method-

ology. That being said, Albert’s examination of Eucken’s methodology exemplifies

how Eucken might be recuperated by social scientists who do not share the same

philosophical assumptions. It also suggests that Eucken should not be thought of as

above philosophical (or, as Albert argues, logical) error. His eclectic methodology

exposed him to the risk of misconstruing, as well as being misconstrued. After all,

he would not be the first economist whose valuable contributions rest on inadequate

foundations.

Two chapters in the last part of the volume (one by Walter Reese–Schaffer, the

other by Jan-Otmar Hesse and Frieder Vogelmann) are concerned with the

Foucaldian reading of ordoliberalism and of Walter Eucken in particular. Both

contributions (and Reese–Schafer’s in particular) offer competent reconstructions of

Foucault’s views on ordoliberalism and its relationship with the ‘neoliberal

governmentality’. Foucault’s arguments are presented clearly and more academi-

cally, yet lively, although unavoidably losing much of the illustrious Frenchman’s

entertaining lecturing style. Unfortunately, neither of these chapters contain a

critical commentary of Foucault’s perspective on German neoliberalism. Eucken’s

writings are not discussed outside Foucault’s second-hand reading. The reader will

not find here an extensive examination of Foucault’s claim that Husserlian

phenomenology offers the key to understanding what ordoliberalism hath wrought.

Take Foucault’s claim, restated by Hesse and Vogelmann in the volume (p. 139ff).

Foucault claims that Eucken departed from the neoclassical conception of markets

and competition because they betrayed the ‘naive naturalism’ (in Husserlian terms) of

classical liberalism. Instead, Eucken would have proposed a new concept of

competition by relying on transcendental phenomenology (again, Husserl’s), in which

competition becomes an Eidos, ‘analysed as an essence recognisable through

abstraction’ (durch Abstraktion erkanntes Wesen) (p. 140). One would expect some

reference to Eucken as proof for this exciting connection. Foucault offers none, and

neither the authors who present it here. Hesse and Vogelmann merely state that

Eucken ‘‘was schooled in phenomenology’’ (p. 130), something which presumably

lends sufficient credibility to Foucault’s interpretation.

Reese–Schafer mostly attempts to show that the French philosopher has been

vindicated in his diagnosis of neoliberalism. There are minor quibbles—Foucault

seems to have been excessive in his judgement that post-war Germans were too

keen to forget their history (p. 112) and he overplayed the opposition between the

Frankfurt and the Freiburg Schools (p. 114), but not enough, apparently, to

invalidate the overall argument. It is surprising in a volume dedicated in part to

Walter Eucken that even the most questionable Foucaldian claims, such as the

ordoliberal view implies a view of society as atomised and infinitely malleable, pass

without comment from the author (who, nevertheless, acknowledges that Foucault’s

interpretation is ‘‘somewhat crude,’’ p. 125).

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Hesse and Vogelmann’s chapter offers little else besides a restatement of

Foucault’s argument that the transformation of economic competition in a principle

for the praxis of governmentality is the hallmark of ordoliberalism. The authors

merely reiterate that Eucken was influenced by Husserl and competition was his

Eidos, that ordoliberalism implies a view of man as a rational entrepreneur, that for

ordoliberals the economic is the preeminent social order, and that in their writings

the state functions only as the watchman of ‘the economy’. It is doubtful, to say the

least, that the ordoliberal authors, and Eucken and his Freiburg colleagues in the first

place, would have recognised themselves in Foucault’s picture. True, as the

aforementioned contributors stress in turn, Foucault never claimed to be a faithful

interpreter of the authors he discussed. Whether this disclaimer is sufficient to

exonerate Foucault from a thorough confrontation to his sources is far from obvious.

It is even more problematic to what extent an interpretation that waives the pretence

of being true to the text it interprets can serve as a guide to those texts. Foucault is

an unavoidable reference for the interpretation of ordoliberalism and of Eucken’s

thought, first because he is probably the most famous among the economist’s

commentators, and secondly because his perspective remains fresh, wide, and

challenging. But if Foucault is to be employed as an aid in reading Walter Eucken

and in understanding Eucken’s place in the intellectual history of the 20th century,

then he must surely be approached with caution and critical rigour.1

Hermann Rauchenschwandtner authors the final chapter, in which he explores the

possibility for a phenomenological grounding for the science of economics, without

reference to Eucken. Rauchenschwandtner unfolds a Husserlian diagnosis of the

crisis in economics: a science without proper ontological foundations, split between

abstract mathematical modelling and behavioural (psychological) economics. He

laments the ‘non-phenomenological reduction’ of theory to a mere technique,

whereby the economic content proper of economics is reduced to the mathematics

of the ordinal calculus. Furthermore, Rauchenschwandtner argues that the technique

of economics, lacking a proper ontology, has become an insidious moral standard. It

is far from clear to what extent this critique of economics would have been endorsed

by Walter Eucken. Rauchenschwandtner proposes a path by which, starting from

‘sociological interpretations of the life-world,’ a new formal method, perhaps

keeping ordinal calculus, could be imagined. He acknowledges it might be

complicated, but does not despair. Rauchenschwandtner’s closing words seem to be

to the point, however, not only in relation to the reform of economics he advocates,

but also in reference to the task of discerning the contribution of phenomenology to

economic thinking: ‘‘[t]hat there is much to be accomplished here appears obvious’’

(p. 165).

The main virtue of the volume under review is that it presents a generous

overview of the scholarship regarding, directly or indirectly, the relationship

between phenomenology and (Eucken’s) economic theory. They reveal the exciting

promises and also the limits of this research, as well as the difficulties inherent in

attempting to tease out the similarities between a philosopher who was never

1 Surprisingly, one of the authors in this volume, Jan-Otmar Hesse, shows, unfortunately somewhere

else, how such a task can be accomplished; see, for example, Hesse (2007).

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particularly interested in economics and an economist who never claimed to be a

philosopher. The diversity of the perspectives contained in this volume constitutes

both its strength and its weakness. While all the main directions on the proposed

topic are represented, many of the chapters fit ill together and could have benefited

from a dialogue between the researchers. It is undoubtedly useful, but insufficient to

limit the extent of the discussion regarding the influence of the philosopher on the

economist at simply spotting out here and there similarities of argument and

phrasing. Unfortunately, that is an all too common procedure. It would be perhaps

necessary—although admittedly difficult—to engage with Eucken’s methodology

more deeply, at the level of substantive theory. That would shed more light on the

possible role of phenomenology in Eucken’s economics—and maybe on the

possibility of an economic phenomenology in general. Thus, for instance, Hans

Albert claims that the lack of nomological explanations in Eucken’s economic

theory undermine its scientific strength. Yet Eucken did not share Albert’s view that

the hypothetical-nomological method is more appropriate as an explanatory device,

at least in the realm of social sciences. Eucken himself viewed his theory of orders

primarily as an exact or ‘objective’ descriptive device, which would allow the

‘actualisation’ of what is commonly understood by economic theories or hypoth-

eses. It is possible to imagine that Eucken would have accepted some of Albert’s

arguments, while disputing the latter’s view on what economic theories should be

about.

In general, the contributions to this volume fail to answer a key question: What,

in Walter Eucken’s work, can be better understood through Husserl’s phenome-

nology? or, alternatively: What, if anything, is there missing if one attempts to

reconstruct Eucken’s arguments without reference to phenomenology? Economists

today often tend to gloss over the arcane philosophical foundations of Eucken’s

work. Are they wrong? Some contributions in the volume, such as Nils

Goldschmidt’s, provide a very useful direction for going further in a more elaborate

manner. Other contributors are less inclined to pursue this investigation, maybe

because they suspect there is little reward for such trouble after all.

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Foucault, M. (2004). Naissance de la biopolitique. Paris: Gallimard.

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