Philosophisches Kolloquium. Universität Leipzig. Lavin, D.
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Institut für Philosophie Philosophisches Kolloquium Wintersemester 2014/15 Organisation: Matthias Haase Kontakt: [email protected] Mittwoch, 22. Oktober 2014 Douglas Lavin (Cambridge/Leipzig) Forms of Rational Agency A measure of good and bad is internal to something falling under it when that thing falls under the measure in virtue of what it is. The concept of an internal standard has broad application. Compare the (external) standards arbitrarily imposed at a dog show with the (internal) standards of health at work in the veterinarian’s office. This paper is specifically about practical standards, measures of action, and thus measures deployed in deliberation and action. According to what is called constitutivism in the theory of practical reason and ethics, we comprehend the validity or authority of a standard of action by showing it to be an internal standard, specifically a standard internal to the self-conscious agency of what is under it. I am sympathetic to this ge- neral outlook. In a slogan: moral goodness is goodness of will. The most familiar way of developing such a view (Kantianism) as well as a familiar way of opposing it (Humeanism) implicitly presuppose an absolutist conception of rational agency: self-conscious, concept deploying agency can take only one determinate form. But we are not forced to choose between unhappy Kantian and Humean extremes if we admit the possibility of rational agents of distinct forms. This essay argues for the merits and viability of such pluralism within the constitutivist project of seeking the ground of practical normativity, especially the categorical demands of morality, in the form of our agency. Doing so is, I believe, a crucial first step in eventually coming to see the importance of the notion of human being in ethics. 19.00 Uhr, Neuer Senatssaal, Ritterstraße 26 InteressentInnen sind herzlich eingeladen!
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Philosophisches Kolloquium. Abstract
Transcript of Philosophisches Kolloquium. Universität Leipzig. Lavin, D.
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Institut fr Philosophie Philosophisches Kolloquium
Wintersemester 2014/15 Organisation: Matthias Haase
Kontakt: [email protected]
Mittwoch, 22. Oktober 2014
Douglas Lavin (Cambridge/Leipzig)
Forms of Rational Agency A measure of good and bad is internal to something falling under it when that thing falls under the measure in virtue of what it is. The concept of an internal standard has broad application. Compare the (external) standards arbitrarily imposed at a dog show with the (internal) standards of health at work in the veterinarians office. This paper is specifically about practical standards, measures of action, and thus measures deployed in deliberation and action. According to what is called constitutivism in the theory of practical reason and ethics, we comprehend the validity or authority of a standard of action by showing it to be an internal standard, specifically a standard internal to the self-conscious agency of what is under it. I am sympathetic to this ge-neral outlook. In a slogan: moral goodness is goodness of will. The most familiar way of developing such a view (Kantianism) as well as a familiar way of opposing it (Humeanism) implicitly presuppose an absolutist conception of rational agency: self-conscious, concept deploying agency can take only one determinate form. But we are not forced to choose between unhappy Kantian and Humean extremes if we admit the possibility of rational agents of distinct forms. This essay argues for the merits and viability of such pluralism within the constitutivist project of seeking the ground of practical normativity, especially the categorical demands of morality, in the form of our agency. Doing so is, I believe, a crucial first step in eventually coming to see the importance of the notion of human being in ethics.
19.00 Uhr, Neuer Senatssaal, Ritterstrae 26 InteressentInnen sind herzlich eingeladen!
Douglas Lavin (Cambridge/Leipzig)
