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Society for American Archaeology

Some Relationships between Behavioral and Evolutionary ArchaeologiesAuthor(s): Michael Brian SchifferReviewed work(s):Source: American Antiquity, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 643-662Published by: Society for American ArchaeologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/282009 .

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AS

SOME RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BEHAVIORALAND EVOLUTIONARY ARCHAEOLOGIES

MichaelBrianSchiffer

Diversity in archaeology's social theories is desirable, butfactioning of the discipline into antagonistic, paradigm-based

camps undermines he scientific enterprise.In order topromote effortsat buildingbridges betweendifferenttheoreticalpro-

grams, this paper examines relationships between behavioral archaeology and evolutionary (selectionist) archaeology.Potential commonground is broughtto light, incompatibilitiesare critically examined,andpossible synergies are explored.It is concluded that there is nofundamentalreason why these twoprograms cannot work in concert to achieve the goal of

explaining behavioral (or evolutionary) change in human societies. Whetherproductive relationships can be established

between otherprograms remains to be determinedon a case-by-case basis.

La diversidad de teorias sociales en arqueologia es necesaria,pero la partici6n de la disciplina enfacciones antagonisticasbasadas en paradigmassabotea la empresa cientifica. Parapromover esfuerzosdestinados a crearpuentes entreprogramasteoricos distintos, este articulo examina las relaciones entre arqueologia conductualy arqueologia evolucionista (selec-

cionista). Se resaltan las areas comunes,se examinancriticamente las incompatibilidades,y se exploranposibles sinergias.Se concluyeque no existen razonesfundamentalespor las que estos programasno puedan trabajaren conciertopara alcan-

zar la meta de explicar cambio conductual (o evolutivo)en sociedades humanas. Laposibilidad de que se establezcan rela-

ciones productivasentre otrosprogramas queda por determinarsecaso por caso.

Scienceconsists n groupingacts so thatgen-eral laws or conclusionsmay be drawn romthem

-Charles Darwin, The Autobiography ofCharlesDarwin, 1809-1882, p. 70

Since the early 1970s, processual archaeol-

ogy's social theory (sensu Schiffer 1988)hassufferedmany ndignitiesat thehandsof

critics (for useful discussions, see Lamberg-

Karlovsky 1989; Preucel 1991; Trigger 1989;

Yoffee and Sherratt1993). Even so, processual-ism-albeit now in manyvarieties-remains well

entrenched n everydaypractice,andit is doubtful

that any competingprogramwill be able to dis-

lodge it and achieve a comparable position ofdominance. For the foreseeable future, then, a

multitudeof minorityprograms, ncludingbehav-

ioral,evolutionary, ognitive,andMarxistarchae-

ologies, will struggle to win followers and alterdisciplinary practice (see discussions in

Wandsnider 992).As a result,archaeologistsmayneed to become accustomed to an abundanceof

seemingly incompatible ocial theories,contribut-

ing to the "thousandarchaeologies" previouslywelcomed(Schiffer1988:479).Althoughdiversityin social theory is desirable(Knapp 1996), divi-

sion of archaeology into antagonistic camps,

seemingly ncapableof engagingeach other n dis-

cussions of substantive issues, diminishes the

integrityof thedisciplineas a scientificenterprise.An alternativepatternof communicationcan

be envisioned. Instead of caricaturing,misrepre-

senting, or summarilydismissingrivalprograms,

archaeologists might make a diligent effort to

understand each other's social theory-maybeeven build some intellectual bridges. Perhapsbecause their positions on significant issues of

Michael Brian Schiffer * Departmentof Anthropology,Universityof Arizona,Tucson,AZ 85721

AmericanAntiquity, 61(4), 1996, pp. 643-662.

Copyright? by the Society forAmericanArchaeology

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AMERICANANTIQUITY

social theory lie between today's theoretical

extremes, some behavioral archaeologists are

eager to hold discussions with practitionersof

other programs (Walker et al. 1995:8); manypapers in ExpandingArchaeology (Skibo et al.

1995), for example, initiatepromisingdialogues

(e.g., McGuire 1995; Nielsen 1995; O'Brien and

Holland 1995b; Orser 1995; Senior 1995; Wylie

1995). Similarly, n the context of historicalcase

studies,I have alreadyexploitedcommongroundbetween behavioral and postprocessual archae-

ologies for explaining instances of behavioral

change pertaining to portable radios (Schiffer

1991) and early electric automobiles(Schifferet

al. 1994). Surprisingly,both studies also haveevolutionary eatures n thattheytreat,diachroni-

cally, the interplaybetween variationand selec-

tion processes (more on this below). Although

handling unconventional subjects, the portableradioandautomobileresearchesnonethelessraise

hopesthatadditionalworkalongtheselines mightlead eventually to a more integrateddiscipline

(see also Duke 1995).An explicit experiment n communication,his

paperexaminessomerelationships etweenbehav-

ioral and evolutionary archaeologies (both aredefinedbelow).That theremaybe important ela-

tionshipsbetweenthese two programshas already

been suggestedby severalevolutionists(O'BrienandHolland1995a:178-179, 193, 1995b;O'Brien

et al. 1994).Needlessto say,thestructure ndcon-

tent of the following discussionsreflect but one

behavioralarchaeologist's erspective.The relationships xaminedbetweenevolution-

aryandbehavioral rchaeologies reof threekinds.

First, areas of potentialcommon ground are set

forth;possibleshared enetsturnoutto be surpris-

ingly numerousandsignificant.Second,thepapertreats he assumptions f evolutionary rchaeologythatseem incompatiblewith behavioralprinciples.It is suggested hatsomeevolutionary ositionsare

insupportable nd,more importantly, re actually

peripheral-if not detrimental-to evolutionary

archaeology.Andthird,possiblesynergiesbetween

thetwoprograms reexplored. beginwitha brief

overviewof bothprograms.

Behavioral ArchaeologyAn outgrowthof processualarchaeology,behav-

ioral archaeologycrystallizedas an explicit pro-

gram in the early 1970s at the University of

Arizona (for a history, see Schiffer 1995a).

Confrontedeven thenby a plethoraof competingarchaeologies,J. JeffersonReid, William Rathje,andI offereda framework f fourinterdependent

strategiesfor reintegratinghe discipline (Reid et

al. 1975; Schiffer 1976:Chapter1). The founda-

tion of this frameworkis a new definition of

archaeology as "the study of the relationshipsbetween human behaviorand materialculturein

all times and all places" (Reid et al. 1975:864).The discipline, we maintained,had outgrownits

traditionalboundariesandwas reconfiguringas a

new science-a behavioralarchaeology.Behavioralarchaeologists,dependingon their

interests, ask idiographic (historical) or nomo-

thetic (general)questionsaboutthe relationshipsbetween people and artifacts (Reid et al. 1975;

Schiffer 1975a). Although behavioral theorists

tend to privilege nomothetic questions (e.g.,Schiffer 1975a, 1976, 1988, 1992), if only to

make up for theirprofoundneglect elsewhere in

the discipline, much behavioralarchaeologyhas

been idiographic.Behavioralistsemphatically ee

no conflict between history and science (Reid1995; Schiffer 1995b).

During ts briefexistence,behavioralarchaeol-

ogy'smainnomotheticcontributionshavebeen to

the realmsof reconstruction heory and method-

ological theory(sensuSchiffer1988).Thisshould

not be surprisinggiven thatprocessualarchaeol-

ogy had failed to lay a firm foundation or infer-

ence; withoutthe tools for creatinga behavioral

past, the prospects for a behavioralarchaeologyseemed bleak. In view of the improvementof

inference in recent years, however,some behav-ioralistsnow assign to the creationof social the-

ory a higher priority (Schiffer 1992, 1995b;

Walkeret al. 1995). Although progress remains

modest, behavioral archaeology nonetheless

offersa distinctiveconceptual rameworkhatcan

informthe developmentof new social theory.Behavioralistsseek to explain variabilityand

change in human behavior by emphasizing the

study of relationshipsbetween people and their

artifacts.By focusing on people-artifact nterac-

tions, behavioralistshave crafteda frameworkofconcepts, principles, and proceduresfor investi-

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RELATIONS ETWEEN EHAVIORALNDEVOLUTIONARYRCHAEOLOGIES

gatinghumanbehaviorwheneverand wherever t

occurs. (Foran introduction o behavioralarchae-

ology, see Schiffer [1995c]; for a concise codifi-

cation of fundamentalenets,

from whichmuchof

this section is adapted,see Schiffer [1995d]; for

recent developments, see Longacre and Skibo

[1994] and Skibo et al. [1995].) In the following

synopsis, I highlight the tenets of behavioral

archaeologymost relevant for engaging the evo-

lutionaryprogram.As the name implies, behavioralists ay stress

on studyingbehavior:whatpeople actuallydid or

do (Nielsen 1995;Reid 1995;Walkeret al. 1995).The basic units of behaviorareactivities,defined

as the interactionbetweenelements (e.g., human,artifact, animal), at least one of which is an

energy source (Rathjeand Schiffer 1982:Chapter3; Schiffer1992; Schiffer and Skibo 1997).Thus,artifacts are an integralpart of humanactivities,from a marriageceremonyto rebuildinga diesel

engine. After all, a white wedding gown is as

essential to a traditional church wedding as

wrenches are to tearing down an engine; in the

absence of either, crucial interactions would be

adverselyaffected.

Theartifacts andevenpeople) takingpart n anactivityhave,by virtueof theirmaterialcomposi-tion and form, specific properties hat affect their

suitability or interactingn particularways.These

activity-specific capabilitiesare knownas perfor-mance characteristics nd can pertain o any kindof interaction-mechanical, thermal,visual, etc.

(Nielsen 1995;SchifferandSkibo 1987, 1997).Activities are usually carriedout, often recur-

rently, by people in behavioral components-a

society'sunits of organization.Behavioralcompo-

nents, such as householdsand communities,con-sist of people, places, and artifacts(RathjeandSchiffer1982:Chapter; Schiffer1992:Chapter ).

Because each kind of artifact tends toward

uniqueness n its set of properties ndperformancecharacteristics, here are few true "functionallyequivalent" artifact types (Schiffer 1979).Activities,whichvary n energysources,otherele-

ments, and interactionpatterns,also usually lackexact functionalequivalents Schiffer1979).Thus,when one kind of artifactreplaces another n an

activity or when one kind of activity replacesanother n a behavioral omponent,"disjunctions"

are created that can initiate further change

processes. As a result, much behavioralchangeoccurs n response o the (often unintended) onse-

quencesof

previousartifact and

activity replace-ments(Schiffer1979, 1992:Chapter ).

Change processes, which involve selection

betweenalternativeartifactsor alternativeactivi-

ties, entail compromises among performancecharacteristics and interactions (McGuire and

Schiffer 1983; Schiffer and Skibo 1987);patternsin these compromisesare influencedby specificbehavioral actors of lifewayandsocial organiza-tion (McGuireand Schiffer 1983; Schiffer 1992;Schiffer and Skibo 1987, 1997). These compro-

mises can be illuminated, n the case of artifacttypes, by use of performancematrices,which fur-

nish explicit comparisons n relationto activity-

specific performance characteristics (Schiffer1995b;Schifferand Skibo 1987).

Farfrombeing autonomous, ndividualactivi-

ties in a behavioralsystem (e.g., a society) are

connected,directlyor indirectly, o all otheractiv-ities by movements of people and artifacts. The

structured elationshipsbetween activities estab-

lish the causal pathwaysalong which behavioral

changestravel(Schiffer 1979; Schifferand Skibo1997). Change processes can also restructure

relationshipsbetweenactivities.

The life historyof artifacts andof people) is a

favored framework for organizing behavioral

studies (Rathje and Schiffer 1982:Chapter4;Schifferand Skibo 1997;Walker1995;Walkeret

al. 1995). Life histories based on groups ofrelatedactivities or processes (e.g., procurement,manufacture, nduse) are knownas flow models

(Schiffer 1972, 1976), whereas those focused on

individualactivitiesaretermedbehavioralchains(Schiffer 1975b, 1976). Developmental cycles(Goody 1971), anotherorganizing ramework, rethe definablestages of existence in the life histo-ries of behavioral components (Rathje and

Schiffer1982:Chapter ; Reid andShimada1982;Rock 1974).

Behavioral archaeology'sbasic concepts and

principles establish a basis for formulatingresearchable questions about variability and

change. Above all, this theoretical framework

emphasizes that behavioral or societal change ischange in activities.

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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY

The explanationof behavioralvariabilityand

change depends on having available countless

new experimental aws andtheories;the fashion-

ingof these

principles,while an effort still in its

infancy (Schiffer 1995b), has enjoyedsome suc-

cess (contra Dunnell 1992a, 1992b).

Behavioralists, however, cannot supply off-the-

shelf answers to explanatory questions. Rather,we have a framework hat,when realizedthroughvaried research strategies-e.g., experimental

archaeology, thnoarchaeology, rehistory,histor-

ical archaeology, and history-can contribute,

principle by principle, to building a new behav-

ioral science (Walkeret al. 1995).

Evolutionary Archaeology

Evolutionaryarchaeologyhas its proximateroots

in the writings of Robert C. Dunnell, especiallyhis 1980 paper in Advances in ArchaeologicalMethod and Theory (see also Dunnell 1978a,

1982, 1989). Beginningin the mid-1980s, contri-

butionsto the literatureof evolutionaryarchaeol-

ogy have come frommany investigators, ome of

whom, especially in the context of case studies,areelaboratingandbroadening heprogram e.g.,

the papers n Teltser1995a).Althoughthe discus-sions below treat mostly Dunnell's seminal for-

mulation of evolutionary archaeology, recent

contributions-some seemingly more behav-

ioral-are also consulted.

The evolutionaryprogramrests on the claim

that Darwiniantheory has not been properlyor

widely applied to culturalphenomena(Dunnell

1980).This contention,however,does not sit well

with the processualarchaeologistswho also con-

sider themselvesto be evolutionistsorregard heir

work as evolutionary for examples of the latter,see Johnsonand Earle 1987; Sanderset al. 1979;

Spencer 1990). Similarly, archaeologistswhose

research s informedbybehavioral cology or evo-

lutionaryecology also wearthe Darwinianmantle

(e.g., Bettinger 1991; O'Connell and Hawkes

1981, 1984; Simms 1987). Perhapsappreciatingthattheirprogram s but one of several maintain-

ing an evolutionarystance,proponentsof evolu-

tionaryarchaeologyhavetakenrecentlyto callingthemselves "selectionists" (e.g., Graves and

Ladefoged 1995:160; Jones et al. 1995:16;Leonard and Reed 1993:648; Neff 1992:179,

1993:27;O'Brien and Holland1990:45).Theterm

"selectionist"also identifies the process-naturalselection-that these latterarchaeologistsbelieve

to bemost important or explaining evolutionary

change.In thispaper,selectionistandevolutionist

are used interchangeably.Evolutionfor the selectionistis the differential

persistenceof discretevariants Dunnell1980:38).

Commonly,variantsarealternative arietiesof an

artifact class that are winnowed over time byselection processes. Selectionists stress that arti-

fact variants can affect the biological fitness of

humanorganisms; rtifactshavingsuch effects are

"functional," hereasartifactsneutralwithrespect

to fitness are "stylistic"(Dunnell 1978a, 1980).However,many selectionist studies focus on the

"replicative uccess"of artifacttypes rather han

on the reproductive success of individuals

(Leonard and Jones 1987:214; O'Brien and

Holland 1990; but see Neff 1992:156).The con-

cept of extended phenotype (Dawkins 1982),which readily encompasseshuman activities and

artifacts(Jones et al. 1995; Neff 1992; O'Brien

and Holland 1995b;O'Brienet al. 1994), permitsselectionists to integrate evolutionary concerns

with the reality that the archaeologicalrecordismainlyartifacts,"the hardpartsof the behavioral

segmentof phenotypes" Dunnell 1989:44).

Explanationconsists in showing how specificfactors of the selective environment-usually the

natural environment-were responsible for the

differential persistence of competing variants

(Leonardand Reed 1993:650). The selectionist,

then, strives to account for the unique contin-

gency-bound successes and failures of artifact

classes (and other traits of the extended human

phenotype) in the history of a locality or region(Dunnell 1980:39;Neff 1993:28).

A distinction of signal importance is that

betweenprocessesof variety-generation nd vari-

ety-selection (Dunnell 1980:39), evolutionists

emphasize the latter, showing little interest in

investigating he sourcesof new variants.

Selectionists akepainsto distinguish heirpro-

gram from others in archaeology hat are seem-

ingly evolutionary.For example,neoevolutionary

stagemodels,whichposittransformationsf entire

societies from tribe to chiefdom or chiefdom tostate,are dismissedas Spencerianor Lamarckian,

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not Darwinian e.g., Dunnell 1980:40). Similarly,the adaptive-systemsmodels built by processual-ists andsometimesby behavioralists re also heav-

ilycriticizedas

beingnon-Darwinian ecause

theyconflate variety-generationand variety-selection

processes(e.g., LeonardandJones1987:200-201).These "adaptationist"cenariosassume that sys-tems change as a result of people intentionally

solving problems,steeringtheir behavior n waysthat are "adaptive," uch as intensifying subsis-

tencein response o demographic renvironmental

stress.Inrecentcase studies,however, ome osten-

sibly selectionistmodels closely resembleadapta-tionistscenarios e.g., GravesandLadefoged1995;

Leonard 1989; Leonardand Reed 1993). Whenprocessualistsand behavioralistsuse these latter

case studies to obtaina quickpeek intothe evolu-

tionaryprogram, hey areaptto becomeconfused,

wonderingwhat is different or distinctive about

selectionism.

In Search of Common Ground

Because neither evolutionary archaeology nor

behavioral archaeology is a homogeneous pro-

gram, the search for common ground between

them is an exercise fraught with peril.Practitionersof each will doubtless take excep-tion to some statements enumerated n this sec-

tion. Nonetheless,the identificationof widely-ifnot universally-shared assumptions,tenets, and

principles establishes a startingpoint for further

discussions. The following 11 statementsrepre-sent a firstapproximation f the commonground.

1. That both programs espouse a scientific

epistemology is an uncontroversial laim: we are

scientistsstriving o explain empiricalphenomena

by explicitly employing well warranted heoriesand laws. Because scientific activity involves not

only the explicit use of theoriesand laws but also

their origination and evaluation, behavioralists

have been energetic in establishingnew princi-

ples; selectionists, however,have been disinclined

thus far to ask or answer nomothetic questions

(see discussionsbelow).2. Scientists arealso permitted o pose histori-

cal questions. Both programsattach importanceto these questions and emphasize that scientific

methodsare appropriateor evaluatingour tenta-tive answers-i.e., models andhypotheses.

3. In the explanationof variationand change,culture is not treated as a causal agent (Braun

1991:427; O'Brien and Holland 1992:37;

Ramenofsky1995:137;Schiffer 1995a;Walkeret

al. 1995:2-4). The adjective "cultural"merelymeans learned, as in cultural transmission;

human,as in culturalphenomena;or societal, as

in cross-culturalregularity.Selectionists should

take no exception to this statement, but some

behavioralistsmightbe rather eluctant ojettison

anthropology'smost sacred cow.

4. The phenomenologicalworld of interest is

variationand change in human behavioror soci-

eties. Despite Dunnell's (1980:48) occasional

acknowledgment hat "humanbehavior" s "theprincipalsubjectmatter," ome selectionists maycontestthis tenet,which is expressed n systemic-context terms, because they believe that their

realm is the archaeological record (Teltser

1995b:3). Operatinganalyticallyin the systemic

context, however,requiresbehavioralreconstruc-

tion or inference,which in the abstract s anath-

ema to many selectionists (e.g., Dunnell 1978a,

1978b, 1989, 1992a, 1992b).Inpractice,however,selectionistsmake behavioral nferencesand seek

to explainchangein systemic-contextphenomena(see "On Behavioral Inference"below). As this

becomes generally appreciated, electionistsmay

acceptvariationandchangein humanbehavioror

societies as the focus of inquiry.5. Evolutionarychange is regardedas the dif-

ferential persistence of discrete variants.

Selectionists insist that all change be treatedin

this way, because any other move forsakes a

Darwinianperspective Dunnell 1980). Doubtless

influenced by selectionists, some behavioralists

have come to appreciate the value of treatingchange as the differentialpersistenceof discrete

variants(e.g., Schiffer 1991; Schiffer and Skibo

1987, 1997; Schiffer et al. 1994); yet, the possi-

bility is kept open that other kinds of changealso

occur-perhaps even some that are transforma-

tion-like.

6. To explain evolutionarychange,the investi-

gatorsituatesthe competitionbetween alternative

variantswithin a specific selective environment,

showinghow the replication(or reproduction)of

each kind of variantwas favoredordisadvantagedby virtueof its propertiesandperformancechar-

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AMERICANANTIQUITY

acteristics(e.g., Maxwell 1995;Neff 1992, 1993;O'Brien et al. 1994). Inaccounting ordifferential

persistence in these terms, specific historical

explanationsoffered

byselectionists and behav-

ioralists converge-at least structurally-to a

considerableextent(compare, orexample,Braun

1983; O'Brien et al. 1994; Schiffer and Skibo

1987), as can data requirements(O'Brien and

Holland 1995b).7. Behaviorand artifactsarepartof the human

phenotype. So long as behavior is defined as

activities (specific matter-energy interactions

between people, artifacts, etc.), this statement

should be acceptable o mostpractitionersn both

programs(compare O'Brien and Holland 1995with Walkeret al. 1995).8. Artifacts play diverse roles in activities,

involving performance-based interactions of

many kinds (Braun 1995; Nielsen 1995; Schiffer

and Skibo 1997). This statement s the stock and

tradeof the behavioralistbutshould occasion few

objectionsfrom selectionists.

9. In comparisonwith genetic transmissionof

variation,cultural ransmission nvolves different

processes andmechanisms,andtheirunderstand-

ing may requirenew laws and theories (Dunnell1978a:198, 200). Tobehavioralists, his statement

is self-evident,but selectionists have been slow to

follow up its implicationswith appropriate omo-

thetic research.

10. The life-history framework s useful for

sorting out some causes of variation. In behav-

ioral archaeology,studying the life histories of

artifacts,people, and behavioralcomponents is

fundamental Rathjeand Schiffer 1982; Schiffer

1992), and new applications appear frequently

(e.g., Schiffer and Skibo 1997; Walker 1995).Implicitlyselectionistsemploythis frameworkn

their recognition,for example, that lithic blanks,

preforms,and bifaces were not competitivevari-

ants but stood in ontogenetic (developmental)relations to one another.There is also interestin

trackingthe life histories of phenotypic features

(O'Brien and Holland 1992:52). Whetherselec-

tionists are willing to extend the life-historyframework to other classes of variants (e.g.,behavioralcomponents)remainsto be seen.

11. It is important o distinguishbetweenvari-ety-generation and variety-selection processes.This tenet is widely championedby selectionists

(e.g., Dunnell 1989:39;Teltser1995b:6)and alsoseems compatible with behavioral archaeology.Behavioralistsmight add that explanations for

variety-generationnd

variety-selectionprocessesare apt to requiredifferentbodies of theory (forfurther discussion, see "Seeking Synergies"below).

Incompatibilities

Although hecommongroundbetween evolution-

ary and behavioralarchaeologiesmay be appre-ciable, there are also some formidable

incompatibilities. Surprisingly, the selectionist

tenets thatcannotbe assimilatedby behavioralists

have nothing to do with evolutionary heory perse. Indeed,a case can be made that these selec-

tionistpositionsarealso at odds withmodernevo-

lutionarybiology.Theargumentdevelopedin this

section is simple: the parts of selectionism that

behavioralists ind most unpalatableare without

foundation, and, moreover,these ideas actuallyundermine efforts to establish an evolutionary

archaeology.

Theory and Model Building in Science

From a behavioral perspective, it appears thatselectionistshave unusualviews abouttheoryand

model building. For example, according to

Dunnell(1989:36), one grand heorygeneratesall

of a field'shypothesesand links all of its explana-tions (Dunnell 1982:5). Apparently, hen, evolu-

tionary theory alone can solve archaeology's

myriad explanatory problems. Although a few

fields do have grandtheories,such as Darwinian

evolution in biology and general relativity in

physics, these theories are but a tiny part of the

nomotheticproductsof those sciences-the partmost visible to people on the outside. On the

inside, as textbooksandjournal articles demon-

strate,are countless othertheories andexperimen-tal laws (sensu Nagel 1961; see also Salmon

1982), many-if not most-exhibiting indepen-dence from the grand theory. Even in biology,

explanations or mitosis and DNA replicationare

not deducible from evolutionarytheory, and in

physics general relativity cannot explainthermionic emission or the effects of doping on

semiconductors. Each of these phenomena ismade intelligible by process-specific principles.The actualstructure f theory n anyscience, then,

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RELATIONS BETWEEN BEHAVIORALAND EVOLUTIONARYARCHAEOLOGIES

is a multitudeof principles-ranging fromsimpleto complex, concrete to abstract,and narrowto

broad-that oftendeal with unrelatedphenomena.

(Onthe structure of

theoryin

archaeology,see

Schiffer1988.)Anothercurious view is thatlaws andtheories

are true by definition. Dunnell (1982:16) arguesthat

Laws, or theoretical laws, are rational,ideational onstructshatultimately rededuc-tions ... fromprimitivedefinitions.Theyare

always rueby virtueof theirconstructionndarenotcontingency ound.

The example he provides, d = vt (distance

equalsvelocity times time),does conformto thesecriteriabecause, in fact, it is not a scientific law

or theory at all, but a mathematical aw (on the

distinction, see Salmon 1982). The position that

theory is immune to empirical falsification

(Dunnell 1982:16) manifestly contradictsscien-

tific practice;as Sober(1984:82) notes, "theoret-

ical claims ought to be testable." The most

abstractand general theories, of course, may be

difficult to test--even today,Einstein'stheory of

generalrelativity s still undergoingevaluation-

yet they are potentially testable (Nagel 1961).Finally,I note thatthe conceptof"true by defini-tion"is itself problematic e.g., Sober 1984:62).

In view of the contentionthattheories aredef-

initionally true, it is surprisingthat theories arealso said to have a substantialempiricalcontent.

According to Dunnell (1989:44), a discipline'sgrand heorymust"generate ts own data"and theunits specified in the theory must be "directlymeasurable in the phenomenological world"

(Dunnell 1982:7, 1994:34). A view more gener-

ally held in science is that the entities, mecha-nisms, or processes postulatedby a theory haveno immediateempiricalcontent,fortheyare often

unobservable.To operationalizeor test a theory,one employs appropriateunits and instrumentsfor measuring the variables that it implicates.These instruments(and the rules of correspon-dence that link them to the theory) involve stillother laws and theories. For example, in testingthe kinetic theoryof gases, which involves invisi-ble entities called molecules, one has to measure

a gas's temperature.Temperaturecan be mea-sured,for example, with a mercurythermometeror infraredthermometry;n eithercase the instru-

ment'soperation s based on principlesother than

the kinetic theory. In addition, from the kinetic

theory one can deduce neithermercury'scoeffi-

cient of thermalexpansion

nor agas's

infrared

emission spectrum. n short,scientific theoriesdonot articulate immediately with the empiricalworld(Sober 1984:73);interposedbetween theo-

ries andobservationsare rulesof correspondence,lower-levelprinciples,andmeasuring nstruments

that are based on still other theories and laws

(Nagel 1961;Tschauner1996).Failure to appreciatethe complex, principle-

rich apparatus hat links theories to observations

can lead to unhelpfuladvice on building archae-

ological theory and models. To wit, Dunnell(1980:88) asserts that a theory's variables "can-

not be defined in behavioralterms."Going fur-

ther he claims, "If archaeologists are going to

employ evolutionarytheory,they must rewrite itin terms of variables that are empirical in the

[archaeological] record" (Dunnell 1980:88). Ifthis recipe were followed literally,then a theorywould be precluded from implicating mecha-nisms andprocesses, which aredecidedlybehav-

ioral phenomena unobservable in the static

archaeological record. At best, archaeologistswould be reduced to crafting relationshipsbetweenmeasurementson sherds,chips of stone,and so on-scarcely the stuff of theory (but see

O'Brien and Holland 1992); at worst,archaeolo-

gists would be operatingin the murkyworld of

merged systemic andarchaeologicalcontexts(onthenecessity of keepingthese contextsconceptu-ally and analytically distinct, see Reid 1985,

1995). In the final analysis, evolutionarytheoryitself cannot be rewritten n archaeological-con-

text terms:sherdswere not partof anyone'sphe-notype (unless reused), yet a cooking pot-asystemic-context entity operationalizedthroughbehavioral nference-was.

The selectionist prohibition against framingmodels andtheories in behavioral erms is out of

step with practice in modern evolutionarybiol-

ogy. In the latterdiscipline, theories and models

incorporatebehavioralvariableson a wide rangeof systemic phenomena, such as predator-preyinteractions,mating patterns,foraging behavior,

and maintenanceof territories,none of which isempirical in the paleontological and paleoenvi-ronmental ecords.Itcouldnotbe otherwise;after

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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY

all, "behaviors at once causeandconsequenceof

evolution" Plotkin 1988:8).In accordwith evolutionarybiologists, and in

contrast o the selectionistposition,

behavioralists

maintain that theories, models, and explana-tions-even those offeredby selectionists-must

be framed n behavioral erms.Ironically, upportfor this claim can be found in Dunnell's (1989)own effort to build an evolutionarymodel. In that

paperhe seeks to explainthe selectionfor "waste"

behavior, specifically the Woodland mortuarycults of the easternUnited Statesthat left behind

obtrusiveburialmounds. The variablesand para-meters of the model include "mean carrying

capacity,""no change or difference in subsis-tence," "populations n equilibriumat different

sizes," "shortfalls in productivity,""intensifica-

tion" of subsistence, "waste-typebehavior,"and

"mortuary ult"(Dunnell1989:48).Tomy knowl-

edge, surveyarchaeologistsnever encountera car-

rying capacity or a waste-typebehavior,nor do

excavators uncover a productivityshortfall or a

mortuarycult. In every instance,these variables

and parametersare more-or-lessbehavioral(i.e.,

systemiccontext),not-as Dunnell(1980:88)pre-

scribes-written interms"thatareempirical n therecord."Other selectionist models invoke vari-

ables and parameters hat are equally systemic

(e.g., GravesandLadefoged1995;Leonard1989;

Leonard and Reed 1993; O'Brien et al. 1994).

Despiterhetoric o the contrary, electionistsbuild

models almostas behavioralas behavioralists.

Becausetheoriesandmodels are formulated n

behavioralterms, the investigator s obligatedto

forge links, through measurement,to empiricalunits in the archaeologicalrecord.This linkage

process is called inference, and it brings us to asecond incompatibility.

On Behavioral Inference

Many selectionists deny the need for behavioral

inferenceanddenigrateas unscientificthe activi-

ties of archaeologistswho reconstructthe past.These efforts are labeled "reconstructionism,"

which Dunnell (1978a:194) elevates to the status

of a paradigm,attributing ts full flowering to

processual and behavioral archaeologies.

According to Dunnell (1978a:195), "behavioralreconstructions.. cannotbe the foundationof an

approach hatprofesses to be both scientific and

evolutionary."Behavioral reconstruction is not

science (Dunnell 1980:78, 1982:20, 1989:43,

1992a:87), but a purveyor of "just-so stories"

(Dunnell 1982:20)that should be abandoned

(Dunnell 1989:45).The decisive dismissal of inference contradicts

many thoughtfulworks in archaeologicalepiste-

mology (e.g., Fritz 1972; Patrik 1985; Salmon

1982; Schiffer 1976; Sullivan 1978; Wylie 1985)and also ignores the countless, well-established

inferences that have greatlyenhancedthe under-

standing of past societies worldwide. What is

more, modern evolutionary biology could not

exist without paleoenvironmentaland paleoeco-

logical reconstruction,not to mention a host ofinferencesaboutthe behaviorof particular axa.

Because selectionist models are actually

expressed in behavioralterms, they do requireinference (see also Wylie 1995:207-208).Evidence that supportsthis latter claim can be

foundin Dunnell's 1989) ownexplanatory ketch

dealing with "waste" behavior. When treating

specifics of the Woodlandcase, he is forced to

operationalize he model by means of behavioral

inferences. Dunnell does not himself construct

these inferences from archaeological evidence,but relies mainlyon reconstructionsprofferedbyotherinvestigators,as in "thenonagriculturalta-

tus of the Woodlandassociatedwith the mortuarycult" (1989:49). Sometimes, without any evi-

dence or argument,he makes assertions about

pastbehavior,such as that the mortuary ult "fre-

quently entails the laborious construction of

earthenmoundsandthemanufacture nddisposalof vast quantitiesof goods, many of which are

costly imports" (1989:48). Dunnell's study of

waste is indicative:every selectionist model canbe shownto rest, implicitlyor explicitly,on a net-

work of behavioral inferences (for other exam-

ples, see Graves and Ladefoged 1995; Leonard

1989; Leonard and Reed 1993; O'Brien and

Holland1992;O'Brienet al. 1994).

Despitethe selectionists'anti-reconstructionist

rhetoric, evaluation of their models patently

requiresbehavioral nference,and in this respect

evolutionary archaeology does not differ from

behavioral,processual,or postprocessualarchae-

ologies (on the latter'sdependenceon behavioralinference, see Duke [1995], Saitta [1992], and

Tschauner [1996])-or evolutionary biology

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RELATIONS ETWEEN EHAVIORALND EVOLUTIONARYRCHAEOLOGIES

(e.g., Thomason 1995). In view of the contradic-

tion between their pronouncementsand practiceon inference (Watsonet al. 1984:255-256), evo-

lutionaryarchaeologistscannotcrediblymaintainany longer that reconstruction s defective and

unscientific. Indeed, until selectionists take

archaeological inference seriously by treating it

explicitly and adoptingmodernmethodology, he

goals of theirprogramwould appear o be out of

reach. Fortunately, n several recent selectionist

papers,there is modest movementtowardexplic-

itly countenancing behavioral inference (e.g.,Jones et al. 1995; O'Brien and Holland 1995b;Teltser1995b).

Closely relatedto the claims that theoriesandmodels should not be built in behavioralterms

and that reconstructionof past behavior is to be

avoided is the selectionist position on functional

principlesand actualisticstudies,a thirdpoint of

incompatibility.

Functional Principles and Actualist Studies

Selectionists downplay the importanceof func-

tional principles n specific explanationsand dis-

regard he actualistic sources of these principles.

Dunnell notes thatecology and evolution are dis-tinct bodies of theory,the former concernedwith

functionalrelationshipsandmechanism, he latter

with historical explanations (Dunnell 1980:36;

1982:12). Both bodies of theory, he does grant,"arecommonly intermingled n particularexpla-nations"(Dunnell 1980:36, cf. 39). Indeed,spe-cific evolutionary explanations in biology are

utterly dependent on functional and behavioral

principles supplied by actualisticstudies, includ-

ing experimentsandethology(Endler1986;Krebs

andDavies 1981:28-29). Moreover,withoutprin-ciples producedby functionalanatomy,ethology,andbehavioral cology,modernevolutionarybiol-

ogy would be explanatorily impotent. A close

examinationof selectioniststudies alsorevealsuse

of manyfunctionaland behavioralprinciples,and

some are even explicit (e.g., Graves and

Ladefoged 1995). Given that the constructionof

selectionistexplanationsrequiressuch principles,it is troublesome hat nowherein the selectionist

literature anone find a discussion on theplace of

the archaeologicalequivalentof behavioralecol-ogy with its actualistic, nomothetic emphasis.When Dunnelldoes mentionthenecessityof func-

tional principles,he is alludingto laws of chem-

istry and physics, not behavioral laws built by

archaeologists e.g., Dunnell 1992b).Onereasonforthe reluctance f evolutionists o

call attention o functionaland behavioralprinci-

ples maystem froma defectiveargumentheyraise

againstreconstruction.t is asserted hatsuchprin-

ciples presupposethat "behaviorcannot change"

(Dunnell 1989:44; cf. Dunnell 1992a:81,

1992b:213; O'Brien and Holland 1995b; Neff

1992). Because behavior s "continuously hang-

ing," laws of human behavior "are structurally

impossible"(Dunnell 1992b:213). Since behav-

ioralists above all appreciatethat behaviors do

change, the ability to establishgeneral principlesmust rest on a basis other han thebelief in behav-

ioral stasis.

In their own version of uniformitarianism,behavioralists argue that certain behavioral

processes-such as boiling food in a ceramicves-

sel over an open fire or disposal of secondaryrefuse in cities-although not universal,exhibit

some regularitieswhenever and wherever theyoccur (Schiffer 1975c, 1978, 1996; Skibo

1992:25-28;Walker t al. 1995).The identification

of a behavioralprocessenablesthe investigatoroseek or create the "behavioralcontexts"(sensuWalkeret al. 1995:4) where nomotheticresearch

maylead to the recognitionof regularitiessuchas

correlatesandc-transforms).Boundaryconditions

of behavioralprocesses enumeratethe identical

characteristicsmong seeminglydissimilar-often

culturally diverse-empirical phenomena. For

example,the McKellarprinciple specifies that in

frequentlymaintainedactivity areas, only small

artifacts remain behind as primary refuse

(McKellar 1983; Schiffer 1976:188-189,1987:62-63). The behavioralprocess of activity-area maintenance s boundedby the term "in fre-

quentlymaintained ctivityareas." ntheseactivityareas, and only in these activity areas, does this

behavioral regularity hold. It holds, however,

despitetemporaland spatialdifferences n artifact

types, in kinds of activities,and in the natureof

activityareas.(The thresholdsize of residualpri-

mary refuse is expected to vary with situational

factors such as the maintenance technology

employed, permeabilityof the substrate,and thenatureof the refuse[Schiffer1976:189,1987:63].)The conceptsof behavioralprocessandboundary

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conditionscanhelpus to resolvetheapparent ara-dox between the constancyof behavioral egulari-ties (andtheprinciples hatdescribe hem)and the

inconstancyof

specificbehaviors

(cf.Hull

1988:463).It should now be clear why the theories and

experimentalaws yielded by nomotheticresearch

in actualisticcontexts areseldom,if ever,"univer-

sal": behavioralprocesses can have very limited

temporalandspatialdistributions. hus,principles

describingthese processes often exhibit a highlycircumscribedgenerality.But this is no cause for

concernsincethe behavioralists content o devise

and employ principles having quite confining

boundaryconditions-as long as they are usefulfor answeringresearchquestions.To achieve anything like the richly textured,

historically contingent explanations crafted by

evolutionarybiologists, selectionistswill need to

employcountlessfunctionalandbehavioralprinci-

ples (see Sober 1984).What is more,to createthe

new principles that an evolutionaryarchaeology

requires,selectionistswill have to ask their own

nomotheticquestions n makingfulluse of the dis-

cipline'sactualistic esearch trategies e.g., exper-

imental archaeologyand ethnoarchaeology-seeSchiffer1978;Schifferet al. 1994;Skibo 1992).

In the very recent selectionist literature, ome

investigatorshave begun to find roles for experi-mental and ethnoarchaeologicalfindings (e.g.,Dunnell 1995:42; Dunnell and Feathers 1991;

Dunnell et al. 1994; Maxwell 1995; Neff

1992:150; O'Brien and Holland 1990:60,

1995:184;O'Brienet al. 1994). Moreover, n rec-

ognizing thatperformancecharacteristics f arti-

fact types affect their replicative success in

particular electiveenvironments, few selection-ists themselvesarebeginningto carryout experi-ments (e.g., Dunnell and Feathers1991; O'Brien

et al. 1994). Perhapsone day soon selectionist

practicewill includeeven ethnoarchaeology.

Discussion

As originally formulated,the evolutionary pro-

gram containsa numberof tenets that contradict

importantparts of behavioral (and processual)

archaeologies.Try as I might, however,I fail to

appreciatewhy anyof these ideas is necessaryforan evolutionary archaeology. Nothing in

Darwinian heory perse norin modernevolution-

arybiology precludes framing heories and mod-

els in behavioralterms, prohibitsmaking infer-

ences aboutthe past, or rules out the conduct of

actualistic,nomothetic studies. These views in

fact distance selectionism from productiveresearch strategies, practiced by behavioralists

and evolutionary biologists alike, that could

improvethe evolutionaryprogram.Moreover,by

maintaining enets that behavioralistsandproces-sualists regard as clearly wrong, selectionists

alienatethe very archaeologistswho ought to be

most receptive to their insights on evolution.

Selectionistsmay be well advised to cast off the

conceptualbaggagethathas so burdened he pro-

gram(see also Wylie 1995).

Seeking Synergies

Building on the common groundbetween evolu-

tionaryand behavioralarchaeologies,andexploit-

ing ideas from both programs,I now attemptto

indicate,with examples,how the studyof behav-

ioral(orevolutionary) hangemightbe enhanced.

Clarifying Selection Processes

In using the term "naturalselection," Darwin

called attentionto a kind of selection differentfromthatpracticed, orexample,by plantand ani-

mal breeders. In natural selection, competing

organisms are winnowed by environmental ac-

tors, such as predatorsandtemperature xtremes.

Today he term"cultural election" s in vogue to

designate processes internalto a humanpopula-tion (e.g., Durham 1991:165), whereas natural

selection is retained for selective agents in the

naturalenvironment.Evolutionaryarchaeologistshavediscussedthenecessityof a conceptlike cul-

turalselection,butno consensushas emerged forvarious viewpoints, see Braun 1995:132-133;

Dunnell 1980:53, 63, 1989:41;LeonardandJones

1987:211; O'Brien and Holland 1992:45, 48,

1995:178;Rindos 1984, 1989).In considering cultural selection, Dunnell

evinces skepticismwhile asking,

Is therea point n human volutionaryistoryat which electiondoesbecomeaninternalul-turalmatterndependentf environmentalon-straint ndchangebecomes ransformational?thinknot,ormoreprecisely, think t wouldbe

prematureo assume o [Dunnell1980:65].

Internalselection is not a process Dunnell is

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eager to embracebecause it implies to him that

change is transformational, o longer the differ-

ential persistence of discrete variants.However,

Dunnell furnishes no argument showing thatinternalselectionmust be transformational; sug-

gest thatit need not be.

In demonstrating that internal selection is

compatiblewith a Darwinianview of change,one

first needsappropriatewaysto conceptualizeboth

the entities being selected and the selection

process. Drawing inspirationfrom Hull's (1988)

expansiveview of selection, I define a populationas any collection of potentially competing vari-

ants. The differential persistence of variants is

governed by the population'sselective environ-ment,which exerts selective pressures.Clearly, f

a populationis internal to a human society, the

selective environmentmay also be internal. For

example, the population of all condoms beingoffered for sale in the United States today has a

selective environment hat includes condom-pur-

chasing activities-an environment internal to

U.S. society. In contrast,a population'sselective

environmentmayconsistmainlyof external,non-

culturalprocesses. An example is a community's

populationof wild-animalprocurement ctivities,which aresubjectto selection, forexample,by the

abundance and accessibility of game. One can

even conceive of populationsthat undergoboth

internaland externalselectivepressures,such as a

neolithic village's agricultural ctivities.

None of these processes need be called "cul-

tural" election or"natural"election.Thisdistinc-

tion perhapshad utility in the nineteenthcentury,but it is not useful today in the study of cultural

phenomena. Of transcendent mportance is the

identificationof populations, onsistingof discretevariants,and the specific selective pressuresto

which such populationsare subject. Selection is

selection,regardlessof the culturalor noncultural

character f environmental gentsand mechanisms

(Hull 1988; O'Brien and Holland 1990). More

importantly,volutionremains he differential er-sistence of discretevariants;here s no theoretical

need to embrace ransformationalhange.In archaeological cases, however, we will

encounter instances of transformation-like

change.The bulk of these may result from onto-geneticprocesses,as in lithicreductionsequences

(Dibble 1995; Goodyear 1974), "devolutionary

cycles" of structures David 1971), sequences of

ceramicreuse (Deal and Hagstrum1995), stagesof householddevelopment(Schiffer et al. 1981),and

growth-relatedalterations in

communityorganization Wills and Leonard1994). The pos-sible occurrenceof non-ontogenetictransforma-

tions of one variant nto another s, for now,best

left an open question.

Appropriate Units and Scales of Selection

A questionfollowingimmediately rom theprevi-ous discussion is, Which populationsof variants

shouldbe the foci of evolutionary tudy?In selec-

tionistarchaeology, his question s framedas one

of scale. Although Dunnell (1980:53) notes thatselectiongoes on "ata varietyof differentscales,"he does not discuss scales otherthan those of the

individualorganismand the culturalsystem as a

whole;he also doubts hat natural electioncan be

effective abovethe individualorganism 1980:55)until "the appearance of complex society"

(1980:66; see also Wenke 1981). In short, the

scale problem remains essentially unresolved

(Dunnell 1989:39, 41, 1995). Anotherrenderingof the questionis, What are the appropriate nits

of selection (Dunnell 1995; Teltser1995b)?Thisquestion,too, lacks definitive answers atpresent,even in evolutionary biology (Hull 1988; Lloyd

1988; Sober 1984; Williams 1992). It is clear,

however, that modern evolutionary biologistsembraceandstudy evolutionary hangein diverse

units at manyscales (e.g., Dawkins 1982:113).As in evolutionary biology, one can find in

behavioral archaeology the employment of a

bewildering array of units along with analysesconducted at countless scales. This seemingly

undisciplined approachreflects the recognitionthat the evolution of culturalphenomenaoccurs

simultaneouslyata greatmanyscales.Thiscomes

aboutbecause (1) there is a vastdiversity n kinds

of units, (2) units occur in multiple hierarchies,

(3) units are interrelated n complex ways both

within andbetweenhierarchies,and (4) there are

highlyvariedselectionprocesses, at manyscales,thataffect differentkinds of unitsdifferentially.

Althoughthe units employedby behavioralists

were not adopted with evolutionary questions

explicitly in mind, they can nonetheless be con-ceived as generalkinds of systemic populations,

particular xamplesof which exhibitdiscretevari-

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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY

ation;thus, they might be useful in evolutionarystudies. ProvisionallyI suggest that the generalunits of behavioralevolution-i.e., the scales at

which selectiontakesplace-are

artifacts,activi-

ties, behavioralprocesses,andbehavioralcompo-nents. Each of these units,of course,is actuallya

hierarchyof morespecific units;the latterneed to

be identified in particularresearch contexts. For

presentpurposes,I focus on the artifact includingits constituentpartsand assemblies),activity,and

severaltypes of behavioral omponent.Parts are the separatelyfabricatedpieces or

substancesof an artifact; xamples nclude a chert

arrowpointand a personalcomputer'sPC)power

transformer.The assembly is a set of parts thatfunctionstogetherin an artifact.An arrow and a

PC's power supply are examples. Assembly is a

very flexibleconceptthat can be used to designatethe many levels lying between discretepartsand

artifacts foranotherapproach o subdividingarti-

facts and linking the latter into systems, see

Oswalt 1976).The artifact s the set of integratedassemblies that functionstogetherin an activity;

examples are a bow-and-arrow and a PC.

Activities areexemplified by huntingwith a bow-

and-arrow ndwritingwitha PC'swordprocessor.Behavioralcomponents,the "tangibleunits of

a society's social organization"Schiffer 1992:4),are entities thatcarryout recurrent ets of activi-

ties in patternedlocations (Rathje and Schiffer

1982). There are two main kinds of behavioral

components.The first is residentiallybased, and

is defined by ever-largeraggregates of people;from least to most inclusivearehouseholds,com-

munities, regional systems, and empires (Rathjeand Schiffer 1982; Schiffer 1992:4-6). A second

type of behavioralcomponent,which has no resi-dential basis, is the task group. In task groups,such as workparties,religiouscongregations,and

corporations,people come together to performactivities such as hunting or assembling PCs

(Schiffer 1992:6);they may or maynot have ded-

icatedactivityareas andfacilities.

At eachscale (orfor eachtypeof unit),one can

define populationsof discretevariants.For exam-

ple, the populationof automobilesbeing used in

the United States today contains numerousvari-

ants on the basis of manufacturer,body style,engine size, type of transmission, uxury appoint-

ments, etc. Similarly,among the population of

U.S. households are variants based on wealth,richness of artifactinventory,generationalcom-

position, size of dwelling, degree of residential

mobility,and so forth. One can also define sub-

populationsof behavioralcomponents,such as all

corporations hat manufacture adios, and delin-

eate variants(e.g., radio-makingcompanies dif-

fering in size, output, variety of models

manufactured).

Having specified provisionalscales and units

for evolutionarystudy,I next turn to the problemof identifying the selective environment or any

particularunit. Because behavioralistshave done

much of theirworkat the scale of artifacts,espe-

cially on artifact-activity elations,the followingdiscussionis most applicableat thatscale.

The immediate selective context can be

defined as all activities in the life history of an

artifact ype; that is, the activities thattakeplace

during processes of procurement,manufacture,

transport,distribution, torage,use, maintenance,

reuse, disposal, etc. These activities exert selec-

tive pressures, and the result is the differential

persistence of variants (O'Brien et al. 1994;Schiffer and Skibo 1997).The replicativesuccess

of a givenvariant s influencedby its activity-spe-cific-i.e., behaviorallyrelevant-properties and

performancecharacteristics.Selection pressuresin the immediateselectivecontext leadto artifacts

thatembodydesign compromisesof manykinds,as in trade-offsbetweenperformance haracteris-

tics pertainingto manufacture,use, and mainte-

nance processes (McGuire and Schiffer 1983;O'Brien and Holland 1990, 1992; O'Brien et al.

1994; Schifferand Skibo 1987) or even between

activities within a given process (Schiffer and

Skibo 1997). Compromises are necessitatedbecause, ordinarily,no single design can maxi-

mize an artifact'sentire set of activity-specific

performance haracteristics.An understanding f

the patterns n design compromisesrequiresone

to delve, sometimes deeply, into what can be

called the extended selective context. Activities,

agents, and mechanisms that make up the

extended selective context are those coupled,byflows of energy,artifacts,or people, to activities

in the immediate selective context (on such con-

nections, see Schiffer 1979, 1992). Examplesofimmediate and extended selective contexts are

furnishedbelow.

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Variety-GeneratingProcesses and Stimulated

Variation

The literature f selectionistarchaeology

slargelysilent aboutvariety-generating rocesses, perhaps

because Dunnell (1978a:197) in an early paper

proclaimed"that he specific originor inventionof

new elements becomes a trivialinquiry."Dunnell

(1978a:197) also asserted hat invention"is analo-

gous to mutation n biological systems;" hus,as a

"randomphenomenon"(Dunnell 1980:66), new

variants would be beyond prediction (Dunnell

1980:62).Construingvariety-generating rocessesin this mannerhas, I suggest, hampered he study

of behavioral volution.Like modern evolutionary biologists (e.g.,Nitecki 1990), archaeologists houldregardvaria-

tionand ts sourcesas subjectseminentlyworthyof

explanation.Variationn a populationat one pointintime is a consequenceof bothpriorselectionand

variety-generating rocesses (e.g., inventionand

borrowing).Study of the latter is clearly crucial,forthe creationof new variants n culturalpopula-tions occurs commonly and sometimes at highrates.Because selection operateson variation, he

state of variationat one point in time immediatelyconstrains he outcome of selection (cf. Dawkins

1982:42-46; Neff 1992:147). Thus, one cannot

explainevolutionary hange n specific cases with-

out documenting and accounting for large and

rapidchangesin the availablevariation.New vari-

ants can arise throughan expansionof inventiveactivities in existing behavioral components,through heproliferation f behavioral omponents

undertakingnventiveactivities,or both.

An argumentcan be made thatvariety-gener-

ating processes work in patternedways. Someprocesses, forexample,cause inventionsof a par-ticularkind to clustermarkedly n time andspace.Indeed,the historicaland archaeologicalrecordsfurnishevidence of ratherdramatic-and some-times predictable-increases in the conduct of

variety-generating activities (Hughes 1983;Schiffer 1993).

One hypothesisto account for some burstsof

variety-generation s that information(as matteror energy) coming from changed conditions in

selective contexts can stimulate an increase ininventiveactivitiesof behavioralcomponentsandcan foster the creationof new behavioralcompo-

nents. This process, which is illustrated n some

detail below, can be called stimulatedvariation

(compare to Neff's [1992:146] discussion of

"directedvariation"and Braun's[1991:431] con-

cept of "directed nnovation").Unlike "directed

mutation" Dawkins 1982:112) and"guidedvari-

ation"(Boyd and Richerson 1985:94-98), which

more than flirt with Lamarckianmechanisms of

change, the process of stimulatedvariation n no

way obviates selection; after all, every variant

producedduringan instanceof stimulatedvaria-

tion can be selectedagainst.Selection thusretains

its Darwinian role, but variety-generationbecomes central o evolutionary nquiry, he study

of its mechanismsandprocesses far fromtrivial.Theprocessof stimulatedvariation anhelp us

to reconcileadaptationist nd selectionistviews of

behavioral hange.In theadaptationistramework,a changingnatural nvironment r a growingpop-ulationexertsselectivepressures hatareperceivedas stresses or problemsby a cultural ystem'spar-

ticipants e.g., Hill 1977).Problem-solvingbehav-iors usually lead to an appropriate esponse,and

theresult s a new adaptation.As selectionistshave

pointedout, however, he adaptationistmodelpre-

sumes thatpeople enjoy a certainomniscienceinidentifyingsignificantproblemsandin forecastingthe future(e.g., Braun 1991:428, 1995:129;Neff

1992:146;see also Schiffer1979, 1992:Chapter).

Essentiallytransformational, daptationist xpla-nations conflate processes of variety-generationandvariety-selectione.g., Jonesetal. 1995:17-18;Rindos 1989:3).

An appreciationor stimulatedvariationallows

us to assignproblem-solvingtsproperrole in evo-

lution, that of producing new variants (Braun

1995:129;Rindos 1989:13-15). Variation reatedby this process (and certainlythere are others-

Basalla [1988]) is not directedby futureadaptiveneeds,but is shapedby contemporaneoushenom-ena intheselectiveenvironment,uchas anartifactthatdoes notreachbehaviorally ignificantperfor-mancelevels in an activityor an activitythat doesnot effectivelyplay its role in a behavioral ompo-nent. If stimulatedvariationhappensto furnish avariant hatbecomes fixed very rapidly, he entire

evolutionaryprocess may be so telescopedthat it

appears ransformational-when n fact it was not.Thetelescopingof evolutionaryprocessesis exac-

erbated,of course, by the low resolutionof most

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AMERICANANTIQUITY

archaeological hronologies,which makes it diffi-

cult to discernrapidexpansionsandcontractions f

variation.Whennotutterlyoverlooked, uch varia-

tion islikely

to be dismissed as mere noise that

complicatestypology-construction.Aware of this

problem,archaeologists houldnowdiligentlyseek

the fine-grainedbehavioralvariation,predictedbythe process of stimulatedvariation, hat our cul-

ture-historicalunits so relentlessly obscure (seealso Plog 1974).

At the present time, neitheradaptationistnor

selectionist explanations furnish adequateaccountsof transformation-likehangesin behav-

ior. In stressingthatproblem solving createsnew

adaptations, adaptationist explanations areincomplete and misleading because they glossover the false starts,partialsolutions,unintended

consequences, and dead-endsthatproblemsolv-

ing also begets. Equallyunsatisfactoryare selec-

tionist explanationsthat ignore large and rapidincreases in the variation availableto selection.

Perhapsthe process of stimulatedvariation can

contribute o buildinga fully generalevolutionary

theorythatassigns ample weight to both variety-

generationandvariety-selection.

Some Illustrations

To illustrate he concepts ust developed,I mainly

exploit my historical researchon radios, which

providessome well-controlleddata sets.

In studies of artifacts in capitalist industrial

societies, it is useful to examine variety-genera-tion and variety-selection in relation to three

processes that occur in the life historyof a prod-uct type: invention,commercialization, ndadop-tion (e.g., Schiffer 1991; Schiffer et al. 1994).

These processes are examinedhere in turn.In the inventionprocess, people createproto-

types of parts,assemblies,and artifacts n order o

demonstrate heir performancecharacteristics o

financiers, entrepreneurs,and manufacturers.A

major source of variation,invention is hardly a

randomprocess;rather,nventiveactivitiescan be

highly patternedby stimulatedvariation.These

strongeffects are often discernibleas a clusteringin time andspaceof similar nventions.For exam-

ple, just after the turn of the last century, nven-

tions proliferated n the partsand assembliesthatwent into radio transmitters nd receivers(Aitken1976, 1985). This was an instance of stimulated

variation hat derived from the immediate selec-

tive context of radios-particularly use activities.

Radios at thattime were used mainly for ship-to-shore

communication,which was

unreliable,however,over long distances. In response to the

blatantperformancedeficiencies of transmitters

and receivers, various task groups invested

resources n the inventionof partsandassemblies

that could raise the power of transmittersand

boost the sensitivity and selectivity of receivers.

This quickly expandingpopulationof inventions

served as the rawmaterial or selection.

Commercialization involves putting a part,

assembly,or artifact ntoproductionandbringing

it to market. This process has both variation-selectingandvariation-generating spects.Onthe

one hand, commercialization is undertakenbytask groups,such as financialandmanufacturing

corporations, hat rigorouslywinnow inventions,with only some reaching he marketplace.On the

otherhand,commercialization eneratesvariation

in the products available for selection by con-

sumer activities.

Stimulatedvariation can also play a role in

commercialization, as another radio example

demonstrates (Schiffer 1991). Figure 1 showschangesin the frequencyof U.S. companiesman-

ufacturingvacuum-tube adios for the home mar-

ket from 1920 to 1955. (It is assumed that

variation n this populationis directlyrelatedto

the frequency of different radios commercial-

ized.) The graph ndicatestwo dramatic ncreases

in variation n these behavioralcomponents:(1)in the early 1920s, beginningin 1922, and (2) in

the late 1940s, commencing n 1946after he war-

caused hiatusin the manufacture f home radios.

Both episodes, I suggest, came about throughstimulatedvariation.The first burstof variation n

the populationof radiocompaniesresultedfrom

the advent of commercial entertainmentbroad-

casting,in November1920,which some entrepre-neurs and manufacturersnterpretedas a portentof profits for firms that commercializedhome

radios. The second expansion of variation

stemmed romthemovement, nto radio(andtele-

vision) manufacture,of electronics companies

seeking new productsand new marketsafterthe

cessation of wartime production.With pent-updemand for consumer products after the priva-tions of the GreatDepressionand WorldWarII,

656 [Vol. 61, No. 4, 1996

7/30/2019 Schiffer 96



200 -

0,

cn

0.

Eo

C-.

0

ctC.

o

>C)

cO

100 -

C)

a,

CD

A

0 I

1920 1930 1940 1950

Figure 1. Changes in the frequency of companies in the United States that manufactured vacuum-tube radios for the

home market, 1920-1955. Based on data in Grinder (1995), each company's period of radio production was estimated

from the time range of annual models listed.

manyfirms eagerly embracedhome-radiomanu-

facture;by 1949, however, the vast majorityof

newcomers had failed in the radio business.An even more dramatic nstanceof stimulated

variationduring commercializationcomes from

the history of U.S. portable radios (Schiffer

1991).Duringthe GreatDepression,battery-pow-ered sets that were designed to be easily carried

aroundwere rare n the marketplace. n 1939 and

1940, however,there was a phenomenal ump in

the variety of portable radio models offered to

consumers(Figure2). The cause of this burst of

commercialization activity was situated in the

extended selective context of radios and radiocompanies. To wit, with the intensification of

warfareactivities in Europe,radio makers saw an

opportunity o offer a type of productthat could

allow Americans to hear war news anywhere.It

should be noted that this episode of stimulated

variation involved the commercializationactivi-

ties of establishedradio-makingcompanies;new

firms were not founded to produce portableradios(see Figure 1).

Duringadoption,consumersbuy anduse com-

mercializedproducts. Purchasingactivities exertselectivepressures,and the lattercanbe swift and

sure. In 1953 nearly two million portableradios

were sold in the United States (ElectronicIndustriesAssociation 1970:13)-and every one

contained vacuum tubes. Late in 1954 the firsttransistorportableradiowas commercialized,and

others were rapidly broughtto market.Althoughfor a few years more expensive than their tube

counterparts,ransistor adios had marvelousbat-

tery economy along with the cachet of "moder-

nity."As a result, consumers quickly selected

againstthe tube-basedportablesand,in less than

seven years, only transistor radios remainedon

the market Schiffer 1991).

Surprisingly, he adoption process is also an

important source of variation, as consumersbecome inventors, iterallyplayingwith theirnew

toys. A new productis tried out in old activities

and the possibilities of new activities are

explored; the result is an expansion of activity

variation,which can contribute o stimulatedvari-

ation in processes of invention and commercial-

ization. For example, in the early 1920s, people

exploredthepossibilitiesof home radios,a newlycommercialized product, taking them outdoors

and using them in diverse activity settings, from

motorcycle-policeon the beat to hot-air balloonraces. These experimentswere widely publicizedin radiomagazines and called attention o possi-

Schiffer] 657

7/30/2019 Schiffer 96


AMERICAN ANTIQUITY

120 -

03

0

10.20

CO

CZ

a,

0

CZ

Laa,

U3-

100 -

80 -

60 -

40 -

20 -

1

0 1.1

1920 1930 1940 1950

Figure 2. Changes in the frequency of different portable radio models manufactured and sold in the United States,1920-1955. Based on a ca. 10 percent interval sample of radios listed by Grinder (1995). To be counted as a portableradio, the receiver must use battery or three-way power and be designated as "portable."All portable radios in thisdatabase employ vacuum tubes.

bilities for new kinds of radios.Impressedby the

opportunities, inventors and entrepreneurs

respondedwith newradiodesignsforspecial-pur-pose communicationsgear, some of which were

commercialized Schiffer 1991).

Discussion

This framework f processes in the life historyof

a product type-invention, commercialization,and adoption-allows one to investigate variety-

generationand variety-selectionin a systematicmanner. n historiesof theportableradio(andthe

early electric automobile [Schiffer et al. 1994]),

the complex interactionof variety-generation ndvariety-selectionprocesses has been illuminated.

The intricateconnectionsof variety-generationandvariety-selectionprocessesestablish relation-

shipsbetweenunits of evolution at diverse scales.

Significantly, in the evolution of cultural phe-nomena,selectionprocesses at one scale can cre-

ate variationat others.Forexample,the selection

of inventions for commercializationby financial

andmanufacturingorporationseads to variation

in products available in the wholesale market-

place. Selection of this variation by retailingbehavioralcomponents hen createsproductvari-

ation in the retailmarketplace. n turn,the selec-

tion processes of consumers influence the varia-

tion in household artifact inventories. One can

envision that the latter variation will be actedupon by additionalselection processes, thereby

affecting the differential persistence of house-

holds. These cascading effects and complicated

relationshipsof variety-generatingand variety-

selecting processes ensure that both must be

treated n evolutionaryexplanations.

Conclusion

In an effort to promote constructive dialoguebetween different heoreticalprograms, hispaper

has examined some relationshipsbetween evolu-tionaryand behavioralarchaeologies, ocusingon

potentialcommon ground, ncompatibilities,and

possible synergies.Various assumptions, tenets, and principles

were delineatedthat have some potentialto form

common groundbetween the two programs.The

statements summarizingthis apparentcommon

groundappear o be of some importance.Tenetsof evolutionaryarchaeology hatcannot

be accepted by behavioralistswere scrutinized.It

was argued hatthese incompatibilities tem fromquestionable ssumptionshatarenot, in fact,inte-

gral to the selectionistprogram.Abandonment f

658 [Vol. 61, No. 4, 1996

7/30/2019 Schiffer 96



these assumptions would make evolutionary

archaeology compatible,not just with behavioral

archaeology,but also with modern evolutionary

biology.Finally,the possibility that the two programscould enjoy synergies was examined through a

treatment of variety-generation and selection

processesalongwith scales andunitsof selection.

And what of the "thousandarchaeologies"once welcomed Schiffer1988:479)? remain om-

fortablewith a diversityof ideas-even a plethoraof socialtheories.Whatdoes concernme, however,is the prospectof archaeologybecoming perma-

nentlyorganized ntoparadigm-basednclaves hat

exchangeonly epithets.This is an intellectual ux-urythatarchaeology, disciplinewithtoo fewprac-titioners spread over too much subject matter,cannot afford. Perhapsit is time to dispute the

Kuhniandogma that differentparadigms-in this

case theoretical rograms orexplainingvariabilityand changein humanbehaviorand societies-are

conceptuallyncommensurable,nd so theirpracti-tionerscannottakepart n meaningfuldialogues.I

suggestthatthedegreeof compatibility rcomple-

mentaritybetween differentprogramsshould be

determinedon a case-by-casebasis. In the case ofbehavioraland evolutionaryarchaeologies,there

appearo be manyopportunitiesorsubstantive is-

cussions, and even hints that the two programsworking nconcertcouldproducea more ntegratedand successful science. Perhaps he establishmentof aconstructiveworking elationship etweenevo-

lutionaryarchaeologyand behavioralarchaeologycould serve as a model for interactionbetween

other,seeminglyless reconcilable, heoreticalpro-

grams.

Acknowledgments.An earlierversionof this paperwas read at

the Universityof Washingtonin January1994. I thank the

Department f Anthropology, ndespeciallyJulie K. Stein,for

the invitationto speak.AnnetteSchifferhelpedto record the

data for Figures1 and2. I am gratefulto the people who fur-

nishedperceptiveandhelpfulcomments on earlierversions ofthis paper, ncludingStevenL. Kuhn,Vincent M. LaMotta,R.Lee Lyman,PatrickD. Lyons,HectorNeff, Michael J. Shott,James M. Skibo,Julie K. Stein, PatriceA. Teltser,William H.

Walker, LuAnn Wandsnider, and especially Michael J.O'Brien and StephenL. Zegura.I am indebted to PatriceA.

Teltser,visiting

scholar in theLaboratory

of Traditional

Technology,1992-1995, for leading manystimulatingdiscus-sions about evolutionaryarchaeology.I thankMariaNievesZedefio fortranslating he abstract.

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