Review: Political Parties: The Functional Approach and the Structural AlternativeAuthor(s): William R. SchonfeldSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Jul., 1983), pp. 477-499Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/421854Accessed: 13/10/2010 13:07

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Review Article

Political Parties: The Functional Approach and the Structural Alternative

William R. Schonfeld

Samuel H. Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federa- tion, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1967.

Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity 2 (Winter 1969): 111-41.

Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1980.

Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? Chatham, N.J., Chatham Pub- lishing House, 1980.

The intermediate character of parties and the importance of their real or al- leged roles in the operation of a political system explain in large part the prop- ensity to define and study parties in terms of their effects. Since the advent of mass suffrage, political parties have been intermediaries between the citizenry and the government. They are intermediate spatially, no matter how a society may be divided vertically and hierarchically. They are intermediate in size, containing only a segment of the entire population but a more inclusive seg- ment than the government. As Roberto Michels noted:

The political party, etymologically and logically, can embrace only a part of the citizenry, politically organized. The party is a fraction; it is pars pro toto.'

Recently Giovanni Sartori reemphasized this point: "A party is part-of-a- whole."2 The study of parties has been molded by their intermediate qual- ity. Their location in the polity between the general public and the government has fixed attention on two critical brokerage functions they appear to perform. On the one hand, parties seem to offer voters a means to make sense out of and organize, what, without their presence, would be a chaotic and incom- prehensible choice among competing candidates for public office. As Leon D.

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Epstein suggested: "Structuring the vote is the minimum function of a politi- cal party in a modern democracy."3 Although the terminology is contempo- rary,the argument is not. A. Lawrence Lowell, writing in 1913, argued: "Their [political parties'] essential function and the true reason for their exis-

tence, is bringing public opinion to a focus and framing issues for the popular verdict."4 Similarly, Edward McChesney Sait, twenty-five years later, ar-

gued: "the function of parties [is] to consolidate public opinion in advance of the election." 5

On the other hand, parties specifically seek control over the government. This function of a political party has been considered central by countless

scholars, including Michels and Duverger, although not in their major works.

... the general orientation of the political party, whether in its personal or im-

personal aspect, is that of Machtstreben (striving for power).6

..* political parties have as their primary goal the conquest of power or a share in its exercise.7

The intermediate character of parties explains the research focus on effects. This emphasis so dominates the field that the explicit definitions of parties in-

variably identify what they do or seek to accomplish within the political sys- tem and ignore what they are or what special activity occurs within them:

The term "party" will be employed to designate associations, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment. The end to which its activity is de- voted is to secure power within an organization for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members. (Weber)'

A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get power. Power is here defined as control of the government. (Schnattschneider)9

A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power. (Schumpeter)1o

... any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label. (Epstein)1

A political party is a formal organization whose self-conscious, primary purpose is to place and maintain in public office persons who will control, alone or in coalition, the machinery of government. (LaPalombara)12

... organizations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions. (Janda)"3

These definitions represent the long and well-established functional thrust of the entire field: the explicit definitions select a single function or goal as the

delimiting trait of a political party"4

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William R. Schonfeld

Scholars who conceive of parties in functional terms do not necessarily ig- nore activity inside the party. But it is given importance only insofar as it in- fluences the performance of party roles.

There is an alternative conceptualization of parties, one that views them, in the first instance, as structures, settings in which activity takes place.

For William Graham Sumner parties are important because they "are con- stantly forced" to practice "antagonistic cooperation," which is "the most productive form of combination in high civilization." "It consists in the com- bination of two persons or groups to satisfy a great common interest while minor antagonisms of interest which exist between them are suppressed."15i This interpretation identifies as the most salient element of a party activity that occurs among its members. As such, it is at total variance with the prevailing definitions in the field.

The difference seems to be associated with the starting point for the schol- ar's reflection. Sumner, a sociologist, began with an attempt to understand how people behave toward one another. His basic concern was with social re- lations. Institutions then are settings in which activity takes place. In turn, he did not inquire about what parties do but only about what people do in parties. In sharp contrast, political scientists focus on polities and thus emphasize how other organizations affect the political system.16 They begin their reflections with the institutions of the nation-state; as a result, their initial questions- what do parties do? why should they be studied? why do they matter?--lead to definitions of the subject matter and subsequent research that centers on the intermediary character of parties, their roles and functions.

The type of work practiced by Sumner is not entirely foreign to basic in- quiry on political parties. In fact, the single most important study in the field adopted such a perspective. Roberto Michels's Political Parties: A Sociolog- ical Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy treats the party as a setting for activity and not as a structure that affects its environ- ment. The focus is on describing and explaining the organizational life of so- cialist, working-class parties not because of its consequences for structuring the vote or obtaining governmental power but because

. . the appearance of oligarchical phenomena in the very bosom of the revolu- tionary parties is a conclusive proof of the existence of immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human organization which strives for the attainment of definite ends."7

Michels made his decision to treat the party as a setting for activity in spite of the fact that the original stimulus for his study apparently came from Max Weber who explicitly advocated examining its effects:

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Weber suggested to Robert Michels that he study the structure of the German Social Democratic party in order to understand the impact of the political par- ties created to mobilize the masses in electoral democracies on the economic and social structures.'8

The importance of Michels's work argues for a perspective that treats the party as a structured setting for human activity. This point is further em- phasized by the factors surrounding his research decision: Michels followed Weber's recommendation for a research site but rejected the proposed functionalism.

On these grounds we could advocate a Sumner-type approach rather than the functional one so prevalent in the discipline. But such a preference would impugn an entire scholarly tradition dating back to Max Weber. Moreover, since parties do clearly occupy an intermediate position in the polity, high- lighting this in our definitions and research seems reasonable, not controver- sial. Consequently, only evidence of serious problems posed by the functional conceptualization would warrant rejecting this approach.

The Inadequacies of the Functional Approach

The problems posed by conceiving of the political party in terms of its effects on the surrounding environment are serious. The most striking feature of re- cent functional literature is the proclivity of its authors to conclude that parties really do not play the role that was investigated. To put this point in its baldest terms, a researcher identifies a function (or a set of functions) of parties viewed as crucial for the political system; evidence and analysis lead to the conclusion that this function (these functions) is (are) not performed or not performed well. Such findings, of course, are significant; they identify ways in which parties do not matter or do not matter very much. However, what is to be made of an approach whose hallmark is the discovery that the phenom- ena it selects for study systematically do not matter very much?

To make matters worse, the same scholars who investigate the critical functions that are not performed or are performed poorly tend to conclude that parties, for unstated or amorphous reasons, are still important.

To illustrate this rather bewildering state of affairs, consider first two recent books, Richard Rose' s Do Parties Make a Difference? and, more briefly, Kay Lawson's Political Parties and Linkage, and then Anthony King's older, more general, and quite telling review of the field, "Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections."

For Richard Rose the basic problem is to determine whether and how par- ties matter in determining governmental policies. The United Kingdom is the

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research site. Since the regime is typically viewed as a prime example of "party government"--the MPs vote strictly along party lines and each gen- eral election tends to place governing responsibility in the hands of a single party-we would expect parties to have significant influence over policy. Rose's findings are stimulating precisely because they are contrary to this ex- pectation.

He begins by contrasting the adversary with the consensus model of party politics:

The conventional model of British government assumes that parties are adver- saries. The Conservative and Labour parties are meant to oppose each other in parliamentary debates and at general elections, and to govern the country differ- ently when each has its turn in office. The Conservative and Labour parties, while opposing each other in Parliament and in general elections, are expected to agree about the fundamentals of governance and not to differ substantially in their policies. When each succeeds the other office, major policies are assumed to remain much the same. (p. 19)

He tests these basic models against five distinct features of the practice of party government in Britain. First, do the Labour and Conservative parties follow an adversary or a consensus course when competing for the voters' al- legiance?

Overall, the test of elections tends to uphold the Consensus rather than the Ad- versary model of party politics .... (T)he parties disagree about which team of politicians is best suited to carry out the broadly consensual wishes of the elec- torate. (pp. 50-51)

Second, to what extent do parties act on their manifestos once they are elected to office? Once again, the adversary model is not upheld. Although parties make specific policy commitments in their manifestos and then, when elected, tend to carry out most of these commitments, the specific prescrip- tions advanced by Labour and Conservative "are not so much contradicting each other as 'talking past' each other. ... Party manifestos are not so much in conflict about how to resolve commonly perceived problems as they are statements of differing priorities for government action." (p. 68) Moreover, the priorities enunicated are not distinctively and systematically partisan.

Third, do the parties act in an adversarial or a consensual manner when they face each other in Parliament? In spite of adversary procedures in the House of Commons, legislation shows both parties tending to conform to the consensus model.

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There were no significant divisions against the government on 78 percent of government bills.... There is normally Consensus on all subjects for legisla- tion.... It is rare for an opposition to give overt consent to government policy by actually voting with it. This is not necessary; avoiding moving a division is enough.... [Finally] a newly installed government repeals little of the legisla- tion enacted by its predecessor. (pp. 79, 81, 86, 87)

Fourth, Rose considers the topic of government reorganization. In this do- main Labour and Conservative are frequently adversaries. Conflict exists and is centered explicitly on the distinct interests of each party. Such interests are challenged, for example, by legislation to change electoral laws. Each side asks "What's in it for us" (p. 105); the answers typically differ and with them the responses to the given issue.

Fifth, which model fits the way in which parties handle the economy? After a rather extensive analysis of available economic statistics, Rose concludes:

Neither sophisticated intelligence nor determined ignorance has been capable of directing the economy along lines that both Conservative and Labour leaders agree are desirable. Secular forces stronger than politicians and economists put together have been the principal determinant of the state of the British economy since 1957. This point is demonstrated by the fact that, statistically, in all nine graphic tests in this chapter a significnt secular trend was found, which on aver- age explains 75 percent of the total change in the period. (p. 139)

Drawing together the insights obtained into British party politics from his examination of these five domains of partisan activity, Rose concludes:

Yes, parties do make a difference in the way Britain is governed-but the dif- ferences are not as expected. The differences in office between one party and another are less likely to arise from contrasting intentions than from the exigen- cies of government. (p. 141)

In other words, although the "beliefs and interests" of Conservative and Labour politicians differ, their behavior is quite similar. There is evolution over time but as a function of secular trends, not as a function of which party is in office. "Necessity rather than ideological consensus is the explanation for similarities in behavior." (p. 145)

Rose's argument is stimulating. In contrast to prevailing interpretations of British politics, he depicts a rather consensual agreement, which deem- phasizes the importance of parties in determining the policies to be im- plemented. Despite the mass of evidence marshaled in this concise and well- written book, the argument is not fully convincing.19 If my purpose were to analyze the policy-formation process in Britain, the role of parties in that

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process, or the nature of politics in the United Kingdom, a detailed and careful assessment of Rose's findings would be needed.20 However, my purpose is different: to elucidate the ways in which parties have been studied and indicate directions in which future research may be profitably oriented.

From this perspective the most remarkable feature of Rose's book is the discovery that British parties really do not perform a key role in shaping gov- ernmental policy. This means, to return to Rose's functionalist conception, that parties do not matter for the phenomena that matter. Surely, they nomi- nate candidates and participate in elections, and we could view them as "teams competing for electoral victory," but to do so denies "any further purpose to parties" and "reduces" elections to "popularity contests" or votes "of confidence (or no confidence) in the relative competence of alterna- tive teams of politicians." (p. 10) For Rose such a perspective (extrapolated from Schumpeter) is denigrating and simplistic. Yet, paradoxically, this is precisely the only view of parties that can be drawn from his research. A careful scrutiny of the British context and of Rose's data might call into ques- tion his analysis but would not alter the fact that the hallmark of his functionalist study was the discovery that parties do not, according to his in- terpretation of the findings, perform the role that he thinks matters most.

Another recent book, Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Per- spective, ed. Kay Lawson, analyzes the role of parties "as agencies for forg- ing links between citizens and policymakers." This function is significant be- cause it "distinguishes parties" from all other public and private institutions. (p. 3) For Lawson, linkage is the defining trait of political parties. They per- form many other functions, but no other private or public institution serves to connect the members of a polity with their government. Hence the special im- portance of parties.

The volume contains studies of four types of linkage: participatory linkage in which parties "serve as agencies through which citizens can participate in government"; policy-responsive linkage in which parties "serve as agencies for ensuring that government officials will be responsive to the views of rank-and-file voters"; linkage by reward in which parties "act primarily as channels for the exchange of votes for favors"; and directive linkage in which parties "are used by governments as aids to maintain coercive control over their subjects." (pp. 13-14)

The separate articles in the volume are case studies of distinct empirical contexts ranging from Los Angeles party activists (by Dwaine Marvick) to Kenyan legislators and their constituents (by Joel D. Barkan and John J. Okumu). They examine distinct types of linkage and do not even share a common theoretical or conceptual framework. Each does address a linkage topic, but the focus, as well as the definitions and operationalizations, varies according to the specific author's preferences.

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As the editor, Lawson has done yeoman service in integrating these sepa- rate pieces into a coherent whole. In her introductory essay, she teases out a series of general theoretical and empirical conclusions from the case studies. Most important for a book on the linkage function:

What do they [the hypotheses extrapolated from the case studies] suggest is the role of parties as agencies of democracy, that is, as agencies that help citizens influence the processes of government (by any of the forms of linkage noted)?

Most of the conclusions are negative. Parties cannot insure that citizens' views will influence policymaking processes by choosing as leaders the socioeco- nomic peers of those citizens. If the elected representatives of parties are capa- ble of influencing policy processes at all, they probably do so at the expense of participatory linkage: learning to function cooperatively with leaders of other parties may well mean learning to forget commitments to the voters. (p. 21)

Succinctly put, parties do not perform the linkage role, the very function identified for scrutiny because of its special significance. What conclusion should we draw from the finding that political parties do not accomplish their role of connecting the citizenry with the government? Lawson's argument is, I think, unsatisfactory:

Parties claim to serve as agencies of linkage because that is one way to maintain legitimacy, to capture the votes which are their currency in the markets of power. To the extent that they ever operate in a fashion to enhance citizen con- trol of the government, they do so because citizens have made it clear that only thus are their votes to be secured. The responsibility for making and keeping parties useful intermediaries can never rest more than partially with the more idealistic of their own activists and leaders. In the final analysis, only an in- formed and assertive citizenry can compel parties-or any other organiza- tion-to adopt structures and practices necessary to aggregate their interests; to recruit responsible, electable, and effective leadership; and to transform rea- soned wishes into public policy. (pp. 23-24)

Lawson thus lays the blame for the parties' failure to perform the linkage function squarely on the electorate. This is a rather odd conclusion since the connective role was one that Lawson and her coauthors claimed for parties. Maybe they erred in attributing special and singular importance to linkage. If the editor had argued, much as Rose had, that parties should be expected to link the citizenry with their policymakers but do not, then the problem of why study parties would remain. At least, however, explicit questions about the utility of researching linkages would have been raised. But Lawson wants to argue for the importance of linkage as a future perspective for party inquiry while simultaneously demonstrating that this function is not actually per- formed; this contradiction cannot be accepted.

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Rose and Lawson suggest that an important function of political parties is not being fulfilled. Knowledge and understanding progress not only through learning what does happen but also by showing that what was intuitively rea- sonable does not occur. From this persepctive findings that demonstrate that governmental decisions are not much affected by which of two "adversarial" parties is in power or that democratic parties do not link the citizenry to their policymakers are quite significant. Even if the data from which Rose and Lawson draw their conclusions are not entirely reliable or are subject to con- flicting interpretations, are not their arguments important additions to the lit- erature?

The two books are noteworthy because they challenge some basic assump- tions about the functions performed by parties. Neither book is, however, path breaking in this respect. More than a decade ago, Anthony King published an incisive review article of the field. He called into question the importance of political parties in performing any of the roles attributed to them.

King focused attention on six alleged basic functions parties perform: structuring the vote, the integration and the mobilization of the mass public, the recruitment of political leaders, the organization of government, the for- mation of public policy, and the aggregation of interests. He suggested that for each of these functions, political parties play a role, often minimal but by no means the critical role.

Structuring the vote may refer either to "parties' efforts to persuade voters to respond to particular party labels" or to "parties' efforts to persuade citi- zens to adopt particular opinions." (p. 121) Considering the first sense, "in most countries at most times the major electoral alliances are in large part party alignments." (p. 121) When King turns to examine the second sense, he discovers an absence of "'fit' between the pattern of party opinion and the pattern of mass opinion." (p. 122) A number of examples from the 1960s, ranging from Black alienation in the United States to student unrest in West Germany and France and the development of French Canadian separatism, suggest that parties may fail to play a critical or an important role in shaping public opinion.

The findings on integrationand mobilization cast doubt on the centrality of the party's role in fulfilling these functions. In many (most?) societies there are prevalent antiparty norms; and "parties can hardly be said to be perform- ing a positive integrative function if there exists widespread antipathy or even indifference towards them." (p. 125) Next, studies examining the impact of party activity on the mass public suggest that such impact may be important, but it is severely restricted and only touches a small proportion of the popula- tion. King concludes: "In Europe as in America, party is likely to remain one important factor in political integration and mobilization; in Europe as in America it has never been the only one and it seems possible that its impor- tance is declining." (p. 128)

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Turning to the function of leadership recruitment. King points out that many critical government decision makers are not elected officeholders but rather are appointed executive officials, senior civil servants, military offic- ers, judges, and so forth. Parties play only a very limited role, if any, in de- termining who the incumbents will be. Moreover, even in connection with re- cruitment to elective office, the role of the party is at least problematic and may in large part be attributable to the "self-recruitment" of individuals.

The function of the organization of government refers to the capacity of parties, as coherent entities, to exercise their authority over the various ele- ments of government. Neither European parties, with their greater cohesion, nor American ones have "been able to extend their grasp over the executive and administration and, for example, publicly-owned industries." (p. 134)

The role of policy formation can be conceived of as the relationship be- tween party and electorate, as Lawson did, or as between party and govern- ment, as Rose did. King pays attention to the second sense and concludes:

Organized party generally remains one of the forces with which Western gov- ernments must contend in the formation of public policy; but it has never been the only one, and there is reason to suppose that in many countries in the late 1960's it is not even a major one. (p. 137)

Considering the final function, King asks: "Are parties in fact the major inter- est aggregators in the west?"

The answer, irrespective of whether aggregation is used in its accommodation of interest sense, or in its general-policy alternatives sense, would seem to be "no'"-that the interest aggregation function, like most of the others discussed here, is performed by a variety of structures of which the political party is only one and not necessarily the most important. (p. 139)

What do these findings mean for the study of political parties? At the "very least," we should be skeptical about the catalog of functions considered and "the great importance attached to parties in large segments of the political sci- ence literature." (p. 140) Research should be reoriented. First, the function in question must be "defined precisely and in detail." Second, the focus of study "should almost certainly be on the function and not on the party." Last, "what is needed above all else are attempts to specify the conditions under which various political parties and other political structures will or will not perform the various political functions." (p. 141)

King's argument merges well with and perhaps was even nurtured by the context of the times in which he wrote. There was a growing depolitization of politics among students of political science, a trend that has since been muted but still persists. The end-of-ideology debate and the notion of the catch-all

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party suggested that political conflict is not nearly as important or as intense in democracies as it used to be or as it is imagined to be.21 Political parties are one purveyor, perhaps the basic purveyor, of political conflict. King's claim that they do not matter as much as it is sometimes intuitively or explicitly al- leged fits the mood of depolitization.

There is a contradiction in King's argument. It is puzzling but instructive. He begins with the assumption that institutions matter because of the effects they have, the basic axiom of any functional perspective. He discovers that parties do not perform or do not extensively perform the functions that were identified as being critical to their role in the political system. He concludes that inquiry should focus on functions, not on structures, including those of parties, and should assess the conditions determining the type of institution that will perform each function effectively.

The logic of the argument is shattered by introducing the idea that parties must be studied in any case.

The experience of all Western societies suggests that, where there is any degree of freedom and where power is both worth having and hard to get, men and women will combine to form political parties. The parties they form are certain to play a large part in almost every process of democratic politics, the electoral, the legislative, the administrative, even the judicial. If the study of political par- ties did not exist, it would clearly have to be invented. (p. 141)

This incongruous statement, reinventing the just eliminated explicit study of political parties, is important because it suggests reasons why the functional approach may be inadequate. First, to develop King's point, although parties may not play the critical role in performing every function attributed to them, they do play a role in performing a whole host of functions. They do many things, and even if in each arena of feasible activity their contribution is not necessarily the most critical one, the number of arenas in which they perform make them central to an understanding of politics in the contemporary nation-state. The functional approach, whether it examines a single role of special significance or a series of functions, runs the risk of underestimating, perhaps even overlooking, the party's cumulative contribution to political ac- tivity.

Second, all the roles associated with parties have surely been fulfilled at some time in a given polity and have been ignored in others. Parties have the potential to perform each of these functions even if in given concrete cases they do not do so. This potential is an important factor in understanding the significance of political parties; it is overlooked by the functionalists.

Third, the incongruous element in King's conclusion is entailed by the very approach he used, which attributes significance to both structures and the ef-

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fects they have on the surrounding environment. It posits that social and po- litical institutions matter because of the roles they perform in the polity. King's evidence and his general conclusion suggest that parties need not and should not be studied directly. This deduction challenges the very approach that guided his inquiry. By inserting into his conclusion the paradoxical asser- tion that parties as such must be subjects in inquiry, King mutes this major contradiction and at the same time reduces the potential controversy that would surround an explicit call to political scientists not to study parties.

The contradiction, of course, is not resolved. If anything, this particular attempt to camouflage it highlights the problem not only within King's article but also within the extensive literature on parties informed by a functional ap- proach. Research indicates that parties do not perform or do not perform well the functions they were expected to fulfill. One deduction that cannot properly be drawn and yet is drawn from these findings is that parties should continue to be a focal point of inquiry.

What deductions should be drawn? How can the contradiction be resolved or avoided? Three alternative remedies can be considered.

1. King's general conclusion should be accepted. The functions supposedly performed by parties matter most; these are what led scholars in the first in- stance to attribute importance to parties. Inquiry should be organized around these functions to determine how they are being fulfilled in different polities and by what social and political institutions. Parties should enter the re- searcher's field of vision only to the extent that they play a role in ac- complishing the prescribed functions.

This solution is problematic not only because the thought of eliminating the explicit study of parties from the political scientist's panoply of research con- cerns is disconcerting. Parties may not be critical to the performance of any specific political function, but their very existence may have a crucial overall effect on the polity. In particular, "democracy" has never developed without political parties. Schattschneider's unequivocal statement that "modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties" is basically exact.22 Al- though we can "think" in just about any terms, we cannot point to a single empirical case of modern political democracy in which parties are not pre- sent.23 Thus a field of study reoriented toward the functions purportedly ful- filled by parties runs the risk by analogy of carefully attending to some trees while ignoring the forest.

2. The problem is not with the functional perspective but rather with its operationalization. Scholars have failed to identify properly the roles per- formed by political parties. As a result, the implications drawn from the gathered data for redirecting inquiry are unfounded. Work is needed to de- velop a better application of functionalism to the study of parties.

This remedy may be correct. Yet the roles selected by researchers-struc-

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turing the vote, shaping public policy, and so forth-seem to be the ones we could reasonably expect parties to perform, and it is difficult to imagine what are the important functions that have escaped attention.

3. The problem stems directly from the functional approach and can only be remedied by employing a perspective that involves a different emphasis. Specifically, parties should be studied as settings in which activity takes place. Earlier I suggested tile plausibility of such an approach and indicated how Michels's seminal work lent it credibility. The empirical problems posed by conceiving of parties in terms of their effects warrant sketching out how such an approach can be applied to the study of parties.

The Structural Remedy

Viewing political parties as settings for activity does not entail a denial of the various functions they have been presumed to fulfill. Parties may aggregate interests, transmit ideology, shape policy, forge links between the citizenry and the government, and so forth. But parties do not necessarily perform any of these roles. The settings perspective posits that the "essence," "exis- tence," or "meaning" of political parties is not captured by any one function or even the full gamut of functions attributed to them.

Political parties are first and foremost (particular kinds of) persistent col- lectivities of people with a more or less extensively shared set of goals. The party is distinct from all other collectivities, including family, school, work place, interest group, civic action group, military, and church, in that its prin- cipal claim is to contain within its membership the personnel capable of gov- erning the nation (either alone or, if necessary, in association with other par- ties).

This conceptualization designates a comparable set of groupings to those conventionally placed under the rubric of political parties. It does not restrict attention to collectivities with a reasonable chance to obtain partial or full control over a nation's government. Power-striving parties-the American Democrats, the British Conservatives, the French Gaullists, the Spanish So- cialists, et al.-are, of course, included within the definition's purview. But community parties-nonviable "contenders" for power such as the American Peace and Freedom party and the French Unified Socialist party (P.S.U.)- are also included; they too claim the capacity to govern.

Most important, the settings conceptualization does not ascribe to or with- hold from parties any special roles in the polity. In contrast to the prevailing functionalist view, it delimits two interconnected directions for inquiry: the organizational sociology of parties (to appreciate both their particularity as a species and their similarity to other members of the genus, human collec-

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tivities) and the party as a training ground for governmental positions (since parties claim to contain among their membership the personnel capable of providing political leadership for the nation).

A consideration of the existing literature that treats parties as organizations suggests an even more focused strategy of inquiry.24 Michels's work argues for concentrating attention on the elites, the "management," of parties, and against discarding a sociology of organizations approach for a sociology of political party organization. But many of his followers, including Barnes, El- dersveld, and Duverger, in their revisions of his perspective, have challenged one or the other or both of these basic propositions. These modifications, paradoxically, highlight the wisdom of the original formulation.

Roberto Michels viewed the political party as an organization. His book drew on the experiences of the early social democratic parties to demonstrate the impossibility for organizations-no matter how strongly their members are committed intellectually and philosophically to democracy-to escape in their operation from "the iron law of oligarchy," the universal tendency within organizations for control to be exercised by those "at the top," the leaders.

Michels did not actually provide an organizational sociology of either par- ties or their elites. Instead, he used political parties as testing sites for a par- ticular principle of how people behave in any collectivity. His inquiry em- phasized that parties are organizations and that in all organizations, the elites, to use a very mild formulation, are disproportionately influential. As the ar- gument unraveled, Michels could have but did not cast light on many critical features of party activity directly related to his basic thesis. To take one exam- ple, he did not examine authority relations between strata, not even the issue of the leaders' directiveness. These omissions were not caused by carelessness but rather by the analytical problem that drove the inquiry.

Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy indicates one type of research compatible with the set- tings approach: drawing on the operation of political parties to test more gen- eral propositions about collective human behavior. This method emphasizes that parties are organizations. Even though it does not provide an organiza- tional sociology, it suggests that such an approach would be a logical further development of the basic perspective. Michels's findings urge that were an organizational sociology of political parties to be undertaken, the most appro- priate strategy of inquiry would be one that centers attention on elites. If the national leadership of a party assumes a determinant part in shaping and di- recting the party's activities, then a research concentration on this stratum-of course, not ignoring its relations with lower strata-would be most appropri- ate.

The proclaimed heirs to Michels curiously tend not only to ignore the logi-

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cal extension of his work but also to undermine and challenge these two basic dicta. For example, the driving force behind Maurice Duverger's now classi- cal study was the search for a general theory of political parties.25 Such a goal directly contradicts the notion that parties are organizations because it as- sumes that parties are so different that they require a special theory in order to understand them. A general theory of complex organizations, including, for example, political parties, work places, and hospitals, may be attainable,26 but this would preclude the very possibility of a general theory of the hospital, the work place, or the party. Succinctly put, if, as Michels thought, parties are a specific type of social institution, they may be too narrow in scope to serve as a basis for constructing a general theory.

Samuel Barnes's research on a provincial federation of the Italian Socialist party (PSI) is a particularly good example of how work conducted in the Michelsian tradition unsuccessfully strives to deny the organizational and elite-centered features of party life. Barnes squarely places his study in the context of illuminating the relationship between democracy and party organi- zation, although revising Michels's formulation (Ch. 1). His data are drawn from interviews with rank-and-file members of a particular local federation of the PSI. The methodology and its consequent findings (providing information on the political attitudes and personal histories of a set of low-level party members) are not relevant to elucidating Michels's thesis. By its very operationalization, the research rejects elite-centered study and an organiza- tional sociology of the party. But are these conclusions justified?

Barnes points out that the PSI is a highly centralized party. He indicates, for instance, the critical role played by the national leaderships of the factions in developing the alternative policy programs presented to ordinary rank-and-file members. Basic policy and important decisions are clearly made by the na- tional elite. But Barnes's research focuses on a local federation. Could the data gathered at this level of party activity cast light on the issues addressed by Michels? If, following Barnes's logic, democracy involves influence, does it matter that rank-and-file members in a specific federation believe they have influence, and if in fact the key decisions are made at the national level, influ- ence over what?

For Barnes the fundamental flaw in Michels's conceptualization was to view the party as (simply another type of) a complex organization:

Michels' formulation of the problem of organizational oligarchy suffers from a serious weakness: it accepts the appropriateness of the bureaucratic model for the study of political parties.... But a political party in a free society exhibits characteristics that differentiate it sharply from many other formal organiza- tions. (pp. 4-5)

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Although it is surely exact that the political party is not indistinguishable from other types of complex organizations, it is also true that it is not different from them in every single respect. The critical issue is: are the differences sufficient to require a special theoretical apparatus? Barnes identifies two basic traits that, in his judgment, limit the application of the "bureaucratic model" to the political party. (pp. 6-7)

First and foremost, "perhaps the most effective limitation on oligarchy in political parties within democracies is the ability of the membership to vote with its feet, to become inactive or even to leave the party." (p. 6) As a result, the elites, dependent on the labor and the enthusiasm of volunteers, cannot re- ally dismiss those who are their subordinates. Second, the leaders must often work with colleagues and subordinates who they have not personally chosen, and they must deal with situations over which they have little influence. In conjunction these two factors limit the amount of hierarchical control that can be exerted.

Barnes concludes:

The student of political parties consequently needs to concentrate as much on the recipients as on the wielders of authority. He should examine the decision to participate, the expectations and rewards associated with participation, and the nature and limits of authority within the organization. He must stress interper- sonal dynamics as well as the formal decision-making structure.... Goal con- flict, muddled lines of authority, and marginality of participation render the po- litical party, at least the one under study, quite different from the typical Ameri- can trade union. (pp. 7, 8, 9)

Barnes's observations are exact. Yet the conclusion drawn from them-

parties are in some fundamental respect different from other complex organi- zations-seems extreme and, in part, based on incomplete observation. Con- sider, for example, the notion that parties differ in the capacity of their mem- bers to "vote with their feet." On the one hand, this ignores the contrast within political parties between "ordinary" members who can, in fact, quit rather easily (assuming they do not have a high degree of identity with the

party) and those who either hold or seek to hold public office. The latter cate-

gory of individuals is rather dependent on the party. Whatever reservations

they might entertain about the processes or goals at any given moment, their

capacity to pack their bags is constrained by their desire to rise to elected pos- itions in the polity. And this group need not constitute only a small fraction of the membership. Note, for example, that at least during the past five or six

years, approximately 20 percent of the membership of the French Socialist

party (P.S.) has actually held public office, and naturally a much larger pro- portion seeks such positions. On the other hand, the "freedom" to leave an

organization cannot logically be construed to lead to more democracy, influ-

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ence, and control by subordinates. In Exit, Voice and Loyalty Albert O. Hirschman enunciates as a "central point" of this powerful and convincing theory that: "The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice. "27 In other words, the facility of the de- parture vitiates the capacity to seek internal change and consequently rein- forces the elite's control over the organization's operation. The very observa- tion from which Barnes draws support for his contention that parties are more "democratic" than other complex organizations, from Hirschman's perspec- tive, leads to a greater capacity for the top leadership to exert effective hierar- chical control.

Barnes's conclusion is also fueled by an exaggeration of the characteristics of other formal organizations. If we look cross-culturally at business enter- prises, at least at times when unemployment is not severe, employees are rarely dismissed (regardless of their behavior on the job). They also have the capacity to leave their jobs and move on to comparable positions in other en- terprises. Perhaps this shift can even be more easily effected than leaving one political party to join another: membership in a party involves symbolic iden- tity with a particular view of the world that is not as necessary a trait of mem- bership in a particular work place.28 Naturally, people may well leave a party and not join another one, whereas a person resigning from one enterprise must seek employment elsewhere. Yet with the exception of the casual joiner who is unlikely to become a party activist, it is not clear that the members' capacity to vote with their feet is markedly greater in the political party than in other (voluntary) formal organizations.

From his assumption of a special type of membership, Barnes derives a special form of authority relationship, which distinguishes the political party from other organizations. For this point, he draws inspiration and support from Eldersveld, who he quotes at length, including the following passage. (p. 13)

The political party is thus to be visualized as a "reciprocal deference structure." Contrary to the bureaucratic and authoritarian models of social organization, the party is not a precisely ordered system of authority and influence from the top down, though as a "paper" structure it may give this appearance. The organi- zation does not function through the issuance of directives from the top which are obeyed without question. Rather, there is tolerance of autonomy, local in- itiative, local inertia.29

This image of the distinct nature of the political party is predicated on an un- realistic and artificial view of other organizations being much like mythical armies composed of obedient subordinates directed completely by autocratic superordinates. Few if any organizations in any society (particularly a demo- cratic one) operate in the way that Eldersveld, seconded by Barnes, ascribes to

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bureaucratic and authoritarian organizations. Negotiation between members of distinct strata, local initiative, and local inertia are widespread features of collective life. Automatic, unquestioned obedience and the absence of au- tonomy are very rare.

Overall, the challenges to Michels's dicta, which extend his work through a special sociology of party organization and a deemphasis on the importance of elites, are not convincing. Rather, to develop the settings perspective along the lines suggested by Michels, an apt research strategy would seek an organi- zational sociology of elites.

Any organizational sociology may attend to three basic topics: relations within strata, relations between strata, and relations with other groups. An or- ganizational sociology of party elites would first draw attention to the follow- ing variables: authority relations (participation, responsiveness, influence flows, and patterns of compliance) among the members of the top national leadership and between them and other segments of the party; the bases and the degree of cohesion and division, the climate of everyday human relations, the decision-making process, the motivational factors leading to commitments of time and energy, and recruitment to top leadership positions. Such an or- ganizational sociology should also provide insights into the party's environ- ment: the social milieu and networks of party leaders, the extent and the na- ture of their relations with the press, television, and radio, as well as with the government, the administrative apparatus of the state, pressure groups, and other political parties.

Gathering insights into each of these separate variables is, in and of itself, a worthwhile project. Surprisingly, we have extraordinarily limited information on the internal operation of national party elites. What is the relationship be- tween the leader and the other members of the national elite? Do mass parties tend to be democratic, as many politicians claim, or oligarchical, as Michels argued, or is authority exercised in a more monocratic manner?30 How di- rective is the national leadership? Under what conditions are they responsive to attempted influence by local party leaders and the general membership? How does the party leadership (the divisiveness of which is especially appa- rent) maintain cohesion? Why is it much more prone to establish patterns of "antagonistic cooperation," to use Sumner's term, than the management of other organizations? Is partisan hostility a function of the degree to which leaders are embedded in antagonistic, mutually exclusive subcultures and networks of contacts?31 These and many other unanswered (often unposed) questions promise to provide important insights into the internal operation of a political party.

Consider, for example, one case that indicates how a focus on the party elite may enrich our perspective on a phenomenon that has not been ignored. Scholars have tended to regard the media as a transmission belt used by lead-

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ers to convert or exercise influence over the "mass."132 The relations between a party elite and the media are significantly more complex and involve at least two additional roles, both camouflaged unless the leadership iself is a focal point of inquiry. First, the presence or the absence of the media, as well as its disposition toward the political force being considered and its various fac- tions, has an influence over the decision-making process of the party. If a party is being ignored, to attract attention it may try to stage a "media event," which in turn may have important unanticipated ramifications on partisan positions taken in the future. Conflict within a party can be accentuated and deepened if the media provide a forum for particular factional leaders who cannot resist the temptation to increase their public exposure. Second, in spite of the conspiratorial image of politics, it may well be that an important seg- ment of the elite of a political party gathers information about its own party's activities and decisions from the media. (Research that I have conducted on the national leaderships of the French Gaullist and Socialist parties indicates that this occurs frequently.) If so, this provides a stimulating base for reflec- tion: what are the consequences for organizational life of a pattern of commu- nication among leaders that is dependent on the radio, television, and the press? What does such a pattern of communication indicate about the deci- sion-making process within the national elite? What are the psychological ramifications for a member of the top leadership stratum to obtain information about his party's positions and activities through the mass media?

A synthesis of the basic, discrete organizational variables provides a gen- eral understanding of the operation of the party's "national government." The importance and the significance of such general practices have been but should not be underestimated. In particular, the established patterns of ex- pectation, activity, interaction, and behavior among members of the party elite and between them and other groups in their environment set parameters on and establish precedents for their behavior should they obtain control over the state apparatus. In other words, membership in the party elite serves as a training ground for governmental position.

This conception goes beyond and differs from the notion that governmental leaders are recruited from party elites. The training-ground idea agrees with Eldersveld's telling formulation that parties are "miniature polities"33 but more importantly and more specifically suggests that there may be a type of symbiosis between leadership in the party and in the government. Member- ship in the national party elite may well be preparation for parallel positions in the nation, which shapes and forms such future behavior. The case of the French Socialist party is almost ideal-typical: the first secretary, Frangois Mitterrand, is now president of the Republic; the man who for a long time was the PS's number two leader, Pierre Mauroy, is prime minister; the third potentate of the party, Gaston Defferre, is now the most powerful minister of

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the government; the leaders of the major non-Mitterrandist "factions," Jean-Pierre Chevenement and Michel Rocard, hold the special title of minister of state; and the all-important staff of the Elysee is directed by long-standing associates, collaborators, and friends of Francois Mitterrand. Such examples could be cited ad nauseum: membership in the elite of the PS and relations with the first secretary served as a training ground for leadership of the nation.

Alternatively, membership in a party's national elite may more or less ex-

tensively be derivative from governmental service. To remain with a French

example, this was to a large extent the case for the top leaders of the current Gaullist movement (RPR). The symbiotic relationship is thus not unidirec-

tional; both government and party may serve as a recruitment base for the other. Moreover, specific individuals may move back and forth between the two organizations or simultaneously serve both.

As a result, it is not unreasonable to assume that as managers of the minia- ture polity become managers of the nation, and vice versa, there is a certain

continuity in their behavior-continuity that is all the more to be expected since such transfers are not idiosyncratic but rather involve collections of peo- ple who have already established working relations with each other. It would in fact be more surprising if these relations were transformed significantly be- cause the context of the interaction had changed. This is the essence of the idea of training ground, which is clearly distinct from the less constraining notion of recruitment.

Although the symbiotic relationship between party and governmental elite is not universal, it is common. An organizational sociology of party elites

permits examining this critical but neglected issue. The findings of an organizational sociology of party elites may be com-

bined with other kinds of data to illuminate a variety of issues important to so- cial scientists. First, the approach outlined here would allow comparison of a

political party with a variety of social institutions, including schools, fac-

tories, work places, and administrations of the state. Such comparison on a cross-national basis would permit distinguishing those features of a party's experience that are culturally specific to the nation in which it is located and

functionally specific to parties (in general or within that nation) from those that are specific to the particular party being studied. More generally, since

organizational sociologists rarely if ever study political parties, research of the kind I have defined might suggest some revisions or amplifications of theories of organizations.

Second, the approach outlined here could be supplemented by findings on other features of a political party. In particular, the settings approach could

provide a context in which to examine how parties perform the various func- tions that have been attributed to them.34 I have already indicated how the or-

ganizational perspective recasts and combines questions on the recruitment of

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political leaders and the organization of government. A deep understanding of the types of party organization, which could only be derived from extensive research in a variety of contexts, would surely cast light on variations in whether and how parties attempt to fulfill the various functions attributed to them and perhaps also into how effective they are. On the basis of such in- quiries, an amalgamation of the settings and effects approaches could be con- structed.

Such an amalgam is clearly desirable since parties are not only structured

settings for activities but also generators of effects. But for the blend to pros- per it must be based, first and foremost, on an understanding of the party as an organization.

NOTES

1. Roberto Michels, First Lectures in Political Sociology (New York: Harper and Row, 1965-originally written and delivered in 1927), p. 134.

2. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, vol. 1 (London, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 26.

3. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 77.

4. A. Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York, London, Bom- bay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green and Company, 1913), p. 70.

5. Edward McChesney Sait, Political Institutions: A Preface (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, Inc., 1938), p. 520.

6. Roberto Michels, First Lectures in Political Sociology, op. cit., p. 134. 7. Maurice Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups: A Comparative Introduction (New

York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972-originally published in 1966), p. 1. 8. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 1 (New York:

Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 284. 9. E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942),

p. 35. 10. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper

and Row, 1962-originally published in 1942), p. 283. 11. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, op. cit., p. 9. 12. Joseph LaPalombara, Politics Within Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,

1974), p. 509. 13. Kenneth Janda, Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey (New York: The Free Press,

1980), p. 5. 14. This statement should not be construed as implying that party scholars systematically pro-

vide definitions of their subject matter. Some of the most important studies, including those of Michels and Duverger, have avoided explicit definitions. (See: Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy [New York: The Free Press, 1962-originally published in 1915]; and Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Or- ganization and Activity in the Modern State [New York: John Wiley, 1963: originally published in 1951].) Even V.O. Key, a seminal figure in American behavioral political science, did not de- fine the phenomenon. Rather he identified four distinct usages of the term: "party-in-the-elector- ate," "the group of more or less professional political workers," "groups within the govern- ment," and an all-encompassing usage "which rolls into one the party-in-the-electorate, the pro- fessional political group, the party-in-the-legislature, and the party-in-the-government." (Poli- tics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 4th ed. [New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958-originally published in 1942], pp. 180-182.)

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Key's usage of the term is clearly functional. Michels and Duverger focus on the party as a terrain of activity and do not seem very concerned with the roles parties play in the political sys- tem.

15. William Graham Sumner, Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals (New York: The American Library, Mentor Books, 1960-originally published in 1906), p. 32.

16. As Weber argued: "By definition a party can only exist within an organization, in order to influence its policy or gain control of it" (op. cit., p. 285). And for political scientists that organi- zation has been the government.

17. Robert Michels, Political Parties, op. cit. p. 50. 18. Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Politics and the Social Sciences (New York, London, and

Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. xx. 19. The adversarial model, as Rose translates it, seems too absolute; foes must not only differ

but also be irreconcilable and oppose one another on virtually every issue. To the extent that the real world of British politics does not conform to this image, Rose judges it to be consensual. Al- though, in the concluding chapter, he indicates that parties that are fundamentally distinct from one another run the risk of either tearing the political system asunder or destroying themselves through fragmentation, in the body of the book, he establishes criteria for adversarial politics that would require precisely the kind of suicidal behavior described in the concluding chapter. His model of adversary politics is so extreme-suggesting, for example, that a newly installed gov- ernment would repeal the legislation adopted by its predecessor-that were it to be realized, it would signify the end of democracy or the beginning of a bizarre form of representative govern- ment characterized by the alternation between competitive "totalitarian" parties.

Rose's argument also suffers from an absence of comparative data. To ascertain the extent to which British politics is consensual or adversarial, evidence drawn from other democracies on the

consequences for public policy of a change in government would have been instructive. Without such data, how do we interpret the fact that 75 percent of the variance in economic indicators is explained by secular trends? If the change in governing party accounts for 25 percent of the var- iance, is this much higher, more or less the same, or much lower than what occurs in other polities? Without an answer to this last question, Rose's findings can, I think, be used to justify labeling British politics as consenual, but they could also have served to support the adversarial perspective. 20. These issues can profitably be considered by comparing Do Parties Make a Difference?

with S.E. Finer's The Changing British Party System, 1945-1979 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980). The two books, published at the same time, cover the same period, often drawing inspiration from similar data. Yet they arrive at distinct conclusions. The compari- son would be all the more instructive because Finer and Rose are engaged in a debate, but neither had read the other's work when he wrote his own. 21. The twin ideas of the "end of ideology" and the "catch-all" party are not nearly as new as

we sometimes imagine. As far back as the 1830s, the Duke of Wellington, commenting on British politics, wrote: " .... there is (now) very little difference of principle among public men in gen- eral." (Cited in R.T. McKenzie, Political Parties: The Distribution of Power within the Conser- vative and Labour Parties, 2nd ed. [New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964- originally published in 1955], p. 1.)

Lord Bryce analyzed both phenomena in now classic and unfortunately rarely studied works. His view of depoliticized politics is captured aptly in the metaphorical suggestion that "the two great [American] parties were like two bottles: (e)ach bore a label denoting the kind of liquor it contained, but each was empty." The American Commonwealth, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1910-originally published in 1894), p. 29.

He emphasized the absence of ideological politics in the United States: (N)either party has any clean-cut principles, and distinctive tenets. Both have traditions. Both claim to have tendencies. ... Tenets and policies, points of political doctrine and points of political practice, have all but vanished. They have not been thrown away, but have been stripped away by Time and the progress of events, fulfilling some policies, blot- ting out others. All has been lost except office or the hope of it. (Ibid., p. 21.)

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InModern Democracies Lord Bryce explains that all political parties in the democracies of his era persisted and thrived for reasons other than the effects they had on the political system or their "ideologies":

Whatever its origin every party lives and thrives by the concurrent action of four tendencies or forces, which may be described as those of Sympathy, Imitation, Competition and Pug- nacity. Even if intellectual conviction had much to do with its creation, emotion has more to do with its vitality and combative power. Men enjoy combat for its own sake, loving to out- strip others and carry their flag to victory. ... Life becomes more interesting when each talks to each of how the opposite party must be outgeneralled, and more exciting when the day of an electoral contest arrives. Though a certain set of views may have been the old basis of a party, and be still inscribed on its banner. The views count for less than do the fighting traditions, the attachment to its name, the inextinguishable pleasure in working to- gether, even if the object sought be little more than the maintenance of the organization it- self. (Modern Democracies, vol. 1 [New York: Macmillan, 1921], pp. 112-13.)

He went on to argue that what we have come to call catch-all parties are the traditional, nine- teenth-century, type of party: "parties of the old type, co-extensive with the nation and trying to draw adherents from all sections and classes within it." (Ibid., p. 123.)

22. E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government, op. cit., p. 1. 23. In the words of Lord Bryce: "(P)arties are inevitable. No free large country has been with-

out them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them." (Modern Democracies, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 119.) 24. This literature is not extensive. Moreover, there are no significant recent studies that treat

parties as organizations. 25. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., p. xiii. 26. An example of such an endeavor is Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex

Organizations (Glencoe, 1ll.: The Free Press, 1961). 27. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organiza-

tions, and States (Cambridge, Mass, and London: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 43. 28. Employees, in fact, may identify strongly with their enterprises. This trait seems wide-

spread in Japan. See Ronald Dore, British Factory-Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973). 29. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally,

1964), pp. 9-10. 30. For some explanation of this issue, see William R. Schonfeld, "Oligarchy and Leadership

Stability: The French Communist, Socialist and Gaullist Parties," American Journal of Political Science (1981): 215-40.

31. This is often thought to be the case. For an argument and data that question this assumption, see William R. Schonfeld, "The 'Closed' Worlds of Socialist and Gaullist Elites," in Elites in France: Origins, Reproduction and Power, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Philip G. Gerney (London: Frances Pinter), pp. 196-215.

32. In the early literature on parties the emphasis was on the party as a "machine," especially in the sense of shaping "public opinion." See Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 2, pp. 3ff. 33. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties, op. cit., p. 1. 34. Alan Ware (The Logic of Party Democracy [New York: St. Martin's Press], 1979) does at-

tempt to link the performance of a party's functions to its internal organization. His research views parties as generators of effects but argues that structure influences the outcome. The prob- lem with the book is that his data are not relevant to the theoretical argument.

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