0732-l 18X/91 $3 00 + 0 00 0 1991 Pergdmon Press plc

THE ONTOLOGY OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES AS A TRUNCHEON*

UWE LAUCKEN

Institute for Research into Man-Environment Relations, Department of Psychology, University of Oldenburg, Kirkenweg 5, D-2900 Oldenburg, Germany

Die Geschichte aller positiven Wissenschaften zeigt, daB sie nur momentan aus den Traumen erwachen und die Augen aufschlagen nach dem Sein des Seienden, das sie erforschen.

Martin Heidegger

QUALIFYING INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Bunge’s “methodological skepticism” (p. 131) is based not only on methodical arguments (e.g., “so far nobody has produced any certified empirical evidence,” p. 133) but also on ontological ones (e.g., “there are no immaterial objects,” p. 135). My commentary will be limited to considering the ontological line of argumentation.

My criticism of Bunge’s use of ontological arguments does not mean at all that I think those buildings of ideas toward which he directs them (e.g., toward “disembodied souls,” “telepathy, ” “clairvoyance”) are acceptable from a scientific point of view. My commentary will be dealing only with a certain line of argumentation, with the way it works, and with the question of whether any other way of thinking must inevitably be regarded as unscientific.

DIFFERENT MODES OF THINKING

If we compare the ways of thinking of different scientists (be it within or between different scientific disciplines), we find the ways are quite different. These differences can be made clear by subdividing them according to different moda of thinking. Each mode of thinking is characterized by a certain method of cognition (the “how” of gaining knowledge) and by a certain conception of the object to be investigated (the “what” of the analysis, the factual “there is,” the implicit or explicity ontology). In the words of Wittgenstein, tell me how you are looking, and I’ll tell you what you will find. There is an analytic connection between the respective method of cognition and the conception of the object; both are of equal origin. In other words, there is no method of cognition that is neutral with regard to its object. Scientists (cf., Herrmann, 1976, p. 104), thinking that one could well research without reflections on the conception of the object of research if only the right methods of cognition were chosen, ignore this connection. This can have one of two consequences: One can either base one’s research on an object-conception that fits the method but is unreflected

*Commentary on M. Bunge (1991) A skeptic’s beliefs and disbeliefs, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 131-149.

203

204 U. Laucken

(according to Heidegger the normal case), or, what is f-ar worse, methods are used that are not appropriate to the object. One example from the field of psychology, well analyzed by Smedslund (e.g., 1988), is the very common habit of investigating semantic (“psycho-logic”) relations in the same way as relations conceived as causal (in the sense of natural sciences). A further example, called “naturalization of consciousness” by Husserl (1965), will be discussed in further detail below (for a more differentiated discussion of different modes of thinking and their consequences, see Laucken, 1989).

The example of psychology may help to explain briefly in what way methods of cognition create their own object (and vice versa). For the psychologist looking for cause-effect relations, in the sense of the natural sciences, the world consists of space-filling states and events, such as stimuli and behavior. For the psychologist looking for regulating rules, the world is a regulated one, that is it consists of information and rules of their transformation. The psychologist interested in phenomenal analyses assumes the existence of a (phenomenal) life- world, containing, for example, experiences as percepts, thoughts, and feelings.

The different concepts of world and of object and the different methods of analyzing cannot be mixed at random or else fruitless combinations will result. A historical example is the so-called “psychology of consciousness” (see, for example, Titchener, 1912) which tried to force the world of phenomena into the corset of causal thinking, the result being a “mechanics of consciousness” (Herbart).

THE ONTOLOGY OF NATURAL SCIENCES

The method of cognition characterizing the natural sciences is the conditional or causal analysis, to which the following ontology (or conception of reality or of the object) corresponds: The world can be broken up into isolatable units which can be measured in centimeters, grams, and seconds (which does not mean, however, that they are not more than this); between these units there are temporal dependencies (in the sense of physical concepts of time). As Bunge puts it: “The world is composed exclusively of concrete (material) things that behave lawfully” (p. 135).

The fundamental characteristic of this kind of reality is its space-filling character; all other characterizations (such as materiality, mass, energy, divisibility, speed, states, and so on) presuppose this characteristic.

This ontological concept can be specified in many ways. Thus, man can be understood as a neural system, as a biomechanical system, or as a system of stimuli and reactions.

The world-concept of the natural sciences is causally closed. This fact is emphasized by Bunge saying that the theorem of energy conservation applies to the world. Toned down, the assertion of closedness reads as follows: Any space-filling event, provided it has been caused, has been caused by another space-filling event. This means for example: A physiological stimulus as a material (space-filling) process cannot “be changed into an immaterial some- thing [for instance into a ‘phenomenal scene’ in the sense of Gibson, 19821 once it has reached a certain spot in the brain to then reappear after a while or in a

Natural sciences as a truncheon 205

different spot as a material process again” (Hering, 1870, p. 367), possibly in order to cause certain behavior.

The “internal” closedness of the world-concept of natural sciences corres- ponds to the fact that it is completely shut off from “the outside.” The philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1980) puts it as follows: Natural science “not only increasingly tries to suppress anything ‘personal’ (e.g., a thought, a feeling or a wish), but seeks a concept of a world that excludes anything ‘personal’ on principle” (p. 46). This exclusion on principle becomes analytically necessary when one says that the ‘personal’ (e.g., a thought) cannot be represented in the coordinate system which is unfolded by centimeters, grams, and seconds.

THE LOGIC OF CONDEMNATION

We are now prepared well enough to understand Bunge’s ontologically founded condemnation, for example, of the hermeneutic or the phenomenolo- gical sciences (cf., p. 135). Presenting the facts as he does, condemnation is logically conclusive:

(a) There is nothing but material, that is, space-filling, reality. (b) Only those sciences based on this assumption are scientifically legitimate. (c) Hermeneutics for instance, or phenomenology, postulates an object, a

reality which cannot be presented as material, as space-filling. (d) Consequently hermeneutics and phenomenology are not scientific under-

takings. This conclusion is necessary “if one assumes that the concepts of cause and

effect [as used by natural sciences] are the only guidelines of cognition, and that whenever they abandon us there is nothing but darkness and ignorance” (Cassirer, 1980, p. 101).

The argumentative basis of this way of condemning certain approaches as nonscientific is the totalization of a specific kind of ontology (“everything in the universe,” p. 146). Consequently all other (nonnatural-scientific) methods of cognition must be called nonscientific because they postulate a different concept of object. By this standard of comparison spiritistic belief in the supernatural is in line with hermeneutics or phenomenology, for they all postulate something immaterial: disembodied souls, meaningful texts, or (subjective) experiences. (By the way, most spiritists meet Bunge’s conception of the world halfway by conceptualizing their “disembodied souls” as beings of etherial material, e.g., astral bodies; cf., Frankl, 1949, p. 12ff.)

Bunge’s “materialism” is the materialism of the natural sciences. This should be emphasized, because there is a host of other concepts of materialism (cf., Bloch, 1972).

REFUSAL TO DE-CENTER

Jean Piaget has called the ability to adopt a perspective different from one’s own the ability to de-center. Certainly Bunge does not lack this ability, but obviously he is not willing to use it. His standard of comparison for the concepts of reality of all other modes of thinking is the question as to whether they are material; his standard of comparison is the ontology of the natural sciences. He

206 U. Laucken

does not leave this position. Consequently, he is unable to realize that the concept of a phenomenal reality (assumed as a ‘there is’ by phenornenologists) is simply insensitive with regard to the characteristic of space-filling materiality. Phenomenal facts are not imrnaterial beings; rather, the natural-scientific concept of materiality does not conceive them, it does not make any sense to them. It would make just as little sense to inquire about the physical state of the meaning of a mathematical equation. We see that the judgment that phenomena are immaterial is a categorical mistake.

If Bunge were willing to de-center, following the tracks of thinking of certain phenomenologists for instance, he would then ask himself of what nature their questions are. So now we will ask for him: The psychologist, for instance, thinking in terms of existential analysis inquires about the order of our waking life in the world. At any point in people’s waking existence one can ask them what they are wanting, thinking, feeling, doing, and the like. With these questions one addresses something that enables someone to answer. The (mundane-empirical, not the transcendental-philosophical) pheno~nenologist calls this something the “(phenomenal) life-world.” It is its reality that he postulates. According to this concept of reality we do have (“there really are”), for example, pains, expectancy, feelings, intentions, etc. Fundamental character- istics of this phenomenal existence are: (a) phenomenal existence is the ~vay in which the world we live in is given to us. Every attempt to escape this WOI-ld ends

in this world; (b) phenomenal existence stands on its ow11, it does not describe, indicate, or- reflect anything lying “behind” or “underneath” it; (c) l~henomenal existence is structured in a referential (not causal) way, meaning that individual phenomena are dependent components of a phenomenal structure and are constituted by this structure (just as the number “7” is constituted by the number system-it is something of its own within it and nothing without it).

Feelings, for instance, understood as components of our life-world, are meaningful in themselves and are found in a context of life that is constitutive for them (the feeling of pride, for instance, is experienced in the context of a “pride story;” without such a story there is no pride; cf., Weiner, Graham, 8c (%ar~dler, 1982). It may be interesting for phenomenalists to look for the orders of life-world which are constitutive for special feelings. Kesearch of this kind can be conducted in a methodically strict and falsifiable mariner.

Bunge is very reluctant to admit the pherlonlenological concept of reality as one permissible and open to research from a scientific point of view, for “emotions are furlctions of the limbic system” (1~. 136). “F~~nctionalisln” as defined by Putnam cannot be mearlt here (which presupposes nail-physical- “immaterial’‘-functional states of the brain): for Bunge the cited sentence means that ernotions themselves are material processes (because “melltal phenomena are brain processes,” p. 131). Indeed, within the framework of natural-scientific thinking, an emotion can be nothing but this (or another space- filling event) or it is nothing. ‘That is tautologically true.

There is no doubt that it can be very instructive to study emotions as brain processes in the frarne of the research program of the natural sciences. But this is not the point here. The point here, rather, is to show that there is a

Natural sciences as a truncheon 207

phenomenological research progra”, and that within this f‘ramework an emotion is something different, a phenomenal fact, a component of’s specifically articulated life-world whose structure may be strictly explicated.

‘l‘he ref‘usal to de-center becomes very obvious: Bunge accepts nothing but the ontology of’ the natural sciences. Since phenomenally conceived emotions 01 feelings, have neither spatial dimension, nor mass, nor speed, nor . . . , etc.; they simply do not exist f’or a person thinking in terms of’ science. Anybody thinking in different terms is a pseudo-scientist.

FAILED ANNEXATION

Somebody saying that anything real is to be regarded as space-filling (material) reality obviously reckons with the objection of’ where and lww OLN experiences, our consciousness, OLII- feelings, etc., fit into this concept of‘ reality. ,4 temptingly simple answer to this objection is the statement that OLII- consciousness is a “spatio-tempoI-al ~lrrarigenierit” (Sperry, 19X7, p. 49) or that “mental phen- omena are brain processes” (Kunge, p. 134); in other words, the ot?ject in question is simply included in the materialistic conception of reality. This, however, has consequences, such as the following.

It‘the sorrow felt about the loss of’ a f‘riend, thejealousy of‘s rival, the pride in one’s achievements, etc., is identical with certain brain processes, then it must be possible to express these feelings as frlcts of experience iri tcw2s of brain

j~l~y~iolo~~~. If‘ experiences consist of‘ space-filling events, it must be possible to express them as s~~cli (e.g., measured in centimeters, grams, and seconds) and not as something parallel to material processes.

‘l‘he materialistic annexation, sensu Kunge, presupposes that for instance a feeling we experience can be expressed, for example, in neurochemical terms. We see, the assertion that feelings and physiological processes are identical is a new case of’ “conceptual muddle” (criticized by Bunge elsewhere, p. l/5). Without question, it may be amusing to read Henry Miller’s assumption that love is nothing but a Boogie-Woogie of’ hormones; this “realization,” however, does not give LIS arly understanding of’ love as a fact of’ our life-world. Husserl (1965) talks about the “absurdity of’ natul-ali/.ation”: “A phenomenon is . not a ‘substantial’ unity, it does not have ‘real qualities’, it does not know real parts, real changes, no causality: all of’ these words understood in the sense of’ the natural sciences; attributing a certain material nature to phenomena and carrying out research into their causal connections is sheer absurdity; no better than inquiring about causal qualities or dependencies etc. of’ numbers. It is the absurdity of’ naturalization” (p. 3.5f). A phenomenon as a part of’ the life-world cannot be annexed as such by the materialistic conception of‘ reality.

It may be interesting in this connection that Bunge’s materialistic position, as far as the identification of’ “mental phenomena” with “brain processes” is concerned, is opposed to another variant of materialism: Paul Churchland’s “eliminative materialism.” Churchland (e.g., 1985) clearly distinguishes between the “intentional idiorn” of’ the phenomenal world and statements about brain processes. There is no identity-relation; on the contrary, progress in neurophy- siology will replace the “intentional idiom,” and will eliminate it. It is remarkable

208 U. Laucken

that Churchland, just like Bunge, does not recognize the categorical difference between the language of life-world and the language of physiology; otherwise it would not be possible to say, as Churchland said (p. 162), that he discovered the inappropriateness of the “intentional idiom” for conceiving brain processes empitically. The inappropriateness is not empirically but analytically true. “It is truth that no description of the physical structure and operations of the brain, no matter how complete, will say anything about rational thought or indeed intentional attitude” (Madell, 1989, p. 118).

ON THE NATURAL-SCIENTIFIC NONREALI.I‘Y OF -I-HE NATURAL SC:IENC:ES

One might, of course, say that one is indeed willing to accept different modes of thinking and that each mode of thinking has its own concept of reality, of object. From this point of view the natural-scientific mode of thinking is nothing but one of many. All this, however, would by no means disprove the statement that natural-scientific thinking is the only scientific mode of thinking. This is true, but so far the point has only been to follow the lines of Bunge’s ontological argumentation. Let me now reflect on the justifiability of his monopoly claim. This can be done in different ways. For instance, I could set up criteria of what is scientific and try to show that, for example, a psychologist thinking and researching in terms of information processing (cf., Simon, 1990) also does scientific work. But this is not the line of argumentation I want to adopt here; rather, I want to show that Bunge openly negates what he accepts unquestion- ably underhand as the basis of the negation.

In the following, therefore, I shall no longer deal with the inner logic of Bunge’s ontological line of argumentation (which is tautologically correct, as we have seen), but I shall apply the ontological argumentation of Bunge to Bunge’s way of thinking itself. I am really against this kind of reflective mirroring, because I believe that any mode of thinking can presuppose an Archimedian point outside the respective mode of thinking for the person thinking within its frame. Certainly the person doing so should be aware of it taking care to avoid totalizations which then fall back on him as well. But Bunge does not take this care in his article, quite the contrary-he vehemently and absolutely advocates the monopoly claim of the world-concept of the natural sciences. He uses their ontology as a truncheon against anybody thinking differently in this respect. By giving examples I would now like to show how Bunge thereby also breaks to pieces the pedestal on which he stands.

(a) Whoever says that only material (space-filling) reality exists, whoever therefore asks for symbols to be translated into “amino acids” (p. 143) cannot say consistently for instance: “we judge a physical theory by its logical consistency” (p. 145), for there are no logical relations between material units such as amino acids in which physical theories as symbol systems should be translated. “Logical consistency” does not appear as part of the ontology of the natural sciences; however, if there exists only material reality, then “logical consistency” does not exist.

(b) Whoever says that phenomena (e.g., experiences) are brain processes cannot at the same time speak about “empirical evidence” (p. 133) which is

Natural sciences as a truncheon 209

“checked with new experiences” (p. 131), for there can be causal relations between material processes (which “experiences” are according to Bunge), but there cannot be comparative operations between them.

(c) Whoever derides texts and their interpretation which necessarily are “highly personal or subjective” (p. 144) (that means: nonscientific) should not write scientific texts, at least not in his function as a scientist. On what am I “really” writing a commentary, if I agree with Bunge on nothing but a complicated pattern of printer’s ink (that may be described in geometrical terms) that thanks to a certain adhesive power sticks to the paper?

When applied to themselves natural sciences disappear as what characterizes them as sciences. I have already said that, in my view, this argument of self- application can be instructive as an argument against materialistic dogmatism only. Self-reflexive physicists such as Werner Heisenberg (e.g., 1984, p. 276) are far from this way of thinking. Science is a symbolic enterprise. The mode of thinking which establishes science as science is a different one from that which offers the natural sciences their objects. If the object conception of natural sciences is totalized by saying that there is nothing but space-filling material reality, then there is no natural science and, even less, there is no “empirical evidence” either.

RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT MODES OF THINKING

The following argumentation is independent of the one above. Therefore, its refusal does not logically imply the refusal of the foregoing. I have included these considerations because Bunge rails against the “metaphysical sin of upholding psychoneural dualism” (p. 138). In other words he rails against the notion of “mind-body dualism” (p. 138) which implies that “immaterial entities” (p. 138) had “causal power” (p. 138) over material entities. In his opinion this is the way of thinking of psychosomatics which he contrasts with the thinking of the “psychoneuroendocrinoimmunology” (p. 138).

Dualistic conceptions are based on an understandable wish: There are phenomenal objects, and there are material objects. If both exist and the world is only one coherent world, then it suggests itself to inquire about the relations between these two modes of reality. The so-called interactive dualism for instance asserts that there is a causal relation of to and fro (cf., Eccles, 1990: “psychon-dendron interaction”).

This way of presenting the problem and this kind of solution fail to recognize that modes of reality can develop only within the framework of certain modes of thinking. “Facts can only be acknowledged in a certain framework of judgment which, in its turn, depends on certain logical conditions” (Cassirer, 1980, p. 17). Consequently, assertions of reality must not be separated from their context of thought, for they make sense in that context only.

With regard to psychology I (Laucken, 1989) have distinguished three modes of thinking:

(1) the pheno~~u~hical mode of thinking which includes, for example, approaches of existential psychology;

210 U. Lauckerl

(2) the logogrq!J~i~~~l mode of thinking which includes, for example, cognitive

or information processing approaches;

(3) the jd~y~icogruphicul mode of thinking which includes, for example, psycho-

biological or certain behavioristic approaches.

Each of these modes of’ thinking has its own method of cognition and its own

conception of reality. While the phenographical mode of thinking asserts that

there is a (phenomenal) life-world, the logographical mode of thinking says

there is a world of mind (e.g., of information, of symbols), and the

l,hysicographical mode of thinking assumes a space-filling (material) world. (I%)

the tvay, by no means does this trinity imply ;m end. ‘I‘here is no reason wht

further modes of thinking sho~~ld no; be conceived, and thus Ilt‘W co11cepts of’

reality. After all, even the physicographical mode of thinking so obtrusi\,ely well-

known today is a thought product of’ the 17th century only: cl‘., (Ltssirer.

1980.)

Each of these realities or worlds is conceptually closed. ‘l‘his means that there

are no lines of coherence lvhich break off in one reality to be continued in

another reality. This is not an empirical statement but a cor~ce~~tL~~~l-;~t1~~i~~tic_al

one. We have already talked about this in connection with the material world (cf.,

the quotation by Hering), but the s;mle is true for the life-world ant1 the mind-

\vorld. ‘I‘he philosopher J.G. Fichte asserts that it is unthinkable that (material)

matter should be able “to walk into co11scioL1sIiess”. , arid it is just as inconcei\,able

that information (in the sense of information processing) “enters aw2irc’liess”

(Kieuwenhuyse, Offenberg, X: Frijda, 1987, p. 27 1). Even coiisciousness,

alvareness, the life-world (as I prefer to say) is a (conceptually) closed world;

there is no entering or leaving the life-world for rlon-t~~lerlotnenal entities.

‘l‘his conceptual closedness has several consequences:

(a) An intrwc.tizv d~di,s~~ in the sense of a causal to and f’ro bet\\een differelit

Fvorld concepts cannot be conceived conclusi\~ely (lxcause they are as they are

conceived).

(b) ‘I‘heories of idr~li&~l saying, for example, that the reality of the life-world is

identical with some neuronal reality make no sense: How ~‘a11 two things be

identical if neither of the two is said to have the qualities of the other? How ca11

ml experience be a neurochemical process which is said ilot to be an experience?

(c) Theories of mqmcr asserting that one world (e.g., the life-\vorld) is the

emerging product of another world (e.g., the space-fillirig world) cannot be

coherently conceived either. How cim a system that is conceived as space-filling

essentially produce units that are anything but space-filling? ‘1‘0 think this way

would contravene the natural-scientific postulate of’causal closedness. Asserting

relations of emergence uithiu one world concept (such as the natura-scientifc

one) is a completely different thing; here we are talking about assertions of

emergence c~nlong differently conceived worlds only.

(d) It is not very informative to ascertain that the phenographer postulates an

immaterial reality (the life-world), because materiality in the sense of the

physicographical mode of thinking is simply not suitable to characterize the

objects of the phenographical mode of thinking. To the phenographer

s&ements of immateriality are insignificant; likewise a physicist is not affected

Natural sciences as a truncheon 211

in his way of thinking if people tell him that they do not experience the table in front of them as an “atomic dodder-cloud” (as Schrddinger once said).

The traditional belief (stemming from the ancient Greek philosophers) in a united universe, however, is not simply satisfied with statements about the closedness of the different world conceptions. Again and again the question is raised whether some sort of coherence can be made. By asking this question we take the position of a “transversal” (Welsch, 1987) thinker. From this position the following can be said for instance:

- “The ideational [the mind-world] exists only to the extent that it somehow manifests itself materially and physically, embodying itself in this manifestation” (Cassirer, 1980, p. 43).

- “(A) machine is an abstract system of states and transitions that can be physically realized in a variety of ways” (Ashby, 1956, p. 52).

Both statements form a relationship between two different concepts of world. However, they do so in a specific way. I have called it an “(inter-world) relation of making possible” (cf., Laucken, 1989, p. 87: “L;rrnii~lictlun,beziehung”).

Although the relation of making possible does not open the different world concepts to each other (they maintain their closedness) it does establish a relationship by saying that the one world needs the other to make its independent existence possible. ‘I-hat means, we are speaking, here, about ontic, not about modal possibility.

It does not follow from this relationship that the analysis of the world that makes the other one possible creates or produces the contents of the world made possible. ‘I‘he chemical and physical analysis of a painting (one can even include the process of production or the looking at the painting) will never result in statements about its information content. ‘I-he kind of dependence the relationship of making possible refers to is a different one. By showing an implication this becomes evident: The empirical question can be asked which structure of the life-world requires for its existence the existence of which neuronal structures. Both structures as such are conceived as totally indepen- dent; there is no causal (in the sence of natural sciences) to and fro between the structures.

Today it suggests itself prototypically to illustrate the relationship of making possible by means of the relationship between software and hardware. Between hardware and software there is no to and fro in the sense of something breaking off on the one side and continuing on the other. But from a transversal point of view it can be said that the software needs hardware as its basis of being possible, and it can be empirically asked whether one and the same software cannot be made possible by (materially) different hardware systems. But it is absolutely clear that pure (space-filling) hardware analysis will never produce software results. ‘rherefore, making possible theoretical questioning always starts with the analysis of the something that is to be made possible.

Subsequent to this prototypical explanation the following is to be emphasized: Software is an object variant of the logographical mode of thinking, not of the phenographical one. I am mentioning it here because sometimes it is said that the software concept is an appropriate equivalent to the concept of life-world

212 U. Laucken

(consciousness, awareness). Here, the following applies: Information is not just not “matter or energy” (Wiener, 1961, p. 155), it is not a phenomenal “experience” (Kurtzman, 1987, p. 55), either. The search schema of information terminology will not find experiences anyway, for these do not belong to the cosmos created by this terminology.

The relationship of making possible is anti-reductionistic and anti-eliminative, because (a) it always starts from the point of giving something to be made possible, (b) it never leaves this starting point, and (c) it excludes any kind of substitutional thinking. Moreover the relationship of making possible is anti- emergentistic, because it questions “from top to bottom” (assuming that the material world concept is metaphorically “the bottom”). The relationship of making possible may be called materialistic if, in the sense of Cassirer, this means that the prerequisite for the existence of the ideational is the material embodiment; it is not materialistic as defined by Bunge.

In conclusion, then, let us return to Bunge: His materialistic totalization not only seems inconsequent to me (e.g., from a reflective point of view) but also extremely unfruitful from a heuristic point of view. A variety of interesting questions (e.g., making possible questions) that can be dealt with methodically strictly are unnecessarily buried or banished as so-called pseudoscience. Let me emphasize again that by saying so I am not defending the research directions attacked for different reasons by Bunge. The only point here was Bunge’s ontological argumentation and its conclusiveness.

REFERENCES

Ashby, W.R. (1956). An introduction to cyDernetic.\. London, U.K.: Chapman & Hall. Bloch, E. (1972). Das Materialisvnus~v-oblem: Seine Geschichte und Substanz. Gesavntausgabe. Vol.

7. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Cassirer, E. (1980). Zur Logik der Kulturwissrnschuften. Darmstadt: Wissenschafdiche

Buchgesellschaft. Churchland, P. (1985). On the speculative nature of our self conception. In D. Copp &

J.J. Macintosh (Eds.), New ~~ssqs in the philosophy ofmind. Series 11. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Eccles, J.C. (1990). Gehirn und Seele. Argumente fiir den Dualismus vom Standpunkt eines Neurologen. Aw Forschuvqg und Medizin, 1, 9-24.

Frankl, V. (1949). Der unhedingte Menxh. Metaklinische Vorlesungevl. Wien: Deuticke. Gibson, J.J. (1982). Wahrnehmuvzg und Umwelt. Der iikoloCgische Aspekt in der zlisuellen

Wahrnehmung. Miinchen: Urban & Schwarzenberg. Heisenberg, W. (1984). Physik und Ev-kenntnis 1927- 1955. Gesammelt Werke: Vol. 1.

Miinchen: Piper. Hering, E. (1870). ijber das Gedschtnis. In Deutscher Geist (o.J.); Vol. 2 (pp. 365-385).

Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Herrmann, Th. (1976). Braucht die Psychologie eine Gegenstandsbestimmung? In: G.

Ebeling & R. Pieper (Eds.), Psychologie-Wissenschafi ohne Gegenstund? Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.

Husserl, E. (1965). Philosophic uls stv-enge Wissenschaft (Ed. W. Szilasi). Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann.

Kurtzman, H.S. (1987). Deconstruction and psychology: An introduction. New Ideas in

Psychology, 5, 33-7 1. Laucken, U. (1989). Denkforvnen der Psychologie. Dargestellt am Entwuvfeiner Logogruphie der

Gefiihle. Bern: Huber.

Natural sciences as a truncheon 213

Madell, G. (1989). Physicalism and the content of thought. Inquiry, 32, 107-121. Nieuwenhuyse, B., Offenberg, L., & Frijda, N.H. (1987). Subjective emotion and

reported body experience. Motivation and Emotion, 11, 169-182. Simon, H. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 1-19. Smedslund, J. (1988). Psycho-Logic. Berlin: Springer. Sperry, R.W. (1987). Structure and significance of the conscious revolution. TheJournal of

Mind and Behavior, 8, 37-66. Titchener, E.A. (1912). The schema of introspection. American Journal of Psychology, 23,

485-508. Weiner, B. (1961). Cybernetics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Weiner, B., Graham, S., & Chandler, C. (1982). Pity, anger, and guilt: An attributional

analysis. Person&y and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 226-232. Welsch, W. (1987). Urlsere postmoderne moderne. Weinheim: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft.