THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY - Ullmannmedien · equal status alongside the pagan religions. About a...

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Christoph Delius and Matthias Gatzemeier,

Deniz Sertcan, Kathleen Wünscher

THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHYF R O M A N T I Q U I T Y T O T H E P R E S E N T

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GREEK PHILOSOPHY

From Myth to Logos

“From the beginning, wonder has mademen philosophize, and it still does.” Thissaying of Aristotle’s, which goes back toPlato, is still valid today. Aristotle takes“philosophical wonder” to mean our amaze-ment at inexplicable phenomena. Thisamazement gives rise to asking questionsabout causes, but it also addresses the problem of the origin and beginning ofphilosophy itself. It is not only academic, professional philosophy that contains philo-sophical knowledge, but also myth, becausemyth too is motivated by wondering, byquestions searching for explanations. Indeedthe boundaries between myth, pre-philo-sophical thinking and philosophy are lessclear-cut than one might assume from thechapter headings of histories of philosophy.The material with which each is concerned,in other words the question of the origin ofthe universe, and the explanation of naturalphenomena and social norms and institu-tions, is common to both philosophy andmyth. However they do differ in the way inwhich they deal with these matters, or to bemore precise, in the particular way each verbalizes these things. The much-quotedtransition from myth to logos is marked by the difference between the narrative

language of stories of gods and heroes on the one hand, and strict argument on the other. Instead of using gods to explainthe world, men increasingly sought arational form of coming to terms with it.Aristotle clarifies this distinction as follows:“Mythologists only thought in the way theycould understand, and paid little attention tous. For when they raise gods to the statusof principles, have gods create everything,and assert that everything that does notfeed on nectar and ambrosia is mortal, it is clear that they are stating somethingcomprehensible to them, while sayingsomething totally incomprehensible for uswhen it comes to the effects of thesecauses. But we do not need to give anyserious thought to mythical insights. On thecontrary, we must seek information fromthose who argue with proofs.” The origin ofphilosophy in the narrower sense is thediscovery of argument.Greek philosophy did not arise on the Greekmainland (it only arrived in Athens in thesecond half of the 5th century B.C., andnever really settled in Sparta at all), but inthe Greek colonies of Asia Minor (Miletus)and southern Italy (e.g. Croton and Elea).This is because in these places the con-frontation with new questions and problemsand with other ways of thinking was moreconducive to theoretical discussion than in

6 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

The Beginnings of Philosophy

ClassicalAntiquity

C L A S S I C A L A N T I Q U I T Y

The origins of Western philoso-phy are to be found in AncientGreece. The Greeks began toexpress thought in philosophicalterms in c. 600 B.C. This periodwas characterized by far-reachingeconomic and social change,which led to a crisis of thearistocratic state and finally tonew forms of rule (tyranny,democracy).

These changes were accompa-nied by what is known as thetransition from myth to logos.In other words, mythological orreligious interpretations of theworld (e.g. stories of the godswhich told of the origin andcourse of the world and its con-tents) were increasingly replacedby a philosophical, scientific, andrational explanation of the world.This transition was only verygradual, however, so that mythi

cal influences are still apparent inmany ancient thinkers.

Ancient philosophy begins withthe Presocratics (c. 650–500 B.C.), including the Mile-sians (Thales, Anaximander), thePythagoreans, the Eleatics (Xeno-phanes, Parmenides) and theAtomists (Leucippus, Democritus).

Presocratic philosophy centers on the question of the basicprinciple permeating the worldand the primal substance fromwhich the world and the thingsin it arose.

The succeeding classical period(c. 480–c. 320 B.C.) was theheyday of Greek civilization, inwhich the Greeks produced theirhighest achievements in thevisual arts (enlargement of theAcropolis under Pericles; impor-tant sculptors: Myron, Phidias,Polycletus); literature (period ofthe greatest representatives ofAttic tragedy: Aeschylus, Sopho-cles, Euripides); and philosophy(Socrates, Plato, Aristotle). Athens

became the center of philosophyat this time, and it was here thatthe new form of state, the polisor city-state, attained its highestexpression.

The Hellenistic period (323– c. 1st century B.C.) was the agein which a mixed culture aroseas the result of the absorption oforiental elements. The Greekinfluence, however, remainedparamount. During this period,the Greeks ruled over large areasof the Middle East as far asnorthern India. Science, scholar-ship and trade flourished. Thecenters of culture were Alexan-dria and Pergamon. Characteristicof Hellenistic art and architecturewas the juxtaposition of differentstyles. Literature and philosophywere marked by a cosmopolitanattitude. New philosophicalschools arose (Stoics, Epicureans).

Pythagoras, Engraving, 16th century, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris

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FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

From Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages

In the 4th century, the civilization of classicalAntiquity was subjected to far-reachingchanges. Increasing pressure from Germanictribes to the north, together with internalsymptoms of dissolution, finally led, in thelate 4th century, to the division of the RomanEmpire into the Eastern and WesternEmpires. Some time after, Rome, the capital of the Western Empire, was sacked by bar-barian tribes, and in A.D. 476, the WesternEmpire collapsed. The Eastern Empire, bycontrast, with its capital at Constantinople,survived until 1453, when the city fell to theTurks. This period of almost a thousand yearsbetween the collapse of the two empires,Western and Eastern, is roughly what wegenerally know today as the Middle Ages, or medieval period. A symbolic date for the transition fromclassical to medieval, that is to say Christian,philosophy is the year A.D. 529, when in the East, Plato’s Academy in Athens wasclosed by Emperor Justinian. That verysame year saw the foundation of the firstgreat monastic order in the West, that of St. Benedict. From then on, the monasteriesbecame the centers of scholarship andteaching in western Europe. The beginning of the Middle Ages alsomarks the beginning of the spread of

Christianity in Europe. There had long beenChristian congregations in the major cities of the Empire, but they played no verysignificant role. Things now changed. In the early 4th century, Emperor Constantinedecreed that Christianity should enjoy equal status alongside the pagan religions.About a hundred years later, Christianity was made the sole religion of the state.Within another four centuries, the whole ofEurope had been Christianized.The spread of Christianity in Europe was accompanied by a change in philos-ophy. Medieval philosophy consists above all in an intermeshing of philosophy and theology. Its basic concern was the question of the relationship between faith and knowledge. Its foundation wasChristian doctrine, which had to bedefended, a position known as Christianapologetics. However, it will become clearthat medieval philosophy did not represent a complete break with that of classicalAntiquity. Many scholars sought to under-stand the philosophical theories of theAncient World and to reconcile them with Christian teaching. One of these scholars was Aurelius Augusti-nus, who as St. Augustine has becomeknown as the most important philosopher of the transitional period between lateAntiquity and the Middle Ages. His thinkingwas influenced above all by Plato and the

20 THE MIDDLE AGES

Philosophy and Theology

The MiddleAges

T H E M I D D L E A G E S

Medieval philosophy consistsprimarily of the union of philos-ophy and theology, because itwas based on Christian doctrine,which it was required to defendand put on a rational foundation.

One of the main themes ofmedieval philosophy wastherefore the question of therelationship between faith andknowledge and the relatedattempt to overcome theapparently irreconcilabledifference between revealed truthand philosophical insight.

The first period (c. 200–700)overlaps with that of lateAntiquity. Its most importantrepresentative is St. Augustine,who laid the foundations for thewhole of medieval philosophy.

The theological and philosophicaldoctrine of medieval western

Europe is known as Scholasti-cism (from the Latin schola,“school”). This term also refers tothe manner in which the veritiesof faith were explained (the“scholastic method” practiced inthe monastic schools).

The development of Scholasti-cism proceeded in three stages.The first stage, that of EarlyScholasticism (c. 800–1200),saw the emergence of thescholastic method and the firstconfrontation with the writings ofAristotle, which were becomingknown in this period.

The succeeding period of HighScholasticism (c. 1150–1300) is seen as the heyday of themovement. It is characterized bythe discovery of Aristotle’sremaining works, and by theattempt to unite Aristotelian

philosophy with Christianteaching (St. Thomas Aquinas).In addition, there was aconfrontation with Arabphilosophy. The last period, thatof Late Scholasticism (c. 1300–1400), was alreadymarked by decline.

Among the core issues ofmedieval philosophy was theproblem of universals. This wasconcerned with whether generalterms had any reality, or whetherthey were simply constructs ofthought and language.

Important for the development of Scholasticism was thefoundation of universities (from the 12th century), whichquickly evolved into centers ofintellectual life.

The earth as a disk surrounded by the ocean,French manuscript illumination,15th century, BibliothèqueNationale, Paris



A NEW UNDERSTANDING OFSCIENCE

Philosophical Consciousness

The study of nature, looking beyond theclosed cosmos, the idea of consciousness,and the appreciation of human individuality –all these began to emerge in the Renais-sance; in the Baroque period whichfollowed, they were enlarged upon andfleshed out, and above all, placed on newfoundations. Nature now came to be studiedvery successfully by quantitative methods in experiments based on mathematicallyoriented hypotheses. The old model of thecosmos with its stationary earth at the cen-ter was now definitely obsolete, and thenew model of the solar system graduallycame to be taken for granted by all thosewho enjoyed the privilege of education.Sober, rational thinkers no longer saw Man as occupying a special position in thehistory of creation, but rather as a particularspecies with certain affective reactions andwith an innate tendency to construct socialforms of living. And consciousness becamea philosophical concept, a place of purethought opposed to the world of things,seeking principles of knowledge in itself, inorder to bring systematic unity into the massof what was there to be explored. The question concerning rationally respon-sible principles of knowledge was becoming

more and more urgent with the rise ofnatural science. For on the one hand, philo-sophical theses ought, it was thought, to be testable in the same way as physicalhypotheses and explanations, and, takentogether, shown to be compatible withreality as it was experienced. Finding andconsistently applying a particular methodensured the constructive transparency of the theses. It became normal to speak of philosophical “systems,” namely thosetasks whose formulations and solutionswere methodologically closed, and whosemeaning could be measured against theirpreconditions and the success of their explanations (of the world, for example).On the other hand, while “philosophy”remained the superordinate term for sciencegenerally (Newton’s chief work on mechan-ics and the cosmic system, published in1687, was entitled Philosophiae naturalisprincipia mathematica [“MathematicalPrinciples of Natural Philosophy”] for exam-ple), in actual fact physics had alreadydeclared its independence. For this reason,philosophy now concentrated particularly on fundamental assumptions, which in theindividual sciences were consciously orunconsciously acknowledged as precondi-tions, without their forming part of therespective subject matter. What actually “is,” what is the “sub-stance” which underlies appearance and

32 THE 17TH CENTURY

Understanding andExperience

The 17thCentury

T H E 1 7 T H C E N T U R Y

After the end of the wars of reli-gion which occupied the first halfof the 17th century, the secondhalf witnessed a consolidation ofa Europe of modern territorialstates. The Papacy lost its inter-national political importance.1625 saw the appearance of atract entitled On the Law of Warand Peace by Hugo Grotius, anotable foundation of moderninternational law.

In France, which became a lead-ing power, Louis XIV and CardinalRichelieu were establishing thesystem of centralized abso-lutism, which became the pat-tern for many other states, andfor which Thomas Hobbes,among others, sought a philo-sophical justification.

The bourgeoisie gainedincreasing influence in Hollandand England, but also in France.

Not least for this reason, generalhuman reason was raised to acentral principle of philosophy.

Also important were considera-tions of natural law, usuallylinked with theses on anthropol-ogy and the original formation ofstate “commonwealths” (the socialcontract). The foundations of nat-ural law were often sought in therational order of things; and therewere demands that, independentof the form of government, thelaws of a country should not con-tradict this natural law.

The new methods of mathe-matical natural research andtheir integration into metaphysicsset the course for the develop-ment of the Western world.

René Descartes made a majorcontribution to the developmentof modern science with his dis-covery of analytical geometry, andhe also provided its philosophicalfoundation.

Following from Descartes, a dual-istic and mechanistic image ofthe world became widespread,in which the world of physicalextension, which functioned like amachine, was imagined as sepa-rated in substance from theworld of the mind or of reason.In his “Monadology” Leibniz setup an opposing view.

Philosophical Rationalists (includ-ing Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz)saw thought as the basis of ourknowledge of reality. Systematicthought embraced not only thecauses of the data of experience,but also the ultimate reasons forthe structure of the world.

The Empiricists (including Locke,Berkeley, Hume) were decidedlyskeptical toward such claims.They sought to return reason to within the boundaries ofexperience.

Louis XIV in a painting byHyacinthe Rigaud, 1701,Louvre, Paris



RATIONAL HUMANITY

The Light of Publicity

Probably the most famous definition of what“enlightenment” means was not restricted toany particular “era”: “Enlightenment is Man’semergence from his self-imposed immaturity.Immaturity is the incapacity to make use ofone’s intellect without the guidance ofanother. This immaturity is self-imposedwhen its causes are to be found not in a lack of intellect, but of the determination andcourage to use it without the guidance ofanother. Have the courage to know – that isthe motto of enlightenment.”Many modern writers have come up withgeneral definitions of “enlightenment” in thebroad sense, seeing it as a process which is constantly taking place in history or isparticularly noticeable at certain periods, for example the age of Socrates and Plato, or the modern age. This process includes the abandonment of prejudices, the destruc-tion of myths, the will to liberate oneself from natural or social fetters, and, on the part of enlightened pioneers, an activelyemancipatory attitude to education.However, more than other periods, theEnlightenment in the historical sense has adefinite article and a capital “E,” and denotesa particular era, namely the 17th and 18thcenturies - more particularly the latter. Indeedin the period between the English Revolutionof 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789– and these two dates provide a useful frame

for the period of the Enlightenment in thenarrower sense – people were growingincreasingly aware that they were living inwhat was, scientifically and philosophically, anew era. In France, Italy and Germany, thetalk was of an enlightened century; the firstconcern was to cast light on “dark” and con-fused ideas and spirits. During the course ofthe 18th century, the noun “Enlightenment”came to be used. For Immanuel Kant, withwhose definition we opened this chapter,independent thought and the questioning oftraditional patterns included the “freedom tomake public use of one’s reason in all fields.”By this he meant the reason “which some-one makes use of as a scholar, before the whole reading public.” This kind of “use of reason” had, together with the “readingpublic” itself, expanded enormously in thecourse of the 18th century to reachundreamed-of heights. Throughout Europe,the public were informed by the press aboutwars, disasters, exotic discoveries and day-to-day politics. Above all, though, there werealso “moral weeklies,” “intelligence sheets,”and scholarly journals, in which the talk wastime and again of that “reason” of whichKant had spoken. This buzzword of theEnlightenment gave a name to what all menhad in common, in whose sign a newlyawakening “world citizenship” was to takeshape. While there was no demand for theabolition of national borders, and rarely forradical change in the forms of government,the motto of the French Revolution, “Liberty,

62 THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Reason and Freedom

TheEnlightenment

T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T

Toward the end of the 18thcentury, Thomas Paine, the best-known political writer of hisday, who was actively involved inthe American Revolution(1773–83) and the FrenchRevolution (1789–92), wrotetwo books: The Age of Reasonand The Rights of Man. The firsttitle can be used as a descriptionof the century as a whole, whilethe second states one of themajor themes of this period.

In his work The Spirit of the Laws(1748), the central work of con-stitutional theory of the Enlighten-ment, Charles de Montesquieuanalyzed types of civil and polit-ical law and their dependenceon the age and the society inwhich they were made. One ofhis influential theses was that a

precondition of political freedomwas the separation of powersand mutual checks and balances.

In the “enlightened despotisms”reforms were implemented inthe fields of law, education and the economy. Frederick theGreat in Prussia and Catherinethe Great in Russia intentlyfollowed the philosophical andliterary developments taking place in France.

In his Persian Letters, Montes-quieu satirized the society of hisday, describing it from the pointof view of a non-European. Thisrelativization of prevailing morality

and conditions was typical of theEnlightenment, and went side byside with the comparative studyof other cultures. Thorough-going Enlightenment philosophywas pursued mainly in France.

The central features here werethe rejection of all traditionalauthority, the exaltation of reason(while rejecting Rationalist meta-physics), the drawing up of thefoundations of a non-theologicalmorality, the conviction thatscientific development wouldbring human progress, thebelief in the explicability of the soul (or the apparatus ofknowledge and sensation), andthe possibility of using thecharacteristics of matter toexplain all phenomena.

In the 1780s, Immanuel Kant criticized previous epistemologicaltheories and also rejected Enlight-enment theses on this topic. His philosophy combined theopposing attitudes of Rationalismand Empiricism.

Frederick II (“the Great”), Kingof Prussia, Painting by FranzDudde, c. 1900



misjudgment etc.). Thus the general willresembles a pantheistic God-Nature, which isOne and All, projected on to society. Theindividual is free, in that he recognizes hisown fully individual will to be subsumed inthe general will and identical with it. Man isa citizen, and yet once again an individual.

Immanuel Kant

The Critique of Pure ReasonAlong with David Hume, to whom by his ownacknowledgment he owed much, Kant jetti-soned metaphysics as an alleged science ofthe supra-sensory, in other words as theseemingly logical and factual theory of whatlies beyond experience. And yet Kant admittedto being in love with metaphysics. He wasconvinced it was indispensable becausequestions concerning the most general defin-itions of reality, the knowability of nature, God,freedom and the immortality of the soul criedout for an answer: “Human reason goes forthinexorably to such questions as cannot beanswered by any experiential use of reason orprinciples based on it.” Questions which can-not be answered a posteriori (“from whatcomes after”), i.e. from experience, requireknowledge a priori (“from what came before”),i.e. on the one hand independent of experi-ence, and on the other not consisting ofstatements which are true by definition (e.g.“Triangles have three sides”). Kant regardedsuch a sentence as this last as an “analyticaljudgment”: the predicate (“three-sided”) de-rives from an analysis of the subject (“trian-gle”). This sentence does not extend

knowledge, in contrast to a “synthetic judg-ment,” e.g.: “Some dogs are dangerous topeople.” This statement is based on experi-ence, a synthetic judgment a posteriori. Nowmetaphysics is concerned with “syntheticjudgments a priori.” Only when it speaks insuch judgments about the principles ofindividual sciences or about certain condi-tions or even leitmotifs of knowledge, forexample about the “idea” of the infinite (butwithout asserting any knowable infinite), ismetaphysics possible as a science, and thenas a “science of the limits of human reason.” In this demarcation exercise, Kant did notfollow the skepticism of Hume. In oppositionto Hume, he believed that experience, whicharises from the mental processing ofperceptions, could not in its turn draw itsprinciples from experience. Unlike manyRationalists, on the other hand, Kant was ofthe opinion that all knowledge begins withexperience, and must make reference toexperience in every case. It could, however,be concerned with merely “possible” experi-ence, examining through mental processesalone the subjective acts of obtaining knowl-edge whose possibility precedes experience,and which are definitive for everything whichcould possibly become the object. Thisexamination is the task of the “transcenden-tal philosophy” which Kant developed.“Transcendental is the name I give to allknowledge which concerns itself not withobjects, but with the way we recognizeobjects, to the extent that this is possible apriori.” Transcendental philosophy is thus theformal basic structure of everything that canbe reality for us. As it makes a priori andgenerally valid statements relating to neces-sary features of reality, Kant continued to callit metaphysics in this respect.

Space and Time as Pure ConceptionsThe Rationalists were of the opinion thattheorems derived mathematically or logicallyfrom definitions or from basic original con-cepts could be applied to the objects ofperception, and at the same time say some-thing about the world in itself as indepen-dent of our perception and thought of as asupra-sensory whole. This was possible, theythought, because thanks to the disposition of God, who does not deceive us, or forother metaphysically derived reasons, certain

70 THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Immanuel Kant,Anonymous portrait, c. 1790

Kant’s epoch-making Critique of Pure Reason (1781) subjected thehuman faculty of cognition to aserious examination and came tothe conclusion that there werecertain conditions anchored in thesubject himself which determinedour view of the world. He arguedthat no statement was possibleabout what the world “in itself” was like (i.e. independent of theconstruction put on it by the subject), because Man could never see things independently of this construction. Thereforeknowledge was not oriented toobjects; rather, it determined theproperties of objects.



GERMAN IDEALISM

The Beginnings of Modernity

The following chapters on German idealismtake up the story directly from the precedingchapter on Kant. Nevertheless, to give thebook a clear structure, a new main section isneeded at this point, so the following para-graphs will comment on the transition fromthe 18th to the 19th century. In recent histor-ical research, including the history of art and literature, this transition is seen as an impor-tant threshold between the eras of the“modern age” and “modernism” in its broadersense (whereas “Modernism” in its narrowersense refers rather to the 20th century).In the second half of the 18th century, up tothe Romantic period around 1800, changesin art and science came to a head which may be termed “secularization” and “human-ization.” Secularization meant the opening up in biology and cosmology of new dimen-sions of natural history by way of evolution-ary perspectives. Thus, for example, a theorydeveloped by Kant concerning the origin ofsolar systems in gaseous nebulae, whichalso implied a theory of the formation of theearth, required the assumption of a period oftime for this formation out of all proportion to the younger age of the earth that wasgenerally assumed at the time. Also – longbefore Darwin’s theory of evolution – thegreat diversity of biological species was gradually being seen in historical terms, that

is to say it came to be understood as theresult of long-term changes, as opposed to the assumption of a fundamentallyunchanging number of species and varieties.The world became the product of a processextending back into in the unimaginablydistant past. In philology, semiotics and thetheory of art, secularization is to be seen inthe assumption that meaning is created bymeans of an individual interpretative processwhich necessarily proceeds by way of thesynthesis of diversity as a temporal process,and, moreover, presents a different appear-ance at different times. Thus meaning is in adouble sense not timeless.The Baroque idea of letting the world repre-sent itself objectively, so to speak, on a vastpanel of signs, disappeared altogether.Humanization – not to be understood here as the creation of humane conditions – is to be seen in a boom in anthropology, thescience of man, in medicine and philosophy,and in the beginnings of sociology.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

The first version of Fichte’s The Science ofKnowledge appeared in 1794, 13 years after Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In hisown way Fichte continued Kant’s transcen-dental philosophy, that is to say the investi-gation of the preconditions that are given in the faculty of knowledge itself prior to any experience, and that make objectivityand an epistemological relationship to

76 THE 19TH CENTURY

From the Modern Age to Modernism

The 19thCentury


After the wars of liberationagainst Napoleon the age ofEuropean nation states began,in which a strong awareness ofnational identity came into beinghelped by an increasedawareness of the conditionsdetermining any particularhistorical moment.

German idealism, the mostimportant philosophicalmovement at the beginning ofthe 19th century, is linked tohistorical awareness inasmuch asit reduces nature and mankind,so to speak, to history. In thisconception history is the self-unfolding of the supra-individualsubjective spirit.

Karl Marx’s materialism was aresponse to idealism. His critiqueof the capitalist economic systemwas at the same time

philosophically significant as acultural critique relating to thesphere of fundamental labor andproperty relations.

Marx turned his attention aboveall to the consequences of theindustrial revolution, whichbegan in England in the last thirdof the 18th century, advancedrapidly and led to the emergenceof the proletariat.

New forms of the division oflabor also arose in naturalscience, which began to breakdown into separate sciences andto shed its links with philosophy.The as yet young disciplines ofbiology and chemistry alteredthe image of inanimate andanimate matter. Darwin’s theoryof evolution constituted arevolution in the image of man.

Philosophy adopted variousattitudes towards the triumphs of science. Positivism (AugusteComte), continuing the Enlighten-ment’s belief in progress, saw the only remaining role forphilosophy as being the scienceof science.

Wilhelm Dilthey, on the otherhand, introduced the distinctionbetween “natural sciences” and“human sciences.” Philosophy,as a “critique of historical reason”and an “application of historicalawareness to philosophy and itshistory,” was to prepare the wayfor the “human sciences.”

Dilthey’s aim was to get closer tolife itself through the fluid under-standing and experience of “types

of world-view.” Hence he alsospoke of vitalism. Henri Bergsonand, to a certain extent, FriedrichNietzsche are also regarded asbelonging to this movement.

Johann Gottlieb FichteCaricature by Gottfried Schadow

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Ideology

“The philosophers have only interpreted theworld in various ways. The point however is tochange it.” This famous proposition is the lastof 11 brief notebook entries in which Marx formulated his view of Feuerbach and whichare known today as the “Feuerbach theses.” Ifphilosophy is part of the “superstructure,” aswas pointed out in the previous section, andmerely involuntarily reflects the “base,” then itfalls short of reality and is unable to changeanything. Marx and Engels used the word“ideology” to describe the conviction, which intheir view was erroneous, that theories andthe changes of consciousness brought aboutby them, could affect the course of history. (In1845–1846 they wrote a book, The GermanIdeology, which remained unpublished at thetime.) This use of the word does not entirelyaccord with the way it is used today. But thenas now “ideology” included ideas that are putforward in the above conviction: “Ideology is aprocess which is carried out consciously bythe so-called thinker, but his consciousness isa false consciousness. The real driving forceswhich govern him remain unknown to him,otherwise it would not be an ideologicalprocess.” (Engels)Feuerbach, according to Marx, wished totransform the “false consciousness” of reli-gion into a true self-consciousness of man.To that extent his intentions were at one with Marx’s own. For Marx “the reform ofconsciousness consists ‘only’ in making the

world aware of its consciousness, in awaken-ing it from its dream of itself, and ‘explaining’its own actions to it.” It is a matter of “thereform of consciousness not through dog-mas but through the analysis of that mysticalconsciousness which is obscure to itself.”But according to Marx, Feuerbach had him-self undertaken this analysis in what was still an ideological manner by remaining onthe level of reason, of the correct use of theintellect. Marx’s concern was to explain thecontents of ideologies in terms of antagonis-tic historical conditions, of class conflict.

NEW QUESTS FOR MEANING– TRANSVALUATION OFVALUES

Arthur Schopenhauer

Like Hegel and like numerous thinkers beforehim, Schopenhauer developed a philosophywith the ambition of providing an all-embrac-ing account of things. His concern was similar to that of Goethe’s Faust: “what holdsthe world together in its innermost parts.” But two of the principal approaches in histhought set him apart from the metaphysicaltradition. Schopenhauer neither begins norends with God, with Being, with the isolatedconsciousness or its experiences and con-cepts, but with man. Man’s relationship tothe world is, it is true, illuminated philosoph-ically, epistemologically, from the outset, buthis knowledge is seen in conjunction with his physical being, his needs and his involve-ment in the endless mechanisms of life andits relationships. Schopenhauer sees thisinvolvement as vulnerability, as suffering, andwith this as its starting point – this too is a breach with the European tradition – his entire doctrine is pessimistic. (Pessimismis here not to be understood primarily ashopelessness regarding the future, but as anegative, critical attitude of rejection towardsthe world, towards life in general.)The title of Schopenhauer’s principal workThe World as Will and Idea (1818) expresses, as he himself stated, “the singleidea” around which all his writings revolve.The “and” of the title contains part of thepoint of this idea, for it is a matter of the con-nection between two aspects of the world, ofhow we are to experience and interpret it.

88 THE 19TH CENTURY

Philosopher, Etching by Max Klinger,sheet 3 of the series Opus XIII, –Death, Part II, First impression1898–1909

With literary virtuosity, Schopenhaueragain and again explained the specificgoals, aspirations and actions ofparticular individuals in terms of a few basic drives, leaving events onearth at the mercy of the fateful pull of the supra-individual will, which isnot benign. Max Klinger, fascinated by Schopenhauer, adopted this view of things in a series of graphic works,some of which have a dramatic“action.” Klinger's “philosopher”arrogantly reaches out beyond the realstream of life and beyond nature, heresymbolically fused with the figure of areclining woman, to a metaphysicalfoundation of all things. But this is seen to be a mirror, the philosopherfinds only himself. The exact location of the mirror (and hence any certaintyas to what is reflected and what isdirectly visible) is left deceptivelyunclear – a somewhat pessimisticimage of philosophy.

Arthur Schopenhauer,1788–1860, Painting by Angilbert Göbel, 1859, Staatliche Kunstsammlung, Kassel

In the very title of his magnumopus, The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer made thefundamental idea of his philoso-phy clear. Schopenhauer agreedwith Kant's view that man experi-ences and knows the world onlywithin his own idea of it. That isto say, the world is conditionedby the subject's mode of knowl-edge. However, there was for him, in contrast to Kant, some-thing on which these ideas are based and which is thus independent of all experience and knowledge, which Schopen-hauer called the “Will.” The Will is not a goal or an intention but a kind of all-pervading force, theinner essence of things and thedriving force of nature. As a “thingin itself”, the Will is the basis ofreality in its entirety, but it alwaysappears in individual phenomenaof the will, which are manifesta-tions of this one Will.



LIFE

From the 19th to the 20th Century

20th-century philosophy is no longer confidentof its right to exist. The catastrophes of our agehave not only affected philosophers’ own livesin many ways, but have also dealt a morelasting blow to their faith in the reality ofreason, far more so than the experience of theestrangement between the old and the new in the age of revolutions was able to do.Philosophy has therefore, unlike classical ideal-ism, lost confidence in its ability to heal thatestrangement in the realm of thought. On thecontrary, its most significant voices proclaimtheir own abdication, whether in favor of art,science or politics. More than in any previousage, the great philosophers now vociferouslyand unanimously sought salvation outsidephilosophy. Paradoxically this manifest self-negation goes hand in hand with an unprece-dented determination to make philosophy intoan academic subject with a “scientific” basis.Never before have there been more people inthe universities and academies of the world forwhom philosophy is their main occupation,never before have there been so manyseparate individual philosophical disciplines –disciplines which now need specialists tosurvey them in their entirety.The first major blow to the its self-confidenceto which 20th-century philosophy respondedcame above all from the work of three men:Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund

Freud. Marx had shown that the capitalisteconomic system is governed by laws of itsown which cannot be controlled by reason and which create the potential for an imminentcrisis. Nietzsche had unmasked the belief ofthe Enlightenment in human self-determina-tion as nothing more than the product of thedesire for power. Finally Freud proceeded tocast doubt on man’s rational ability to controlhis own inner self, his emotions and instincts,by describing them as the forms taken by a ubiquitous sexual drive. All these ideasradically questioned the power of reason: incentral areas of man’s self-understanding ithad turned out that it was not the self-assuredsubject but rather blind forces that were incontrol. The response of philosophy to thischallenge varied: in some cases it led to theabdication of reason, in others to a radicalrestatement of the goals and beliefs of theEnlightenment, in order to face up to the pow-erful onslaught to which they had been sub-jected by those great enlighteners Marx, Freud,and Nietzsche. Even as regards the broadgeneral public, by the late 19th century thebelief that the world could be shaped by rea-son had begun to crumble as man was com-pelled to see himself, with fewer and fewerreservations, as part of the functional networkof modern industrial societies. The First WorldWar merely brought out into the open onceand for all the fact that there was nothing leftin the bourgeois notion of progress with whichto oppose the destructive forces of the present.

96 THE 20TH CENTURY

The End of Philosophy?

The 20thCentury


The historian Eric Hobsbawmcalled the 20th century the Age ofExtremes. Indeed, in no centuryhave progress and regression, warand peace, enlightenment andbarbarity co-existed so closely,both temporally and spatially, as inthe 20th century.

The two major ideologies of thecentury, fascism and commu-nism, brought men under thesway of the belief that they couldcontrol the course of history. TheSecond World War unleashed byGermany and the murder ofEuropean Jews constituted abreak with civilization which gavethe lie once and for all to thepromise of political salvation forthe Western world. The strugglebetween the opposing systems ofcapitalism and communism waseventually won by capitalism.

In the field of culture, an avant-garde art and literature began atan early stage to break theautonomous, enlightened bour-geois subject of the 19th centurydown into its component parts.

By the end of the 20th century,thanks to electricity, gramophonerecords, the telephone, television,PCs and the Internet, a commer-cialized mass culture hadreached even the remotest cor-ners of the earth. Since the studentprotests of the 1960s, concep-tions of life geared to the existen-tial experience of the self have toan increasing degree replaced theinflexible role models of modernindustrial society. The theory ofrelativity and quantum theory

along with the discovery of DNAwere the central scientific discov-eries of the 20th century.

Philosophy faced up to theupheavals of the age. The certain-

ties of the Enlightenment andPositivism were questioned. Thenew topics of Life, Languageand Society moved into the cen-ter of philosophical reflection.Language became the principaltopic of philosophy, because itseemed that the unity of experi-ence within the multiplicity ofpossible perspectives could onlybe found, if at all, in linguisticcommunication. The guiding con-cept of “Life” took into accountthat, with the irreversible break-down of traditional communities,a source of spontaneous vitalenergy had also been blocked off.Finally, society became a topic ofphilosophy because the multifac-eted dependence of each individ-ual on the world could no longerbe credibly described in terms oftheological concepts.

Thales of Miletus, Hans Arp,1952, private collection



A priori, a posteriori (Latin, from[what came] before; from [whatcomes] after): With reference toan Aristotelian distinction (hys-teron versus proteron), a pair ofepistemological terms introducedby the Scholastics. A prioriknowledge can be obtainedthrough reason alone, indepen-dent of human experience. Kantsummarizes under “a priori” theconditions that make knowledgepossible in the first place, i.e.logically necessary and strictlygeneral knowledge such asspace and time, analytical deci-sions, categories, and conceptsof reason. A posteriori knowl-edge, by contrast, comprises allthe rest, e.g. sense-perceptions,with no claim to general validity.

Agnosticism: (Greek a-gnoéin =not to know): An epistemologi-cal concept coined by T. Huxley,meaning that only the outwardappearance of what exists canbe known, not its true being.Agnosticism disputes the possi-bility of solving the metaphysicalproblem of truth. The ancientSophists and Skeptics wereagnostics, as were later, amongothers, J. Locke, D. Hume, and H. Spencer. Nietzsche was criticalof agnosticism on the groundsthat the position of “not beingable to know” the truth presup-posed the knowledge of that verytruth, which meant, he argued,that the frontier to the Transcen-dental had been crossed.

Agora: Name given in ancientAthens both to the assembly ofcitizens and to the place wherethey met (the market-place).Political discussion (agorein) wasone of the most important civicduties in Athenian public life.Every male citizen was bothentitled and indeed required totake part. The agora was thus anexpression of the basic idea ofthe polis, namely that the statewas founded on direct participa-tion by its citizens in political life.

Academy (Greek akademeia):Originally the name of a templearea outside Athens named forthe hero Akademos. It was herein 385 B.C. that Plato foundedhis philosophical school of thesame name, which remaineduntil 529 A.D., when it wasclosed by the Emperor Justinian.Even in Antiquity, the PlatonicAcademy was already the modelfor other schools (Peripatos, Stoa), and it influenced theeducational system of the MiddleAges. In 1440 Cosimo de'Medici founded an “Academia

Platonica” in Florence. Since then,academy has been a generalterm for a university, college orlearned society.

Analytic and synthetic judg-ments: In the introduction to hisCritique of Pure Reason, Kantdistinguishes “judgments” (i.e.statements) according to therelationship between the subjectand predicate (what is said aboutthe subject). Analytical judgmentsare those in which the predicateis already contained in thedefinition of the subject, e.g. “All bodies possess extension” or “A bachelor is unmarried.”Synthetic judgments by contrastgive additional information about the subject in the form of knowledge gained fromexperience, e.g. “All bodies haveweight,” or “The Amazon is over4000 miles long.”

Archimedean firm place: Animaginary immovable fulcrumoutside the confines of the Earth(or any system), and by extension,a foundation of knowledgebeyond all possible doubt, fromwhich all other knowledge canbe supported or undermined.The term goes back to a sayingby the Greek mathematician andengineer Archimedes (287–212B.C.): “Give me a firm place onwhich to stand and I shall movethe Earth.”

Axiom (Greek axioma = demand,axioein = regard as true): Generalstatement that cannot be proveditself but forms the basis for theproof of other statements. Euclid'sgeometry for example is foundedon axioms, and there are axiomsof logic (e.g. a statement cannotbe true and false at the sametime). In the natural sciences, anaxiom is a statement confirmedby experience, but unprovable.

Being, to be (Greek on, ousia:Latin esse, ens): The meanings of these controversial basicconcepts of philosophy can bedivided into three: (1) existence,(2) identity, and (3) the logicalrelation between two terms,expressed by the copula “to be.”Parmenides was one of the firstto define being as permanence,non-transitoriness, as opposed toappearance, becoming and dis-appearing. By contrast, for Hera-clitus there was no permanentbeing, all being was becoming.Aristotle thought of being as theexistence of the existent thing.Ontology usually understandsbeing as the existence of thingsas such. Heidegger's existentialontology, on the other hand,

conceives Being itself not assomething that is, but as a“process of de-concealment” (Ent-bergungsgeschehen) of what is.

Categories (Greek kategorein =to make a statement): Conceptsof existence. A term introducedby Aristotle for the various kindsof statement which can be made about an object. Aristotledistinguished ten categories(substance, quantity, quality,relation, place, time, position,state, action, and affection), whilePlato distinguished only four(identity, difference, persistence,and change). For Kant, the cate-gories were both definitions ofobjects and a priori forms ofknowledge, in other words men-tal concepts, which he derivedfrom possible kinds of judgment.In this way, he arrived at twelvedifferent categories, which hedivided into four groups.

Categorical imperative: A general principle of behaviorwhich Kant, in his Critique ofPractical Reason, formulated asfollows: “Always act in such away that the maxims of your willcould at all times constitute theprinciples of a general law.”

Causality: The relation of causeand effect between two eventstaking place at different times.The principle of causality statesthat every event has a cause,and, conversely, that every causehas an effect.

Consciousness: Awareness of one's (spiritual or mental)existence. The term is understoodin widely differing ways byphilosophers, but is generallyinterpreted as the capacity toimagine objects. It comprises thetotal content of sensory percep-tion, sensation, emotion, will andthought. The term in its modernsense is due to Descartes; in hisMethodical Doubt, conscious-ness is the knowledge of thedoubter that his doubt is beyonddoubt. Descartes saw in thiscertainty of self the foundation ofhis concepts of existence andknowledge. With his concept of“transcendental consciousness,”Kant introduced the connectionbetween self-awareness and theunity of objects of experience: thesubject is aware of his identityand of changing mental states,but is also aware of the unity of an object which can be seen in different ways. For Kant,“transcendental consciousness” is the basic condition of thepossibility of knowledge. Thephenomenology of Husserldefines consciousness as a con-sciousness that is always directedtowards something and in thissense intentional. All reality isonly such to the extent that it

relates to a perceptible, thinking,and remembering consciousness.For Husserl, the world is the cor-relate of acts of consciousness.

Copernican revolution: In thenarrower sense, the revolution incosmology resulting from thereplacement by Copernicus of ageocentric universe by a helio-centric universe. By extension, any radical intellectual shift. ThusKant regarded his theory that the“knower” imposed his mentalstructures on the objects ofknowledge as a Copernicanrevolution in philosophy.

Cynics: A school of philosophyfounded by Antisthenes(444–368 B.C.). The Cynics livedaccording to their ideal of anentirely untrammeled existence,despising all cultural values andnotions of property. The modernuse of the word goes back totheir disregard for all social con-ventions and to their provocativepronouncements.

Deduction (Latin deducere = tolead down): Derivation of the par-ticular from the general; obtain-ing a new statement from otherstatements by logical conclusions.See Syllogism. (see Induction.)

Deism (Latin deus = god): Systemof natural religion current in theEnlightenment. It recognized aGod as creator and origin of theworld, but not as a being whichintervened in the affairs of theworld, either through miracles orthrough revelation.

Dialectic (Greek dialégein = artof conversation): The logic ofcontradiction; method of philoso-phizing. As early as the Eleatics(Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno),also later in Socrates, dialecticwas regarded as the art of inves-tigating truth through dialogue.For Plato, dialectic is knowledgethat arises from conflicting opin-ions. Kant described dialectic asthe “logic of appearances,” the art which invests falsehood withthe appearance of truth. He useddialectic as a method of expos-ing sophistry. For Fichte (theory of science) and Hegel (science of logic), dialectic was that formof thought which includes con-tradiction (negation) of a thoughtor idea in itself. Their dialecticalmethod shows how any concept(thesis) can turn into its opposite(antithesis), and how from thecontradiction between these twoa higher concept (synthesis)emerges, which is then subjectto the same fate.

Empiricism (Greek empeiria =experience): The epistemologicaland philosophical standpointwhich sees experience as theonly source of knowledge. Forthe representatives of classical

112 GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Terms in bold can be found under their own heading in the glossary



Empiricism (Hobbes, Locke,Hume), there were no innateideas; the whole content ofconsciousness was due to sen-sory experiences which could becollated into empirical knowledgeby the principles of similarity andcausality. Accordingly, permissi-ble scientific methods for empiri-cists are observation andexperiment. (See Sensational-ism.)

Encyclopedia (Greek enkyklios =circular, paideia = teaching): Theuniversal learning of theSophists, comprising grammar,rhetoric, dialectics, arithmetic,music, geometry and astronomy.The modern encyclopedia aimsat providing a written summaryof current knowledge. In 1751,Diderot and d'Alembert, togetherwith 142 authors (“encyclope-dists”) set about a systematiccompilation of all human knowl-edge, a project concluded in1772 with the Encyclopédie oudictionnaire raisonné des sci-ences, des arts et des métiers.

Energeia (Greek activity, reality,realization): According to Aristotle,energeia is the principle thatrealizes potential. Taking theexample of teacher and pupil, heexplains the relationship betweendynamis (movement, ability) andenergeia. By imparting knowl-edge, a teacher can change theability of a pupil, if the latter hasthe capacity to learn. As long asthe pupil does not apply theknowledge he has acquired, heis only a potential “knower.” Onlywhen he implements this knowl-edge does this activity becomeenergeia. It is defined as therealization of those aspects ofdynamis, of the capacity to havean effect, of potentiality.

Enlightenment: A Europeanintellectual movement of the18th century, which sought toliberate itself from the ideashanded down by medieval andecclesiastical authorities. While forDescartes it was still the radiantpower of God that helped reasonto discover truth, for the Enlight-enment it was mankind itselfwhose own reason determinedthe rational and political order ofthe world. The leading philoso-phers of the Enlightenment were,in Great Britain and Ireland,Locke, Berkeley and Hume; inFrance, the encyclopedistsDiderot, d'Alembert, Montesquieu,Rousseau; in Germany, Wolff,Lessing and Kant. Kant definedEnlightenment as “man's emer-gence from his self-imposedimmaturity” and urged accord-ingly: “Sapere aude!” (Dare to useyour brain). With their trust inempiricism, reason and theevolutionary progress of society,the Enlightenment however ranthe risk of ushering in a new

immaturity, namely blind faith inthe universal authority of science.

Entelechy (Greek entelecheia =having oneself as a goal): Anexpression which goes back toAristotle, who stated that anyexisting thing contains the goalof its development already withinit, as for example a seed has asits goal the fully-grown plant. The first entelechy of a viableorganism is, for Aristotle, the soul.Leibniz described the monads asentelechies, as the purpose oftheir realization is containedwithin them.

Epicureanism: the teaching andway of life propounded by Epicu-rus (341–270 B.C.), in which happiness and a life of pleasureare seen as the greatest good. To attain to this good, Epicurusrecommended a life of with-drawal and political abstinence.

Epistemology (Greek episteme= knowledge, understanding): Thetheory of knowledge. Episte-mology is one of the basicphilosophical disciplines; it is concerned with questions of the origins of the meanings,principles, methods and limita-tions of knowledge. Philosophicalepistemology (in contrast to thephilosophy of science) necessarilyquestions the validity of existing,scientific knowledge. Since, fol-lowing the tradition of Descartes,a boundary exists between theunderstanding subject and theobject to be understood, it isnecessary to agree about under-standing as a means. While Kant,in his epistemology, examinesmetaphysical knowledge, whichis supposed to be independentof all experience, Fichte raisesthe question of whether scienceis possible at all. According tohow these preconditions areinterpreted, epistemology remainsto this day divided between logi-cal, psychological and transcen-dental-phenomenological schools.

Esthetics (Greek aisthetikós =relating to what is perceptible):Originally the theory of sensoryperception; later, as one of thecardinal philosophical disciplines,narrowed down to the theory ofart and beauty. Philosophicalesthetics investigates the condi-tions under which judgments oftaste arise, the effect of beauty onthe beholder, and the relationshipbetween art and reality. Estheticshas not been confined to anyparticular epoch in its pursuit ofthe connection between the sen-suous and sense-formation: Platoand Plotinus understood beautyas the radiance of the Platonicideas shining into the world;Aristotle saw order, regularity, and discrimination as the sourcesof beauty. With his Aesthetica

(1750) A. E. Baumgarten becamethe first to attempt to create abasic science of sensory experi-ence. In his Critique of Judgment,Kant explained beauty as thesymbolic visualization of thesupra-sensory in the sensory; forSchelling, it was the finite repre-sentation of the infinite. Hegeland Schopenhauer understoodart as truth made visible; accord-ing to Adorno, art aims for truthin the sense of a rescue of theOther, Non-identical.

Ethics (Greek éthos = custom):Moral philosophy. Ethics investi-gates the preconditions and theeffects of human actions. Incontrast to autonomous ethics,authority-based ethics denies thatindividuals have the capacity toformulate the maxims of theirown behavior (an example wouldbe the theological ethics repre-sented by the Christian com-mandments). Normative ethicsaims to formulate universallybinding values and standards.Utilitarianism sees utility and themaximization of happiness as theonly moral principles. The Stoicsheld that ethics was derived froma law of nature. Kant developedthis idea in his categoricalimperative. In place of the deter-mination of man by nature, heproposed an autonomy of thewill, which makes a law for itself.This enables the individual tojustify the reasons for his actions.Practical ethics (P. Singer) devel-ops options of action for problemsituations, especially those arisingfrom technological progress inmedicine.

Existentialism: Philosophy ofexistence and being. Existentialismwishes to restore a connectionbetween abstract thinking andthe individual's concrete experi-ence of the self and the world.This awareness of one's own selfis created in extreme situationssuch as fear, guilt, and death. Themain exponents of Existentialismare Kierkegaard, Jaspers andHeidegger (ontology). In Francethe term “existentialisme” denotesphilosophical movements which,unlike essentialism, accept theprimacy of existence overessence. In Being and Nothing-ness Sartre explained this pri-macy as signifying that man firstexists, encounters himself,appears in the world, and thendefines himself accordingly.

Experience (Greek: empeiria,Latin: experientia): Knowledge ofthe particular. Aristotle definedexperience as the ability to rec-ognize and judge things correctly.The precondition of every experi-ence is memory. It takes manymemories to create the faculty offorming general concepts on thebasis of individual experiences. In

modern times (cf. Empiricism)experience has been regarded asthe basis of scientific knowledge.Francis Bacon used the word“experientia” in the sense ofexploration, meaning the processof learning, the method ofobtaining general statements. The Empiricists (e.g. Locke) iden-tified experience with perception.Locke distinguished externalexperience (sensation), the regis-tration of the external worldthrough the sense organs, frominternal experience (reflection), the “inner life” of man accessibleto mental capacity. Kant usuallyidentified experience with empiri-cal knowledge. For Phenome-nology it is the relationship ofexperience to the practical life-world that is important, as it isthe foundation for all scientificstatements and for knowledge.

Frankfurt School: A school ofthought concerned with thecritique of society and sciencewhich takes its name from theInstitute for Social Researchfounded in Frankfurt in 1923. Of its members, the authorsHorkheimer and Adorno withtheir “critical theory” are associ-ated with a program of analysisof social power structures. InDialectic of Enlightenment,Horkheimer and Adorno exposedthe veiled power-seeking of theEnlightenment and its shift intomyth, while, however, alsoreflecting on their theory itself aspart of the blindness of theEnlightenment. Marcuse andHabermas also belong to the tra-dition of the Frankfurt School.

Genealogy (Greek: genealogia):The study of origins and descent.In its narrower sense genealogydenotes the theory of humanancestry; in its broader sense itdemonstrates the fundamentalconnections between ideaswhich are interrelated in theirhistorical development, as didNietzsche, for example, in hisGenealogy of Morals.

Geocentric, heliocentric (Greekge = earth, helios = sun): Theview, current until the end of theMiddle Ages, that the Earth wasat the center of the universe, istermed geocentric. Copernicusushered in the heliocentric view,whereby the Sun was at thecenter of the planetary system.

Hedonistic (Greek hedon =pleasure): The view of life whichsees enjoyment and the plea-sures of the senses as the aimand goal of human action (seeEpicureanism).

Hellenism (Greek hellen =Greek): That period of classicalAntiquity, between the 4thcentury B.C. and the rise of theRoman Empire, in which Greek

GLOSSARY 113



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Original title: Geschichte der Philosophie von der Antike bis heuteISBN 978-3-8480-0431-7

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