The Theory of Organism

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Theory Biosci. (2000) 119: 276317 Urban & Fischer Verlaghttp://www.urbanfischer.de/journals/theorybiosc

The Theory of Organism and the CulturalistFoundation of Biology

Mathias Gutmann1 & Eva M. Neumann-Held2

1Institut fu r Philosophie, Philipps-Universitat Marburg2Europaische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischerEntwicklungen GmbH, Wilhelmstr. 56, 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler

Address for correspondence: Mathias Gutmann, Institut fu r Philosophie, Philipps-Universitat Marburg, Blitzweg 16, 35039 Marburg

Received: July 17, 2000; accepted: August 28, 2000

Key words: Organism, Function, Structure, Constructional Morphology, Culturalism

Summary: After the disappearance of organism was diagnosed, the discussion aboutthe role of a theory of organism in biology is characterised by a significant contradic-tion. On the one hand, the importance of a theory of organism is stated. Particularlydevelopmental biology demands organism-centred approaches as a basis for concep-tual integration. On the other hand, several modern biological disciplines such as ge-netics and molecular biology simply don't need a theory of organism for their work.Consequently, the determination of the status of the organism and its relevance forbiology at all is an unsolved problem.In order to clarify the methodological status of the organism in biology we start withthe reconstruction of three important propositions. A life oriented approach and ahierarchy concept which both are from a neo-Darwinian origin are confrontedwith a structuralist approach of organism, that can be characterised as a non-Darwi-nist approach.Our own attempt for the solution of the organism problem applies the tools of cultur-alist methodology. In accordance to this pragmatic approach, the term organism is in-troduced as a concept of notion. A constructional morphological case study exempli-

fies the applicability of this concept. From the culturalist point of view amethodological foundation of biology can be achieved, that provides a consistent basisfor a comprehensive integration of biological knowledge.

1 Introduction

A clarification of the status and the nature of the organism has a signif-icance that reaches far beyond the realm of biology alone. The organismhas been and still is used as model and metaphor in the effort to describerelationships between parts and wholes in very different areas, to concep-tualise organisation, differentiation, and even the social embeddedness ofstructures or parts of the entity they comprise.


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Such so-called organicist approaches have a long history in Western philo-sophy, as do some typical features of organicist approaches, such as whole-ness and structural closure (e. g. the naturalist justification of Platon's idealstate see Schafer 1993)1. In modern times Kant2 (1983) noted that the or-

ganisation of modern states could be compared to the relationship be-tween parts of an organism. Such an analogy is obviously based on theidea that as in an organism, the parts in the organisation of a state de-pend functionally on each other, that they are mutually means and endsfor each other at the same time3. Likewise, we find in romantic politicalconcepts the term organism as a metaphor for human communities (seeTaylor 1989 for further reading). Nowadays, organicist descriptions arefrequently used in a variety of philosophical approaches. Examples are thetheory and philosophy of culture (e. g. Sponger 1983), theory of action(see Mead's 1992 a & 1992 b, 1998 and Peirce's 1996 application of biologi-

cal knowledge) and even linguistic or hermeneutic approaches (see Hum-boldt's 1985 usage of the word organism and organisation for lan-guage; see Gadamer 1990). The same is true for the approaches ofphilosophical anthropology that usually refer (directly or indirectly) to atheory of organism (see e. g. Gehlen 1986, Plessner 1975). Even within thecontext of theory of arts, the term organism seems to be applicable (seeEggebrecht 1986). In addition to these examples from philosophy, theoryof culture and arts, organicist positions are also prominent in politics, so-ciology and history. The organism obviously plays an important role in

the construction of theories of numerous disciplines.This presumes that the status and the nature of the organism are settled.Here, it is usually assumed that the clarification and definition of the or-ganism is the typical project and even the object of biology, and that there-fore organicist positions are securely grounded in biological knowledge. Itmust come as an unpleasant surprise to realise that in modern biology, the

The theory of organism and the culturalist foundation of biology 277

1 For a discussion of such features see section 4.2 As the term organicist is a diagnosis, based upon historical as well as systematic recon-

struction, we will refer only to some features that are tightly connected with such ap-proaches. As the term organism from ancient Greek time to nowadays changed its meaningfundamentally, the identification of an author as an organicist provides severe problems ofcomparability that can be avoided by the characterisation we applied here.3 Kant writes: Man kann umgekehrt (because a direct analogy of the organisation of naturewith any causality we know, the authors) einer gewissen Verbindung, die aber auch mehr inder Idee als in der Wirklichkeit angetroffen wird, durch eine Analogie mit den genannten un-mittelbaren Naturzwecken Licht geben. So hat man sich, bei einer neuerlich unternommenganzlichen Umbildung eines groen Volkes zu einem Staat, des Worts Organisation haufig fu rdie Einrichtung der Magistraturen u. s. w. und selbst des ganzen Staatsko rpers sehr schicklichbedient. Denn jedes Glied soll freilich in einem solchen Ganzen nicht blo Mittel, sondernzugleich auch Zweck, und, indem es zu der Mo glichkeit des Ganzen mitwirkt, durch die Idee

des Ganzen wiederum, seiner Stelle und Funktion nach, bestimmt sein. (Kant 1983: 323)Note here that Kant uses the German word Staatskorper, which means literally body ofstate.


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loss of the organism is almost a truism4. With the loss of the organismbiology appears to have lost its foundation as well, and one might alsowonder what this can mean considering that we are obviously surroundedby organisms, that is by plants, animals, and other living beings.

Indeed, the word organism can be used exactly in the same sense as and as a synonym for living beings. If organism is used in the senseof living being then it seems that in some areas of biology the organ-ism (the living being) no longer plays a significant role. In molecularbiology, for example, some biochemical molecules might stem from livingbeings (although these molecules can be synthesised as well), but for mostexperimental approaches the living tissue is at best one of numerousother purely technical settings in which biochemical reactions occur. Or-ganismically derived is not the same as reactions typically observed inliving beings. A second example is evolutionary biology. Here, many ap-

proaches model evolution by focussing on the differential distribution ofheritable patterns, thus viewing the organism itself as nothing but somekind of vehicle for the heritable entities that are assumed to be essential(e. g. Dawkins 1986 & 1992). On the other hand, in some areas of biologythe organism continues to play a significant role and can be found inmorphological approaches as well as within the context of ecological, de-velopmental and evolutionary concepts (e. g. Driesch 1935, Duncker 1998,Goodwin 1990, Gutmann W. F. 1995, Roux 1881, Tansely 1935, Uexku ll1973, Wagner & Laubichler 2000, Webster and Goodwin 1982 & 1996; for

further reading s. Weingarten 1993, Potthast 1999). Often, these ap-proaches have a non or an anti-Darwinist impulse5, particularly when theyuse the word organism as a technical term, so that different approachesdeveloped different meanings for organism. This situation becomes evenmore complicated when we consider that several of these approaches areof an explicitly non-biological, mostly philosophical origin, but neverthe-less refer to or incorporate biological knowledge and theories to corrobo-rate the intended speech about the organism.So, today we face a curious situation in which, on the one hand, the or-

ganism has lost its central place in modern biology, but on the other handnumerous different organism-centred approaches have been developedfrom a melange of biology and philosophy. This situation has promptedsome philosophers to pose the question of whether the organism is a bio-

278 M. Gutmann and E. M. Neumann-Held

4 For the discovery of the disappearance of the organism see Webster & Goodwin (1982 &1996), Goodwin (1997).5 We distinguish between the terms Darwinian and Darwinist. Darwinian refers to onetype of evolutionary theory that can be gained by reconstructing Darwin's approach of breed-ing as a model for evolution. Darwinist approaches, for example mathematical populationgenetics, have systematically reduced the Darwinian approach. Interestingly, it can be shown

that anti-Darwinist approaches may be in some respects even compatible with Darwin'sown conceptualisation of the structural problems of a comprehensive evolutionary theory(for the detailed argument, see Gutmann 1996, Gutmann & Weingarten 1999).


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logical, a philosophical or even a philosophical-scientific problem (see, forexample, Mahner & Bunge 1997).Rather than trying to answer this question, which in some ways presup-poses the existence of (a) correct organism concept(s), we suggest taking

a closer look at alternative approaches in biology. We will therefore startour analysis with a reconstruction of some applications of the word or-ganism in biological theory. This will lead us to the conceptual origin ofthe loss of the organism. We will then contrast these results with an exam-ple of an alternative approach, which attempts to reestablish a theory oforganism that gives the organism a central place in biology.Attempts of this kind come mainly from the field of developmental re-search6. Therefore, the next part of this paper presents an analysis of oneof the most substantial approaches of this type, the structuralist ap-proach.

Using theoretical, philosophical, historical and biological perspectives, thestructuralist approach attacks dichotomies, such as the phenotype geno-type distinction, which have replaced the organism in the Darwinist ap-proach (see, for example, Webster and Goodwin 1992 & 1996). Althoughanti-Darwinist and Darwinist approaches are antagonistic in several im-portant aspects, we nevertheless think that both have severe shortcomings.In the last part of this article we will therefore present our own approachto the problem: a proposal for a theory of organism, based on an explicitconsideration of the explanatory goals, the anticipated knowledge, and the

status of the resulting explanations and descriptions. This proposal notonly avoids the typical misunderstandings of current organism conceptsbut also provides a basis for the determination of the limits to the realm ofbiology itself.

2 The Organism in Modern Biology Its Loss and its Defence

Our investigation will begin with a re-visit to the loss of organism from

biology. This requires a reconstruction of the main applications of theword organism, for which we will use two examples. Our first exampledelineates the loss of the organism through the identification of the or-ganism with life. The second example will try to localise the organ-ism in so-called natural hierarchies. This will lead to some more generalreflections on the status of natural hierarchies and ontological assumptionsin the construction of biological (scientific) theories.


6 Developmental biology was traditionally always more anti-Darwinian than other fields ofbiology (for a historical outline, see Jahn 1990, for a systematic argument Weingarten 1993).


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2.1 Organism Lost in Life

It might appear as a surprising starting point to begin our search for theloss of the organism with Mayr, for whom organicism is a characteris-tic feature of a specific conceptual tradition in modern biology. However,

we will show that it is precisely in organicism of the type that Mayrcharacterised and which has been highly influential in the major partsof biology that the organism is lost as an entity with definite proper-ties.In his efforts to establish biology as a science Mayr presents an instructiveand revealing characterisations of organicism by emphasising two mainpoints: the holistic and the emergentist aspect. Mayr writes:

To sum up, organicism is best characterised by the dual belief in the importance of consider-ing the organism as a whole, and at the same time the firm conviction that this wholeness is

not to be considered something mysteriously closed to analysis but that it should be studiedand analysed by choosing the right level of analysis. (Mayr 1997: 20)

Therefore, Mayr seems to hold the view that the organism is just one par-ticular level in a hierarchy of life. This level can be analysed, so Mayr con-tinues, by referring to the relevant lower levels of this hierarchy:

At the molecular level, all and at the cellular level, most of their functions obey the lawsof physics and chemistry. There is no residue that would require autonomous vitalist princi-ples. Yet, organisms are fundamentally different from inert matter. They are hierarchically or-dered systems with many emergent properties never found in inanimate matter; and, most im-portantly, their activities are governed by genetic programs containing historically acquired

information, again something absent in inanimate nature. (Mayr 1997: 20 pp)

Note here Mayr's emphasis that organisms have to be clearly distinguishedfrom inanimate matter after all, this seems a requirement for the determi-nation of the object of biology itself. But organisms also have to bethought of as hierarchically ordered systems, in which each level can beanalysed by chemical and physical means, and which obeys natural laws.Based on the fact that numerous levels of biological organisation can bedistinguished we first started with the question: What exactly defines oneof the levels in the hierarchically ordered system usually given as the level

of organism? A second question, apparently connected to the first, thenarises: How is life to be distinguished from inanimate matter?And clearly, Mayr seems to think that both questions can be resolved inone approach, which points out the characteristics of life. In his viewthey are obviously also the characteristics of the level of the organism:

These properties of living organisms give them a number of capacities not present in inani-mate systems: A capacity for evolution, a capacity for self-replication, a capacity for growthand differentiation via a genetic program, a capacity for metabolism (the binding and releas-ing of energy) a capacity for self-regulation, to keep the complex system in steady state(homeostasis, feed-back), a capacity (through perception and sense organs) for response to sti-muli from the environment, a capacity for change at two levels, that of the phenotype andthat of the genotype. (Mayr 1997: 22)



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According to Mayr these features characterise a living organism. Organ-isms as multi-leveled hierarchically ordered systems can be distinguishedfrom other kinds of such systems, because organisms are fundamentallydifferent from inanimate matter. Therefore the next question is: what dis-

tinguishes inanimate matter from animate matter? Surprisingly, Mayr ex-plicitly uses here the same properties as being those of life.One might argue now that the systematic problem with these definingproperties is that combinations of them, or sometimes even all of them,could equally well be attributed to inanimate matter. Mayr's definitiononly seems adequate because he applies an implicit background knowledgethat refers to a sufficient difference between animate and inanimate enti-ties. Without this background knowledge the properties are not appropri-ate for distinguishing life from non-life. What does this mean for the de-finition of the organism? Note, that when Mayr gave the properties that

distinguish animate from inanimate matter, he related these features notonly to animate matter that is life but to living organisms as well.Since organisms were defined so far as multi-leveled systems which can bedistinguished from other systems by belonging to animate matter, organ-isms have been introduced so far only as being nothing more than a partof animate matter. Therefore, when Mayr uses the expression living or-ganism (see quote above) the extension organism is unnecessary or re-dundant. The term organism is reduced to a word that does not add anyrelevant aspect to the object of biology, which is life (animate matter) it-

self.What then are the specifics and the significance of organicism for biol-ogy? A further quote from Mayr is helpful here:

Since the 1920s, the term holism and organicism have been used interchangeably. Perhaps, atfirst, holism was more frequently used, and the adjective holistic is still useful today. Butholism is not a strictly biological term, since many inanimate systems are also holistic, asNiels Bohr pointed out correctly. Therefore, in biology the more restricted term organi-cism is used now more frequently. It encompasses the recognition that the existence of a ge-netic program is an important feature of the new paradigm. (Mayr 1997: 17)

Indeed, the assumption that holistic systems exist in the realm of inani-mate matter as well is true for many if not all the criteria, which Mayr ap-plies in order to distinguish, animate from inanimate matter. Another mostimportant point here is the significance given to the genetic program. Thegenetic program comes to be the most important criterion for the differ-ence between inanimate and animate entities, as a further quote stresseseven more:

Every system, every integron, loses some of its characteristics when taken apart, and manyof the important interactions of components of an organism do not occur at the physicochem-ical level but at a higher level of integration. And finally, it is the genetic program, which con-

trols the development and activities of the organic integrons that emerge at each successivelyhigher level of integration. (Mayr 1997: 20)



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Obviously, the level of organism within the hierarchy of life (animate mat-ter) is still not determined by applying any specified set of criteria. In-stead, Mayr continues to analyse the difference between inanimate and ani-mate matter, which he defines by the existence of a genetic program, or

more precisely, by a particular dualism, the phenotype-genotype relation-ship. Mayr writes:

The dualism of modern biology is consistently physicochemical, and it arises from the factthat organisms possess both a genotype and a phenotype. The genotype, consisting of nucleicacids, requires for its understanding evolutionary explanations. The phenotype, constructedon the basis of the information provided by the genotype, and consisting of proteins, lipids,and other macromolecules, requires functional (proximate) explanations for its understanding.Such a duality is unknown in the inanimate world. (Mayr 1997: 21).

For Mayr, therefore, the genotype-phenotype dualism reflecting the ge-netic-program metaphor serves as the defining aspect of life. The organ-

ism, on the other hand, has been introduced only as multi-leveled systemof animate matter. Since apparently the main characterisation of animatematter is the genotype/phenotype distinction, it has to be concluded thatthis is also the main feature of the organism. In other words: the organismas a specific structure in its own right does not hold a place within thehierarchy of life that could not equally well be expressed by referring toother descriptions of living entities (such as the genotype-phenotype).In Mayr's view the categorical difference between approaches which referto the organism rather than to life as the object of biology, is denied

by refusing to define life and organism differently. Reducing thespeech about organisms to speech that deals with life as the very object ofbiology, the term organism remains a word only, and the dualism betweenlife and organism collapses to a dualism between phenotype andgenotype.At this point we can summarise the result of Mayr's approach: the or-ganism, which was assumed to be a putative biological unit of uniquecharacter, is lost in its identification with life, which is distinguishedfrom inanimate matter by the genetic program. The unity of biology isthereby resolved by creating an unbridgeable gap between phenotype andgenotype7.

2.2 Organism Lost in Hierarchies The Schism of Biology

We started the above analysis of Mayr's approach with the aim of findinga definition of the particular level of organism. Since Mayr had demandedthat the organism should be analysed by choosing the right level of analy-sis, we had posed the question which criteria would determine the level of


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The inclusion of emergence does not solve the methodological problem here, becauseemergence can be reconstructed as a confusion of different language levels (s. Gutmann1999).


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the organism among other levels of analysis of animate matter (Mayrnames, for example, the molecular and the cellular level, see quote above).However, although Mayr uses the word organism and even defends aparticular kind of organicism, he nevertheless loses the organism in

the gap between phenotype and genotype. Our search will now lead us toa second author, Niles Eldredge, in whose writings the organism plays acentral role, this time not in one hierarchy but in two. The question willagain be whether we can find any definition(s) that specifies (specify) theparticular level oforganism(s) in any of these hierarchies.First of all Eldredge claims a schism of biology, which is reflected in thefundamental difference between the realms of ecology and evolution. As aresult of the gap between ecology and evolution, two hierarchies must bedeveloped, which are separate fundamentally, intrinsically, and ontologi-cally (Eldredge 1992: 3).

Following this dualistic scheme, the units of the different hierarchies dif-fer. Starting from the top, the genealogical hierarchy, made up of popu-lations (= reproductive unites), consists of 1. monophyletic taxa, 2. spe-cies, 3. demes, 4. organisms. 5. chromosomes and 6. genes. (Eldredge1985: 188)The ecological hierarchy, made up of the atavars (= economic units)consists of 1. regional biotas, 2. communities, 3. populations, 4. organ-isms, 5. cells and 6. molecules. (Eldredge 1985: 188)A first comparison reveals the term organism in both hierarchies at posi-

tion 4. And although the two hierarchies are irreducible and thereforethe roles played by organisms change, depending on the membership ofhierarchy8, Eldredge states:

Organisms are simultaneously parts of both systems. In other words, any single organism(with some special exceptions) is always a part of a local economic system, as well as a localreproductive population. Because this is so, it is obviously that the two hierarchies convergeat the organism level (. . .).(Eldredge 1992: 3).

This convergence of hierarchies plays a significant role in Eldredge's con-cept, because from here it is possible to consider putative relationships be-

tween both hierarchies, which again allows the processes in both to beconceptualised as participating together in the evolutionary process. InEldredge's words:


8 Note here, that Eldredge's dualism is not in contrast to the phenotype-genotype gap, but thedifference between germ lines and soma becomes significant below the organismic level, en-suring the irreducability of the two hierarchies not only above, but also below the level of or-ganism. Eldredge writes:Below the organism level, of course, the distinction between the somatic and the germ lines(i. e., in multicellular organisms) once again ensures a clean separation of the elements of the

two hierarchies. Hence the conclusion (Eldredge and Salthe 1984) that there must in fact betwo independent, yet parallel and interacting, process hierarchies that together combine toyield evolution. (Eldredge 1985: 175)


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Hierarchy allows us to acknowledge that both ecological and genealogical entities, events,and processes are involved in the evolutionary process. The entities all appear to be stableindividuals. They are hierarchically arranged. There are processes intrinsic to each level thatare not reducible to those of lower levels subsumed by higher levels. (Eldredge 1985: 214)

For Eldredge, different kinds of relationships between these two hierar-

chies are imaginable, and he discusses two possible extreme positions thatdefine a whole spectrum of combinations (Eldredge 1985: 187 pp):1. There may be one single level, thought to be predominant (this may be

the organism, but can of course also be any of the other levels).2. The relationship between the reproductive and the economic hierarchy

can be determined in terms of completely symmetrical mutual relation-ships between each single level of both hierarchies.

Of course, the solution of the problem of how the two sides may bebrought together again depends methodologically on the answer to the

question of whether or not the elements of the two hierarchies are reallycomparable, i. e. whether or not the references of the respective entities areidentical. And here we come back to the main problem that we are con-cerned with in this paper. The fact that in both hierarchies at the sameplace (given here as position 4) the same word organism can be found,does not imply that the same reference is meant. The problem we are fac-ing is not only that it is not clear by which characteristics the level of or-ganism is determined, but furthermore that there are two hierarchies inwhich the term organism might even have different meanings. This lastpoint could only be excluded on the basis of strong ontological assump-tions about the nature of nature. For the organism this has two alterna-tive consequences. In the first case, the organism simply denotes thingslike plants and animals. Here the term is not part of a scientific language,and the process of its transformation into such a scientific (definable) termremains as unclear as its status in any of the presented hierarchies. In thesecond case the organism is specified, and its characteristics are given inscientific language. Following the hierarchy argument the characteristicsare then given either by reference to a lower level (e. g. in terms of thegenetic code or the constituting molecules) or to a higher level (e. g. in

terms of economic or reproductive relations, demes, atavars etc.). In thesecases the organism can be replaced by the respective descriptions. In allthe cases that stem from the model of hierarchical description of nature orlife reconstructed here, the organism is lost.

2.3 The Status of Hierarchies for the Foundation of Biology

So far, it has been shown that the organism is lost in the framework of thehierarchies of nature or of life (animate matter) that have been dis-cussed. We might now ask, how are the proposed hierarchies themselves

justified? Therefore, in this section we will work on a more general aspect,namely the argumentative function and the methodological status of hier-



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archies in biology. This investigation is important in view of our aim tointroduce our own approach towards a concept of an organism. For thispurpose it is useful to be clear whether this must be preceded by the con-struction or the acknowledgement of a hierarchy of nature. After all, the

two approaches considered above showed that hierarchies usually serveas a background ontology, which shall provide what could be called therealm of biology. The organism would then have to be found if at all as part of such a naturally given hierarchy. In ontological approaches thedetermination of the status of the organism and the determination of therealm of biology itself is thus closely linked to the natural givenness ofthe hierarchy of nature. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate this claimof the ontological foundation of biology. Mahner & Bunge (1997) havevery explicitly and in sophisticated philosophical terms explored the pre-requisites of an ontological foundation, which is at the basis of many ap-

proaches to biology (and the sciences in general). Therefore, we will con-centrate on their work to describe the ontological prerequisites and tostate its limits. In an ontological foundation the realm of biology is usual-ly given in terms of description, i. e. scientific theories are thought to de-scribe the world at least in parts. From this point of view an ontologi-cal foundation (in general) is not an optional but a necessary prerequisitefor every single science, stated in the words of Mahner & Bunge as fol-lows:

If ontology is general science, then the specific factual sciences, or sciences of reality, are spe-cial metaphysical or regional ontologies. In our view, both sciences and ontology inquire intothe nature of things, but whereas science does it in detail and thus produces theories open toempirical scrutiny, ontology is extremely general and can be checked solely by its coherencewith science. (Mahner & Bunge 1997: 4)

The relation between science and ontology is described here in a Husser-lian manner as a first science, from which constitutive elements of thefactual or single sciences of reality are derived as detailed research ap-proaches. From this point of view ontology is indeed a first science,which gives the very general structures of the nature of things, which

themselves are subjects of inquiry by ontology as well as by sciences. Con-sequently, some very general propositions (called axioms or postulates) canbe given, which describe the references of scientific theories in a sequenceof decreasing generality. According to Bunge & Mahner:

Postulate 1.1. The world (or universe) exists on its own (i. e. whether or not there are in-quirers). (Mahner & Bunge 1997: 5)

As to the status of postulate 1.1, they state:

This axiom is not provable, and it tells us nothing about whether the world can be knownand, if so, to what extent. (Mahner & Bunge 1997: 5)



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And furthermore:

A philosophical principle shared by most philosophical schools is that all things are in flux.(To be sure, although this principle has never been refuted, it is hard to prove: this is why wemust postulate it.) Thus we introduce: Postulate 1.5: Everything changes. (Mahner & Bunge1997: 17 pp).

If we introduced the realm of biology in terms of postulates, that givethe ontological characteristics of the respective objects, then a classicalhierarchy of levels, called biolevels, can be defined. The investigations ofthe former chapters, however, have led to the question: How can such(any) hierarchy be justified? Clearly, the justification of such hierarchiesrequires a closer look at the methodological status of the postulates, fromwhich the respective definitions (e. g. the definitions of the single biolev-els) are derived. The postulates named here are obviously very general; and

it is stated (correctly) that they are not falsifiable. If ontology is indeeda necessary prerequisite of sciences9, the quest for an alternative must stophere. However, if it could be shown that accepting ontology as a prerequi-site of science leads to methodological problems, it might be advisable toexamine the possibility that ontological assumptions might be neither ne-cessary nor useful for the construction of scientific theories.Indeed, when we take a closer look at the relationship between ontologyand science, we can detect a significant dilemma. On the one hand, ontol-ogy is seen as a field of fundamentals that are needed for sciences (de-scribed as the field of regional ontologies). But on the other hand, it is al-

most always possible to suggest different propositions for ontologies.Therefore, we need criteria in order to determine the correct ontology10.And here is the dilemma, which easily becomes a vicious circle: If coher-ence with sciences is thought to be relevant for the selection of the correctontological basis, this basis cannot be constitutive for the sciences them-selves.If, alternatively, the sciences of reality give the criteria for the correct on-tology without forming a vicious circle, then the sciences must be possiblewithout an ontological foundation of the proposed type. In that case, how-

ever, we are in the difficult situation that independently of an ontologicalfoundation criteria for the correctness of the sciences and their assump-tions must be found. The fundamental problems we are facing in defenceof ontological statements of the proposed kind can be exemplified in thecases of the hierarchies of nature that have been discussed. Distinct propo-


9 This is a weak implication of the assumption that the relationship between ontology andsciences is the relation between ontology and regional ontologies, whereby the latter isthe field of the sciences of reality.10 Here, it is often suggested that the criteria for the right ontology are its coherence with

science. As a model of such coherence approaches one could think of the Duhem-Quine-Thesis; on Holism from an epistemological point of view and for further reading, s. Stegmu l-ler (1987).


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sitions of hierarchies can be made, which are simply irreducible (See Tab. 1and 2).

Table 1. The table gives an overview of several hierarchies that can be found. Note the differ-ing structure of these hierarchies as well as the different levels that are mentioned.

Ecological(Odum 1991: 39)11

Physiological(Odum 1991: 39)

Genealogical hierarchy(Eldredge 1985: 187)

Ecological hierarchy(Eldredge 1985: 187)

Biosphere Individual Monophyletic taxa Regional biotasBiogeographical Organ system Species CommunitiesRegionBiom Organ Demes PopulationsLandscape Tissue Organisms OrganismsEcosystem Cell Chromosomes CellsLiving community Organelle Genes MoleculesPopulation MoleculeOrganism

Table 2. The table continues the overview of Table 1

Bio-levels (Mahner & Bunge 1997: 178) Vertical aspects(Solbrig 1994: 4312)

Horizontal aspects(Solbrig 1994: 43)

B 1 = elementary cells = set of all elementarycells

Molecules Populations, species,living communities

B 2 = composite cell level = the set of allcomposite cells

Cells

B 3 = organ level = the set of all(multicellular) organs

Organs

B 4 = multicellular organismic level = the setof all multicellular organismsB 5 = population level = the set of allbiopopulationsB 6 = community level = the set of allcommunities (biocoenoses)B 7 = biosphere level = the set of all biospheres

The hierarchies in Table 1 and 2 clearly differ in several aspects, especiallyin the number of levels, their names and their relationships. The last hier-archy is a particularly good example of a mixed concept, because there are

only three levels in the vertical direction and three further units of nature,which are thought to refer to each of these levels and to each other. Withthese examples in mind the methodological problems identified by discuss-ing the standard ontology of Mahner & Bunge (1997) can be demon-strated. If distinct hierarchies are possible (at least in the sense of think-able), then there should be some criterion that allows the correct one tobe identified. Alternatively a principle or rule of translation or correspond-ence must be stated, which allows one or all the single levels of these hier-archies to be correlated.


11 Translated from the German edition.12 Translated from the German edition.


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But even if this were possible, there still remains one fundamental diffi-culty to be solved by all concepts of hierarchies of nature: the explicationof any principle for the construction of a hierarchy. Only such a principleor rule evaluates whether or not a proposed hierarchy was properly con-

structed, at least in terms of its completeness and adequacy. At this pointof our attempt to identify the place of the organism in the realm of biol-ogy, hierarchies have not been particularly helpful. Although we cannotshow it in detail in this paper the same holds true if the realm of biology isdetermined ontologically not by reference to hierarchies but by alternativemetaphors, such as a multitude of processes or network.

3 Introducing the Organism as a Unit of Transformation

The attempts to determine the relevant features of an organism in termsof a list of putative characters of life or a natural hierarchy has lead tosome severe methodological objections, as was shown in the preceding sec-tions. Setting aside the differences in detail, the approaches discussed(Mayr and Eldredge) show at least one fundamental similarity: They referto a specific concept of evolution, which includes the fundamental gaps wehave noted between genotype and phenotype and between ecology andevolution. On such an evolutionary basis the organism and its proposedrole in biology is considered very strictly in terms of the explanatory goals

of evolutionary theory. This in itself is not problematic, but becomes sowhen it is assumed that an evolutionary description of the organism is suf-ficient for all purposes. This would imply that the theory of evolution isindeed the comprehensive and fundamental biological master program, asit was characterised for example by Dobzhansky in his famous quote:Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution (Dobz-hansky et al. 1977). However, following the design of such a master pro-gram results, as we have seen, in the loss of the organism as a relevantscientific entity. This is exactly the result which Webster and Goodwin de-

rive as well:Organisms have disappeared as real entities from biology. Their essences are identified withhereditary determinants, which Weismann located in a distinct part of the egg, the germplasm. The information in these determinants, now identified with DNA sequences in thechromosomes, directs the development of the visible body of the organism from the rest ofthe egg substance, the somatoplasm. (. . .) Weismann's dualism saved Darwinism from incon-sistency by excluding the possibility of Lamarckian inheritance, and it provided a clear ratio-nale for studying inheritance independently of development, since embryogenesis can be re-duced to the activities of genes as the primary determinants of morphogenesis. (Webster &Goodwin 1996: 131)

In contrast to this Darwinist position and its constitutive dualism, thestructuralist approach is formulated as an alternative proposing a theory oforganism in which the organism remains a real and constitutive entity of



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biology. It is a morphogenetic approach and centres on the form. To un-derstand what follows it is necessary to realise that although Webster &Goodwin ask for the return of the organism in biology, the term organismstands at first glance more or less for the living being and is therefore a

non-scientific term that simply denotes plants and animals. Introducingthe relevant scientific (technical) term form, however, integrates the or-ganism into scientific theory (for a reconstruction of this program s. Gut-mann & Voss 1995). The form must not be misunderstood as an empiri-cally evident matter of fact description, as it might be in the context ofclassical or traditional morphology. Therefore, the form is not the or-ganism (that is, the living being) or the empirical outer shape of the or-ganism (the living being) or its parts. Rather: the form is a mathematicalrepresentation ofgenerative relations that refer to the whole or, as willbe relevant later, to parts of organisms:

In the theoretical models proposed by Goodwin, the field is conceived as a dynamical sys-tem and he argues that genetic and environmental factors determine parametric values in theequations describing the field and therefore act to select or stabilise one manifest form fromthe set of forms which are possible for that type of field. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 121)

In contrast to the Darwinist approaches discussed above, we clearly findhere a distinction between the non-scientific, undefined use of the term or-ganism (a living being) and a technical term, the form, which refers to or-ganisms and their parts. The organism, that is the form, thereby becomespart of a scientific theory of biology, and is not reduced to genes presolved

in dualisms. Obviously, Webster's and Goodwin's approach seems to beable to supply what we have been looking for: The return of the organ-ism in the realm of biology by its representation in a biological theory!Rather than stopping here, however, we like to continue with a furtherquestion and ask: What is the status and the function of the form in thattheory? Is the structuralist approach indeed the solution to developing atheory of organism and providing a foundation to biology? Or does it runinto its own set of problems? Therefore, we must now take a closer lookat the structuralist project and the introduction and function of form in

biological theories. As we have seen, morphogenetic fields, described asmathematical representations, are the rational of form. The mathemati-cal formula as the ideal representation of the space of possible empiricalforms is related to these empirical forms as an ideal to its realisations:

In principle, therefore, a set of determinate empirical forms is conceived as being generatedby a series of determinate fields and these fields are the same in the sense that they are all sus-ceptible to description in terms of a single set of fundamental equations. In that sense theyconstitute a single kind. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 121)

The generation of the single empirical forms is therefore thought of asthe abstract representation of concrete embryogenetic processes. Conse-quently, the structuralist approach takes the complete life cycle as the ob-

ject of transformation. It stands in contrast to traditional systematics,



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which is fundamental to Darwinist approaches and which focuses prefer-entially on adult life stages. The structuralist life cycle is represented astransformational series, and the rationale for the series are the funda-mental equations which were stated above. The methodological status of

these empirical forms is defined as natural kinds. The generation of therespective forms depends on the understanding of the relation between thenatural kinds (as, to follow Cassirer, the form of forms) and their re-spective realisations. This natural kind concept, which underlies the struc-turalist approach, is in some respects a classic one (e. g. to the considera-tions of Quine 1975). To quote from Webster and Goodwin:

Consequently, the determinate members of the series are variants of that kind [the naturalkind, which is given by the fundamental equations: the authors] related as transformations they comprise a rational system and the basic field equations are, in Cassirer's terminol-ogy13, a symbolic representation of the form of the series in a sense, the essence of the

kind. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 121 pp)And furthermore:

Thus, insofar as any set of specifically different empirical forms or patterns can be under-stood as being produced by the same generative mechanism in this sense, that set can be con-ceived as comprising a single kind. From this perspective, kinds are theoretically significantkinds, that is, natural kinds. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 121 pp)

Seemingly, the structuralist theory allowed us to cut nature at its joints.The determination of the respective natural kinds becomes possible withreference to the mathematical description. All empirical forms that follow

the same basic field equation are representatives of the same kind. So,the sameness of empirical forms is defined in terms of the respectivetransformation rules. And this sameness implies (as was stated in the cita-tion above) the identity of the generative mechanism.In a next step, the form becomes the realm of rational systematics. Thedescription of forms (which, as should be remembered, refer to living enti-ties and their parts) is used to generate a rational systematics that expressesthe correct order of nature itself:

Hence, the research project of rational systematics would consist, in principle, of an attempt

to reconstruct the hierarchical system of empirical taxa as a rational system in terms of the se-rial forms which are possible for each kind of field in the temporal sequence. (Webster &Goodwin 1996: 123)

Based on the principles of a rational systematics, a correction of tradi-tional, empirical taxonomy is even assumed to be possible:

However, we should bear in mind that, given the dialectical relation between taxonomic andexplanatory knowledge, one outcome of such a project, supposed it to be successful, might bethat the merely empirical classification would be subject to theoretical corrections of a more-


13 One might very well wonder whether this reference to Cassirer is not misleading. How-

ever, an analysis of Cassirer's terminology in regard to its application in the structuralized ap-proach cannot be done in the framework of this paper. To Cassires concept of the Form ofForm see Gutmann & Weingarten (1996).


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or-less radical nature, as has happened in the physical sciences, since the critical (essential)properties used for distinguishing kinds will be those which are grounded by the explanatorytheory. Thus, what from an empirical perspective may appear to be two distinct kinds maycome to be regarded, from a theoretical perspective, as simply variants of a single kind andvice versa. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 123)

The very subject matter of such a rational taxonomy is then the organism and its parts which is now understood as a realised form of one of theforms of forms, which were called natural kinds. In a way, this paral-lels the hierarchy argument, insofar as the taxonomic hierarchy is reinter-preted in terms of organismic development:

Thus, in terms of the type of morphogenetic theory proposed in this book, a qualified ver-sion of von Baer's thesis would lead us to suppose the existence of a temporal sequence ofkinds of morphogenetic fields where each kind of field corresponds to a level in the empiricaltaxonomic hierarchy. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 122 pp)

Here, Webster and Goodwin go a step further by proposing an existenceof a temporal sequence of kinds of morphogenetic fields. In other words,they claim that the resulting rational systematics would allow the identifi-cation of evolutionary relations. In stark contrast to classical Darwinist ap-proaches then, evolutionary development would be inferred not from gen-ealogical relations but from the sameness of the respective transformationsets. As an example of such a procedure Goodwin uses the development ofvertebrate limbs, which serve here as the units of a rational systematics:

Vierfu er-Extremitaten sind definiert als die Menge mo glicher Formen, die gema den Re-geln der fokalen Verdichtung, der Gabelung und der Segmentierung im morphogenetischenFeld der Extremitatenknopse erzeugt werden. Alle Formen sind aquivalent bezu glich Trans-formationen, die nur diese generativen Prozesse verwenden. Damit gelangen wir zu einer lo-gischen Definition der Vierfu er-Extremitaten, die unabhangig ist von der Stammes-geschichte. (Goodwin 1997: 237)

The important point here is that the units of the rational systematics areintroduced as being the same they are all vertebrate limbs in regardto a particular equivalence relation the transformations, which are usedby only these generative processes for the development of the respectivelimbs. At this point we meet the first severe methodological problem,

which becomes evident by a closer look at the procedures suggested.The procedure, which is being used here, is that of abstraction. An abstrac-tor is a word that indicates a shift in the level of language (for further read-ing s. e. g. Hartmann 1993, Lorenzen 1987). If things are the same in somerespect, we may introduce an abstractor referring to this particular same-ness. Obviously, this does not imply that these things are identical, butonly that they are the same with reference to a particular equivalence rela-tion. Likewise, the sameness of living entities can only be stated if an ap-propriate language is provided. Let us look at the order of description indetail: If we describe the limbs of fishes, amphibians, reptiles and mam-mals as members of the same set (tetrapods), we build an abstractor re-ferring to their sameness with respect to classical descriptive terms (e. g.



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phalanges, tarsalia, carpalia etc.). Consequently, we neglect the differencesin detail, and use the same term for specified parts of the limbs of differentanimals. Now, in the structuralist approach sameness is not related to clas-sical descriptive terms, but to mathematical descriptions, which were de-

rived from descriptive terms. That is, we must start with this classical lan-guage of description, and then construct a second language level thatincludes the mathematical description of these parts. The next step usesthe mathematical descriptions, the forms, to derive transformational rela-tions or transformation sets of these forms. Now, according to the quoteabove, these transformation sets provide the equivalence relations, relativeto which sameness of forms (mathematical descriptions) can be stated,and which are being used to build the rational systematics. This demon-strates that we arrive at these transformation sets and thereby at theequivalence relation by using a particular order of steps. When Webster

and Goodwin state, however, that the empirical forms (i. e. the mathemati-cal descriptions of single living entities or their parts) are the expressions of(or are derived from) the basic or fundamental equations, they reverse themethodical14 order and thereby commit a fallacy of category. The mathe-matical descriptions refer to living entities or their parts (e. g. the limbs oftetrapods), but the entities so described are not constructed in this way,which is described by the appropriate abstract representation. This formal-ist fallacy is basically grounded in a confusion of levels of descriptive lan-guage. If the difference between these levels is neglected we lose the possi-

bility of distinguishing between empirical, formal (e. g. logic) and ideal(e. g. mathematics) sciences. Kant saw this problem with complete clarity.He insisted that biological descriptions of Naturwesen (natural entities)are of a reflexive origin:

Gleichwohl wird die teleologische Beurteilung, wenigstens problematisch, mit Recht zurNaturforschung gezogen; aber nur um sie nach der Analogie mit der Kausalitat nach Zwek-ken unter Prinzipien der Beobachtung und Nachforschung zu bringen, ohne sich anzumaen,sie darnach zu erklaren. Sie geho rt also zur reflektierenden, nicht der bestimmenden Urteil-skraft. (Kant 1983: 306).

However, he goes on:Es ist namlich ganz gewi, da wir die organisierten Wesen und deren innere Mo glichkeitnach blo mechanischen Prinzipien der Natur nicht einmal zureichend kennen lernen, vielweniger uns erklaren ko nnen; und zwar so gewi, da man dreist sagen kann, es ist fu r denMenschen ungereimt, auch nur einen solchen Anschlag zu fassen, oder zu hoffen, da nochetwa dereinst ein Newton aufstehen ko nne, der auch nur die Erzeugung eines Grashalms


14 The difference between methodological and methodical is very important for the entireargument. The word methodical means applying a method. The word methodologicalmeans thinking about methods and procedures and their application. The point of view we

adopted in this article is that of a methodical culturalism. Consequently, the construction ofa line of argument has to be done methodically, e. g. by starting within everyday lifeworldand obeying the principle of methodical order (for further reading s. Janich 1992 & 1997).


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nach Naturgesetzen, die keine Absicht geordnet hat, begreiflich machen werde: sondern manmu diese Einsicht dem Menschen schlechterdings absprechen (Kant 1983: 352)

This means that the description of natural entities, in terms of me-chanische Prinzipien (mechanical principles), constitutes the named ana-

logy and provides the possibility of knowledge of organised entities. Butthe formal description of natural entities15 has only a regulative function(in contrast to a possible constitutive function16), and therefore the con-struction of the formal language of description must not be confused withthe natural entities themselves.Clearly, we do not have to arrive at Kant's own solution of this fundamen-tal biological problem. However, as the above analysis of the structuralistapproach has shown, we may safely assume with Kant and thus summar-ise the results of the analysis so far that the description of living entitiesor their parts in terms of a specified language (e.g. a mathematical or aphysical one) is an act ofattribution (s. Gutmann 1999). This attribution iscomposed of two distinct language levels. The formalist fallacy we haveidentified consists in confusing the language level of the analogy withthe language level of the described entities. Obviously, the sameness ofthings in terms of a specified set of descriptive means does not imply theidentity of these things in terms of a different set of descriptive means .So far, we have seen in our reconstruction of the structuralist approachthat the introduction of the organism into biological theory is methodi-cally flawed. The main problem was and this is an important point a

confusion on the level of language! Now, we will turn to a further prob-lem, that of a structuralist foundation for biology, which is suggested bythe program of a rational systematics that could be used as correctiveagent for empirical taxonomy. Such a program must supply criteria thatdistinguish between correct and false systematisations, so that we mayavoid the following three, equally inadequate, solutions:1. If we use the classical taxa as guidelines for our corrections, we produce

a reconstructive circle which anticipates the contingently existingtaxonomy as the aim of the rational reconstruction. This would be a fal-

lacy: Since an indefinite number of descriptions of a thing (and a for-tiori, of a living entity) is possible, other taxonomies may be con-structed as well as the one contingently given.

2. If we neglect the classical taxonomic implications we must concede thatthe proposed theory of organismic transformation is the correct theory


15 Kant aims specifically at the description of natural entities in terms of mean-end-relations.But irrespective of the special description, the methodological problem is the same.16 Kant emphasises this aspect of reflection several times: Der Begriff eines Dinges, als ansich Naturzwecks, ist also kein konstitutiver Begriff des Verstandes oder der Vernunft, kann

aber doch ein regulativer Begriff fu r die reflektierende Urteilskraft sein, nach einer entferntenAnalogie mit unserer Kausalitat nach Zwecken u berhaupt die Nachforschung u ber Gegen-stande dieser Art zu leiten und u ber ihren obersten Grund nachzudenken; (. . .). (Kant 1983: 324)


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of evolution. If this assumption is not justified then a dogmatic argu-ment seems to be unavoidable17.

3. Before we can describe living entities in terms of a formal language,they must be described on a different language level that allows us to in-

troduce the predicates needed to determine the sameness of the re-spective entities in terms of their evolutionary relation.The problem stated in the first inadequate solution is realised by the struc-turalists themselves:

If this project [the rational science of transformation: the authors] were to be successful indemonstrating that different fields could be conceived as different natural kinds and each kindcorresponds to a part of the empirical taxonomic system then something like the traditionalview would be vindicated. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 123)

The criteria according to which it is possible to distinguish between those

parts of the traditional empirical system that can be justified as the aim ofreconstruction, and those that are rejected by the reconstruction, must in-deed be given before we start to reconstruct. On the other hand this selec-tion cannot be done by referring to the results of the structuralist ap-proach alone, because then we run the risk of adopting the secondinsufficient solution: a dogmatic presupposition. If we want to avoid theaccusation of a dogmatic argument, we might assume that the transforma-tive lines that result from developmental research in terms of fundamentalequations and their respective realisations are themselves already evolu-tionary lines. The hierarchy of developmental processes is then thought to

reflect evolutionary transformations. Following the structuralist concept ofevolution, the generative transformations intended here are juxtaposedto the classical historical assumptions:

When taxonomy is treated as genealogy, then the logical relationship between ontogeneticpathway and taxonomic distance is lost, because neighbouring species are then determined byhistorical sequences rather than by generative relationships. The historical succession of spe-cies has no obligation to proceed systematically through a space of possible forms. Thoughthere will be a tendency for the neighbourhood relations to attractors to be expressed in thesequence of species discovered by evolution, parametric variation can be discontinuous andjump from one domain of parameter space to another, missing intervening attractors, which

may be encountered later. So genealogical taxonomy a la Darwin, will in general not be thesame as a rational taxonomy. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 254 pp)

What is being suggested here is the following: the generative transforma-tions constitute the possible morphospace, and these transformativelines are defined as evolutionary lines, which do not have to coincide withthe historical succession of species. Of course such a procedure is possible,but encounters a severe methodological problem: within the line of evo-lutionary transformations, it is not possible to determine the later andthe earlier events. That means: Webster & Goodwin offer us a solution


17 To justify an approach as the correct theory of evolution, the criticism of the concurring ap-proaches is not sufficient. It is merely a necessary prerequisite.


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to incorporate the organism (as form) in biological theory at the cost ofmaking evolution ahistorical18!The problem we encounter here is the problem of the Lesrichtungskri-terium (criterion of evolutionary direction), which has been a core pro-

blem in evolutionary approaches. In the search for such an adequate criter-ion, Goodwin derives a decline in symmetries and an increase incomplexity from the sequence of vertebrate limb developments. He writes:

In diesem evolutionaren Trend (the development of vertebrate limbs, the authors) zeigt sicheine allmahliche Abnahme der Symmetrie und ein stetiges Anwachsen der Komplexitat, dasmit der Zunahme der Symmetriebrechungen in der morphogenetischen Kaskade einhergeht.Dies ist die natu rliche Fortentwicklung eines dynamischen Systems, dessen Parameter infolgeder zufalligen Neukombination des Erbguts verandert werden. (Goodwin 1997: 240)

However, this general trend of evolution, which Goodwin uses to re-construct the correct sequence of generative transformations (i. e. the se-

quence of the correct ontogenetic transformations), must be justifiedagain. For example, one might very well argue against the criterion of in-creasing complexity on empirical grounds: clearly, we know many cases ofso-called reduction lines, e. g. such curious forms as hemichordates, po-gonophores or sipunculids. But even if we leave these empirical argumentsaside, the criterion (increase of complexity) is still problematic. It has themethodological function of a premise, i.e. it must be known before westart to reconstruct. Let us consider that the criterion itself is (at least) athree-termed comparative (polar contrary to simple) predicate. If we

consider a thing A to be complex, we actually mean: A is more complexthan B with regard to a criterion C, which serves as the relevant parameterfor comparison. If evolution is defined as the increase in complexity, thecomparability of the compared things (here the living entities) must beguaranteed, and the criterion of comparison determined beforehand. If weuse knowledge gained from the classical taxonomic concepts in order todetermine e. g. the route from specific fishes as predecessors to specificamphibian and reptile forms, then the well-known problem of a viciouscircle arises (see Ax 1984). Look for example at the following quote from

Goodwin:Wir ko nnen einen dieser Trends in der Evolution der Anhangsel von Wirbeltieren identifizie-ren. Offensichtlich entwickeln sich die Fischflossen aus seitlichen Hautfalten, die sich an bei-den Ko rperseiten der fru hen Wirbeltiere entlangzogen. Diese Falten bildeten sich dann zuzwei paarigen Anhangseln zuru ck, den Brust- und den Bauchflossen. Bei den Knochen-fischen, zu denen auch die Quastenflosser geho ren, schrumpften diese weiter zu gelapptenFlossen, welche am Anfang der fu r die Vierfu er, die sich aus den Quastenfloern entwickel-ten, kennzeichnenden Gabelungen stehen. (Goodwin 1997: 240)

The increase in complexity in this case refers to a particular line of evolu-tion, namely from early fishes via e. g. coelacanths towards early tetra-


18 This shortcoming could be avoided if a biogenetic principle is stated. In this case, a vi-cious circle will appear when the principle itself has to be derived or justified.


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pods. Despite the numerous empirical problems that are connected withthis reconstruction (particularly whether coelacanths are the predecessorsof modern tetrapods at all), the evolutionary line has to be justified as avalid empirical assumption. In order to justify such a premise, we have to

refer to knowledge, which is based upon the classical languages of descrip-tion. Therefore, if we defined evolution as a process of increasing com-plexity this way, we would commit a petitio principii, which is as uncon-vincing as the alternative options. At the same time the function of thestructuralist approach, namely to serve as a corrective to classical empiricaltaxonomy, gets lost.The fact that the structuralist description of living entities in terms of aformal (here mathematical) language refers to classical implications for thedirection of evolution which is, in a second step, described as an increasein complexity leads to the third inadequate solution we indicated

above. As we stated, an adoption of the classical determinations of the di-rection of transformation (in our example the line from early fishes viacoelacanths to early vertebrates19) forces us also to adopt the underlyinglanguage of description. This difficulty is seen within the concept as thedifference between naming and interpretation. Thus, Webster and Good-win give an example of a classical concept, the names of structures (such asphalanges or digits or ulna):

The original tetrapod limb, that which belonged to the common ancestor of the four-legged lineage, is assumed to have been one with five digits, since this is the condition of pri-

mitive, extinct amphibians such as Eryops and continues to be the predominant amphibianlimb form. These digits were accordingly named 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Darwinian belief thatthere is some type of inherited, material continuity of the individual elements that constitutea persisting form, such as the tetrapod limb, results in the view that the elements in the limbsof different species can be named in relation to the original digits. (Webster & Goodwin1996: 140)

Here, structures are thought to be homologous referring to an originaltype which is genealogically connected to them. The original type servesas an archetype here, which allows us to determine whether or not astructure possessed by two animals is homologous (for the archetype

problem s. Young 1993, Gutmann 1996). Because the type is thought toexist (here in the form of Eryops as its representative), the respectivestructures (here the phalanges) are equally thought to exist as a pattern.This point of view provokes a lot of methodological difficulties that havepreviously been identified and discussed (Weingarten 1992, 1993). Thestructuralists contrast this position with their concept of homology as anequivalence relation:

The invariant is simply connectedness. The mappings can obey the constraint that the anglesbetween intersecting lines in one space are preserved in the image space. These define equiva-


19 In case of this forms there may even be a minimum consensus. This is surely not the caseregarding the wide filed of invertebrates.


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lence under conformal mappings. Or distance can be preserved, as in the motions of rigidbodies (translations, rotations and inversions), giving equivalence under metric transforma-tions. Each equivalence set has an invariant property that is preserved by the transformation.A hierarchy of such equivalence classes can be defined, each successive invariant includingbut imposing more constraints than the previous. (Webster & Goodwin 1996: 144)

If the homology is introduced this way, the structuralists avoid the ob-vious methodological shortcoming of the classical concept. But on theother hand they introduce the equivalence relations with reference to de-scriptions of living entities, which already contain such terms as digits,phalanges and ulna. These terms indicate the evolutionary comparability ofthe structures. So, in a way the comparability of the natural entities beingdescribed is already stated, by describing them in classical terms. What ismissing in the structuralist approach is the construction of a reference lan-guage that allows us to operationalise our formal description. Metaphori-cally speaking, the entry point of the structuralist solutions to the namingproblem is too high. Consequently, the biological meaning of structuresthat are described as homologous this way cannot be derived from the for-mal description.At this point we can summarise the results of our reconstructions of theexamples of contradictory and mutually exclusive points of view, namelythe Darwinist on the one hand and the structuralist on the other. Theyhave led us to a curious position. When we regain the organism as an intel-ligible biological unit in terms of structuralism history collapses into math-ematical transformations, whereas the attempt to argue from a genealo-

gical or historical point of view as performed by Darwinistapproaches results in the disappearance of the organism. At the sametime, our reconstruction showed that neither result is the product of thenature of nature or the nature of organisms, but are tightly connectedwith the language we use to describe the respective assumed realms ofbiology (life on the one hand, the organism on the other). The result, thatthe language we naturally apply becomes a part of the problem that it wassupposed to solve, provides us with a new starting point for the construc-tion of a theory of organism and the foundation of biology.

4 Looking for a New Starting Point

So far, we have analysed different approaches in terms of their efforts to in-troduce a scientific concept of organism into biological theories. We haveshown that none of the suggestions was completely satisfying. Ultimately,the language applied was itself part of the problem. Since we want to sug-gest a new approach to conceptualising the organism and make it acces-sible to biological theorising the obvious starting point for such a projectis an analysis of the language used. We need to begin with the very firstquestion that was the reason for these considerations: What is an organism?



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The form of this question is typical of What is . . . questions, e. g. Whatis a chair?, or What is a cow? The simple form of these questions indi-cates that the questions refer to concrete things. Usually, such questionswould be answered by enumerating some characteristic features. In the

case of the question What is an organism?, we might give a list of sev-eral important or relevant features. Those features include several abil-ities such as metabolising or reproducing. One argument against thisapproach is that by using these features we gain nothing more than a syno-nym for living entities.A more serious argument is that the descriptive terms metabolise and re-produce come from an already highly standardised scientific language incontrast to the word chair or the feature used to sit upon. Adding herethe ability to have a form as proposed by the structuralists would notmake the situation any better. The next approach to this problem must there-

fore be to have a closer look at the second part of the expression living en-tity, namely the word entity. It was used exclusively as a substitute forsuch expressions as plant or animal, and it is exactly this substitution thatleads us to the starting point we need. In contrast to life or entity whichcould be understood as standing tor specific ontological or even metaphysicalintuitions the terms animal and plant are tightly connected with theeveryday lifeworld. The term lifeworld, with its qualifier everyday, hasbeen used several times throughout this paper, and its meaning was probablyunderstood intuitively. Now, however, is the time to introduce the term more

explicitly. Everyday lifeworld refers to the practices that comprise a widefield of differing human activities. The means and tools that are used withinthese fields of activities as well as the respective results constitute an array ofmean-end-relationships. It is important to note here that this field of humanactivities and their means-end-relationships include language as well. Con-sequently, the term everyday lifeworld describes such different activitiesand techniques as the building of houses, weaving, mining, metallurgy, the cul-tivation of weed and the breeding of cattle. Obviously within different specif-ic contexts of the everyday lifeworld, we can successfully deal with building

material, yarn, ore, animals and plants and the procedure of naming them,i. e. we are able to achieve our goals and ends. This might look like a trivialtruism, but it is of some methodological relevance. It is exactly at this pointthat we observe a significant asymmetry in the relation between science andthe everyday lifeworld. In the contexts of everyday lifeworld we are clearlyable to deal with animals and plants without having to refer to scientific (herebiological) knowledge20. A scientific treatment of animals and plants, however,is impossible without reference to everyday knowledge and know-how.


20

This does not exclude the utilisation of scientific knowledge at all. As we will see soon, e. g.physical (and chemical) knowledge can be used, insofar as the constitution of these forms ofknowledge is not based in relevant aspects on biology.


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One result of this asymmetry between the everyday lifeworld and scienceis that the everyday lifeworld precedes science methodologically, and thelanguage of the everyday lifeworld precedes scientific language. Within theeveryday lifeworld we usually use a language which permits communica-

tion about the relevant aspects of living entities with which we are usuallyconfronted. What is even more important is the fact that we can success-fully handle, manipulate, breed, cultivate etc. living entities and describethe relevant operations, within evervday language. The methodologicalpriority of everyday language is reflected by the fact that even if we wantto answer scientific questions, we will necessarily start with those parts ofeveryday language that belong to this field of successful cultural practices.Since we diagnosed the theoretical problem analysed in the precedingchapters as largely due to difficulties with language, we can now see thatfollowing a methodological order of everyday lifeworld language and

scientific language can prevent such language difficulties. In other words:starting from everyday lifeworld language (which is rooted in culturalpractices) we can develop a procedure that allows the distinction of at leasttwo levels of language21, which are ordered insofar as everyday languageand practices provide the methodical starting point for the introduction ofthe primary terms into scientific language. The language of description thatis designated as a scientific language here refers to particles of the everydaylifeworld language. These particles originate in the practical context withinwhich we deal with living entities. When we deal with living entities on

this level of the everyday lifeworld, the term living entities encompassessimply the animals and plants with which we are usually acquainted particularly within such explicitly marked practices like breeding and cul-tivation. Referring to the relevant particles of language which shall beabbreviated as L (Lifeworld language particles) we can describe proper-ties (for example features, motion, performances or behaviours) of animalsand plants that are relevant for different purposes. These purposes reflectthe respective goals we aim at within different practices. An examplemight illustrate this point. The ability to carry burdens, possessed by the

group of cattle-like animals, is of the utmost importance if one's aim is toproduce (breed) animals with optimal performance in this area. In othercircumstances other purposes are chosen, for example, the quantity ofmilk that can be produced by cows, the productivity of plants, the beautyof the fins of goldfish. In all these cases we are able to describe the rele-vant features (milk production, fin beauty) of these animals by referring tothe goals we attempt to achieve. Usually these goals can be identified asthe direct or indirect purposes of breeding or cultivation, and it is pre-


21 Obviously there are at least two levels of language; we needn't stop with the construction

of further language levels at this point. The respective higher language levels have to be con-sidered to refer to the respective lower levels. The most important point again is the starting-point named as a methodical starting point or beginning.


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cisely these practices, which have accompanied the historical developmentof human societies, that give rise to the relevant knowledge and know-how. In the same way, breeding and cultivation practices provide the ne-cessary language particles that we need to describe animals or plants.

These language particles refer not only to individual properties, likeshape or physical abilities, but also to super-individual properties, like theability to propagate.All these properties, features, abilities etc. are then described by refer-ence to the respective manipulative action that constitutes breeding or cul-tivation. Consequently these descriptive terms refer to purposeful humanaction and not to natural aspects of the respective living entities. Ob-viously the language refers to specific operations (usually within the con-text of use and production of animals and plants). The relevant particles ofthis language are introduced not just by means of description but by refer-

ence to the relevant practices. We can call this a prescriptive point of viewin contrast to a pure descriptive one.Note that what we called the features, characters or behaviour of ani-mals and plants are descriptions (i. g. prescriptions, see above) within themarked context, which do not imply biological knowledge. Consequently,the knowledge and know-how we gain within the context of the everydaylifeworld has a restricted claim of validity in several important respects. Instark contrast to the field of scientific statements and predictions, weneither expect nor demand universality but are restricted to particular va-

lidity. In the next section we will show how a scientific language a lan-guage of description can be acquired by starting from the language ofthe everyday lifeworld.

4.1 Towards a Language of Description

To obtain adequate scientific explanations, descriptions or predictions, wehave to introduce a standardised language language S that both preservesthe knowledge and know-how of the primary language level L and also

avoids all the indeterminacy, ambiguity and sometimes even inconsistency,of this language L. Consequently, the standardised language we are lookingfor must be constructed by starting within the restricted context of theeveryday life world, and transcending it by explicating a procedure thatprovides a sufficient degree of reproducibility and clarity. To accomplishsuch a task we suggest applying the constructive model theory (for furtherreading see Gutmann 1996, 2000). In this approach, a model is not merely atwo-termed relation that constitutes an analogy, e. g. between technical ab-stractions and several properties (for example the shape or performance ofliving entities), as is suggested by such advanced approaches as the structur-alist theory of organism. A model in terms of the methodical culturalist the-ory is a three-termed relation, as the following example shows:



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As we know from everyday lifeworld experience a horse can be used topull a plough. It is possible to describe this action in terms of classical me-chanics. We then describe the horse as ifit actually were a force-generatingunit. We do not simply identify horses with machines or engines (in terms

of force-generating units) but we describe them as if they were machines,i. e. we use machines to introduce such terms we need to describe the mo-tion, action and performance of the horse in mechanical terms. More gen-erally, using the three-term relationships in methodical culturalist modeltheory, an object whose relevant aspects are adequately described withinone language, is described by applying particles borrowed from anotherlanguage. This modelling will result in the construction of a (in this casemechanically) standardised language S, by applying a technical language.By modelling a horse as a force-generating unit we ascribe functions toseveral relevant parts of the animal. Because we introduced a model as a

three-termed relation, we can name the parts of the animal that are rele-vant to a specified motion, action or performance (described in terms of Lwhere L stands for everyday lifeworld language) as structures that per-form a specified function (described in terms of S where S stands forstandardised, e. g. scientific, language). That is: the application of the tech-nical knowledge and know-how by means of language denotes a proce-dure that can be called structuralising. In applying the procedure ofmethodical culturalist model theory, we move from one language level (L)to another (S). This shift of language level is marked by the shift of lan-

guage particles. Whereas in L we deal with animals, plants, living entitiesand their component parts (such as their limbs), in S we deal with theirstructures and organs (for the introduction of the term organ see Gut-mann 1996). This procedure can be applied to the other descriptive termswe mentioned above (such as motion, movement and performances of liv-ing entities) if we only keep in mind that the everyday lifeworld contextsfrom where we start are themselves practicalcontexts. That means that liv-ing entities neither have parts, nor do they have structures and organs.Rather, we describe the objects in L (living entities) on the one hand, func-

tions, structures and organs we intend within the specified context of in-quiry in S on the other hand. Having found the place of the word livingentities in everyday lifeword language, these considerations allow us nowto determine the methodical status of the organism as well.

4.2 The Term Organism

Based on the preceding considerations, we now suggest the introductionof the term organism into biology as a concept of notion or Refle-xionsterminus (for further reading s. Gutmann 1996, Janich & Weingar-ten 1999, Gutmann 2000). Referring to Kant's explication of the descrip-tion of Naturwesen (natural beings) in terms of means and ends, we can



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describe living entities (starting with the well known plants and animals ofeveryday life) as organisms. In doing so, the organism is constructedby beginning with the single or collective properties or characteristics ofliving entities (animals, plants etc.). These properties or characteristics are

used to constitute primary biological terms, which we call organismicproperties. With reference to organismic properties we suggest using theterm organism as an abbreviation to stand for a list of all those proper-ties or characteristics of living entities described as organismic properties.Using the term organism in such a way, it becomes part of a meta-lan-guage M. M refers to Sb (where b stands for biological), and describes theconstituted primary and subsequent constructed biological terms, which inturn have their foundation in everyday life practices in L. This sum oforganismic properties should be seen as an open list of the organismicproperties, which can be expanded if necessary (e. g. for new biological

disciplines). In a certain sense, the notion of organism is replaced byorganismic properties. Organismic properties can be defined opera-tionally, e. g. by the model-based constitution of the universe of dis-course of specified biological theories, beginning with the qualities ormovement of animals and plants.Such a methodological reconstruction of biology leads to distinct andwell-defined branches like functional morphology, constructional mor-phology, reconstructional morphology, constructional genetics, construc-tional theory of evolution etc. The functional and constructional de-

scription of animals determines an organismic construction. The same ispossible for collective properties like the ability to propagate. In the nextsection we will try to make this general description of the methodologicalreconstruction of biology clearer by using an example taken from mor-phology.

4.3 Presenting a Case Study: How does a Crayfish get its Struc-tures?

To give an example of what might be called an organismic description ofan animal, let us take a closer look to the procedure of structuralisation.Within everyday lifeworld contexts we are well acquainted with interest-ing animals such as crayfish22. These animals are interesting for several rea-sons. They are of great economic interest, they can easily be farmed, andlast not least, when carefully prepared many people find them very tasty.Crayfish early became a preferred object of biological description and re-search, particularly in neurophysiology, because they show characteristicescape behaviour (s. e. g. Kennedy & Takeda 1965, Wine & Hagiwara

1977, Wine & Krasne 1982). This behaviour, which is also observed in


22 The following from Gutmann (1998).


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other crustaceans such as prawns, consists of the abrupt flexion of the bot-tom of the crayfish's tail against the bottom of its forepart. If we want to

know how this motion which usually results in locomotion occurs, wecould start by describing this process as propulsion.However, there is a great difference between a body that is accelerated bythe application of an external force (like a stone thrown or catapulted) anda crayfish that moves by itself. The question here is: how are these forcesproduced from within the crayfish? We can approach this question byidentifying the crayfish as a force-generating unit. We then assume thatparts in the unit crayfish act in concert with each other to generatethe force (propulsion). We assume that the crayfish can be structur-

alised as a force-generating unit. To test this assumption, three steps arenecessary to enable us to structure the crayfish in the required form. First,we have to section it, in order to identify anatomically the parts of these ani-mals. Second, we must provide a model that allows possible functions to beascribed. Finally, we have to integrate the resulting structures within a me-chanical framework that is termed the construction of the animal.Before we go through the suggested procedure in detail, it is important toclarify what can be expected from the scientific investigation of the cray-fish's escape behaviour. At the end of this procedure, we should not as-sume that the crayfish is a force-generating unit, or that a crayfish is

built up out of the force-generating structures identified. In this case wewould simply but wrongly try to create a synthesis out of our analytical


Fig. 1. Schematic representation of some anatomical aspects of the thorax of a crayfish(P. leniusculus). Longitudinal section. (After Gutmann 1998)


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functional ascription and structuralisation; an analytical procedure wechose (from alternatives) in order to explain particular aspects of thebehaviour23 of interest. Such a reversion from analysi

The Theory of Organism

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