Vortrag »Demokratiepolitische Chancen und Gefahren der Digitalisierung«

Demokratiepolitische Chancen und Gefahren der Digitalisierung Peter Purgathofer

Cyberspace the liberator is now a tyrant’s tool

Utopians believed the internet would be an unstoppable force for

democracy, but the bad guys have got wise

In der Dissidenten-Republik Eine Justizfarce in der früheren Sowjetrepublik Aserbaidschan zeigt, wie ge!ährlich das Internet !ür Autokratien geworden ist.

»Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace«

»Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignity where we gather. ... I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.« John Perry Barlow, Cognitve Dissident, EFF Co-Founder

Davos, Switzerland, World Economic Forum, 8. Feb. 96

»We must declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts. We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made before.«

John Perry Barlow, Cognitive Dissident, EFF Co-Founder Davos, Switzerland, World Economic Forum, 8. Feb. 96

»Ich glaube nicht, dass die weltweite Telekommunikation und die neuen Medien an sich zu einer gerechteren Welt beitragen. Sie sind weder Quellen des Widerstands noch Symbole des Bösen. […] Fast alles, was in der Welt vorhanden ist, finden wir im Internet vor. Die Idee, das virtuelle Netz sei etwas völlig anderes, eine parallele Welt, die alternativ wäre, habe ich immer abgelehnt. Gesellschaft und Internet werden eins – ob wir’s mögen oder nicht. Worum es geht, ist, die wenigen internetspezifischen Merkmale zu finden und auszunutzen. Dieses Medium hat wirklich bestimmte einmalige, schützenswerte Merkmale.«

Geert Lovink, 2009

I would have been a bit more humble about the “Citizens of Cyberspace” creating social contracts to deal with bad behavior online.

Welche Chancen !ür die Demokratie ergeben sich, und wie können sie genutzt werden? Oder sind die demokratiepolitischen Vorteile der neuen Technologien eher Schall und Rauch? Führen Online-Verfahren tatsächlich zu mehr Beteiligung oder sind sie im Endeffekt sogar sozial selektiver? Wie sicher sind e-voting Systeme wirklich und welche Vor- und Nachteile bringen sie mit sich? Und welche demokratie- und gesellschaftspolitischen Visionen leiten eigentlich das Handeln der neuen technischen Eliten im Silicon Valley?

Neue Technologien ermöglichen neue Beteiligungsformen

eVoting - electronic voting machines

»California banned the use of Diebold machines because the security was so bad.«

Bob Rowe, www.coastalpost.com/04/12/02a.htm

»Diebold voting machines opened with hotel minibar key The key that controls access to a standard Diebold voting machine is a common key that can be ordered from the Internet, also used to open hotel minibars.«

boingboing.net

»Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts.«

avi rubin, informatiker, john hopkins university

fundstücke u.a.#defineDESKEY((des_KEY8F2654hd4"

»Diebold hadn't password-protected the [vote database] file or secured the audit log, so anyone with access to the tabulation program during an election could change votes and alter the log to erase the evidence.«

kim zetter, wired news

der konkrete einsatz von technologie macht aus

»sauberen«

technischen konzepten techno-soziale »amalgame«

»I was going about my business this morning when I was surprised to see some unattended electronic voting machines that had already been delivered to a polling place in advance of Tuesday’s election. I wasn’t looking for voting machines in this location, not knowing that it served as a polling place, but the machines were pretty hard to miss.«

ed felten, www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1084

ursachen systemische bedingungen


ed felten mit »gefundenen« voting machines

»Die Wahlcomputer wurden in mehreren Fällen vor der Ankunft des Wahlvorstands angeliefert und standen unbewacht im frei zugänglichen Wahllokal, bestenfalls unter Aufsicht des Schulhausmeisters. Gesichert waren die Wahlcomputer mit einer einfachen Bleiplombe, die sich mit wenig Aufwand !älschen bzw. manipulieren lässt.«

bericht der ccc-wahlbeobachtergruppe von der oberbürgermeisterwahl in cottbus


»amateurs tend to attack machines, whereas professionals target people.«

bruce schneier, semantic network attacks, 2000

semantische attacken

Technology is neither good nor bad — nor is it neutral.

eVoting - electronic voting machines


»The important thing isn't the voting software, it's an effective voting procedure.«

kommentar von chandon seldon auf slashdot.org

E-Voting in Austria

Process guide to Austria's E-Voting project: http://www.oeh-wahl.at

I. Vote Casting between May 18th, 08:00 and May 22nd, 2009, 18:001. Encryption with the public key of the election commission

Identifi cationUsing Citizen Card

May 28th, 2009, 17:00 1. Removal of the signatur

II. Counting of the Votes

2. Mixing of theencrypted ballots

3. Decryption with the private key of the election commission, then counting the votes

2. Signing of the completed encrypted ballot

4

E-Voting in Austria – Tomorrow’s election ready for real?

Austria's fi rst legally-binding electronic election will be held from the 18th to the 22nd of May during the "Austrian Student Union's" elections. This will be the fi nal part of a two-year consultation process to the Austrian Ministry of Science by E-Voting.CC.

E-Voting in Austria. The initial plans to implement E-Voting in Austria, were rooted in the fi rst ever legally-binding Internet elections, which were held in February 2000 at the University of Osnabrück in Germany. Fol-lowing the elections, the former head of the Austrian Student Union claimed the implemen-tation of a remote voting chan-nel for students, and a new-ly set-up task force decided to

pursue electronic voting. This concluded in a parliamentary decision which legally enabled E-Voting in 2001. “E-Voting.at”, a scientifi c group, fi nally con-ducted a shadow election for the federal student body elec-tions in 2003.

The Student Union elections in May 2009. A project group at the Aus-trian Ministry of Science will now implement this ambitious

election modernization project. The E-Voting channel will be opened one week before the pa-per election, which will be held around the end of May in order to ensure maximum resilience. For authentication, the citizen card will be used. After it is in-serted into a card reader and a code has been typed in, the vot-er makes his or her choice. The vote is then encrypted and dig-itally signed. The electronic bal-lot will be kept safe until after the paper election. Following the electoral process, the elec-tion commission is authorized to remove the signatures. The votes are mixed and then count-ed after two decryption keys have been added.

Pilot project and outlook. This pro-ject is provoking great debate and discussions, which shows the importance of conducting such a project in this frame-work. What is certain, is that a complex modernization project like this takes quite a lot of time and effort to communicate to the voters. Nevertheless, the experi-ence gathered will be of great value for the future of voting procedures in Austria. Author: Robert Krimmer

Hiermit gebe ich, Max Mustermann, 0800001, die folgenden verschlüsselten Stimmen ab.





E-Voting in Austria

Process guide to Austria's E-Voting project: http://www.oeh-wahl.at

I. Vote Casting between May 18th, 08:00 and May 22nd, 2009, 18:001. Encryption with the public key of the election commission

Identifi cationUsing Citizen Card

May 28th, 2009, 17:00 1. Removal of the signatur

II. Counting of the Votes

2. Mixing of theencrypted ballots

3. Decryption with the private key of the election commission, then counting the votes

2. Signing of the completed encrypted ballot

4

E-Voting in Austria – Tomorrow’s election ready for real?

Austria's fi rst legally-binding electronic election will be held from the 18th to the 22nd of May during the "Austrian Student Union's" elections. This will be the fi nal part of a two-year consultation process to the Austrian Ministry of Science by E-Voting.CC.

E-Voting in Austria. The initial plans to implement E-Voting in Austria, were rooted in the fi rst ever legally-binding Internet elections, which were held in February 2000 at the University of Osnabrück in Germany. Fol-lowing the elections, the former head of the Austrian Student Union claimed the implemen-tation of a remote voting chan-nel for students, and a new-ly set-up task force decided to

pursue electronic voting. This concluded in a parliamentary decision which legally enabled E-Voting in 2001. “E-Voting.at”, a scientifi c group, fi nally con-ducted a shadow election for the federal student body elec-tions in 2003.

The Student Union elections in May 2009. A project group at the Aus-trian Ministry of Science will now implement this ambitious

election modernization project. The E-Voting channel will be opened one week before the pa-per election, which will be held around the end of May in order to ensure maximum resilience. For authentication, the citizen card will be used. After it is in-serted into a card reader and a code has been typed in, the vot-er makes his or her choice. The vote is then encrypted and dig-itally signed. The electronic bal-lot will be kept safe until after the paper election. Following the electoral process, the elec-tion commission is authorized to remove the signatures. The votes are mixed and then count-ed after two decryption keys have been added.

Pilot project and outlook. This pro-ject is provoking great debate and discussions, which shows the importance of conducting such a project in this frame-work. What is certain, is that a complex modernization project like this takes quite a lot of time and effort to communicate to the voters. Nevertheless, the experi-ence gathered will be of great value for the future of voting procedures in Austria. Author: Robert Krimmer






black boxvertrauen?➔

wahlkommission

wähler/innen


vertrauen?


»TNO«-security (trust noone)

steve gibson

eVoting - electronic voting machines vielleicht doch besser als schachcomputer geeignet?


Beteiligung

Beteiligungsform als »Filter« !ür die Partizipation

»OH: SF tech culture is focused on solving one problem: what is my mother no longer doing for me?« (@azizshami)

»A more recent obstacle is the growth of the ›brogrammer‹—a shorthand term for a macho, just-out-of-the-dorm-room culture that's being imported from college campuses to startup offices.[…] it’s interesting that the brogrammer identity is the predominant one in pop culture right now.”«

Motivation zur Beteiligung

LONG TERM GOALS vs

Instant Gratification

Eat me!

I'm yummy!

Omnomnom!

I'm low fat!

LONG TERM GOALS vs

Instant Gratification

✘ ✘

»(selbst-)wirkungserfahrung«

Meinungsbildung Filter Bubble

Eine Lüge ist bereits dreimal um die Erde gelaufen, bevor sich die Wahrheit die Schuhe anzieht.

Mark Twain

»(selbst-)wirkungserfahrung«

»Ich glaube nicht, dass die weltweite Telekommunikation und die neuen Medien an sich zu einer gerechteren Welt beitragen. Sie sind weder Quellen des Widerstands noch Symbole des Bösen. […] Fast alles, was in der Welt vorhanden ist, finden wir im Internet vor. Die Idee, das virtuelle Netz sei etwas völlig anderes, eine parallele Welt, die alternativ wäre, habe ich immer abgelehnt. Gesellschaft und Internet werden eins – ob wir’s mögen oder nicht. Worum es geht, ist, die wenigen internetspezifischen Merkmale zu finden und auszunutzen. Dieses Medium hat wirklich bestimmte einmalige, schützenswerte Merkmale.«

Geert Lovink, 2009

Welche Chancen !ür die Demokratie ergeben sich, und wie können sie genutzt werden? Oder sind die demokratiepolitischen Vorteile der neuen Technologien eher Schall und Rauch? Führen Online-Verfahren tatsächlich zu mehr Beteiligung oder sind sie im Endeffekt sogar sozial selektiver? Wie sicher sind e-voting Systeme wirklich und welche Vor- und Nachteile bringen sie mit sich? Und welche demokratie- und gesellschaftspolitischen Visionen leiten eigentlich das Handeln der neuen technischen Eliten im Silicon Valley?

Neue Technologien ermöglichen neue Beteiligungsformen

Demokratiepolitische Chancen und Gefahren der Digitalisierung Peter Purgathofer

Vortrag »Demokratiepolitische Chancen und Gefahren der Digitalisierung«

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