BROADFOOT K. Perspective–Damisch w Lacan

8/10/2019 BROADFOOT K. PerspectiveDamisch w Lacan

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Damisch with Lacan

Keith roadfoot


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Perspective

Yet

Again: Dam isch w ith Lacan

Keith Broadfoot

I

In the cou r se of his analysis of the panels with w hich Filippo Brunelleschi

1. SamuelY Edgerton,The Renaissance d e m o n s t r a t e d thepracticeof perspective in

pa in t ing ,

Samuel Edger ton relate

Kahsccrerj

of Una*

Perspeaire

(Basic Bookl:New

m

gn ti dn g fantasy of time travel:

York, 1975), p. 124.

b J

2.

E d g e r t o n , K

K m a m a a c e

Red iscovery o f

Linear ,

f H G W e

|

r s f a m o u s Ume

machine were everto be onloanto our histor ical fancy, on eof the

m

P

ta>rc

- P-

m o r e

fascina t ing de st ina t ionsforwhichwecouldset the dial would be: Florence, Italy, Piazza

3. E d g e r t o n ,

K

Rm aks ancc Red i s co v e r y

o f

Unear del Duomo, 1425,onthat day (assumingit to be a helpful and suggest ive machine) whena

Perspect ive, p. 125. shor t , middle-aged man arr ived at the piazza betweenthe Cathedral and facing Bapt istery tot ing

4 . E d g e r t o n , K Rena i s s ance Red i s co v e r y o f

Linear * cunously small square wooden panel, anda similar ly square mir ro r .

1

Paspeaive,p. 185

Returning

to

this point

in

time, Edgerton proceeds

to

imagine

how we

could

watch as Brunelleschi himself 'stands within

the

portal, looking out tow ard

the

Baptistery opposite, with

one

hand holding

the

small painted panel, oddly

enough, obversely right

up

against

his

face,

and the

other balancing

the

flat

mirror ' .

2

Beyond however even observing Brunelleschi himself,

the

real

fascination

of

this imaginary return lies

for

Edgerton

in the

prospect

of

taking

into one's

own

hands this small painted panel with

the

accompanying mirror

and seeing what Brunelleschi could

see: 'If our

time machine

is

generous

enough,

we

might wait until

he

[Brunelleschi] suddenly beckons

to a

passer-by

one of us? to

come over

and see how

good

his

painting

is.'

3

To

thus

complete what

is

suggested

by

this scenario: responding

to

Brunelleschi's

invitation

we

would perhaps move

to

that very spot

at

which Brunelleschi

had

strategically positioned himself in

the

portal, and holding the painted panel and

the mirror

as he had

done

so, we

would look dirough

a

small hole

in the

painted panel

to see the

painting

as it is

reflected

in the

mirror .

What

is

so attrac tive

to

Edgerton about this fantasy

of

time travel is the fact

that Brunelleschi's original painted panel

is

lost.

Our

only access

to it,

and also

to

the

panel

in

Brunelleschi's other perspective demonstration which

he

completed some years after

the

first,

is via a

written account

by the

first

biographer

of

Brunelleschi, Antonio Manetti,

who

wrote about Brunelleschi's

panels some

SOor 60

years after their initial appearance. Lamenting the loss

o

Brunelleschi's

two

panels

and

attempting

to

find some other substantial

documentation

of

them other than that found

in

Manetti, Edgerton

can

only

end by regretting that 'sadly, we must conclude that, except

for

Manetti's own

recollection,

no

other trace

of

how these

two

pictures appeared

has

survived

the fifteenth century'.*

I have commenced this article

on

perspective

by

drawing attention

to how

Edgerton frames his own study

of

the subject because, although

it

may seem

as

if what Edgerton relates would suggest nothing more than that idle reverie into

which

any

historian

may

fall, some othe r m ore p rofound significance suggests

itself after we read that Hubert Damisch,

in

introducing his book,

The

Origin

o

Perspective, proposes that:

T he no t ion of a 'historyofpe r spect ive 'has nomeaning exceptas It r e la t esto t he m o v e m e n t ,

const i tut ive of the paradigmas such, that cont inuously promptsa returnto its own o r ig ins,

logicalaswellas histor ical, and perhaps even mythic.If t her eis any aspectof perspect ive that

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is worth examining yet again, I t is th is movement, a lways resumed and always resumaWe,

b e ca u se a lwa ys o b s t ru c te d a n d o f n e ce ss i ty d e s t in e d to f a i lu re , th e re b e in g n o o r ig in sa ve o n e

th a t I s a n I n ve n t io n , I n a l l se n se s o f th e wo rd .

0

In this article I want to discuss the nature of the return that Damisch speaks of

here, examining how it is possible to understand the seemingly paradoxical

idea that a continual return to the origin of perspective does itself constitute

the very history of perspective. To do this I will be arguing that, in order to

fully comprehend the theoretical and methodological ambitions of Damisch's

book, it is necessary to elaborate upon the underlying debt that his work owes

to the ideas of Jacques Lacan. I will be elaborating upon this relation to Lacan

not, as has been done by Margaret Iversen, 'to allow Lacan to respond to

Damisch . . . because Lacan's own understanding of perspectival representa-

tion is very much at odds with Damisch's

1

. Rather, it will be to highlight the

subtle interplay between Damisch and Lacan, drawing attention to how

Damisch is able to offer a remarkable explication of some of Lacan's more

enigmatic, but for all that mo re lasting, observations on the nature of art. Y et,

with this having been said, I will also be following Iverson's lead and arguing

that what should be added to Damisch's analysis of perspective is Lacan's

concept of die real.

I I

What radically distinguishes the analysis of Damisch and Edgerton is how they

approach the loss of Brunelleschi's original panel. For Damisch the fact of the

loss is something other than a simple historical accident, something which is

not necessarily just the unfortunate result of someone's neglect or ignorance.

In a strange way, the loss of the original panel is essential to perspective's

history. What this is to suggest is that, rather than thinking of a separation

between the original panel and its subsequent reconfiguring, it is necessary to

follow the odd thought of how it could be said that Brunelleschi's panel only

exists within the fantasy of its reconstruction, that is, again strangely, how it is

necessary to conceptualize die 'original' demonstration of perspective as being

always already subject to repetition. What is crucially placed in developing

such an understanding of Brunelleschi's demonstration is Manetti's account,

because it is dirough the narrative of his account, Damisch argues, that

Brunelleschi's perspective demonstration passed into history.

7

To examine the ambiguous nature of this moment of entry into history let

us first quote a key passage from Manetti. This is how Manetti recalls

Brunelleschi's original model:

He f i rst demonstrated his system of perspective on a small panel about half a oraccto square.

He ma d e a re p re se n ta t io n o f th e e x te r io r o f S a n G io va n n i I n F lo re n ce , e n co mp a ssin g a s mu ch o f

th a t te mp le a s ca n b e se e n a t a g la n ce f ro m th e o u ts id e . I n o rd e r to p a in t i t I t se e ms th a t h e

s ta t io n e d h imse l f so me th re e

b r a c c l a

Inside the centra l porta l of Santa Maria del Fiore. . . .

Since In such a painting I t is necessary that the painter postulate beforehand a single poin t

f ro m wh ich h is p a in t in g mu st b e v ie we d , ta k in g I n to a cco u n t th e le n g th a n d wid th o f th e s id e s

a s we l l a s th e d is ta n ce , I n o rd e r th a t n o e r ro r wo u ld b e ma d e in lo o k in g a t i t , h e ma d e a h o le I n

the painted panel a t that poin t in the temple of San Giovanni which Is d irectly opposite the eye

o f a n yo n e s ta t io n e d I n s id e th e ce n t ra l p o r ta l o f S a n ta Ma r ia d e l F io re , f o r th e p u rp o se o f

p a in t in g I t . The h o le wa s a s t in y a s a le n t i l be a n o n th e p a in te d s id e a n d I t wid e n e d co n ica lly

l ike a wo ma n ' s s t ra w h a t to a b o u t th e c i rcu mf e re n ce o f a d u ca t , o r a b i t mo re , o n th e re ve rse

s id e . He re q u ire d th a t wh o e ve r wa n te d to lo o k a t I t place h is e ye o n th e re ve rse s id e wh e re th e

h o le wa s la rg e , a n d wh i le b r in g in g th e h o le u p to h is e ye wi th o n e h a n d , to h o ld a f la t mi r ro r wi th

th e o th e r h a n d in su ch a wa y tha t th e p a in t in g wo u ld b e re f le c te d I n I t . Th e mi r ro r wa s e x te n d e d

b y th e o th e r h a n d a d is ta n ce in re g u la r b raccte f ro m th e p la ce h e a p pe a rs to h ave b e e n wh e n

h e p a in te d I t u p to th e ch u rch o f S a n G io va n n i . Wi th th e a f o re me n t io n e d e le me n ts o f th e

5 Hubert DamUch, Th eOrigin ofPcnpectlrc,

t rans John Goodman (MIT Preu- Cam bridge,

MA, 1994), p. 47

6. Margaret Iverson, 'Ortho dox and

Anamorphic Perspective ' ,

Oiford

An journal,

vol . 18 , no . 2 , 1 995, p . 81 .

7. Damijch, Th e

Origin

of Pmpcalre, p. 85

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Perspec tive Y et Again

8. Antonio di Tu cao M anetti , The Life of

Brunellachi,trans. Catne nne Enggass (The

Pennsylvania State University Press: University

Park and London, 1970), pp 42 -4 .

9. Damisch,

Th eOriginof Perspective,

p . 1 2 6 .

1 0.

Darrusch, Th eOrigino f

Penpeaire

, p . 1 27 .

Fig.i - Brunelleschi's first demonstration.

burnished silver , the piazza, the viewpoint , etc. , the spectator felt he saw the actual scene

when he looked at the paint ing. I have had i t in my hands and seen i t many t imes In my days

and can t est i fy t o I t

8

To read between the lines of this explanation of the protocol for using

Brunelleschi's model, what is left unsaid in Manetti's description, and what

Damisch suggests Brunelleschi can be said to have demonstrated, is that in its

operation, perspective implies the projective coincidence of the point of view

and vanishing point. In the model as described, the viewer places himself

behind die panel, positioning his eye at a hole through which

to see through

being the Latin meaning of perspective

he will see the painting. It is at t

point behind the panel that the spectator retrospectively, via die relay of the

mirror, establishes his point of view in front of the painting (Fig. 1).

Much of Damisch's analysis of Brunelleschi's demonstration revolves

around the question of why the inclusion of the mirror. What need is there to

introduce a mirror to demonstrate the theoretical suppositions and rules

constituting perspective? Damisch argues that it is the retrospective nature of

the return to the point of view that must be seen as the true significance of

Brunelleschi's use of a mirror because, simply to disclose to the spectator the

place at which he or she would need to stand to produce a painting analogous

to Brunelleschi's, the painting itself would have sufficed. A demonstration

proceeding by means of reflection must therefore respond to another

requirement. What the mirror effects, Damisch argues with direct reference

to Lacan via Panofsky, is a split between the imaginary and the symbolic:

I f Brunelleschi's sole Intent ion was to localize, by means of the mir ror , the point that

per spective Is supposed t o de signat e , t he exper iment would have had consequences on ly fo r

the imaginary. I ts demonst rat ion that the point of view can be posited, grasped as such, In I ts

value and funct ion as

o r i gi n ,

only ret roact ively and by means of a relay mechanism, a

subsequent scansion , t h is d l - m o s t r a t l o , In t he s t r ic t sense o f t he wo r d , p r ovided a r ule gover n ing

appor t ionment between the imaginary and the symbolic. Histor ically speaking, we would retain

Panofsky's argument that the discovery of the vanishing point , I ts being brought to l ight ,

chrono log ica lly p r eceded t he Inven t ion o f t he po in t o f v iew, which was l inked t o t he assumpt ion ,

precisely at the point of the eye, of a 'subject ' to be defined as that of perspect ive . . . .

Of this rule dividing the imaginary and the symbolic Damisch says no more.

Nevertheless, for Damisch it is because of this rule that the reflection in

Brunelleschi's mirror introduces a movement of return that the whole

'history' of perspective will repeat. What I wish to propose is diat, in order to

understand the nature of this rule, it is here that Damisch's reference to Lacan

needs to be developed. At this point what should be included is what Lacan

adds to, and indeed at times places betwee n, the symbo lic and the imaginary -

that is, the category of the real. To establish, dien, the place of the real within

the history of perspective, what constitutes perspective's origin needs to be

considered in more detail.

I l l

What Damisch in fact specifies as the origin of perspective is neither the point

of view nor the vanishing point but that which precedes and creates both, the

hole in Brunelleschi's panel. 'The essential thing', Damisch writes:

The const i tut ive given of the exper iment , the act organizing I t as such, the Invent ion - In the

ar chaeo log ical sense o f t he wor d - was t he p ie r c ing o f a ho le in t he pane l 's cen t e r t ha t de f ine d

somet h ing l ike a 'v iew' .

10

Before the 'subject's' assignment to a point

either the point of view or the

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Keith Broadfoot

vanishing pointthere is a hole. The 'subject' locates itself in this hole. What,

then, is the nature of this hole?

In his seminar of 1959 60,

Th eEthicsof Psychoanalysis,

Lacan offers a general

statement on the nature of the existence of art, claiming that all art is

characterised by a certain mode of organisation around a void. Aware of the

seemingly all-encompassing scope of this statement, Lacan adds: 'I don't

believe that this is a vain formula, in spite of its generality, in guiding those

who are interested in explaining the problems of art; and I believe I have the

means of illustrating that to you in a variety of striking wa y s. '" Intriguingly for

us ,

perspective is the key example that Lacan uses to substantiate this general

claim. In his discussion of perspective, however, and this is also rather

intriguing in

itself,

Lacan never mentions Brunelleschi. Nevertheless, despite

this absence, his comments offer a remarkable insight into the significance of

Brunelleschi's place in the history of perspective and why it should be that

Damisch locates Brunelleschi's lost model at the origin of perspective, or

rathe r, at the basis of the very prob lematic of the designation of an origin. The

question that arises from Lacan's comments on perspective, therefore, is how

the hole with which Brunelleschi's panel was pierced is to be associated with

the void that Lacan claims all art organizes itself around. This is a question

which allows us to examine the particular conception of history that Damisch

develops in his book.

In Lacan's elaboration upon the general claim that all art is characterised by

a certain mode of organisation around a void, he begins by returning to how

the making of a pot has been mythically placed at the origin of art. Lacan

speaks of the creation of the pot (or vase) in relation to the enigmatic nature of

what is referred to as da sDing the Thing:

I posit the following: an object , Insofar as I t Is a created object , may f i l l the funct ion that

en ables I t no t t o avo id t he T hing as s lgn i f ie r , bu t to r e pr esen t I t . Accor d ing t o a fable handed

down t h r ough t he chain o f gener a t ions, and t hat no t h ing p r even t s us f r om using , we ar e go ing

t o r e fe r t o what is the most p r imit ive o f a r t is t ic act iv it ies , t hat o f t he po t t e r .

To speak of both the potter and the Thing, Lacan is here referencing

Heidegger's discussion of both in his article, 'What is a Thing?'.

1 3

Heidegger,

Lacan says, is 'the last in a long line to have meditated on the subject of

creation; and he develops his dialectic around a vase.'

l+

What is immediately

important for Lacan in Heidegger's discussion of the vase and the question of

the Th ing, is that for H eidegger the vase as die Thing is not to be understood

and diis initially strikes one as strange as an object in Cartesian space. The

significance of this distinction lies, for Lacan, in how he is understanding the

creation of the vase as being equivalent to the creation of the signifier. What is

crucial here, Lacan proposes, is that if the vase really is a signifier:

And the f irst of such signlf iers fashioned by human hand, i t is In I ts signifying essence a

sign i f ie r o f n o t h ing o t her t han o f s ign i fy ing as such o r , in o t her wor d s, o f no par ticu lar

s i g n i f i e d .

16

The first signifier is dien a pure signifier, what Levi-Strauss would term a

floating signifier. It is a signifier without any signified or any real reference.

This absence of content nevertheless emerges, Lacan specifies, through the

form of the vase:

This nothing In par t icular that character izes I t [ the vase] In I ts signifying funct ion is that which in

its Incarnated form character izes the pot as such. I t creates the void and thereby Int roduces the

possibil i ty of f i l l ing i t . Empt iness and fullness are Int roduced into a wor ld that by i tself knows

11 Jacques Lacan, Th e

Ethics

o f

Psychoanalysis,

ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter

(Tavistock/Roudedg e: London, 1992), p 130.

12. Lacan, Th eEthicso f

Psychoanalysis,

p . 1 1 9 .

1 3.

See Martin Heidegger, 'W hat is a Thing?' ,

in

Poetry, Language, Thought,

trans. Albert

Hofstadter (Harper & Row: New Y ork, 1971 ) .

14. Lacan,

Th eEthicso fPsychoanalysts, p 1 2 0 .

1 5.

Lacan, Th eEihta of

Psychoanalysis,

p .1 2 0 .

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Perspective Yet Again

16 .

Lacan,

K Ethia

of

Psychoanalysis,

p . 12 0 .

1 7 . Lacan, The Ethia ofPsychoanalysis,

p 121

18 Lacan, K

Ethics

o f

Psychoanalysis,

p 1 2 1 .

19 . Lacan, K

Ethics

o f

Psychoanalysis,

p . 12 2 .

no t o f t he m, I t Is on t he basis o f t h is fabr icat ed s ign i f le r , t h is vase, t ha t empt iness and fu l lness

as such en t e r t he wor ld . . . .

1S

The point to stress here is diat the vase createsthe void. What this means is tha

there is not a void that pre-exists the vase, the void is not to be und erstood as

located in reality as such, something which could be found to be already

existing in natur e. Rather, the void is to be situated in what Lacan designates as

the real. It is thus in relation to this association between the void and the real

that Lacan's proposal of how all art is characterised by a certain mode of

organisation around a void needs to be considered.

With this focus upon the creation of the void, it is evident that Lacan is

drawn into speculating upon the function of the creative act in art. Given the

prominence of the work of the potter within debates around the nature and

function of the creative act in art, Lacan's selection of this example is intended

to establish a point of difference. With the 'incarnated form' of the vase, Lacan

is speaking of how something gives body to , or comes from, no tiling. How can

something come from nothing? It is with this question, which poses one of the

oldest and most enduring conundrums of philosophy, that Lacan wishes to

change the direction and purpose of how the example of the vase has been used

to speak of artistic creation.

Within philosophical debate, the vase has traditionally been used because its

production evidenced a transformation of matter. The purpose of this

emphasis upon the matter of die vase was to affirm the way in which the

substance of the vase conforms to a philosophical heritage which asserts that

something cannot come from nothing. In contradiction to this, however,

Lacan suggests:

Now If you consider t he vase f r om t he po in t o f v iew t hat I fi r s t p r oposed , as an ob ject made t o

r epr esen t t he exis t ence o f t he empt iness a t t he cen t e r o f t he r ea l which is ca l led t he T hing , t h is

empt ine ss as r epr esen t ed In t he r epr ese n t a t ion p r e sen t s I t se l f as a

nihi l ,

as no t h ing. And t hat

Is why the pot ter , Just l ike you to whom I am speaking, creates the vase with his hand around

this e mpt ine ss, create s I t , Just l ike the mythical creator , ax nlhllo , s t a r t ing wi th a ho le .

17

What Lacan is opposing here is an Aristotelian-based philosophy which would

put forward a reality of plenitude in which a void could not exist. For Lacan,

that Aristotelian philosophy could only affirm diat 'nodiing is made from

nothing' was an indication that it remained 'mired in an image of the world

that never permitted even an Aristotle

and it is difficult to imagine in the

whole history of human thought a mind of such power to emerge from the

enclosure that the celestial surface presented to his eyes'.'

8

What the

introduction of the signifier causes is a disturbance of this perception of

a

finite

and closed world. In fact, Lacan aligns its introduction with the point in time

when:

T he vault o f t he heavens no longer e xis t s, and a l l t he ce lest ia l bod ie s, which ar e . t he best

reference point there, appear as If they could Just as well not be there. Their reali ty, as

existent ialism puts I t , Is essent ially character ized by fact lclty, they are fundamentally

c o n t i n g e n t .

18

This is the moment, Lacan further specifies, of the birth of modem science

with G alileo. Y et, I would propo se that this could equally be die mo ment of

the origin of perspective inasmuch as perspective, with the infinity of the

vanishing point, implies a condition no longer limited to the finite enclosure of

the sphere.

A quandary diough presents itself at diis point. How is perspective's

implication of infinity to be intro du ced to a world conceived of as finite?



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Keith Broadfoot

Damisch , in h is book Theone du Nuage:Pour une histoire de la peinture (prior to

Th eOrigin of Perspective),

suggests that the hole in Brunelleschi's original model

introduces an infinity which is fundamentally out of step with, if not

theoretically 'tabo o' t o, the A ristotelian conception of the world at die time of

the initial demonstration.

2

As a taboo, then, infinity is introduced only to be

immediately covered over, repressed. It is therefore to move too quickly, as

Damisch subsequently suggests in

TheOrigin of Perspective,

for Panofsky to say

diat 'Brunelleschi's disposition

presupposed,

and even less that it demonstrated,

the notion of an abstract, homogenous, and isotropic geometric space,

continuous and undefined, if not infinite, the quantum continuum central to

post-Cartesian science'.

21

O n the contrary, Damisch argues diat if you

consider not only Brunelleschi's original model but also his other perspective

demonstration, which he completed some years later and which contained

representations of some of the buildings surrounding die Piazza della Signoria,

then attention should be given to 'die places the artist [Brunelleschi] chose to

represent

two clearly delimited, enclosed piazzas', widi dieir very closure

signifying that Brunelleschi 'was not prepared to draw from his discovery die

theoretical conclusions it implied'.

2

Ind eed, insofar as Brunelleschi's two

experiments appeared to apply diemselves to, Damisch says, 'solid objects,

notably buildings, which were solidly planted in die ground, to die exclusion

of die sky and its phen om ena ', dien it was as if, 'faithful in diis respect t o die

Aristotelian conception of die cosmos, die inventor of perspective had

respected, in devising his experiment, die consecrated opposition between die

celestial and terrestrial realms'.

2 3

To diis, it could be added diat perhaps

Brunelleschi's sight was dien, like A ristotle's before him, m ired by an image of

die world diat could not emerge from die enclosure diat die celestial surface

presented to him. Furthermore, it could even be proposed diat in die

functioning of BruneOeschi's m od el, w idi die restrictions diat w ere placed on

die eye as it looked dirough die hole, it was as diough die model was

constructed to act as a blinker, preventing any wayward look upward diat

might lead to a questioning of die status of diat enclosed celestial sphere.

Y et die situation is not perhaps quite so forced as diis would suggest. There

is also a remarkable subterfuge to die model. What should not be forgotten,

and diis is what constitutes die truly ingenious nature of die experiment, is

diat it is one's own eye as it is placed to die hole diat itself accomplishes die act

of covering over die dieoretical gap in die experiment. It is one's own look

diat hides die hole diat has introduced infinity, die hole diat has pierced (at

least implicidy) die enclosure of die celestial surface. Placing one's eye in die

hole to see is also dierefo re, you could say, to m etaphorically enact a closing of

die eye, for at die very same spot, infinity is bodi given and at die same time

wididrawn. Hence, what die first dieoretical model of perspective

demonstrates, is diat a seeing of perspective is at die same time a not-

seeing of perspective: to look dirough die hole to see dirough, if we again

recall, being die meaning of

perspectiva

is at die same time not to see

perspective; or to say diis in anodier way, diere is a not-seeing of perspective

which occurs because, paradoxically, to see somediing in perspective one has

to 'look dirough' perspective. Strangely, dierefore, perspective is demon-

strated dirough blindness as much as dirough vision. A paradox is presented

whereby die more clear-sighted vision is, die more it is able to 'see dirough',

dien d ie mo re non-seeing, die m ore b und , diat vision is. O r, diis could be said

as well in anodier way: widi die hole in Brunelleschi's model, it is as if one is

to look dirough it and not at it, widi die implication of diis being diat die hole

itself does not form an object of dieoretical contemplation.

20 .

Se c

Huber t Damuch,

Thiorie d u nuage- Pour

une histoire

de la

peinture

(Editions

D u

Seuil-

Paru, 1972), section 4 2.4: 'Le tabou de

l'lnfini'.

21 . Damisch, Th eOrigino f

Perspective, p 1 5 4 .

22 . Da m u c h , K Origino fPrnpectire, p .

1 53

23 .

Damisch, K

Origin

o f

Perspealre,

p .

1 5 3 .

7 8 O X F O R D A R T J O U R N A L 2 5 . 1 2 0 02


9/24

Perspective YefAgain

IV

24.Damijch, 7iOripno/Pmporirt, p. 116.

T o

farther pursue the implicit paradoxes and contradictions contained withi

Brunelleschi's model we should, at this stage, subject Lacan's proposals to

further investigation. With Damisch's suggestion mat Brunelleschi's model is

itself shaped by an Aristotelian conception of die world, it is important to step

back for a moment and carefully examine what Lacan says Aristotle was unable

to see. Lacan draws a connection between the opening up of die closed world,

diat is, the possibility of seeing beyond the enclosure of die celestial surface as

it was presented to Aristotle's eyes, and the idea diat what is taken to be

reality is itself something that could be fictitious'essentially characterized by

facticity'. What is remarkable here is that it could be argued diat it is precisely

this connection diat lies behind perspective. To suggest how diis is so, let us

reconsider die concluding words of Manetti, how he proposed diat with die

'elements of die burnished silver, die piazza, die viewpoint, etc., die spectator

felt that he saw die actual scene when he looked at the painting' or, to give

here die translation diat John Goodman offers inThe Origin of Perspective,

seemed diat one was seeing trudi itself.

24

How are we to assess diis effect of trudi, or as Damisch terms it, diis 'trudi

value', diat Manetti assigns to Brunelleschi's original model? It is intriguing

diat, after Manetti puts forward diis experience of trudi, he should dien

immediately add

witii die hope, we might imagine, of relinquishing any

doubts diat die reader may have diat he has looked dirough die hole in

Brunelleschi's model on a number of occasions: 'I have had it in my hands and

seen it many times in my days and can testify to it. ' Perhaps, to pursue

Damisch's suggestion of die taboo, what is not said in Manetti's text emerges

dirough die excess of what is said: why a number of times and not just one?

Was diere somediing lacking in die first moment of looking diat die

subsequent looks were seeking some compensation for? Here I would like to

propose diat what is repressed in die attempt to immediately cover over die

hole in Brunelleschi's model is die very questioning of die status of reality diat

its introduction implied. Thus, if Manetti proclaims, in an expression of almost

disbelief,diat it is die trudi itself diat is seen when one looks dirough die hole

in Brunelleschi's model, would not die diought diat, if Brunelleschi could

construct an image of die trudian image diat would have die semblance of

die trudi be a diought diat could contaminate trudi itself? Would it not

suggest diat trudi might be no more man an image, a semblance, or indeed, an

effect?

A key point here is diat Brunelleschi's model was constructed widi die

possibility of die demonstration taking place insitu:one could stand, if not at

die very position diat die painter stood to paint die picture, as Manetti's

description of die model for die first experiment seems to suggest, dien at

least at a spot from which one could compare image and reality, continually

moving backwards and forwards between die two. Indeed, diis is an implicit

aspect of die functioning of die first model diat becomes much more

pronounced if Brunelleschi's second perspective experiment is examined.

Manetti relates how, after his first perspective panel, Brunelleschi, a few years

later, 'made in perspective die piazza of die Palazzo della Signoria in Florence,

togedier widi all diat is in front of it and around it, insofar as it was accessible

to view, standing outside die piazza'. Now, to accommodate diis view, die

second panel needed to be much larger dian die first. Manetti, consequendy,

proceeds to explain how, due to die size of diis panel, die same set-up of die

little hole to look dirough and die mirror held at die appropriate distance

OXFORD

ART

JOURNAL

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79


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Keith Broadfoot

could not be used. To replace this, Manetti proposes that in diis instance

Brunelleschi:

Lef t I t t o t he d iscr e t ion o f he who loo ks, as Is t he case fo r a l l o t her pa in t ing s by o t her pa in t e r s ,

even t hough he who loo ks is never d iscr e t e . And In t he p lace wher e he had put t he bur n ished

silver in that of the San Giovanni, here he cut above the buildings the wood on which he had

p a i n t e d .

And he took i t wfth him to a spot where he could observe I t with the natural

a t mospher e above t he bui ld ings.

25

(Rg. 2).

To what spot, one cannot help asking, would have Brunelleschi taken it? As

Damisch suggests, nothing in Manetti's text precludes us from imagining that

Brunelleschi could have placed his painting so that it functioned as 'a kind of

screen at the entrance to the piazza', with the 'discreet' observer so placed

that the contour of the top of the buildings in the panel could be superimposed

upon the outline of the real buildings as they stood there in the piazza.

26

With

this set up, Brunelleschi has indeed taken his panel to a 'spot where he could

observe it with the natural atmosphere above the buildings'. Positioned in this

way, however, die effect of the panel is to create confusion between the

buildings, that is, a confusion between what is depicted and what is real.

What, then, if there was no difference between the buildings? What if the

image were the truth

itself,

would this not again subtly undermine the

substance of reality? What if what one was seeing in reality was no more than a

construction, an image, the facade of a building behind which was what

nothing? This thought is there, but it may be hidden. The fact that Manetti is

compelled to add that he has seen it (and it is ambiguous to what the 'it'

exactly refers) many times, so that he can testify to it, hints at this. Again, we

could ask, why the necessity to see it many times? Is it that the origin only

exists in its repetition, in its re-seeing?

25 . I give here John Go odm an's translation of

Manetti's text in Damisch, Th eOrigin of

Pmpeaire, pp. 143+.

26 .

Damisch,

K

Originof Pcnptalrc, p . 1 48 .

'If Brunelleschi's discovery had inaugural import', Damisch argues:

T his was t o t he ext en t i t c r ea t ed t he Impr ession t ha t , by I t s means, r epr esen t a t ion ga ined

access t o a new kind o f ' t r u t h ' . A subject p lacing h is eye behind t he ho le , t h islumi re or l ight

Fig. 2. B runelleschl's second demonstration.

80 O XFORD ART JOURNAL 25.1 2002


11/24

27 .

D u n u d l ,

77KOrigin

of Pcnpcairc,p . 148.

28 . Damisch, 77KOrigin

ofPasptalre,

p . 149.

29. Lacan, Th t Ethicso fPychtxmaljrsls, p . 1 2

30 .

Da milc h ,

77KOrigin ofPenpcaire, p .1 4 9 .

31 . DamiJch, 77KOrigin

o f

PcTspcctlre, p . 1 50

32. Lacan, Th eEthicso fPsychoanaljrsis, p . 1 4 0 .

Perspective Y et Again

hole pierced through t r ie center of the San Giovanni tawatet ta, could only confirm a precise

cor r esponde nce be t ween t he per spect ive f ic t ion and i t s ob ject; Just as a ' d iscr ee t ' obser ver

wo u ld , o f ne cessit y , see t he upper con t o ur o f t he second t avo la co incide a lmost per fectly w i th

the silhouet te of the buildings In the Piazza delta Stgnor ia, without being required to use only

o n e e y e .

27

If there is a question though of an inaugural mo ment here, it is a mom ent that

Damisch then immediately qualifies as one which 'escapes all periodization'.

28

What can an inaugural moment that escapes all periodization be? To enter into

the paradox of this moment that both begins history and is at the same time

outside of history, it is necessary to first consider that the moment of which

Damisch speaks here concerns a confusion between reality and fiction, a

possible rendering of reality as fictitious. Now what is crucial about this

mo me nt, if we return to Lacan, is the stru cture , how it is that, as Lacan would

emphasize many times, 'reality isstructured as fictitious'. To thus elaborate

upon this structure what if, to change Damisch's 'historical placement' of

Brunelleschi's model within an Aristotelian tradition, we were to consider

perspective as something which arises from nofJiing? How, that is, can we

understand perspective as something which is structured around a void?

To oppose a tendency in Panofsky's argument diat would lead to situating

Brunelleschi's experiments within a space understood to be continuous and

infinite, Damisch observes that each of Brunelleschi's demonstrations was

'centered around an architectonic object that was at die same time a basic,

almost "ideal" body, a kind of limit-shape, to use Husserl's terminology,

denned entirely by a set of surfaces'.

30

The significance of this for Damisch is

that the d emo nstration can then be figured as operating within die strictures of

an Aristotelian world-view where to ask what is between bodies, that is, to

speak of

a

portion of space as blank or e mpty , had no sense. W hat Brunelleschi

was therefore doing was not so much 'imitating space', but, Damisch reasons,

'producing it', constituting this space as an object so that in this respect, 'like

the geometers of antiquity', Brunelleschi was 'less interested in space itself

than in the bodies it contained'.

31

Is it possible diough to view these

architectural bodies which were the central point of focus in Brunelleschi's

experiments in another way?

At the origin of perspective, there is undoubtedly die question of

architecture. This is a fact diat Lacan acknowledges by arguing for an intimate

connection between the two. As with art in general, Lacan assigns to

architecture die initiating aim of encircling a void. Such an intention, Lacan

suggests, is die audientic impression that die form of a temple or cadiedral

offers. Moving beyond diis form of architecture diough, what is to be

observed, Lacan notes, is that we see a:

Unk fo r ged be t ween t he t emple , as a const r uct ion a r ound empt iness t hat designat es t he p lace

of t he T hing , t o t he f igur a t ion o f empt ine ss on t he wal ls o f t h is empt ine ss I t se lf - t o t he e xt en t

that paint ing progressively learns to master this empt iness, to take such a t ight hold of i t that

pain t ing becomes de d ica ted t o f ix ing I t in t he fo r m of t he I llusion o f space.

33

This creation of die illusion of space is for Lacan coincident widi die discovery

of perspective, a discovery which sees perspective as maintaining die function

originally assigned to architecture. Lacan describes the transition from

architecture to painting as follows:

For economic r eason s, one Is sat isf ied wi t h pain t ing images o f t ha t a r ch i tect ur e , on e lear ns t o

paint architecture on the walls of architecture; and paint ing, too, Is f irst of all something that is

o r gan ized ar ound a

vo id .

Since I t Is a mat te r o f f ind ing o nce mor e t he sacr ed vo id o f



12/24

Keith Broadfoot

architecture Inthe less marked mediumof painting,theattemptIsmadetocreate something

that resemblesItmoreandmore closely, thatIs tosay, perspectiveIsdiscovered.

33

3 3 . Lac an ,

77*E t h l a ofFijchoanaljib, p. 136.

The relation between architecture and painting that Lacan is presenting here

u

^ ^ ^

ufi

^

Brvntllacbli

p +2

throws new light upon Manetti's account of Brunelleschi's original

demonstration. What should now be seen as highly significant, is how

Manetti structures his account of Brunelleschi's invention of perspective in

terms of a retrospective return from painting to architecture. If one were to

travel back to Brunelleschi's youth, Manetti writes, then it would be

discovered that 'he propounded and realised what painters today call

perspective.'

34

The implication of this is that perspective in painting follows

what was produced and practised in architecture. On this particular point,

though, it is important to be aware that what Lacan is suggesting is more

complex than a simple progression from architecture to painting. What his

words also evoke is a confusion between architecture and painting, a confusion

that indeed effectively marks the fascination that Brunelleschi's original model

provides. In Lacan's reference to painting undertaking a process to 'more and

more' closely resemble architecture, it is to be imagined that in the logic of

this process a limit-point is reached where, due to the heightening exactitude

of resemblance, the distinction between architecture and painting cannot be

drawn and one becomes the other. What Brunelleschi's demonstration

registers within this process of the escalation of resemblance is a moment on

the threshold, a moment suspended, between architecture and painting. This is

another aspect of the sense of astonishment that Manetti returns to in outlining

his experience of Brunelleschi's model. The many times that Manetti saw the

model, his constant return, could be understood as an attempt to 'pinpoint'

the exact moment when architecture and painting exchange places, an attempt

to see that moment when architecture becomes painting and painting becomes

architecture.

Beyond, however, even this initial correspondence with Lacan's proposal,

what is truly remarkable is that Brunelleschi's demonstration responds to the

desire, to requote Lacan, 'of finding once more the sacred void of architecture

in the less marked medium of painting'. What, therefore, cannot now pass

without comment is that the location of Brunelleschi's original demonstration

is a sacred site. In fact, Brunelleschi's inaugural gesture is one which places the

vanishing point of paintinga hole

inside

a building that was already there to

encircle and contain the void. As Manetti describes Brunelleschi's procedure:

'he made a hole in the painted panel at that point in the temple ofSan Giovanni

which is directly opposite the eye of anyone stationed inside the central portal

of Santa Maria del Fiore, for the purpose of painting it'. The vanishing point is

inside the temple. At the origin of perspective, therefore, to re-find the point

of view is to re-find the void of that place which encircles the Thing.

This return to a void within architecture also concurs with the significance

of Damisch's structuralist analysis of certain paintings that he proposes return

to Brunelleschi's original model. In paintings such as theCnta ideale,Raphael's

Marriage of the Virgin,and Perug in o ' s Consignmentof theKeystoSaintPeter,th e re

is a repetition of what Damisch classifies (with reference to Lacan's

conceptualisation of the nature of the reflection in the mirror of the mirror

stage) as the imagothat is formed in the mirror of Brunelleschi's first

experiment. What one finds in each of these paintings is a centrally positioned,

dome-structured building which has sacred connotations. More to the point,

however, in the open door of each of these temples one finds the vanishing

point to each painting. Thus, according to the structuralist methodology that

82 OXFORD ARTJOURNAL 25.1 2002


13/24

35 . Dunbch , 77* rigin

ofFmptalrt,

p . 439 .

36 . U o n , K Bihlaaffsychoaaalpis, p . 1 2 1 .

3 7 . S l i v oj i l i e k , f o / 77Kf Knoir M x What They

D o: Eajojrmcnt as a Political Factor (Verso: London

jnd New York, 1991), p. 216.

Perspec tive Y et Again

Damisch adopts, these works a posteriori justify Damisch's claim that in

Brunelleschi's original experiment the vanishing point to the painting was

located inside the door of the San Giovanni Baptistery.

35

Why, though, a

posteriori

This is where it is necessary to speak of what Damisch does not.

VI

In their return to perspective's origin, each of diese paintings repeats the

retroactive principle that Brunelleschi's mirror inaugurated. Why this

repetition? O n this point, we should return to expand upon D amisch's

suggestion that the mirror in Brunelleschi's model and the 'retrospective

scansion' that it introduces corresponds to 'an apportionment between the

imaginary and the symbolic'. As has already been suggested, it is also necessary

to add to this reference to the Lacanian terms of the symbolic and the

imaginary the missing third term, the concept of the real.

Th e

aposteriori

element of Damisch's argument corresponds to die mode of

retroactive causality that characterises the symbolic for Lacan, a causality

which does not run in a standard linear direction with effect following cause,

but rather one where effects chase after causes in a constant rewriting of the

past. The reason for this dislocation from the past is that the symbolic order as

conceptualised by Lacan is a synchronous order whose origin cannot be

explained diachronically. As Levi-Strauss says of language, which is the

paradigm of the symbolic order, it appears 'all at once'. But how, then, and

this is the interesting question, to account for that which is suddenly and

miraculously there? How can a 'history' of die appearance of asymbolic order

be given?

The idea of structural linguistics that language forms a differential system

such that

one

element has a meaning only in relation to

al l

die o dier elements,

implies that it is

apriori

impossible to explain the emergence of this system

diachronically. Everything is, to repeat, simply present

all

at once. Y et,

Lacan's interpretation of structuralist methodology, which gives his rule for

the division between die imaginary and die symbolic, is that, if diere is a

totality given all at once, diis is only, paradoxically, because somediing has

initially been subtracted from the whole. The totality is dierefore never, in

fact, a totality. That a step-by-step diachronic history of die emergence of a

symbolic order cannot be given is why, to return to art's mode of

organisation around a void, Lacan maintains diat 'the fashioning of the

signifier and die introduction of a gap or a hole in reality is identical'. The

retroactive causality of die symbolic order is thus one which is perpetually

returning to an absent cause insofar as its appearance is reliant upon a gap, a

discontinuity in the causal chain diat led to it, what Slavoj Zizek has named

the missing link.

Widi diis concept of die missing link, Zizek, after Lacan, convincingly

argues diat die structuralist principle of die priority of die synchronic over die

diachronic is really nodiing odier than die positive reverse of die impossibility

of returning to die origin diat is constitutive of the symbolic order. The result

of diis is, as he explains:

That the symbolic order Is def ined by the paradox of a f ini te totali ty; every language const i tutes

a ' t o t a l i t y ', a un iver se comple t e and c losed In i t se l f; i t a l lows no ou t s ide , ever y t hing can be sa id

In i t ; yet this very totali ty Is simultaneously marked by an ir reducible f lnt tude. The inner tension

of a f ini te totali ty Is at tested by a loop that per tains to our basic at t i tude towards language:

spon t aneo usly, we somehow pr esuppose t hat language d epen ds o n ' ex t e r n a l ' rea l i ty , t ha t It

' renders' an Independent state of things, yet this 'external' reali ty Is always-already disclosed

t hr o u g h la n g u ag e , m e d i a te d b y i t



14/24

Keith Broadfoot

As Zizek also argues, it is this impossibility of moving outside of the symbolic

order, the fact that there is 'always-already' mediation that provides the true

meaning of the famous proposition of structuralist semiotics concerning the

'arbitrariness of the signifier'. This statement should not be read as suggesting

that we can somehow compare words and things from an 'outside' position

and say that their connection is arbitrarywhy a table should be called 'tab le',

or

'Tisch',

or so on

but rather as marking:

The very Impossibil i ty of assuming such an external posit ion f rom which we could 'compare'

wor ds and t h ings. Wor ds me an what t hey mean on ly wit h r egar d t o t he i r p lace In t he t o t a l it y o f

language; this totali ty determines and st ructures the very hor izon within which reali ty Is

disclosed to us; within which we can eventually 'compare' Individual words with things.

38

To state this even mo re simply, there is no reality outside of language; the

symbolic order creates what we perceive and understand to be reality. The

implication of Lacan's proposal of an association between the making of a

signifier and a hole is that it is impossible to find any ultimate grounding of

language

the symbolic

in reality. What language eventually refers back to is

the hole that created its own possibility. Language is, therefore, a self-referring

system that endlessly turns back upon

itself,

always chasing its own tail.

This,

th en, is language as a symbolic orde r. W hat, though, of perspective as

a symbolic order? What of Damisch's provocative adoption in The

Origin

of

Perspective of the structuralist principle of the priority of the synchronic over

the diachronic? What of his proposal that the 'history' of perspective must be

understood in terms of

a

structural order? It is now possible to elaborate upon

the insights that his approach contains.

Like the structuralist approach to language, Damisch suggests that

perspective arrives 'in a single blow'.

3 9

Thus, there is a fundamental enigma

to perspective that can never be properly deciphered or revealed. No

diachronic process can explain the appearance of perspective because its origin

is,

on the contrary, a gap a discontinuitywhich is, I am arguing, the hole

with which Brunelleschi's tableau was

pierced.

It is indeed this idea of a

constitutive discontinuity that can justify Damisch's hypothesis concerning the

nature of Manetti's return to Brunelleschi's model. Damisch argues that,

because Manetti's text displays a lack of attention to the procedure of

construction, with the focus instead placed upon the protocol of the

experiment, his approach registers what Husserl, writing on the condition for

the emergence of science, determines as the moment of reversal from a

practical to a tJieoretical interest.

40

However, for Damisch's hypothesis to be

presented in its full force at this point, it needs to be related to the idea of the

missing link. With the existence of

a

gap in any causal chain leading back t o the

invention of perspective, the implication is that the procedure of perspective's

construction could never be adequately explained inasmuch as perspective

emergesexnihilo,out of nothing, it is a true invention. It is, consequently, upon

establishing this connection between the origin of perspective and the concept

of the missing link that it becomes possible to draw out the significance of the

impossibility of considering what would be 'outside', or indeed also what

would be 'before', perspective.

If we reconsider Zizek's comments on language as symbolic order, they

become all the more pertinent when applied to the case of perspective as

symbolic order. In particular, Zizek's reference to the 'very impossibility of

assuming an external position from which we can compare words and things'

takes on added significance because the notion of a point of view is implicitly

invoked. Thus, for example, the peculiarity of a return to the origin of

84 O X FO RD A RT JO U RN A L 25 . 1 2002

38 . Zl ick, Fo r

Thej Know

No t

What They

D o,

p. 20 0

39 .

D i m u d l ,

77K

Origin

o/Penpealre, p.

127.

40. Damisch, Th e

Origin

o f

Penpeaire,

p 1 57 .


15/24


perspective can be thought of in this context if we were to ask how it could be

that perspective i tself could eve r be the co ntent of a scene. W e speak of a

41 . Dimisch,

TJ*

On

g

m offcnpeaivt,

P

. 1+0. pain ting bein g in perspe ctive , bu t can it ever be the subject of a painting? Ca

. , . , J . . . . , . . perspective reverse, or rather perhaps inver t , i tself so that i t is the contained

42 . Jaccjua Lacan,

Emu. A Selection,

tram. Alan r r > r r

Shendan (Tamtock Publications London, ra th er tha n th e co nta ine r? T he im pos sib ility of such an ex erc ise is sel f-ev ide nt.

1977), p . 223. Th ere is no extern al positio n from which to see persp ectiv e, for a painting is

' a lways-al ready ' in perspective . O ne ca nnot present a pain ting that is outs ide

of perspective with the in tention of seeing perspective

itself.

In a closed ,

synchronous order not al lowing any external suppor t , perspective, l ike the

' totality ' of language, turns in a vicious circle upon itself. Hen ce th e

impor tance of the mirror in Brunel leschi ' s exper iment, for i t indeed

demonstrates ( if i t is possib le for such a th ing to be demonstrated) the self-

referring nature of this circle that turns

or rather reflects

back upon itself

As Damisch h imself wr ites of the image that appeared in the mirror at the rear

of the configuration:

I t was ne ither the Imprint n or the re f lect ion of an extern al reality. . . . Far f rom captur ing the real

d i r ect ly, as camer as and t e lescope s can , t h is 'view' cor r esponded t o a b r acket ing , t o a ver i t ab le

phenomeno log t ea l r ed uct ion : w it h in t he b r acket s e st abl ished by t he pane l and t he mirr o r , t he

real was excluded, was outside the circuit . . . . Thus a system that , however empir ically open i t

may have been, was theoret ically isolated, closed in on I tself. . . .

4 1

The slight modification, however, that needs to be made to Damisch's

observation here is that it is indeed the very exclusion of reality that actually

creates reality. The point of Lacan's insistence on the fact that reality is not

simply fictitious, but structured as fictitious, is that one mu st pay attention to

this structural rule whereby reality first appears through its withdrawal. What

one could then say is occurring with the 'bracketing', with this circuit which

closes in on

itself,

is that Brunelleschi's model is a kind of doubling of the

reality that is created by the initial absence of reality, the reality created by that

missing part that is withdrawn to allow for a reality that is 'structured as

fictitious'. It is this doubling, we could now say, that gives the truth-value to

what is seen in the mirror. This is a truth that acknowledges that reality

appears at the very same moment as that reality is rendered fictitious, as that

reality, again in Damisch's words, is isolated, closed in upon

itself.

Within this closure, though, it is necessary to rem embe r that there is also an

opening. There is the hole, the void which the 'totality' of the horizon of

perspective is defined by and around which it circulates. To properly

understand this paradoxical relation between what is closed and at the same

time open, it needs to be related back, I wish to suggest, to the particular way

in which Lacan draws a distinction between reality and the real. To attempt to

capture the exact nature ofthis distinction and its connection to the case under

consideration here, there is a statement by Lacan that seems to be strikingly

appropriate. Replacing, as he did in his later seminars, the terminology of the

Thing with theobjeta,Lacan writes that 'the field of reality is sustained only by

the extraction of the objet a, which, however, gives it its frame'.

42

This

statemen t, on an initial reading, is rather enigmatic. If theobjetais absent, how

can it still frame reality, that is, how can one look through it to see the 'field of

reality'? In asking this question, however, it can uncannily seem as though

Lacan's theory of the distinction between reality and the real was made after

reflecting upon Brunelleschi's model. What is extraordinary to note about the

original demonstration of perspective is that the procedure of piercing a hole,

reversing the panel, and then using a mirror, effectively answers this question

of how theobjet a, in being absent, is nevertheless able to frame reality. With

O X F O R D A R T J O U R N A L 2 5 .1 2 0 0 2 8 5


16/24

Keith Broadfoot

the holein Brunelleschi's panelonelooks throughit to see, as Manetti relates

to us, truth itself, that is, the hole presents a framing of reality. Thus,the

crucial theoretical point

is

that

the

hole located

at the

origin

of

perspective

is

+3

U c a n

^ ^^ ^p^,^^

p

.

140

.

created by the extraction of the objeta. This theoretical point is of capital

u

Lum,V ht

a

tPychoanai&s,

p

importance for it now enablesus to restate the 'history' of perspective that

Damisch has boldly presented. What this history is, that consists of the

continual return

to an

ever-absent origin,

is the

return

of the

real. Lacan

himself theorised

the

return

of the

real

in art

with

the

concept

of the

gaze

as

objet a.How,

then,

can

this gaze

asobjet abe

figured within this history

of

perspective that Damisch offers? To encounter this gazewe need to turn to

what is perhaps perspective's 'other': anamorphosis.

VII

In Lacan's brief account

of

perspective

in TheEthics ofPsychoanalysis in his

comments regarding the passage from architecture which surrounds thevoid

to

the

figuration

of

the void

on the

walls

of

architecture

itself it

would seem,

he suggests, that a history of painting could be organised around the

progressive mastery of the illusion of space. Yet there is something that

remains

to

subvert this mastery. With

the

discovery

of

perspective, Lacan

writes, 'onearrivesat illusion'. Illusion thoughis not the whole story, Lacan

adds,

for at

this moment:

One f ind s

a

sensi t ive spo t ,

a

l e s i o n ,

a

locus

of pain,a

po in t

of

reversal

of the

wfiole

of

history,

Insofar

as It Is the

history

of art and

Insofar

as we are

Implicated

in It;

t hat po in t concer ns

the

n o t i o n t h at

the

Illusion

of

space

Is

d i f fe r en t f r om

the

creat ion

of avo id .It Is

this that

the

appearance

of

anamorphosis

at the end of the

s ix tee n t h

and the

beg inn ing

of the

s e v e n t e e n t h

c e n t u n e s r e p r e s e n t s . *

3

With this pointofreversalofthe historyof art ofwhich Lacan speaks,we find

Damisch's thesis:

'the

notion

of a

"history

of

perspective"

has no

meaning

exceptas itrelatesto the movement, constitutiveofthe paradigmassuch, that

continuously prom ptsareturnto its ownorigins'.Yet,thisisperspective that

Damisch

is

speaking

of, not

anamorphosis. What then

is the

nature

of the

connection between

the

two? This

is a

question that again arises

as

Lacan goes

on

to

further describe anamorphosis:

As

a

t u r n ing po in t when

the

ar t is t comple t e ly r ever ses

the use of

that illusion

of

space, when

he

f o r c e s

it to

en t e r In t o

the

o r ig ina l

g o a l,

t hat

is to

t r ansfo r m

It

into

the

suppor t

of the

h idden

reali ty

- It

b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d t h a t,

to a

cer t a in ext en t ,

a

work

of art

always involves encircling

the

T h i n g .

How, then, is the turning point of anamorphosis to be related to the return

movement that the origin of perspective institutes? The answer, I wish to

propose, lies with their mutual encircling

of the

Thing, that

is, the

gaze

as

objet

a.

In this early seminar, and in the chapterson thegaze includedin die later

semin ar , The

Four

Fundamental

Concepts

of Psychoanalysis, Lacan

was

particularly

drawn to a description givenby Baltrusaitisof a spectator's reaction to Hans

Holbein's The Ambassadors (Fig.3).What caught Lacan'seye was thetemporal

factor

and,

crucially,

die

process

of

'return' involved

in the

perception

of the

anamorphic image.Thespectator, viewingthepainting fronton,sees a stainin

the foreground

of the

image,

a

stain which, although capturing

the

interest

of

the spectator, remainsan incomprehensible form.AsBaltrusaitis describesthe

spectator's encounter with

the

painting,

it is

only upon leaving

the

room

through a door located besidethe paintingand 'turning around' for the final

8 6 O X F O R D

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erspectiveYet

Again

time that the spectator, at the required oblique view, sees the image appear

from wit in its former di~tort ion.~ s we know, when The Ambussodors is

45.

JU I ~ I S B a l d t i s .

hamorphlc

An mans.

viewed from the side the image of a skull miraculously appears. What is so

W . J Strachan Ahrams: New Y O I ~ 1977 ,

astonishing about thls appearance is not simply that from an incomprehensible

pp.

104 5.

stain a recopsable image is formed, but that the image which appears does so

in front ofthe plane ofrepresentation of the painting, that is, i t presents itselfbeyond

the limits of representation

in

a space

in

front of the painting itself.

It is with this movement from representation to presentation that there is

return to Lacan s description of the pot, or more specifically, of the void in the

pot which in presenting itself in the representation presents itself

as

nihil, s

nothing . Like the pot, therefore, what the incarnated form of anamorphosi

gives body to is nothmg. Yet, the crucial question here is: what is this nothing?

Flg 3 Hans Holbein the Younger. The Ambassados.

1533

oil on oak. 207 x 209 5

cm.

National Gallery. London. Photo: National Gallery. London.)

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Keith Broadfoot

I wish to propose that it is the nothingof the void that perspective re-finds.

Anamorphosis materialises

the

Tiling,

theobjeta,it

gives body

to the

hole with

which Brunelleschi's tableau was pierced. Now, admittedly, on first 46. Ucm,77&A,

a

o/PycAoanaTrA

P

. 71.

consideration, this idea may seem nonsensical:how is that which appearsin

front of the picture plane, that is, outside of the bounds of the fieldof

representation,

to be

related

to

that hole which

is at the

centre

of

the painting

in Brunelleschi's demonstration,

the

hole which forms

the

nucleus

of its

interior? To answer this question, it is once again necessary to follow the

distinction thatis to be drawn between Lacan's conceptof the realand reality

as such.

To assist us here in thinking about diis not quite so .straightforward

relation between theexteriorand theinterior, it is far from coincidental that

at

the

very moment that Lacan introduces

a

discussion

of

anamorphosis

in his

seminar, he should also begin using the neologismof the extimate extimite

a

word that combines

the

exterior

and the

intimate

in one.

What

is odd

about Lacan's proposal that the work of art always involves encircling the

Thing

is

that, prior

to

this proposal, when

a

topographical representation

of

the Thing had been attempted, Lacan admitted that this would be difficult

because

c

das Dingis at the centre onlyin the sense thatit isexcluded'.

4

*It is

this paradoxical conception

of an

'intimate exteriority',

of

something being

at

the

centre only because

it is

outside, that also describes

the

peculiar nature

of

the

relation between

the

real

and the

symbolic:

the

real

is at

once outside

ofthe symbolic, an effect of die symbolic diat cannotbe represented within

its domain,

and

inside

the

symbolic

as the

cause

of its

structural order. What

is fascinating here is that this also servesas adescription, I amsuggesting,for

the nature of the relation of the gaze as

objeta

to perspective, that is, to

specify this within the contextof theparticular example thatI amusing he re,

the natureof the relation between anamorphosis and perspective. Thus,the

image that materialises

in

anamorphosis

is

excluded from

the

symbolic

domain of perspective. It occupies a place outsideof the limitsof the space

of representation (this being understood

as the

image that presents itself

in

front of the picture plane) yet, at the same time, this position of being

outside only arises because

the

image

is a

m aterialisation

of the

central core,

the hole, which constitutes perspective

as die

domain

of the

symbolic

in the

first place.

The

odd

nature

of

this relation between exterior

and

interior could also

be

explained in another way. In anamorphosis, what is in front of the picture

plane does

not

locate itself

in an

external reality

but in the

real. This

is

what

makes the image that forms itself diere a presentation rather than a

representation. The strangeness of this situation, however, should be

acknowledged, for die real is not a reality that precedes or comes after

perspective, a reality that would be outside the symbolic order; the real is a

lack that arises from widiin

the

symbolic order

itself. How,

then,

to

fill this

hole diat is not in reality but in the real? Anamorphosis does so, not by

representing

any

object

in

reality,

an

external reality diat

is

before

or

beyond

representation, because that reality, after

all,

only exists already within

die

symbolic, already within representation,

but by

means

of a

presentation, diat

is,

by diat which presents itself widiin representation widi die paradox to

add here, diough, diat what presentsitself,becauseit is not arepresentationof

any pre-existing diing, cannot

be

'within' representation.

The

perplexing

natureof diepresenceof diis object (diegazeasobjeta)is dierefore diatit is

die incarnation

of a

lack,

die

materialisation

of a

void. This

is die

understanding Lacanhas of anamorphosis when hereturns to discussit again

8 8 O X F O R D

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Keith Broadfoot

Rg 4

Ambrogio L orenzetti, The Annunciation, 13 44 , tempera on panel,

22 x

117 cm. Pinawteca

Nazionale, Siena. (Photo: The Bridgeman

Art

Library.)

In its sp atial ambiguity, functioning as it d oes as a kind of m ask or screen, this architectonic

elem ent 1s the lynchpin of an eminently contradictory structure in which the paving s recession

is in open conflict with the flanenm g effect created

by

the gold ground -within wh~ chhe

van~ shing oint is geometrically situated.50

It is this eminently contrad ictory st ructu re that we could alternately designate

as

the extimate. Indeed, this is an association that is made all the more

compelling when Damisch continues to note how numerous 'other examples

of such contradiction could he cited; it is almost as though the point designated

by the construction was somehow so powerful, yet so suspect, that it cannot

be openl? ackno\vledged, that it had to be dissimulated behind a mask or

veil.' With this statement Damisch secms to be inadvertently presenting

nothing oth er than Lacan's thesis of how perspective emerges

in

relation to the

Thing. What thus must be drawn from this parallel is that it becomes necessary

to understand how this eminently contradictor). structure

s

perspective. What

this means is that it should not be imagined that the column is somehow

preventing a proper revealing of perspcrtive, as if it could only be when it was

removed that there could be a fully conscious and theoretically sound

understanding of perspective and further still, as if it could only be then that

onc would a niv c at ( or is it to return to? ) the origin of perspective, with the

point designated by the construction being finally clear and transparent for all

to see. It is, rather, how the obstruction of the column is essential to

persprctivc. I t is.

i f

wc return

to

the proposal of Damisch's with which

we

50

Damisch.

he

Ongrn ofPerrpcnrre

p. 81

. Dam~sch hc

Or ~ g tn jPe r r pa r r e

p.


21/24


5 2. It is tfai] desire to see w hit is behind that

also drove Bnmelleschi. As Damisch notes of

Brunelleschrs conitruction:

The importance of manipulation in the

experiment should not be underestimated.

For it was thil that made of the painting an

object to be handled as well as seen, to be

turned round and round, just as savages ,

It is said, turned the first mirron presented

to them round and round to see what was

hidden behind diem. Bnmelleschi did

exactly the same dung, wanting to discover

what was hidden behind perspective, he

went to see for himself, going so far as to

place his eye behind it to capture its

operation in the mirror T h e rigin of

Pmptctlrt , p . 1 3 8 )

53 L a c a n , Th e Four Fundamental Con cepts of

Psycho-Analysis, p 9 6 .

commenced this article, how the column is there to mark a history of

perspective which is but a return to its own origins, part of 'this movement,

always resumed and always resumable, because alwaysobstructed[my emphasis

and of necessity destined to failure, there being no origin save one that is an

invention,

in all senses of the word*. Behind the column, then, there is no

vanishing point. There is not even any vanishing point there that will be

revealed sometime in the future according to some evolutionary schema of

theoretical articulation. What is behind, if we could invoke the question posed

by Zeusis in Pliny's famous fable, is nothing.

52

The column is, we should

perhaps now specify, and this should not really be that unexpected, phallic. In

collusion with the thematic of the Annunciation, the column, as the phallic

signifier, is the materialisation of nothing, the index of the impossible.

This analysis of the strategic significance of the column in Ambrogio

Lorenzetti's Annunciation painting could lead us back to another viewing of

Holbein's

The

Ambassadors. It could enable us to see, for example, somethi

else in the obscure placement of a crucifix in the top left-hand corner of the

painting. It seems as though a curtain has been ever so slightly drawn so as to

reveal this crucifix hanging on the wall. The attempt to depict the suffering of

Christ incarnate could now perhaps be seen as structurally related to the

incarnate form that anamorphosis itself equally attempts to figure. Without

entering into the specificity of this particular connection, the more general

relation that is being made here between anamorphosis and the column as it

appears not just in Lorenzetti's Annunciation painting but in the numerous

other Annunciation paintings to which Damisch alludes, is to suggest that it is

ultimately, in this seeming materialisation of nothing, that diere is to be found

the secret link to pe rspective. W hat is there in both cases is the attem pt to give

body to perspective as a lost object, or, to be precise, Brunelleschi's lost

model. The nature of this lost object should, however, be qualified for it must

now be seen that the loss of Brunelleschi's model is essential to perspective's

very appearance. With anamorphosis, let us specify further, perspective

appears as a lost phallic object, th at is, it is an object whose loss arrives through

its very presence. Thus when, for example, the image of the skull inT he

Ambassadors

is seen, its presence comes about through the loss of its relation

the su ppo rt, so that what occurs is that it gives body to a certain fundamental

loss

in

its very presence. This is, once again, why the return to the origin of

perspective is a necessary failure, why the return is always 'obstructed', or

alternatively, why the origin of perspective is nodiing other than this phallic

'obstruction' itself.

From the outset, to return once again to the 'original' viewing of

Brunelleschi's model, the eye which positioned itself at die hole (what

Edgerton refers to as a 'peephole') was also perhaps nothing other than a

phallic obstruction itself. If anamorphosis can be understood to materialise the

hole with which Brunelleschi pierced his painting, is this not also precisely

what a spectator such as Manetti would have done in placing his eye not just to

the surface of the back of Brunelleschi's panel but actually inside the hole,

which is to say, inside the painting? O n this point, Brunelleschi's

demonstration would seem to confirm Lacan's proposal (a proposal which

we should note has an extimate structure to it): 'I am not simply that

punctiform being located at the geometral point from which the perspective is

grasped. No doubt, in the depths of my eye, the picture is painted. The

picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I am in the picture.'

53

What anamorphosis

images, therefore, is this eye, or more precisely, this eye as it embodies the

gaze.

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Keith Broadfoot

IX

To follow diis suggestion of the presence of the gaze rather than the eye at the

origin of perspective, the question could be posed: in the utilisation of

Brunelleschi's model, does the spectator discover, when he places his eye

behind the panel and looks through the hole, the reflection of his own eye?

Damisch suggests that Lichtenberg's paradox how can you see yourself in a

mirror widi your eyes closed? found a possible solution with photography.

But Damisch suggests this only to pose and consider the more peculiar paradox

of Brunelleschi's de mon stration: how , in being opposite a mirror and captured

by the sight of what is reflected there, to not see oneself seeing?" If one does

not, then it is because ultimately Brunelleschi's demonstration is not

concerned widi that 'self-reflexive' philosophical condition where thought

grasps itselfasthou ght and for which 'seeing oneself seeing' forms a groun d of

certainty, which is to say it is not concerned with the condition of die 'seeing

oneself seeing' which Lacan specifies as the elision of the gaze. Qu ite to the

contrary, there is here an opening to the gaze. What one thus fails to perceive

is the gaze with which the tableau was pierced.

The nature of what Damisch specifies as the continual failure of the return

to th e origin of perspective also follows on from diis inability to see the gaze. If

Brunelleschi's model demonstrates diat it is onlyretrospectively that a point of

view is established, this is because one's own look is originally subjected to

what Lacan, following Merleau-Ponty, presents as the 'pre-existence of a gaze

I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked at from all

sides' .

The hole in Brun elleschi's mo del is, dius, an absence which reco rds

by means of its very absence this status of pre-existence that Lacan gives to the

gaze. Hen ce, also, die p eculiar q uality of the origin of perspec tive: it is a

return to a look which, though seeming to originate from oneself, always

precedes one's own look. The odd nature of this look could be grasped by

suggesting a relation to Freud's writing on die voyeuristic desire to see one's

own origin in what he terms die primal scene. In fact, Brunelleschi's model

may itself be positioned as the very model of the primal scene if we consider

diat, as Zizek stresses, what is involved in the return to die primal scene is not

die sight of any content but simply die experience of die gaze of die person

witnessing

die even t. The p rimal scene is a fantasy, Zizek explains, insofar as

the:

5 4 . D a m i s c h , The Origin of Pmpeaire, p 1 2 6 .

5 5 L acan , 77K Four Fundamental Concepts of

Prjrcho-Analjrsis, p . 8 3 .

5 6 . L acan , The Four Fundamental Concepts of

Psycho-Analysis, p 7 2 .

5 7 Z i i e k , For They Know Not W hat They Do,

p . 1 9 7 .

58 .

Damisch,

Th tOrigin offenpeaire,

p . 126 .

Basic paradox of t r ie psychoanalytic notion of fantasy consists In a kind of t ime loop - the

'orig inal fantasy' is a lways the fantasy of the orig ins - that Is to say, the e lementary skele ton of

th e f a n ta sy-sce n e I s f o r th e su bje c t to b e p re se n t a s a pu re g a ze b e f o re i ts o wn co n ce p t io n o r ,

mo re p re c ise ly , a t th e ve ry a c t o f I ts o wn co n ce p t io n .

57

There is die same time loop in perspective. When Damisch argues diat what

Brunelleschi demonstrates is that 'die point of view can be posited, grasped as

such, in its value and function as origin, only retroactively and by means of a

relay mechanism', Damisch does diis, if we recall, by proposing diat:

We re ta in P a n o f sky' s a rg u me n t th a t th e d isco ve ry o f the va n ish in g p o in t , I ts b e in g b ro u g h t to

l ig h t , ch ro n o lo g ical ly p re ce d e d th e in ve n t io n o f th e p o in t o f v ie w, wh ich wa s l in ke d to th e

a ssu mp t io n , p re c ise ly a t the p o in t o f th e e ye , o f a 'su b je c t '. . . .

Strangely, die vanishing point, which is itself preceded by die hole, precedes

die point of view, die point, diat is, at which die existence of die subject will

be assumed. At die origin of perspective, dierefore, diere is die basic paradox

of fantasy which, again according to Zizek, 'consists precisely in diis

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23/24

Perspective Yet Again

59. Ziiek, For

They

Know Not

What Thtf

Do,

197.

60 . Damisch, 77K

Ongin

of

Penpectlre

, p. 121.

6 1 .

Dimijch, 77K Origin

ofPmpcalrt,

p. 121.

62 . D a mbd l , 77K Origin of

Ptnptalre,

p. 122.

"nonsensical" temporal short circuit whereby

the

subject qua pure gaze

so t

speakprecedes itselfand witnesses

its own

origin'.

59

This basic paradox of fantasy is an important paradox to maintain, as it

enables

an

understanding

of an

aspect

of

Brunelleschi's original model that

Damisch claims has been 'widely and grossly misunderstood'. Damisch argues

that:

If we arec o n e c tin saying thatthepo in tofview andthe vanishing point coincideon theplaneof

pr o ject ion ,

it

d o e s

not

follow that there

is

symmet r y be t ween t hem. T he van ish ing po in t

is not

an Image - nar r owly const r uct ed ,ageo met r ic Image - of thepo in tofview;if t hey co incideon

t he p lane , t h isIsdue exclusivelyto an effect producedby the pr o ject ion on t othe mir r o r .

00

In Brunelleschi's model,

if the

vanishing point

is

inscribed opposite

the eye

withintheframeof the baptistery door, then, Damisch r

BROADFOOT K. Perspective–Damisch w Lacan

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