Lernen aus der „griechischen“ Krise: Europa braucht mehr ... · in reasonably good...

Lernen aus der „griechischen“ Krise: Europa braucht mehr Governance

Ansgar BelkeUniversity of Duisburg-Essen & DIW BerlinUniversity of Duisburg-Essen & DIW Berlin

Lange Nacht der Wissenschaften im DIW Berlin

Schumpeter-Saal, 18:00 bis 19:00 Uhr 5. Juni 2010, Berlin

5. Juni 2010Chair for Macroeconomics

University of Duisburg-Essen DIW Berlin 1

Gliederung

1. Europäische Integration am Scheideweg – Ist Europa ein optimaler Währungraum?

2. Ursachen der europäischen Schuldenkrise – Demografie um ein Vielfaches bedeutsamer als Finanzkrise

3. Anleihekäufe der Europäischen Zentralbank – Chronik 3. Anleihekäufe der Europäischen Zentralbank – Chronik einer angekündigten Pleite?

Und ggfs.

4. Insolvenzverfahren für Staaten – Ein Europäischer Währungsfonds?

5. Juni 2010 2Chair for Macroeconomics

University of Duisburg-Essen DIW Berlin

1. Europäische Integration am Scheideweg –Ist Europa ein optimaler Währungraum?

• Strukturelle und anhaltende DivergenzUngleiche Verschuldung, ungleiche internationaleWettbewerbsfähigkeit und Anfälligkeit gegenüber plötzlichem Stoppexterner Finanzierungexterner Finanzierung

• Unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von einer EuropäischenWirtschaftsregierung“Norden”: Satz verschärfter Budget- und Verschuldungsregeln“Süden”: Übertragung fiskalpolitischer Kompetenz auf eine Supra-Ebene, aktive Koordinierung der Fiskalpolitik)

• Lissabon-Vertrag für Austrittsklauseln öffnen oder nicht?

• Theorie optimaler Währungräume – endogen oder exogen?



Es gab vier Gründe für die europäischen Länder, das EWS aufzugeben und zur WWU überzugehen:

• Umfassendere Integration der europäischen Märkte

Zur Vorgeschichte der europäischen Einheitswährung

Folie: 8

• Auch die übrigen Länder, nicht nur Deutschland, sollten an geldpolitischen Entscheidungen beteiligt werden, die das Gesamtsystem betrafen.

• Völlige Freiheit für Kapitalbewegungen

• Politische Stabilität für Europa

Sie besagt, dass sich feste Wechselkurse am besten für solche Wirtschaftsräume eignen, die

• durch Außenhandel und Faktorbewegungen stark integriert sind,

• eine hohe Preis- und Lohnflexibilität aufweisen,

Die Theorie optimaler Währungsräume

Folie: 11

• eine hohe Preis- und Lohnflexibilität aufweisen,

• und ggfs. föderale Transferzahlungen und einen Steuerausgleich zwischen den Mitgliedsländern zur Abfederung regionalspezifischer Schocks vorsehen (Süd-versus Nordländer).

= in denen hinreichende Ersatzventile zur Anpassung an länderspezifische Schocks vorhanden sind!

• Wirtschaftliche Integration und die Vorteile eines Gebiets mit festen Wechselkursen: die GG-Kurve

– Monetärer Effizienzgewinn

• Für das Beitrittsland entfallen die Unsicherheits-, Konfusions-, Kalkulations- und Transaktionskosten, die flexible Wechselkurse mit sich bringen.


Folie: 12

sich bringen.

• Er fällt um so höher aus, je stärker die wirtschaftliche Integration zwischen dem Beitrittsland und dem Gebiet mit festen Wechselkursen.

– GG-Kurve

• Sie zeigt, dass der potenzielle Gewinn des Beitritts zum Euroraum von den Handelsverbindungen des Beitrittslandes mit diesem Raum abhängt.

• Sie hat einen ansteigenden Verlauf.

Folie: 14

Wirtschaftliche Integration und die Kosten eines Währungsverbunds: die LL-Kurve

– Verlust wirtschaftlicher Stabilität

• Der Verlust wirtschaftlicher Stabilität rührt daher, dass das Beitrittsland auf seine Fähigkeit verzichtet, Produktion und Beschäftigung mit Hilfe währungs- und geldpolitischer Maßnahmen zu stabilisieren.


Folie: 15

zu stabilisieren.

• Er ist um so geringer, je stärker die wirtschaftliche Verflechtung des Beitrittslandes mit dem Währungsverbund, dem es beitritt.

– LL-Kurve

• Sie zeigt die Beziehung zwischen dem Verlust wirtschaftlicher Stabilität und der Integration des Beitrittslands mit dem Währungsverbund.

• Sie hat einen fallenden Verlauf.

Folie: 16

• Die Entscheidung über den Beitritt zu (Austritt aus?) einem Währungsverbund: die Kombination von GG- und LL-Kurve

Der Schnittpunkt von GG und LL

• Er zeigt an, welches Niveau die wirtschaftliche Integration zwischen einem Währungsverbund und


Folie: 17

Integration zwischen einem Währungsverbund und einem potenziellen Beitrittsland mindestens erreicht haben sollte.

• Er gibt Aufschluss darüber, ob ein Land seinen Wechselkurs gegenüber dem Euro festlegen sollte.

Folie: 18

2. Ursachen der EU-Schuldenkrise –Demografie um ein Vielfaches

bedeutsamer als die Finanzkrise



Outline

1. Stylized facts: fiscal developments up to 2009

2. Causes of the European debt crisis I - Short to medium run

3. Causes of the European debt crisis II – Medium to long run

4. Parallel development of private, corporate and 4. Parallel development of private, corporate and government debt? A sector-specific view

5. Fiscal policy considerations and policy conclusions

03 May 2010 20Chair for Macroeconomics


Stylized facts: fiscal developments in 2009

• In 2009 fiscal positions deteriorated sharply in most euro area countries (ECB 2010, p. 83).

• According to the updated stability programmes submitted by most euro area countries between December 2009 and February 2010 (see Table 9), the euro area general February 2010 (see Table 9), the euro area general government deficit more than tripled, rising from 2.0% of GDP in 2008 to 6.2% of GDP in 2009.

• This is the most dramatic budget deterioration since the inception of EMU. At the same time, euro area general government debt increased from 69.4% of GDP in 2008 to 78.7% of GDP in 2009.



Figure 1 - Public deficits in the EMU

Public deficit 2009, in % of GDP (Source: EU)

Italy

Netherlands

Malta

Austria

Germany

Finland

Luxembourg

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Ireland

Greece

Spain

Portugal

France

Slowakia

Cyprus

Belgium

Slowenia

Italy

Developments at the country level

• 3 euro area countries (Greece, Ireland and Spain) with double-digit deficit-to-GDP ratios in 2009.

• Second group of countries (Portugal, France, Slovakia, Belgium, Cyprus, Slovenia and Italy) recorded high deficit ratios in the range of 5% to 9.5% of GDP.

• 4 countries (Netherlands, Malta, Austria and Germany) • 4 countries (Netherlands, Malta, Austria and Germany) had deficit ratios ranging from 3% to 4.9% of GDP.

• Only in Finland and Luxembourg did budget deficits remain below 3% of GDP.

• Overall, 14 out of the 16 euro area countries recorded deficits above the 3% of GDP reference value in 2009. Except Cyprus, all these countries are currently subject to excessive deficit procedures (EDPs).



Table 1 - Selected countries: fiscal data for 2009



• Among the rich countries in reasonable fiscal-financial shape are Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland.

• Some advanced industrial countries widely considered to be in reasonably good fiscal-financial condition – Canada, Germany and the Netherlands - are so only compared to the Germany and the Netherlands - are so only compared to the truly dire conditions experienced by most of their peers.

• Note: according to IMF data, the combined current account surplus of the three smaller creditor nations Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands is now somewhat larger than that of Germany. The adjustment on the creditor side thus has to come certainly not only from Germany.



Figure 2 - Deterioration of public finances (Euroland)

Debt-to-GDP ratios (Maastricht) in 2007 and IMF projections for 2014

80

100

120

140Debt / GDP 2007 IMF projection 2014

Maastricht: 60% / GDP

Source: IMF, UniCredit Research

0

20

40

60

Finla

nd

Portu

gal

Austri

a

Italy

Ger

man

y

Belgi

um

Franc

eN

ethe

rland

s

Gre

ece

Spain

U.S

.

U.K

.

Irela

nd

Fiscal unsustainability not confined to the Euro Area

• Table 1: Euro area in aggregate in better fiscal shape than US and UK.

• Rising gross general government debt to annual GDP ratios are likely to take the US and the UK no later than 2011 into the higher-than-90 percent bracket for which Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have identified a marked negative effect on the Rogoff (2009) have identified a marked negative effect on the growth rate of real GDP.

• Deterioration in the fiscal positions of most industrialized countries has been spectacular, …

• … even more so when set against the remarkable fiscal restraint demonstrated by most emerging markets over the same period (Buiter 2010, p. 9).



Figure 3 - Major Economies with Fiscal Deficits at or above 10% of GDP, (% of Global GDP), 1980-2009



2. Causes of the European debt crisis I –Short to medium run

1. Financial crisis and economic downturn triggered declines in tax revenues and increases in social payments (such as unemployment benefits) through the operation of automatic stabilisers.

2. Revenues were adversely affected by factors (such as falling 2. Revenues were adversely affected by factors (such as falling asset prices in private and public pension systems) not reflected in development of key macroeconomic aggregates, giving rise to revenue shortfalls. = “Second-round effects”

3. While the trend growth rate of the euro area economy declined, structural spending growth maintained its momentum.



4. Following the European Economic Recovery Plan endorsed by the EC in December 2008, most euro area governments implemented significant fiscal stimulus measures.

5. Several countries have taken far-reaching measures to stabilise their financial sectors which impacted on the government debt position in 2009 or translated into government debt position in 2009 or translated into substantial contingent liabilities.

The latter constitute a risk of higher deficits and/or debt in the future, depending on exit strategies (ECB 2009).



Fig. 4 - Lower growth potential in the Euro area: Urgent need to deleverage will lead to structurally lower domestic demand

160

180

200

220

240

260

NFCs

Households

Public

Debt in % of GDP (Private sector debt based on outstanding EMU-MFI credit solely)

31

Source: Eurostat, ECB, UniCredit Research

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Ireland US Portugal Spain Italy Greece EMU Germany France

Figure 4a - Cumulated interventions and their fiscal impact ineuro area countries

32

Figure 4b - Ten-year government bond yield spreads of euro area countries over Germany and the expected budget balance relative to Germany

Although all countries have announced

broad-based bank rescue packages,

investors have differentiated between countries mainly on the basis

of other, more country-specific factors

33

(e.g., fiscal outlook).

This has also been valid more recently,

after February 2010 when markets

have increasingly differentiated among the weak members.

3. Causes of the European debt crisis II – Medium to long run

1. Strongly pro-cyclical behavior by the fiscal authorities during the boom period between the bursting of the tech bubble at the end of 2000 and the onset of the financial crisis of the North-Atlantic region in August 2007. “Not making hay while the sun shone“(Buiter 2010, p. 5).

2. Global liquidity/money growth (“excess liquidity”) made it easy to incur additional debt over the same period and to extend …

3. Excessive credit: Schularick/Taylor "Credit Booms Gone Bust“ and Mian/Sufi "Household Leverage and the Recession of 2007 to 2009"



4. „Invisible“ implicit government debt and the coming age-related public spending conflict



Figure 5 - Global Liquidity and Global Uncertainty



Source:

Belke/Gros (2010), Jeddah Economic Forum.

Background papers•BELKE, ANSGAR, ORTH, WALTER, SETZER, RALPH (2009): Liquidity and the

Dynamic Pattern of Asset Price Adjustment: A Global View, forthcoming in:

Journal of Banking and Finance. Plus:



Table 2 - Net Present Value of Impact on Fiscal Deficit of Crisis,and Age-related Spending (percent of GDP)



European debt crisis initiated by financial crisis only the tip on

the iceberg

• IMF calculations for G-20: International Monetary Fund, The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis, March 2009.

• Present value of cumulated fiscal burden caused by thefinancial crisis on average 28 percent of GDP (Germany getsfinancial crisis on average 28 percent of GDP (Germany getsoff relatively cheaply, 14 percent).

• Public expenditures caused by future demographicdevelopment many times higher.



• On average for G-20, IMF estimates the present value ofadditional public expenditures at about more than 400 percent of GDP.

• Additional public expenditures caused by the demographicfactor exceed the burden caused by the financial crisis by thefactor 20!factor 20!

• In a nutshell: the events of the last 1½ years have aggravatedthe situation of public budgets significantly. But essential litmus test is still to come!

• Without structural reforms of the social security systemsfiscal policy will be subjected to pressures against which theburdens from the financial crisis appear minor.



Figure 6 - Implicit government debt

Explicit plus IMPLICIT government debt (base year 2004), in % of nominal GDP

400

500

600

0

100

200

300

400

Austria Norway Germany France UK US

Source: Hagist, Moog, Raffelhüschen, Vatter (2009)

Figure 7 - Demographic burden is weighing heavily on consolidation process

Share of 65+ in % of population aged between 15-64

40

50

60

Greece

Portugal

Spain

Germany

Source: United Nations

0

10

20

30

40

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

4. Parallel development of private, corporate and government debt? A sector-specific view

• The sovereign debt problems encountered by most advanced industrial countries are logical final step of a classic ‘hot potato’ game of excessive sectoral debt or leverage.

1. Excessively indebted households passed part of their debt 1. Excessively indebted households passed part of their debt back to their creditors – the banks.

2. The banks, excessively leveraged and at risk of default, passed part of their debt to the sovereign.

3. The now overly indebted sovereign is passing the debt back to the households, through higher taxes, lower public spending, the risk of default or the threat of monetization and inflation (Buiter 2010, p. 8).



Figure 8 - Deleveraging especially needed in countries withhousing bubbles

Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Debt and deleveraging: The

global credit bubble and its economic consequences, January.

• Of these five are household sectors (UK, US, ES and to a lesser extent CAN and SK), three are commercial real estate sectors (UK, US and ES), one comprises parts of Spain’s financial sector (especially the smaller banks) and one comprises the construction and real estate related part of Spain’s corporate sector excluding commercial real estate.

• Ireland and Latvia (and to some extent Spain) offer good • Ireland and Latvia (and to some extent Spain) offer good examples of this game: in both countries public debt was not an issue prior to crisis (about 25% of GDP in Ireland and close to zero in Latvia).

• Crisis has changed this radically: by 2011 public debt in Ireland is expected to reach 95% of GDP and 60% of GDP in Latvia (Gros 2010a).



If one assumes that central banks cannot go bankrupt …

• Euro area: clear distinction between public and private debt not possible any more, since printing press is not accessible for euro area governments (which makes government debt risk free in nominal terms in countries with own currency, „tango between ever liquid CB and ever solvent government“, Buiter and Goodhart). solvent government“, Buiter and Goodhart).

• Greece and Portugal as illustrative cases (Gros 2010a)). Governments borrowed heavily on international capital markets to finance unsustainable consumption booms.

• Public debt of peripheral euro area countries displays characteristics of private debt. Debt of core countries with solid public finances (Germany?) remains public debt.



• Sustainability of public debt in the euro area periphery? Not only current fiscal accounts but also resource balance for the entire country matters (Gros 2010a).

• PIGS: two different groups, with Greece and Portugal in the weakest one due to their low degree of domestic saving.

• Gross national savings rates of GR and PT (private plus government) at record lows. IR and ES much closer to euro area average than to GR and PT.

=> ES and IR able to finance government deficits from their national savings now that housing investment has crashed and no longer absorbs ample savings.



In support of Daniel Gros‘ recent proposals

• Implications for GR and PT: Fiscal adjustment alone is not sufficient to solve the problem, and bail-out would be costly.

• Fiscal adjustment that is not reflected in an increase in the national savings rate would simply transfer the problem from the government to the private sector. Fiscal deficit reduction would just increase private debt! would just increase private debt!

• Accumulation of non-performing loans with banks which in turn will have to be bailed out by the government (again the hot potato game).

• Adjustment presupposes “belt tightening” by the entireeconomy. To set Greece and Portugal back on a sustainable economic path requires an increase in savings, i.e. a cut in consumption.



• Europe’s Stability Pact flawed since it focuses merely on one sector (government) rather than on entire country’s resource balance as the relevant long-run target.

• Government budget stance is not sustainable if financing of the private budgets is not sustainable! the private budgets is not sustainable!

• Preventing a repeat of the problems of the weakest of the PIGS requires concentrating surveillance on this aspect.



5. Fiscal policy considerations and policy conclusions

5.1. The difficult way out of the debt trap

5.2. Further concerns



5.1 The difficult way out of the debt trap

• Fiscal policy worldwide is confronted with an extremelydifficult balancing act:

- Public debt has to be reduced markedly within the nextyears in order to avoid a further increase of the interestpayments.

- Austerity measures should not unduly put a strain on theeconomy.

• Otherwise, threat of deficiency in government receipts whichmight endanger the success of adjustment.

• Absolutely, one of THE most important future questionsgovernments are confronted with: which kind of measures do reduce government debt in sustainably?



Table 3 - The way out of the debt trap – Sobering experience

Fiscal budget consolidation successfull only in some cases (underscored = successful consolidation)

Australia 1987 1988

Austria 1984 1996 1997 2005

Belgium 1982 1984 1987 2006

Canada 1981 1986 1987 1995 1996 1997

Denmark 1983 1984 1985 1986 2005

Finland 1973 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 2000

France 1979 1996

Source: Alesina, A. and S. Ardagna (2009): Large changes in fiscal policy: taxes

and spending, NBER Working Paper No. 15438, October.

Germany 1996 2000

Greece 1976 1986 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006

Ireland 1976 1984 1987 1988 1989 2000

Italy 1976 1980 1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 2007

Japan 1984 1999 2001 2006

Netherlands 1972 1973 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996

New Zealand 1987 1989 1993 1994 2000

Norway 1979 1980 1983 1989 1996 2000 2004 2005

Portugal 1982 1983 1986 1988 1992 1995 2002 2006

Spain 1986 1987 1994 1996

Sweden 1981 1983 1984 1986 1987 1994 1996 1997 2004

UK 1977 1982 1988 1996 1997 1998 2000

• Alesina, A. and S. Ardagna (2009): Large changes in fiscal policy: taxes and spending, NBER Working Paper No. 15438, October, give an answer to this question

• Examine the evidence on episodes of large stances in fiscal policy, both in cases of fiscal stimuli and in that of fiscal adjustments in OECD countries from 1970 to 2007.

• More than 100 cases in which governments tried to lower the debt ratio by lowering budget deficits.

• Results are disillusioning and interesting at the same time.

• Disillusioning: in less than 20 percent of the cases consolidation policies were successful at all (i.e. lowering the debt ratio by more than 4½ percentage points).



• Interesting: In those few cases in which adjustment was successful, governments tended to enact a combination of significant expenditure cuts and moderate tax cuts. In addition, adjustments on the spending side rather than on the tax side are less likely to create recessions.

• This raises serious doubts about the success of recent steps taken by some EMU countries: taken by some EMU countries:

• Beyond significant wage reductions the public sector, Greece has decided to increase a couple of taxes., i.e. a VAT increase from 19% to 21%, a one-time levy for firms which generate profit and an increase of energy taxes.

• Spain will cut its public exenditures. However, a VAT increase by 2 percentage points is planned for the start of July as well. In Portugal, the maximum tax rate will be increased.



• Hence, these countries do not fit with conditions which have in the past been vital for noticeable reduction of government debt.

• In addition: demographic burden will become increasingly pressing in the next years (Figure 7). This is not only valid for problematic countries such as Greece but for nearly all industrialized countries.industrialized countries.

• Reduction of government debt and regaining ample room for manoevre within public budgets will become an extremely difficult venture.



5.2 Further concerns

Dramatic rise in the fiscal imbalances of euro area countries is threatening the sustainability of public finances and is giving cause for concern for several reasons.

1. Growing budget deficits and government debt may push up inflation expectations and place an additional burden on inflation expectations and place an additional burden on the ECB’s monetary policy for the euro area.

2. Large government (re)financing needs may, which could also spill over to other euro area countries, drive up (real) medium and longer-term interest rates and crowd out private demand in the recovery phase.



3. Rising government debt and higher sovereign bond yields imply higher interest expenditure.

This either has to be covered by higher taxes, which are detrimental to potential growth, or by imposing constraints on other government spending items, including those on other government spending items, including those promoting longer-term growth (e.g. infrastructure or education).

Constraints will become even tighter in absence of reforms addressing rising budgetary costs of an ageing society.



4. Large fiscal imbalances may fuel accumulation of other macroeconomic imbalances, such as current account deficits, which make countries more vulnerable to negative shocks.

Moreover, high budget deficits and debt severely limit the Moreover, high budget deficits and debt severely limit the ability of fiscal policy action to counter such shocks (ECB 2010, p. 87).

Political economy of reforms => But the historical evidence shows that crises also provide great opportunities to undertake far-reaching structural measures. This opportunity should not be missed!



3. Anleihekäufe der Europäischen Zentralbank – Chronik einer angekündigten Pleite?

• Die Anleihekäufe der EZB gefährden nicht nur ihre politische, sondern auch ihre finanzielle Unabhängigkeit.

• Fährt die EZB Verluste ein, müssen die ohnehin verschuldeten Euro-Staaten einspringen – mit der Gefahr, die Inflation anzuheizen.

Siehe: Ansgar Belke, Chronik einer angekündigten Pleite, Kommentar in Financial Times Deutschland, Mittwoch 19. Mai 2010, S. 26.



• Politische Unabhängigkeit?

• Finanzielle Unabhängigkeit der EZB und des ESZB?

• Wenn Zentralbanken in Kapitalnot geraten

• „Fiscal Backing“ einer Zentralbank – Pro und contra



• Mangelndes „Fiscal backing“ der EZB – ein Vorteil

• Sterilisierung der Anleihekäufe

• Zielrichtung der Geldpolitik sollte die Aktivseite der Notenbankbilanz seinNotenbankbilanz sein

• Effektivität der Anleihekäufe



4. Insolvenzverfahren für Staaten – Ein Europäischer Währungsfonds?

Stichworte: Transferunion, IWF …

Siehe: Daniel Gros und Tom Mayer (2010), How to Deal with Siehe: Daniel Gros und Tom Mayer (2010), How to Deal with Sovereign Default in Europe? Create the European Monetary Fund Now, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, May 17.



Design – Wichtige Aspekte

• Probleme in einem bestimmten Mitgliedsland führen in einer Währungsunion zu starken negativen Übertragungseffekten: besondere Verantwortung für Vermeidung von Schwierigkeiten der Partnerländer (Maastricht-Fiskalkriterien und SWP)!

• Ohne EWF wird die EZB zur „Bad Bank“: „frightenedinvestors are dumping government bonds with dubiousrepayment values on the ECB‘s balance sheet“.



Design – Wichtige Aspekte

• Mit verschlechterter Notenbank-Bilanz verringert sich zunächst der Außenwert und dann auch der Binnenwert des Euros!

• Wiederherstellung der Marktdisziplin durch Ermöglicheneines Zahlungsausfalls ohne größere Schäden für die eines Zahlungsausfalls ohne größere Schäden für die anderen Länder, nicht durch Verhindern dieses Ausfalls!



Design – Spezifika I

1. Finanzierungsmechanismus (Beiträge nach Insolvenz- und Illiquiditätsrisiko, Benchmark: Maastrichter Fiskalkriterien)

2. Konditionalität(Anspruch auf Funds in Höhe der bisherigen (Anspruch auf Funds in Höhe der bisherigen Einzahlungen, darüber hinaus nur mit überwachtem Anpassungsprogramm)



Design –Spezifika II

3. Durchsetzung(Ausschluss des Landes von EU-Fonds und dessen Anleihen von der EZB-Refinanzierung)

4. Geregelter Zahlungsausfall (mit „Haircuts“ unter Beteiligung der Gläubiger, (mit „Haircuts“ unter Beteiligung der Gläubiger, Erstattung nur für vorher registrierte Transaktionen, Benchmark: Maastricht-Kriterien)



Thank you for your attention!Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!

5. Juni 2010Chair for Macroeconomics


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Lernen aus der „griechischen“ Krise: Europa braucht mehr ... · in reasonably good...

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