Kant's Standpoint Anno 1772

Johan Arnt Myrstad, Troms0

I.

There are several reflections - according to Adickes written about 1772 - that are naturally grouped together, and which seem to represent a standpoint in Kant's development clearly separated both from the standpoint of the disser-tation and the standpoint of the Duisburg'schen Nachlass. In his book, Der schweigende Kant, Wolfgang Carl finds that these reflections represent the first attempt to give a transcendental deduction of the categories.1 More specifically, he argues that Kant tried to work out what in the Critique of Pure Reason is called an objective deduction, which, as Carl understands the term, means that the argumentation is regressive and rests on the assumption of a possible or real experience.2 According to Wolfgang Carl an objective deduc-tion cannot solve the problem of the deduction; the objective validity of the categories can only be proved in a subjective deduction. However, Carl finds versions of the objective deduction even in the Critique, for instance in § 14 and in the first part of the Α-deduction. The standpoint of 1772 according to Wolfgang Carl therefore represents an enigma in the thought of Kant that runs through all attempts to give a transcendental deduction of the objective validity of the categories.

I will argue that the presentation in the reflections from 1772, do not follow the line of a regressive method. On the contrary, they present thoughts of the critical period that are as explicitly put forward once more only long time after the publication of the B-version of the Critique, and then especially frequently in the Opus postumum. On the other hand and though I agree with Carl on the importance and autonomy of the reflections as compared to the Duisburg'schen Nachlass, I still find that they show more continuity with the latter than he does, but also that what they argue could easily be used in a subjective deduction.

Wolfgang Carl, Der schweigende Kant. Die Entwürfe zu einer Deduktion der Kategorien vor 1781 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &c Ruprecht, 1989). I am grateful to Prof. Carl for his comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Kant's distinction between objective and subjecive deduction in the Critique is actually more of a distinction between two sides of one and the same deduction or argumentative complex. See Critique A XVII. The references to the Critique will be to the A- and B-edition respec-tively; to the reflections the references will be to the number volumes and pages given in Kants gesammelte Schriften, the Akademie edition, Berlin and Leipzig, 1900 ff.

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36 Johan Amt Myrstad

The apperception is not mentioned by that title in these reflections. How-ever, it is my contention that the apperception implicitly makes its appearance in the meanings of expressions such as "Thätigkeiten des Gemiiths", which are internally connected to activities of the mind that are themselves divided into real, sensible, and logical functions. The most important of these reflec-tions are 4629, 4631 and 4634. Reflection 4629 is especially important as a source of understanding of the sensible functions, while R 4631 and R 4634 relate the real functions to the logical functions. Reflection 4635 states that the real functions have a founding status in relation to the logical functions, while R 4640 connects the different functions explicitly to the founding "Thätigkeiten des Gemiiths", that turn up later in theDuisburg'schen Nachlass as equally founding "Functionen der Apperception". Wolfgang Carl identifies the sensible functions with space and time as forms of intuitions, though understood as systems of definite positions; the logical functions he associates with the forms of judgment and the real functions with the categories as determinate forms of judgment. In my opinion (and also in the opinion of Wolfgang Carl) the determinate forms of judgment or the functions associated with these, are identical to what Kant calls the real uses of the understanding, while as I understand the scheme, the real functions are something that all representations, be they concepts or intuitions, must have as presentations or "Vorstellungen überhaupt", i.e. as presenting an object. This applies in par-ticular to the sensible empirical intuitions or perceptions. There is explicit support for this interpretation in these reflections; furthermore, this interpre-tation fits the explicit priority of conditioning that Kant describes between the different forms of functions. And, finally, this way of understanding the real functions gives meaning to the reasoning in these reflections. This concerns mainly the way Kant on the one hand states a parallel between the forms of intuitions and the logical forms as systems of places ("Stellen") in which "Erscheinungen", respectively "Begriffe," may be placed, and on the other hand maintains that these forms of intuitions and judgments do not on their own give the representations d e f i n i t e p l a c e s . Thus it is the real functions through which the representations are given to or placed ("gesetzt") in the mind ("im Gemüthe"), that grounds the determinations and relations of the representations both within the forms of intuition and within the forms of judgment. Through the original placing in the mind by the real functions, the representations will thus first be given sensitive functions in relation to each other in space and time, and then potentially determinate logical func-tions through the real use of the understanding. The real use of the under-standing is thus grounded in the way the real functions condition the sensible functions of the representations.

II.

It is my opinion, that these reflections give an exposition of what in critical terms is understood as the original synthetic unity of apperception as the basic

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Kant's Standpoint Anno 1772 37

condition of all sensible intuitions and thus also the possibility of an exposi-tion of the categories as aspects of the explicitly conceived synthetic unity. To show this I will quote from and comment on some of the more important of the reflections. First R 4634 , Ak XVII, 618-619 :

Um nun auszumachen, was das für Begriffe seyn, die nothwendig vor aller Erfahrung vorhergehen müssen und durch welche diese nur möglich ist, die also a priori gegeben sind und auch den Grund zu den urtheilen a priori enthalten, müssen wir eine Erfahrung überhaupt zergliedern. In jeder Erfahrung ist etwas, wodurch uns ein Gegenstand gegeben, und etwas, wodurch er Gedacht wird. Nehmen wir die Bedingungen, die in den Thatigkeiten des gemüths liegen, wodurch er allein gegeben werden kann, so kann man etwas von den obiecten a priori erkennen. Nehmen wir das, wodurch er allein gedacht werden kann, so kann man auch von allen möglichen Gegenständen etwas a priori erkennen. Denn dadurch allein wird etwas vor uns ein Gegenstand oder eine Erkenntnis desselben.

Wir wollen das erstere Untersuchen. Das, wodurch uns ein Gegenstand (8 der Erfahrung) gegeben wird, heißt Erscheinung. Die Möglichkeit der Erscheinungen ist von der seite des Menschlichen Gemüths Sinnlichkeit. In der Sinnlichkeit ist eine Materie, welche Empfindung heißt, und in ansehung deren und ihrer Verschiedenheit sind wir blos leidend, und die mannigfaltigkeit der Eindrücke macht, daß wir a priori nichts in uns finden, was wir vor den Eindrücken aus uns a priori kenneten. Man kann sich keinen [neuen] Eindruck von einer neuen art niemals in Gedanken vorstellen. Aber die Erscheinungen haben auch eine Form, einen in unserm Subiekt liegenden Grund, wodurch wir entweder die Eindrücke selbst oder das, was ihnen correspondirt, ordnen und iedem theile derselben seine stelle geben. Dieses [ist] kann nichts anderes als eine Thatigkeit seyn, die zwar natürlich durch die Eindrücke erregt wird, aber doch vor sich selbst erkannt werden kan.

I have emphasized occurrences of the word "wodurch", since this word is used by Kant in this period to make clear the contrast between forms "worin" the representations find their "places" (Stellen) and the functions "wodurch" they are determined quite specific places.3 As may be seen from the quotation, Kant maintains that there are two kinds of "Thätigkeiten des Gemüths" whereby (wodurch) an object on the one hand is given ("gegeben") to us and on the other hand thought. In this paragraph Kant addresses the first kind, that is, those functions or acts by/in the mind (here in the sense of "Sinn-lichkeit") through which we are given an object. I will suggest that the contrast between the forms of intuitions within (worin) and the sensible and real functions through which (wodurch) we are given an object ("eine Erscheinung") is rather clear in this quotation. It makes it evident that Kant here speaks about the real and sensible functions through which the appear-

3 See for instance R 4 6 7 4 Ak XVII, 643: "Die Verkettung gründet sich (sowie die Erscheinung nicht auf bloße [Einfluß] Empfindung, sondern in innern Principien der Form) nicht auf die bloße Erscheinung, sondern ist eine Vorstellung von der innern Handlung des Gemüths, Vorstellungen zu verknüpfen, nicht blos bey einander in der Anschauung zu stellen, sondern ein Ganzes der Materie nach zu machen. Hie ist also Einheit, nicht [der] vermöge desienigen: worin, sondern: wodurch das Manigfaltige in eines gebracht wird, mithin allgemeingültigkeit. Daher sind es nicht formen, sondern functionen, worauf die relationes der Erscheinungen beruhen. Die exposition der Erscheinungen ist also die Bestimmung des Grundes, worauf der Zusammenhang der Empfindungen [derse] in denselben beruht."

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38 Johan Amt Myrstad

anees ("Erscheinungen") and all their parts ("iedem Theile derselben") are determined quite specific places within space and time; and that these func-tions thus do something that the forms of intuition, just because they are the forms they are, cannot contribute themselves! That the reference is to the sensible functions (and the real functions which they are grounded in) should however also be clear from the paragraph that follows what has been quoted so far:

(Wenn wir im Raum und in der Zeit etwas setzen, so handeln wir; wenn wir es neben und nach einander setzen, so verknüpfen wir. Diese Handlungen sind nur Mittel, iene stellen zu stände zu bringen; aber man kann sie besonders nehmen; wenn wir einerley etliche mal oder in der einen Handlung zugleich die andere setzen, so ist dieses eine Art von Handlungen, dadurch wir etwas der Regel der Erscheinungen gemäß setzen, wobey dieses setzen seine besondere Regeln haben muß, die von den Bedingungen der Form, wie sie in Ansehung der Erscheinung zu stellen sind, unterschieden sind.)

The acts that place the object of the representation in space and time are here characterized as determined by rules that are different from the condi-tions that concern the form "wie sie in Ansehung der Erscheinung zu stellen sind" - and which I understand as a reference to space and time as forms of intuitions. R 4 6 3 4 thus contributes essentially to the introduction of "Thätig-keiten des Gemiiths" in connection with the space and time determination of empirical intuition. In this reflection Kant reveals the spontaneity of the subject as the ground of the sensible determination or specification of the object.

III.

I will continue with an examination of R 4 6 2 9 . This reflection contains support for the view that the sensible functions are grounding the determinate logical functions, that is, according to my interpretation, also the real use of the understanding:

Die Grundbegriffe aller unsrer Erkenntnis sind [die qualitaet (was da sey) die quantitaet (wie viel mal)] l.das seyn überhaupt (8 quidditaet), zweytens: wie etwas ist, drittens: wie vielmal es ist. Das, wodurch die Dinge gegeben sind, ist empfindung; wie sie gegeben sind, reine Anschauungen. Durch den Verstand werden entweder Dinge gedacht oder nur ihre sinnliche Vorstellungen. Die Zahl bedarf Raum und Zeit zu ihrer Anschauenden Vorstellung. Die logische Form ist eben das vor die [Begriffe] Verstandes Vorstellungen von einem Dinge, was räum und Zeit vor die Erscheinungen derselben sind: nemlich iene enthalten die stellen, sie zu ordnen. Die Vorstellung [sei], wodurch wir einem object seine eigenthümliche logische Stelle anweisen, ist der reale Verstandesbegrif und rein: z. E. Etwas, was ich jederzeit nur als subject brauchen kann; Etwas, wovon ich hypothetisch auf ein conseqvens schließen muß etc. Dadurch dass unsre Empfindungen eine bestimmte Stelle* im Räume und der Zeit bekommen, erlangen sie eine function unter den Erscheinungen; die Stelle aber im Räume und in der Zeit ist bestimmt durch die Nachbarschaft anderer Empfindungen in denselben; z. E. auf den Zustand meiner Empfindungen,

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Kant's Standpoint Anno 1772 39

die mit den vorigen etwas gemein haben, folgt der andere; die empfindung eines Wiederstandes ist zugleich in demselben räume mit der Schwere verbunden. Durch die Bestimmung der logischen stelle bekommt die Vorstellung eine Function unter den Begriffen e. g. Antecedens, conseqvens. Doch ist die sensitive Function der Grund der intellectualen.

* (8 eine bestimmte Stelle ist von der willkürlichen unterschieden.)4

Firstly, R 4629 shows how the sensible functions determine specific places for the objects in space and time. In this reflection Kant makes it explicit how "Stellen" in space and time as forms of intuitions are determined for the "Empfindungen", not through the forms of intuitions alone, but through their neighborhood to other sensations. Kant here further claims that objects are given to us through "Empfindungen", but also that the way they are given is determined by the forms of intuitions; that is, that the objects are not given as "Empfindungen", neither are the "Empfindungen" first (logically) given and thereafter (eventually) put together in a pure form of intuition, but that these are simultaneous ("gleichursprüngliche") moments of the way objects are given to us: "wodurch" and "worin"/"wie". Thirdly, the general ways "wodurch" "Empfindungen" determine each other places ("Stellen") in space and time, their neighborhood, is what later will be understood as "transcen-dental schemata". The reflection shows that Kant sees a parallel between the determination of how a representation may be accorded intellectual functions among concepts, and the determination through the sensible functions of the place of a sensible representation in space and time. But it also shows that Kant maintains that the sensible functions ground the determination of the intellectual function of a representation and thereby its place in the logical

space . This conforms with the program of the Critique·. A sensible representation

cannot be subsumed directly under the categories; it has to be subsumed through the mediation of the sensible functions between this and other sen-sible representations. That the problem of Schematism has been with Kant from early on in the silent decade has until recently not been noticed by the Kant interpretation. Under these circumstances it must therefore necessarily be difficult to understand how Kant worked out the position of the Critique, since the Schematism is deeply involved in the Transcendental Deduction.

IV.

In our examination we have now arrived at R 4631: Ak XVII, 615

(g Der Raum ist ein datum.) Die logische Handlungen sind actus, wodurch wir die data zu Vorstellungen der Dinge respective gegen einander setzen und ordnen. Dadurch bekommen die Vorstellungen logische functionen. Die reale function [ist] besteht in der Art, wie

4 Ak XVII, 614. The instances of the word "wodurch" are not emphasized in the original.

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4 0 Johan Amt Myrstad

wir eine Vorstellung an und vor sich selbst setzen; also ist es eine Handlung (a priori), welche ieglichem data (a posteriori) correspondirt und wodurch dieses zum Begriffe wird. Diese handlungen sind die Quellen, woraus die logischen Möglich sind. Daraus entspringen alle Erkenntnisse, wie wir nemlich data fassen und uns selbst etwas, was Erkentnis heißt, formiren können. In der Natur können uns keine data vorkommen, als daß, wenn man Gesetze darin warnimt, sie den allgemeinen arten correspondiren, wornach wir etwas setzen, weil sonsten keine gesetze würden bemerkt werden oder überhaupt kein Obiect, sondern nur verworrene innere Veränderungen. Da wir also obiecte nur durch unsre Veränderungen Vorstellen können, so fern sie etwas unsern Regeln zu setzen und aufzuheben gemäßes an sich haben, so sind die realfunctionen der Grund der Möglichkeit der Vorstellung der Sachen und die logische Functionen der grund der Möglichkeit der Urtheile, folglich der Erkentnisse. Denn obiect heißt nur das, welche bricht ab.5

A n important contribution which this reflection makes to the understand-ing of Kant's standpoint a n n o 1 7 7 2 , is the emphasis on the connect ion be-tween "Thätigkeiten des G e m ü t h s " as acts and the primary products of these acts, the real functions that the manifold of the representation is possessed with, as well as the respective functions between representations (the sensible and logical functions). We also see h o w K a n t argues that all data are made thinkable through the real functions they are given with, in the sense that the real functions m a k e possible the product ion of concepts that conceive the objects of the data : ( " u n d w o d u r c h dieses zum Begriffe wird. Diese handlungen sind die Quellen, w o r a u s die logischen [Handlungen] Mögl ich sind. Daraus entspringen alle Erkenntnisse, wie wir nemlich data fassen und uns selbst etwas, w a s Erkentnis heisst, formieren können [, durch die logichen Func-t ionen. ] " ) . T h e basic relation between the real functions and the logical functions acts is therefore that the real m a k e the logical possible.6

5 Ak XVII, 615. The emphasis of the word "wodurch" is mine. 6 Wolfgang Carl also states that "die allgemeinen arten" refer to the real functions (Carl, p. 60).

But since he identifies the latter with the real use of the understanding, Carl reads this text as saying that the representations first become representations of objects through the deter-mination by categories in judgments. But firstly, the part of R 4631 that precedes the part he cites, i. e., the simultaneous ("gleichzeitige", ) addition "Der Raum is ein Datum", shows that his identification of data and "Empfindungen" and his interpretation of "Empfindungen" as sense data without any intentional relation to the sensed object, hardly can be correct. Secondly, what follows the part quoted by Carl, shows that Kant differentiates between the conditions of "Vorstellungen der Sachen" and conditions of "Erkenntnisse der Sachen", and thus underscores the relation between real functions and "Empfindungen" and "Anschau-ungen" on the one hand, and the relation between the real use of the understanding through the application of categories (intellectual functions) and knowledge ("Erfahrung") on the other. Other reflections that differentiates similarly are R 4635 (Ak XVII, 617) and R 4634 (Ak XVII, 618). The most important reflection in this connection is, however, R 4636 (Ak XVII, 619-620): "Erkenntnisse a priori müssen gar nicht auf bestimmte Dinge (weil diese noch nicht gegeben sind), sondern auf allgemeine Vorstellungen von Dingen überhaupt gehen und also auf anschauungen (g nicht Empfindungen, denn diese sind es, wodurch etwas Bestimmtes gegeben wird) oder auf Gedanken überhaupt. (Man kann etwas Anschauen, ohne etwa dabey oder darunter zu denken.) (8 Alle Erkenntnisse kommen in uns durch denken, d. i. durch Begriffe, sie sind nicht Anschauungen.)"

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Kant's Standpoint Anno 1772 4 1

In my opinion, Kant also introduces the sensible functions and the relation between the sensible and the real and the logical functions in this reflection, even though the sensible functions are not explicitly mentioned. This intro-duction takes place in the paragraph that begins with the phrase "In der Natur können uns keine .. .". Kant here opens the exposition by maintaining that no data can occur in nature if the laws we eventually recognize in nature do not accord with the general ways (that is, the real functions) in which we possess something as represented at all, since if things were otherwise, we would not be able to recognize any laws in nature, where the data are given, or notice any objects at all.7

What Kant examines here is thus the relation between the real functions and the sensing of objects on the one hand and knowledge of natural laws on the other. Kant thus touches on the theme that he explores in relation to inner sense and the triple synthesis in the Α-deduction and further on in the Analytic of Principles. The theme is that our representations occur successively in time and that we must recognize objects and the natural laws through this flux: "Da wir also obiecte nur durch unsre Veränderungen Vorstellen können, so fern sie etwas unsern Regeln zu setzen und aufzuheben gemäßes an sich haben, so sind die realfunctionen der Grund der Möglichkeit der Vorstellung der Sachen". On my reading, this passage states: The rules that make it possible to possess something or deny something at all, must also determine the connections between the representations through the flux of time that constitute the ground for connected representations of an object and make it possible to know the laws of nature. These reflections thus give expression to an understanding of the relation between perceptions and experience as knowl-edge of sensibly given objects, that is expressed as succinctly only in the Opus postumum.

V.

There are thus three levels of "Thätigkeiten des Gemüths" that give synthetic unity and functions to the (re) presentations (Vorstellungen). Firstly, the sen-sibly given representations of the objects are possessed in the mind through "Thätigkeiten des Gemüths" that subject the representations to real func-tions. Secondly, the successively given representations are put into relation to each other through synthesizing "Thätigkeiten des Gemüths" that are grounded in the unity that is determined through the real functions of the representations, and which make possible specific representations of the ob-

7 Carl, p. 60 contains an important misquotation. The passage which reads "sie den allgemeinen arten correspondiren", according to the Academy edition, is reproduced as "die den allgemeinen arten correspondiren" by Carl. The version of the Academy edition makes it possible to read the sentence not as an assertion that no data may occur for us in nature if we do not conceive of them according to the laws of nature, but as an assertion that when ("wenn") we discover laws in nature, then these laws must correspond to the ways we posit our "Vorstellungen an und vor sich", i. e., according to the real functions.

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4 2 Johan A m t Myrstad

jects through sensible functions between the representations. Thirdly, these sensible functions and their "Thätigkeiten des Gemiiths" in their turn make possible "the knowledge" of the objects through the determination of the logical (or intellectual) functions between the representations that ground judgments, that is, the real use of the understanding.

What are the internal relations between these levels? According to the teaching of the Critique the synthetic unity in the real, the sensible and the logical functions must be identical, being constituted in and through the constitution by the representing subject of its own representing and acting unity. The differences are also sharp though: the real functions correspond to the synopsis of the intuition, and neither the manifold in the intuition as manifold nor the unity that this manifold are given with, i.e. as unity, are as such presented through the real functions alone. The sensible functions con-stitute the presentations of the manifold of intuitions and the intuition of manifold, as such, in singular presentations, i.e., in intuitions, with the help of the imagination. The intellectual functions constitute experience through the presentation in judgement of the manifold of intuition as determined under the unity that makes the synthesis of the imagination possible.8

Equally important as the differences however, are the connections between the different forms of function that are going to be used in a transcendental deduction of the objective validity of the categories: By being given sensations, these must be determinately presented in space and time, and this demands that the mind acts in a way that further on makes possible acts of synthesis that combine the sensations with each other in a continuum of sensations and appearances. Kant also tries to show that the application of the categories on the manifold of empirical intuitions, i. e., the realization of the intellectual functions between the data, must make use of the mediation through the sensible functions. The transmission takes place in the following way: The immediate sensation gives us the object in an empirical intuition as immedi-ately given Erscheinung. Sensation (Erfindung) is what in the intuition corre-sponds to what the objects is given to us through ("wodurch"). But the conscious sensation of the object as mediated Erscheinung is perception (Wahrnehmung) which only is possible through a synthesis of apprehension. In the synthesis of apprehension the sensations are given sensible "Functionen

It must be admitted that this interpretation of the reflections from 1 7 7 2 goes farther than what can be safely read out of these reflections alone. But the interpretation gives consistent and coherent meaning to the three reflections we have looked into, and may be confirmed through the reading of others, both from the same period and from Duisburg'schen Nachlass. But since the most important contribution that this interpretation makes is its understanding of the real function, I will confine myself to a citation of a reflection from 1 7 7 2 that expresses what most clearly singles out the real function in contradistinction from the intellectual and the sensible functions, i. e., that it is non-respective: R 4 6 3 5 , Ak XVII, 6 1 9 : "Nicht ein jedes obiect ist eine sache. Dasjenige an der Vorstellung, wodurch sie ihre eigenthümliche function hat, stellet [die Sache selbst] das Obiect vor (reale function); ihre function im Urtheile ist die respective function, wodurch sie eine vielgültigkeit in ansehung anderer Vorstellungen hat. Die erste function geht auf das, was in der Vorstellung liegt; die zweyte, was dadurch erkannt werden kann".

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Kant's Standpoint Anno 1 7 7 2 43

unter den Erscheinungen" through an act with a unity of consciousness, that only is conceived as such through a reflection on the subject's acting unity ("als Thätigkeit des Gemüths"). And only when the object that is given in the sensation is represented as determined according to ("nach") this unity, is it explicitly and determinately known as such.

In this case Kant has the following argument for identifying the unity of the real, the sensible and the intellectual functions and acts: Only thus may the object that is given through the real function be known through the intellectual functions. Only thus may the object that is given in the immediate intuition through the real function, be continually represented in the flux of sensations through the sensible functions. Only thus may the unity that determines the given representation through the real functions be represented in the intellectual function through the mediation of the sensible functions and the exposition of the real through the sensible functions.9

A central theme in Kant's elaborations between 1772 and the writing of the Duisburg'schen Nachlass is therefore the connections and differences between the sensible and the intellectual functions discussed under the treat-ment of the corresponding acts of conjugation and exposition, and between their general "products", the schemata and categories, respectively.10 It is also evident that Kant now acknowledges that the real functions can be subjected to articulated scruting only through reflections on the way they condition the sensible and intellectual functions. A discursive examination demands that the "non-respective" functions are "represented" through the "respective" ones. This is an important predicament for the self-understanding of a being that does not possess an intellectual intuition or an intuitive understanding.

9 In the Duisburg'schen Nachlass the relation between the sensible functions and the real use of the understanding is mainly treated in connection with the treatment of the relation between apprehension ("Apprehension") and exposition ("Exposit ion") . These reflections demonstrate the same complex understanding Kant used the real, sensible and intellectual functions to argue in the reflections from 1 7 7 2 : R 4 6 7 8 Ak XVII, 6 6 0 - 6 6 1 : "Wir müssen Begriffe exponiren, wenn wir sie nicht construiren können. Erscheinungen können wir nicht construiren, obzwar Anschauungen. Allein wir müssen Regeln ihrer exposition haben. Diese Regeln sind wirklich regeln der erscheinung selbst, aber in so fern das innere derselben in der Auflösung derselben entdeckt werden soll. Die Regeln also der Auflösung der Erscheinungen sind eigentlich die Bedingungen der apprehension, in so fem sie von einer zur andern übergeht und sie coniugirt".

10 Cf. R 4 6 7 4 (Ak XVII, 6 4 6 ) on the notions of conjugation and exposition, and see R 4 6 4 0 (AK XVII, 6 2 1 ) for an early treatment on the functional level of the relation between schemata and categories.

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