Beiträge zur Kölner Afrikawissenschaftlichen Nachwuchstagung (KANT II)

 

Herausgegeben von

Marilena Thanassoula, Kathrin Kolossa, Claudia Baasner, Peter André Rodekuhr, Marc Seifert, Nico Nassenstein, Anne-Kathrin Horstmann, Christoph Vogel, Larissa-Diana Fuhrmann

The Africa Policy of ‚normative‘ power EU considering Cotonou Agreement and promotion of EPAs

Christoph Vogel, Universität zu Köln

1. INTRODUCTION

Economic relations between the EU and ACP countries have a long tradition. After Yaoundé conventions in the

1960s, 1975 the first Lomé Agreement was established between ACP countries and EC member states. Between

1975 and 2000 EU and ACP countries ran four subsequent Lomé conventions replaced by Cotonou agreement now.

Lomé was concerned to be an agreement providing ACP countries better access to European markets in order to

push economic development and build up domestic production. The emergence of WTO in 1995 changed the

regulatory framework for regional trade agreements in such a way, that Lomé IV could not pass into a fifth version.

In order to be compliant with WTO measures, a new agreement was worked out 2000 in Cotonou. It came into

power in 2002.

The complete establishment of that treaty it is still far from becoming reality, as a considerable number of ACP

countries have still not negotiated EPAs. A crucial issue in these negotiations is the division of ACP countries in six

groups for regional EPAs. This division does not merge with other regional trade and political networks in Sub-

Saharan Africa and does not include all ACP countries.

With ‘good governance’ having emerged as a ‘vital’ issue in international politics and especially in EU’s

agenda, a relevant number of non-economic issues found their way into Cotonou agreement. By linking trade

agreements and development aid with the spread of European or Western democracy ‘standards’ those different

fields were brought into contact. The major question of the following research shall be, whether EU trade policy

towards ACP countries is supposed to be an instrument serving the diffusion of human rights and democracy or

rather a ‘smoke screen’ for a hidden economic agenda.

This research will work with different approaches rooted in political science following the basic assumption

EU-ACP cooperation has always been a political relationship1. In the following theoretical chapter (neo-)realist

interpretation will be put in contrast to Ian Manners’ ‘normative’ power approach using Lisbeth Aggestam’s

framework of role model theory. Further on, the research chapter will discuss characteristic matters of EU-ACP

relations and put into focus chances and perils of conditional economic cooperation and development aid.

                                                            1 cp. Hurt, Stephen R.: Co-operation and coercion? 2003, p. 161-176.

                    KANT II                                                

 

2  

                                                           

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. ROLE MODEL THEORY

The question, whether EU is ‘a political actor’ in its foreign policy has been widely discussed by scholars. The

following research paper will take up Aggestam’s2 proposal in order to structure the theoretical assessments.

Aggestam takes up a pattern rooted in theatre studies and sociology3, known as role theory. Quoting Le Prestre she

defines a role reflecting “a claim on the international system, a recognition by international actors, and a conception

of identity”4.

As “there does not exist a single general role theory”5 this approach will only give a framework for how “EU’s

international action” could be categorized, assuming that EU might be seen as an actor. Going along with Kalevi

Holsti, who elaborated role theory for foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s, Aggestam sees a dynamic interaction

between those filling out such a role and the structure in which they are acting. Roles are therefore not constituted

by political actors independently, but rely on other actors as well. According to Holsti, a role is firstly “a product of

a nation’s socialization process and influenced by its history, culture and societal characteristics”6, as “foreign

policy-makers […] are neither completely free choosing agents, nor is their behaviour entirely determined by

external structures”7.

For better illustrating and facilitate empirical use of role theory in foreign policy analysis, Aggestam proposes

a threefold analytical scheme, consisting of “institutional, interactional and intensional”8 perspectives. She points

out that “structures are upheld by ongoing processes of structuration”9, hence such perspectives should not be

regarded as non-dynamic categories set once. That is basically why it is not sufficient to look only at the institutional

perspective, as it cannot explain the dynamics of change. The interactional perspective allows further on to see how

different actors are influencing themselves in a reciprocal way10, whereas the intensional perspective gives us the

possibility to identify self-referential influence in constructing roles11.

More relevant for this paper are Aggestam’s distinctions of roles. The division of expectation, conception,

performance and set of a role12 will be used to illustrate possible differences between ‘legal’ and ‘living’

constitution of EU-ACP relations. Whereas ‘role expectations’ result from external expectations to an actor, who is

supposed to “learn what behaviour is expected of”13 it, ‘role conception’ describes the self-given (“normative”14)

claim the actor expresses towards itself. Aggestam further on notes that actors “tend to conceive multiple roles” and

 2 Aggestam, Lisbeth: Role Theory and European foreign policy: a framework for analysis. 2006, p. 11-29. 3 Ibid. p. 12. 4 Ibid. p. 11. 5 Ibid. p. 12. 6 Holsti, Kalevi, in: Ibid. p. 13. 7 Ibid. p. 13. 8 Ibid. p. 14. 9 Ibid. p. 14. 10 Cp. Ibid. p. 16-17. 11 Cp. Ibid. p. 17. 12 Cp. Ibid. p. 18. 13 Aggestam, p. 18. 14 Ibid. p. 18.

                    KANT II                                                

 

3  

                                                           

also try to allow themselves some “room for manœuvre”15. Role performance is then the “actual foreign-policy

behaviour in terms of […] decisions and actions undertaken in specific situational contexts”16 and thus the empirical

action seen under presumptions of role model theory. The role-set combines various roles adopted by an actor, it

“represents the sum total”17 of roles of an individual (or an actor). Aggestam mentions Duchêne’s “concept of

civilian power Europe”18 as an example. Concluding she mentions role model theory as a concept to go “beyond

mere considerations to maximize its material interests”19.

In the following the ‘role-sets’ will be EU as a ‘realist’ power20 or actor compared to it being a ‘normative’

power. This paper will not further take into consideration the sources and conflict potentials of roles Aggestam is

dealing with.

2.2. CONCURRENT THEORIES

2.2.1 EU AS A REALIST ACTOR21

The realist approach as a grand theory in Political Science has had little influence22 in the current analysis of EU

international action, compared to other major approaches, like the liberal-idealist, although we will see below it

merits to be also used in this field. As Adrian Hyde-Price argues, liberal-idealist approaches are rather concentrated

in values and which way they are promoted, instead of analyzing power and power constellation as Realism does.

Quoting Hedley Bull, Hyde-Price points out that ‘normative’ or ‘ethical’ power is strongly related to a “strategic

environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control”23 and can therefore be an

incomplete analytical frame.

Following the classical realist division of “high politics” and “low politics”, issues like security, welfare and

sovereignty are to be classified as parts of the first group, whereas issues like norms and values are forming the

second group. A realist assessment about EU being a ‘normative’ or ‘ethical’ power must therefore rely on the

condition that EU is enjoying a certain state of security, which is enabling it to dedicate itself to what is defined as

‘low politics’.

Hence, EU’s abilities to spread values as an international actor are highly depending on a favourable environment in

terms of power constellations. This implies on one hand that it is able to provide security for its members as a

collective actor and on the other hand the absence of existential threats. Examining these implications would be

impossible without taking into consideration the sui generis24 nature of the European Union.

 15 Both: Ibid. p. 20. 16 Ibid. p. 20. 17 Ibid. p. 21. 18 Duchêne, in: Ibid. p. 21. 19 Ibid. p. 25.

21 As it is not a major question of this research to reveal the major differences of classical and neo-realism there will be no further division of those terms. 22 Cp. Hyde-Price, Adrian: ’Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique, 2006, p. 218. 23 Bull, Hedley, 1982, p. 151, in: Hyde-Price, Adrian 2006, p. 218. 24 In this case, the term ‘sui generis’ targets the different polity frames (supranational vs. intergovernmental) shaping EU policy in the different columns.

                    KANT II                                                

 

4  

                                                           

As there is no real ‘European army’ or anything else comparable to this25 and there are even visible threats to

security in various member states26, realist argumentation needs to be amended by rationality. Adrian Hyde-Price

suggests using it as an intervening factor in the action of a state27.

Thus, within the frame of security and sovereignty, states “also pursue distinctive normative and ideological

agendas, usually in response to domestic political factors”28, but do not do that “at the expense of their vital national

interests”29 which are namely the so-called ‘high politics’. As long as their security and sovereignty will not be

affected negatively, states are likely to act value-orientated. A European country for example should be strongly

interested in being seen as a fighter for universal Human Rights, as they correspond widely to fundamental values in

European societies. Hyde-Price is calling the EU “a vehicle for the collective pursuit”30 of such and similar interests.

Used as an element of conditionality this vehicle can have structural access in other fields where the EU can be

seen as an “instrument”31 of its members. That is the case in economic policy, where the EU is supposed to be the

agent representing collective interests of the member states, or in international diplomacy where the “EU acts as a

collective hegemony, shaping its external milieu by utilizing both hard and soft power”32. The striking gap between

realist and norm-based approaches is that in realism norms and values are ‘instruments’ or even ‘instruments of

instruments’33, whereas normative approaches place them in the theory’s core.

2.2.2 EU AS A NORMATIVE ACTOR

Theories of ‘normative’ or ‘ethical’ power gained considerable importance in the context of analyzing European

politics. Those approaches are basically rooted in what Duchêne called ‘civilian’34 power. The term ‘normative’

power as such has at least a threefold meaning. According to Ian Manners it can be used for a power that “changes

the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity” as

well as a “hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance”35. Alongside to this

rather structural views, it describes political action being verbatim ‘normative’ or “ethically good”36.

Characterized as a ‘normative’ power, EU is supposed to act relying “on civilian rather than military means

and to pursue the spread of particular norms, rather than geographical expansion or military superiority”37.

Illustrating the ‘normative’ power approach, Manners mentions the promotion of broadly accepted normative

principles38 or the acquisition of what we call ‘universal’ moral, normative and ethical rules, as well as their

 25 Certainly the so-called ‘EU-Battlegroups’ cannot be characterized as an army. 26 External threats would be i.e. terrorist attacks in Madrid or London, but also ‘neighbourhood issues’ like war in former Yugoslavia. Internal threats would be i.e. the civil riots in Athens at the end of 2008. 27 cp. Hyde-Price, Adrian: A ‘tragic actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical Europe’, 2008, p.31. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. p 32. 31 Ibid. p 31. 32 Hyde-Price, Adrian, in: Sjursen, Helen: What kind of power? 2006, p. 178. 33 Illustrating the relation norms and values can have towards EU milieu-shaping, yet defined as ‘instrument’ by Hyde-Price. 34 Diez, Thomas: Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’, 2005 p. 614. 35 Both: Manners, Ian: The normative ethics of the European Union, 2008, pp. 45. 36 Ibid. 37 Diez, p. 613. 38 Cp. Manners, p. 46.

                    KANT II                                                

 

5  

                                                           

integration in an ideational-political portfolio39. That might be measured taking the nine normative principles of EU

politics as a basis and compare them with the empirical objectives, actions and impacts40.

Due to its lack of terminological clarity ‘normative’ power theory appears to be vulnerable to critiques. A first

objection concerns the question, if ‘normative’ is rooted in ‘norms’ or in ‘normality’, or even in both41. Another

question concerns ‘normative power’ being a power “to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’” or more likely “the

power to shape the values of others”42. This lack of conceptual clarity is complemented by more critical points.

Diez mentions “the discrepancy between rhetoric and concrete policies”43, which might be an obvious

suspicion, referring to such overall and rather brisk wordings, as “eradicating poverty” or “respect for and promotion

of all human rights”44 in Cotonou treaty.

Another significant critique to the ability of a state or a group of states being a ‘normative’ power towards

others is up to a cultural perception. Hence, it appears to be difficult maintaining the assumption, general values and

norms should be spread all over the world. Yet the idea of universal values is dangerous. Without any doubt, issues

like peace, rule of law or freedom are not to be discussed, but as soon as polity-oriented or economic thoughts enter

that area it becomes complicated to classify them as a common value, and even ‘Human Rights’ are not culturally

independent, looking at the fact that there is a ECHR. Or, in Helen Sjursens words, we “(…) cannot really tell

whether or not the EU’s ‘normative’ power is simply an expression of Eurocentric cultural imperialism”45.

3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

3.1 THE NATURE OF EU-ACP RELATIONS

Examining the relationship ACP states and the EU established in the framework of the four Lomé conventions and

Cotonou agreement/EPAs requires clarifying different terms used to describe this kind of relationship. Official EU

statements are pointing out this relationship is a “partnership”46 and a “cooperation”47. These terms imply

reciprocity, both in ensuring this reciprocity as well as in the share of resources.

Referring to Cotonou one might argue that already the abolishment of unilateral trade preferences is a step to meet

such terminological aims, but such presumptions might lead to analytical shortcomings. According to Hurt and

Clapman, “the first Lome Convention was a unique agreement in that it was negotiated during international

circumstances that allowed the ACP states to negotiate from ‘something approaching a position of equality’”48. Hurt

mentions the installation of STABEX, which ensured EDF financing for ACP countries when agricultural incomes

were fluctuating due to market prices.

 39 Ibid, p. 56. 40 Cp. Ibid, pp. 48-59. 41 Cp. Diez, p. 615f. 42 Both: Ibid. 43 Ibid, p. 613. 44 Both: Cotonou full agreement text. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/agr01_en.pdf, 1st January 2009. 45 Sjursen, pp. 175. 46 An interpretation of this term is delivered in: Raffer, Kunibert: Cotonou: Slowly undoing Lomé’s concept of partnership. 47 Cotonou full agreement text, inter al. p. 7, 9, 11 and many others. 48 Hurt, p. 161-162.

                    KANT II                                                

 

6  

                                                           

Due to the worldwide spread of neoliberal ideas in economy issues such ideas were mainly rejected in

following Lomé Conventions49. At the same time, EU policy as a whole became concentrated on ideas like

“liberalization of markets, removal of subsidies and foreign direct investment”50, while protectionist policies where

sharpened in the area of agricultural economy.

The Maastricht Treaty and following establishment of European single market can be seen as a mirror for the

neoliberal trend. That being a break in the history of European integration led to a paradigmatic shift reflected in

external relations some time later. Connected to the hypothesis of EU being a ‘normative power’, one could argue

the establishment free trade areas became a ‘European value’ at the latest when EU emerged as one huge free trade

area.

Pursuing this path, it is rather logic, that this ‘norm’ must be spread further in the world. Explaining the same

evolution, Hurt is referring to a neo-Gramscian concept, where “hegemony is represented as a fit between power,

ideas and institutions”51, but states that such hegemony is “based mostly on consent and not coercion”52. In the case

of European single market that might be right, but going back to EU-ACP relations one can observe that

“(t)he language of the Cotonou Agreement cleverly blends ideas of consent and coercion (central to a

neo-Gramscian perspective). Consent is achieved through notions of 'dialogue', 'partnership' and of

ACP states 'owning' their own development strategies. Coercion is present in the EU's presentation of

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as the only viable alternative and also thought he

implementation of frequent reviews of aid provision that have conditionality attached. Hence we see

consent in the first instance with the coercion coming later.”53

Another example of ideas gaining hegemonic power is the adaption of IMF and World Bank ‘ideology’, as in Lomé

IV the EDF was partly linked to SAPs, which have had almost ‘normative’ character in 1980s and early 1990s.

In the framework of Cotonou agreement other significant changes took place. Articles 2 and 2154 stress the position

of the private sector whereas article 11 represents EU and ACP countries accepting market economy55. Besides from

various theses, there is no real argumentation in the agreement text, why the economic system of the Western

hemisphere should be the right choice for a prosperous future in ACP countries. Rather we have to ask whether the

“increasing incorporation of democratically unaccountable non-state actors, especially the private sector, into the

process may actually serve to weaken the process of democratization”56.

As access to basic services is already limited, the possible take-over of i.e. water works and power stations by

private sector could worsen the provision of public goods even more. As “ACP countries do not have a competitive

private sector”57, this would open new markets, i.e. for European energy enterprises, feeding the argument that the

EU is pursuing its own economic interests in a realist manner, and that being another expression of spreading a value,

 49 Cp. Ibid, p. 162. 50 Ibid, p. 163. 51 Cox, Robert, in: Hurt, p. 163. 52 Ibid, p. 163. 53 Ibid, p. 163 54 among many others: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/agr01_en.pdf, p. 9, 33, 34. 55 Ibid, p. 18. 56 Hurt, p. 172 57 Raffer, p. 7.

                    KANT II                                                

 

7  

                                                           

which has been induced for a considerable period of time in the EU area.

Also the notion of non-state actors58, particularly in article 4, could be classified as an application of neoliberal

thoughts, albeit not necessarily in a pure economic way59. In the context of democratization and development aid,

there are specific programmes Commission delegations are running explicitly and exclusively with local NGOs. In

the framework of these programmes, financial aid is given to local organizations applying for it and able to present a

coherent, solid and relevant agenda60.

3.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR ACP COUNTRIES WITH FOCUS ON AFRICA

The history of EU-ACP countries shows several points where EU claims to provide sustainable development and

economic prosperity have not been met. An example is the actual ACP share in EU market (declining from 4.1 % in

1970 to 1.0 % in 200361). This happened although former Lomé conventions envisaged unilateral trade preferences

for the ACP group. Borrmann et al. state that poor ACP export performances do not mainly rely on general trade

liberalization. They argue “the real reasons behind the dismal performance” are missing “productive and

technological capacities, marketing skills, transportation channels, and appropriate technical and sanitary regulations

that are required to exploit the opportunities on EU and world markets.”62 Contrary to various affirmations the EU

made in ACP partnership, its assistance to generate improved and competitive environments in ACP countries has not

been successful.63

The new initiative consisting of the introduction of EPAs is considered to renew EU-ACP ‘partnership’. Pushed

by WTO compliance the creation of EPAs shall promote “mutual liberalization”64, which is verbatim the reciprocal

reduction of tariff barriers. Within this process65 EU seeks to elaborate regional EPAs with six regions. Indeed those

regions do not cover all ACP countries66 and they do not even “coincide with existing regional integration

schemes”67, which is not the best base to start negotiations. Given the fact, that some regions, like SADC for example

consist of non-LDCs as well as LDCs68 negotiations would have to take into consideration these differences as

well69.70 71

The possible introduction of EPAs implies some more risks, especially for the ACP group. They would for

example include a significant loss of tariff revenues for participating governments72. These losses might be absorbed

 58 Hurt, p. 11,12. 59 as this includes also NGOs, civil movements or think tanks. 60 own experience during an internship with the Delegation of the Commission in Kinshasa, DRC, albeit it is a case of bounded aid, enforcing realist assumptions. 61 Cp. Ibid, p. 169. 62 Ibid, p. 170. 63 Ibid, p. 170. 64 Ibid, p. 170. 65 A process, that is covered by a WTO waiver, which is a slight commitment to ACP countries. 66 Especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. 67 Borrmann, p. 171. 68 The case of South Africa is again different. See in Borrmann, p. 172. 69 Ibid, p. 172. 70 For further information see also: McQueen, Matthew: ACP-EU Trade Cooperation after 2000: An Assessment of Reciprocal Trade Preferences, 1998, p. 677-678. 71 See also Table 5.1. 72 Borrmann, p. 171.

                    KANT II                                                

 

8  

                                                           

by higher export rates, but there is no certainty for ACP governments, whether the mentioned lack of capacities will

allow this. Moreover, Borrmann et al. mention “considerable structural adjustment costs”73 for ACP countries

adopting an EPA and according to McQueen these countries might not be interested in that due to their “structural

weaknesses”74. In his article about Cotonou treaty Raffer shows why it cannot be taken for granted that EU aid will

help significantly in eliminating these weaknesses, as significant amounts of EDFs are distributed rather slowly and

are finally raid for other using75. Grimm and Brüntrup state further on, that free trade generally seen, “is not,

however, enough to ensure economic growth, and it may not even be necessary”76, mentioning the development of

Asian countries as an example.

Other forms of cooperation provided by the Cotonou framework are EU’s GSP and EBA. Due to space, the

mentioned cannot be explained in detail77.

3.3 WTO COMPLIANCE AS A ‘REALIST’ ELEMENT

The former non-reciprocal trade preferences for ACP countries provided by EC and EU in Lomé conventions have

been recognized as incompatible to WTO regulations and GATT rules. An outstanding argument for that has been

the fact, that non-LDCs within the ACP group are profiting from unilateral trade preferences whereas LDCs outside

of ACP group do not, what actually is not conform with GATT enabling clause from 1979.78

The non-reciprocal nature of Lomé conventions further broke article XXIV79 of GATT establishing reciprocity

as precondition for trade agreements. Those irregularities in GATT compliance led to a situation where EU was

given a six-year ‘waiver’. Looking at the current difficulties establishing EPAs it seems probable, that several more

WTO waivers will be necessary, before EU-ACP relations will be conform.

These implementation problems EU and ACP group are facing raises the question, why EU suddenly had such

an interest in fulfilling WTO requirements, as it can be assumed, that ACP states have not been the driving force for

this development. Following Raffer, “the WTO proves a helpful means to abolish remaining Lomé instruments”80

Given the fact, that EU commits that it has “to defend their economic and geopolitical interests“81 in a paper

concerning its relations to ACP states there is some evidence for its acting being an expression of realist politics82.

A similar argument is given by Goodison and Stoneman, stressing the thesis, that EU’s “underlying

motivations” are among others “securing a WTO agreement” providing “market expansion” and a “commercial

advantage for EU producers over the international competitors”83. Such reasons must not be underestimated, as

Emily Jones notes, that “the only constraint on a fair agreement between the EU and ACP countries – apart from  

73 Ibid, p. 172. 74 McQueen, p. 673. 75 Cp. Raffer, p. 4-6. 76 Grimm, Sven and Brüntrup, Michael: EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP regions, 2006, p. 88.77 For information’s see Hurt, Borrmann or McQueen. 78 Ibid, p. 50. 79 Cp. Borrmann, p. 169 and McQueen, p. 669. 80 Raffer, p. 3. 81 EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER 1996. Available at: http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/com96_570/index_en.htm, 4th January 2009. 82 That, albeit it is not about classical power politics, but a clever instrumentalization of external norms, which are used in order to pursue strategic interests. 83 Goodison, Paul and Stoneman, Colin: Europe: Partner or Exploiter of Africa? The G-90 & the ACP, 2004, pp. 732.

                    KANT II                                                

 

9  

                                                           

political will – is that any deal needs to be in compliance with World Trade Organization rules”84 with addition that

this means an agreement which “includes the very basics needed for WTO compatibility”85.

Asking for the ‘normative’ side of WTO compliance it should not be forgotten that “(t)he introduction of

reciprocal liberalization under the FTA and Economic Co-operation proposals could expose some of the world's

most food insecure countries to the dumping of heavily subsidized EU exports”86. Even though this does not mean

that EU is not acting in a normative way87, there is to say that promoting food security is – ethically seen – a

fundamental political aim. Hence this could only be a ‘normative’ behaviour, if it is defined as a pursuit of a norm

given by WTO88 or if the term ‘normative’ is used in a self-referential way89.

3.4 POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AS A ‘NORMATIVE’ ELEMENT

Cotonou agreement is accompanied by some paradigmatic shifts in EU-ACP relations. Alongside to WTO

compliance, a major point is the political conditionality.

Combining economic agreements with genuine political topics is not a completely new feature of Cotonou

agreement. The great change concerning Cotonou is that, “politics is now at the centre”90, at least regarding the ‘legal

constitution’. In the framework of ‘aid’ emerging as a constantly more important issue one can clearly see the

outcomes of linking ‘cooperation’ to non-economic topics. Basically the EU tries to enforce the democratization by

providing aid to specific initiatives and campaigns in this field, but also by sanctioning violations91. Whereas the first

part of this strategy appears to be a promising approach, Raffer criticizes that “all demands subsumed under political

conditionality are fairly opaque, and the EU is largely free to decide what it considers a breach of obligations with

regard to essential elements”92. This will obviously be the case, as Cotonou agreement text does not precisely define,

when and how the principles of democracy and good governance are ignored and Article 96 (2b)93 allows the use of

an immediate sanction with reference to Article 9 assessing that

(t)he Parties refer to their international obligations and commitments concerning respect for human

rights. They reiterate their deep attachment to human dignity and human rights, which are legitimate

aspirations of individuals and peoples. Human rights are universal, indivisible and inter-related. The

Parties undertake to promote and protect all fundamental freedoms and human rights, be they civil

and political, or economic, social and cultural. In this context, the Parties reaffirm the equality of

men and women.94

 84 JONES, Emily: Partnership or power play? OXFAM briefing paper April 2008, 2008, p. 34. 85 Ibid, p. 34. 86 Watts, p. 48. 87 Taking into consideration terminological difficulties, concerning the ‘normative’ term. 88 Whereas it is to say, that EU countries as the most powerful WTO member group did not have a small influence in negotiating this. 89 Not corresponding with Manners definition this does not seem to be a meaningful argument. 90 Borrmann, p. 162. 91 Hurt, p. 171. 92 Raffer, p. 16. 93 Cotonou full agreement text, p. 119. 94 Ibid, p. 15.

                    KANT II                                                

 

10  

                                                           

Apart a gender-related statement at the end, any kind of definite expression of the nature of ‘human rights’ or

‘fundamental freedoms’ is missing. ACP countries thus face a scenario where the EU might measure the fulfillment

of these principles with bias-suspicious indicators like “the holding of elections”95 and by this enabling superficially

democratic regime to rule in an environment characterized as ‘“low-intensity’ democracy96. Looking at the Failed

States Index 200897 this applies to a large number of ACP countries in a striking way, especially in Sub-Saharan

Africa, as the performances remain extremely weak regarding categories like ‘human rights’ or others98. William

Easterly states that in 2002 the 25 most undemocratic nations received aid payments of 9 billion US$99, that includes

several ACP heads of government supported by EU. Is that EU’s ‘normative’ power?

4. CONCLUSION

Coming back to the major question if EU policy towards ACP countries with focus on the situation of Sub-Saharan

Africa is rather a ‘realist’ or a ‘normative’ one, Ian Manners delivers the following statement: „From a cynical

viewpoint it might be suggested that such treaty articles and the policies they drive are at best unimportant, or at

worst provide cover for more covert commercial interests. “100

Considering the vague wording of Cotonou treaty, this viewpoint might not be cynical after all, especially, if

we have a closer look on the nine normative principles101. One could already wonder if there is i.e. complete ‘social

freedom’ within EU member states, but the external promotion of the mentioned principles lacks visibly sustainable

implementation and the question of origin and validity of those principles remains open.

Depending on how we define normative, as described in the theoretical part above, the EU as a ‘power’ is

acting in a ‘normative’ way with regard to values accepted in the domestic area, but as Helen Sjursen stresses,

“‘Power’ alludes to ‘coercion’; ‘normative’ alludes to ‘legitimacy’. How do we know that the EU’s use of –

normative – power is legitimate, as is implied in this concept?”102 If we add the economic impact Cotonou treaty

and EPAs could have, we should even more question the self-concept of EU, as ‘sustainable development’103

implies access to basic goods, which is certainly not assured by the establishment of FTAs nor by the promotion of

private sector.

On that base, “(t)he entire history of the official discourse of EU-ACP development co-operation can be

dismissed as, to a large degree, false rhetoric that is subsumed by the realities and power relations of the

 95 Cp. Hurt, p. 171. 96 Ibid, p. 171. 97 Foreign policy: The Failed States Index 2008. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1, 12th of January 2009. 98 Low performance in ‘human flight’, ‘group grievance’ or ‘refugees and displaced persons’ could be good indicators of a general absence of ‘good governance’, too. 99 Easterly, William: The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s efforts to Aid the Rest have done so much ill and so little good, 2006, p. 124. 100 Manners 2008, p. 48. 101 Ibid, p. 48-55. 102 Sjursen, p. 172. 103 Manners 2008, p. 48.

                    KANT II                                                

 

11  

                                                           

international political economy”104 as well as “the concept of partner(ship) pursuant to Cotonou (…) (m)entioned 52

times in only 100 Articles - and nine times in the Annexes – […] is definitely a crucial concept. In spite of this lip

service this relation has become so unequal that "partnership" can only be understood in an Orwellian sense”105. On

the other side, the argument of Europe seeking for economic and strategic advantages through ‘cooperation’ with

ACP countries becomes clear, as FTAs with that great number of states would provide a considerable comparative

advantage to EU in international economy and the conditions Cotonou has been elaborated under correspond to

realist assumptions106. A point not directly explained by realist role comprehension is why the EU continues

emphasizing strongly the spread of democracy and human rights. Indeed, the empirical situation that either the EU is

not interested in really pushing those issues forward as long as its strategic interests are served or it simply uses

them as a so-called ‘smoke screen’ to achieve these interests.

Finally it is to say, that the Africa policy EU pursues in the framework of Cotonou cannot be characterized

‘ethically’ bad as such, but empirical implications display the EU behaving like a realist actor seeking to enlarge its

power in order to widen its benefits and – only if this target is not endangered – as a normative actor promoting

norms and values107.

5. ABBREVIATIONS

EU EUROPEAN UNION

ACP AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES

EPA ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

EDF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

GSP GENERAL SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES

EBA EVERYTHING BUT ARMS INITIATIVE

ECHR EUROPEAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS

STABEX STABILIZATION OF EXPORT REVENUES

SAP STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME

IMF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

NGO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

DRC DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

LDC LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRY

SADC SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

GATT GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

FTA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

 104 Hurt, p. 174. 105 Raffer, p. 3. 106 As “the need to meet Europeans’ concerns by making long-term political choices“ was already expressed 1996 in: European Commission Green Paper 1996, p. 58. 107 With the restriction, that these norms and values have to been defined as universal ones and a EU not being able or willing to implement them completely in Sub-Saharan ACP countries.

                    KANT II                                                

 

12  

6. TABLES

6.1 CLASSIFICATION OF ACP STATES FOR COTONOU AGREEMENTT

108

                                                            108 Hurt, Stephen R.: Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention, 2003, pp 167.

                    KANT II                                                

 

13  

6.2 REGIONAL DISINTEGRATION IN AFRICA: ‘INITIALLED’ TRADE REGIMES109

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

7.1 PRIMARY SOURCES

COTONOU FULL AGREEMENT TEXT. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/agr01_de.pdf

(german), http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/agr01_en.pdf (english), both 1st January 2009.

                                                            109 Jones, Emily: Partnership or power play? OXFAM briefing paper April 2008. Available at: http://www.fes.de/cotonou/OTHER_BACKGROUND_TRADE/PARTNERSHIP_OR_POWERPLAY_OXFAM_22APRIL2008.PDF, 28th December 2008, p.18.

                    KANT II                                                

 

14  

COMMISSION CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU-AFRICA ACTION PLAN 2008-2010. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_action_plan_2008_2010_en.pdf, 1st January 2009.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER 1996. Available at:

http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/com96_570/index_en.htm, 4th January 2009.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ONE YEAR AFTER

LISBON: THE AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP AT WORK. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_EU_africa_partnership_en.pdf, 1st January 2009.

7.2 SECONDARY LITERATURE

AGGESTAM, Lisbeth: Role Theory and European foreign policy: a framework for analysis, in: Elgstrøm, Ole/Smith,

Michael (eds.): The European Union’s roles in International Politics, Routledge/New York, 2006, pp. 11-29.

BABARINDE, Olufemi/Faber, Gerrit: From Lomé to Cotonou: Business as usual? Paper prepared for the Eighth

Biennial conference of the European Union Studies Association, Nashville/Tennessee, 2003.

BORRMANN, Axel/Busse, Matthias and Neuhaus, Silke: EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Impact,

Options and Prerequisites, in: Intereconomics, Vol 40, No 3, 2005, pp 169-176.

Brown, William: Restructuring North-South Relations: ACP-EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal

International Order, in: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 85, 2000, pp. 367-383.

DIEZ, Thomas: Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’, in:

Millenium – Journal of International Studies, Vol 33, 2005, pp. 613-636.

EASTERLY, William: The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s efforts to Aid the Rest have done so much ill and so

little good, New York, 2006, p. 111-185.

FOREIGN POLICY: The Failed States Index 2008. Available at:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1, 12th of January 2009.

GOODISON, Paul and Stoneman, Colin: Europe: Partner or Exploiter of Africa? The G-90 & the ACP, in: Review of

African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 102, Agendas, Past & Future, 2004, pp. 725-734.

GRIMM, Sven and Brüntrup, Michael: EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP regions, in:

Klingebiel, Stephan (ed.) Africa Agenda 2007. German Development Institute/Bonn, 2006, pp. 87-92.  

 

HAFNER-BURTON, Emilie M.: Trading Human Rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government

                    KANT II                                                

 

15  

repression, in: International Organization, Vol 59, 2005, pp. 593-629. 

HURT, Stephen R.: Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP

states and the end of the Lomé Convention, in: Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 1, 2003, pp 161-176.

HYDE-PRICE, Adrian: ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique, in: Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 13,

2006, pp. 217-234.

HYDE-PRICE, Adrian: A ‘tragic actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical Europe’, in: International Affairs, Vol 84,

No 1, 2008, pp. 29-44.

JONES, Emily: Partnership or power play? OXFAM briefing paper April 2008. Available at:

http://www.fes.de/cotonou/OTHER_BACKGROUND_TRADE/PARTNERSHIP_OR_POWERPLAY_OXFAM_22

APRIL2008.PDF, 28th December 2008.

MANNERS, Ian: The European Union as a normative power: A response to Thomas Diez, in: Millennium - Journal of

International Studies, Vol 35, 2006, pp. 167-180.

MANNERS, Ian: The normative ethics of the European Union, in: International Affairs, Vol 84, No 1, 2008, pp. 45-60.

MCQUEEN, Matthew: ACP-EU Trade Cooperation after 2000: An Assessment of Reciprocal Trade Preferences, in:

The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1998, pp. 669-692.

RAFFER, Kunibert: Cotonou: Slowly undoing Lomé’s concept of partnership. Available at:

http://www.edpsg.org/index.pl (21.), 3rd January 2009.

SJURSEN, Helen: What kind of power? In: Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 13, 2006, pp. 169–181.

WADLE, Sebastian: Auf dem Weg zum EU-Afrika-Gipfel. Elemente einer strategischen Partnerschaft zwischen EU

und AU. SWP-Studie S 28, 2007.

WATTS, Patrick: Losing Lomé. The Potential Impact of the Commission Guidelines on the ACP Non-Least

Developed Countries, in: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 79, 1999, pp. 47-71.